Description
Project management is the discipline of planning, organizing, motivating, and controlling resources to achieve specific goals. A project is a temporary endeavor with a defined beginning
APPENDIX REPORT OF PROJECT
E PANEL
MANAGEMENT
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CONTENTS Part PANEL APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT El E2 E3 TASK ASSIGNMENT . . . . . . . .......... PANEL MEMBERSHIP . . . . . . . .......... SUMMARY * . . . . . . . . . . .......... INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . .......... General Division Cryogenic Technical Capability ......... ......... ......... ....... ... E-l E-3 E-5 E-5 E-5 E-6 E-6 E-7 E-7 E-7 E-10 E-11 E-11 E-12 E-13 E-13 E-14 E-15 E-15 E-18 Page
of Responsibilities Oxygen Tank Design Control
Configuration
Procedures Incident ............ ...........
Oxygen Tank Handling KSC Detanking Materials Security
at Downey
Problems
Compatibility Program ...............
Safety and Reliability and Quality ................. Assurance Failure E4 Reporting ..............
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ............. RACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE ........... ORGANIZATION ..... NASA - APOLLO MANAGEMENT NASA Headquarters Organization ........
Office of Manned Space Flight ................ Organization Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) ........
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Part
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Page Space Flight Center (MSFC). . . . . . E-18 E-18 E-21 E-21 ~-26 ~-26 E-31 E-31 E-31 . . . . ~-32 E-32 ~-32 ~-32 E-33 E-33 E-33 E-33 E-35 E-35 E-35
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Marshall
Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) . . . . . . . . . .
CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . North American Rockwell (NR) . . . . . . . . .
North American Launch Operations Space Division (KSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . Beech Aircraft E5 Corporation . . . . . . . . . .
RFSPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATINGRELATIONSHIPS . . . NASA ADMINISTRATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNEDSPACE FLIGHT.................... Manned Space Flight Management Council
Science and Technology Advisory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manned Space Flight Experiments Board . . . .
APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . Test Directorate Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Directorate
Systems Engineering Program Control
Directorate
Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&&A) Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Support Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MSC APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE (ASPO)....................
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Part Assistant Program Manager for Flight Safety................... Systems Engineering CSM Project Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
Engineering
Division
Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Offices (RASPO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MSC RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (R&QA)OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . MSC SAFETY OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~-38 E-39 E-39 E-40 E-41 E-41 E-41 E-60 ~-63 ~-63 ~-64 ~-64 ~-64 E-67 ~-67 E-68 E-69 E-69
MSC ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENI DIRECTORATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KSC APOLLO PROGRAM MANAGER. . . . . . . . . . . KSC DIRECTOR OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS ....... INTER-CENTER RELATIONSHIPS ........... PROGRAMMANAGEMENT CONTINUITY . . . . . . . . . E6 APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS . . . DESIGN REVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary Critical Design Review . . . . . . . . . .
Design Review . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . READINESSREVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customer Acceptance Flight Readiness Readiness Reviews . . . .
Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Launch Minus 2-Day Review
LAUNCH CHECKOUT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . .
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Part E7 OXYGENTANKMANAGEMENTREVIEW . . . . . . . . . . GENERALTANK HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tank Vacuum and Heat Leak Problems Fan Motors . . . . . .
Page E-73 E-73 E-75 E-75 ~-76 ~-76 E-77 ~-78 E-80 ~-85 ~-85 ~-85 ~-87 E-89 E-89 E-89 .............. Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-89 E-92 E-101
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Vat-ion Pump and Electromagnetic Interface (EMI) Problems . . . . . . . . . . Heater Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHRONOLOGY OF APOLLO 13 OXYGENTANK . . . . . . Handling Detanking E8 Incident Incident
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OXYGENTANK MATERIAL SELECTION . . . . . . . . . . FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Material Materials Property Listing Requirements . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EP
SAFETYAND RELIABILITYAND QUALITY ASSURANCE(R&QA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTRODUCTIONAND ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . General ...................
NASA Headquarters Manned Spacecraft
John F. Kennedy Space Center
North American Rockwell Corporation Space Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Beech Aircraft Corporation . . . . . . . . . .
E-102 E-105
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Part SAFFJYAND R&Q,AAUDITS ............. MSC SAFETY/R&A PARTICIPATION Phase III CARR for .........
Page E-106 E-107 E-107 E-108 .......... Activities .... E-109 E-110 E-113 E-115 E-116
CSM 109 ..........
FRRR&QASummary ............... Weekly Safety/R&Z&A Report Apollo 13 Mission Real-Time
CONCLUSION. .................. El0 SECURITY ..................... REFERENCES....................
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PARTEl TASK ASSIGNMENT The Project Management Panel was established by the Apollo 13 Review Board to review those management systems in the Apollo Program In effect, this task which were pertinent to the Apollo 13 accident. required the review of all appropriate design, manufacturing, and test procedures covering vehicle systems which may have failed in flight, including the means by which various organizations coordinated their The Panel took special care individual efforts in the total process. to evaluate carefully the safety management system which was applicable to Apollo 13. Principal questions addressed by the Management Panel focused on and systems used to monitor and control the organization, procedures, of test, assembly, and final certifications CSM design, manufacturing, of the cryogenic oxygen system used flight equipment, and particularly in the service module electric power system and environmental control system.
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PARTE2 PANEL MEMBERSHIP Panel 4 was chaired by Mr. E. C. Kilgore, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Services, Langley Research Center. The Board Monitor was Mr. Milton Klein, Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. Panel members were: Mr. R. D. Ginter, Director, Special Program Office Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART) NASA, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Mr. Merrill Mead, Chief, Ames Research Center Moffett Field, California Programs and Resources Office
Mr. James B. Whitten, Asst. Mechanics Division Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia
Chief,
Aeronautical
and Space
In addition, Mr. R. C. Puffer of MSC Security assisted preparing the section of the report on Security.
the Panel by
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PART E3 SUMMARY INTRODUCTION The Management Panel carried out a detailed in-depth review of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office organizational structure and the management system used to control both command and service module (CSM) hardware development and decision-making processes. The review examined the system for Apollo and focused attention on the specific cryogenic oxygen tank directly involved in the Apollo 13 accident. Key management personnel at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), the Kennedy Space Center and subcontractors were interviewed. These @SC), and Apollo contractors interviews were specifically aimed at understanding what decisions were made regarding the oxygen tank system for Apollo 13, who participated in what information was available from the management these decisions, system, how effectively the organizational elements functioned in reviewand carrying out assigned responsibilities, and ing, communicating, whether management system changes are required in view of the oxygen Records of the oxygen tank reviews, discrepancy reports, tank accident. and procedures were examined to determine if the review failure reports, systems and configuration control system functioned as they were intendSafety, and Reliability ed. Separate reviews were made of the Security, and Quality Assurance (R&&4) management systems to determine effectiveness. Visits were made to the CSM prime contractor, North American Rockand to the oxygen tank subcontractor, well (NR), Downey, California, were held Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, during which discussions Reliability inspecwith key design, test, and manufacturing personnel. and process-control procedures and tion, safety, configuration-control KSC operations were resystems were reviewed and examined in detail. viewed and disctissions were held with key test and launch operations personnel regarding their responsibilities, procedures, and controls. Similar discussions were held with MSC Apollo CSM key management and Throughout its analysis, the Panel devoted parengineering personnel. ticular attention to the history of the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 including design and manufacturing waivers, discrepancies, and anomalies and how these were handled by the Apollo management team. General Technical Capability
The Panel found key Apollo personnel to be technically capable and dedicated to producing a reliable and safe spacecraft system. Although there have been cutbacks in the total number of Apollo personnel, the
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morale of the remaining Apollo team is considered by officials interviewed to be high. Reductions in personnel complements as the flight rate has been reduced have not detrimentally impacted the experience level within the Program to this point. Moreover, critical flight and ground system personnel requirements have been carefully reviewed by project officials to insure adequate manning. During the Apollo Program, there have been changes in key management personnel. The Panel found that attention was given to maintaining continuity of experience by essentially promoting from within the Apollo Program. Some technicians with considerable CSM experience have been replaced at NR-Downey by technicians from other programs with more seniority, but no CSM experience. This was recognized as a potential problem and en intensified training program was instituted. Continued surveillance of the contractor technician experience level and capability is necessary. Division of Responsibilities
The Apollo spacecraft organization involves a large number of consubcontractor, tractor, and Government organizations. It was found that these organizations understand their individual responsibilities and that necessary coordination processes were in effect. This process provides a system of checks and cross-checks to assure that detailed consideration end attention is given to problems by the right organizations prior to final flight commitment. Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Design
Apollo oqgen tank no. 2 was designed in the 1962-1963 time period by Beech prior to the formation of the formal design review and subsystem manager systems which now exist at MSC. During the design phase, there was limited participation by MSC technical personnel in the early design. The primary emphasis at this time by both the prime contractor and MSC was on the thermodynamic performance of the oxygen system. The tank did receive informal design reviews primarily by NR and Beech personnel. Even though these reviews were made, it was found that the final design resulted in a complex assembly procedure with a wiring However, cluster which cannot be inspected after assembly in the tank. the complexity of the assembly and the inability to inspect the tank interior components after assembly was recognized by Government, NR, Consequently, a detailed step-by-step manufacturand Beech personnel. ing and assembly procedure was established and carried out with checklistsupplemented by NR and Government inspections type Beech inspections, A First Article Configuration Inspection at defined critical points. (FACI) was held on the oxygen tank in 1966 which was jointly signed off No subsequent formal design by MSC and contractor subsystem managers. reviews were held.
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A thermostatic switch (thermal switch) was incorporated into the Block I oxygen tank heaters to avoid overheating while using 28 V dc spacecraft power. After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifications from NR in February 1965, which required the tank heater to operate not only on 2% V de spacecraft power but also with 65 V dc GSE for rapid tank pressurization during launch operations at KSC, Beech did not require their Block I thermal switch supplier to make a change in switch JYRnever subsequently reviewed the heater assembly to assure rating. compatibility between the GSE and the thermal switch. This resulted in NR, MSC, and KSC personnel subsequently assuming that the tank was protected from overheating while using the 65 V dc power supply. Configuration Control Procedures
The Panel found that a strict and rigorous management system exists on the CSM for configuration control, problem reporting, customer acceptand flight readiness reviews. Both contractors ance readiness reviews, R&QA orand Government CSM organizations participate in this system. ganizations independently monitor, record, and report all problems and Examination of documentation, such as failure approved resolutions. and waivers generated in the management reports, discrepancy reports, system and applicable to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank, demonstrated to the Closeouts Panel that the management system was being followed closely. were being accomplished with authorized approvals. Oxygen Tank Handling Incident at Downey
In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank handling incident at NRDowney, the Panel found that a Discrepancy Report was written and funcThe incident was judged to tional tests were made by NR Engineering. have caused no tank damage by the contractor's systems engineers and representatives of the RASP0 at Downey. Also, the oxygen tank subsystems Subsequent functional manager at MSC was made aware of the incident. The Discrepancy Report was closed out tests were successfully passed. was not rein the authorized manner. Although the handling incident ported to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager, it should be noted that such reporting of Discrepancy Report closeouts is not required in all Once this incident was closed out in the manner prescribed by cases. the Apollo management control system, it was not reopened as a possible factor relating to the later detanking problem at KSC. KSC Detanking all Problems
In the case of the detanking problem at KSC, it was found that The authorized Discrepancy Reports were filed and signed off.
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change from normal detanking procedures was made to use the tank heaters and fans in an attempt to boil off the liquid oxygen in the tank. This was unsuccessful and the normal procedure was further altered by use of a pressure pulsing method. These changes to the test procedures were made by the KSC Systems Engineer and NR Systems Engineer who were on They obtained concurrence of the NR lead systems engineer at station. for test proKSC. This is in agreement with the present requirements After the pressure pulsing method was used to detank cedural changes. oxygen tank no. 2, the problem received further attention, including additional analyses and test. The Apollo team problem-solving effort that resulted was led by the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager and the KSC Director of Launch Operations. NR and Beech personnel were also The MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office formulated a checkinvolved. list of analyses to be made and questions to be answered prior to making the flight decision on the tank. This included: 1. 2. Details Details and procedures for normal detanking at Beech and KSC.
of abnormal detanking
at KSC on March 27 and 28. loose fill tube in the
3. Hazards resulting oxygen tank. 4. 5. problem? 6.
from a possible at KSC? on the fill test
Can the tank be X-rayed Could loose tolerances
tube cause detanking be made on the tank? Module 2 TV-1 and
Should a blowdown and fill
7. Disassemble examine components.
an oxygen tank on Service
including possible failure modes, was made at A detailed analysis, Beech. Tests were run which indicated that even in the event of a loose metal fill tube (which was concluded to be the most likely cause of the a resultant electrical short would provide only 7 detanking problem), millijoules of energy and it was judged that this energy level could All of the cause no damage except loss of the quantity gage indication. checklist requirements were met by test or analysis prior to making the It was jointly decision to fly without a change in the oxygen tank. concluded by the Beech Apollo Program Manager, the NR CSM Program Manager, the KSC Director of Launch Operations, and the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) Manager that the tank was flightworthy. Further examination of this event since the Apollo 13 accident, however,
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has revealed that incomplete and, in some cases, was used in the decision process. This included:
incorrect
information
nor the MSC ASP0 1. Neither the KSC Launch Operations Director Manager knew of the previous tank handling incident at NR-Downey and neither knew that the oxygen tank internal heaters were on for 8 consecutive hours during detanking at KSC. Key personnel at NR-Downey knew of both events. No personnel at MSC, KSC, or NR knew that the tank heater thermal switches would not protect the tank from overheating. 2. A portion of the normal detanking process at Beech is similar to the normal detanking process at KSC. The KSC Launch Operations Director and MSC ASP0 Manager were mistakenly informed that they were (If they had known of the similarity in detanking processes, different. they possibly would have concluded that some change took place in the tank between Beech and MSC.) the MSC ASP0 Manager, and 3. The KSC Launch Operations Director, key personnel at Downey mistakenly understood that the oxygen tank on previous test Service Module 2 TV-1 had similar detanking problems which led to the decision to disassemble the 2 TV-1 tank and examine the components. That examination was interpreted as evidence that a loose-fitting metal fill tube probably was causing the detanking diffculty. Further examination has revealed, however, that 2 TV-1 oxygen tank probably detanked normally. Although none of the principals in making the oxygen tank decision that the availability of informa(NR, MSC, KSC) can say with certainty tion in 1, 2, and 3, above would have altered their decision, each concurs that the availability of such information could have altered their decisions. On the basis of its review, the Project following observations to be pertinent: Management Panel feels the
personnel did not fully understand the oxygen 1. Launch operations tank internal components or fully appreciate the possible effect of changed detanking procedures on the reliability of such internal components. 2. The hazard associated with the long heater consideration in the decision to fly this tank. cycle was not given
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utilized telephone 3. Problem solving during launch operations but without subsequent written conferences among knowledgeable parties, which would have permitted more deliberate consideration verification, and review. 4. Deviations from test procedures during tests at KSC were made This does not in accordance with the established approval process. require prior approval or concurrence of NR-Downey or MSC subsystem specialists. consideration was given to the 5. It was found that insufficient tank internal details such as sharp edges, internal wiring, and heater thermal switch ratings during the design reviews. 6. An historical record of the oxygen tank existed in the manageto in making the flight However, it was not referred ment system files. decision. 7. Dependence upon memory of personnel being reported to higher management levels. 8. Key Apollo management personnel ing the Panel interviews; problems internal KSC test (a) Provide total or anomalies during led to erroneous data dur-
.
made several
suggestions
background history launch operations, personnel
on subsystems which have of the
(b) Launch operations details of subsystems.
need more knowledge
(c) NR (Downey) and MSC Subsystem Managers should review procedures and subsequent procedure changes. (d) Verification of data is needed in problem solving.
telephone
(e) Followup documentation conferences on key problems Materials
of information exchanged during is recommended.
Compatibility
The compatibility of oxygen tank materials with oxygen received consideration in the original design. Beech reviewed and selected the tank materials in accordance with the published material knowledge that No data on hot-wire tests or existed in the 1962-1963 time period. Beech ran special ignition tests were available to Beech at that time. tests on the fan and motor assembly which was tested at 1000 psia in oxygen gas at 300" F. The motor passed this test with no evidence of
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Some attention was paid in the assembly procedures to avoid ignition. pulling wires over threads or sharp corners and to provide protective and as was However, most sharp corners were not eliminated sleeving. previously mentioned, the tank design necessitated a blind assembly with no way for subsequent inspection for damage. After the original design, Beech was not requested by NR to make any further materials compatibility study or tests. In April 1969, NE?was directed by MSC to review the nonmetallic materials in the cryogenic oxygen subsystem and document them in accordance with the COMAT (Characteristics of Materials All nonmetallic materials in the oxygen tank were evaluated System). materials met the requirements of and documented by NR. All nonmetallic These materials criteria were specifithe materials control program. cally formulated for the lunar module and command module, where nonpropagation of fire was a requirement even if a fire started. These COMATrequirements do not adequately cover the $200 psi cryogenic oxygen tank. No electrical ignition testing of any materials was NR reviewed the service module systems to made for the oxygen tank. provide electrical circuit protection such as breakers and fuses in 1967 in an effort to avoid electrical fires in case of shorts. Security Program
During its review, the Panel also investigated the physical security at Beech, NR-Downey, and KSC for adequacy during the times the Apollo 13 oxygen tank was in custody at these locations. The security program at each location was found to be satisfactory and adequate to provide the physical protection of the oxygen tanks. A determination was made as a result of the survey that no evidence was discovered that the failure of the oxygen tanks on Apollo 13 was the result of any willful, deliberate, or mischievous act on the part of an individual at the facilities surveyed. Safety and Reliability and Quality Assurance
A detailed management review was made of both the Safety and R&QA organizations as applicable to the Apollo CSM. Safety Offices at NASA Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight, MSC, and KSC have safety responsibilities regarding Apollo which are clearly established and implemented by both Government and support contractor personnel. Safety audits by NASA Headquarters teams and participation by MSC and KSC personnel in panels, boards, and program reviews demonstrates continuing organizational attention to safety. Safety studies are being made to identify hazards associated with the Apollo spacecraft during ground tests and for each manned mission. NR-Downey has a safety organization
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with specific responsibilities for the Apollo CSM. The NR safety function is integrated into the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Test Operations with its objectives to eliminate or control risks to personnel and equipment throughout the manufacture, checkout, and flight missions as written in their of the Apollo CSM. Even though the NR safety effort, units, it apparSafety Plan, is fragmented over several organizational ently is working effectively. In all cases, the safety organizations report to a sufficiently high organizational level to provide them a desirable independence of safety surveillance. Failure Reporting
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The Panel found that the Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance organizations at MSC, KSC, NR, and Beech have an effective independent failure-reporting and failure-correction and tracking system. Documentation from this system was observed to be both rapid and accurate. The Reliability Group provides special studies such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Suspect Flight Anomalies Report, and configuration change tracking. In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank, a Single Point Failure Summary was made in 1968. Among the failure modes considered was fire in the CSM external to the oxygen tanks which might lead to the loss of them. This was considered an acceptable risk because of control of ignition sources and low probability of occurrence. Rupture of the oxygen tanks was also considered and accepted due to the redundance of the oxygen supply and low likelihood of failure occurrence. a System Safety Assessment was For Apollo 13, as for previous missions, made on February 19, 1970, as an additional review from previous misand it was concluded that there were no open safety items to sions, constrain the Apollo 13 flight.
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PART E4 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION Relating organizational and management structures to an event of the kind now under consideration is particularly difficult inasmuch as the time period of importance includes the entire history of the Program, in this case some 9 years, during which these structures have undergone many significant changes. With this in mind, the approach adopted for this study was (1) to examine and document what exists today, (2) to trace the history of events that might have had a direct bearing on the (3) to examine the management inplications of those specific failure, are still events, and (4) to try and assess whether those implications pertinent to management as it exists today and whether, therefore, corrective measures of any kind are indicated. To accomplish even this limited objective has required an early focusing of attention on just those organizations and functions directly involved, or potentially involved, in the events under consideration. Thus, following a brief description of the overall organizational and management relationships applicable to the Program as a whole, this report concentrates on those organizations responsible for the particular elements of the Apollo spacecraft in which the failure occurred. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE The Apollo Program has represented the largest single research and development program ever undertaken by the United States Government; at its peak (in 1966) it involved about 300,000 persons. The Governmentindustry team responsible for the Program has included 25 prime contractors and more than 4,000 subcontractors and vendors. In its simplest terms, the Apollo Program has two major objectives: (1) to develop a vehicle capable of landing men on the surface of the Moon and returning them safely to the surface of the Earth, and (2) to operate that vehicle in an initial series of manned lunar landing missions. These two objectives have, in a gross sense, dictated the major division of responsibilities among NASA organizations in the management of the vested in the NASA HeadApollo Program. With overall responsibility quarters organization, responsibility for producing the vehicle was assigned to two NASA field installations: 1. Texas. For the spacecraft, to the Manned Spacecraft to the Marshall Center, Houston, Center,
2. For the launch vehicle, Huntsville, Alabama.
Space Flight
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The responsibility for operating the vehicle in the series of flight missions which constituted the second objective was also assigned to two field installations: 1. For launching Cape KeMedy, Florida. 2. Houston, For all Texas. the space vehicle, operations, to the Kennedy Space Center, to the Manned Spacecraft Center,
postlaunch
These two major objectives also serve to classify the two major time periods into which the g-year history of the Program can be Thus, the first 7 years, from 196lto 1968, constituted the divided. development stage of the Program in which all components of the space supporting equipment, and operational facilities were designed, vehicle, developed, manufactured and tested; the last 2 years, from 1968 to the present, have constituted the beginning of the "operations" stage of the Program, with two successful manned lunar landing missions already The significance of distinguishing between these two periods achieved. of time lies in the inevitable shift of emphasis that accompanied the transition between the two from engineering problems to operational problems. NASA - APOLLO MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION Two classical approaches to project management were available to NASA when the Apollo Program began in 1961. The first approach, often used by Government and the aircraft industry in the early years of aircraft development, would place in a single organization and under the total control of the project manager all of the skills and specialities required to manage the project. Thus, the project organization would provide for itself all the support necessary in engineering, procurement, and quality assurance, program control, financial management, reliability and would operate virtually independently of the institutional oretc., ganization of which it was a part. The second approach, which was rapidly gaining acceptance during the 1940's and 1950's, was the so-called "matrix" concept in which skeletal project management organizations were .superimposed on an institutional organization containing elements and subelements in all of the specialities needed by the projects. Thus the institutional organization would provide the basic capabilities required by the projects in engineering, procurement, program control, managers would draw upon those as required. The etc., and the project advantages of this approach for multi-project organizations are apparent. Costly duplication of support activities is minimized, the overall efficiency of manpower utilization is maximized, and the quality of support provided is enhanced by consolidation.
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NASA adopted the matrix approach to project management for the Apollo Program. In NASA Headquarters, and in each of the three principal NASA field centers involved, Apollo Program Offices were established from which virtually all of the direction for conduct of the Program has emanated. At each location, however, these Program Offices are essentially management organizations and depend heavily on the line elements of the host institution's organization for support. Continuity in lines of authority between the Apollo Program Director in Headquarters and the Apollo Program organization in the field has been assured through the delegation by each Center Director to his Apollo Program Manager of full authority for conduct of that Center's part of the Program. Thus, for purposes of program direction and authority, there exists throughout the Agency a single pyramidal management structure cutting across institutional lines and tying together all elements of the Apollo Program organization. This relationship is illustrated in figure E&l. The organizations the Apollo Program are which the locations of are indicated by heavy of the principal NASA institutions involved in illustrated in figures ~4-2 through ~4-6, in offices with primary responsibility for Apollo lines. Organization
NASA Headquarters
The Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, who heads the Office of Manned Space Flight, is the Administrator's executive agent for the genera.l management of all manned space flight programs. His authority flows directly from the Administrator and is broad, covering all aspects of all manned space flight programs. He also exercises institutional line authority over the three manned space flight field centers which report directly to him. Office of Manned Space Flight Organization
Figure ~4-2 shows the organizational structure within the Headquarters The Associate Administrator for Manned Office of Manned Space Flight. Space Flight has assigned the responsibility for management of all aspects of the Apollo Program to the Apollo Program Director, and has delegated to him full authority to carry out that responsibility. The Apollo Program Director is the highest Agency official whose responsiThere are counterpart bility is exclusively for the Apollo Program. Program Directors for other manned space flight programs with similar responsibilities to their own programs, and there are a number of funcwith the matrix management concept, tional offices which, consistent Shown also in figure E4-2 provide support to all on-going programs. are the direct lines of program authority between the Apollo Program Director and his subordinate program managers in the three field centers.
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APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE NASA HEADQUARTERS
APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
1
APOLLO LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM OFFICE MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
CONTRACTORS
Figure
E&l.-
NASA Apollo
Program organization.
ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
DIRECTOR SPACE MEDICINE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
DIRECTOR MISSION OPERATIONS
I I I
DIRECTOR ADVANCED MANNED MISSIONS PROGRAM
I
I
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
KENNEDY SPACE
Figure
EL2.-
Office
of Manned Space Flight
organization.
Manned Spacecraft
Center
(MSC)
The organization of the Manned Spacecraft Center is shown in figThe permanent functional organizations are represented by the ure E4-3. five technical directorates (Engineering and Development, Science and Applications, Medical Research and Operations, Flight Crew Operations, and Flight Operations) and the institutional Directorates and Staff Program Control and Contracts, Public Offices (e.g., Administration, Affairs, Legal, etc.). The program management organizations presently include the Apollo Spacecraft, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Program Offices, for studies and the Advanced Missions Program Office, which is responsible and planning potentially leading to new flight programs. Responsibility for managing all aspects of the Apollo Program assigned to the Center is vested in the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft concept, a relaProgram Office (ASPO). Under the matrix-management tively small percentage of the Center's staff directly employed in the Apollo Program reports to him organizationally. Virtually all of the Apollo tasks done in-house at MSC (component testing, instrumentation development, flightcrew training, operations planning, etc.) are performed by the Center's line organizations (the functional Directorates) under the overall direction and coordination of the ASP0 Manager. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
This Center is responsible for the development, manufacture, and testing of the launch vehicles used in the Apollo Program. The organization of the Center is shown in figure E4-4. As at MSC, this Center employs the matrix-management concept in which the basic organization, represented by the Program Development, Science and Engineering, and Administration and Technical Services Directorates, is functional and represented by the Program Managethe program-management organization, is made up of program offices for individual launch ment Directorate, vehicles or stages. Although the Saturn Program Office represents the Apollo Launch Vehicle Program Office for purposes of full-time management, the Director of Program Management has been designated the Apollo Launch Vehicle Program Manager. He manages and directs all aspects of the Apollo Program assigned to MSFC, drawing on technical support from the Science and Engineering Directorates. Kennedy Space Center The KSC responsibility in the Apollo checkout, and launch of the space vehicle. (KSC) Program includes the assembly,
E-18
f ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
I PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
I
LEGAL OFFICE
I
SAFETY OFFICE
I
RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICE
1
NASA INSPECTOR I DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT I I ADMINISTRATION DIRECTOR OF PROGRAM CONTROL AND CONTRACTS AOVANCED MISSIONS SPACE SHUTTLE
I DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 1 LUNAR MISSIONS OFFICE EARTH -- ORBITAL MISSIONS OFFICE MAPPING SCIENCES LABORATORY EARTH OBSERVATIONS DIVISION
MEDICAL RESEARCH
t
INTEGRATION , -
SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION GUIDANCE AND CDNTROL DIVISION COMPUTATION AND ANALYSIS
LUNAR RECEIVING ILABORATORY
TECHNDLOGY
-
SPACE PHYSICS D,V,SION
--
OPERATIONS
-
LUNAR AND EARTH SCIENCES DIVISION
c
WHIT, T FAI
4NDS
7
r
TY
Figure E4-3.-
Manned Spacecraft
Center organization.
I
DIRECTOR
I
r
SAFETY
I
UNIVERSITY AFFAIRS
I
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
I
PROCUREMENT POLICY AND REVIEW
I
CHIEF COUNSEL
1
EXECUTIVE STAFF
I
I
1
r
I
1
PROGRAM PLANNING OFFICE
--
ADVANCED PROGRAM SUPPORT CFFICE
CENTRAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
--
AEROASTRODYNAMICS LABORATORY
SATURN PROGRAM OFFICE
--
APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM OFFICE
CENTERPLANS AND RESOURCES OFFICE
--
FACILITIES OFFICE
ADVANCED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OFFICE
--
MISSION AND PAYLOAD PLANNING OFFICE
ASTRIONICS LABORATORY
__
ASTRONAUTICS LABORATORY
ENGINE PROGRAM OFFICE
--
M1SSION OPERATIONS OFFICE
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE
--
MANAGEMENT SERVICES OFFICE
PRELIMINARY DESIGN OFFICE I
-
ADVANCED PROJECTS OFFICE
COMPUTATION LABORATORY
_
_
MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING LABIJRATORY
Figure
E4-4.-
Marshall
Space Flight
Center organization.
.
’
The organization of the Center is shown in figure E4-5. Again the basic organization is functional, consisting of those major operational activities necessary to the launch of all space vehicles. The programmanagement organization is similar to that at MSC and is made up of an Overall reindividual program office for each active flight program. sponsibility for managing all aspects of the preparation, checkout, and launch of the Apollo space vehicles is assigned to the Manager of the organizations at the Center Apollo Program Office (APO). All functional participate in those activities under the overall direction of the APO Direct responsibility for launch and checkout is delegated to Manager. the Director of Launch Operations. COYTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS The oxygen tank in which the failure occurred was a component of the cryogenic gas storage subsystem (CGSS), which serves both the electrical power system (EPS) and the environmental control system (ECS) and contractual of the spacecraft service module (SM). The contractors relationships involved in the manufacture of the tank are illustrated in figure ~4-6. North American Rockwell (formerly North American Aviation), prime contractor for the command and service modules (CSM), subcontracted with Beech Aircraft Corporation for manufacture of the CGSS. Beech, in turn, purchased certain parts for the subsystem from the three vendors Products shown: the oxygen pressure vessel (inner tank) from Airite the oxygen quantity and temperature Division of the Electrada Corporation; sensor probe from Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.; and the fan motors Pertinent organization charts for North from Globe Industries, Inc. American Rockwell and Beech Aircraft are shown in figures E4-7 through The organizations of the vendor companies were not considered E4-11. pertinent and are not shown. North American Rockwell (NR)
The Apollo CSM contract is held by the Space Division of North American Rockwell and the organization of that Division is shown in North American Rockwell also applies the matrix-management figure E4-7. concept in their current organization with program offices (Saturn S-II, etc.) superimposed on a basically Space Station, CSM,'Space Shuttle, functional organizational structure which includes Manufacturing, Research, Engineering, and Test; Material; Quality and Reliability The administrative-support functions. Assurance; and the conventional Apollo contract is managed for NR by the CSM Program Office headed by Figure ~4-8 shows the organization of that a division vice president. Within the CSM Program Office the principal suborganization Office. headed by an Assistant Program for program management is Engineering, On the functional side of the Space Manager and Chief Program Engineer. Division, referring again to figure E4-7, line responsibility for E-21
I-
DIRECTOR
I
DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTER CENTER OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT I
I
RANGE SAFETY STAFF
I
DIRECTOR QUALITY ASSURANCE
I
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
1
I
SAFETY OFFICE
I
EXECUTIVE STAFF
------‘I
Figure
E4-5.-
Kennedy Space Center organization.
NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL PRIME CONTRACTOR : COMMAND & SERVICE MODULES
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
M I w”
I
GLOBE INDUSTRIES,
INC
ELECTRADA CORP, AIRITE PRODUCTS DIVISION VENDOR: OXYGEN-TANK INNER SHELL (PRESSURE VESSEL) t
SlMMoNDs PRECISION PRODUCTS, INC VENDOR: OXYGEN QUANTITY AND TEMPERATURE SENSOR PROBE
VENDOR: OXYGEN-TANK FAN MOTORS
Figure
~4-6.-
Croygenic
gas storage
subsystem-contractual
relationships.
I FIELD
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPPORT I
I
OPERATIONS
OFFICE (HOUSTON)
~~~l~l~l~~~~
1 SATURN S-II PROGRAM I SPACE STATION PROGRAM
PROGRAMS
& PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT
I
Figure
E4-7.-
North American Rockwell,
Space Division
organization.
/
.
VICE PRESIDENT & PROGRAM MANAGER ASSISTANT PROGRAM MANAGERS SKYLAB
APOLLO PROGRAM - CSM EXPERIMENTS INTEGRATION
H=
I
SAFETY
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT PROGRAM MANAGER & CHIEF PROGRAM ENGINEER
I-I
MANUFACTURING MANAGER
I
I
MATER IAL MANAGER
Figure
~4-8.-
North American Rockwell,
Space Division,
CSM Program
Office
organization.
performance (as opposed to management) under the Apollo contract falls under the functional support organization for Research, Engineering, and Test, also headed by a division vice president. The organization of that Office is along systems/subsystems lines. At the subsystem level, the engineer in charge in this organization also acts as the subsystem manager for the program management organization, in a manner quite analogous to the technique used by the MSC organization described earThe relationship at North American Rockwell is illustrated in lier. figure E4-9. North American Launch Operations Space Division (KSC) All NR CSM operations at KSC are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Supplement KSC-1 to MSC contract no. NASg-150 with NR. The Supplement contains a statement of work prepared by KSC and KSC is responsible for technical direction to the NR personnel. The NR Apollo CSM Operations at KSC supports KSC in CSM checkout and launch and is a part of the NR Launch Operations Space Division under the NR Vice President and General Manager who is located at Cocoa Beach, Florida. He, in turn, reports to the Space Division President, NR. Beech Aircraft Corporation
The subcontract from North American Rockwell, for manufacturing of the cryogenic gas storage subsystem, is held by the Boulder Division of the Beech Aircraft Corporation. The organization of that Division is shown in figure E4-10. Beech also uses the matrix-management concept with management responsibility for the Apollo subsystem contract vested in the Apollo Program Manager and performance responsibility in the Manager, Engineering. Figure E4-11 shows the breakdown of management responsibilities within the office of the Apollo Program Manager.
~-26
NORTH AMERICAN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CSM PROGRAMS VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER I
ROCKWELL CONTRACT PERFORMANCE RESEARCH, ENGINEERING AND TFST VICE PRESIDENT
t
I
t
ENGINEERING ASS’T PROGRAM MANAGER AND CHIEF PROGRAM ENGINEER M I 2: CSM PROJECT ENGINEERING I
FLUIDS & PROPULSION SYSTEMS SENIOR MANAGER
2
I
t
SUBSYSTEM ‘1-1--------1-1
MANAGEMENT
FUEL CELLS AND CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS MANAGER
c t I SUBCONTRACTORS
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP . CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SUBSYSTEM (CGSS)
Figure
E&9.-
North American Rockwell organizational relationships to cryogenic gas storage subsystem.
applicable
doc_577062828.pdf
Project management is the discipline of planning, organizing, motivating, and controlling resources to achieve specific goals. A project is a temporary endeavor with a defined beginning
APPENDIX REPORT OF PROJECT
E PANEL
MANAGEMENT
,-
.
.
CONTENTS Part PANEL APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT El E2 E3 TASK ASSIGNMENT . . . . . . . .......... PANEL MEMBERSHIP . . . . . . . .......... SUMMARY * . . . . . . . . . . .......... INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . .......... General Division Cryogenic Technical Capability ......... ......... ......... ....... ... E-l E-3 E-5 E-5 E-5 E-6 E-6 E-7 E-7 E-7 E-10 E-11 E-11 E-12 E-13 E-13 E-14 E-15 E-15 E-18 Page
of Responsibilities Oxygen Tank Design Control
Configuration
Procedures Incident ............ ...........
Oxygen Tank Handling KSC Detanking Materials Security
at Downey
Problems
Compatibility Program ...............
Safety and Reliability and Quality ................. Assurance Failure E4 Reporting ..............
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ............. RACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE ........... ORGANIZATION ..... NASA - APOLLO MANAGEMENT NASA Headquarters Organization ........
Office of Manned Space Flight ................ Organization Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) ........
iii
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_..
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Part
.
Page Space Flight Center (MSFC). . . . . . E-18 E-18 E-21 E-21 ~-26 ~-26 E-31 E-31 E-31 . . . . ~-32 E-32 ~-32 ~-32 E-33 E-33 E-33 E-33 E-35 E-35 E-35
-
Marshall
Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) . . . . . . . . . .
CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . North American Rockwell (NR) . . . . . . . . .
North American Launch Operations Space Division (KSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . Beech Aircraft E5 Corporation . . . . . . . . . .
RFSPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATINGRELATIONSHIPS . . . NASA ADMINISTRATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNEDSPACE FLIGHT.................... Manned Space Flight Management Council
Science and Technology Advisory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manned Space Flight Experiments Board . . . .
APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . Test Directorate Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Directorate
Systems Engineering Program Control
Directorate
Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&&A) Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Support Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MSC APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE (ASPO)....................
-
iv
Part Assistant Program Manager for Flight Safety................... Systems Engineering CSM Project Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
Engineering
Division
Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Offices (RASPO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MSC RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (R&QA)OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . MSC SAFETY OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~-38 E-39 E-39 E-40 E-41 E-41 E-41 E-60 ~-63 ~-63 ~-64 ~-64 ~-64 E-67 ~-67 E-68 E-69 E-69
MSC ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENI DIRECTORATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KSC APOLLO PROGRAM MANAGER. . . . . . . . . . . KSC DIRECTOR OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS ....... INTER-CENTER RELATIONSHIPS ........... PROGRAMMANAGEMENT CONTINUITY . . . . . . . . . E6 APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS . . . DESIGN REVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary Critical Design Review . . . . . . . . . .
Design Review . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . READINESSREVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customer Acceptance Flight Readiness Readiness Reviews . . . .
Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Launch Minus 2-Day Review
LAUNCH CHECKOUT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . .
V
,
.._.-_._ ...- ._-_.__~
Part E7 OXYGENTANKMANAGEMENTREVIEW . . . . . . . . . . GENERALTANK HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tank Vacuum and Heat Leak Problems Fan Motors . . . . . .
Page E-73 E-73 E-75 E-75 ~-76 ~-76 E-77 ~-78 E-80 ~-85 ~-85 ~-85 ~-87 E-89 E-89 E-89 .............. Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-89 E-92 E-101
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vat-ion Pump and Electromagnetic Interface (EMI) Problems . . . . . . . . . . Heater Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHRONOLOGY OF APOLLO 13 OXYGENTANK . . . . . . Handling Detanking E8 Incident Incident
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OXYGENTANK MATERIAL SELECTION . . . . . . . . . . FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Material Materials Property Listing Requirements . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EP
SAFETYAND RELIABILITYAND QUALITY ASSURANCE(R&QA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTRODUCTIONAND ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . General ...................
NASA Headquarters Manned Spacecraft
John F. Kennedy Space Center
North American Rockwell Corporation Space Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Beech Aircraft Corporation . . . . . . . . . .
E-102 E-105
vi
Part SAFFJYAND R&Q,AAUDITS ............. MSC SAFETY/R&A PARTICIPATION Phase III CARR for .........
Page E-106 E-107 E-107 E-108 .......... Activities .... E-109 E-110 E-113 E-115 E-116
CSM 109 ..........
FRRR&QASummary ............... Weekly Safety/R&Z&A Report Apollo 13 Mission Real-Time
CONCLUSION. .................. El0 SECURITY ..................... REFERENCES....................
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PARTEl TASK ASSIGNMENT The Project Management Panel was established by the Apollo 13 Review Board to review those management systems in the Apollo Program In effect, this task which were pertinent to the Apollo 13 accident. required the review of all appropriate design, manufacturing, and test procedures covering vehicle systems which may have failed in flight, including the means by which various organizations coordinated their The Panel took special care individual efforts in the total process. to evaluate carefully the safety management system which was applicable to Apollo 13. Principal questions addressed by the Management Panel focused on and systems used to monitor and control the organization, procedures, of test, assembly, and final certifications CSM design, manufacturing, of the cryogenic oxygen system used flight equipment, and particularly in the service module electric power system and environmental control system.
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PARTE2 PANEL MEMBERSHIP Panel 4 was chaired by Mr. E. C. Kilgore, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Services, Langley Research Center. The Board Monitor was Mr. Milton Klein, Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. Panel members were: Mr. R. D. Ginter, Director, Special Program Office Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART) NASA, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Mr. Merrill Mead, Chief, Ames Research Center Moffett Field, California Programs and Resources Office
Mr. James B. Whitten, Asst. Mechanics Division Langley Research Center Hampton, Virginia
Chief,
Aeronautical
and Space
In addition, Mr. R. C. Puffer of MSC Security assisted preparing the section of the report on Security.
the Panel by
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PART E3 SUMMARY INTRODUCTION The Management Panel carried out a detailed in-depth review of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office organizational structure and the management system used to control both command and service module (CSM) hardware development and decision-making processes. The review examined the system for Apollo and focused attention on the specific cryogenic oxygen tank directly involved in the Apollo 13 accident. Key management personnel at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), the Kennedy Space Center and subcontractors were interviewed. These @SC), and Apollo contractors interviews were specifically aimed at understanding what decisions were made regarding the oxygen tank system for Apollo 13, who participated in what information was available from the management these decisions, system, how effectively the organizational elements functioned in reviewand carrying out assigned responsibilities, and ing, communicating, whether management system changes are required in view of the oxygen Records of the oxygen tank reviews, discrepancy reports, tank accident. and procedures were examined to determine if the review failure reports, systems and configuration control system functioned as they were intendSafety, and Reliability ed. Separate reviews were made of the Security, and Quality Assurance (R&&4) management systems to determine effectiveness. Visits were made to the CSM prime contractor, North American Rockand to the oxygen tank subcontractor, well (NR), Downey, California, were held Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, during which discussions Reliability inspecwith key design, test, and manufacturing personnel. and process-control procedures and tion, safety, configuration-control KSC operations were resystems were reviewed and examined in detail. viewed and disctissions were held with key test and launch operations personnel regarding their responsibilities, procedures, and controls. Similar discussions were held with MSC Apollo CSM key management and Throughout its analysis, the Panel devoted parengineering personnel. ticular attention to the history of the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 including design and manufacturing waivers, discrepancies, and anomalies and how these were handled by the Apollo management team. General Technical Capability
The Panel found key Apollo personnel to be technically capable and dedicated to producing a reliable and safe spacecraft system. Although there have been cutbacks in the total number of Apollo personnel, the
E-5
morale of the remaining Apollo team is considered by officials interviewed to be high. Reductions in personnel complements as the flight rate has been reduced have not detrimentally impacted the experience level within the Program to this point. Moreover, critical flight and ground system personnel requirements have been carefully reviewed by project officials to insure adequate manning. During the Apollo Program, there have been changes in key management personnel. The Panel found that attention was given to maintaining continuity of experience by essentially promoting from within the Apollo Program. Some technicians with considerable CSM experience have been replaced at NR-Downey by technicians from other programs with more seniority, but no CSM experience. This was recognized as a potential problem and en intensified training program was instituted. Continued surveillance of the contractor technician experience level and capability is necessary. Division of Responsibilities
The Apollo spacecraft organization involves a large number of consubcontractor, tractor, and Government organizations. It was found that these organizations understand their individual responsibilities and that necessary coordination processes were in effect. This process provides a system of checks and cross-checks to assure that detailed consideration end attention is given to problems by the right organizations prior to final flight commitment. Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Design
Apollo oqgen tank no. 2 was designed in the 1962-1963 time period by Beech prior to the formation of the formal design review and subsystem manager systems which now exist at MSC. During the design phase, there was limited participation by MSC technical personnel in the early design. The primary emphasis at this time by both the prime contractor and MSC was on the thermodynamic performance of the oxygen system. The tank did receive informal design reviews primarily by NR and Beech personnel. Even though these reviews were made, it was found that the final design resulted in a complex assembly procedure with a wiring However, cluster which cannot be inspected after assembly in the tank. the complexity of the assembly and the inability to inspect the tank interior components after assembly was recognized by Government, NR, Consequently, a detailed step-by-step manufacturand Beech personnel. ing and assembly procedure was established and carried out with checklistsupplemented by NR and Government inspections type Beech inspections, A First Article Configuration Inspection at defined critical points. (FACI) was held on the oxygen tank in 1966 which was jointly signed off No subsequent formal design by MSC and contractor subsystem managers. reviews were held.
-
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A thermostatic switch (thermal switch) was incorporated into the Block I oxygen tank heaters to avoid overheating while using 28 V dc spacecraft power. After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifications from NR in February 1965, which required the tank heater to operate not only on 2% V de spacecraft power but also with 65 V dc GSE for rapid tank pressurization during launch operations at KSC, Beech did not require their Block I thermal switch supplier to make a change in switch JYRnever subsequently reviewed the heater assembly to assure rating. compatibility between the GSE and the thermal switch. This resulted in NR, MSC, and KSC personnel subsequently assuming that the tank was protected from overheating while using the 65 V dc power supply. Configuration Control Procedures
The Panel found that a strict and rigorous management system exists on the CSM for configuration control, problem reporting, customer acceptand flight readiness reviews. Both contractors ance readiness reviews, R&QA orand Government CSM organizations participate in this system. ganizations independently monitor, record, and report all problems and Examination of documentation, such as failure approved resolutions. and waivers generated in the management reports, discrepancy reports, system and applicable to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank, demonstrated to the Closeouts Panel that the management system was being followed closely. were being accomplished with authorized approvals. Oxygen Tank Handling Incident at Downey
In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank handling incident at NRDowney, the Panel found that a Discrepancy Report was written and funcThe incident was judged to tional tests were made by NR Engineering. have caused no tank damage by the contractor's systems engineers and representatives of the RASP0 at Downey. Also, the oxygen tank subsystems Subsequent functional manager at MSC was made aware of the incident. The Discrepancy Report was closed out tests were successfully passed. was not rein the authorized manner. Although the handling incident ported to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager, it should be noted that such reporting of Discrepancy Report closeouts is not required in all Once this incident was closed out in the manner prescribed by cases. the Apollo management control system, it was not reopened as a possible factor relating to the later detanking problem at KSC. KSC Detanking all Problems
In the case of the detanking problem at KSC, it was found that The authorized Discrepancy Reports were filed and signed off.
E-7
change from normal detanking procedures was made to use the tank heaters and fans in an attempt to boil off the liquid oxygen in the tank. This was unsuccessful and the normal procedure was further altered by use of a pressure pulsing method. These changes to the test procedures were made by the KSC Systems Engineer and NR Systems Engineer who were on They obtained concurrence of the NR lead systems engineer at station. for test proKSC. This is in agreement with the present requirements After the pressure pulsing method was used to detank cedural changes. oxygen tank no. 2, the problem received further attention, including additional analyses and test. The Apollo team problem-solving effort that resulted was led by the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager and the KSC Director of Launch Operations. NR and Beech personnel were also The MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office formulated a checkinvolved. list of analyses to be made and questions to be answered prior to making the flight decision on the tank. This included: 1. 2. Details Details and procedures for normal detanking at Beech and KSC.
of abnormal detanking
at KSC on March 27 and 28. loose fill tube in the
3. Hazards resulting oxygen tank. 4. 5. problem? 6.
from a possible at KSC? on the fill test
Can the tank be X-rayed Could loose tolerances
tube cause detanking be made on the tank? Module 2 TV-1 and
Should a blowdown and fill
7. Disassemble examine components.
an oxygen tank on Service
including possible failure modes, was made at A detailed analysis, Beech. Tests were run which indicated that even in the event of a loose metal fill tube (which was concluded to be the most likely cause of the a resultant electrical short would provide only 7 detanking problem), millijoules of energy and it was judged that this energy level could All of the cause no damage except loss of the quantity gage indication. checklist requirements were met by test or analysis prior to making the It was jointly decision to fly without a change in the oxygen tank. concluded by the Beech Apollo Program Manager, the NR CSM Program Manager, the KSC Director of Launch Operations, and the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) Manager that the tank was flightworthy. Further examination of this event since the Apollo 13 accident, however,
E-8
has revealed that incomplete and, in some cases, was used in the decision process. This included:
incorrect
information
nor the MSC ASP0 1. Neither the KSC Launch Operations Director Manager knew of the previous tank handling incident at NR-Downey and neither knew that the oxygen tank internal heaters were on for 8 consecutive hours during detanking at KSC. Key personnel at NR-Downey knew of both events. No personnel at MSC, KSC, or NR knew that the tank heater thermal switches would not protect the tank from overheating. 2. A portion of the normal detanking process at Beech is similar to the normal detanking process at KSC. The KSC Launch Operations Director and MSC ASP0 Manager were mistakenly informed that they were (If they had known of the similarity in detanking processes, different. they possibly would have concluded that some change took place in the tank between Beech and MSC.) the MSC ASP0 Manager, and 3. The KSC Launch Operations Director, key personnel at Downey mistakenly understood that the oxygen tank on previous test Service Module 2 TV-1 had similar detanking problems which led to the decision to disassemble the 2 TV-1 tank and examine the components. That examination was interpreted as evidence that a loose-fitting metal fill tube probably was causing the detanking diffculty. Further examination has revealed, however, that 2 TV-1 oxygen tank probably detanked normally. Although none of the principals in making the oxygen tank decision that the availability of informa(NR, MSC, KSC) can say with certainty tion in 1, 2, and 3, above would have altered their decision, each concurs that the availability of such information could have altered their decisions. On the basis of its review, the Project following observations to be pertinent: Management Panel feels the
personnel did not fully understand the oxygen 1. Launch operations tank internal components or fully appreciate the possible effect of changed detanking procedures on the reliability of such internal components. 2. The hazard associated with the long heater consideration in the decision to fly this tank. cycle was not given
E-9
.
.
.
.-_~..
.._-
.-
-I_
--_._.,i
.--.---~
-__ll-_^lll
utilized telephone 3. Problem solving during launch operations but without subsequent written conferences among knowledgeable parties, which would have permitted more deliberate consideration verification, and review. 4. Deviations from test procedures during tests at KSC were made This does not in accordance with the established approval process. require prior approval or concurrence of NR-Downey or MSC subsystem specialists. consideration was given to the 5. It was found that insufficient tank internal details such as sharp edges, internal wiring, and heater thermal switch ratings during the design reviews. 6. An historical record of the oxygen tank existed in the manageto in making the flight However, it was not referred ment system files. decision. 7. Dependence upon memory of personnel being reported to higher management levels. 8. Key Apollo management personnel ing the Panel interviews; problems internal KSC test (a) Provide total or anomalies during led to erroneous data dur-
.
made several
suggestions
background history launch operations, personnel
on subsystems which have of the
(b) Launch operations details of subsystems.
need more knowledge
(c) NR (Downey) and MSC Subsystem Managers should review procedures and subsequent procedure changes. (d) Verification of data is needed in problem solving.
telephone
(e) Followup documentation conferences on key problems Materials
of information exchanged during is recommended.
Compatibility
The compatibility of oxygen tank materials with oxygen received consideration in the original design. Beech reviewed and selected the tank materials in accordance with the published material knowledge that No data on hot-wire tests or existed in the 1962-1963 time period. Beech ran special ignition tests were available to Beech at that time. tests on the fan and motor assembly which was tested at 1000 psia in oxygen gas at 300" F. The motor passed this test with no evidence of
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Some attention was paid in the assembly procedures to avoid ignition. pulling wires over threads or sharp corners and to provide protective and as was However, most sharp corners were not eliminated sleeving. previously mentioned, the tank design necessitated a blind assembly with no way for subsequent inspection for damage. After the original design, Beech was not requested by NR to make any further materials compatibility study or tests. In April 1969, NE?was directed by MSC to review the nonmetallic materials in the cryogenic oxygen subsystem and document them in accordance with the COMAT (Characteristics of Materials All nonmetallic materials in the oxygen tank were evaluated System). materials met the requirements of and documented by NR. All nonmetallic These materials criteria were specifithe materials control program. cally formulated for the lunar module and command module, where nonpropagation of fire was a requirement even if a fire started. These COMATrequirements do not adequately cover the $200 psi cryogenic oxygen tank. No electrical ignition testing of any materials was NR reviewed the service module systems to made for the oxygen tank. provide electrical circuit protection such as breakers and fuses in 1967 in an effort to avoid electrical fires in case of shorts. Security Program
During its review, the Panel also investigated the physical security at Beech, NR-Downey, and KSC for adequacy during the times the Apollo 13 oxygen tank was in custody at these locations. The security program at each location was found to be satisfactory and adequate to provide the physical protection of the oxygen tanks. A determination was made as a result of the survey that no evidence was discovered that the failure of the oxygen tanks on Apollo 13 was the result of any willful, deliberate, or mischievous act on the part of an individual at the facilities surveyed. Safety and Reliability and Quality Assurance
A detailed management review was made of both the Safety and R&QA organizations as applicable to the Apollo CSM. Safety Offices at NASA Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight, MSC, and KSC have safety responsibilities regarding Apollo which are clearly established and implemented by both Government and support contractor personnel. Safety audits by NASA Headquarters teams and participation by MSC and KSC personnel in panels, boards, and program reviews demonstrates continuing organizational attention to safety. Safety studies are being made to identify hazards associated with the Apollo spacecraft during ground tests and for each manned mission. NR-Downey has a safety organization
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with specific responsibilities for the Apollo CSM. The NR safety function is integrated into the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Test Operations with its objectives to eliminate or control risks to personnel and equipment throughout the manufacture, checkout, and flight missions as written in their of the Apollo CSM. Even though the NR safety effort, units, it apparSafety Plan, is fragmented over several organizational ently is working effectively. In all cases, the safety organizations report to a sufficiently high organizational level to provide them a desirable independence of safety surveillance. Failure Reporting
..
'
The Panel found that the Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance organizations at MSC, KSC, NR, and Beech have an effective independent failure-reporting and failure-correction and tracking system. Documentation from this system was observed to be both rapid and accurate. The Reliability Group provides special studies such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Suspect Flight Anomalies Report, and configuration change tracking. In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank, a Single Point Failure Summary was made in 1968. Among the failure modes considered was fire in the CSM external to the oxygen tanks which might lead to the loss of them. This was considered an acceptable risk because of control of ignition sources and low probability of occurrence. Rupture of the oxygen tanks was also considered and accepted due to the redundance of the oxygen supply and low likelihood of failure occurrence. a System Safety Assessment was For Apollo 13, as for previous missions, made on February 19, 1970, as an additional review from previous misand it was concluded that there were no open safety items to sions, constrain the Apollo 13 flight.
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PART E4 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION Relating organizational and management structures to an event of the kind now under consideration is particularly difficult inasmuch as the time period of importance includes the entire history of the Program, in this case some 9 years, during which these structures have undergone many significant changes. With this in mind, the approach adopted for this study was (1) to examine and document what exists today, (2) to trace the history of events that might have had a direct bearing on the (3) to examine the management inplications of those specific failure, are still events, and (4) to try and assess whether those implications pertinent to management as it exists today and whether, therefore, corrective measures of any kind are indicated. To accomplish even this limited objective has required an early focusing of attention on just those organizations and functions directly involved, or potentially involved, in the events under consideration. Thus, following a brief description of the overall organizational and management relationships applicable to the Program as a whole, this report concentrates on those organizations responsible for the particular elements of the Apollo spacecraft in which the failure occurred. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE The Apollo Program has represented the largest single research and development program ever undertaken by the United States Government; at its peak (in 1966) it involved about 300,000 persons. The Governmentindustry team responsible for the Program has included 25 prime contractors and more than 4,000 subcontractors and vendors. In its simplest terms, the Apollo Program has two major objectives: (1) to develop a vehicle capable of landing men on the surface of the Moon and returning them safely to the surface of the Earth, and (2) to operate that vehicle in an initial series of manned lunar landing missions. These two objectives have, in a gross sense, dictated the major division of responsibilities among NASA organizations in the management of the vested in the NASA HeadApollo Program. With overall responsibility quarters organization, responsibility for producing the vehicle was assigned to two NASA field installations: 1. Texas. For the spacecraft, to the Manned Spacecraft to the Marshall Center, Houston, Center,
2. For the launch vehicle, Huntsville, Alabama.
Space Flight
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The responsibility for operating the vehicle in the series of flight missions which constituted the second objective was also assigned to two field installations: 1. For launching Cape KeMedy, Florida. 2. Houston, For all Texas. the space vehicle, operations, to the Kennedy Space Center, to the Manned Spacecraft Center,
postlaunch
These two major objectives also serve to classify the two major time periods into which the g-year history of the Program can be Thus, the first 7 years, from 196lto 1968, constituted the divided. development stage of the Program in which all components of the space supporting equipment, and operational facilities were designed, vehicle, developed, manufactured and tested; the last 2 years, from 1968 to the present, have constituted the beginning of the "operations" stage of the Program, with two successful manned lunar landing missions already The significance of distinguishing between these two periods achieved. of time lies in the inevitable shift of emphasis that accompanied the transition between the two from engineering problems to operational problems. NASA - APOLLO MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION Two classical approaches to project management were available to NASA when the Apollo Program began in 1961. The first approach, often used by Government and the aircraft industry in the early years of aircraft development, would place in a single organization and under the total control of the project manager all of the skills and specialities required to manage the project. Thus, the project organization would provide for itself all the support necessary in engineering, procurement, and quality assurance, program control, financial management, reliability and would operate virtually independently of the institutional oretc., ganization of which it was a part. The second approach, which was rapidly gaining acceptance during the 1940's and 1950's, was the so-called "matrix" concept in which skeletal project management organizations were .superimposed on an institutional organization containing elements and subelements in all of the specialities needed by the projects. Thus the institutional organization would provide the basic capabilities required by the projects in engineering, procurement, program control, managers would draw upon those as required. The etc., and the project advantages of this approach for multi-project organizations are apparent. Costly duplication of support activities is minimized, the overall efficiency of manpower utilization is maximized, and the quality of support provided is enhanced by consolidation.
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NASA adopted the matrix approach to project management for the Apollo Program. In NASA Headquarters, and in each of the three principal NASA field centers involved, Apollo Program Offices were established from which virtually all of the direction for conduct of the Program has emanated. At each location, however, these Program Offices are essentially management organizations and depend heavily on the line elements of the host institution's organization for support. Continuity in lines of authority between the Apollo Program Director in Headquarters and the Apollo Program organization in the field has been assured through the delegation by each Center Director to his Apollo Program Manager of full authority for conduct of that Center's part of the Program. Thus, for purposes of program direction and authority, there exists throughout the Agency a single pyramidal management structure cutting across institutional lines and tying together all elements of the Apollo Program organization. This relationship is illustrated in figure E&l. The organizations the Apollo Program are which the locations of are indicated by heavy of the principal NASA institutions involved in illustrated in figures ~4-2 through ~4-6, in offices with primary responsibility for Apollo lines. Organization
NASA Headquarters
The Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, who heads the Office of Manned Space Flight, is the Administrator's executive agent for the genera.l management of all manned space flight programs. His authority flows directly from the Administrator and is broad, covering all aspects of all manned space flight programs. He also exercises institutional line authority over the three manned space flight field centers which report directly to him. Office of Manned Space Flight Organization
Figure ~4-2 shows the organizational structure within the Headquarters The Associate Administrator for Manned Office of Manned Space Flight. Space Flight has assigned the responsibility for management of all aspects of the Apollo Program to the Apollo Program Director, and has delegated to him full authority to carry out that responsibility. The Apollo Program Director is the highest Agency official whose responsiThere are counterpart bility is exclusively for the Apollo Program. Program Directors for other manned space flight programs with similar responsibilities to their own programs, and there are a number of funcwith the matrix management concept, tional offices which, consistent Shown also in figure E4-2 provide support to all on-going programs. are the direct lines of program authority between the Apollo Program Director and his subordinate program managers in the three field centers.
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APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE NASA HEADQUARTERS
APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
1
APOLLO LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM OFFICE MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
CONTRACTORS
Figure
E&l.-
NASA Apollo
Program organization.
ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
DIRECTOR SPACE MEDICINE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
DIRECTOR MISSION OPERATIONS
I I I
DIRECTOR ADVANCED MANNED MISSIONS PROGRAM
I
I
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
KENNEDY SPACE
Figure
EL2.-
Office
of Manned Space Flight
organization.
Manned Spacecraft
Center
(MSC)
The organization of the Manned Spacecraft Center is shown in figThe permanent functional organizations are represented by the ure E4-3. five technical directorates (Engineering and Development, Science and Applications, Medical Research and Operations, Flight Crew Operations, and Flight Operations) and the institutional Directorates and Staff Program Control and Contracts, Public Offices (e.g., Administration, Affairs, Legal, etc.). The program management organizations presently include the Apollo Spacecraft, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Program Offices, for studies and the Advanced Missions Program Office, which is responsible and planning potentially leading to new flight programs. Responsibility for managing all aspects of the Apollo Program assigned to the Center is vested in the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft concept, a relaProgram Office (ASPO). Under the matrix-management tively small percentage of the Center's staff directly employed in the Apollo Program reports to him organizationally. Virtually all of the Apollo tasks done in-house at MSC (component testing, instrumentation development, flightcrew training, operations planning, etc.) are performed by the Center's line organizations (the functional Directorates) under the overall direction and coordination of the ASP0 Manager. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
This Center is responsible for the development, manufacture, and testing of the launch vehicles used in the Apollo Program. The organization of the Center is shown in figure E4-4. As at MSC, this Center employs the matrix-management concept in which the basic organization, represented by the Program Development, Science and Engineering, and Administration and Technical Services Directorates, is functional and represented by the Program Managethe program-management organization, is made up of program offices for individual launch ment Directorate, vehicles or stages. Although the Saturn Program Office represents the Apollo Launch Vehicle Program Office for purposes of full-time management, the Director of Program Management has been designated the Apollo Launch Vehicle Program Manager. He manages and directs all aspects of the Apollo Program assigned to MSFC, drawing on technical support from the Science and Engineering Directorates. Kennedy Space Center The KSC responsibility in the Apollo checkout, and launch of the space vehicle. (KSC) Program includes the assembly,
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f ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
I PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
I
LEGAL OFFICE
I
SAFETY OFFICE
I
RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICE
1
NASA INSPECTOR I DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT I I ADMINISTRATION DIRECTOR OF PROGRAM CONTROL AND CONTRACTS AOVANCED MISSIONS SPACE SHUTTLE
I DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 1 LUNAR MISSIONS OFFICE EARTH -- ORBITAL MISSIONS OFFICE MAPPING SCIENCES LABORATORY EARTH OBSERVATIONS DIVISION
MEDICAL RESEARCH
t
INTEGRATION , -
SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION GUIDANCE AND CDNTROL DIVISION COMPUTATION AND ANALYSIS
LUNAR RECEIVING ILABORATORY
TECHNDLOGY
-
SPACE PHYSICS D,V,SION
--
OPERATIONS
-
LUNAR AND EARTH SCIENCES DIVISION
c
WHIT, T FAI
4NDS
7
r
TY
Figure E4-3.-
Manned Spacecraft
Center organization.
I
DIRECTOR
I
r
SAFETY
I
UNIVERSITY AFFAIRS
I
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
I
PROCUREMENT POLICY AND REVIEW
I
CHIEF COUNSEL
1
EXECUTIVE STAFF
I
I
1
r
I
1
PROGRAM PLANNING OFFICE
--
ADVANCED PROGRAM SUPPORT CFFICE
CENTRAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
--
AEROASTRODYNAMICS LABORATORY
SATURN PROGRAM OFFICE
--
APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM OFFICE
CENTERPLANS AND RESOURCES OFFICE
--
FACILITIES OFFICE
ADVANCED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OFFICE
--
MISSION AND PAYLOAD PLANNING OFFICE
ASTRIONICS LABORATORY
__
ASTRONAUTICS LABORATORY
ENGINE PROGRAM OFFICE
--
M1SSION OPERATIONS OFFICE
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE
--
MANAGEMENT SERVICES OFFICE
PRELIMINARY DESIGN OFFICE I
-
ADVANCED PROJECTS OFFICE
COMPUTATION LABORATORY
_
_
MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING LABIJRATORY
Figure
E4-4.-
Marshall
Space Flight
Center organization.
.
’
The organization of the Center is shown in figure E4-5. Again the basic organization is functional, consisting of those major operational activities necessary to the launch of all space vehicles. The programmanagement organization is similar to that at MSC and is made up of an Overall reindividual program office for each active flight program. sponsibility for managing all aspects of the preparation, checkout, and launch of the Apollo space vehicles is assigned to the Manager of the organizations at the Center Apollo Program Office (APO). All functional participate in those activities under the overall direction of the APO Direct responsibility for launch and checkout is delegated to Manager. the Director of Launch Operations. COYTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS The oxygen tank in which the failure occurred was a component of the cryogenic gas storage subsystem (CGSS), which serves both the electrical power system (EPS) and the environmental control system (ECS) and contractual of the spacecraft service module (SM). The contractors relationships involved in the manufacture of the tank are illustrated in figure ~4-6. North American Rockwell (formerly North American Aviation), prime contractor for the command and service modules (CSM), subcontracted with Beech Aircraft Corporation for manufacture of the CGSS. Beech, in turn, purchased certain parts for the subsystem from the three vendors Products shown: the oxygen pressure vessel (inner tank) from Airite the oxygen quantity and temperature Division of the Electrada Corporation; sensor probe from Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.; and the fan motors Pertinent organization charts for North from Globe Industries, Inc. American Rockwell and Beech Aircraft are shown in figures E4-7 through The organizations of the vendor companies were not considered E4-11. pertinent and are not shown. North American Rockwell (NR)
The Apollo CSM contract is held by the Space Division of North American Rockwell and the organization of that Division is shown in North American Rockwell also applies the matrix-management figure E4-7. concept in their current organization with program offices (Saturn S-II, etc.) superimposed on a basically Space Station, CSM,'Space Shuttle, functional organizational structure which includes Manufacturing, Research, Engineering, and Test; Material; Quality and Reliability The administrative-support functions. Assurance; and the conventional Apollo contract is managed for NR by the CSM Program Office headed by Figure ~4-8 shows the organization of that a division vice president. Within the CSM Program Office the principal suborganization Office. headed by an Assistant Program for program management is Engineering, On the functional side of the Space Manager and Chief Program Engineer. Division, referring again to figure E4-7, line responsibility for E-21
I-
DIRECTOR
I
DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTER CENTER OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT I
I
RANGE SAFETY STAFF
I
DIRECTOR QUALITY ASSURANCE
I
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
1
I
SAFETY OFFICE
I
EXECUTIVE STAFF
------‘I
Figure
E4-5.-
Kennedy Space Center organization.
NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL PRIME CONTRACTOR : COMMAND & SERVICE MODULES
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
M I w”
I
GLOBE INDUSTRIES,
INC
ELECTRADA CORP, AIRITE PRODUCTS DIVISION VENDOR: OXYGEN-TANK INNER SHELL (PRESSURE VESSEL) t
SlMMoNDs PRECISION PRODUCTS, INC VENDOR: OXYGEN QUANTITY AND TEMPERATURE SENSOR PROBE
VENDOR: OXYGEN-TANK FAN MOTORS
Figure
~4-6.-
Croygenic
gas storage
subsystem-contractual
relationships.
I FIELD
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPPORT I
I
OPERATIONS
OFFICE (HOUSTON)
~~~l~l~l~~~~
1 SATURN S-II PROGRAM I SPACE STATION PROGRAM
PROGRAMS
& PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT
I
Figure
E4-7.-
North American Rockwell,
Space Division
organization.
/
.
VICE PRESIDENT & PROGRAM MANAGER ASSISTANT PROGRAM MANAGERS SKYLAB
APOLLO PROGRAM - CSM EXPERIMENTS INTEGRATION
H=
I
SAFETY
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT PROGRAM MANAGER & CHIEF PROGRAM ENGINEER
I-I
MANUFACTURING MANAGER
I
I
MATER IAL MANAGER
Figure
~4-8.-
North American Rockwell,
Space Division,
CSM Program
Office
organization.
performance (as opposed to management) under the Apollo contract falls under the functional support organization for Research, Engineering, and Test, also headed by a division vice president. The organization of that Office is along systems/subsystems lines. At the subsystem level, the engineer in charge in this organization also acts as the subsystem manager for the program management organization, in a manner quite analogous to the technique used by the MSC organization described earThe relationship at North American Rockwell is illustrated in lier. figure E4-9. North American Launch Operations Space Division (KSC) All NR CSM operations at KSC are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Supplement KSC-1 to MSC contract no. NASg-150 with NR. The Supplement contains a statement of work prepared by KSC and KSC is responsible for technical direction to the NR personnel. The NR Apollo CSM Operations at KSC supports KSC in CSM checkout and launch and is a part of the NR Launch Operations Space Division under the NR Vice President and General Manager who is located at Cocoa Beach, Florida. He, in turn, reports to the Space Division President, NR. Beech Aircraft Corporation
The subcontract from North American Rockwell, for manufacturing of the cryogenic gas storage subsystem, is held by the Boulder Division of the Beech Aircraft Corporation. The organization of that Division is shown in figure E4-10. Beech also uses the matrix-management concept with management responsibility for the Apollo subsystem contract vested in the Apollo Program Manager and performance responsibility in the Manager, Engineering. Figure E4-11 shows the breakdown of management responsibilities within the office of the Apollo Program Manager.
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NORTH AMERICAN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CSM PROGRAMS VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER I
ROCKWELL CONTRACT PERFORMANCE RESEARCH, ENGINEERING AND TFST VICE PRESIDENT
t
I
t
ENGINEERING ASS’T PROGRAM MANAGER AND CHIEF PROGRAM ENGINEER M I 2: CSM PROJECT ENGINEERING I
FLUIDS & PROPULSION SYSTEMS SENIOR MANAGER
2
I
t
SUBSYSTEM ‘1-1--------1-1
MANAGEMENT
FUEL CELLS AND CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS MANAGER
c t I SUBCONTRACTORS
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP . CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SUBSYSTEM (CGSS)
Figure
E&9.-
North American Rockwell organizational relationships to cryogenic gas storage subsystem.
applicable
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