Description
Decision making can be regarded as the cognitive process resulting in the selection of a course of action among several alternative scenarios.
SC62 Doc. 46.4 Annex
D ECISION -MAKING M ECHANISMS AND N ECESSARY C ONDITIONS
FOR A
F UTURE T RADE IN A FRICAN E LEPHANT IVORY
FINAL REPORT
The Background Study on which this report is based has been submitted to the CITES Secretariat
Consultancy for the CITES Secretariat (CITES Notification No. 2011/046) by R.B. Martin, D.H.M. Cumming, G.C. Craig, D. St.C. Gibson, D.A. Peake
24 May 2012
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Decision-Making Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for a Future Trade in African Elephant ivory
Final Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. CITES Decision-making in Relation to Ivory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 CITES controls on international trade in ivory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Key features of the CITES decision-making processes relating to elephants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The present system of trade and the market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Efficacy and costs of existing compliance and enforcement measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Concluding comment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Evaluation of Trade Regimes in High-valued Products.. 3.1 Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Trade in high valued commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Ivory market chains and controls.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Concluding comment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . 4 4 4 6 7 8 8
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4. Impact of Harvesting and Trade on Elephant Populations. . . 4.1 History of ivory trade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Elephant population estimates.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Sustainability of ivory production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 One-off ivory sales. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5. Principles and a Decision-making Mechanism for a future Trade in Ivory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Basic principles and factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Quotas and Trade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 A Decision-making Mechanism and Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Concluding Comment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Conditions under which a trade in ivory could take place. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 A potential ivory-trading system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Structure of the CISO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Relationships of the CISO to key organisations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Funding of the CISO.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annex 1: Terms of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 ii
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List of Figures 3.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 Production and disposal of ivory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Objectives Network .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Decision-making involved in the process of legal trade in ivory .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Management Strategy Evaluation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Organisational structure of the CISO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
List of Tables 4.1 Continental elephant estimates 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
List of Acronyms AED – African Elephant Database (of the AfESG) AfESG – African Elephant Specialist Group (of the SSC) AsESG – Asian Elephant Specialist Group (of the SSC) BNs – Bayesian networks CBD – Convention on Biological Diversity CBNRM – Community Based Natural Resource Management CISO – Central Ivory Selling Organisation CITES – Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora CoP – Conference of the Parties CSG – Crocodile Specialist Group (of the SSC) DTC – Diamond Trading Company (De Beers) ETIS – Elephant Trade Information System FAO – Food and Agricultural Organisation (of the United Nations) FSC – Forest Stewardship Council ITRG – Ivory Trade Review Group ITTA – International Tropical Timber Agreement IUCN – The World Conservation Union MIKE – Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants MSE – Management Strategy Evaluation MSY – Maximum Sustained Yield MTW – Mean Tusk Weight NAMMCO – North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation SSC – Species Survival Commission (of IUCN) SULi – Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist Group (of SSC) TAG – Technical Advisory Group (to ETIS and MIKE) TRAFFIC – Trade Records Analysis of Fauna and Flora in Commerce ______________ iii
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Acknowledgements
We thank the CITES Secretariat for giving us the opportunity to undertake this interesting and significant project. In particular, we thank Tom de Meulenaer, Jon Barzdo, Alice Abalos and Philippe Brarda who have provided the administrative support for the project. A. In response to a request we sent out early in 2012 to range states, other countries and relevant nongovernmental organisations seeking information and thoughts on the project, we would like to acknowledge the inputs we received and thank the following individuals – African Range States Joëlle Zouzou (Cote d’Ivoire); Yeneneh Teka (Ethiopia); Nana Kofi Adu-nsiah (Ghana); Theo Freeman (Liberia); Julius Kipng’Etich, Solomon Kyalo (Kenya); Emilia Polana (Mozambique); Fidelis Omeni, Fidelis Odiakaose (Nigeria). We did not receive any responses from the Asian elephant range states. Other countries Meng Xianlin, Wan Ziming (China CITES MA); Hugo-Maria Schally, Gaël de Rotalier, Angus Middleton. (EU MEA); Mark Baxter, Trevor Salmon, Francis Marlow (UK Defra); Roddy Gabel (USA FWS). IUCN SSC : Simon Stuart; Specialist Groups : Holly Dublin, Diane Skinner, Daniel Stiles (AfESG); Hank Jenkins, Don Ashley (CSG); Rosie Cooney, Stratos Arampatsis, Stefan Carpenter, Dr. David Lusseau, Herbert Prins, Robin Sharp (SULi); Environmental Law Programme : Aaron Laur, W olfgang E. Burhenne. Other NGOs Earthmind : Francis Vorhies; Lukuru Foundation (DRC): John Hart; TRAFFIC : Tom Milliken; WCS : Hilde Vanleeuwe, Simon Hedges. ____________ B. The first draft of the report was circulated by the CITES Secretariat early in April to the reviewers designated in the Terms of Reference for the consultancy. Comments were received from – The CITES Secretariat, the African Elephant Specialist Group (AfESG), Amboseli Trust, Botswana, China, India, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Elephant Voices (Joyce Poole & Petter Granli), SULi (Rosie Cooney, David Lusseau, Robin Sharp, Michael ‘t Sas Rolfes), South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom. We thank the reviewers. These comments were useful and have greatly influenced the final report. ___________ Finally we thank a few personal friends: Meg Cumming for copy-editing and helpful comments on several draft chapters, Graham Child, Vernon Booth and Michael Eustace for valued inputs and discussions. ___________
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Executive Summary
E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
Elephant populations are growing in some parts of Africa and declining drastically in others. Human populations are expanding throughout Africa with the result that habitat for elephants is declining and conflict between people and elephants is a growing problem in many parts of their range. Some protected areas are facing problems associated with overpopulation of elephants while others are facing rapid declines as elephants are being killed for their ivory. This report was commissioned by the CITES Secretariat following the adoption, by the fifteenth meeting (Doha, 2010) of the Conference of the Parties (CoP), of Decision 14.77, as follows – “The Standing Committee, assisted by the Secretariat, shall propose for approval at the latest at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties a decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties”. The Terms of Reference for this work ( Annex 1 , page 34) specifically excluded the question of whether or not there should be a trade in ivory. CITES Decisions: In response to increasing international legal and illegal trade in ivory the African elephant was listed on Appendix II in 1977. A rapid escalation of trade in the following eight years resulted in the introduction by CITES of a quota system. The amount of ivory leaving Africa declined in the following three years from about 800,000 to about 140,000 tonnes but illegal killing and trade in ivory continued and the species was placed on Appendix I in 1989. As a result many elephant populations began to recover although a low level of illegal trade continued until 2005 when it began to increase to the present high levels. Sales of stockpiled ivory from southern Africa occurred in 1999 (to Japan) and 2008 (to China and Japan) under the supervision of the CITES secretariat. We suggest that, in many parts of Africa, the failure of CITES regulations to control the illegal trade in ivory is largely because many range states have not implemented strong domestic legislation and law enforcement to control illegal hunting and their unregulated domestic ivory markets. Most countries in Africa appear to be unable (or unwilling) to meet the high costs required to fully protect their elephants. The regulatory mechanisms adopted so far by CITES and by range states are characterised by a lack of incentives to key stakeholders to conserve elephants. Regulation of ivory trade in consumer countries has also fallen short of required standards. International trade regim es in other species and commodities are not directly comparable to those of elephants and ivory but nevertheless can provide some useful indicators on how a trade in ivory may be conducted. We examined trade regimes associated with African rhinos, vicunas, narwhals, tigers, the timber trade, and the diamond trade 1 and concluded that: 1. The costs of protecting species with high valued products may be very high and beyond the means of many developing countries to meet. 2. Government and public support, together with an absence of civil disorder, are important ingredients for successful conservation of high valued species and the maintenance of legal trade in commodities. 3. Expanding the area of habitat available to high valued species, such as elephants, beyond the boundaries of state protected areas requires incentives to landholders.
1. Trade regimes in several other species and commodities (e.g. reptiles, fisheries, sturgeon, drugs and alcohol prohibition) were examined, but the details are not included in our report because there is no direct comparison to elephants and ivory.
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4. The development of regional and local institutions, such as joint commissions, 2 for the management of species and trade in their commodities is likely to be beneficial, as is the involvement of a full range of stakeholders in the management of the resource and its trade. 5. Strong domestic law and its enforcement is pivotal to success. 6. An understanding of the market in which commodities are to be traded needs to be based on sound empirical data dealing with consumer preferences, attitudes and behaviour, particularly if consumers are to be influenced by pricing structures and certification, or green labelling initiatives. 7. The shorter the market chain between producer and consumer the less likelihood there is of illegal components being laundered in a legal trade and the fewer the opportunities for corrupt practices to develop. Population sim ulation models were used to explore the potential impacts of alternative harvesting regimes on elephant populations. The results indicate that a sustainable production of some 300 tonnes of ivory from 350,000 elephants (the approximate number in Appendix II countries) is possible. This ivory would be harvested only from natural mortality, control of problem animals, trophy hunting and culling for ecological reasons. None of the management regimes aim at killing elephants to produce ivory. A comparison between prices paid for ivory at the one-off sales held in 1999 and 2008 and wholesale market prices for raw ivory at the time indicate a loss of revenue of between 66% and 75% by range states involved. A link between the two one-off legal ivory sales and increasing illegal killing of elephant has not been established by the data presently available. It is apparent that many drivers are involved in the ongoing illegal ivory trade. A devolved decision-making process is proposed that would include a full range of stakeholders, and involve both top-down and bottom-up decision-making mechanisms in a multi-level governance framework from the CITES CoP to the local level. The process would provide for those directly responsible for the conservation of elephants and the supply of ivory, to link directly with those responsible for carving ivory through a single link in the form of a Central Ivory Selling Organisation. By closely linking supply and demand the crucial issue of incentives to maintain stakeholder buy-in and compliance in a sustainable and legal trade in ivory could be established. It provides for shorter, tighter feedback loops and minimises scale mismatches between institutions and resource management. Equally, it provides the basis for a legal market to establish market control for ivory, control that presently rests in the hands of the criminal syndicates that are able control both the supply and the price of illegal ivory. A process of trade: In exploring conditions under which an international trade in ivory could take place the establishment of a central ivory selling organisation (CISO) is proposed. It is emphasised, however, that the proposed system is not a blueprint and should be regarded only as a starting point for discussion and negotiation amongst primary and secondary stakeholders in the trade in ivory and the conservation of elephants. The proposed structure could not be implemented overnight. An important component includes the development of direct links between producers and consumers of ivory so as to establish the shortest possible market chain. This should result in short and direct feedback loops between regulatory institutions and those involved in the trade and in the management and conservation of elephants. Importantly, it should also provide for returns and incentives to landholders, be they the state, private landholders or communities. _____________
2.
W eber (2008) analyses the potential benefits of links between regional management organisations and CITES.
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Section 1
1. INTRODUCTION
Elephant populations are growing in some parts of Africa and declining drastically in others. Human populations are expanding throughout Africa with the result that habitat for elephants is declining and conflict between people and elephants is a growing problem in many parts of their range. Some protected areas are facing problems associated with overpopulation of elephants while others are facing rapid declines as elephants are being killed for their ivory. Since the initial listing on Appendix I in 1989, the elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have been listed on Appendix II and two sales of stockpiled ivory have taken place, one in 1999, and the other in 2008. Stocks of ivory held by governments have continued to increase and there are pressures from range states with expanding elephant populations to trade in ivory. However, countries in West, Central and East Africa continue to experience declining elephant populations and most do not therefore support a legal trade in ivory. This report was commissioned by the CITES Secretariat following the adoption, by the fifteenth meeting (Doha, 2010) of the Conference of the Parties (CoP), of Decision 14.77, as follows – The Standing Committee, assisted by the Secretariat, shall propose for approval at the latest at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties a decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties At its 61st meeting in Geneva, August 2011, the CITES Standing Committee agreed to a procedure specified in document SC61 Doc. 44.4 to progress work on the implementation of Decision 14.77. This included conduct of an independent study on the development of a decision-making mechanism and process for future trade in elephant ivory to serve as a basis for further discussion by the Standing Committee. The Terms of Reference for this study are contained in Annex 1 (page 34) and specifically state “The study is not to determ ine whether there should or should not be international trade in ivory.” This statement is re-enforced by the following text from the record of the 61st meeting of the Standing Committee held on the 15-19th August 2011 in Geneva. The study is not to determine whether there should or should not be international trade in ivory, which is a separate and distinct matter for the Parties. This is a technically-focused study on a “decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties” that can be utilised by the Parties should they decide to enable future international trade in ivory under the Convention. The value systems that influence the conservation and management of elephant, and the sale and marketing of elephant products differ greatly across the world. As a result, the trade in ivory is characterised by highly polarised positions grounded in differing worldviews, mental models, and asymmetrical power relations that will need to be reflected upon and considered in any decision-making process related to a future trade in ivory. Some of the more pertinent positions and their philosophical underpinnings that form the basis of these polarised views and intense debate are: 1. Recognition of the intrinsic value of elephants and their ranking as sentient beings underpins the belief that the killing of elephants for any reason, and trade in their products, is unethical 2. Recognition of the extrinsic or utilitarian value of elephants and their products as a resource that can be used for the benefit of people and contribute to securing wild land for conservation. Utilitarian value is extended to both live elephants and to their products (ivory, hide and meat). 1
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3. Recognition of the primacy of human interests. Direct conflicts between land use systems and between farmers and elephants result in elephants being killed and/or their available habitat being taken over for other uses with the result that the habitat available to elephants is reduced. 4. Recognition of the existence and ecological values of other (often rare) plant and animal species that may be threatened in areas where high densities of elephants occur. Elephants act as ecosystem engineers in protected areas and opinions (and values) differ on the levels at which their impacts on habitats and other species are acceptable. Given existing strongly held views relating to elephants and their conservation it is clear that reconciling these values is difficult if not impossible at a global level and an “ objective and independent decision-making mechanism ” that would satisfy all interests and positions is unlikely to emerge from this, or any other study. For this reason it is necessary, at the outset, to outline the main assumptions that underlie the decision making mechanism and a process for trade in ivory that are developed in this report. In summary these are as follows: (1) That should the Conference of the Parties (CoP) decide to permit a legal international trade in ivory for a species listed on Appendix I it would require a two-thirds majority for the transfer of the species, or a population of the species, to Appendix II. This would be a primary decision of the CoP and is explicitly not part of our Terms of Reference. This assumption is necessary to avoid continually qualifying statements about trade in the writing that follows. (2) This report deals with the subsidiary decisions and processes that may allow a trade in ivory from countries whose elephant populations are listed on Appendix II. It is in this context that we propose a decision-making mechanism and process for a trade in ivory (Section 5.3, p20 and Section 6, p27) to assist the CoP in reaching a decision on whether or not a trade in ivory could take place. (3) The main subsidiary assumptions and principles that we have applied in developing a workable decision-making process and a process for a trade in ivory include the following: a. That any legal trade will be sustainable and contribute positively to the conservation of elephants as envisaged in the African elephant range states’ African Elephant Management Plan. If a legal trade does not meet this objective, it should be stopped. b. That an effective and controlled legal trade in ivory can provide additional incentives to conserve elephants and their habitats and that landowners /occupiers should be involved in decision-making regarding the management and conservation of elephants, and in deriving benefits from maintaining elephants, on their land. c. That short and tight feedback loops between the state of elephant populations, the production and marketing of ivory, is essential and would require appropriate hierarchical decision-making processes and a measure of subsidiarity. d. That it is possible to establish a trade in ivory that minimises corrupt practices and the laundering of illegal ivory. By creating conditions that are advantageous for a legal trade, ultimately the illegal killing of elephants will be reduced. e. That effective monitoring and management of elephant populations and ivory can be maintained in countries trading in ivory. f. That best business practices, transparency and accountability will be adhered to in trading ivory.
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g. That ivory will be derived from natural mortality, sport hunting (presently legally permitted under CITES quotas), animals killed to control human-wildlife conflict, and, in some cases, culling to control overpopulation of elephants. Elephants will not be harvested to produce ivory, i.e. ivory, hides and meat will be a by-product of other management activities. h. That the failure to protect and conserve elephants in many countries in Africa is not primarily because other countries have traded in ivory but because they have not invested sufficiently in protecting their elephants and have not provided incentives for their conservation. (4) That this report will not be interpreted as an intended blue-print but as a basis for negotiation towards a workable solution to a trade in ivory that will involve a full range of stakeholders. More specifically, in order for the CoP to agree to a trade in ivory from Appendix II countries agreement in principle, if not in detail, between the countries and prospective importers would need to be established regarding four main aspects. These aspects are – a. The process for trading in ivory; b. Measures to ensure the sustainable conservation and management of elephant populations; c. The creation of incentives for elephant protection and conservation in those countries involved (i.e. disbursement of benefits derived from a trade in ivory); and d. Secure legal processing and marketing procedures in countries importing ivory in order to minimise, if not eradicate, the laundering of illegal ivory.
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Section 2
2. CITES DECISION -MAKING IN RELATION TO IVORY
TOR Clause (a): ... exam ination of the various processes and decision-m aking mechanism s related to ivory trade that are or have been operating under the provisions of the Convention, including compliance and enforcem ent provisions; 2.1 Introduction CITES decision-making mechanisms are governed by the Articles of the Convention and guided by Resolutions adopted by the Parties, which interpret and assist in implementation of the Convention. Proposals to amend the Appendices of the Convention and/or their accompanying annotations in respect of any particular species may be submitted by one or more Parties 150 days in advance of a CoP and should include consultations with the other range states in which the species occurs. In the event that the proposing Party decides not to consult with other range states (which is not required under Article XV), the proposal should be submitted 330 days in advance of the CoP (Res.Conf. 8.21) to enable the Secretariat to carry out the required consultation with range states. For adoption, amendments of the Appendices require a two-thirds majority of the Parties present and voting. Parties may lodge reservations in cases where they do not accept an adopted amendment provided they make written notification to the depositary government within the 90 days before the amendment comes into effect. In this section of the report we first outline the development of steps that have been taken by CITES (based on Wijnstekers 2011 and related CITES documents) to stem the illegal international trade in ivory that has contributed to the decline of many elephant populations in Africa. We then briefly examine the key features of the decision-making processes relating to elephants and ivory, the impacts of the one-off sales of ivory, and the efficacy and costs of existing compliance procedures. 2.2 CITES controls on international trade in ivory 3 The Asiatic elephant, Elephas maximus, was listed on Appendix I of CITES when the Treaty was first signed in 1974. The African elephant, Loxodonta africana, was listed in Appendix III in February 1975 by Ghana and then listed on Appendix II in February 1977 following the first CoP held in Switzerland in November 1976. The decision-making mechanism was a straightforward process based on significant trade in ivory and a proposal, by Ghana, for listing on Appendix II and a vote of the Parties. Increasing ivory trade continued into the 1980s and reached a peak of over 1,000 tonnes in 1983. Concerns over the volume of trade led to the inception of a quota system in 1985 (see below). The decision-making processes involved in the lead-up to the introduction of the quota system began in 1981, with Resolution Conf. 3.12, which recommended to parties to introduce a number of steps and controls aimed at improving the level of documentation relating to the export and import of ivory, in an effort to distinguish between legal and illegal movements of ivory. Given the escalating amounts of ivory that continued to leave Africa between 1981 and 1986 these recommendations appear to have had limited, if any, impact. In 1985 (immediately before inception of the quota system) 912 tonnes of ivory left Africa and the legal trade dropped to 805t in 1986, 331t in 1987 and 142t in 1988 (Barbier et al 1990). Illegal trade undoubtedly took place over the same period but data on its extent are not available. The intent of the quota system was that countries should set their own quotas using the method of calculation prescribed in Res. Conf. 5.12 but there was little that the quota system could do to address the problem of illegal trade from countries such as Burundi the United Arab Emirates that were not parties to CITES in 1985. 4
3. 4. Fuller details of resolutions and decisions taken by successive CoPs are provided in the Background Study . Burundi acceded to CITES in 1988 and the UAE in 1990.
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Burundi had been a major exporter of ivory before the quota system was adopted although it had a population of only one elephant (Barbier et al 1990). Other major ivory traders continued to accumulate stocks of illegally acquired ivory which their governments could not accommodate within the quota system and, at the same time, maintain credibility. Inevitably such ivory had to be exported illegally. The problem was exacerbated once countries such as Japan adopted stricter importing regulations that excluded illegal ivory causing the illegal traffic, which was substantial, to move to other entrépots such as Macau and Singapore. The quota system was superseded by the transfer of all populations of the African elephant to Appendix I in 1989 with the adoption of Resolution Conf. 7.8 that urged all Parties to support the listing on Appendix I and to introduce stricter domestic controls on trade. The decision-making process in this case involved major technical and public action before the 7 th CoP in Lausanne in September 1989. The Ivory Trade Review Group, convened by the Wildlife Conservation Society, conducted a study of the global ivory trade and its impact on the African elephant in 1988 (ITRG 1989). The results of the study were released in June 1989 and resulted in the United States, the European Community and Hong Kong immediately placing an import ban on all worked and raw ivory. Japan introduced an import ban on worked ivory and raw ivory from all non-African states. Resolution Conf.7.8 came into force for all Parties to the Convention early in 1990 and effectively introduced a ban on all trade in raw and worked ivory. Reservations were entered by Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe. At the 8 th CoP, held in Kyoto in 1992, these four countries submitted proposals to transfer their elephant populations to Appendix II in return for which they undertook to maintain a moratorium on trade in ivory. Their proposals were not adopted. Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe appear not to have exported any raw ivory between 1990 and 1997 despite holding reservations against the Appendix I listings. They did, however, continue to sell ivory to their domestic carving industries. The absence of exports is partly explained by the fact that no importing Parties had entered reservations at the time of the listing in 1989. The elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe were transferred to Appendix II at CoP 10 in Harare in 1997 and the reservations that these countries had entered in 1989 were withdrawn. However, the CoP placed constraints on trade in ivory by the affected range states by adopting CoP Decisions 10.1 & 10.2 and Resolution Conf.10.10, which replaced Conf. 9.16. The first one-off sale of raw ivory from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe took place in 1999 with Japan being the single buyer approved by the CITES Secretariat. The decision-making process behind this sale was governed by the annotations included in Resolution Conf. 10.10. 5 The South African elephant population was transferred to Appendix II in 2000 with a zero quota for trade in raw ivory (CoP 11 in Gigiri, Kenya). A further one-off sale was approved by the Parties at CoP12, in Santiago (Chile) in 2002, but the sale was postponed at a succession of Standing Committee meetings until 2008. An “Action plan for the control of trade in African Ivory” was established at CoP13, in Bangkok in 2004, (Decision 13.26 (Rev. CoP15)) calling on all range states to urgently: (a) prohibit the unregulated domestic sale of ivory and, where regulated domestic trade is permitted, it should comply with the provisions of Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15); (b) instruct all law enforcement and border control agencies to enforce legislation rigorously; and (c) engage in awareness campaigns to publicise existing and new legislation regarding ivory sales.
5.
Additional constraints were added at subsequent meetings of the CoP and last consolidated under Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) at the 15 th CoP held in Doha in 2010. The current provisions governing international trade in ivory are given in the Background Study (Annex 2).
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The action plan also recommended range states to cooperate with research on ivory identification, called on the Secretariat to seek support from governments and other agencies to help eradicate illegal exports of ivory from Africa, and to assess progress in implementation of the action plan, particularly in states where unregulated internal markets are active. Provision was made in Decision 13.26 for countries selling significant amounts of illegal ivory to be sanctioned through a Standing Committee Notification to Parties “advising that the Conference of the Parties recommends that Parties do not authorize commercial trade in specimens of CITES-listed species with the State in question” (Wijnstekers 2011). At a meeting of the Standing Committee on 5 October 2006 a decision on the sale of ivory agreed at CoP12 in 2002 was further postponed. At CoP14, held in the Hague (Netherlands) in 2007 the existing annotation for the populations of elephants listed in Appendix II was replaced with one that constrained trade in ivory to buyers approved by the CITES Secretariat, namely, China and Japan at the time. These countries were to satisfy the Standing Committee that they had sufficient controls in place to prevent the laundering of illegal ivory through their ivory carving industries. The annotation also precluded any further proposals to sell ivory for a period of nine years. A one-off legal sale of 108 tonnes of ivory from Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe eventually took place in 2008. The ivory was auctioned and imported into China and Japan in 2009 (see Section 4, page 17). Recent studies of the ivory carving industry in China (EIA 2011, Martin & Vigne 2011a) have revealed that the legal provisions and controls, on which their status as a buyer of ivory is based, are not being fully implemented. Large quantities of illegal ivory are clearly entering their ivory carving industries. Once again the implementation of CITES resolutions at a national level by a member state has fallen short of expectations. At CoP 15 in Doha (Qatar) in 2010, further revisions of Resolution Conf. 10.10 took place resulting in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15). 2.3 Key features of the CITES decision-making processes relating to elephants The period between 1976, when the African elephant was first listed on Appendix II, and 2010 when the Conference of the Parties last met, has witnessed two surges in the amount of ivory leaving Africa – both associated with increasing prices for ivory. The first occurred during the 1980s and reached a peak in 1983 and the second is presently underway (i.e. in 2011/2012). Attempts to contain both the legal (through a quota system) and illegal trade during the 1980s were widely considered to have failed with the result that African elephants were listed on Appendix I in 1990. The following sixteen or so years witnessed a recovery of many elephant populations, associated with reduced illegal killing of elephant and reduced prices for ivory. The recovery was widely attributed to CITES intervention and the ban on international trade in ivory. However, domestic ivory carving industries continued within Africa and illegal ivory continued to leave the continent to support ivory carving in several Asian countries (Lemieux and Clarke 2009, Martin & Vigne 2010, 2011a, 2011b, Stiles 2004, 2009a, 2009b). The transfer to Appendix II of three populations in 1997 was accompanied by an increased effort to monitor the illegal trade in ivory and the illegal killing of elephants with the establishment of the ETIS and MIKE programs, which report through a Technical Advisory Group to the Secretariat. The primary purpose of these two programmes is “to establish monitoring systems through which the impact of CITES decisions with respect to elephants and trade in elephant specimens can be assessed” (Annexes to Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15). Since the transfer to Appendix II of the elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1997, and that of South Africa in 2000, the two sales of stockpiled ivory (1999 and 2008) were accompanied by continuing revisions, mostly in the form of annotations, to the initial primary resolution (Conf. 10.10) governing the trade in ivory from the Appendix II countries. The hope that the monitoring 6
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programs would provide definitive results on the impacts of CITES decisions in respect of trends in illegal trade in ivory and killing of elephants, particularly those related to the two sales of stockpiled ivory, have not yet been realised (see Section 4, page 17). It is important to appreciate that CITES itself does not have any direct enforcement or implementation capacity: 6 this lies with the member states and their capacity to implement the legally binding resolutions and decisions adopted by the CoP. And herein lies the crux of the conservation problems for African elephants. A high proportion of African elephant range states do not have the resources in funds and trained personnel to protect their elephant populations (e.g. Lemieux & Clarke 2009). As a result there is a marked scale mismatch (Cumming et al 2006) between the centralised decision-making processes of the Convention and the decision-making process and capacity on the ground. Furthermore, the feedback loops between what is happening in the field and the Convention’s decision-making and subsequent action on the part of member states are lengthy and delayed. High levels of elephant mortality and illegal trade in ivory have coincided with periods of civil disorder, corruption, and conflict associated with armed conflict and militias in eastern, central and southern Africa (e.g. Douglas-Hamilton (1983), Cumming (1986), Smith (et al 2003), Hart (2012 in litt). 2.4 The present system of trade and the market Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) and its annotations determine the manner in which trade in ivory can take place from countries whose elephant populations are listed on Appendix II. The practice of selling ivory stockpiles at lengthy, irregular intervals departs from normal commercial practices. It results in substantial losses to those selling ivory and, because the supply of legal ivory is irregular and uncertain, it provides no incentives to ivory traders to confine their trade to legally available ivory. There have been several economic studies of the likely effects of banning trade in ivory, of the one-off sales of ivory, and of the trade-offs between levels of law enforcement and incentives for illegal harvesting of ivory and rhino horn. Barbier et al (1990) drew attention to the need to provide incentives for elephant conservation if a ban was not to have negative impacts on elephants. Barnes (1996) explored the effects of an ivory trade ban on the economic value of elephants to Botswana and concluded that it reduced the existence and use value of elephants by about half. Several theoretical papers by Bulte, Damania, van Kooten, and by others (e.g. Bulte & van Kooten 1999, Bulte et al 2007) explore the effects of the ivory trade ban and one-off sales of ivory on the illegal trade, ivory prices and incentives to illegal trade but without clear policy solutions emerging. A key, and still unresolved, issue (despite the above studies) is the likely effect of a legal trade in ivory by some countries on the illegal killing of elephants elsewhere in Africa. Sound data with which to test the various hypotheses that have been advanced in relation to this issue are not available, and are unlikely to be so, until such time as the alternative hypotheses are tested empirically. Elephants provide ecosystem services, both in the sense of their keystone role in ecosystem dynamics and in the sense of their existence and aesthetic value to many cultures. Payments for ecosystem services are emerging as an important source of support for environmental conservation (e.g. Kok et al 2010) and possibly as a means of assisting in meeting the costs of conserving elephants and large carnivores (e.g. Bulte et al 2008, Dickman et al 2011). These still nascent initiatives might provide an avenue that CITES and member states could explore as opportunities to develop incentives for the conservation of species such as elephants, rhinos and the large carnivores.
6.
The use of sanctions against non-compliant states can and has been used to effectively to bring about compliance by affected states. However, this instrument does not appear to have been used in dealing with the problem of unregulated domestic ivory markets in Africa (see Reeve 2006).
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There are at least three sets of costs that need to be factored into the elephant conservation equation that are related to present compliance and enforcement measures under CITES. These are the costs associated with protecting elephant populations in the field, the costs of CITES monitoring of compliance and enforcement and the external subsidies that support African elephant conservation. Here we deal only with the likely law enforcement costs. The costs of managing protected areas in savannas can be estimated using the following formula developed by Martin (2007) –
Total Cost = US$ A x Illegal Hunting Challenge x Annual Scout Salary x %(Area)
– where A is a constant of 4 for savanna parks and 2 for desert parks, Illegal Hunting Challenge is a constant taking the values: 1 = Low, 2 = Moderate, 3 = High, 4 = Severe; the Annual Scout Salary is expressed in US$; park Area is expressed in square kilometers. This relationship provided a good fit with the state protected areas in South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique. An earlier rule of thumb derived from park running costs in the early 1980s was a figure of at least US$ 200 per km 2 for operating costs. Cumming (2008) provided examples of operating budgets and their deficits for five major parks in the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area and all were operating on budget deficits of between 62% (Chobe National Park) and 92% (Hwange National Park) based on the above formula. For protected areas in tropical forests the constant A could well be eight or greater. Taking an average park area of 10,000 km 2 for central, east and southern Africa, a severe illegal hunting challenge of 4, a ranger or scout annual salary of $4,000 per annum and a constant of 6 (mean of 4 and 8) for A, with a total of (say) 40 parks that include elephants, the likely minimum budget required to adequately protect these elephant populations would be in the region of US$384 million per annum. 2.6 Concluding comment The measures taken by CITES and member states almost certainly contributed to reducing levels of illegal trade for the period 1990 to about 2006. Other factors such as improved law enforcement in some countries following the ban may have also contributed. However, given the present rise in illegal killing of elephants in West, Central and East Africa it is clear that current measures are not containing the present upsurge in the illegal trade in ivory. The tendency to ascribe this increase to the sale of stockpiled ivory in 2008 diverts attention away from the far more serious problems relating to the inability of African countries to invest in protecting their elephants – an observation that begs the question of what incentives are there for them to do so? The focus on regulation without incentives is a central issue that needs to be addressed, a point made strongly by Barbier (et al 1990) in their contribution to the ITRG report and in their book and later by Swanson (2000). Or, as Murphree (1996) put it – “Regulation of use is an essential component for sustainability in use. Prevailing regulatory structures consist largely of a proscriptive and legislative nature imposed by the centre on the periphery, and they have failed to stop negative trends. The profile of the incentive package for regulatory compliance is too often wrong. Incentive is the fulcrum of regulation.” ______________
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3. EVALUATION OF TRADE REGIMES IN HIGH -VALUED PRODUCTS
TOR Clause (b): ... evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of international trade regim es and associated controls, safeguards and m onitoring m ethods for other high-value comm odities in the context of future trade in ivory 3.1 Introduction Domestic and international trade in wildlife is one of the major factors that affects the status and distribution of wild species (Oldfield 2003). By their very nature wild species, unless farmed or ranched, are common pool resources and are often de facto open access resources, which means that issues of ownership and resource protection become important variables (e.g. Ostrom 2009). These considerations suggest that a finer-scaled approach to examining the effectiveness or otherwise of trade regulations and markets for wildlife (Fischer 2004, 2010) is needed if we are to draw lessons from case studies on other species for the conservation of elephants in Africa. Elephant ivory probably fits within a high value / medium-to-low volume category and can only be retrieved from dead animals. Rhino horn presently commands a very high price but can be harvested from wild animals without killing them, as can the wool from vicuna. 7 The highest levels of trade in wild species, in both volume and overall value, are to be found in the timber and marine fisheries trade, but value per unit mass is generally low. An exception is the black caviar from the beluga sturgeon where the retail value is about US$ 465 per ounce or $16,402/kg (Weber 2010). International trade regimes in high valued products from wild species that are strictly comparable, or analogous, to elephants do not exist. This obstacle may be overcome to some extent by considering particular features of trade regimes in other species and other non-wildlife commodities that may provide useful guidelines for a trade in ivory. 3.2 Trade in high valued commodities We examined trade regimes in several species and groups of species, but only the following are briefly covered here: African rhinos, narwhals, vicuna, tigers, timber, and diamonds (see Background Study , Chapter 3 for further details). We drew the following key features that are relevant to a future trade in ivory from each example – 3.2.1 African rhinoceroses (Diceros bicornis, Ceratotherium simum ) All African species of rhinoceros were listed on Appendix I in 1977, in response to a dramatic decline in the numbers of black rhino from > 60,000 in 1970 to < 15,000 in 1980 (Emslie & Brooks 1999). Key features that emerge from the rhino conservation experience that have implications for elephant conservation and a trade in ivory are – a) The recent upsurge in rhino poaching, despite very high levels of protection, emphasises the increased level of investment required to protect endangered species carrying very valuable appendages. In some areas intensive daily monitoring of tagged individuals has been a cornerstone of protection and law enforcement strategies, as has dehorning. b) The northern white rhino is now probably extinct in its former range. High NGO investment in its protection in Garamba National Park eventually failed against a backdrop of negligible government support, and high levels of civil disorder and military action in the area.
7.
The price for raw ivory in the field is dependent on the size of the tusk but even the largest tusks seldom exceed a value of US$1,000/kg – whereas the current price for rhino horn is around US$25,000/kg to the illegal hunter. Vicuna wool has been valued at between US$ 250 and $940/kg (Lichtenstein 2011).
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The growth in numbers of the southern white rhino over the last 30 years was associated with an expansion in their range through the purchase of animals by private landholders to stock conservancies and game ranches. For landowners the incentives were the added value to their tourism enterprises. Similar incentives supported the relocation of black rhino from national parks on Zimbabwe’s border to private land during the period when the country’s population crashed from > 1,775 in 1986 to < 350 in 1993 (Du Toit 2002, Emslie & Brooks 1999). The value of rhino horn has risen rapidly in the last few years despite the absence of a legal trade in rhino horn since 1977. 3.2.2 Narwhals (Monodon monoceros ). Narwhals are confined to the Arctic waters of northern Russia, northern Canada, Greenland and Svalbard, and are usually in or near sea ice. Adults are 4-5m long, weigh up to 1,600kg, and males carry a single spiralled tusk of 1.5 to 3m long. They are highly social mammals, reach sexual maturity at 7-9 years with a gestation period of 14-15 months, and may live for 75 to 100+ years (NAMMCO 2005). Inuit hunters have subjected them to a subsistence harvest for centuries and the animals have been hunted since medieval times for their tusks, which were believed to have magical properties. The main market for the ivory was Europe. The global population is estimated to be about 80,000. They were listed on Appendix II in 1977. There are two aspects relating to the management of narwhals that may have useful pointers for the management of elephants and a trade in ivory, namely, the role of localised commissions to manage the species and their modified use of the Non-Detrimental Findings (NDF) process. These institutional arrangements go some way to reducing the scale mismatches identified in the previous section and thus increase the likelihood of local participation in decision-making, buy-in and compliance. 3.2.3 Vicuña (Vicugna vicugna ). Vicuñas were listed on CITES Appendix I in 1975 when the total population had dropped to about 10,000 animals through overexploitation. The Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Vicuña was signed in 1979 by Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Andean people were named as the main beneficiaries of future vicuña use in Article I of the Vicuña Convention and in the signatory states’ subsequent submissions to CITES meetings. Luxury garments made from vicuña fibre are sold in the most exclusive fashion houses in Europe, USA, Asia and Australia. The vicuña population recovered to about 421,500 individuals during the period 1965-2010. CITES and the Vicuña Convention played a key role in halting the population decline (Lichtenstein 2011). The total vicuña fibre production of Andean countries is approximately 7,400 kg per year. In the past ten years, prices paid for raw fibre have ranged from US$250 to US$940 per kg and have varied greatly among and within countries. The profits obtained from the transformation of raw material in Italy are high but producers probably reap less than 5% of the price paid for the final product (Lichtenstein 2011). Despite these problems of equity and the apparently low rewards to local farmers the recovery of vicuña has been remarkable and has been characterized by the following key features – a) An initial listing on Appendix 1, which provided an effective ban on lethal harvesting of vicuña that was complied with by the range states involved. b) A formal Convention for the Conservation and Management of Vicuña was then established by the five range states in which the species occurred. c) Once recovery of the species began, and appropriate institutions were established under the legal frameworks of the countries concerned, vicuñas were then listed on Appendix II. d) An explicit commitment was made to involve and benefit local farmers and communities in the conservation and management of vicuña.
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3.2.4 Tigers (Panthera tigris ). As in the case of black rhinos, the range of tigers and their numbers have plummeted in recent decades (Dinerstein et al 2007) primarily through demand for body parts and a loss of habitat and prey. There are a few examples where concerted conservation efforts have resulted in some local recovery. The costs of these successful conservation efforts have varied from as little as $14/km2 in the Russian Far East to about $250/km2 in the Terai Arc Landscape of Nepal (Dinerstein et al 2007). China banned all trade in tiger parts within its territory in 1993 and this was considered to have been successful in reducing demand and trade (Gratwicke et al 2008). Conservationists argue that the farming of tigers in China will provide an opening for the laundering of parts from wild tigers, particularly those from wild animals that are considered to provide a more potent medicine (Dinerstein et al 2007, Gratwicke et al 2008). Bulte & Damania (2005), using theoretical models, examined aspects of likely market responses to parts from wild and farmed animals (tigers and rhinos) and concluded “simple rules of thumb might not exist in the complex world of the international trade in wildlife commodities.” They suggest that criminal networks, centred between illegal suppliers and consumers, can gain market control and so influence the relative balance in pricing between wild (illegal) and farmed components of trade. We examined the examples of tigers and crocodiles because they raise two pertinent points that relate to trade regimes in high valued products – a) When member states seriously attempt to implement CITES decisions, as China did in banning domestic trade in tiger parts, they can contribute positively to the conservation of endangered species within and beyond their borders. b) The insights relating to market control and thresholds between legal and illegal supplies of high valued commodities raised by Bulte and Damania’s (2005) analysis may have important implications for the manner in which any legal trade in ivory is managed. c) In-depth economic analysis of wildlife trade (at least for the species covered above) has been restricted to theoretical modelling and surveys of what is available in end markets. We are not aware of any in-depth empirical studies of demand and preferences for wildlife products by consumers based on statistically sound market and opinion surveys. 3.2.5 The International Timber Trade and Certification . Timber is by some margin the most valuable renewable natural resource commodity traded. In the early 1990s, TRAFFIC estimated the global timber trade was worth around US$104 billion, approximately 65% of the total worldwide wildlife trade. By 2009, the FAO estimated the annual turnover at more than US$200 billion (TRAFFIC 2012). In response to ongoing depletion of forests and the general failure of trade agreements, civil society organisations sought to build stronger links between the producers and consumers of timber and timber products by the certification of products throughout the full chain of custody. Perhaps the most prominent of these certification schemes has been that driven by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) founded in 1993. The ten FSC principles and criteria for certification (http://www.fsc.org/) are relevant to a trade in ivory because the developments in certification and green labelling may provide guidance in achieving public involvement in market choices in relation to ivory artefacts (Background Study , Chapter 3). It should be recognized, however, that such developments are only likely to be effective in societies where consumers feel a moral obligation to avoid illegally sourced goods and to support socially and environmentally sound and sustainable practices. These societal values are not presently evident in the major markets for ivory but there is no reason why attempts should not be made to develop them. The applicability of this type of approach (often referred to as “eco-labelling”) to CITES and the trade in wildlife is well argued by Swanson (2000) and requires a meeting of minds between producers and consumers. 11
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3.2.6 The diam ond trade. Up until the late nineteenth century, diamonds were a rare and valued gemstone. They were found in a few riverbeds in India and Brazilian forests. The entire world production of gem diamonds amounted to a few kilograms a year, which served to maintain their rarity value. In 1867 the discovery of the Eureka diamond along the Orange River in South Africa precipitated a rush for alluvial diamonds along the river. This was soon eclipsed by the discovery of a diamond pipe at Kimberley in 1870 that resulted in the first diamond mine. This mine, and later others, yielded huge numbers of diamonds that had the potential to flood the market. The major investors in diamond mines realized that it would be in their interests to combine into a single entity powerful enough to control diamond production and maintain the scarcity of diamonds. The instrument that they created for this purpose was De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.; a company incorporated in South Africa (Epstein 1982). De Beers dominated the diamond mining, diamond trading and industrial diamond manufacturing sectors up until 2000 when it relinquished its global monopoly (Stein, 2001). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) originated at a meeting of Southern African diamond-producing states in Kimberley in May 2000. The process was designed to certify the origin of rough diamonds from sources which are free of conflict funded by diamond production. However, it is not providing the hoped-for controls over the trade and many international NGOs which supported the KCPS initially are now withdrawing their support. One of the KCPS’s major flaws lies in its organisational structure which relies on system of rotating chairs from national governments and allows the political process to influence the decisions of the organisation. We do not see the Kimberley Process as providing a model for the ivory trade. The former De Beers’ system is relevant to a potential future trade in ivory because of the direct links it established between producers and diamond cutting factories and the manner in which it sold diamonds. The De Beers selling system In 1931 the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) took over the responsibility for allocating diamonds to manufacturers and wholesalers. (1) The entire world supply of raw diamonds was distributed through a single outlet at Number Two Charterhouse Street in London where sales (called ‘sights’) took place every five weeks during the year, i.e. about ten sales per year. Some 250 chosen buyers (named ‘sightholders’) who owned diamond-cutting factories in New York, Tel Aviv, Bombay, Antwerp and Hong Kong attended the sales. DTC carried out its own market research on the demand for diamonds and allowed sightholders to submit requests for their particular requirements before each sale. Rough diamonds were sorted into ‘parcels’ before each sale and the head of DTC set the price for each parcel. Each parcel was allocated to a specific individual sightholder. Buyers had to accept the prices set for their parcels and haggling was not permitted. A sightholder had Hobson’s Choice – he either accepted his parcel or rejected it. If he refused to pay the price he might not be invited to future sights. Sightholders undertook to move their rough diamonds directly into the diamond cutting and polishing industry. They agreed not to trade in the rough stones they had purchased and also undertook not to sell their cut and polished stones to wholesalers or retail jewellers who undercut prices at the retail level. De Beers sought to remove destructive competition in the jewellery market. Sightholders agreed to provide De Beers with whatever information it needed to assess the diamond market. This included full inventories of their own stocks in both rough and polished diamonds.
(2) (3) (4) (5)
(6)
(7)
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This system of selling enabled De Beers to extend its control from the mines to the cutting factories of Belgium, India, Israel and the United States. Through its clients De Beers was able to monitor and regulate the flow of diamonds that passed through the pipeline into the world retail market. The key elements of this system that have potential for a trade in ivory and the conservation of elephants are – a) b) A very short and effectively controlled market chain between production and processing. Cooperation between producers and processors leading to adaptive management in, and careful attention to, the pricing of the raw material and the selling of processed artefacts. c) Effective control of the legal market for an extended period.
3.3 Ivory market chains and controls Ivory is produced when elephants die from natural causes (including predation) or when humans kill them. A person then collects the ivory that may travel via several routes to a variety of end users as indicated diagrammatically in Fig. 3.1 below. A key question, is where and how in this “market chain” control of the trade might be implemented to most effectively minimise illegal trade and the risk of illegal ivory entering the legal market chain?
Figure 3.1: M ovement of ivory from production in the field to end consumers through legal (blue lines) and illegal (red lines and boxes) pathways. The two-way arrow between the legal external ivory trader and the illegal ivory trade in the centre of the diagram highlights a key point of “contagion” between legal and illegal ivory and one that could be closed by the process outlined in Chapter 6.
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Illegally derived ivory has clearly been included in the ivory carving businesses in Asia (Martin & Vigne 2011a) and some African countries (Martin & Vigne 2011b). In the case of China the legally purchased 60 tonnes ivory in 2008 had been held by government agencies and rationed to carving business but with a price hike of some 500% over the purchase price (D. Stiles 2012 in litt.). In this way an intermediary trader in ivory could radically influence the price of raw ivory, whether legal or illegal. The selection of which countries could buy ivory was based on an evaluation, by the Secretariat (e.g. CITES 2005), of the domestic controls the country had in place to regulate their ivory carving. Clearly these controls have been ineffective (Martin & Vigne 2011a). The question then is what means are likely to be the most effective in regulating the entry of ivory into the market chain and its transit to ivory carvers and consumers? 3.4 Concluding comment The above brief review of aspects relating to the international trade in several species with high valued products and of the earlier trade in diamonds, suggests that the following features may be important in designing a process for the trade in ivory – 1. The costs of protecting species with high valued products may be very high and beyond the means of many developing countries to meet. 2. Government and public support, together with an absence of civil disorder, are important ingredients to successful conservation of high-valued species and the maintenance of legal trade in commodities. 3. Expanding the range of high-valued species beyond the boundaries of state protected areas requires incentives to landholders. 4. The development of regional and local institutions, such as joint commissions, 8 for the management of species and trade in their commodities is likely to be beneficial, as is the involvement of a full range of stakeholders in the management of the resource and its trade. 5. 6. Strong domestic law and enforcement is pivotal to success. An understanding of the market in which commodities are to be traded needs to be based on sound empirical data dealing with consumer preferences, attitudes and behaviour, particularly if they are to be influenced by pricing structures and certification, or green labelling initiatives. 7. The shorter the market chain between producer and consumer the less likelihood there is of illegal components being laundered in a legal trade and the fewer the opportunities for corrupt practices to develop. 8. There is a clear need to address the leakages in the collection of ivory and in its distribution in trading partner countries. _______________
8.
See W eber (2008) for an analysis of the potential benefits of links between regional management organisations and CITES
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Section 4
4. IMPACT OF H ARVESTING AND T RADE ON E LEPHANT P OPULATIONS
Clause (d) of the TOR states: Exploration of the conditions under which international trade in elephant ivory could take place, taking into account: ecological and econom ic sustainability of the ivory trade; the impact of trade on the illegal killing of elephants; the initial im pact of the one-off sale that was agreed at the 14 th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (The Hague 2007); levels of illegal trade, enforcem ent challenges and capacities; inform ation on linkages between legal and illegal trade; and methods to elucidate these linkages; methods to track the chain of custody, etc.. This section is a summary of Chapter 4 which appears in the Background Study . 4.1 History of ivory trade The latter part of the 19 th Century saw a major rise in the export of ivory from Africa which reached a peak in 1887 with approximately 1,000 tonnes leaving Africa (Spinage 1973) and a corresponding decline in elephant numbers across the continent. By the 1950s most elephant populations had shown clear signs of recovery. A sharp rise in the amount of ivory being exported from Africa began in the 1970s, reached a peak of nearly 1,100 tonnes in 1983 and declined until 1989 when the international ban on the trade in ivory was introduced. During the last two centuries the movement of ivory has tended to shift with changing patterns of supply and demand. Large quantities of ivory were imported into India during the early part of the 19 th Century, then into the United Kingdom, followed by Japan and Hong Kong during the latter part of the 20 th Century. The imports of ivory into these four countries alone over the two hundred year period have in several years approached 1,000 tonnes per annum. The ivory exports from Africa during the ten years prior to the listing of the African elephant on Appendix I exceeded 800 tonnes consistently up until the inception of the quota system in 1985. Eastern and Central Africa together provided more than 80% of these exports. While many consider that the ongoing illegal trade in ivory and the declines in some elephant populations are driven by demand for ivory in China, there are many drivers involved and identifying and quantifying the root causes of declines in elephant populations with any certainty is presently not possible because of a lack of appropriate data (e.g. Burn et al 2011, Stiles 2009, Stiles 2012, in litt.). 4.2 Elephant population estimates Elephant population estimates are available from the African Elephant Database for 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2007. The data for 2007 (Blanc et al 2007) are given in Table 4.1 below but they are already 5 years out of date. If the average rates of increase of populations in each region up to 2007 had persisted, the continental elephant population would be some 738,000 in the year 2012. However, recent reports suggest that elephant populations in W est, East and Central Africa have declined markedly in the past two years. In making estimates of the potential ivory production at a continental level, we have conservatively used a figure of 500,000 elephants (the ‘Definites’ and ‘Probables’). The quality of the data does not allow much greater precision. Table 4.1: Continental elephant estimates 2007
ESTIMATES Definite 453,073 Probable 101,900 Possible 104,085 Speculative 50,364 Def+Prob 554,973 TOTALS Def+Prob+Poss 659,058 All 709,422
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Section 4
The sustainability of ivory production under increasing levels of exploitation has been examined for several scenarios using a population simulation model (Background Study , Annex 3). (1) When the offtake targets the animals with the largest tusks in the population, the maximum sustained yield occurs at an offtake of about 5% of the total numbers, at which level – a. b. c. The population growth rate is close to zero and the mean tusk weight of ivory coming from the population would be about 5kg; The proportions of tusks coming from males and females would be roughly equal. The oldest surviving males would be about 22 years and the oldest surviving females about 50 years old; Ivory production would be about 0.5kg per annum per living elephant in the population which would yield about 500kg of ivory for every 1,000 elephants. 9.
Under certain circumstances, these figures could be useful in making deductions about the status of living elephant populations or drawing conclusions from raw ivory seizures. (2) Some alternative scenarios are given – a. Illegal exploitation of elephant might take the form of successively making entire ‘subpopulations’ extinct in which case the ivory appearing in the market would exhibit the structure and characteristics of the ivory in the living population. The mean tusk weight for the male ivory in all age classes is 8.36kg and that for the females is 2.55kg. In examining a seizure of ivory, these characteristics could be used to determine whether the ivory came from a population of previously unexploited elephants. A typical elephant management regime where trophy hunting, culling, problem animal control and natural mortality all contribute to ivory production results in a relatively high volume of ivory with two-thirds of the total coming from trophy hunting (offtake
Decision making can be regarded as the cognitive process resulting in the selection of a course of action among several alternative scenarios.
SC62 Doc. 46.4 Annex
D ECISION -MAKING M ECHANISMS AND N ECESSARY C ONDITIONS
FOR A
F UTURE T RADE IN A FRICAN E LEPHANT IVORY
FINAL REPORT
The Background Study on which this report is based has been submitted to the CITES Secretariat
Consultancy for the CITES Secretariat (CITES Notification No. 2011/046) by R.B. Martin, D.H.M. Cumming, G.C. Craig, D. St.C. Gibson, D.A. Peake
24 May 2012
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Decision-Making Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for a Future Trade in African Elephant ivory
Final Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. CITES Decision-making in Relation to Ivory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 CITES controls on international trade in ivory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Key features of the CITES decision-making processes relating to elephants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The present system of trade and the market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Efficacy and costs of existing compliance and enforcement measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Concluding comment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Evaluation of Trade Regimes in High-valued Products.. 3.1 Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Trade in high valued commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Ivory market chains and controls.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Concluding comment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . 4 4 4 6 7 8 8
............. 9 ............. 9 ............. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15 15 15 16 17 18 18 18 20 21 26 27 27 30 32 32 32
4. Impact of Harvesting and Trade on Elephant Populations. . . 4.1 History of ivory trade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Elephant population estimates.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Sustainability of ivory production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 One-off ivory sales. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5. Principles and a Decision-making Mechanism for a future Trade in Ivory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Basic principles and factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Quotas and Trade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 A Decision-making Mechanism and Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Concluding Comment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Conditions under which a trade in ivory could take place. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 A potential ivory-trading system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Structure of the CISO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Relationships of the CISO to key organisations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Funding of the CISO.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annex 1: Terms of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 ii
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List of Figures 3.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 Production and disposal of ivory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Objectives Network .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Decision-making involved in the process of legal trade in ivory .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Management Strategy Evaluation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Organisational structure of the CISO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
List of Tables 4.1 Continental elephant estimates 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
List of Acronyms AED – African Elephant Database (of the AfESG) AfESG – African Elephant Specialist Group (of the SSC) AsESG – Asian Elephant Specialist Group (of the SSC) BNs – Bayesian networks CBD – Convention on Biological Diversity CBNRM – Community Based Natural Resource Management CISO – Central Ivory Selling Organisation CITES – Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora CoP – Conference of the Parties CSG – Crocodile Specialist Group (of the SSC) DTC – Diamond Trading Company (De Beers) ETIS – Elephant Trade Information System FAO – Food and Agricultural Organisation (of the United Nations) FSC – Forest Stewardship Council ITRG – Ivory Trade Review Group ITTA – International Tropical Timber Agreement IUCN – The World Conservation Union MIKE – Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants MSE – Management Strategy Evaluation MSY – Maximum Sustained Yield MTW – Mean Tusk Weight NAMMCO – North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation SSC – Species Survival Commission (of IUCN) SULi – Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist Group (of SSC) TAG – Technical Advisory Group (to ETIS and MIKE) TRAFFIC – Trade Records Analysis of Fauna and Flora in Commerce ______________ iii
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Acknowledgements
We thank the CITES Secretariat for giving us the opportunity to undertake this interesting and significant project. In particular, we thank Tom de Meulenaer, Jon Barzdo, Alice Abalos and Philippe Brarda who have provided the administrative support for the project. A. In response to a request we sent out early in 2012 to range states, other countries and relevant nongovernmental organisations seeking information and thoughts on the project, we would like to acknowledge the inputs we received and thank the following individuals – African Range States Joëlle Zouzou (Cote d’Ivoire); Yeneneh Teka (Ethiopia); Nana Kofi Adu-nsiah (Ghana); Theo Freeman (Liberia); Julius Kipng’Etich, Solomon Kyalo (Kenya); Emilia Polana (Mozambique); Fidelis Omeni, Fidelis Odiakaose (Nigeria). We did not receive any responses from the Asian elephant range states. Other countries Meng Xianlin, Wan Ziming (China CITES MA); Hugo-Maria Schally, Gaël de Rotalier, Angus Middleton. (EU MEA); Mark Baxter, Trevor Salmon, Francis Marlow (UK Defra); Roddy Gabel (USA FWS). IUCN SSC : Simon Stuart; Specialist Groups : Holly Dublin, Diane Skinner, Daniel Stiles (AfESG); Hank Jenkins, Don Ashley (CSG); Rosie Cooney, Stratos Arampatsis, Stefan Carpenter, Dr. David Lusseau, Herbert Prins, Robin Sharp (SULi); Environmental Law Programme : Aaron Laur, W olfgang E. Burhenne. Other NGOs Earthmind : Francis Vorhies; Lukuru Foundation (DRC): John Hart; TRAFFIC : Tom Milliken; WCS : Hilde Vanleeuwe, Simon Hedges. ____________ B. The first draft of the report was circulated by the CITES Secretariat early in April to the reviewers designated in the Terms of Reference for the consultancy. Comments were received from – The CITES Secretariat, the African Elephant Specialist Group (AfESG), Amboseli Trust, Botswana, China, India, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Elephant Voices (Joyce Poole & Petter Granli), SULi (Rosie Cooney, David Lusseau, Robin Sharp, Michael ‘t Sas Rolfes), South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom. We thank the reviewers. These comments were useful and have greatly influenced the final report. ___________ Finally we thank a few personal friends: Meg Cumming for copy-editing and helpful comments on several draft chapters, Graham Child, Vernon Booth and Michael Eustace for valued inputs and discussions. ___________
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E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
Elephant populations are growing in some parts of Africa and declining drastically in others. Human populations are expanding throughout Africa with the result that habitat for elephants is declining and conflict between people and elephants is a growing problem in many parts of their range. Some protected areas are facing problems associated with overpopulation of elephants while others are facing rapid declines as elephants are being killed for their ivory. This report was commissioned by the CITES Secretariat following the adoption, by the fifteenth meeting (Doha, 2010) of the Conference of the Parties (CoP), of Decision 14.77, as follows – “The Standing Committee, assisted by the Secretariat, shall propose for approval at the latest at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties a decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties”. The Terms of Reference for this work ( Annex 1 , page 34) specifically excluded the question of whether or not there should be a trade in ivory. CITES Decisions: In response to increasing international legal and illegal trade in ivory the African elephant was listed on Appendix II in 1977. A rapid escalation of trade in the following eight years resulted in the introduction by CITES of a quota system. The amount of ivory leaving Africa declined in the following three years from about 800,000 to about 140,000 tonnes but illegal killing and trade in ivory continued and the species was placed on Appendix I in 1989. As a result many elephant populations began to recover although a low level of illegal trade continued until 2005 when it began to increase to the present high levels. Sales of stockpiled ivory from southern Africa occurred in 1999 (to Japan) and 2008 (to China and Japan) under the supervision of the CITES secretariat. We suggest that, in many parts of Africa, the failure of CITES regulations to control the illegal trade in ivory is largely because many range states have not implemented strong domestic legislation and law enforcement to control illegal hunting and their unregulated domestic ivory markets. Most countries in Africa appear to be unable (or unwilling) to meet the high costs required to fully protect their elephants. The regulatory mechanisms adopted so far by CITES and by range states are characterised by a lack of incentives to key stakeholders to conserve elephants. Regulation of ivory trade in consumer countries has also fallen short of required standards. International trade regim es in other species and commodities are not directly comparable to those of elephants and ivory but nevertheless can provide some useful indicators on how a trade in ivory may be conducted. We examined trade regimes associated with African rhinos, vicunas, narwhals, tigers, the timber trade, and the diamond trade 1 and concluded that: 1. The costs of protecting species with high valued products may be very high and beyond the means of many developing countries to meet. 2. Government and public support, together with an absence of civil disorder, are important ingredients for successful conservation of high valued species and the maintenance of legal trade in commodities. 3. Expanding the area of habitat available to high valued species, such as elephants, beyond the boundaries of state protected areas requires incentives to landholders.
1. Trade regimes in several other species and commodities (e.g. reptiles, fisheries, sturgeon, drugs and alcohol prohibition) were examined, but the details are not included in our report because there is no direct comparison to elephants and ivory.
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4. The development of regional and local institutions, such as joint commissions, 2 for the management of species and trade in their commodities is likely to be beneficial, as is the involvement of a full range of stakeholders in the management of the resource and its trade. 5. Strong domestic law and its enforcement is pivotal to success. 6. An understanding of the market in which commodities are to be traded needs to be based on sound empirical data dealing with consumer preferences, attitudes and behaviour, particularly if consumers are to be influenced by pricing structures and certification, or green labelling initiatives. 7. The shorter the market chain between producer and consumer the less likelihood there is of illegal components being laundered in a legal trade and the fewer the opportunities for corrupt practices to develop. Population sim ulation models were used to explore the potential impacts of alternative harvesting regimes on elephant populations. The results indicate that a sustainable production of some 300 tonnes of ivory from 350,000 elephants (the approximate number in Appendix II countries) is possible. This ivory would be harvested only from natural mortality, control of problem animals, trophy hunting and culling for ecological reasons. None of the management regimes aim at killing elephants to produce ivory. A comparison between prices paid for ivory at the one-off sales held in 1999 and 2008 and wholesale market prices for raw ivory at the time indicate a loss of revenue of between 66% and 75% by range states involved. A link between the two one-off legal ivory sales and increasing illegal killing of elephant has not been established by the data presently available. It is apparent that many drivers are involved in the ongoing illegal ivory trade. A devolved decision-making process is proposed that would include a full range of stakeholders, and involve both top-down and bottom-up decision-making mechanisms in a multi-level governance framework from the CITES CoP to the local level. The process would provide for those directly responsible for the conservation of elephants and the supply of ivory, to link directly with those responsible for carving ivory through a single link in the form of a Central Ivory Selling Organisation. By closely linking supply and demand the crucial issue of incentives to maintain stakeholder buy-in and compliance in a sustainable and legal trade in ivory could be established. It provides for shorter, tighter feedback loops and minimises scale mismatches between institutions and resource management. Equally, it provides the basis for a legal market to establish market control for ivory, control that presently rests in the hands of the criminal syndicates that are able control both the supply and the price of illegal ivory. A process of trade: In exploring conditions under which an international trade in ivory could take place the establishment of a central ivory selling organisation (CISO) is proposed. It is emphasised, however, that the proposed system is not a blueprint and should be regarded only as a starting point for discussion and negotiation amongst primary and secondary stakeholders in the trade in ivory and the conservation of elephants. The proposed structure could not be implemented overnight. An important component includes the development of direct links between producers and consumers of ivory so as to establish the shortest possible market chain. This should result in short and direct feedback loops between regulatory institutions and those involved in the trade and in the management and conservation of elephants. Importantly, it should also provide for returns and incentives to landholders, be they the state, private landholders or communities. _____________
2.
W eber (2008) analyses the potential benefits of links between regional management organisations and CITES.
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Section 1
1. INTRODUCTION
Elephant populations are growing in some parts of Africa and declining drastically in others. Human populations are expanding throughout Africa with the result that habitat for elephants is declining and conflict between people and elephants is a growing problem in many parts of their range. Some protected areas are facing problems associated with overpopulation of elephants while others are facing rapid declines as elephants are being killed for their ivory. Since the initial listing on Appendix I in 1989, the elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have been listed on Appendix II and two sales of stockpiled ivory have taken place, one in 1999, and the other in 2008. Stocks of ivory held by governments have continued to increase and there are pressures from range states with expanding elephant populations to trade in ivory. However, countries in West, Central and East Africa continue to experience declining elephant populations and most do not therefore support a legal trade in ivory. This report was commissioned by the CITES Secretariat following the adoption, by the fifteenth meeting (Doha, 2010) of the Conference of the Parties (CoP), of Decision 14.77, as follows – The Standing Committee, assisted by the Secretariat, shall propose for approval at the latest at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties a decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties At its 61st meeting in Geneva, August 2011, the CITES Standing Committee agreed to a procedure specified in document SC61 Doc. 44.4 to progress work on the implementation of Decision 14.77. This included conduct of an independent study on the development of a decision-making mechanism and process for future trade in elephant ivory to serve as a basis for further discussion by the Standing Committee. The Terms of Reference for this study are contained in Annex 1 (page 34) and specifically state “The study is not to determ ine whether there should or should not be international trade in ivory.” This statement is re-enforced by the following text from the record of the 61st meeting of the Standing Committee held on the 15-19th August 2011 in Geneva. The study is not to determine whether there should or should not be international trade in ivory, which is a separate and distinct matter for the Parties. This is a technically-focused study on a “decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties” that can be utilised by the Parties should they decide to enable future international trade in ivory under the Convention. The value systems that influence the conservation and management of elephant, and the sale and marketing of elephant products differ greatly across the world. As a result, the trade in ivory is characterised by highly polarised positions grounded in differing worldviews, mental models, and asymmetrical power relations that will need to be reflected upon and considered in any decision-making process related to a future trade in ivory. Some of the more pertinent positions and their philosophical underpinnings that form the basis of these polarised views and intense debate are: 1. Recognition of the intrinsic value of elephants and their ranking as sentient beings underpins the belief that the killing of elephants for any reason, and trade in their products, is unethical 2. Recognition of the extrinsic or utilitarian value of elephants and their products as a resource that can be used for the benefit of people and contribute to securing wild land for conservation. Utilitarian value is extended to both live elephants and to their products (ivory, hide and meat). 1
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3. Recognition of the primacy of human interests. Direct conflicts between land use systems and between farmers and elephants result in elephants being killed and/or their available habitat being taken over for other uses with the result that the habitat available to elephants is reduced. 4. Recognition of the existence and ecological values of other (often rare) plant and animal species that may be threatened in areas where high densities of elephants occur. Elephants act as ecosystem engineers in protected areas and opinions (and values) differ on the levels at which their impacts on habitats and other species are acceptable. Given existing strongly held views relating to elephants and their conservation it is clear that reconciling these values is difficult if not impossible at a global level and an “ objective and independent decision-making mechanism ” that would satisfy all interests and positions is unlikely to emerge from this, or any other study. For this reason it is necessary, at the outset, to outline the main assumptions that underlie the decision making mechanism and a process for trade in ivory that are developed in this report. In summary these are as follows: (1) That should the Conference of the Parties (CoP) decide to permit a legal international trade in ivory for a species listed on Appendix I it would require a two-thirds majority for the transfer of the species, or a population of the species, to Appendix II. This would be a primary decision of the CoP and is explicitly not part of our Terms of Reference. This assumption is necessary to avoid continually qualifying statements about trade in the writing that follows. (2) This report deals with the subsidiary decisions and processes that may allow a trade in ivory from countries whose elephant populations are listed on Appendix II. It is in this context that we propose a decision-making mechanism and process for a trade in ivory (Section 5.3, p20 and Section 6, p27) to assist the CoP in reaching a decision on whether or not a trade in ivory could take place. (3) The main subsidiary assumptions and principles that we have applied in developing a workable decision-making process and a process for a trade in ivory include the following: a. That any legal trade will be sustainable and contribute positively to the conservation of elephants as envisaged in the African elephant range states’ African Elephant Management Plan. If a legal trade does not meet this objective, it should be stopped. b. That an effective and controlled legal trade in ivory can provide additional incentives to conserve elephants and their habitats and that landowners /occupiers should be involved in decision-making regarding the management and conservation of elephants, and in deriving benefits from maintaining elephants, on their land. c. That short and tight feedback loops between the state of elephant populations, the production and marketing of ivory, is essential and would require appropriate hierarchical decision-making processes and a measure of subsidiarity. d. That it is possible to establish a trade in ivory that minimises corrupt practices and the laundering of illegal ivory. By creating conditions that are advantageous for a legal trade, ultimately the illegal killing of elephants will be reduced. e. That effective monitoring and management of elephant populations and ivory can be maintained in countries trading in ivory. f. That best business practices, transparency and accountability will be adhered to in trading ivory.
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g. That ivory will be derived from natural mortality, sport hunting (presently legally permitted under CITES quotas), animals killed to control human-wildlife conflict, and, in some cases, culling to control overpopulation of elephants. Elephants will not be harvested to produce ivory, i.e. ivory, hides and meat will be a by-product of other management activities. h. That the failure to protect and conserve elephants in many countries in Africa is not primarily because other countries have traded in ivory but because they have not invested sufficiently in protecting their elephants and have not provided incentives for their conservation. (4) That this report will not be interpreted as an intended blue-print but as a basis for negotiation towards a workable solution to a trade in ivory that will involve a full range of stakeholders. More specifically, in order for the CoP to agree to a trade in ivory from Appendix II countries agreement in principle, if not in detail, between the countries and prospective importers would need to be established regarding four main aspects. These aspects are – a. The process for trading in ivory; b. Measures to ensure the sustainable conservation and management of elephant populations; c. The creation of incentives for elephant protection and conservation in those countries involved (i.e. disbursement of benefits derived from a trade in ivory); and d. Secure legal processing and marketing procedures in countries importing ivory in order to minimise, if not eradicate, the laundering of illegal ivory.
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2. CITES DECISION -MAKING IN RELATION TO IVORY
TOR Clause (a): ... exam ination of the various processes and decision-m aking mechanism s related to ivory trade that are or have been operating under the provisions of the Convention, including compliance and enforcem ent provisions; 2.1 Introduction CITES decision-making mechanisms are governed by the Articles of the Convention and guided by Resolutions adopted by the Parties, which interpret and assist in implementation of the Convention. Proposals to amend the Appendices of the Convention and/or their accompanying annotations in respect of any particular species may be submitted by one or more Parties 150 days in advance of a CoP and should include consultations with the other range states in which the species occurs. In the event that the proposing Party decides not to consult with other range states (which is not required under Article XV), the proposal should be submitted 330 days in advance of the CoP (Res.Conf. 8.21) to enable the Secretariat to carry out the required consultation with range states. For adoption, amendments of the Appendices require a two-thirds majority of the Parties present and voting. Parties may lodge reservations in cases where they do not accept an adopted amendment provided they make written notification to the depositary government within the 90 days before the amendment comes into effect. In this section of the report we first outline the development of steps that have been taken by CITES (based on Wijnstekers 2011 and related CITES documents) to stem the illegal international trade in ivory that has contributed to the decline of many elephant populations in Africa. We then briefly examine the key features of the decision-making processes relating to elephants and ivory, the impacts of the one-off sales of ivory, and the efficacy and costs of existing compliance procedures. 2.2 CITES controls on international trade in ivory 3 The Asiatic elephant, Elephas maximus, was listed on Appendix I of CITES when the Treaty was first signed in 1974. The African elephant, Loxodonta africana, was listed in Appendix III in February 1975 by Ghana and then listed on Appendix II in February 1977 following the first CoP held in Switzerland in November 1976. The decision-making mechanism was a straightforward process based on significant trade in ivory and a proposal, by Ghana, for listing on Appendix II and a vote of the Parties. Increasing ivory trade continued into the 1980s and reached a peak of over 1,000 tonnes in 1983. Concerns over the volume of trade led to the inception of a quota system in 1985 (see below). The decision-making processes involved in the lead-up to the introduction of the quota system began in 1981, with Resolution Conf. 3.12, which recommended to parties to introduce a number of steps and controls aimed at improving the level of documentation relating to the export and import of ivory, in an effort to distinguish between legal and illegal movements of ivory. Given the escalating amounts of ivory that continued to leave Africa between 1981 and 1986 these recommendations appear to have had limited, if any, impact. In 1985 (immediately before inception of the quota system) 912 tonnes of ivory left Africa and the legal trade dropped to 805t in 1986, 331t in 1987 and 142t in 1988 (Barbier et al 1990). Illegal trade undoubtedly took place over the same period but data on its extent are not available. The intent of the quota system was that countries should set their own quotas using the method of calculation prescribed in Res. Conf. 5.12 but there was little that the quota system could do to address the problem of illegal trade from countries such as Burundi the United Arab Emirates that were not parties to CITES in 1985. 4
3. 4. Fuller details of resolutions and decisions taken by successive CoPs are provided in the Background Study . Burundi acceded to CITES in 1988 and the UAE in 1990.
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Burundi had been a major exporter of ivory before the quota system was adopted although it had a population of only one elephant (Barbier et al 1990). Other major ivory traders continued to accumulate stocks of illegally acquired ivory which their governments could not accommodate within the quota system and, at the same time, maintain credibility. Inevitably such ivory had to be exported illegally. The problem was exacerbated once countries such as Japan adopted stricter importing regulations that excluded illegal ivory causing the illegal traffic, which was substantial, to move to other entrépots such as Macau and Singapore. The quota system was superseded by the transfer of all populations of the African elephant to Appendix I in 1989 with the adoption of Resolution Conf. 7.8 that urged all Parties to support the listing on Appendix I and to introduce stricter domestic controls on trade. The decision-making process in this case involved major technical and public action before the 7 th CoP in Lausanne in September 1989. The Ivory Trade Review Group, convened by the Wildlife Conservation Society, conducted a study of the global ivory trade and its impact on the African elephant in 1988 (ITRG 1989). The results of the study were released in June 1989 and resulted in the United States, the European Community and Hong Kong immediately placing an import ban on all worked and raw ivory. Japan introduced an import ban on worked ivory and raw ivory from all non-African states. Resolution Conf.7.8 came into force for all Parties to the Convention early in 1990 and effectively introduced a ban on all trade in raw and worked ivory. Reservations were entered by Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe. At the 8 th CoP, held in Kyoto in 1992, these four countries submitted proposals to transfer their elephant populations to Appendix II in return for which they undertook to maintain a moratorium on trade in ivory. Their proposals were not adopted. Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe appear not to have exported any raw ivory between 1990 and 1997 despite holding reservations against the Appendix I listings. They did, however, continue to sell ivory to their domestic carving industries. The absence of exports is partly explained by the fact that no importing Parties had entered reservations at the time of the listing in 1989. The elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe were transferred to Appendix II at CoP 10 in Harare in 1997 and the reservations that these countries had entered in 1989 were withdrawn. However, the CoP placed constraints on trade in ivory by the affected range states by adopting CoP Decisions 10.1 & 10.2 and Resolution Conf.10.10, which replaced Conf. 9.16. The first one-off sale of raw ivory from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe took place in 1999 with Japan being the single buyer approved by the CITES Secretariat. The decision-making process behind this sale was governed by the annotations included in Resolution Conf. 10.10. 5 The South African elephant population was transferred to Appendix II in 2000 with a zero quota for trade in raw ivory (CoP 11 in Gigiri, Kenya). A further one-off sale was approved by the Parties at CoP12, in Santiago (Chile) in 2002, but the sale was postponed at a succession of Standing Committee meetings until 2008. An “Action plan for the control of trade in African Ivory” was established at CoP13, in Bangkok in 2004, (Decision 13.26 (Rev. CoP15)) calling on all range states to urgently: (a) prohibit the unregulated domestic sale of ivory and, where regulated domestic trade is permitted, it should comply with the provisions of Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15); (b) instruct all law enforcement and border control agencies to enforce legislation rigorously; and (c) engage in awareness campaigns to publicise existing and new legislation regarding ivory sales.
5.
Additional constraints were added at subsequent meetings of the CoP and last consolidated under Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) at the 15 th CoP held in Doha in 2010. The current provisions governing international trade in ivory are given in the Background Study (Annex 2).
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The action plan also recommended range states to cooperate with research on ivory identification, called on the Secretariat to seek support from governments and other agencies to help eradicate illegal exports of ivory from Africa, and to assess progress in implementation of the action plan, particularly in states where unregulated internal markets are active. Provision was made in Decision 13.26 for countries selling significant amounts of illegal ivory to be sanctioned through a Standing Committee Notification to Parties “advising that the Conference of the Parties recommends that Parties do not authorize commercial trade in specimens of CITES-listed species with the State in question” (Wijnstekers 2011). At a meeting of the Standing Committee on 5 October 2006 a decision on the sale of ivory agreed at CoP12 in 2002 was further postponed. At CoP14, held in the Hague (Netherlands) in 2007 the existing annotation for the populations of elephants listed in Appendix II was replaced with one that constrained trade in ivory to buyers approved by the CITES Secretariat, namely, China and Japan at the time. These countries were to satisfy the Standing Committee that they had sufficient controls in place to prevent the laundering of illegal ivory through their ivory carving industries. The annotation also precluded any further proposals to sell ivory for a period of nine years. A one-off legal sale of 108 tonnes of ivory from Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe eventually took place in 2008. The ivory was auctioned and imported into China and Japan in 2009 (see Section 4, page 17). Recent studies of the ivory carving industry in China (EIA 2011, Martin & Vigne 2011a) have revealed that the legal provisions and controls, on which their status as a buyer of ivory is based, are not being fully implemented. Large quantities of illegal ivory are clearly entering their ivory carving industries. Once again the implementation of CITES resolutions at a national level by a member state has fallen short of expectations. At CoP 15 in Doha (Qatar) in 2010, further revisions of Resolution Conf. 10.10 took place resulting in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15). 2.3 Key features of the CITES decision-making processes relating to elephants The period between 1976, when the African elephant was first listed on Appendix II, and 2010 when the Conference of the Parties last met, has witnessed two surges in the amount of ivory leaving Africa – both associated with increasing prices for ivory. The first occurred during the 1980s and reached a peak in 1983 and the second is presently underway (i.e. in 2011/2012). Attempts to contain both the legal (through a quota system) and illegal trade during the 1980s were widely considered to have failed with the result that African elephants were listed on Appendix I in 1990. The following sixteen or so years witnessed a recovery of many elephant populations, associated with reduced illegal killing of elephant and reduced prices for ivory. The recovery was widely attributed to CITES intervention and the ban on international trade in ivory. However, domestic ivory carving industries continued within Africa and illegal ivory continued to leave the continent to support ivory carving in several Asian countries (Lemieux and Clarke 2009, Martin & Vigne 2010, 2011a, 2011b, Stiles 2004, 2009a, 2009b). The transfer to Appendix II of three populations in 1997 was accompanied by an increased effort to monitor the illegal trade in ivory and the illegal killing of elephants with the establishment of the ETIS and MIKE programs, which report through a Technical Advisory Group to the Secretariat. The primary purpose of these two programmes is “to establish monitoring systems through which the impact of CITES decisions with respect to elephants and trade in elephant specimens can be assessed” (Annexes to Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15). Since the transfer to Appendix II of the elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1997, and that of South Africa in 2000, the two sales of stockpiled ivory (1999 and 2008) were accompanied by continuing revisions, mostly in the form of annotations, to the initial primary resolution (Conf. 10.10) governing the trade in ivory from the Appendix II countries. The hope that the monitoring 6
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programs would provide definitive results on the impacts of CITES decisions in respect of trends in illegal trade in ivory and killing of elephants, particularly those related to the two sales of stockpiled ivory, have not yet been realised (see Section 4, page 17). It is important to appreciate that CITES itself does not have any direct enforcement or implementation capacity: 6 this lies with the member states and their capacity to implement the legally binding resolutions and decisions adopted by the CoP. And herein lies the crux of the conservation problems for African elephants. A high proportion of African elephant range states do not have the resources in funds and trained personnel to protect their elephant populations (e.g. Lemieux & Clarke 2009). As a result there is a marked scale mismatch (Cumming et al 2006) between the centralised decision-making processes of the Convention and the decision-making process and capacity on the ground. Furthermore, the feedback loops between what is happening in the field and the Convention’s decision-making and subsequent action on the part of member states are lengthy and delayed. High levels of elephant mortality and illegal trade in ivory have coincided with periods of civil disorder, corruption, and conflict associated with armed conflict and militias in eastern, central and southern Africa (e.g. Douglas-Hamilton (1983), Cumming (1986), Smith (et al 2003), Hart (2012 in litt). 2.4 The present system of trade and the market Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) and its annotations determine the manner in which trade in ivory can take place from countries whose elephant populations are listed on Appendix II. The practice of selling ivory stockpiles at lengthy, irregular intervals departs from normal commercial practices. It results in substantial losses to those selling ivory and, because the supply of legal ivory is irregular and uncertain, it provides no incentives to ivory traders to confine their trade to legally available ivory. There have been several economic studies of the likely effects of banning trade in ivory, of the one-off sales of ivory, and of the trade-offs between levels of law enforcement and incentives for illegal harvesting of ivory and rhino horn. Barbier et al (1990) drew attention to the need to provide incentives for elephant conservation if a ban was not to have negative impacts on elephants. Barnes (1996) explored the effects of an ivory trade ban on the economic value of elephants to Botswana and concluded that it reduced the existence and use value of elephants by about half. Several theoretical papers by Bulte, Damania, van Kooten, and by others (e.g. Bulte & van Kooten 1999, Bulte et al 2007) explore the effects of the ivory trade ban and one-off sales of ivory on the illegal trade, ivory prices and incentives to illegal trade but without clear policy solutions emerging. A key, and still unresolved, issue (despite the above studies) is the likely effect of a legal trade in ivory by some countries on the illegal killing of elephants elsewhere in Africa. Sound data with which to test the various hypotheses that have been advanced in relation to this issue are not available, and are unlikely to be so, until such time as the alternative hypotheses are tested empirically. Elephants provide ecosystem services, both in the sense of their keystone role in ecosystem dynamics and in the sense of their existence and aesthetic value to many cultures. Payments for ecosystem services are emerging as an important source of support for environmental conservation (e.g. Kok et al 2010) and possibly as a means of assisting in meeting the costs of conserving elephants and large carnivores (e.g. Bulte et al 2008, Dickman et al 2011). These still nascent initiatives might provide an avenue that CITES and member states could explore as opportunities to develop incentives for the conservation of species such as elephants, rhinos and the large carnivores.
6.
The use of sanctions against non-compliant states can and has been used to effectively to bring about compliance by affected states. However, this instrument does not appear to have been used in dealing with the problem of unregulated domestic ivory markets in Africa (see Reeve 2006).
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There are at least three sets of costs that need to be factored into the elephant conservation equation that are related to present compliance and enforcement measures under CITES. These are the costs associated with protecting elephant populations in the field, the costs of CITES monitoring of compliance and enforcement and the external subsidies that support African elephant conservation. Here we deal only with the likely law enforcement costs. The costs of managing protected areas in savannas can be estimated using the following formula developed by Martin (2007) –
Total Cost = US$ A x Illegal Hunting Challenge x Annual Scout Salary x %(Area)
– where A is a constant of 4 for savanna parks and 2 for desert parks, Illegal Hunting Challenge is a constant taking the values: 1 = Low, 2 = Moderate, 3 = High, 4 = Severe; the Annual Scout Salary is expressed in US$; park Area is expressed in square kilometers. This relationship provided a good fit with the state protected areas in South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique. An earlier rule of thumb derived from park running costs in the early 1980s was a figure of at least US$ 200 per km 2 for operating costs. Cumming (2008) provided examples of operating budgets and their deficits for five major parks in the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area and all were operating on budget deficits of between 62% (Chobe National Park) and 92% (Hwange National Park) based on the above formula. For protected areas in tropical forests the constant A could well be eight or greater. Taking an average park area of 10,000 km 2 for central, east and southern Africa, a severe illegal hunting challenge of 4, a ranger or scout annual salary of $4,000 per annum and a constant of 6 (mean of 4 and 8) for A, with a total of (say) 40 parks that include elephants, the likely minimum budget required to adequately protect these elephant populations would be in the region of US$384 million per annum. 2.6 Concluding comment The measures taken by CITES and member states almost certainly contributed to reducing levels of illegal trade for the period 1990 to about 2006. Other factors such as improved law enforcement in some countries following the ban may have also contributed. However, given the present rise in illegal killing of elephants in West, Central and East Africa it is clear that current measures are not containing the present upsurge in the illegal trade in ivory. The tendency to ascribe this increase to the sale of stockpiled ivory in 2008 diverts attention away from the far more serious problems relating to the inability of African countries to invest in protecting their elephants – an observation that begs the question of what incentives are there for them to do so? The focus on regulation without incentives is a central issue that needs to be addressed, a point made strongly by Barbier (et al 1990) in their contribution to the ITRG report and in their book and later by Swanson (2000). Or, as Murphree (1996) put it – “Regulation of use is an essential component for sustainability in use. Prevailing regulatory structures consist largely of a proscriptive and legislative nature imposed by the centre on the periphery, and they have failed to stop negative trends. The profile of the incentive package for regulatory compliance is too often wrong. Incentive is the fulcrum of regulation.” ______________
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3. EVALUATION OF TRADE REGIMES IN HIGH -VALUED PRODUCTS
TOR Clause (b): ... evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of international trade regim es and associated controls, safeguards and m onitoring m ethods for other high-value comm odities in the context of future trade in ivory 3.1 Introduction Domestic and international trade in wildlife is one of the major factors that affects the status and distribution of wild species (Oldfield 2003). By their very nature wild species, unless farmed or ranched, are common pool resources and are often de facto open access resources, which means that issues of ownership and resource protection become important variables (e.g. Ostrom 2009). These considerations suggest that a finer-scaled approach to examining the effectiveness or otherwise of trade regulations and markets for wildlife (Fischer 2004, 2010) is needed if we are to draw lessons from case studies on other species for the conservation of elephants in Africa. Elephant ivory probably fits within a high value / medium-to-low volume category and can only be retrieved from dead animals. Rhino horn presently commands a very high price but can be harvested from wild animals without killing them, as can the wool from vicuna. 7 The highest levels of trade in wild species, in both volume and overall value, are to be found in the timber and marine fisheries trade, but value per unit mass is generally low. An exception is the black caviar from the beluga sturgeon where the retail value is about US$ 465 per ounce or $16,402/kg (Weber 2010). International trade regimes in high valued products from wild species that are strictly comparable, or analogous, to elephants do not exist. This obstacle may be overcome to some extent by considering particular features of trade regimes in other species and other non-wildlife commodities that may provide useful guidelines for a trade in ivory. 3.2 Trade in high valued commodities We examined trade regimes in several species and groups of species, but only the following are briefly covered here: African rhinos, narwhals, vicuna, tigers, timber, and diamonds (see Background Study , Chapter 3 for further details). We drew the following key features that are relevant to a future trade in ivory from each example – 3.2.1 African rhinoceroses (Diceros bicornis, Ceratotherium simum ) All African species of rhinoceros were listed on Appendix I in 1977, in response to a dramatic decline in the numbers of black rhino from > 60,000 in 1970 to < 15,000 in 1980 (Emslie & Brooks 1999). Key features that emerge from the rhino conservation experience that have implications for elephant conservation and a trade in ivory are – a) The recent upsurge in rhino poaching, despite very high levels of protection, emphasises the increased level of investment required to protect endangered species carrying very valuable appendages. In some areas intensive daily monitoring of tagged individuals has been a cornerstone of protection and law enforcement strategies, as has dehorning. b) The northern white rhino is now probably extinct in its former range. High NGO investment in its protection in Garamba National Park eventually failed against a backdrop of negligible government support, and high levels of civil disorder and military action in the area.
7.
The price for raw ivory in the field is dependent on the size of the tusk but even the largest tusks seldom exceed a value of US$1,000/kg – whereas the current price for rhino horn is around US$25,000/kg to the illegal hunter. Vicuna wool has been valued at between US$ 250 and $940/kg (Lichtenstein 2011).
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The growth in numbers of the southern white rhino over the last 30 years was associated with an expansion in their range through the purchase of animals by private landholders to stock conservancies and game ranches. For landowners the incentives were the added value to their tourism enterprises. Similar incentives supported the relocation of black rhino from national parks on Zimbabwe’s border to private land during the period when the country’s population crashed from > 1,775 in 1986 to < 350 in 1993 (Du Toit 2002, Emslie & Brooks 1999). The value of rhino horn has risen rapidly in the last few years despite the absence of a legal trade in rhino horn since 1977. 3.2.2 Narwhals (Monodon monoceros ). Narwhals are confined to the Arctic waters of northern Russia, northern Canada, Greenland and Svalbard, and are usually in or near sea ice. Adults are 4-5m long, weigh up to 1,600kg, and males carry a single spiralled tusk of 1.5 to 3m long. They are highly social mammals, reach sexual maturity at 7-9 years with a gestation period of 14-15 months, and may live for 75 to 100+ years (NAMMCO 2005). Inuit hunters have subjected them to a subsistence harvest for centuries and the animals have been hunted since medieval times for their tusks, which were believed to have magical properties. The main market for the ivory was Europe. The global population is estimated to be about 80,000. They were listed on Appendix II in 1977. There are two aspects relating to the management of narwhals that may have useful pointers for the management of elephants and a trade in ivory, namely, the role of localised commissions to manage the species and their modified use of the Non-Detrimental Findings (NDF) process. These institutional arrangements go some way to reducing the scale mismatches identified in the previous section and thus increase the likelihood of local participation in decision-making, buy-in and compliance. 3.2.3 Vicuña (Vicugna vicugna ). Vicuñas were listed on CITES Appendix I in 1975 when the total population had dropped to about 10,000 animals through overexploitation. The Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Vicuña was signed in 1979 by Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Andean people were named as the main beneficiaries of future vicuña use in Article I of the Vicuña Convention and in the signatory states’ subsequent submissions to CITES meetings. Luxury garments made from vicuña fibre are sold in the most exclusive fashion houses in Europe, USA, Asia and Australia. The vicuña population recovered to about 421,500 individuals during the period 1965-2010. CITES and the Vicuña Convention played a key role in halting the population decline (Lichtenstein 2011). The total vicuña fibre production of Andean countries is approximately 7,400 kg per year. In the past ten years, prices paid for raw fibre have ranged from US$250 to US$940 per kg and have varied greatly among and within countries. The profits obtained from the transformation of raw material in Italy are high but producers probably reap less than 5% of the price paid for the final product (Lichtenstein 2011). Despite these problems of equity and the apparently low rewards to local farmers the recovery of vicuña has been remarkable and has been characterized by the following key features – a) An initial listing on Appendix 1, which provided an effective ban on lethal harvesting of vicuña that was complied with by the range states involved. b) A formal Convention for the Conservation and Management of Vicuña was then established by the five range states in which the species occurred. c) Once recovery of the species began, and appropriate institutions were established under the legal frameworks of the countries concerned, vicuñas were then listed on Appendix II. d) An explicit commitment was made to involve and benefit local farmers and communities in the conservation and management of vicuña.
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3.2.4 Tigers (Panthera tigris ). As in the case of black rhinos, the range of tigers and their numbers have plummeted in recent decades (Dinerstein et al 2007) primarily through demand for body parts and a loss of habitat and prey. There are a few examples where concerted conservation efforts have resulted in some local recovery. The costs of these successful conservation efforts have varied from as little as $14/km2 in the Russian Far East to about $250/km2 in the Terai Arc Landscape of Nepal (Dinerstein et al 2007). China banned all trade in tiger parts within its territory in 1993 and this was considered to have been successful in reducing demand and trade (Gratwicke et al 2008). Conservationists argue that the farming of tigers in China will provide an opening for the laundering of parts from wild tigers, particularly those from wild animals that are considered to provide a more potent medicine (Dinerstein et al 2007, Gratwicke et al 2008). Bulte & Damania (2005), using theoretical models, examined aspects of likely market responses to parts from wild and farmed animals (tigers and rhinos) and concluded “simple rules of thumb might not exist in the complex world of the international trade in wildlife commodities.” They suggest that criminal networks, centred between illegal suppliers and consumers, can gain market control and so influence the relative balance in pricing between wild (illegal) and farmed components of trade. We examined the examples of tigers and crocodiles because they raise two pertinent points that relate to trade regimes in high valued products – a) When member states seriously attempt to implement CITES decisions, as China did in banning domestic trade in tiger parts, they can contribute positively to the conservation of endangered species within and beyond their borders. b) The insights relating to market control and thresholds between legal and illegal supplies of high valued commodities raised by Bulte and Damania’s (2005) analysis may have important implications for the manner in which any legal trade in ivory is managed. c) In-depth economic analysis of wildlife trade (at least for the species covered above) has been restricted to theoretical modelling and surveys of what is available in end markets. We are not aware of any in-depth empirical studies of demand and preferences for wildlife products by consumers based on statistically sound market and opinion surveys. 3.2.5 The International Timber Trade and Certification . Timber is by some margin the most valuable renewable natural resource commodity traded. In the early 1990s, TRAFFIC estimated the global timber trade was worth around US$104 billion, approximately 65% of the total worldwide wildlife trade. By 2009, the FAO estimated the annual turnover at more than US$200 billion (TRAFFIC 2012). In response to ongoing depletion of forests and the general failure of trade agreements, civil society organisations sought to build stronger links between the producers and consumers of timber and timber products by the certification of products throughout the full chain of custody. Perhaps the most prominent of these certification schemes has been that driven by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) founded in 1993. The ten FSC principles and criteria for certification (http://www.fsc.org/) are relevant to a trade in ivory because the developments in certification and green labelling may provide guidance in achieving public involvement in market choices in relation to ivory artefacts (Background Study , Chapter 3). It should be recognized, however, that such developments are only likely to be effective in societies where consumers feel a moral obligation to avoid illegally sourced goods and to support socially and environmentally sound and sustainable practices. These societal values are not presently evident in the major markets for ivory but there is no reason why attempts should not be made to develop them. The applicability of this type of approach (often referred to as “eco-labelling”) to CITES and the trade in wildlife is well argued by Swanson (2000) and requires a meeting of minds between producers and consumers. 11
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3.2.6 The diam ond trade. Up until the late nineteenth century, diamonds were a rare and valued gemstone. They were found in a few riverbeds in India and Brazilian forests. The entire world production of gem diamonds amounted to a few kilograms a year, which served to maintain their rarity value. In 1867 the discovery of the Eureka diamond along the Orange River in South Africa precipitated a rush for alluvial diamonds along the river. This was soon eclipsed by the discovery of a diamond pipe at Kimberley in 1870 that resulted in the first diamond mine. This mine, and later others, yielded huge numbers of diamonds that had the potential to flood the market. The major investors in diamond mines realized that it would be in their interests to combine into a single entity powerful enough to control diamond production and maintain the scarcity of diamonds. The instrument that they created for this purpose was De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.; a company incorporated in South Africa (Epstein 1982). De Beers dominated the diamond mining, diamond trading and industrial diamond manufacturing sectors up until 2000 when it relinquished its global monopoly (Stein, 2001). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) originated at a meeting of Southern African diamond-producing states in Kimberley in May 2000. The process was designed to certify the origin of rough diamonds from sources which are free of conflict funded by diamond production. However, it is not providing the hoped-for controls over the trade and many international NGOs which supported the KCPS initially are now withdrawing their support. One of the KCPS’s major flaws lies in its organisational structure which relies on system of rotating chairs from national governments and allows the political process to influence the decisions of the organisation. We do not see the Kimberley Process as providing a model for the ivory trade. The former De Beers’ system is relevant to a potential future trade in ivory because of the direct links it established between producers and diamond cutting factories and the manner in which it sold diamonds. The De Beers selling system In 1931 the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) took over the responsibility for allocating diamonds to manufacturers and wholesalers. (1) The entire world supply of raw diamonds was distributed through a single outlet at Number Two Charterhouse Street in London where sales (called ‘sights’) took place every five weeks during the year, i.e. about ten sales per year. Some 250 chosen buyers (named ‘sightholders’) who owned diamond-cutting factories in New York, Tel Aviv, Bombay, Antwerp and Hong Kong attended the sales. DTC carried out its own market research on the demand for diamonds and allowed sightholders to submit requests for their particular requirements before each sale. Rough diamonds were sorted into ‘parcels’ before each sale and the head of DTC set the price for each parcel. Each parcel was allocated to a specific individual sightholder. Buyers had to accept the prices set for their parcels and haggling was not permitted. A sightholder had Hobson’s Choice – he either accepted his parcel or rejected it. If he refused to pay the price he might not be invited to future sights. Sightholders undertook to move their rough diamonds directly into the diamond cutting and polishing industry. They agreed not to trade in the rough stones they had purchased and also undertook not to sell their cut and polished stones to wholesalers or retail jewellers who undercut prices at the retail level. De Beers sought to remove destructive competition in the jewellery market. Sightholders agreed to provide De Beers with whatever information it needed to assess the diamond market. This included full inventories of their own stocks in both rough and polished diamonds.
(2) (3) (4) (5)
(6)
(7)
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This system of selling enabled De Beers to extend its control from the mines to the cutting factories of Belgium, India, Israel and the United States. Through its clients De Beers was able to monitor and regulate the flow of diamonds that passed through the pipeline into the world retail market. The key elements of this system that have potential for a trade in ivory and the conservation of elephants are – a) b) A very short and effectively controlled market chain between production and processing. Cooperation between producers and processors leading to adaptive management in, and careful attention to, the pricing of the raw material and the selling of processed artefacts. c) Effective control of the legal market for an extended period.
3.3 Ivory market chains and controls Ivory is produced when elephants die from natural causes (including predation) or when humans kill them. A person then collects the ivory that may travel via several routes to a variety of end users as indicated diagrammatically in Fig. 3.1 below. A key question, is where and how in this “market chain” control of the trade might be implemented to most effectively minimise illegal trade and the risk of illegal ivory entering the legal market chain?
Figure 3.1: M ovement of ivory from production in the field to end consumers through legal (blue lines) and illegal (red lines and boxes) pathways. The two-way arrow between the legal external ivory trader and the illegal ivory trade in the centre of the diagram highlights a key point of “contagion” between legal and illegal ivory and one that could be closed by the process outlined in Chapter 6.
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Illegally derived ivory has clearly been included in the ivory carving businesses in Asia (Martin & Vigne 2011a) and some African countries (Martin & Vigne 2011b). In the case of China the legally purchased 60 tonnes ivory in 2008 had been held by government agencies and rationed to carving business but with a price hike of some 500% over the purchase price (D. Stiles 2012 in litt.). In this way an intermediary trader in ivory could radically influence the price of raw ivory, whether legal or illegal. The selection of which countries could buy ivory was based on an evaluation, by the Secretariat (e.g. CITES 2005), of the domestic controls the country had in place to regulate their ivory carving. Clearly these controls have been ineffective (Martin & Vigne 2011a). The question then is what means are likely to be the most effective in regulating the entry of ivory into the market chain and its transit to ivory carvers and consumers? 3.4 Concluding comment The above brief review of aspects relating to the international trade in several species with high valued products and of the earlier trade in diamonds, suggests that the following features may be important in designing a process for the trade in ivory – 1. The costs of protecting species with high valued products may be very high and beyond the means of many developing countries to meet. 2. Government and public support, together with an absence of civil disorder, are important ingredients to successful conservation of high-valued species and the maintenance of legal trade in commodities. 3. Expanding the range of high-valued species beyond the boundaries of state protected areas requires incentives to landholders. 4. The development of regional and local institutions, such as joint commissions, 8 for the management of species and trade in their commodities is likely to be beneficial, as is the involvement of a full range of stakeholders in the management of the resource and its trade. 5. 6. Strong domestic law and enforcement is pivotal to success. An understanding of the market in which commodities are to be traded needs to be based on sound empirical data dealing with consumer preferences, attitudes and behaviour, particularly if they are to be influenced by pricing structures and certification, or green labelling initiatives. 7. The shorter the market chain between producer and consumer the less likelihood there is of illegal components being laundered in a legal trade and the fewer the opportunities for corrupt practices to develop. 8. There is a clear need to address the leakages in the collection of ivory and in its distribution in trading partner countries. _______________
8.
See W eber (2008) for an analysis of the potential benefits of links between regional management organisations and CITES
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SC62 Doc. 46.4 Annex
Decision-Making Mechanism for Trade in Ivory – Final Report
Section 4
4. IMPACT OF H ARVESTING AND T RADE ON E LEPHANT P OPULATIONS
Clause (d) of the TOR states: Exploration of the conditions under which international trade in elephant ivory could take place, taking into account: ecological and econom ic sustainability of the ivory trade; the impact of trade on the illegal killing of elephants; the initial im pact of the one-off sale that was agreed at the 14 th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (The Hague 2007); levels of illegal trade, enforcem ent challenges and capacities; inform ation on linkages between legal and illegal trade; and methods to elucidate these linkages; methods to track the chain of custody, etc.. This section is a summary of Chapter 4 which appears in the Background Study . 4.1 History of ivory trade The latter part of the 19 th Century saw a major rise in the export of ivory from Africa which reached a peak in 1887 with approximately 1,000 tonnes leaving Africa (Spinage 1973) and a corresponding decline in elephant numbers across the continent. By the 1950s most elephant populations had shown clear signs of recovery. A sharp rise in the amount of ivory being exported from Africa began in the 1970s, reached a peak of nearly 1,100 tonnes in 1983 and declined until 1989 when the international ban on the trade in ivory was introduced. During the last two centuries the movement of ivory has tended to shift with changing patterns of supply and demand. Large quantities of ivory were imported into India during the early part of the 19 th Century, then into the United Kingdom, followed by Japan and Hong Kong during the latter part of the 20 th Century. The imports of ivory into these four countries alone over the two hundred year period have in several years approached 1,000 tonnes per annum. The ivory exports from Africa during the ten years prior to the listing of the African elephant on Appendix I exceeded 800 tonnes consistently up until the inception of the quota system in 1985. Eastern and Central Africa together provided more than 80% of these exports. While many consider that the ongoing illegal trade in ivory and the declines in some elephant populations are driven by demand for ivory in China, there are many drivers involved and identifying and quantifying the root causes of declines in elephant populations with any certainty is presently not possible because of a lack of appropriate data (e.g. Burn et al 2011, Stiles 2009, Stiles 2012, in litt.). 4.2 Elephant population estimates Elephant population estimates are available from the African Elephant Database for 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2007. The data for 2007 (Blanc et al 2007) are given in Table 4.1 below but they are already 5 years out of date. If the average rates of increase of populations in each region up to 2007 had persisted, the continental elephant population would be some 738,000 in the year 2012. However, recent reports suggest that elephant populations in W est, East and Central Africa have declined markedly in the past two years. In making estimates of the potential ivory production at a continental level, we have conservatively used a figure of 500,000 elephants (the ‘Definites’ and ‘Probables’). The quality of the data does not allow much greater precision. Table 4.1: Continental elephant estimates 2007
ESTIMATES Definite 453,073 Probable 101,900 Possible 104,085 Speculative 50,364 Def+Prob 554,973 TOTALS Def+Prob+Poss 659,058 All 709,422
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SC62 Doc. 46.4 Annex
Decision-Making Mechanism for Trade in Ivory – Final Report 4.3 Sustainability of ivory production
Section 4
The sustainability of ivory production under increasing levels of exploitation has been examined for several scenarios using a population simulation model (Background Study , Annex 3). (1) When the offtake targets the animals with the largest tusks in the population, the maximum sustained yield occurs at an offtake of about 5% of the total numbers, at which level – a. b. c. The population growth rate is close to zero and the mean tusk weight of ivory coming from the population would be about 5kg; The proportions of tusks coming from males and females would be roughly equal. The oldest surviving males would be about 22 years and the oldest surviving females about 50 years old; Ivory production would be about 0.5kg per annum per living elephant in the population which would yield about 500kg of ivory for every 1,000 elephants. 9.
Under certain circumstances, these figures could be useful in making deductions about the status of living elephant populations or drawing conclusions from raw ivory seizures. (2) Some alternative scenarios are given – a. Illegal exploitation of elephant might take the form of successively making entire ‘subpopulations’ extinct in which case the ivory appearing in the market would exhibit the structure and characteristics of the ivory in the living population. The mean tusk weight for the male ivory in all age classes is 8.36kg and that for the females is 2.55kg. In examining a seizure of ivory, these characteristics could be used to determine whether the ivory came from a population of previously unexploited elephants. A typical elephant management regime where trophy hunting, culling, problem animal control and natural mortality all contribute to ivory production results in a relatively high volume of ivory with two-thirds of the total coming from trophy hunting (offtake