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Brief illustration pertaining to norwegian cruise line center for digital.
TC6-0037
This case was written by Dave Sibley (T’13) and Professor M. Eric J ohnson of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. It
was written as a basis for class discussion and not to illustrate effective or ineffective management practices. Version: J une 18,
2013.
©2013 Trustees of Dartmouth College. All rights reserved. For permission to reprint, contact the Center for Digital Strategies
at 603-646-0899.
Norwegian Cruise Line
Kevin Sheehan, Chief Executive Officer and President of Norwegian Cruise Line, looked
out the window as the plane descended into Frankfurt, Germany, where Sheehan would join
colleagues to drive to the Meyer Werft Shipyard in Papenburg, Germany. With two months
before the delivery of Norwegian’s newest ship, Norwegian Breakaway, Sheehan reflected
on the evolution of the company’s Freestyle Cruising product offering. Breakaway was
completely designed and built to deliver on the latest generation of Freestyle Cruising—
Norwegian’s core differentiator that provided guests more options for dining, entertainment
and accommodations than typical cruise vacations. Under Sheehan’s leadership over the
past six years, Norwegian had experienced a dramatic turnaround, largely due to his efforts
to help the organization deliver on the promise of providing a great Freestyle experience. In
J anuary 2013, after five years of profitable growth, Sheehan rang the bell at NASDAQ on
Norwegian’s first day of trading. It had been a whirlwind getting ready for the IPO and the
first months of 2013 had not let up. Looking at the bleak March landscape surrounding the
airport, Sheehan wondered how Norwegian could continue to improve the guest experience,
further enhancing the Freestyle concept on board Norwegian Breakaway and the fleet’s
eleven other ships.
The Cruise Industry
The modern passenger cruise industry evolved from a means of transportation to become a
popular vacation option where, beyond the exotic destinations, the ship’s amenities and the
voyage itself were a key part of the vacation experience. Mass-market cruise ships typically
carried between 2,000 and 5,000 passengers (as well as 800 to 1,700 crewmembers) and
offered a wide variety of entertainment. Cruise lines generated revenue in two primary
ways. The majority came from the sale of the passenger ticket, or cruise fare, with
additional revenue generated from the sale of onboard food, drink, merchandise,
entertainment, and shore excursions.
The industry had grown significantly over the past three decades, with capacity growing at
an annual rate of 7.78% from 41,000 lower berths (sleeping beds) in 1981 to nearly 390,000
in 2011
1
. Cruise Line International Association (CLIA), the largest cruise line association,
forecasted a total global passenger count of 20.97M in 2013 with 17.6M passengers being
from North America. While most passengers were North American, cruise lines offered
cruises all over the world; the primary markets were the Caribbean (34.4%), the
Mediterranean (21.7%) and Northern Europe (10.9%). The majority of cruises were 7-nights
1
Cruise Line International Association’s Passenger Carrying Report, Q1 2012
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in length, but anything from 3 nights to 14 night cruises were common. Cruise ships
typically returned to the home port early in the morning to let guests disembark, clean the
ship, replenish food and beverage, and welcome new guests before departing the port in the
late afternoon for the next cruise.
The cruise market had matured into three segments: contemporary, premium and luxury.
While price and quality (accommodations, included food and drink, etc.) were the primary
differentiators, cruise lines in different segments tended to differ on cruise lengths, ship
sizes, and destinations. The range of per person, per night prices for each segment was:
contemporary between $150 and $200, premium between $300 and $350, and luxury in
excess of $500. The majority of the cruise industry fell in the contemporary (~75%) and
premium (~20%) segments.
While there were dozens of cruise line brands, the industry was highly concentrated,
stemming from significant merger and acquisition activity and high barriers to entry. The
two largest operators in 2013, Carnival Corporation & PLC and Royal Caribbean Cruises
Ltd., owned 47% and 24% of industry capacity, respectively
2
.
Carnival Corporation operated ten cruise brands including Carnival Cruise Lines, Princess
Cruises, Holland America Line, and Costa Cruises. Together, the brands generated $15.4B
dollars in revenue and operated a combined 100 cruise ships, 61% of which belong to their
North American brands
3
(see Exhibit 1 for detailed breakdown).
Carnival Cruise Lines was the largest brand in the world, operating 24 ships. Carnival
deployed the majority of their ships from ports in the United States, many beyond the
popular Florida ports. Additional home ports included Boston, Los Angles, Charleston,
Galveston, New Orleans, and Baltimore. By sailing cruises from ports that were closer to
population centers, Carnival was able to reduce the total vacation cost.
Carnival’s stated mission was to “take the world on vacation and deliver exceptional
experiences that appeal to a large variety of consumers, all at an outstanding value.”
4
Their
target customers were value focused.
Royal Caribbean Cruises was the second largest cruise company in the world operating 40
ships across five brands including Royal Caribbean International (RCI), Celebrity Cruises,
and Pullmantur. In 2012, Royal Caribbean generated roughly $7.7B in revenue across all
brands.
Royal Caribbean International, was the second largest cruise line with 22 ships, including the
largest passenger cruise ships in the world, Oasis of the Seas and her sister ship, Allure of
the Seas.
2
The Essentials of Cruise Investing, Goldman Sachs, May 4, 2012
3
Carnival Corporation Form10-K, Fiscal Year ended November 30, 2012
4
Carnival Corporation Form10-K, Fiscal Year ended November 30, 2012
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There were dozens of other cruise lines that offered ocean and river cruises (see Exhibit 2 for
list). Among them were the Italian line, MSC Cruises, a division of the large Mediterranean
Shipping Company, with 12 ships in 2013 and Disney Cruise Line with 4 ships.
Carnival, Royal Caribbean, and Norwegian were priced comparably, while the onboard
revenue was the highest for Norwegian and lowest for Carnival:
Full Year 2012 Net Revenue per Person per Day (Double Occupancy)
5
Cruise Line Ticket Onboard Total
Norwegian $124 $52 $176
Royal Caribbean $128 $46 $174
Carnival $130 $41 $171
Norwegian Cruise Line
Norwegian Cruise Line was founded in 1966 with one cruise ship and was the first cruise
line to offer round-trip cruises to the Caribbean from the then-new Port of Miami. In early
2013, Norwegian was the third largest cruise line operating 11 ships, with two Breakaway
class ships scheduled to be delivered in 2013 and 2014. For the 12 months ending December
31
st
, 2012, Norwegian had revenue of $2.3B, with $1.6B generated from passenger ticket
revenue and the remaining $0.7B from onboard and other.
Although Norwegian had been an industry pioneer, it floundered in 1990’s with mistaken
acquisitions and divestitures that diluted the brand and allowed competitors to surpass it in
size and market share. “Norwegian had old ships, a weaker brand and was fading away”,
said Andy Stuart, EVP of Sales and Passenger Services.
In 2000, Norwegian was acquired by what is today known as Genting Hong Kong, a
financial holding company that owned Star Cruises, making Star Cruises the third largest
cruise operator in the world. In the first few years of the relationship, Norwegian contracted
a number of new ships and transferred others to Star Cruises. Between 1999 and 2010,
Norwegian launched 10 new ships.
In 2003, Norwegian launched a new brand, NCL America, which over the next three years,
launched three U.S. flagged and crewed ships to sail the Hawaiian Islands (due to the
Passenger Services Act, foreign flagged and crewed ships could not sail from a U.S. port to
another U.S. port without first docking at a foreign port). The rapid capacity expansion into
Hawaii, along with the impending recession proved too aggressive, and the company later
withdrew two of the three ships from the market after losing an estimated $100M a year.
In August 2007 the private equity group, Apollo Management, invested $1B cash into
Norwegian, making the firm a 50% owner. One of Apollo’s first actions was to appoint
Kevin Sheehan CEO in 2008. Sheehan brought to Norwegian a diverse business background
5
Company SEC filings
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that included taking Avis rental car public, helping found the Spanish-language network
Telemundo, and launching the Sega channel.
Sheehan made changes to several executive level positions, which resulted in a leadership
team that was a mix of cruise industry veterans and those with outside expertise. Since
taking the helm in 2008, Sheehan reinvigorated the company’s culture and improved
financial performance, ultimately leading to the IPO in early 2013 (see Exhibit 3 for
financial results), that sold 13% of the company to the public.
Norwegian’s mission was to be a “leading global cruise line operator, offering cruise
experiences for travelers with a wide variety of itineraries… with the goal of providing our
customers the highest levels of overall satisfaction on their cruise experience… We created a
distinctive style of cruising called ‘Freestyle Cruising’ onboard all of our ships, which we
believe provides our passengers with the freedom and flexibility associated with a resort
style atmosphere and experience as well as more dining options than a traditional cruise.”
6
Launching Freestyle Cruising
Norwegian launched Freestyle Cruising in 2000 to differentiate it from other cruise lines and
to attract travelers who were turned off by the “cattle call” perception of cruising.
The typical cruise model offered guests one of two dining times in a large main dining room
and two showings of the main entertainment. Guests could choose to have an early dinner
with a late show or have an early show and a late dinner. Cruise ships like those operated by
Carnival and Royal Caribbean typically had large restaurants in which guests ate each night,
usually at the same table with the same fellow guests and server. Guests were typically
expected to dress in relatively formal attire to enhance the dining experience for all. Such
traditional cruise lines also offered buffets and limited specialty dining, enabling guests to
upgrade to higher-end dining venues. Seating was very limited and upgrading could be
expensive, so most guests ate the majority of dinners in the main dining room. With this
operating model, cruise lines controlled the flow of traffic, forcing the majority of guests
into one of two options (see Carnival deck plan in Exhibit 4).
In 2000, Norwegian launched the Freestyle Cruising concept on select ships, with the idea to
let guests dine when and where they wanted. On Star Cruises’ ships, which largely served as
gambling ships in Asia, dining was not a main appeal of cruising; therefore, cruises didn’t
have set dining times. Several company executives decided to bring this idea to Norwegian
as a way to differentiate the brand from its competitors.
The company cut the size of the main restaurants and offered additional dining venues with
varying sizes—up to 9 restaurants on the initial ships, with several charging small cover
charges. The program offered open seating, more flexible hours, and more flexible “resort-
casual” attire.
6
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd FormS-1 Registration statement
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The transition to Freestyle Cruising was rough, recalled VP of Hotel Operations, Mark
Kansley, who joined Norwegian shortly before the introduction of Freestyle Cruising. With
years of cruise industry experience, he was initially skeptical of the idea. “When I heard
these conversations, I was really afraid. Deep within myself, I thought that there is no way
we can do this.” When Norwegian went live with the first Freestyle Cruising voyage on the
Norwegian Sky, Kansley reflected “I distinctly remember on the first day—by midnight I
was literally crying… the execution was not what our guests paid for.”
The biggest initial struggle was long lines for the main dining room, which could be 30-
minutes or longer during peak times. One Norwegian Sky guest from 2004 wrote a review
on cruisecritic.com:
“For our Freestyle dining experience, it was "Eat when Norwegian wanted
you to, where Norwegian wanted you to". We stood in line every night to put
our name on a list for a table then sat around and waited for our name to be
called. Every time when we went into the dining room there were tables
available, but no staff to serve them. When we did get a table, the staff was
inexperienced or experienced and overworked (more tables than they could
handle or training other staff). Every night we heard trays of dishes hit the
floor.”
7
Additionally, as the food and beverage team focused on the new dining options, the main
dining room saw lower quality than guests expected. This, in addition to the cover charges
for many restaurants, meant guests felt like they had to pay for decent food. Reflecting on
the transition, Andy Stuart commented, “everybody underestimated how much the product
hinged on having two dining times.” Long lines, slow service, and poor food quality forced
the organization to dig deep and change the way they had historically operated.
Freestyle Built Ships
By the mid-2000’s the company’s fleet was comprised of a mix of ships, some purpose built
for Freestyle Cruising and others that were retrofitted for the concept. The company
embarked on a fleet renewal program which resulted in the transfer of these retrofitted ships
to Star Cruises along with the construction of the second generation of Freestyle Cruising
ships. These ships, known as the J ewel class, debuted in 2005, and took Freestyle Cruising
to the next level with additional dining options and accommodations, including a private all-
suites complex, which was branded in 2010 as “The Haven by Norwegian”. The 93,000
gross ton ships had a double-occupancy capacity of 2,400 passengers and focused on
providing increased flexibility for dining and cabin selection. The dining locations were
intentionally spread throughout the ship on the main passenger decks and pool decks to
move crowds away from the main dining room. The J ewel class ships were the first to have
an expanded option of suites with 10 different room types offered.
7
http://www.cruisecritic.com/memberreviews/memberreview.cfm?EntryID=4865
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Additionally, these ships were built with an increased number of galleys to support the
increased number of dining venues. Without this improvement, the operations of moving
food around the ship and to the table would have been complex and time-consuming.
Having improved the delivery of Freestyle dining, Norwegian shifted focus towards the
entertainment offering when designing its third generation ship. The result was the
Norwegian Epic, which was designed and ordered just prior to Sheehan’s arrival. Epic was
the third largest passenger cruise ship in service with a gross tonnage of 155,000 tons and a
double-occupancy capacity of 4,100 passengers. Its entertainment offering followed a
similar design as the dining product, which meant that while the main entertainment venue
was smaller, it had new additional venues throughout the ship allowing for more options.
For example, a typical J ewel class ship had an occupancy capacity of 2,400 (double
capacity) and a main theatre capacity of 1,200, while Epic had a capacity of 4,100 and a
main theatre capacity of only 700. A show would be offered several times over the course of
a cruise so that guests could see it when it best fit their schedule. Guests could stop by for a
seat or make reservations ahead of time (See exhibit 6 for Norwegian Epic venue capacity).
In addition to more options, Norwegian focused on partnerships to deliver high-quality
entertainment. On Epic, guests could watch the Blue Man Group in the main theater, enjoy
Howl at the Moon piano bar, watch comedy from Chicago-based The Second City in more
intimate venues, watch the Cirque Dreams & Dinner in a dedicated venue known as the
Spiegeltent and see Nickelodeon characters throughout the ship.
Lastly, Norwegian Epic provided a cruise industry first: stateroom cabins designed for
singles. Traditionally cabins were priced per passenger assuming double occupancy.
Passenger capacity was traditionally calculated as rooms multiplied by two. However, many
rooms could accommodate more than two passengers. For example, a typical double room
could accommodate two adults and two children. The children would sleep in fold-up bunks
or pull-out couches. Thus it was possible to have more passengers on board than the stated
double-berth capacity. If a cruise guest wanted an individual stateroom, she would have to
pay for herself plus 75% of a second ticket. The Norwegian single-room cabins, known as
studio staterooms, enabled guests to book a smaller room of their own without paying a
surcharge.
Epic’s construction and delivery presented many challenges. Senior Vice President of
Technical Operations, Brian Swensen noted that Epic was designed in a silo by a small
group of individuals from the prior management team. This process forced operating
departments to adapt or submit change orders to comply with these designs, complicating
communication with the shipyard and adding to the construction cost. The result was
coordination problems with the shipyard that resulted in mistakes and delays. In addition,
during construction, there were floods, leaks, piping issues and a fire in the provision area
shortly before launch. Cabin inspections were behind schedule and rooms were undergoing
inspections during inaugural cruises. While the entertainment offering and other features
helped make Epic Norwegian’s most successful ship at the time, Sheehan vowed to learn
from the flaws in the design process and break down the organizational silos in the
development of Norwegian Breakaway.
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Communicating Freestyle
Explaining the difference and value of Freestyle Cruising initially proved difficult for
Norwegian. As several of the dining options required fees, many agents and guests simply
thought that Norwegian was now making guests pay for food. In the mid 2000’s Norwegian
launched a series of campaigns that were aimed to show how Norwegian was different that
the rest of the industry by mocking the typical structure of cruising (see Exhibit 7 for
examples). The ads strived to define Freestyle as different from traditional cruising.
However, those new to cruising had no point of reference, and many old-time cruisers liked
the traditional format. While innovative, the campaign failed. Maria Miller, SVP of
Marketing, explained that the challenge of both defining Freestyle and then attaching it to
Norwegian was too great. In 2012, she launched a new campaign that focused on the
Norwegian brand with Freestyle Cruising and the freedom and flexibility it offers as the core
attribute of a Norwegian cruise (see Exhibit 8). The internal vision created by Norwegian
executives was to “be the cruise line of choice.”
Operational Initiatives
Dining
Among Freestyle Cruising’s biggest challenges was wait times that guests experienced for
dining. To address this obstacle, Norwegian introduced a series of innovations to better
shape the flow of passengers.
Without the scheduled meals, it was inevitable that there were times when crowds would
form as they waited for tables. Beyond reducing the waiting time, Sheehan and team worked
to improve waiting experiences. Mike Flesch, SVP of Hotel Operations, joined Norwegian
in 2009 with significant restaurant industry experience, having worked for Dave and Busters
and Olive Garden. Leveraging this background, he quickly realized that one of the first
things to improve the guest experience while waiting was to message the wait to the guest so
that they knew what to expect. Instead of just giving them a time to come back, Norwegian
provided pagers so that guests could stroll around the ship. Norwegian also added more
shopping boutiques, where guests could browse while waiting. If lines were unusually long,
wait-staff brought out appetizers or gave drink coupons to guests.
To further improve the waiting experience on Norwegian Breakaway, Sheehan challenged
the team to design many of the large dining venues with bars or lounges right at the entrance
so that guests could enjoy a drink and music while they waited for a table (see Exhibit 5).
Flesch said of Breakaway, “We have entertainment and a bar where people will be more
comfortable and will spend money as they wait for their dining time… we’ve also put
restaurants throughout the ship so that people can walk around bars and shops nearby while
they wait.”
Lastly, Norwegian leveraged technology accelerators to help with the operations obstacles of
Freestyle dining. Using Silverware, a table management system, Norwegian gained
visibility into table turn times, improved productivity of restaurants, and allowing better
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order visibility to the chefs. Most importantly, Norwegian used this information to
communicate dining room constraints to guests. Norwegian installed display screens
throughout the ship that showed guests, on a red-yellow-green stop-light basis, the vacancy
at each restaurant so guests could plan their dining accordingly. Norwegian also allowed
diners to make reservations up to 45 days before the cruise, but they were careful to limit
prebooking to ensure tables would be available for guests who didn’t book ahead of time.
When a reservation was made in Silverware or when a guest swiped their card upon arriving
at a restaurant, the system updated the availability and displayed changes on monitors
throughout the ship. In addition to managing expectations, this system drove the behavior
that Norwegian wanted. Guests began to see what booked up quickly and would make
reservations ahead of time to ensure they were able to dine where they wanted on each day
of the cruise. Kansley noted that after the signaling was installed that lines still formed on
the first evening or two of a cruise, but by the third day, there were few waits for dining, as
guests came to understand the system and planned accordingly.
Labor
Initially, the total ship staff grew as Freestyle was introduced. The resulting cost pressure
forced Norwegian to develop new practices and procedures to better deliver the Freestyle
Cruise offering while keeping headcount in check. Understanding the Freestyle concept was
initially hard for crew. Norwegian had to train the crew for cross utilization as staff
members were no longer dedicated to one spot for all three meals, as is typical on other
cruise lines. Instead, the Freestyle concept made passenger demand at any particular venue
less predictable, making staff needs ever changing. Flexible staffing allowed Norwegian to
move staff where needed, but required them to be more knowledgeable of the product
offering and processes used in the different dining rooms. Norwegian launched a major
training initiative, hiring coaches to help staff learn all of the dining concepts and how to
serve in different venues. Forecasting models tracked daily demand at the different venues
and shifted staff accordingly. This meant that servers typically would not learn their dining
assignments until few hours in advance. Nevertheless, even with these changes the best
Freestyle ships maintained slightly larger crews than traditional ships because of the
complexity of offering expanded dining and entertainment options (see Exhibit 9 for a
comparison between Norwegian and Carnival).
Freestyle also required Norwegian to think about the interactions between guests and crew.
On most cruise lines, a server waited on the same guests at the same table throughout the
cruise, enabling a close connection between the server and the guest. This was not possible
with Norwegian’s dining options. To make up for this lost connection, Norwegian moved
relationship building to the room stewards, who cleaned and prepared the rooms. Stewards
were trained to spend more time getting to know their guests. Within the first 24 hours of
the cruise, stewards introduced themselves and memorized passenger names. Besides
providing friendly service, stewards become key advisors for guests on dining choices and
excursion options. Norwegian further enabled the stewards by providing access to systems
that showed guests’ dining history, allowing them to improve recommendations.
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Aligning the crew members with an external marketing campaign that challenged parents to
be a “vacation hero”, Norwegian also rolled out the Vacation Hero program for all crew.
The goal was to improve the overall vacation experience and to go the extra mile to ensure
satisfaction. Norwegian trained the crew on the entire cruise product and required them to
sign a contract to be a vacation hero for their guests. Better trained staff meant that anyone
from a bar tender, dining room server, or steward could help guests with questions and guide
them towards experiences that were sure to satisfy.
Norwegian also tweaked the labor operations to improve the poolside guest experience.
Historically, drink servers roamed the poolside decks offering guests drinks. This resulted in
a guest being asked several times by different servers if they cared for a drink. Some guests
would grow irritated by the barrage of offers. The team at Norwegian rearranged the servers
so that each would be dedicated to a particular area. This ensured that guests would have a
server who would learn their preferences and know not to repeatedly offer unwanted drinks.
Further, Norwegian equipped the servers with mobile devices so that they could charge the
guest on-the-spot and the bartender would see the drink order immediately, improving the
delivery time to the guest.
Entertainment
With Norwegian Epic, the company designed a more flexible entertainment offering. In
addition to providing more flexibility for entertainment, this helped combat the ‘peak’
demand for dinner that occurred between 7:00 and 7:30. Norwegian scheduled some of the
most attractive entertainment options during peak dinner times. For example, Epic showed
main attractions, such as Blue Man Group, in the Epic Theater at 7:00 and 10:00. Offering
this attractive entertainment and other popular events like a poolside barbeque pulled guests
away from the restaurants at the peak times.
With the smaller venues, Norwegian focused on counter programming, whereby main
attractions would be offered at overlapping times so that all guests would not want to attend
the same show. Further, Norwegian staggered show times so that they would end at
different times, preventing a large crowd from filling the halls and restaurants at once.
Finally, Norwegian looked at guest demographics to identify the optimal times for different
shows. For example, Norwegian would shift main shows on a Hawaiian cruise from 7:30 in
the summer when there were more families onboard to 7:00 in the winter when the guests
were typically older.
Looking Ahead
The cruise line that Kevin Sheehan inherited in 2008 had struggled to deliver a top notch,
Freestyle cruise. By bringing in executives with diverse backgrounds from both inside and
outside the cruise industry, Sheehan was able to assemble a team that took Freestyle
Cruising to the next level. With Norwegian Breakaway just a few months away from
launch, Sheehan’s team was excited to watch how the design changes on Breakaway would
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complement the operational changes that had already been made on other Norwegian ships
to deliver the best, most flexible Freestyle cruises.
Norwegian Breakaway, due in April 2013, was the first ship that was designed and built
under Sheehan’s vision. Finance Director, Edel Cruz, said that “Freestyle was taken to the
next level with Norwegian Epic, and now more so with Norwegian Breakaway.” The ship’s
design process and construction had been smoother than that of Norwegian Epic, primarily
due to Sheehan’s leadership that broke down the siloed decision making that created issues
on Epic. SVP of Technical Operations, Brian Swensen, said of Breakaway’s design, “We
went from single individuals making decisions that compounded in every facet to having a
management style that involved the team to get everybody’s input. While siloed decision
making may work on a typical cruise product, it is critical for every department to be at the
table to drive the integration required by Freestyle.”
With over a decade of refining Freestyle Cruising, Norwegian had been able to differentiate
itself from competitors. However, some cruise lines were copying elements of Freestyle by
building ships with additional dining venues, and nearly all cruise lines offered guests the
option of some flexible dining times, in addition to traditional two-seating dinning. For
example, Royal Caribbean offered My Time Dining and Carnival guests could choose Your
Time Dining. As Sheehan thought about the improvements with Norwegian Breakaway, he
wondered whether Norwegian’s Freestyle Cruising offering was a sustainable differentiator
and what the next step should be in the evolution of freedom and flexibility.
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Exhibit 1: Data on Cruise Operators
Line
Capacity
(Double Berths)
Ships Markets
Carnival Cruise Lines 61,968 24 North America
Princess Cruises 36,912 16 North America
Holland America Line 23,492 15 North America
Seabourn 1,986 6 North America
Costa 31,720 14 Italy, France and Germany
AIDA Cruises (“AIDA”) 16,442 9 Germany
P&O Cruises (UK) 14,636 7 UK
Cunard 6,672 3 UK and North America
P&O Cruises (Australia) 4,780 3 Australia
Ibero Cruises (“Ibero”) 4,176 3 Spain and South America
Total 202,784 100
Line Capacity (Double Berths) Ships
Royal Caribbean International 62,000 22
Celebrity 24,796 11
Azamara 1,400 2
Pullmantur 6,300 4
Total 94,496 39
Ship Built Gross Tonnage Class
Norwegian Spirit 1998 75,338 Leo Class
Norwegian Sky 1999 77,104 Sun Class
Norwegian Star 2001 91,740 Dawn Class
Norwegian Sun 2001 78,309 Sun Class
Norwegian Dawn 2002 92,250 Dawn Class
Norwegian Jewel 2005 93,502 Jewel Class
Pride of America 2005 80,439 United States
Norwegian Jade 2006 93,558 Jewel Class
Norwegian Pearl 2006 93,530 Jewel Class
Norwegian Gem 2007 93,530 Jewel Class
Norwegian Epic 2010 155,873 F3 Class
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Exhibit 2: Cruise Operator Capacity (double berth)
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Exhibit 3a: Financial Statements
NCL Corporation Ltd.
Consolidated Statements of Operations
(in thousands, except share and per share data)
Year Ended December 31,
2012 2011 2010
Revenue
Passenger ticket $1,604,563 $1,563,363 $1,411,785
Onboard and other 671,683 655,961 600,343
Total revenue 2,276,246 2,219,324 2,012,128
Cruise operating expense
Commissions, transportation and other 410,531 410,709 379,532
Onboard and other 173,916 169,329 153,137
Payroll and related 293,059 290,822 265,390
Fuel 283,678 243,503 207,210
Food 125,807 124,933 114,064
Other 191,442 228,580 227,843
Total cruise operating expense 1,478,433 1,467,876 1,347,176
Other operating expense
Marketing, general and administrative 251,183 251,351 264,152
Depreciation and amortization 189,537 183,985 170,191
Total other operating expense 440,720 435,336 434,343
Operating income 357,093 316,112 230,609
Non-operating income (expense)
Interest expense, net (189,930 ) (190,187 ) (173,672 )
Other income (expense) 1,393 934 (33,951 )
Total non-operating income
(expense) (188,537 ) (189,253 ) (207,623 )
Net income $168,556 $126,859 $22,986
Earnings per share
Basic $0.95 $0.71 $0.13
Diluted $0.94 $0.71 $0.13
Weighted-average shares outstanding (1)
Basic 178,232,850 177,869,461 177,563,047
Diluted 179,023,683 178,859,720 178,461,210
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Exhibit 3b: Financial Statements
NCL Corporation Ltd.
Consolidated Balance Sheets
(in thousands, except share data)
December 31,
2012 2011
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents $45,500 $ 58,926
Accounts receivable, net 15,062 8,159
Inventories 39,681 36,234
Prepaid expenses and other assets 64,686 48,824
Total current assets 164,929 152,143
Property and equipment, net 4,960,142 4,640,093
Goodwill and tradenames 611,330 602,792
Other long-term assets 202,026 167,383
Total assets $5,938,427 $ 5,562,411
Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity
Current liabilities:
Current portion of long-term debt $221,233 $ 200,582
Accounts payable 79,126 80,327
Accrued expenses and other liabilities 231,040 208,102
Due to Affiliate 59,897 2,963
Advance ticket sales 353,793 325,472
Total current liabilities 945,089 817,446
Long-term debt 2,764,120 2,837,499
Due to Affiliate 147,364 —
Other long-term liabilities 63,070 63,003
Total liabilities 3,919,643 3,717,948
Commitments and contingencies (Note 9)
Shareholders’ equity:
Ordinary shares, $.0012 par value; 40,000,000 shares authorized;
21,000,000 shares issued and outstanding 25 25
Additional paid-in capital 2,335,563 2,331,973
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) (17,619 ) (19,794 )
Retained earnings (deficit) (299,185 ) (467,741 )
Total shareholders’ equity 2,018,784 1,844,463
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $5,938,427 $ 5,562,411
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Exhibit 4 – Deck Plans for Three Ship Styles
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Exhibit 5 – Breakaway Deck Plans
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Exhibit 6 – Norwegian Epic Statistics & Capacities
Gross Tonnage (GT) 155,873
Length Overal l (m) 329.18
Doubl e Occupancy 4,100
Max Occupancy 5,186
Crew Berths 1,708
Sq Ft Seats
Total Dining 91,664 3,758
Inside Dining 80,054 3,152
Main Dining 22,564 1,118
Aft Main Dining 11,739 592
Atrium Dining 10,825 526
Buffet 20,788 680
Specialty Dining 19,077 806
Le Bistro ($) 2,399 126
Steakhouse Restaurant ($) 3,282 146
Churrascaria ($) 2,679 114
Chinese & Noodle Bar ($) 2,690 109
Teppanyaki ($) 2,270 104
Sushi ($) 990 25
Italian ($) 4,767 182
24 Hour Dining 9,964 269
Dinner Show ($) 5,638 217
Private Dining (Suite Guests Only) 2,023 62
Outdoor Dining 11,610 606
Outside Buffet 7,758 366
Outdoor Grill 3,852 240
Sq Ft Seats
Total Bar 16,710 542
Atrium Bar 4,250 106
Theater Entrance and Bar 183 6
Casino Bar 527 14
Whiskey Bar 3,099 92
Ice Bar (S) 624 25
Cocktail Bar 2,152 66
Churrascaria Lounge 2,303 67
Studio Lounge 1,076 70
Pool Bar 516 24
Private Lounge (Suite Guests Only) 1,980 62
Sq Ft Seats
Entertainment 25,383 1,223
Theater 10,857 672
Night Club (Bliss) 8,597 132
Comedy Club/Spinnaker 3,077 259
Jazz Club 2,851 160
Sq Ft
Casino 18,679
Central Retail 13,310
Spa and Gym 27,094
Atrium Reception 4,186
Kids Club 6,940
Teen Lounge 1,808
Video Arcade 1,442
Pool/Sun Deck/Aqua Park 45,095
Pool Only Total 1,286
Main Pools 752
Aft Pools 258
Courtyard Pool 277
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Exhibit 7 – Old Advertising of Freestyle
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Exhibit 8 - New Advertising of Breakaway
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Exhibit 9: Passenger Capacity and Crew Counts
Double
Occupancy
Ship Crew
Norwegian
Epic 4,100 1,753
Jade 2,402 1,078
Gem 2,394 1,101
Pearl 2,394 1,099
Jewel 2,376 1,100
Star 2,348 1,083
Dawn 2,224 1,073
Aloha 2,138 940
Spirit 2,018 962
Sky 2,004 934
Sun 1,936 953
Total 26,334 12,076
Carnival
Breeze 3,690 1,386
Magic 3,690 1,367
Dream 3,646 1,367
Splendor 3,006 1,150
Liberty 2,987 1,160
Conquest 2,984 1,150
Glory 2,984 1,150
Valor 2,984 1,180
Freedom 2,974 1,150
Triumph 2,758 1,100
Victory 2,758 1,100
Legend 2,124 930
Miracle 2,124 934
Pride 2,124 930
Ecstacy 2,056 920
Fantasy 2,056 920
Fascination 2,056 920
Imagination 2,056 920
Sensation 2,056 920
Inspiration 2,054 920
Paradise 2,052 920
Elation 2,052 920
Paradise 2,052 920
Total 59,323 24,334
doc_813080274.pdf
Brief illustration pertaining to norwegian cruise line center for digital.
TC6-0037
This case was written by Dave Sibley (T’13) and Professor M. Eric J ohnson of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. It
was written as a basis for class discussion and not to illustrate effective or ineffective management practices. Version: J une 18,
2013.
©2013 Trustees of Dartmouth College. All rights reserved. For permission to reprint, contact the Center for Digital Strategies
at 603-646-0899.
Norwegian Cruise Line
Kevin Sheehan, Chief Executive Officer and President of Norwegian Cruise Line, looked
out the window as the plane descended into Frankfurt, Germany, where Sheehan would join
colleagues to drive to the Meyer Werft Shipyard in Papenburg, Germany. With two months
before the delivery of Norwegian’s newest ship, Norwegian Breakaway, Sheehan reflected
on the evolution of the company’s Freestyle Cruising product offering. Breakaway was
completely designed and built to deliver on the latest generation of Freestyle Cruising—
Norwegian’s core differentiator that provided guests more options for dining, entertainment
and accommodations than typical cruise vacations. Under Sheehan’s leadership over the
past six years, Norwegian had experienced a dramatic turnaround, largely due to his efforts
to help the organization deliver on the promise of providing a great Freestyle experience. In
J anuary 2013, after five years of profitable growth, Sheehan rang the bell at NASDAQ on
Norwegian’s first day of trading. It had been a whirlwind getting ready for the IPO and the
first months of 2013 had not let up. Looking at the bleak March landscape surrounding the
airport, Sheehan wondered how Norwegian could continue to improve the guest experience,
further enhancing the Freestyle concept on board Norwegian Breakaway and the fleet’s
eleven other ships.
The Cruise Industry
The modern passenger cruise industry evolved from a means of transportation to become a
popular vacation option where, beyond the exotic destinations, the ship’s amenities and the
voyage itself were a key part of the vacation experience. Mass-market cruise ships typically
carried between 2,000 and 5,000 passengers (as well as 800 to 1,700 crewmembers) and
offered a wide variety of entertainment. Cruise lines generated revenue in two primary
ways. The majority came from the sale of the passenger ticket, or cruise fare, with
additional revenue generated from the sale of onboard food, drink, merchandise,
entertainment, and shore excursions.
The industry had grown significantly over the past three decades, with capacity growing at
an annual rate of 7.78% from 41,000 lower berths (sleeping beds) in 1981 to nearly 390,000
in 2011
1
. Cruise Line International Association (CLIA), the largest cruise line association,
forecasted a total global passenger count of 20.97M in 2013 with 17.6M passengers being
from North America. While most passengers were North American, cruise lines offered
cruises all over the world; the primary markets were the Caribbean (34.4%), the
Mediterranean (21.7%) and Northern Europe (10.9%). The majority of cruises were 7-nights
1
Cruise Line International Association’s Passenger Carrying Report, Q1 2012
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in length, but anything from 3 nights to 14 night cruises were common. Cruise ships
typically returned to the home port early in the morning to let guests disembark, clean the
ship, replenish food and beverage, and welcome new guests before departing the port in the
late afternoon for the next cruise.
The cruise market had matured into three segments: contemporary, premium and luxury.
While price and quality (accommodations, included food and drink, etc.) were the primary
differentiators, cruise lines in different segments tended to differ on cruise lengths, ship
sizes, and destinations. The range of per person, per night prices for each segment was:
contemporary between $150 and $200, premium between $300 and $350, and luxury in
excess of $500. The majority of the cruise industry fell in the contemporary (~75%) and
premium (~20%) segments.
While there were dozens of cruise line brands, the industry was highly concentrated,
stemming from significant merger and acquisition activity and high barriers to entry. The
two largest operators in 2013, Carnival Corporation & PLC and Royal Caribbean Cruises
Ltd., owned 47% and 24% of industry capacity, respectively
2
.
Carnival Corporation operated ten cruise brands including Carnival Cruise Lines, Princess
Cruises, Holland America Line, and Costa Cruises. Together, the brands generated $15.4B
dollars in revenue and operated a combined 100 cruise ships, 61% of which belong to their
North American brands
3
(see Exhibit 1 for detailed breakdown).
Carnival Cruise Lines was the largest brand in the world, operating 24 ships. Carnival
deployed the majority of their ships from ports in the United States, many beyond the
popular Florida ports. Additional home ports included Boston, Los Angles, Charleston,
Galveston, New Orleans, and Baltimore. By sailing cruises from ports that were closer to
population centers, Carnival was able to reduce the total vacation cost.
Carnival’s stated mission was to “take the world on vacation and deliver exceptional
experiences that appeal to a large variety of consumers, all at an outstanding value.”
4
Their
target customers were value focused.
Royal Caribbean Cruises was the second largest cruise company in the world operating 40
ships across five brands including Royal Caribbean International (RCI), Celebrity Cruises,
and Pullmantur. In 2012, Royal Caribbean generated roughly $7.7B in revenue across all
brands.
Royal Caribbean International, was the second largest cruise line with 22 ships, including the
largest passenger cruise ships in the world, Oasis of the Seas and her sister ship, Allure of
the Seas.
2
The Essentials of Cruise Investing, Goldman Sachs, May 4, 2012
3
Carnival Corporation Form10-K, Fiscal Year ended November 30, 2012
4
Carnival Corporation Form10-K, Fiscal Year ended November 30, 2012
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There were dozens of other cruise lines that offered ocean and river cruises (see Exhibit 2 for
list). Among them were the Italian line, MSC Cruises, a division of the large Mediterranean
Shipping Company, with 12 ships in 2013 and Disney Cruise Line with 4 ships.
Carnival, Royal Caribbean, and Norwegian were priced comparably, while the onboard
revenue was the highest for Norwegian and lowest for Carnival:
Full Year 2012 Net Revenue per Person per Day (Double Occupancy)
5
Cruise Line Ticket Onboard Total
Norwegian $124 $52 $176
Royal Caribbean $128 $46 $174
Carnival $130 $41 $171
Norwegian Cruise Line
Norwegian Cruise Line was founded in 1966 with one cruise ship and was the first cruise
line to offer round-trip cruises to the Caribbean from the then-new Port of Miami. In early
2013, Norwegian was the third largest cruise line operating 11 ships, with two Breakaway
class ships scheduled to be delivered in 2013 and 2014. For the 12 months ending December
31
st
, 2012, Norwegian had revenue of $2.3B, with $1.6B generated from passenger ticket
revenue and the remaining $0.7B from onboard and other.
Although Norwegian had been an industry pioneer, it floundered in 1990’s with mistaken
acquisitions and divestitures that diluted the brand and allowed competitors to surpass it in
size and market share. “Norwegian had old ships, a weaker brand and was fading away”,
said Andy Stuart, EVP of Sales and Passenger Services.
In 2000, Norwegian was acquired by what is today known as Genting Hong Kong, a
financial holding company that owned Star Cruises, making Star Cruises the third largest
cruise operator in the world. In the first few years of the relationship, Norwegian contracted
a number of new ships and transferred others to Star Cruises. Between 1999 and 2010,
Norwegian launched 10 new ships.
In 2003, Norwegian launched a new brand, NCL America, which over the next three years,
launched three U.S. flagged and crewed ships to sail the Hawaiian Islands (due to the
Passenger Services Act, foreign flagged and crewed ships could not sail from a U.S. port to
another U.S. port without first docking at a foreign port). The rapid capacity expansion into
Hawaii, along with the impending recession proved too aggressive, and the company later
withdrew two of the three ships from the market after losing an estimated $100M a year.
In August 2007 the private equity group, Apollo Management, invested $1B cash into
Norwegian, making the firm a 50% owner. One of Apollo’s first actions was to appoint
Kevin Sheehan CEO in 2008. Sheehan brought to Norwegian a diverse business background
5
Company SEC filings
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that included taking Avis rental car public, helping found the Spanish-language network
Telemundo, and launching the Sega channel.
Sheehan made changes to several executive level positions, which resulted in a leadership
team that was a mix of cruise industry veterans and those with outside expertise. Since
taking the helm in 2008, Sheehan reinvigorated the company’s culture and improved
financial performance, ultimately leading to the IPO in early 2013 (see Exhibit 3 for
financial results), that sold 13% of the company to the public.
Norwegian’s mission was to be a “leading global cruise line operator, offering cruise
experiences for travelers with a wide variety of itineraries… with the goal of providing our
customers the highest levels of overall satisfaction on their cruise experience… We created a
distinctive style of cruising called ‘Freestyle Cruising’ onboard all of our ships, which we
believe provides our passengers with the freedom and flexibility associated with a resort
style atmosphere and experience as well as more dining options than a traditional cruise.”
6
Launching Freestyle Cruising
Norwegian launched Freestyle Cruising in 2000 to differentiate it from other cruise lines and
to attract travelers who were turned off by the “cattle call” perception of cruising.
The typical cruise model offered guests one of two dining times in a large main dining room
and two showings of the main entertainment. Guests could choose to have an early dinner
with a late show or have an early show and a late dinner. Cruise ships like those operated by
Carnival and Royal Caribbean typically had large restaurants in which guests ate each night,
usually at the same table with the same fellow guests and server. Guests were typically
expected to dress in relatively formal attire to enhance the dining experience for all. Such
traditional cruise lines also offered buffets and limited specialty dining, enabling guests to
upgrade to higher-end dining venues. Seating was very limited and upgrading could be
expensive, so most guests ate the majority of dinners in the main dining room. With this
operating model, cruise lines controlled the flow of traffic, forcing the majority of guests
into one of two options (see Carnival deck plan in Exhibit 4).
In 2000, Norwegian launched the Freestyle Cruising concept on select ships, with the idea to
let guests dine when and where they wanted. On Star Cruises’ ships, which largely served as
gambling ships in Asia, dining was not a main appeal of cruising; therefore, cruises didn’t
have set dining times. Several company executives decided to bring this idea to Norwegian
as a way to differentiate the brand from its competitors.
The company cut the size of the main restaurants and offered additional dining venues with
varying sizes—up to 9 restaurants on the initial ships, with several charging small cover
charges. The program offered open seating, more flexible hours, and more flexible “resort-
casual” attire.
6
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd FormS-1 Registration statement
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The transition to Freestyle Cruising was rough, recalled VP of Hotel Operations, Mark
Kansley, who joined Norwegian shortly before the introduction of Freestyle Cruising. With
years of cruise industry experience, he was initially skeptical of the idea. “When I heard
these conversations, I was really afraid. Deep within myself, I thought that there is no way
we can do this.” When Norwegian went live with the first Freestyle Cruising voyage on the
Norwegian Sky, Kansley reflected “I distinctly remember on the first day—by midnight I
was literally crying… the execution was not what our guests paid for.”
The biggest initial struggle was long lines for the main dining room, which could be 30-
minutes or longer during peak times. One Norwegian Sky guest from 2004 wrote a review
on cruisecritic.com:
“For our Freestyle dining experience, it was "Eat when Norwegian wanted
you to, where Norwegian wanted you to". We stood in line every night to put
our name on a list for a table then sat around and waited for our name to be
called. Every time when we went into the dining room there were tables
available, but no staff to serve them. When we did get a table, the staff was
inexperienced or experienced and overworked (more tables than they could
handle or training other staff). Every night we heard trays of dishes hit the
floor.”
7
Additionally, as the food and beverage team focused on the new dining options, the main
dining room saw lower quality than guests expected. This, in addition to the cover charges
for many restaurants, meant guests felt like they had to pay for decent food. Reflecting on
the transition, Andy Stuart commented, “everybody underestimated how much the product
hinged on having two dining times.” Long lines, slow service, and poor food quality forced
the organization to dig deep and change the way they had historically operated.
Freestyle Built Ships
By the mid-2000’s the company’s fleet was comprised of a mix of ships, some purpose built
for Freestyle Cruising and others that were retrofitted for the concept. The company
embarked on a fleet renewal program which resulted in the transfer of these retrofitted ships
to Star Cruises along with the construction of the second generation of Freestyle Cruising
ships. These ships, known as the J ewel class, debuted in 2005, and took Freestyle Cruising
to the next level with additional dining options and accommodations, including a private all-
suites complex, which was branded in 2010 as “The Haven by Norwegian”. The 93,000
gross ton ships had a double-occupancy capacity of 2,400 passengers and focused on
providing increased flexibility for dining and cabin selection. The dining locations were
intentionally spread throughout the ship on the main passenger decks and pool decks to
move crowds away from the main dining room. The J ewel class ships were the first to have
an expanded option of suites with 10 different room types offered.
7
http://www.cruisecritic.com/memberreviews/memberreview.cfm?EntryID=4865
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Additionally, these ships were built with an increased number of galleys to support the
increased number of dining venues. Without this improvement, the operations of moving
food around the ship and to the table would have been complex and time-consuming.
Having improved the delivery of Freestyle dining, Norwegian shifted focus towards the
entertainment offering when designing its third generation ship. The result was the
Norwegian Epic, which was designed and ordered just prior to Sheehan’s arrival. Epic was
the third largest passenger cruise ship in service with a gross tonnage of 155,000 tons and a
double-occupancy capacity of 4,100 passengers. Its entertainment offering followed a
similar design as the dining product, which meant that while the main entertainment venue
was smaller, it had new additional venues throughout the ship allowing for more options.
For example, a typical J ewel class ship had an occupancy capacity of 2,400 (double
capacity) and a main theatre capacity of 1,200, while Epic had a capacity of 4,100 and a
main theatre capacity of only 700. A show would be offered several times over the course of
a cruise so that guests could see it when it best fit their schedule. Guests could stop by for a
seat or make reservations ahead of time (See exhibit 6 for Norwegian Epic venue capacity).
In addition to more options, Norwegian focused on partnerships to deliver high-quality
entertainment. On Epic, guests could watch the Blue Man Group in the main theater, enjoy
Howl at the Moon piano bar, watch comedy from Chicago-based The Second City in more
intimate venues, watch the Cirque Dreams & Dinner in a dedicated venue known as the
Spiegeltent and see Nickelodeon characters throughout the ship.
Lastly, Norwegian Epic provided a cruise industry first: stateroom cabins designed for
singles. Traditionally cabins were priced per passenger assuming double occupancy.
Passenger capacity was traditionally calculated as rooms multiplied by two. However, many
rooms could accommodate more than two passengers. For example, a typical double room
could accommodate two adults and two children. The children would sleep in fold-up bunks
or pull-out couches. Thus it was possible to have more passengers on board than the stated
double-berth capacity. If a cruise guest wanted an individual stateroom, she would have to
pay for herself plus 75% of a second ticket. The Norwegian single-room cabins, known as
studio staterooms, enabled guests to book a smaller room of their own without paying a
surcharge.
Epic’s construction and delivery presented many challenges. Senior Vice President of
Technical Operations, Brian Swensen noted that Epic was designed in a silo by a small
group of individuals from the prior management team. This process forced operating
departments to adapt or submit change orders to comply with these designs, complicating
communication with the shipyard and adding to the construction cost. The result was
coordination problems with the shipyard that resulted in mistakes and delays. In addition,
during construction, there were floods, leaks, piping issues and a fire in the provision area
shortly before launch. Cabin inspections were behind schedule and rooms were undergoing
inspections during inaugural cruises. While the entertainment offering and other features
helped make Epic Norwegian’s most successful ship at the time, Sheehan vowed to learn
from the flaws in the design process and break down the organizational silos in the
development of Norwegian Breakaway.
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Communicating Freestyle
Explaining the difference and value of Freestyle Cruising initially proved difficult for
Norwegian. As several of the dining options required fees, many agents and guests simply
thought that Norwegian was now making guests pay for food. In the mid 2000’s Norwegian
launched a series of campaigns that were aimed to show how Norwegian was different that
the rest of the industry by mocking the typical structure of cruising (see Exhibit 7 for
examples). The ads strived to define Freestyle as different from traditional cruising.
However, those new to cruising had no point of reference, and many old-time cruisers liked
the traditional format. While innovative, the campaign failed. Maria Miller, SVP of
Marketing, explained that the challenge of both defining Freestyle and then attaching it to
Norwegian was too great. In 2012, she launched a new campaign that focused on the
Norwegian brand with Freestyle Cruising and the freedom and flexibility it offers as the core
attribute of a Norwegian cruise (see Exhibit 8). The internal vision created by Norwegian
executives was to “be the cruise line of choice.”
Operational Initiatives
Dining
Among Freestyle Cruising’s biggest challenges was wait times that guests experienced for
dining. To address this obstacle, Norwegian introduced a series of innovations to better
shape the flow of passengers.
Without the scheduled meals, it was inevitable that there were times when crowds would
form as they waited for tables. Beyond reducing the waiting time, Sheehan and team worked
to improve waiting experiences. Mike Flesch, SVP of Hotel Operations, joined Norwegian
in 2009 with significant restaurant industry experience, having worked for Dave and Busters
and Olive Garden. Leveraging this background, he quickly realized that one of the first
things to improve the guest experience while waiting was to message the wait to the guest so
that they knew what to expect. Instead of just giving them a time to come back, Norwegian
provided pagers so that guests could stroll around the ship. Norwegian also added more
shopping boutiques, where guests could browse while waiting. If lines were unusually long,
wait-staff brought out appetizers or gave drink coupons to guests.
To further improve the waiting experience on Norwegian Breakaway, Sheehan challenged
the team to design many of the large dining venues with bars or lounges right at the entrance
so that guests could enjoy a drink and music while they waited for a table (see Exhibit 5).
Flesch said of Breakaway, “We have entertainment and a bar where people will be more
comfortable and will spend money as they wait for their dining time… we’ve also put
restaurants throughout the ship so that people can walk around bars and shops nearby while
they wait.”
Lastly, Norwegian leveraged technology accelerators to help with the operations obstacles of
Freestyle dining. Using Silverware, a table management system, Norwegian gained
visibility into table turn times, improved productivity of restaurants, and allowing better
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order visibility to the chefs. Most importantly, Norwegian used this information to
communicate dining room constraints to guests. Norwegian installed display screens
throughout the ship that showed guests, on a red-yellow-green stop-light basis, the vacancy
at each restaurant so guests could plan their dining accordingly. Norwegian also allowed
diners to make reservations up to 45 days before the cruise, but they were careful to limit
prebooking to ensure tables would be available for guests who didn’t book ahead of time.
When a reservation was made in Silverware or when a guest swiped their card upon arriving
at a restaurant, the system updated the availability and displayed changes on monitors
throughout the ship. In addition to managing expectations, this system drove the behavior
that Norwegian wanted. Guests began to see what booked up quickly and would make
reservations ahead of time to ensure they were able to dine where they wanted on each day
of the cruise. Kansley noted that after the signaling was installed that lines still formed on
the first evening or two of a cruise, but by the third day, there were few waits for dining, as
guests came to understand the system and planned accordingly.
Labor
Initially, the total ship staff grew as Freestyle was introduced. The resulting cost pressure
forced Norwegian to develop new practices and procedures to better deliver the Freestyle
Cruise offering while keeping headcount in check. Understanding the Freestyle concept was
initially hard for crew. Norwegian had to train the crew for cross utilization as staff
members were no longer dedicated to one spot for all three meals, as is typical on other
cruise lines. Instead, the Freestyle concept made passenger demand at any particular venue
less predictable, making staff needs ever changing. Flexible staffing allowed Norwegian to
move staff where needed, but required them to be more knowledgeable of the product
offering and processes used in the different dining rooms. Norwegian launched a major
training initiative, hiring coaches to help staff learn all of the dining concepts and how to
serve in different venues. Forecasting models tracked daily demand at the different venues
and shifted staff accordingly. This meant that servers typically would not learn their dining
assignments until few hours in advance. Nevertheless, even with these changes the best
Freestyle ships maintained slightly larger crews than traditional ships because of the
complexity of offering expanded dining and entertainment options (see Exhibit 9 for a
comparison between Norwegian and Carnival).
Freestyle also required Norwegian to think about the interactions between guests and crew.
On most cruise lines, a server waited on the same guests at the same table throughout the
cruise, enabling a close connection between the server and the guest. This was not possible
with Norwegian’s dining options. To make up for this lost connection, Norwegian moved
relationship building to the room stewards, who cleaned and prepared the rooms. Stewards
were trained to spend more time getting to know their guests. Within the first 24 hours of
the cruise, stewards introduced themselves and memorized passenger names. Besides
providing friendly service, stewards become key advisors for guests on dining choices and
excursion options. Norwegian further enabled the stewards by providing access to systems
that showed guests’ dining history, allowing them to improve recommendations.
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Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth—Glassmeyer/McNamee Center for Digital Strategies 9
Aligning the crew members with an external marketing campaign that challenged parents to
be a “vacation hero”, Norwegian also rolled out the Vacation Hero program for all crew.
The goal was to improve the overall vacation experience and to go the extra mile to ensure
satisfaction. Norwegian trained the crew on the entire cruise product and required them to
sign a contract to be a vacation hero for their guests. Better trained staff meant that anyone
from a bar tender, dining room server, or steward could help guests with questions and guide
them towards experiences that were sure to satisfy.
Norwegian also tweaked the labor operations to improve the poolside guest experience.
Historically, drink servers roamed the poolside decks offering guests drinks. This resulted in
a guest being asked several times by different servers if they cared for a drink. Some guests
would grow irritated by the barrage of offers. The team at Norwegian rearranged the servers
so that each would be dedicated to a particular area. This ensured that guests would have a
server who would learn their preferences and know not to repeatedly offer unwanted drinks.
Further, Norwegian equipped the servers with mobile devices so that they could charge the
guest on-the-spot and the bartender would see the drink order immediately, improving the
delivery time to the guest.
Entertainment
With Norwegian Epic, the company designed a more flexible entertainment offering. In
addition to providing more flexibility for entertainment, this helped combat the ‘peak’
demand for dinner that occurred between 7:00 and 7:30. Norwegian scheduled some of the
most attractive entertainment options during peak dinner times. For example, Epic showed
main attractions, such as Blue Man Group, in the Epic Theater at 7:00 and 10:00. Offering
this attractive entertainment and other popular events like a poolside barbeque pulled guests
away from the restaurants at the peak times.
With the smaller venues, Norwegian focused on counter programming, whereby main
attractions would be offered at overlapping times so that all guests would not want to attend
the same show. Further, Norwegian staggered show times so that they would end at
different times, preventing a large crowd from filling the halls and restaurants at once.
Finally, Norwegian looked at guest demographics to identify the optimal times for different
shows. For example, Norwegian would shift main shows on a Hawaiian cruise from 7:30 in
the summer when there were more families onboard to 7:00 in the winter when the guests
were typically older.
Looking Ahead
The cruise line that Kevin Sheehan inherited in 2008 had struggled to deliver a top notch,
Freestyle cruise. By bringing in executives with diverse backgrounds from both inside and
outside the cruise industry, Sheehan was able to assemble a team that took Freestyle
Cruising to the next level. With Norwegian Breakaway just a few months away from
launch, Sheehan’s team was excited to watch how the design changes on Breakaway would
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complement the operational changes that had already been made on other Norwegian ships
to deliver the best, most flexible Freestyle cruises.
Norwegian Breakaway, due in April 2013, was the first ship that was designed and built
under Sheehan’s vision. Finance Director, Edel Cruz, said that “Freestyle was taken to the
next level with Norwegian Epic, and now more so with Norwegian Breakaway.” The ship’s
design process and construction had been smoother than that of Norwegian Epic, primarily
due to Sheehan’s leadership that broke down the siloed decision making that created issues
on Epic. SVP of Technical Operations, Brian Swensen, said of Breakaway’s design, “We
went from single individuals making decisions that compounded in every facet to having a
management style that involved the team to get everybody’s input. While siloed decision
making may work on a typical cruise product, it is critical for every department to be at the
table to drive the integration required by Freestyle.”
With over a decade of refining Freestyle Cruising, Norwegian had been able to differentiate
itself from competitors. However, some cruise lines were copying elements of Freestyle by
building ships with additional dining venues, and nearly all cruise lines offered guests the
option of some flexible dining times, in addition to traditional two-seating dinning. For
example, Royal Caribbean offered My Time Dining and Carnival guests could choose Your
Time Dining. As Sheehan thought about the improvements with Norwegian Breakaway, he
wondered whether Norwegian’s Freestyle Cruising offering was a sustainable differentiator
and what the next step should be in the evolution of freedom and flexibility.
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Exhibit 1: Data on Cruise Operators
Line
Capacity
(Double Berths)
Ships Markets
Carnival Cruise Lines 61,968 24 North America
Princess Cruises 36,912 16 North America
Holland America Line 23,492 15 North America
Seabourn 1,986 6 North America
Costa 31,720 14 Italy, France and Germany
AIDA Cruises (“AIDA”) 16,442 9 Germany
P&O Cruises (UK) 14,636 7 UK
Cunard 6,672 3 UK and North America
P&O Cruises (Australia) 4,780 3 Australia
Ibero Cruises (“Ibero”) 4,176 3 Spain and South America
Total 202,784 100
Line Capacity (Double Berths) Ships
Royal Caribbean International 62,000 22
Celebrity 24,796 11
Azamara 1,400 2
Pullmantur 6,300 4
Total 94,496 39
Ship Built Gross Tonnage Class
Norwegian Spirit 1998 75,338 Leo Class
Norwegian Sky 1999 77,104 Sun Class
Norwegian Star 2001 91,740 Dawn Class
Norwegian Sun 2001 78,309 Sun Class
Norwegian Dawn 2002 92,250 Dawn Class
Norwegian Jewel 2005 93,502 Jewel Class
Pride of America 2005 80,439 United States
Norwegian Jade 2006 93,558 Jewel Class
Norwegian Pearl 2006 93,530 Jewel Class
Norwegian Gem 2007 93,530 Jewel Class
Norwegian Epic 2010 155,873 F3 Class
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Exhibit 2: Cruise Operator Capacity (double berth)
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Exhibit 3a: Financial Statements
NCL Corporation Ltd.
Consolidated Statements of Operations
(in thousands, except share and per share data)
Year Ended December 31,
2012 2011 2010
Revenue
Passenger ticket $1,604,563 $1,563,363 $1,411,785
Onboard and other 671,683 655,961 600,343
Total revenue 2,276,246 2,219,324 2,012,128
Cruise operating expense
Commissions, transportation and other 410,531 410,709 379,532
Onboard and other 173,916 169,329 153,137
Payroll and related 293,059 290,822 265,390
Fuel 283,678 243,503 207,210
Food 125,807 124,933 114,064
Other 191,442 228,580 227,843
Total cruise operating expense 1,478,433 1,467,876 1,347,176
Other operating expense
Marketing, general and administrative 251,183 251,351 264,152
Depreciation and amortization 189,537 183,985 170,191
Total other operating expense 440,720 435,336 434,343
Operating income 357,093 316,112 230,609
Non-operating income (expense)
Interest expense, net (189,930 ) (190,187 ) (173,672 )
Other income (expense) 1,393 934 (33,951 )
Total non-operating income
(expense) (188,537 ) (189,253 ) (207,623 )
Net income $168,556 $126,859 $22,986
Earnings per share
Basic $0.95 $0.71 $0.13
Diluted $0.94 $0.71 $0.13
Weighted-average shares outstanding (1)
Basic 178,232,850 177,869,461 177,563,047
Diluted 179,023,683 178,859,720 178,461,210
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Exhibit 3b: Financial Statements
NCL Corporation Ltd.
Consolidated Balance Sheets
(in thousands, except share data)
December 31,
2012 2011
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents $45,500 $ 58,926
Accounts receivable, net 15,062 8,159
Inventories 39,681 36,234
Prepaid expenses and other assets 64,686 48,824
Total current assets 164,929 152,143
Property and equipment, net 4,960,142 4,640,093
Goodwill and tradenames 611,330 602,792
Other long-term assets 202,026 167,383
Total assets $5,938,427 $ 5,562,411
Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity
Current liabilities:
Current portion of long-term debt $221,233 $ 200,582
Accounts payable 79,126 80,327
Accrued expenses and other liabilities 231,040 208,102
Due to Affiliate 59,897 2,963
Advance ticket sales 353,793 325,472
Total current liabilities 945,089 817,446
Long-term debt 2,764,120 2,837,499
Due to Affiliate 147,364 —
Other long-term liabilities 63,070 63,003
Total liabilities 3,919,643 3,717,948
Commitments and contingencies (Note 9)
Shareholders’ equity:
Ordinary shares, $.0012 par value; 40,000,000 shares authorized;
21,000,000 shares issued and outstanding 25 25
Additional paid-in capital 2,335,563 2,331,973
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) (17,619 ) (19,794 )
Retained earnings (deficit) (299,185 ) (467,741 )
Total shareholders’ equity 2,018,784 1,844,463
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $5,938,427 $ 5,562,411
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Exhibit 4 – Deck Plans for Three Ship Styles
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Exhibit 5 – Breakaway Deck Plans
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Exhibit 6 – Norwegian Epic Statistics & Capacities
Gross Tonnage (GT) 155,873
Length Overal l (m) 329.18
Doubl e Occupancy 4,100
Max Occupancy 5,186
Crew Berths 1,708
Sq Ft Seats
Total Dining 91,664 3,758
Inside Dining 80,054 3,152
Main Dining 22,564 1,118
Aft Main Dining 11,739 592
Atrium Dining 10,825 526
Buffet 20,788 680
Specialty Dining 19,077 806
Le Bistro ($) 2,399 126
Steakhouse Restaurant ($) 3,282 146
Churrascaria ($) 2,679 114
Chinese & Noodle Bar ($) 2,690 109
Teppanyaki ($) 2,270 104
Sushi ($) 990 25
Italian ($) 4,767 182
24 Hour Dining 9,964 269
Dinner Show ($) 5,638 217
Private Dining (Suite Guests Only) 2,023 62
Outdoor Dining 11,610 606
Outside Buffet 7,758 366
Outdoor Grill 3,852 240
Sq Ft Seats
Total Bar 16,710 542
Atrium Bar 4,250 106
Theater Entrance and Bar 183 6
Casino Bar 527 14
Whiskey Bar 3,099 92
Ice Bar (S) 624 25
Cocktail Bar 2,152 66
Churrascaria Lounge 2,303 67
Studio Lounge 1,076 70
Pool Bar 516 24
Private Lounge (Suite Guests Only) 1,980 62
Sq Ft Seats
Entertainment 25,383 1,223
Theater 10,857 672
Night Club (Bliss) 8,597 132
Comedy Club/Spinnaker 3,077 259
Jazz Club 2,851 160
Sq Ft
Casino 18,679
Central Retail 13,310
Spa and Gym 27,094
Atrium Reception 4,186
Kids Club 6,940
Teen Lounge 1,808
Video Arcade 1,442
Pool/Sun Deck/Aqua Park 45,095
Pool Only Total 1,286
Main Pools 752
Aft Pools 258
Courtyard Pool 277
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Exhibit 7 – Old Advertising of Freestyle
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Exhibit 8 - New Advertising of Breakaway
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Exhibit 9: Passenger Capacity and Crew Counts
Double
Occupancy
Ship Crew
Norwegian
Epic 4,100 1,753
Jade 2,402 1,078
Gem 2,394 1,101
Pearl 2,394 1,099
Jewel 2,376 1,100
Star 2,348 1,083
Dawn 2,224 1,073
Aloha 2,138 940
Spirit 2,018 962
Sky 2,004 934
Sun 1,936 953
Total 26,334 12,076
Carnival
Breeze 3,690 1,386
Magic 3,690 1,367
Dream 3,646 1,367
Splendor 3,006 1,150
Liberty 2,987 1,160
Conquest 2,984 1,150
Glory 2,984 1,150
Valor 2,984 1,180
Freedom 2,974 1,150
Triumph 2,758 1,100
Victory 2,758 1,100
Legend 2,124 930
Miracle 2,124 934
Pride 2,124 930
Ecstacy 2,056 920
Fantasy 2,056 920
Fascination 2,056 920
Imagination 2,056 920
Sensation 2,056 920
Inspiration 2,054 920
Paradise 2,052 920
Elation 2,052 920
Paradise 2,052 920
Total 59,323 24,334
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