Description
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011
J ames R. Barth Gerard Caprio J r Ross Levine
Article information:
To cite this document:
J ames R. Barth Gerard Caprio J r Ross Levine, (2013),"Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries
from 1999 to 2011", J ournal of Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 5 Iss 2 pp. 111 - 219
Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381311329661
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Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
Puspa Amri, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg, (2011),"International comparisons of bank regulation,
liberalization, and banking crises", J ournal of Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 3 Iss 4 pp. 322-339 http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381111182909
Wenling Lu, David A. Whidbee, (2013),"Bank structure and failure during the financial crisis", J ournal of
Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 5 Iss 3 pp. 281-299http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/J FEP-02-2013-0006
Mikael Petitjean, (2013),"Bank failures and regulation: a critical review", J ournal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance, Vol. 21 Iss 1 pp. 16-38http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13581981311297803
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Bank regulation and supervision
in 180 countries from
1999 to 2011
James R. Barth
Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, USA and
Milken Institute, Santa Monica, California, USA
Gerard Caprio Jr
Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, USA, and
Ross Levine
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors’ approach is based upon the quanti?cation of
hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the
powers of of?cial supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance
mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank
regulatory and supervisory policies.
Findings – It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in
many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes
over the past decade despite the worst global ?nancial crisis since the Great Depression.
Research limitations/implications – The data are based on survey responses and this requires
that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure
greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses
in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well-functioning banking
systems.
Originality/value – The authors’ data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers
and researchers to examine cross-country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies
over time.
Keywords Financial institutions, Banks, Government policy, Regulation, Financial control,
Comparative ?nancial systems
Paper type Research paper
I. Introduction
Motivating an investigation of bank regulation and supervision is easy. One can point
to the global banking crisis of 2007-2009, the banking problems still plaguing many
European countries in 2013, and the more than 100 systemic banking crises that have
devastated economies around the world since 1970. All these crises re?ect, at least
partially, defects in bank regulation and supervision[1]. One can also point to research
showing that banks matter for human welfare beyond periodic crises. Banks in?uence
economic growth, poverty, entrepreneurship, labor market conditions, and the economic
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1757-6385.htm
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Vol. 5 No. 2, 2013
pp. 111-219
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
1757-6385
DOI 10.1108/17576381311329661
Bank regulation
and supervision
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opportunities available to people[2]. Thus, examining the type and impact of bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in countries is a critical area of inquiry.
The problem, however, is that measuring bank regulation and supervision around
the world is hard. Hundreds of laws and regulations, emanating from different parts of
national and local governments, de?ne policies regarding bank capital standards, the
entry requirements of new domestic and foreign banks, bank ownership restrictions,
and loan provisioning guidelines. Numerous pages of regulations in most countries
delineate the permitted activities of banks and provide shape and substance to deposit
insurance schemes and the nature and timing of the information that banks must
disclose to regulators and the public. And, extensive statutes de?ne the powers of
regulatory and supervisory of?cials over banks – and the limits of those powers. There
are daunting challenges associated with acquiring data on all of the laws, regulations,
and practices that apply to banks in countries and then aggregating this information into
useful statistics that capture different and important aspects of regulatory regimes. This
helps explain why the systematic collection of data on bank regulatory and supervisory
policies is only in its nascent stages. Yet, without sound measures of banking policies
across countries and over time, researchers will be correspondingly constrained in
assessing which policies work best to promote well-functioning banking systems, and in
proposing socially bene?cial reforms to banking policies in need of improvement.
In this paper, we offer a new database on bank regulation and supervision for more
than 180 countries, covering the period from 1999 through 2011. Although we do not
assess the impact of banking sector policies on banks or the broader economy, we do
seek to contribute to research on the design and implementation of policies by providing
useful measures of bank regulation and supervision. As reportedly argued by the great
scientist Lord Kelvin in the nineteenth century, “f you cannot measure it, you cannot
improve it”[3].
Our database builds on four surveys sponsored by The World Bank. About 16 years
ago, The World Bank asked us to assemble the ?rst cross-country database on bank
regulation and supervision. With guidance and help from bank supervisors, ?nancial
economists, and World Bankstaff, we developed and implemented an extensive survey[4].
We had bank regulatory of?cials complete the survey – and often had several of?cials
fromthe same country complete the survey in order to verify the consistency of responses.
Survey I covered 118 countries, included over 300 questions, and was mostly completed in
1999[5]. For the second survey, we extended and revised the questionnaire based on input
from World Bank staff, country of?cials, and academics. The World Bank released
Survey II in2003, which provides informationon bank regulatoryand supervisorypolicies
in 2002. Survey II includes information from 151 counties covering over 400 questions.
SurveyIII was postedonThe WorldBank’s website inthe summer of 2007, andit provides
information on banking policies in 2006 for 142 countries. In these ?rst three surveys, we
were extensively involved in writing the questionnaire, implementing the survey, and
assembling the data. For Survey IV, we played a less prominent role in managing the
survey[6]. Speci?cally, we helped The World Bank conduct a major revision of the
questionnaire, but we did not implement the survey. Released in 2012, Survey IVprovides
information on banking policies in 125 countries for 2011. Overall, the surveys cover
180 countries, althoughthe number varies fromone surveytothe next as alreadyindicated.
The dataset that we make available online differs from the survey responses posted
by The World Bank in two key regards[7]. First, we devote considerable effort to
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identifying and resolving inconsistencies and missing values by reviewing each of
the four surveys individually and by considering the time-series of answers for each
country. For example, there are cases when a country provides the same information
about a technical regulatory rule in Surveys I, II, and IV, but provides a different answer
for Survey III, or a country provides the same answers in Surveys I, III, and IV, but
gives a different response for Survey II. In such cases, we examine country documents
and web sites to assess whether there is any reason for such odd changes and reversals
in policies to assess whether this represents a coding mistake or an actual change
in policy. As another example, for each missing data entry, we reviewed national
publications and contacted national regulatory of?cials in an effort to complete the
dataset to a greater degree. Although we are certain that the resultant dataset is less
than perfect, we believe this review process has yielded a more comprehensive and
accurate set of data.
The second, and perhaps more important, dimension along which our data differs
from the survey responses posted by The World Bank involves the construction of
indexes. For each of the four surveys, we provide summary indexes of major categories
of bank regulatory and supervisory policies. This is crucial because of the size of the
surveys. There are hundreds of questions in each survey, many with sub-questions and
sub-components of those sub-questions. As a result, there are limitations to formulating
sound impressions about either differences in policies or cross-time changes in policies
from the raw survey data. Consequently, besides providing the answers to all the
individual survey questions, we aggregate the responses to individual questions into
indexes that summarize notable aspects of bank regulation and supervision. We
construct indexes of policies on capital, ownership, the activities of banks, the entry of
new banks, the powers of supervisors, the ability of private investors to monitor bank
behavior and to govern banks, deposit insurance features, loan classi?cation and
provisioning practices, and many other areas of bank regulation and supervision. The
result of this effort is the construction of more than 50 indexes. We provide a detailed
description of the construction of the indexes in the online dataset.
The dataset also provides information on the organization of regulatory agencies
and the size and structure of the overall banking system. We document whether there
is a single regulator or multiple regulators and whether countries authorize their central
banks to play a key role inbanksupervision. We also document the size of each country’s
banking system, the concentration of the system, and the role of government owned and
foreign-owned banks and how these characteristics have changed over time. The
dataset, therefore, facilitates analyses of the relationships among the organization of
national banking authorities, the details of ?nancial regulation and supervision, and the
size and structure of the banking system. Moreover, researchers can easily combine
these data with other datasets to explore the factors that explain banking sector policies,
and the consequences of those policies for a variety of outcomes.
Besides describing the data, this paper provides a wealth of cross-country and
cross-time comparisons. We analyze changes in bank regulatory and supervisory
practices over time, examine the degree to which banking policies have converged
across countries, and document howthe organization of bank regulatory authorities and
the size and structure of the banking system differ around the world. Although there is
some convergence along some dimensions of bank regulation, there remains substantial
heterogeneity in policies, organization, and structure.
Bank regulation
and supervision
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of
the survey. Section III discusses the indices of bank regulatory and supervisory policies
regarding permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of the of?cial
supervisory entities, transparency, private monitoring, and external governance of banks,
deposit insurance schemes, barriers to entry, loan provisioning. Section III also examines
the extent to which bank regulations and supervisory practices have been converging
across countries during the tumultuous period since 1999. Section IV concludes.
II. An overview of the survey data
The extensive database on bank regulation and supervision (presented in the online
datasethttp://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm) is based on four
surveys conducted by The World Bank. Appendix 1 contains the entire list of questions
from Survey IV, while the online dataset contains the questions for each of the four
surveys. As noted above, the surveys pose questions on a wide array of bank regulatory
and supervisory policies. These include: entry into commercial banking, ownership of
bank restrictions, capital standards, allowable activities for banks, external auditing
requirements, governance of banks, liquidity and diversi?cation requirements, deposit
protection schemes, asset classi?cation and provisioning practices, accounting and
informationdisclosure requirements, supervisorypowers associated for dealing withbanks
in ?nancial duress, and the structure, mandate, staf?ng, and procedures of supervisory
agencies. In addition, some information is available on the characteristics of banking
systems, and Survey IVobtains newinformation on efforts designed to enable regulators to
better address issues of systemic risk and consumer protection regulations in banking.
The surveys cover a broad cross-section of countries. Figure 1 shows the countries that
responded to the various surveys, and Table AI provides detailed information on those
that responded to each of the surveys. Table AII lists the countries that responded to
Survey IV, sorting them by region and per capita GDP levels. It is clear that coverage is
fairly good, with countries represented fromall parts of the world and all levels of income.
The fewest number of countries responding are in the lower income category with small
populations. For the four surveys, 118 countries responded to Survey I, 151 countries
responded to Survey II and 143 countries responded to both Surveys III and IV. Of these
countries, 73of themrespondedtoall four surveys. Barthet al. (2001, 2006, 2008) assess the
results of Surveys I-III, while Cihak et al. (2012) discuss some of the data from Survey IV.
Before de?ning and reviewing the bank regulation and supervision data, we begin in
Table I by documenting cross-country differences in key banking system indicators,
using Survey IV for illustrative purposes. As shown, Table I provides information
on banking system size, the number of banks, the proportion of banking assets in
government-owned banks (where a bank is considered government-owned if 50 percent
or more of the shares are controlled by the government), the proportion of banking assets
in foreign-owned banks, the number of of?cial bank supervisors per bank in the country,
and the percent of the ten largest banks in a country that are rated by one of the major
international ratings agencies.
For many of the banking system indicators depicted in Table I, the range of
variation is impressive. Some examples will illustrate this point. Luxemburg has the
highest ratio of bank assets-to-GDP at a striking 1,942 percent, while Iraq has the
lowest ratio at 18 percent[8]. These ?gures are not surprising given that Luxemburg is
a very small country with internationally active banks, whereas Iraq is still recovering
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from a recent war. The share of bank assets that is foreign-owned ranges from a high
of 100 percent in several offshore ?nancial centers to 0 percent in Ethiopia. In the case
of government ownership of bank assets, the share ranges from 0 percent for several
countries to 74 percent in India (China did not respond to this question, but available
information indicates the ?gure exceeds 90 percent. In the 2007 survey China did
respond and reported the share was slightly less than 70 percent, but this only
captured the four big state-owned banks. The ?gure exceeds 90 percent even earlier if
one includes all state or government-owned banks). Banking density also seems to
vary to an astonishing degree, though much less so once one removes offshore banking
centers, such as the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, and Seychelles. The median
number of banks per 100,000 people is 0.4, with the lowest ?gure being 0.01 for India.
Large banks control a substantial share of bank assets, with the median share of the
top ?ve banks being 73 percent, and yet although most or all big banks are audited by
international (so it is hoped, more arms-length) ?rms, in a distressing number of cases
no large banks are so audited, such as in Botswana and Iceland.
Besides providing a snapshot of the structure of banking systems in 2011, the data also
illustrate the evolution of banking systems since 1999. As shown in Figure 2, many
countries have experienced rapid growth in the ratio of bank assets to GDP from
Surveys I (1999) to IV(2011). Figure 2 provides informationonall countries for whichthere
are data for both Surveys I and IV. In Figure 2, we graph all countries with greater than
1 percent growth from Surveys I to IV in the left panel and all countries with less
than 21 percent growth in the right panel. In 44 countries the ratio increased, while it
decreased in eight countries. Figure 3 shows the maximumratio of bank assets to GDPfor
each country across all four surveys and the survey when this maximum occurred. It is
also seen in the ?gure that most of countries reported the highest ratio in Survey IV.
Figure 1.
Countries participating in
the World Bank surveys
Bank regulation
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A
N
/
A
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
4
2
3
1
0
.
0
4
6
3
6
2
0
2
5
.
3
7
0
C
o
o
k
I
s
l
a
n
d
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
0
0
8
9
2
0
.
8
0
C
o
s
t
a
R
i
c
a
6
4
4
7
0
.
3
7
8
5
4
3
1
7
.
4
7
0
C
o ˆ
t
e
d
’
I
v
o
i
r
e
N
/
A
1
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
1
1
6
6
9
0
.
7
7
5
4
8
9
3
.
3
1
0
C
y
p
r
u
s
7
2
9
N
/
A
3
.
5
6
9
1
3
5
0
.
8
3
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
Some basic differences
in banking systems
around the world
JFEP
5,2
116
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
2
4
5
N
/
A
2
.
2
8
3
1
2
1
N
/
A
7
0
D
o
m
i
n
i
c
a
n
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
3
3
2
2
0
.
1
8
7
3
1
8
1
0
.
8
8
0
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
3
6
2
9
0
.
2
7
0
1
7
2
4
N
/
A
E
g
y
p
t
6
4
2
7
0
.
0
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
1
.
8
7
0
E
l
S
a
l
v
a
d
o
r
6
3
4
0
0
.
2
8
5
6
9
3
1
0
.
1
5
0
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
1
4
0
N
/
A
1
.
3
9
3
0
9
9
3
.
9
0
E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a
2
5
N
/
A
0
.
0
2
8
4
6
1
0
1
.
7
N
/
A
F
i
j
i
7
8
6
5
0
.
6
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
5
8
0
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
2
5
6
N
/
A
1
.
8
9
1
0
7
4
0
.
7
6
0
F
r
a
n
c
e
3
6
8
N
/
A
1
.
1
8
7
2
1
2
N
/
A
1
0
0
G
a
m
b
i
a
6
0
1
4
0
.
8
7
2
0
8
0
1
.
4
0
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
1
2
4
N
/
A
2
.
3
2
5
3
2
1
2
N
/
A
1
0
0
G
h
a
n
a
3
7
1
4
0
.
1
4
5
1
0
5
1
5
.
4
0
G
i
b
r
a
l
t
a
r
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
7
9
0
1
0
0
0
.
5
0
G
r
e
e
c
e
2
1
2
N
/
A
0
.
2
7
8
1
1
2
1
6
.
1
8
0
G
u
a
t
e
m
a
l
a
4
6
2
3
0
.
1
8
0
2
1
0
1
0
.
4
8
0
G
u
e
r
n
s
e
y
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
2
5
7
4
2
1
0
0
G
u
i
n
e
a
-
B
i
s
s
a
u
N
/
A
6
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
G
u
y
a
n
a
6
3
3
0
0
.
8
9
7
0
5
6
3
.
8
0
H
o
n
d
u
r
a
s
7
3
4
9
0
.
2
6
9
1
5
0
6
.
7
7
0
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
,
C
h
i
n
a
7
0
5
N
/
A
2
.
7
4
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
.
1
1
0
0
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
7
0
5
N
/
A
0
.
3
6
3
4
8
3
3
.
9
8
0
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
1
9
3
1
1
5
1
.
6
1
0
0
4
1
0
5
0
I
n
d
i
a
8
0
5
1
0
.
0
1
3
8
7
4
7
8
.
3
1
0
0
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
4
7
2
6
0
.
1
5
0
3
8
3
4
7
.
7
9
0
I
r
a
q
1
8
9
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
4
8
3
N
/
A
1
7
2
2
1
6
3
1
.
6
1
0
0
I
s
l
e
o
f
M
a
n
N
/
A
N
/
A
3
6
.
2
7
0
0
1
0
0
0
.
2
1
0
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
Bank regulation
and supervision
117
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
I
s
r
a
e
l
1
4
8
N
/
A
0
.
2
9
4
0
3
6
.
5
5
0
I
t
a
l
y
2
0
4
N
/
A
1
.
3
6
6
0
.
1
1
8
0
.
9
1
0
0
J
a
m
a
i
c
a
5
0
2
6
0
.
3
9
5
0
9
5
1
1
.
4
2
9
J
e
r
s
e
y
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
6
5
1
8
1
0
0
0
.
1
1
0
0
J
o
r
d
a
n
N
/
A
7
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
4
0
K
a
z
a
k
h
s
t
a
n
N
/
A
3
9
0
.
2
7
2
2
3
1
7
1
.
1
1
0
0
K
e
n
y
a
N
/
A
3
3
0
.
1
5
0
5
3
7
1
.
4
8
0
K
o
r
e
a
,
R
e
p
.
1
1
2
1
0
2
0
.
0
3
8
0
2
2
7
7
N
/
A
1
0
0
K
o
s
o
v
o
5
6
3
5
0
.
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
3
.
1
3
8
K
u
w
a
i
t
1
1
9
7
1
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
0
0
K
y
r
g
y
z
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
2
6
N
/
A
0
.
4
5
5
2
0
4
6
2
.
6
0
L
a
t
v
i
a
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
.
3
5
9
1
6
6
9
1
.
3
N
/
A
L
e
b
a
n
o
n
N
/
A
7
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
5
0
L
e
s
o
t
h
o
5
7
1
5
0
.
2
1
0
0
3
9
7
1
.
3
N
/
A
L
i
e
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
i
n
N
/
A
N
/
A
4
7
.
2
9
2
2
9
4
0
.
3
2
0
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
8
6
N
/
A
0
.
6
8
0
0
8
1
3
.
1
9
0
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
1
9
4
2
N
/
A
2
9
3
1
5
9
4
0
.
3
4
0
M
a
c
a
o
,
C
h
i
n
a
2
3
8
5
7
5
.
2
7
3
0
.
2
9
9
0
.
6
3
0
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r
2
4
N
/
A
0
.
0
5
8
2
0
1
0
0
1
.
9
0
M
a
l
a
w
i
3
7
1
6
0
.
1
8
3
9
2
9
2
.
3
0
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
2
0
3
1
2
0
0
.
1
5
9
0
2
2
7
.
5
9
0
M
a
l
d
i
v
e
s
9
8
5
7
1
.
9
9
8
3
9
6
1
1
.
8
0
M
a
l
i
N
/
A
1
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
M
a
l
t
a
8
1
4
N
/
A
6
.
3
7
1
0
8
6
0
.
7
2
0
M
a
u
r
i
t
i
u
s
1
1
2
8
9
1
.
4
6
5
1
6
8
1
.
9
2
0
M
e
x
i
c
o
4
2
1
9
0
.
0
4
7
4
1
3
8
5
1
0
.
8
1
0
0
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
6
0
3
4
0
.
4
6
9
1
3
4
2
3
.
1
0
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
9
6
6
8
1
.
7
7
7
N
/
A
8
8
4
1
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
JFEP
5,2
118
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
8
8
6
9
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
M
o
z
a
m
b
i
q
u
e
3
7
2
8
0
.
1
9
2
0
9
2
N
/
A
0
M
y
a
n
m
a
r
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
a
m
i
b
i
a
7
0
5
5
0
.
2
1
0
0
0
8
6
3
.
3
2
5
N
e
p
a
l
6
5
5
6
0
.
1
2
6
2
4
1
7
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
h
e
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
4
6
9
N
/
A
0
.
5
8
4
1
4
N
/
A
2
.
8
1
0
0
N
e
w
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
2
0
5
N
/
A
0
.
4
8
4
3
9
5
0
.
4
1
0
0
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a
6
4
3
1
0
.
2
9
6
1
2
4
3
.
7
4
4
N
i
g
e
r
N
/
A
1
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
5
2
2
9
0
.
0
2
4
8
0
6
1
6
.
7
1
0
0
N
o
r
w
a
y
5
3
N
/
A
0
.
6
7
6
0
3
0
0
.
8
1
0
0
O
m
a
n
4
9
4
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
7
0
P
a
k
i
s
t
a
n
4
7
2
1
0
.
0
2
5
1
2
1
5
9
7
.
3
0
P
a
l
e
s
t
i
n
i
a
n
T
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
y
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
7
8
0
6
2
4
.
1
5
0
P
a
n
a
m
a
2
6
9
8
4
2
.
7
4
7
1
1
6
2
1
.
3
1
0
0
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
5
4
3
9
0
.
2
6
7
6
4
0
2
.
8
N
/
A
P
e
r
u
4
2
2
4
0
.
1
8
7
0
4
9
1
1
.
9
4
0
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
7
0
3
0
0
.
0
4
5
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
.
2
1
0
0
P
o
l
a
n
d
7
4
N
/
A
0
.
1
4
9
2
2
6
2
6
.
8
9
0
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
3
1
4
N
/
A
1
.
1
7
4
2
3
2
2
1
8
0
P
u
e
r
t
o
R
i
c
o
N
/
A
N
/
A
0
.
3
5
9
1
8
2
1
1
0
0
Q
a
t
a
r
1
2
2
4
4
1
7
4
N
/
A
0
4
.
4
9
0
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
6
1
4
0
0
.
1
5
7
8
8
4
3
.
6
6
0
R
u
s
s
i
a
7
5
4
4
0
.
7
4
8
4
1
1
8
4
.
3
N
/
A
S
a
m
o
a
(
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
)
5
5
4
7
2
.
2
1
0
0
0
7
1
2
0
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
N
/
A
2
6
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
Bank regulation
and supervision
119
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
S
e
r
b
i
a
8
3
5
0
0
.
5
4
5
1
8
7
4
1
.
9
0
S
e
y
c
h
e
l
l
e
s
1
0
9
2
4
8
.
1
9
4
3
1
6
9
1
.
4
0
S
i
e
r
r
a
L
e
o
n
e
3
0
1
0
0
.
2
7
4
3
8
6
2
2
.
6
0
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
6
7
6
1
1
3
3
.
2
3
9
0
7
1
1
.
1
1
0
0
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
8
4
N
/
A
0
.
3
7
2
1
9
4
2
.
7
N
/
A
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
1
4
3
N
/
A
0
.
9
6
0
5
1
2
8
1
.
5
5
0
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
1
3
0
8
0
0
.
1
9
2
0
.
1
2
8
3
.
4
1
0
0
S
p
a
i
n
3
7
6
N
/
A
0
.
7
6
4
0
8
1
1
0
0
S
r
i
L
a
n
k
a
5
4
2
7
0
.
1
7
3
5
9
1
4
1
.
7
1
0
0
S
u
r
i
n
a
m
e
4
9
2
4
1
.
7
8
8
3
3
2
1
0
.
7
1
1
S
w
a
z
i
l
a
n
d
4
4
2
5
0
.
4
N
/
A
1
6
8
4
2
.
3
N
/
A
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
5
4
8
1
9
3
4
.
2
6
7
1
6
1
2
0
.
2
9
0
S
y
r
i
a
7
9
N
/
A
0
.
1
6
9
7
1
0
3
.
3
1
0
T
a
i
w
a
n
2
6
1
N
/
A
0
.
1
7
3
1
8
1
1
9
.
4
9
0
T
a
j
i
k
i
s
t
a
n
2
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
8
4
1
4
6
N
/
A
0
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
3
6
1
5
0
.
1
6
4
5
4
9
1
.
8
0
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
1
2
2
1
0
2
0
.
0
5
6
3
1
8
7
1
3
.
1
1
0
0
T
o
g
o
N
/
A
3
1
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
o
n
g
a
5
9
4
4
2
.
9
1
0
0
1
3
8
7
1
.
7
6
7
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
7
7
3
2
0
.
6
9
5
2
4
4
6
7
.
9
N
/
A
T
u
n
i
s
i
a
N
/
A
6
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
8
0
T
u
r
k
e
y
8
9
4
3
0
.
1
6
0
3
2
1
7
6
.
3
1
0
0
U
g
a
n
d
a
2
8
1
4
0
.
1
6
1
3
7
5
3
.
6
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
JFEP
5,2
120
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
1
0
0
6
2
0
.
4
3
7
1
7
4
8
1
.
8
N
/
A
U
n
i
t
e
d
A
r
a
b
E
m
i
r
a
t
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
5
0
U
K
6
0
7
2
0
6
0
.
5
6
8
2
6
1
8
0
.
8
1
0
0
U
S
A
8
4
5
7
2
.
1
4
7
0
N
/
A
0
.
3
1
0
0
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
6
4
2
3
0
.
4
7
5
4
6
5
4
1
2
.
1
1
0
0
V
a
n
u
a
t
u
1
2
8
6
8
1
.
7
1
0
0
1
4
8
6
1
.
5
7
5
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
l
a
2
8
2
1
9
0
.
1
6
2
3
3
1
7
N
/
A
N
/
A
V
i
r
g
i
n
I
s
l
a
n
d
s
,
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
N
/
A
N
/
A
5
.
5
9
5
4
9
5
0
.
8
6
7
Y
e
m
e
n
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
Z
i
m
b
a
b
w
e
4
9
N
/
A
0
.
2
5
4
8
4
6
1
.
6
1
0
0
H
i
g
h
1
,
9
4
2
2
0
6
4
3
7
.
5
1
0
0
7
4
1
0
0
2
5
.
3
1
0
0
L
o
w
1
8
6
0
.
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
.
1
0
M
e
d
i
a
n
7
8
3
9
0
.
4
7
3
8
.
5
4
9
2
.
7
7
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
:
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
s
(
I
F
S
)
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
f
o
r
e
u
r
o
a
n
d
T
a
i
w
a
n
(
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
)
,
a
n
d
G
i
b
r
a
l
t
a
r
,
G
u
e
r
n
s
e
y
a
n
d
S
y
r
i
a
(
t
h
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
o
f
e
a
c
h
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
)
;
G
D
P
(
W
D
I
)
,
W
E
O
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
f
o
r
T
a
i
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Table I.
Bank regulation
and supervision
121
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
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E
R
R
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U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Bank concentration and ownership have also changed materially. We again illustrate
changes in concentration and ownership between Surveys I and IVfor all countries that
have information for both surveys. Figure 4’s right panel shows that some countries
have experienced sharp reductions in bank concentration, which is measured by the
share of assets in the ?ve largest banks. Most of the countries that experienced these
pronounced reductions in concentration have small ?nancial systems. Figure 4’s left
panel shows even more countries experienced notable increases in concentration,
includingGermany, Malaysia, Turkey, Spain, Italy, Brazil, Chile, Australia, SouthKorea,
Canada, and the USA. Across all countries that provided data on bank concentration for
Surveys I and IV, the average level of bank concentration was 66 percent in Survey I and
70 percent in Survey IV, indicating a 4 percentage point increase in average bank
concentration.
In many countries, state ownership of banks also changed appreciably between
Surveys I and IV, where state ownership is de?ned as the proportion of banking assets
in government-owned banks (where a bank is considered government-owned if
50 percent or more of system’s assets are owned by the government). Figure 5 shows
that a substantial number of countries experienced large decreases in state ownership,
especially in such big countries as Germany, India, and Russia, where state ownership
was particularly large in 1999. As with all of the ?gures, we include those countries
with data in both Surveys I and IV. A number of countries also reported large increases
in the share of bank assets controlled by state-owned banks. The most striking case is
the UK with an increasing share amounting to 26 percent in 2010, due to the bailout of
the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008, while the corresponding share was 0 percent in the
?rst survey. For those countries with data on state ownership of banks for both
Surveys I and IV, the average percentage of total bank assets in state-owned banks
was 21 percent in 1999 and 15 percent in 2011.
Figure 2.
Total bank assets/GDP
Panama
Macao, China
Indonesia
Philippines
Morocco
Jamaica
Oman
Argentina
Malta
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Switzerland
The Netherlands
Spain
France
Belgium
Portugal
Venezuela
Denmark
Greece
New Zealand
Italy
Malaysia
Canada
Israel
Slovenia
South Africa
Vanuatu
Germany
Thailand
Kuwait
Mauritius
Korea, Rep.
Chile
Brazil
United States
India
Russia
Poland
Nepal
El Salvador
Romania
Gambia
Moldova
Tonga
Nigeria
Botswana
Guatemala
Mexico
Peru
Ghana
Tajikistan
-100% 100% 300% 500% 700% 900% -100% 100% 300% 500% 700% 900%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Survey IV Survey I minus IV Survey I Survey IV minus I
JFEP
5,2
122
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Figure 3.
Highest total bank
assets/GDP ratio based
on Surveys I-IV
0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600% 700% 800%
Tajikistan (IV)
Kyrgyz Republic (IV)
Ghana (III)
Peru (IV)
Mexico (IV)
Burundi (III)
Armenia (IV)
Guatemala (IV)
Botswana (IV)
Nigeria (IV)
Argentina (I)
Kenya (I)
Lesotho (IV)
Bolivia (II)
Bhutan (III)
Kazakstan (III)
Moldova (IV)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (IV)
Sri Lanka (III)
Romania (IV)
Bangladesh (IV)
Oman (I)
El Salvador (III)
Honduras (IV)
Poland (IV)
Russia (IV)
Belarus (IV)
Trinidad and Tobago (IV)
India (IV)
United States (IV)
Lithuania (IV)
Morocco (I)
Philippines (I)
Slovakia (II)
Guyana (III)
Hungary (IV)
Brazil (IV)
Bulgaria (IV)
Chile (IV)
Korea, Rep. (IV)
Latvia (III)
Croatia (IV)
Kuwait (IV)
Egypt (III)
Germany (IV)
Thailand (II)
South Africa (IV)
Estonia (IV)
Slovenia (IV)
Vanuatu (II)
Israel (IV)
Seychelles (II)
Virgin Islands,British (III)
Australia (III)
Canada (IV)
Malaysia (IV)
Italy (IV)
New Zealand (IV)
Greece (IV)
Jordan (III)
Mauritius (III)
Denmark (IV)
Finland (IV)
Taiwan (IV)
Macao, China (II)
Portugal (IV)
Lebanon (III)
Austria (IV)
France (IV)
Spain (IV)
Panama (I)
Belgium (III)
The Netherlands (III)
Iceland (III)
Ireland (III)
Switzerland (III)
United Kingdom (IV)
Singapore (IV)
Cyprus (IV)
Malta (IV)
Luxembourg (II)
Guernsey (II) 6,500%
3,300%
814%
Survey with highest ratios for
countries
Survey I: 6
Survey II: 8
Survey III: 19
Survey IV: 49
Bank regulation
and supervision
123
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
One of the most signi?cant changes, and one that has greatly complicated the world of
bank regulation and supervision, is the dramatic increase in the share of total bank assets
in foreign-owned banks, as shown in Figure 6. The share of total bank assets in foreign-
ownedbanks is de?nedas the proportionof bankingassets inforeign-ownedbanks, where
a bank is considered foreign-owned if 50 percent or more of system’s assets are foreign-
owned. From Surveys I to IV, 76 percent of the countries experienced an increase in
the share of bank assets in foreign-owned banks. Across all countries that provided data
for both surveys, the average percentage of bank assets in foreign-owned banks was
Figure 4.
Percentage of assets
accounted for by ?ve
largest banks
Lesotho
Guyana
Trinidad and Tobago
Jamaica
Israel
Seychelles
Liechtenstein
Belgium
Peru
Canada
El Salvador
Belarus
Denmark
Malawi
Korea, Rep.
Guatemala
Gibraltar
Greece
Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Chile
Slovakia
Kazakhstan
Brazil
Honduras
Switzerland
Italy
Spain
Turkey
Malaysia
Kyrgyz Republic
Argentina
Philippines
Panama
United States
Luxembourg
Germany
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Botswana
Gambia
Malta
Finland
Estonia
Burundi
New Zealand
Mauritius
Lithuania
The Netherlands
Cyprus
Russia
Ghana
Qatar
Puerto Rico
China
Thailand
Macao, China
Moldova
Bangladesh
Venezuela
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Kenya
Romania
Poland
Nepal
Nigeria
Armenia
Guernsey
India
Austria
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Survey I Survey IV minus I Survey IV Survey I minus IV
Figure 5.
Percentage of total bank
assets government owned
Belarus
Sri Lanka
Slovenia
Argentina
Venezuela
Liechtenstein
United Kingdom
Nepal
Trinidad and Tobago
Kazakhstan
Portugal
Kyrgyz Republic
Chile
Puerto Rico
Switzerland
Tajikistan
The Netherlands
Vanuatu
Tonga
Philippines
Moldova
Austria
Botswana
Guernsey
Luxembourg
Kenya
Virgin Islands, British
Hungary
New Zealand
Mauritius
Denmark
South Africa
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
India
Maldives
Romania
Bangladesh
Russia
Iceland
Burundi
Bhutan
Jamaica
Brazil
Lesotho
Malawi
Lithuania
Indonesia
Poland
Qatar
Taiwan
Germany
Ghana
Croatia
Turkey
Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Korea, Rep.
Slovakia
Mexico
Finland
Guyana
Bulgaria
Italy
Nigeria
Greece
Panama
Guatemala
El Salvador
Cyprus
Armenia
Peru
Macao, China
Honduras
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Survey I Survey IV minus I Survey IV Survey I minus IV
JFEP
5,2
124
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
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R
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N
I
V
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R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
47 percent in 2011, up from 29 percent in 1999. This substantial increase emphasizes the
importance of cross-country coordination in the resolution of big banks that operate
globally.
Beyond these general characteristics of banking systems, there are also cross-country
differences inthe organizationof bankregulatoryandsupervisoryinstitutions. Tables II-IV
provide information on whether countries have single or multiple supervisory authorities
for commercial banks, whether the bank supervisor is in the central bank or a separate
agency (or both, in the case of multiple supervisors), and whether there is a single ?nancial
supervisor for the entire ?nancial system, respectively. Table II shows that the vast
majority of countries have a single bank supervisory authority: 126 countries have a single
bank supervisory authority, while only ten have multiple authorities, including the USA.
Table III provides information on whether the central bank is a bank supervisory
authority. It is seen that in 89 countries the central bank is the only such authority. In
contrast, in 38 countries the central bank is not a supervisory authority at all. The
remaining nine countries that provide information indicate that the central bank is one
among multiple supervisors, with the USA being one of these countries.
Since banks are not the only ?nancial ?rms, information was also requested as to
whether a country has a single ?nancial supervisory authority or multiple authorities.
Table IV provides information on the scope of coverage by ?nancial supervisory
authorities in countries. In 101 countries there are multiple authorities covering the
?nancial sector, while in 25 countries there is a single authority covering the entire
?nancial sector. Most of the countries with a single authority are relatively small in
terms of both population and GDP.
III. Aggregating the data: the art and science of forming indices
There are formidable conceptual challenges to aggregating the information contained
in the answers to detailed questions from the surveys into meaningful and usable
measures of bank regulatory and supervisory practices. While fully aware of the
Figure 6.
Percentage of total bank
assets foreign owned
Cayman Islands
Macao, China
Estonia
Lesotho
Jamaica
Slovakia
El Salvador
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Malta
Mexico
Romania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Gambia
Korea, Rep.
Finland
Singapore
Seychelles
Mauritius
Armenia
Panama
Poland
Maldives
Guyana
Honduras
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Chile
Cyprus
Indonesia
Malawi
Slovenia
Belarus
Portugal
Malaysia
Greece
Russia
Italy
Austria
Brazil
Kazakhstan
Turkey
Burundi
Switzerland
Germany
Guatemala
India
Bangladesh
Tajikistan
Nigeria
Liechtenstein
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Guernsey
Tonga
Gibraltar
New Zealand
Botswana
Luxembourg
Ghana
Argentina
Nepal
Venezuela
Puerto Rico
Bhutan
Australia
Qatar
Philippines
Spain
Thailand
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Survey I Survey IV minus I Survey IV Survey I minus IV
Bank regulation
and supervision
125
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u
Table II.
Countries with single
vs multiple bank
supervisory authorities
JFEP
5,2
126
D
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w
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l
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a
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d
b
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B
r
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t
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h
Table III.
Countries with the central
bank as a supervisory
authority
Bank regulation
and supervision
127
D
o
w
n
l
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e
d
b
y
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N
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1
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6
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Table IV.
Scope of supervisory
authority
JFEP
5,2
128
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(
P
T
)
challenges, we have formulated a set of indexes with the goals of measuring major
features of each country’s regulatory and supervisory regime and gauging how these
features have evolved over time. Table V shows a full list of variables in the dataset
with the de?nition, quanti?cation, and speci?c questions for each variable.
In the paper, we describe some of the indexes and provide some cross-country and
time-series comparisons. In the online data ?le, we show precisely how each aggregate
index is constructed fromthe individual components of the survey. We also organize the
data ?le, so that it is easy for researchers to construct their own indexes from the
individual responses.
III.A. Scope of bank activities and ?nancial conglomerate variables
National regulators license banks and specify permissible activities. Countries may
restrict banks to a narrow range of activities, or allow them to engage in a broad array.
Since the scope of activities helps de?ne what is meant by a “bank” and since the scope
of permissible activities differs across countries, banks are not the same across countries.
Furthermore, bank regulations de?ne the extent to which banks and non-banks may
combine to form ?nancial (i.e. bank and non-bank ?nancial) or mixed (i.e. bank and
non-bank non-?nancial) conglomerates.
From the survey questions, we construct indexes of the degree to which national
regulations restrict banks from engaging in:
.
securities activities;
.
insurance activities; and
.
real estate activities.
More speci?cally, securities activities refers to securities underwriting, brokering, dealing,
and all aspects of the mutual fund industry. Insurance activities involve insurance
underwriting and selling. And real estate activities refer to real estate investment,
development, and management. The index values for securities, insurance, and real estate
range from1 to 4, where larger values indicate more restrictions on banks performingeach
activity. In particular, four signi?es prohibited, three indicates that there are tight
restrictions on the provision of the activity, two means that the activity is permitted but
with some limits, and one signals that the activity is permitted.
For each of these three bank activity indexes, Figure 7 provides information on the
distribution of countries by the degree of restrictive ness for Surveys I and IV. The data
?le contains this information by country for all four surveys. The ?gure shows that
securities activities are the least restricted of the bank activities, while real estate
activities are the most restricted. Focusing on Survey IV, only nine of 124 countries
actually prohibit banks from engaging in securities activities. In contrast, 42 countries
prohibit them from engaging in real estate activities. With respect to insurance,
19 countries prohibit banks from engaging in this type of activity. Guyana and Uganda
are the only countries that completely prohibit banks from engaging in all three
activities (securities, insurance, and real estate). However, 12 other countries either
completely prohibit or put speci?c some restrictions on all of these activities.
As illustrated, there is great cross-country variability in the degree to which countries
restrict banks from engaging in different activities. The regulatory notion of a bank,
therefore, differs markedly across countries – and, this de?nition changes over time
within the same country, which is also shown in Figure 7. For example, Kosovo,
Bank regulation
and supervision
129
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Table V.
Information on bank
regulatory, supervisory
and deposit insurance
variables
JFEP
5,2
130
D
o
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l
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e
d
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y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
2
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
c
o
n
g
l
o
m
e
r
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
B
a
n
k
o
w
n
i
n
g
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
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m
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
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h
i
c
h
b
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n
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m
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n
d
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n
t
r
o
l
n
o
n
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?
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a
n
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i
a
l
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m
s
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H
i
g
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e
r
v
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l
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e
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n
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c
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t
e
m
o
r
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s
t
r
i
c
t
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v
e
)
a
¼
1
;
b
¼
2
;
c
¼
3
;
a
n
d
d
¼
4
4
.
4
W
h
a
t
a
r
e
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h
e
c
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n
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t
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n
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n
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c
h
b
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g
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n
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n
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?
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a
l
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e
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c
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e
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g
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n
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y
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n
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u
b
s
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d
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a
r
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e
s
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o
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n
a
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o
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o
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p
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r
e
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t
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t
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u
b
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e
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t
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o
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e
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t
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m
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p
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l
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o
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t
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e
a
c
t
i
v
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p
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t
N
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n
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n
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a
l
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m
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o
w
n
i
n
g
b
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n
k
s
T
h
e
e
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e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
b
a
n
k
s
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H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
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e
s
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n
d
i
c
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t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
a
¼
1
;
b
¼
2
;
c
¼
3
;
a
n
d
d
¼
4
2
.
6
C
a
n
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
o
w
n
v
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g
s
h
a
r
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n
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e
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a
l
b
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n
k
s
?
a
.
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o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
a
c
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m
m
e
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c
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a
l
b
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n
k
b
.
N
o
n
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n
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n
c
i
a
l
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m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
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e
n
t
o
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t
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e
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u
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m
m
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c
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l
b
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n
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b
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t
p
r
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o
r
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t
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o
r
i
z
a
t
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n
o
r
a
p
p
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o
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e
q
u
i
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d
c
.
L
i
m
i
t
s
a
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
o
n
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
b
y
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
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n
k
’
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
s
d
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
c
a
n
n
o
t
o
w
n
a
n
y
e
q
u
i
t
y
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n
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t
m
e
n
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n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
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a
l
b
a
n
k
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
o
w
n
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
b
a
n
k
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
a
¼
1
;
b
¼
2
;
c
¼
3
;
a
n
d
d
¼
4
2
.
7
C
a
n
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
(
e
.
g
.
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
?
n
a
n
c
e
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
e
t
c
.
)
o
w
n
v
o
t
i
n
g
s
h
a
r
e
s
i
n
c
o
m
m
e
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c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
a
.
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
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t
y
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
b
.
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
,
b
u
t
p
r
i
o
r
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
i
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
c
.
L
i
m
i
t
s
a
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
o
n
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
b
y
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
’
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
s
d
.
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
c
a
n
n
o
t
o
w
n
a
n
y
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
c
o
n
g
l
o
m
e
r
a
t
e
s
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
I
.
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
I
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
I
.
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
I
)
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
131
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
3
.
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
e
n
t
r
y
/
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
m
a
y
e
n
t
e
r
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
(
L
o
w
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
.
8
A
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
e
n
t
e
r
i
n
g
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
?
a
.
A
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
b
.
S
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
c
.
B
r
a
n
c
h
d
.
J
o
i
n
t
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
E
n
t
r
y
i
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
l
e
g
a
l
s
u
b
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
o
b
t
a
i
n
a
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
1
.
6
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
a
r
e
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
b
e
s
u
b
m
i
t
t
e
d
b
e
f
o
r
e
i
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
?
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
a
.
D
r
a
f
t
b
y
l
a
w
s
1
.
6
(
a
)
þ
1
.
6
(
b
)
þ
1
.
6
(
e
)
þ
1
.
6
(
f
)
þ
1
.
6
(
g
)
þ
1
.
6
(
h
)
þ
1
.
6
(
i
)
þ
1
.
6
(
d
)
b
.
I
n
t
e
n
d
e
d
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
h
a
r
t
d
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
/
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
e
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
?
r
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
f
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
m
a
i
n
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
g
.
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
/
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
t
u
r
e
B
o
a
r
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
h
.
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
/
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
t
u
r
e
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
i
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
s
t
o
b
e
u
s
e
d
a
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
n
t
r
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
d
e
n
i
e
d
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
r
e
d
e
n
i
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
[
1
.
7
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
0
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
b
)
]
/
[
1
.
7
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
0
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
a
)
]
1
.
7
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
f
r
o
m
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
(
i
.
e
.
t
h
o
s
e
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
o
w
n
e
d
)
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
0
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
1
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
a
n
e
w
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
2
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
y
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
a
b
r
a
n
c
h
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
r
e
d
e
n
i
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
.
7
(
b
)
/
1
.
7
(
a
)
1
.
7
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
f
r
o
m
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
(
i
.
e
.
t
h
o
s
e
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
o
w
n
e
d
)
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
132
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
r
e
d
e
n
i
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
[
1
.
1
0
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
b
)
]
/
[
1
.
1
0
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
a
)
]
1
.
1
0
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
1
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
a
n
e
w
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
2
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
y
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
a
b
r
a
n
c
h
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
4
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
?
e
c
t
s
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
r
i
s
k
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
d
e
d
u
c
t
s
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
e
l
o
s
s
e
s
f
r
o
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
b
e
f
o
r
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
d
e
q
u
a
c
y
i
s
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
3
.
1
(
a
)
þ
3
.
2
(
a
)
þ
3
.
2
(
b
)
þ
3
.
1
8
.
3
(
d
)
*
3
þ
1
(
i
f
3
.
1
8
.
2
,
0
.
7
5
)
3
.
1
W
h
i
c
h
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
d
e
q
u
a
c
y
r
e
g
i
m
e
s
d
i
d
y
o
u
u
s
e
a
s
o
f
e
n
d
o
f
2
0
1
0
a
n
d
f
o
r
w
h
i
c
h
b
a
n
k
s
d
o
e
s
e
a
c
h
r
e
g
i
m
e
a
p
p
l
y
t
o
(
i
f
u
s
i
n
g
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
o
n
e
r
e
g
i
m
e
)
?
a
.
B
a
s
e
l
I
3
.
2
W
h
i
c
h
r
i
s
k
s
a
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
a
.
C
r
e
d
i
t
r
i
s
k
3
.
1
8
.
2
W
h
a
t
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
g
a
i
n
s
i
s
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
3
.
1
8
.
3
A
r
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
d
e
d
u
c
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
d
.
U
n
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
l
o
s
s
e
s
i
n
f
a
i
r
v
a
l
u
e
d
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
s
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
f
u
n
d
s
m
a
y
b
e
u
s
e
d
t
o
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
l
y
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
z
e
a
b
a
n
k
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
l
y
v
e
r
i
?
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
1
.
4
.
2
A
r
e
t
h
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
o
f
f
u
n
d
s
t
o
b
e
u
s
e
d
a
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
v
e
r
i
?
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
/
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
.
4
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
.
4
.
3
a
n
d
1
.
5
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
.
4
.
2
þ
1
.
4
.
3
þ
1
.
5
1
.
4
.
3
C
a
n
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
d
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
o
r
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
i
n
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
b
e
d
o
n
e
w
i
t
h
a
s
s
e
t
s
o
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
c
a
s
h
o
r
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
?
1
.
5
C
a
n
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
b
y
p
r
o
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
b
e
i
n
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
d
f
u
n
d
s
?
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
i
n
d
e
x
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
V
.
I
)
þ
(
I
V
.
I
I
I
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
V
.
I
)
þ
(
I
V
.
I
I
I
)
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
133
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
5
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
t
o
t
a
k
e
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
5
.
1
0
a
¼
0
;
b
o
r
c
¼
1
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
5
.
9
,
5
.
1
2
,
(
b
)
,
1
2
.
3
.
2
,
1
0
.
5
(
b
)
,
1
1
.
1
(
f
)
,
1
1
.
1
(
j
)
a
n
d
1
1
.
1
(
k
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
1
.
5
(
a
)
,
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
a
n
d
1
1
.
5
(
c
)
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
¼
1
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
¼
0
;
a
n
d
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
¼
0
5
.
1
0
þ
5
.
9
þ
5
.
1
2
(
b
)
þ
1
2
.
3
.
2
þ
1
0
.
5
(
b
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
f
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
j
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
k
)
*
2
þ
1
1
.
5
(
a
)
þ
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
*
2
þ
1
1
.
5
(
c
)
*
2
5
.
9
A
r
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
e
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
a
n
y
p
r
e
s
u
m
e
d
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
i
n
i
l
l
i
c
i
t
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
,
f
r
a
u
d
,
o
r
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
u
s
e
?
5
.
1
0
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
r
i
g
h
t
t
o
m
e
e
t
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
t
h
e
i
r
r
e
p
o
r
t
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
?
a
.
N
o
b
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
b
a
s
i
s
c
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
n
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
a
l
b
a
s
i
s
5
.
1
2
I
n
c
a
s
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
i
d
e
n
t
i
?
e
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
h
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
a
n
i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
a
u
d
i
t
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
t
a
k
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
[
.
.
.
]
b
.
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
1
0
.
5
D
o
b
a
n
k
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
O
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
h
e
e
t
i
t
e
m
s
1
1
.
1
P
l
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
f
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
t
o
c
o
v
e
r
a
c
t
u
a
l
o
r
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
o
s
s
e
s
j
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
o
r
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
t
o
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
k
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
o
r
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
b
o
n
u
s
e
s
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
r
e
m
u
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
1
1
.
5
W
h
i
c
h
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
o
f
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
a
.
D
e
c
l
a
r
e
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
c
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
b
a
n
k
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
1
2
.
3
.
2
C
a
n
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
o
r
c
e
a
b
a
n
k
t
o
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
t
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
?
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
134
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
P
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
a
l
a
w
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
s
p
r
e
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
l
e
v
e
l
s
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
f
o
r
c
e
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
r
o
m
p
t
n
e
s
s
i
n
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
t
o
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
1
.
3
*
[
1
1
.
1
(
a
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
f
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
j
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
k
)
*
2
þ
1
2
.
3
.
2
]
1
1
.
1
P
l
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
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p
e
r
v
i
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o
r
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e
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y
a
.
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e
a
s
e
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n
d
d
e
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i
s
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t
y
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o
r
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e
r
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o
r
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m
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e
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t
b
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r
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t
i
c
e
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.
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e
q
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i
r
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n
k
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o
c
o
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t
i
t
u
t
e
p
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o
v
i
s
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o
n
s
t
o
c
o
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e
r
a
c
t
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a
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r
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t
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a
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o
s
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e
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.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
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n
k
s
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e
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c
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r
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s
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n
d
d
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d
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o
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
k
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
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n
k
s
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
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r
s
u
s
p
e
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d
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o
n
u
s
e
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a
n
d
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t
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e
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r
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o
r
s
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a
n
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e
r
s
1
1
.
3
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
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n
c
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r
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t
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a
n
e
a
r
l
y
i
n
t
e
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v
e
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t
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o
n
f
r
a
m
e
w
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r
k
(
e
.
g
.
p
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
a
t
f
o
r
c
e
s
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
a
c
t
i
o
n
w
h
e
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
t
r
i
g
g
e
r
s
/
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
s
a
r
e
b
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
?
1
2
.
3
.
2
C
a
n
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
o
r
c
e
a
b
a
n
k
t
o
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
t
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
?
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
e
a
t
r
o
u
b
l
e
d
b
a
n
k
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
)
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
¼
1
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
¼
0
;
a
n
d
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
¼
0
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
þ
1
1
.
5
(
c
)
*
2
1
1
.
5
W
h
i
c
h
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
o
f
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
:
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
,
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
,
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
c
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
b
a
n
k
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
D
e
c
l
a
r
i
n
g
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
d
e
c
l
a
r
e
a
d
e
e
p
l
y
t
r
o
u
b
l
e
d
b
a
n
k
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
t
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
5
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
¼
1
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
¼
0
;
a
n
d
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
6
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
1
.
5
(
a
)
þ
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
1
1
.
5
W
h
i
c
h
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
o
f
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
:
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
,
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
,
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
.
”
a
.
D
e
c
l
a
r
e
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
135
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
m
a
y
e
n
g
a
g
e
i
n
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
w
h
e
n
c
o
n
f
r
o
n
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
l
a
w
s
a
n
d
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
i
m
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
l
e
s
s
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
)
1
1
.
1
P
l
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
1
(
b
)
b
.
F
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
(
i
.
e
.
t
o
w
a
i
v
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
a
n
d
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
1
.
3
,
1
2
.
1
2
a
n
d
1
2
.
1
2
.
1
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
1
.
1
(
b
)
þ
1
1
.
3
þ
1
2
.
1
2
þ
1
2
.
1
2
.
1
1
1
.
3
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
a
n
e
a
r
l
y
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
(
e
.
g
.
p
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
a
t
f
o
r
c
e
s
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
a
c
t
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o
n
w
h
e
n
c
e
r
t
a
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n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
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r
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t
r
i
g
g
e
r
s
/
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
s
a
r
e
b
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
?
1
2
.
1
2
I
f
a
n
i
n
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
n
y
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
u
r
s
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
,
m
u
s
t
i
t
b
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
?
1
2
.
1
2
.
1
A
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
m
u
s
t
t
a
k
e
i
n
t
h
e
s
e
c
a
s
e
s
?
C
o
u
r
t
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
c
o
u
r
t
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
l
e
s
s
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
(
1
i
f
1
1
.
6
(
a
)
¼
1
1
.
6
(
b
)
¼
1
1
.
6
(
c
)
¼
1
1
.
6
(
d
)
¼
1
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
1
1
.
6
(
e
)
þ
1
1
.
7
1
1
.
6
I
s
c
o
u
r
t
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
a
.
D
e
c
l
a
r
e
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
d
.
U
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
e
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
c
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
b
a
n
k
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
e
.
A
p
p
o
i
n
t
a
n
d
o
v
e
r
s
e
e
a
b
a
n
k
l
i
q
u
i
d
a
t
o
r
/
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
r
1
1
.
7
C
a
n
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
a
p
p
e
a
l
t
o
t
h
e
c
o
u
r
t
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
a
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
?
L
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
T
h
e
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
l
o
a
n
s
i
n
a
r
r
e
a
r
s
a
s
s
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
a
n
d
l
o
s
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
I
f
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
l
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
,
t
h
e
a
c
t
u
a
l
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
d
a
y
s
b
e
y
o
n
d
w
h
i
c
h
a
l
o
a
n
i
n
a
r
r
e
a
r
s
m
u
s
t
b
e
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
t
h
e
n
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
,
a
n
d
?
n
a
l
l
y
l
o
s
s
a
r
e
s
u
m
m
e
d
9
.
1
.
3
(
a
)
þ
9
.
1
3
(
b
)
þ
9
.
1
3
(
c
)
(
d
a
y
s
)
9
.
1
.
3
A
f
t
e
r
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
d
a
y
s
i
s
a
l
o
a
n
i
n
a
r
r
e
a
r
s
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
.
.
.
?
a
.
S
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
?
b
.
D
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
?
c
.
L
o
s
s
?
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
T
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
a
s
l
o
a
n
s
b
e
c
o
m
e
s
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
a
n
d
l
o
s
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
T
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
t
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
w
h
e
n
a
l
o
a
n
i
s
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
i
v
e
l
y
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
,
a
n
d
l
o
s
s
.
I
f
a
r
a
n
g
e
i
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
,
t
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
i
s
u
s
e
d
9
.
6
.
3
(
a
)
þ
9
.
6
.
3
(
b
)
þ
9
.
6
.
3
(
c
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
9
.
6
.
3
W
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
a
s
l
o
a
n
s
b
e
c
o
m
e
[
.
.
.
]
?
a
.
S
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
?
b
.
D
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
?
c
.
L
o
s
s
?
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
136
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
a
r
e
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
,
v
e
r
i
?
a
b
l
e
,
q
u
a
n
t
i
?
a
b
l
e
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
f
o
r
a
s
s
e
t
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
b
a
n
k
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
t
o
m
a
k
e
l
o
a
n
s
a
b
r
o
a
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
7
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
7
.
2
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
7
.
2
þ
7
.
2
.
2
7
.
2
A
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
r
u
l
e
s
o
r
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
a
s
s
e
t
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
?
7
.
2
.
2
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
m
a
k
i
n
g
l
o
a
n
s
a
b
r
o
a
d
?
6
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
t
e
n
u
r
e
T
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
e
n
u
r
e
o
f
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
Y
e
a
r
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
1
2
.
3
9
W
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
e
n
u
r
e
o
f
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
(
i
.
e
.
w
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
y
e
a
r
s
t
h
a
t
s
t
a
f
f
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
)
?
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
f
r
o
m
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
n
?
u
e
n
c
e
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
2
.
4
T
o
w
h
o
m
i
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
a
b
l
e
?
c
.
A
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
v
e
b
o
d
y
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
o
r
C
o
n
g
r
e
s
s
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
b
a
n
k
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
2
.
9
C
a
n
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
s
t
a
f
f
b
e
h
e
l
d
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
l
y
l
i
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
t
o
a
b
a
n
k
c
a
u
s
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
i
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
r
o
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
c
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
g
o
o
d
f
a
i
t
h
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
i
r
d
u
t
i
e
s
?
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
a
b
l
e
t
o
m
a
k
e
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
l
y
o
f
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
A
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
o
f
f
o
u
r
y
e
a
r
s
o
r
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
¼
1
;
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
f
o
u
r
y
e
a
r
s
o
r
n
o
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
¼
0
1
2
.
6
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
h
e
a
d
o
f
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
h
a
v
e
a
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
?
1
2
.
6
.
1
I
f
y
e
s
,
h
o
w
l
o
n
g
(
i
n
y
e
a
r
s
)
i
s
t
h
e
t
e
r
m
?
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
S
u
m
o
f
(
V
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
V
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
V
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
V
)
M
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
T
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
,
o
r
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
f
o
r
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
n
a
t
i
o
n
’
s
b
a
n
k
s
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
2
.
1
W
h
a
t
b
o
d
y
/
a
g
e
n
c
y
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
e
s
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
f
o
r
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
c
.
M
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
b
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
/
s
u
p
e
r
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
2
.
1
W
h
a
t
b
o
d
y
/
a
g
e
n
c
y
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
e
s
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
f
o
r
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
b
.
A
s
i
n
g
l
e
b
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
s
u
p
e
r
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
n
c
y
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
B
a
n
k
S
i
n
g
l
e
v
s
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
T
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
o
r
n
o
t
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
s
i
n
g
l
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
137
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
7
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
C
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
c
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
d
o
r
c
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
5
.
1
*
5
.
1
.
1
(
a
)
5
.
1
I
s
a
n
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
5
.
1
.
1
I
f
y
e
s
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
o
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
O
b
t
a
i
n
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
c
e
r
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
p
a
s
s
a
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
e
x
a
m
t
o
q
u
a
l
i
f
y
a
s
s
u
c
h
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
T
h
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
0
.
8
/
1
0
*
1
0
0
i
f
1
3
.
1
.
9
,
1
0
.
8
/
1
3
.
1
i
f
1
0
.
8
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
(
e
.
g
.
,
M
o
o
d
y
’
s
,
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
a
n
d
P
o
o
r
)
?
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
3
.
1
,
1
0
1
3
.
1
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
2
0
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
T
h
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
0
.
9
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
?
1
3
.
1
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
N
o
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
w
e
r
e
f
u
l
l
y
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
i
m
e
a
b
a
n
k
f
a
i
l
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
i
f
8
.
1
¼
0
o
r
8
.
1
7
.
2
¼
0
0
i
f
8
.
1
¼
1
a
n
d
8
.
1
7
.
2
¼
1
8
.
1
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
8
.
1
7
.
2
W
e
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
w
h
o
l
l
y
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
(
t
o
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
f
l
e
g
a
l
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
i
m
e
a
b
a
n
k
f
a
i
l
e
d
?
B
a
n
k
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
o
r
u
n
p
a
i
d
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
r
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
o
n
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
s
a
r
e
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
b
a
n
k
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
0
.
2
.
4
,
1
0
.
1
a
n
d
1
0
.
5
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
0
.
2
.
5
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
0
.
2
.
4
þ
1
0
.
2
.
5
þ
1
0
.
1
þ
1
0
.
5
.
2
1
0
.
1
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
f
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
1
0
.
2
.
4
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
s
t
i
l
l
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
1
0
.
2
.
5
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
1
0
.
5
.
2
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
l
i
a
b
l
e
i
f
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
d
i
s
e
r
r
o
n
e
o
u
s
o
r
m
i
s
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
?
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
e
x
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
/
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
o
f
?
r
m
s
,
w
i
t
h
h
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
m
o
r
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
o
v
e
r
s
i
g
h
t
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
V
I
I
.
I
þ
(
1
i
f
V
I
I
.
I
I
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
(
1
i
f
V
I
I
.
I
I
I
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
V
I
I
.
I
V
þ
V
I
I
.
V
þ
[
1
i
f
3
.
1
8
(
c
)
¼
3
.
1
8
.
1
(
d
)
¼
1
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
]
þ
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
b
)
þ
1
0
.
5
(
c
)
þ
1
1
.
1
.
1
3
.
1
8
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
1
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
c
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
3
.
1
8
.
1
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
d
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
138
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
0
.
5
.
1
D
o
b
a
n
k
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
O
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
h
e
e
t
i
t
e
m
s
1
1
.
1
.
1
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
s
/
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
m
a
k
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
f
o
r
m
a
l
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
e
a
s
e
a
n
d
d
e
s
i
s
t
o
r
d
e
r
s
a
n
d
w
r
i
t
t
e
n
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
a
b
a
n
k
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
/
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
b
o
d
y
a
n
d
a
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
?
8
.
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
t
o
m
a
k
e
t
h
e
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
t
o
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
i
n
a
b
a
n
k
,
t
a
k
e
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
,
a
n
d
h
a
s
e
v
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
a
n
y
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
f
?
c
e
r
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
o
w
e
r
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
8
.
4
(
c
)
þ
8
.
4
.
1
þ
8
.
4
.
2
þ
8
.
4
.
3
8
.
4
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
i
t
s
m
a
n
d
a
t
e
?
c
.
B
a
n
k
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
8
.
4
.
1
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
b
y
i
t
s
e
l
f
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
c
a
n
c
e
l
o
r
r
e
v
o
k
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
o
r
a
n
y
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
?
8
.
4
.
2
C
a
n
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
t
a
k
e
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
l
a
w
s
,
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
b
y
l
a
w
s
(
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
?
8
.
4
.
3
H
a
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
e
v
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
l
a
w
s
,
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
b
y
l
a
w
s
(
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
?
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
s
-
t
o
-
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
T
h
e
s
i
z
e
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
R
a
t
i
o
8
.
1
3
.
1
I
f
p
r
e
f
u
n
d
e
d
,
w
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
f
u
n
d
s
t
o
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
s
o
f
e
n
d
o
f
2
0
1
0
?
F
u
n
d
i
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
e
x
i
s
t
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
)
8
.
1
1
W
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
o
f
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
w
a
s
a
c
t
u
a
l
l
y
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
a
s
o
f
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
8
.
1
1
*
1
3
.
4
/
1
3
.
2
2
0
1
0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
2
W
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
o
f
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
(
I
n
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
o
f
l
o
c
a
l
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
)
2
0
1
0
1
3
.
4
W
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
o
f
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
(
I
n
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
o
f
l
o
c
a
l
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
)
2
0
1
0
V
a
r
i
o
u
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
n
g
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
e
x
i
s
t
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
)
8
.
1
0
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
m
a
l
c
o
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
,
i
.
e
.
a
r
e
A
L
L
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
l
y
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
f
o
r
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
i
r
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
8
.
1
3
(
b
)
,
8
.
1
4
a
n
d
8
.
1
0
8
.
1
3
F
u
n
d
i
n
g
i
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
[
.
.
.
]
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
a
.
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
8
.
1
3
(
a
)
a
n
d
8
.
1
3
(
c
)
b
.
B
a
n
k
s
Y
e
s
¼
N
o
¼
0
c
.
C
o
m
b
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
/
o
t
h
e
r
(
p
l
e
a
s
e
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
)
8
.
1
3
þ
8
.
1
4
þ
8
.
1
0
8
.
1
4
D
o
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
e
e
s
/
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
d
t
o
b
a
n
k
s
v
a
r
y
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
s
o
m
e
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
o
f
r
i
s
k
?
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
139
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
9
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
B
a
n
k
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
(
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
)
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
5
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
6
.
1
O
f
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
w
a
s
h
e
l
d
b
y
t
h
e
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
B
a
n
k
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
(
a
s
s
e
t
)
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
s
s
e
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
5
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
6
O
f
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
w
a
s
h
e
l
d
b
y
t
h
e
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
7
.
2
W
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
w
a
s
i
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
(
e
.
g
.
,
w
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
r
s
o
w
n
e
d
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
)
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
r
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
7
.
1
W
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
w
a
s
i
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
(
e
.
g
.
,
w
h
e
r
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
)
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
1
0
.
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
o
f
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
T
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
o
f
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
s
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
o
f
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
)
5
.
1
I
s
a
n
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
5
.
1
,
5
.
1
.
2
,
5
.
1
.
1
(
a
)
,
5
.
7
(
a
)
,
5
.
9
a
n
d
5
.
1
2
(
b
)
5
.
1
.
1
I
f
y
e
s
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
o
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
O
b
t
a
i
n
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
c
e
r
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
p
a
s
s
a
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
e
x
a
m
t
o
q
u
a
l
i
f
y
a
s
s
u
c
h
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
5
.
1
0
a
¼
0
;
b
o
r
c
¼
1
5
.
1
þ
5
.
1
.
2
þ
5
.
1
.
1
(
a
)
þ
5
.
7
(
a
)
þ
5
.
1
0
þ
5
.
9
þ
5
.
1
2
(
b
)
5
.
1
.
2
A
r
e
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
r
n
a
t
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
s
p
e
l
l
e
d
o
u
t
?
5
.
7
D
o
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
a
c
o
p
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
T
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
’
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
o
n
t
h
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
5
.
9
A
r
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
e
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
a
n
y
p
r
e
s
u
m
e
d
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
i
n
i
l
l
i
c
i
t
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
,
f
r
a
u
d
,
o
r
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
u
s
e
?
5
.
1
0
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
r
i
g
h
t
t
o
m
e
e
t
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
t
h
e
i
r
r
e
p
o
r
t
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
?
a
.
N
o
b
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
b
a
s
i
s
c
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
n
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
a
l
b
a
s
i
s
5
.
1
2
I
n
c
a
s
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
i
d
e
n
t
i
?
e
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
h
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
a
n
i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
a
u
d
i
t
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
t
a
k
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
[
.
.
.
]
b
.
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
140
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
T
h
e
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
o
f
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
)
1
0
.
1
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
f
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
0
.
2
.
4
,
1
0
.
1
,
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
b
)
,
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
c
)
a
n
d
1
0
.
5
.
2
1
0
.
2
.
4
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
s
t
i
l
l
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
0
.
2
.
5
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
0
.
2
.
4
þ
1
0
.
1
þ
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
b
)
þ
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
c
)
þ
1
0
.
5
.
2
þ
1
0
.
2
.
5
1
0
.
2
.
5
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
1
0
.
5
.
1
D
o
b
a
n
k
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
O
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
h
e
e
t
i
t
e
m
s
c
.
G
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
r
i
s
k
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
1
0
.
5
.
2
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
l
i
a
b
l
e
i
f
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
d
i
s
e
r
r
o
n
e
o
u
s
o
r
m
i
s
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
?
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
T
h
e
t
y
p
e
o
f
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
u
s
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
)
B
o
t
h
(
a
)
a
n
d
(
b
)
a
r
e
y
e
s
¼
1
;
O
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
¼
0
1
0
.
2
.
2
o
r
1
0
.
2
.
1
1
0
.
2
.
1
A
r
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
i
n
a
c
c
o
r
d
a
n
c
e
w
i
t
h
U
S
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
A
c
c
e
p
t
e
d
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
P
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
s
(
G
A
A
P
)
?
a
.
A
t
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
b
a
n
k
l
e
v
e
l
b
.
A
t
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
l
e
v
e
l
1
0
.
2
.
2
A
r
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
i
n
a
c
c
o
r
d
a
n
c
e
w
i
t
h
I
F
R
S
?
a
.
A
t
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
b
a
n
k
l
e
v
e
l
b
.
A
t
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
l
e
v
e
l
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
a
n
d
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
T
h
e
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
b
y
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
f
o
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
b
a
n
k
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
(
1
i
f
3
.
1
8
(
c
)
¼
3
.
1
8
.
1
(
d
)
¼
1
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
*
2
þ
1
0
.
7
þ
(
1
i
f
1
0
.
8
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
(
1
i
f
1
0
.
9
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
3
.
1
8
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
1
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
c
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
3
.
1
8
.
1
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
d
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
1
0
.
7
A
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
b
y
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
t
o
h
a
v
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
?
1
0
.
8
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
(
e
.
g
.
,
M
o
o
d
y
’
s
,
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
a
n
d
P
o
o
r
)
?
1
0
.
9
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
?
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
i
n
d
e
x
S
u
m
o
f
(
X
.
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
V
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
X
.
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
V
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
141
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Moldova, Slovakia, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay prohibit insurance and real
estate activities but allow unrestricted securities activities, while three countries grant
banks unrestricted securities, insurance, and real estate powers – Hong Kong, Jersey and
Switzerland. All of these countries, moreover, have a single bank supervisory authority.
We also constructed two indexes of the degree to which national regulations:
(1) restrict banks from owning non-?nancial ?rms; and
(2) restrict non-?nancial ?rms from owning banks.
These particular regulations are quite important and, needless to say, controversial.
Figure 7 shows that the degree of overall ?nancial conglomerates restrictiveness
displays substantial variation across countries. Based on Survey IV, bank ownership of
non-?nancial ?rms is more restricted than non-?nancial ?rm ownership of banks. About
30 percent of the countries prohibit bank ownership of non-?nancial ?rms, whereas only
one of 124 countries prohibits ownership of banks by non-?nancial ?rms. 15 percent
of the countries, including the USA, restrict the mixing of banking and commerce.
Comparing Surveys IV to I, Figure 7 shows that there was a substantial increase in
the number of countries prohibiting bank ownership of non-?nancial ?rms, an increase
to 38 from eight. The opposite is the case for prohibiting banks from engaging in
insurance activities, with a decrease to 19 countries from 40. There was not much of a
change with respect to regulatory restrictions for the other variables in the ?gure over
the 13 year period fromSurveys I to IV. Overall, it seems that most countries allowsome
co-mingling of bank and non-?nancial ?rms.
We also construct anindexof the overall restrictions onbankactivities that measures the
extent to which a bank can both engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities
and own non-?nancial ?rms. We include restrictions on banks owning non-?nancial
?rms in this overall index of because regulations on the extent to which banks may own
non-?nancial ?rms affects the ability of a bank to diversifyrevenue streams and is therefore
Figure 7.
Regulatory restrictions on
bank activities and the
mixing of banking and
commerce:
62
58
7
10
19
18
15
14
16
40
39
43
68
49
29
20
24
45
67
38
14
19
30
27
34
40
47
59
40
44
9
6
19
40
42
48
38
8
1
4
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Unrestricted Permitted Restricted Prohibited
Non financial firm
ownership of
banks
Bank ownership of
nonfinancial firms
Real estate
Insurance
Securities
I
IV
I
IV
I
IV
I
IV
I
IV
Note: percentage distribution of 126 countries in Survey I and 124 countries in Survey IV
by degree of restrictiveness
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similar in some ways to the regulatory restrictions on other activities. Based on four of the
indexes de?ned above, this index of overall restrictions on bank activities can potentially
range from 4 to 16, with higher numbers indicating greater restrictive ness.
Figure 8 shows information on the change in the index of overall restrictions on bank
activities from Surveys I to IV. Positive numbers indicate an increase in restrictions.
As with many features of bank regulation and supervision, there is great cross-country
heterogeneity. Of the countries in the ?gure, 43 of them increased restrictions and
36 countries decreased restrictions. In the case of another 18 countries there was no
change. The country that increased restrictions the most was Seychelles, while the
Figure 8.
Change in the index
of overall restrictions
on bank activities:
Surveys I to IV
–8 –6 –4 –2 0 2 4 6
Iceland, Jamaica, Kuwait,
Virgin Islands British
Bahrain, Burundi, Egypt, Gibraltar,
Liechtenstein, Malawi, Morocco
Australia, Austria, China, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Italy,
Kenya, Kosovo, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, The Nertherland,
Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Spain, United Kingdom
Armenia, Chile, Guernsey, Israel, Malta, Nigeria,
Qatar, SouthAfrica, SriLanka, Tajikistan, Trinidad
and Tobago, United States
Banglades, Canada, Croatia, Denmark,
Estonia, Maldives, Singapore, Taiwan
Urugu
Argentina, Botswana, Cayman Islands,
Cyprus, France, India, Jordan, Macao China,
Panama, Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Korea Rep.,
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland,
Slovakia, Venezuela
Seychelles
Guyana, Moldova, Nepal, Tonga
Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Indonesia, Mexico, Namibia
Belarus, Brazil, Puerto Rico
El Salvador
Romania
Ecuador, Gamibia, Ghana, Ireland, Mauritius,
Oman, Portugal, Russia, Samoa (Western),
Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, Vanuatu
Less restricted More restricted
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country that decreased restrictions the most was Romania. For those countries with data
used to construct index of overall restrictions on bank activities for both Surveys I and
IV, the average index value goes from 7.4 down to 7.2, which means that on average
countries decreased overall restrictions from 1999 to 2011.
We also examine whether countries tightened or eased the overall restrictions on
bank activities following the global ?nancial crisis. This is done by comparing the
index values for Surveys III and IV. Table VI shows that 80 percent of the countries
tightened such restrictions following the crisis.
III.B. Capital regulations
Capital regulations represent a mainstay of banking sector policies around the world.
Many rules and policies determine the precise amount and nature of capital that banks
must hold. In terms of the amount of capital, this is typically characterized in terms
of the ratio of capital to total banks assets. In terms of the nature of capital, there are
policies concerning the de?nition of capital beyond cash or government securities, the
de?nition and valuation of bank assets, and whether the regulatory and supervisory
authorities verify the sources of capital.
We construct indexes of the stringency of bank capital regulations that measure the
amount of capital banks must hold and the stringency of regulations on the nature and
source of regulatory capital. It is composed of the answers from speci?c survey questions:
(1) Is the capital-asset ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle I guidelines?
(2) Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of an individual bank’s
credit risk?
(3) Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of market risk?
(4) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are
deducted from the book value of capital? Market value of loan losses not
realized in accounting books? Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?
Or unrealized foreign exchange losses?
Tighten Ease
Argentina Egypt Lebanon Philippines Bahrain
Armenia Estonia Liechtenstein Poland Brazil
Bangladesh France Luxembourg Russia El Salvador
Belgium Gambia Macao, China Seychelles Hungary
Bhutan Ghana Malawi Singapore Iceland
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Greece Maldives Slovakia Indonesia
Botswana Guatemala Malta South Africa Jamaica
Burundi Guyana Mauritius Spain Kenya
Canada India Mexico Taiwan Kuwait
Cayman Islands Ireland Moldova Thailand Peru
Chile Israel Morocco Trinidad and Tobago Portugal
China Italy The Netherlands UK Romania
Croatia Jordan New Zealand USA Sri Lanka
Cyprus Korea, Rep. Nicaragua Uruguay Switzerland
Denmark Kosovo Oman Venezuela Tajikistan
Ecuador Latvia Panama Virgin Islands, British
Table VI.
Did countries tighten or
ease overall restrictions
on bank activities
following the global
?nancial crisis?
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(5) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
(6) Are the sources of funds to be usedas capital veri?ed bythe regulatory/supervisory
authorities?
(7) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with
assets other than cash or government securities?
(8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? Larger
values of this index of bank capital regulation indicate more stringent capital
regulation.
The maximum possible value is 10, while the minimum possible value is 0. Figure 9
shows the change in the index of bank capital regulations from Surveys I to IV, where
positive numbers indicate an increase in restrictions on bank capital. Of the 107 countries,
65 increased the stringency of capital regulation, 28 decreased them, and 14 made no
changes.
Since Survey IV covers the period after the emergence of the global ?nancial crisis
and the introduction of Basel III, we compare capital regulation before and after the
crisis by examining the change in the capital regulatory restrictions index from
Surveys III to IV. Table VII shows that 79 percent of the countries increased the
stringency of their capital regulations following the crisis, including the USA. Note,
however, that at least up to the time of the latest survey, Austria, Mexico and the UK
had reduced the stringency of their capital regulations in the aftermath of the crisis.
III.C. Of?cial supervisory power
An important aspect of supervision is whether the supervisory authorities possess the
power to obtain information from banks and take an assortment of actions to change
the behavior of banks based on the assessments of the of?cial supervisory authority.
In some cases, the authorities might even be required to take corrective action to
address a problem, and in other cases the authorities may have the discretionary power
to act as they see ?t. Courts, moreover, may intervene in some instances and
thereby limit, delay or even reverse actions taken by the supervisory authorities, but in
other cases, the courts have less power over the regulatory and supervisory agencies.
We construct an index of of?cial supervisory power to measure the degree to which
the country’s bank supervisory agency has the authority to take speci?c actions. It is
composed of the answers from speci?c survey questions:
(1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors
about banks?
(2) Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency about
elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
(3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?
(4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational
structure?
(5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors?
(6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses?
(7) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute:
Bank regulation
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dividends;
.
bonuses; and
.
management fees?
(8) Can the supervisory agency supersede the rights of bank shareholders and
declare a bank insolvent?
(9) Can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights?
Figure 9.
Change in the index of
bank capital regulations:
Surveys I-IV
Austria
Mexico
United Kingdom
Argentina
Hungary
Denmark
Gibraltar
Isle of Man
Puerto Rico
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ghana
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Nigeria
Portugal
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Spain
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Côted' Ivoire
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Senegal
Togo
Armenia
Brazil
Ecuador
Estonia
Finland
Guernsey
Lesotho
Luxembourg
Malta
Mauritius
Nepal
Russia
Seychelles
Slovakia
Chile
Ireland
Jordan
Lebanon
Macao, China
Malaysia
Morocco
Poland
Qatar
Singapore
Burundi
Australia
Belarus
Canada
France
Gambia
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Italy
Jamaica
Kyrgyz Republic
Maldives
Namibia
The Netherlands
Oman
Panama
Samoa (Western)
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Tonga
United States
Vanuatu
Bhutan
Botswana
Fiji
Iceland
India
Israel
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Lithuania
Peru
Virgin Islands, British
Cayman Islands
Bulgaria
Croatia
Guyana
Moldova
Philippines
Romania
Taiwan
Bahrain
Egypt
El Salvador
Indonesia
Latvia
Malawi
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus
Bangladesh
Turkey
Venezuela
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4 6 8
Less stringent More stringent
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(10) Can the supervisory agency:
.
supersede shareholder rights;
.
remove and replace management; and
.
remove and replace directors?
The of?cial supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum value of 0,
where larger numbers indicate greater power.
Figure 10 shows the change in the index of of?cial supervisory powers from
Surveys I to IV, where positive numbers indicate an increase in such powers.
On balance, slightly more countries weakened the powers of their of?cial supervisory
agencies than strengthened those powers. A number of countries indicated no
change, including the USA. One might think that whether a country weakens
or strengthens of?cial supervisory powers would be important for helping
predict whether banks would operate safely and soundly. However, an increase in
supervisory power was not found to be helpful in promoting bank development,
performance, or stability in our earlier work (Barth et al., 2006). Indeed, we found that
in countries with weak democratic institutions, of?cial supervisory power was
associated with increased corruption in the lending process with no corresponding
bene?cial effects on stability.
To determine whether countries tightenedincreased or decreasedof?cial supervisory
powers following the global ?nancial crisis, we compare the index values for Surveys III
and IV. Somewhat surprisingly, Table VIII shows that 45 percent of the countries
decreased such powers.
The surveys also provide information on whether supervisory authorities must
report as well as take mandatory actions when they identify infractions of prudential
regulations. Table IX provides information in this regard. It is interesting that
127 countries indicate that infractions must be reported when found, while in only
11 countries is this not the case. The number of countries that require mandatory
Tighten Ease
Argentina Estonia Kuwait Poland Austria
Australia Fiji Kyrgyz Republic Romania Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bahrain Finland Liechtenstein Seychelles Burundi
Bangladesh Germany Lithuania Singapore Gibraltar
Belarus Greece Macao, China Slovakia Guernsey
Belgium Guyana Malawi Slovenia Hungary
Botswana Honduras Mali Tajikistan Iceland
Brazil India Malta Thailand Isle of Man
Bulgaria Indonesia Moldova Tonga Malaysia
Canada Ireland Morocco Trinidad and Tobago Mexico
Cayman Islands Israel Namibia USA Portugal
Croatia Italy The Netherlands Vanuatu Russia
Cyprus Jamaica Oman Venezuela South Africa
Denmark Jordan Panama Virgin Islands, British Spain
Egypt Kenya Peru Sri Lanka
El Salvador Korea, Rep. Philippines Switzerland
UK
Table VII.
Did countries tighten or
ease bank capital
regulations following the
global ?nancial crisis?
Bank regulation
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actions to be taken when infractions are found is 105, while 33 countries do not require
mandatory actions. Israel is a country that neither requires the reporting of infractions
nor mandatory actions when they are found. The UK and the USA both require the
reporting of infractions, but of these two countries, only the USA requires mandatory
actions. The table also provides information on whether supervisors are legally liable
for their actions. Only 23 countries report that this is the case, whereas in 118 countries
supervisors are not held liable.
Figure 10.
Change in the index of
of?cial supervisory
powers: Surveys I-IV
Kazakhstan
Botswana
Colombia
Lebanon
Paraguay
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Morocco
Ecuador
Gibraltar
Qatar
Tajikistan
Guinea-Bissau
Angola
Samoa (Western)
Armenia
Bahrain
Cyprus
Finland
Ireland
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côted 'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Hong Kong, China
Ukraine
Argentina
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Greece
Guernsey
Jersey
Korea, Rep.
Switzerland
Zimbabwe
Malaysia
Senegal
Togo
Norway
Isle of Man
Mozambique
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Egypt
Fiji
Honduras
Hungary
Jamaica
Lesotho
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Russia
Suriname
Portugal
Nigeria
Australia
Bangladesh
Belize
Cayman Islands
Cook Islands
Ghana
Guatemala
Kenya
Kosovo
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Maldives
Namibia
Oman
Philippines
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Tan zania
Tonga
Uganda
United States
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Puerto Rico
Israel
Bhutan
Croatia
Estonia
Germany
Indonesia
Macao, China
Malta
Turkey
Venezuela
China
Burundi
India
Lithuania
Nepal
Peru
South Africa
Gambia
Latvia
Virgin Islands, British
Mexico
Liechtenstein
Denmark
France
Kyrgyz Republic
Malawi
Moldova
The Netherlands
Romania
Taiwan
Chile
Guyana
Thailand
Singapore
Belarus
Canada
Jordan
Mauritius
Iceland
Italy
Trinidad and Tobago
Seychelles
–10 –8 –6 –4 –2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Less power Greater power
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III.D. Private monitoring and external governance
III.D.1 Private monitoring. Regulatory and supervisory policies can also shape the
incentives and ability of private investors to monitor and exert effective governance
over banks. For example, the degree to which supervisory agencies require banks to
obtain certi?ed audits and/or ratings from international-rating agencies and
disseminate accurate, comprehensive and consolidated information on the full range
of their activities and risk-management procedures may in?uence the quality of private
sector scrutiny of banks. To the extent that national regulatory and supervisory
authorities make bank directors legally liable if information is erroneous or misleading
might similarly in?uence the quality of information provided by banks to private
investors and hence the ability of those investors to monitor and govern banks. And,
the incentives of private investor to obtain and process information and then exert
governance over bank executives will surely be shaped by the degree to which
countries have either credibly demonstrated that they will not bailout investors of
failed banks or indicated their willingness to protect those investors. Thus, private
monitoring is not simply an absence of regulations and supervision. Of?cial supervisory
policies also shape private monitoring by forcing information disclosure and de?ning
the liability and hence incentives of private investors.
We construct an index of private monitoring to examine the degree to which
regulatory and supervisory policies encourage the private monitoring of banks that
builds on an array of individual questions contained in the survey. Speci?cally, the
private monitoring index is composed of information on:
Increase Decrease
Belarus Moldova Angola Ecuador Malaysia
Bhutan The Netherlands Argentina Egypt Maldives
Botswana New Zealand Armenia El Salvador Malta
Burkina Faso Nicaragua Australia Estonia Mauritius
Burundi Niger Austria Fiji Mexico
Finland Norway Bahrain Gambia Morocco
France Oman Bangladesh Germany Nigeria
Greece Peru Belgium Ghana Pakistan
Guatemala Poland Belize Gibraltar Philippines
Guernsey Puerto Rico Benin Hungary Portugal
Guinea-Bissau Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina Indonesia Romania
Guyana Seychelles Brazil Israel Senegal
Iceland Slovakia Bulgaria Jordan Singapore
India Sri Lanka Canada Kazakhstan Slovenia
Isle of Man Suriname Cayman Islands Kenya South Africa
Italy Tajikistan Chile Korea, Rep. Spain
Jamaica Thailand China Kosovo Switzerland
Jersey Togo Colombia Latvia Taiwan
Kuwait Trinidad and Tobago Cook Islands Lesotho Tonga
Kyrgyz Republic Uruguay Coˆte d’Ivoire Liechtenstein Turkey
Lebanon Vanuatu Croatia Lithuania Uganda
Luxembourg Virgin Islands, British Cyprus Macao, China USA
Malawi Zimbabwe Denmark Madagascar
Mali
Table VIII.
Did countries increase
or decrease of?cial
supervisory powers
following the global
?nancial crisis?
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If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Angola Yes Yes No
Argentina Yes Yes Yes
Armenia Yes Yes No
Australia Yes Yes No
Austria Yes Yes No
Bahrain Yes Yes No
Bangladesh Yes Yes No
Belarus Yes Yes No
Belgium Yes No No
Belize Yes Yes No
Benin N/A N/A No
Bhutan Yes Yes Yes
Bosnia and
Herzegovina Yes Yes No
Botswana Yes Yes No
Brazil Yes Yes No
Bulgaria Yes No No
Burkina Faso Yes Yes No
Burundi Yes Yes No
Canada Yes No No
Cayman Islands Yes No No
Chile Yes Yes Yes
Colombia Yes Yes Yes
Cook Islands Yes Yes No
Costa Rica Yes Yes Yes
Coˆte d’Ivoire Yes Yes No
Croatia Yes Yes No
Cyprus Yes No No
Denmark Yes No No
Dominican Republic Yes Yes No
Ecuador Yes No Yes
Egypt Yes Yes No
El Salvador Yes Yes Yes
Estonia Yes No No
Ethiopia Yes Yes No
Fiji Yes Yes No
Finland No Yes No
France Yes No No
Gambia Yes Yes No
Germany Yes Yes No
Ghana Yes Yes No
Gibraltar Yes Yes No
Greece No No No
Guatemala Yes Yes No
Guernsey Yes No No
Guinea-Bissau Yes Yes No
(continued)
Table IX.
Prudential bank
regulations and their
enforcement
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supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
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supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Guyana Yes Yes No
Honduras Yes Yes Yes
Hong Kong, China Yes No No
Hungary Yes Yes No
Iceland Yes Yes No
India Yes No No
Indonesia Yes Yes No
Iraq Yes Yes No
Ireland Yes Yes No
Isle of Man Yes Yes No
Israel No No No
Italy Yes No Yes
Jamaica Yes Yes No
Jersey No No No
Jordan N/A Yes No
Kazakhstan Yes Yes No
Kenya Yes Yes No
Korea, Rep. Yes N/A Yes
Kosovo Yes Yes No
Kuwait Yes Yes No
Kyrgyz Republic Yes Yes No
Latvia No Yes Yes
Lebanon Yes N/A Yes
Lesotho N/A N/A No
Liechtenstein No Yes No
Lithuania No No Yes
Luxembourg Yes Yes No
Macao, China Yes No No
Madagascar Yes Yes No
Malawi Yes Yes No
Malaysia Yes No No
Maldives Yes No No
Mali Yes Yes No
Malta Yes No No
Mauritius Yes Yes No
Mexico Yes Yes Yes
Moldova Yes Yes No
Montenegro Yes Yes Yes
Morocco No Yes No
Mozambique Yes Yes Yes
Myanmar Yes Yes Yes
Namibia Yes Yes No
Nepal N/A Yes No
The Netherlands No No No
New Zealand Yes No No
Nicaragua Yes Yes Yes
(continued)
Table IX.
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0
1
6
(
P
T
)
If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Niger Yes Yes No
Nigeria Yes Yes No
Norway Yes Yes N/A
Oman Yes Yes No
Pakistan Yes Yes No
Palestinian Territory Yes Yes No
Panama Yes Yes Yes
Paraguay Yes Yes Yes
Peru Yes Yes No
Philippines Yes Yes No
Poland Yes No No
Portugal Yes Yes No
Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes
Qatar Yes Yes No
Romania Yes Yes No
Russia No Yes No
Samoa (Western) Yes Yes No
Senegal Yes Yes No
Serbia Yes Yes No
Seychelles Yes Yes No
Sierra Leone Yes Yes Yes
Singapore Yes No No
Slovakia Yes Yes No
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes
South Africa Yes Yes No
Spain Yes Yes No
Sri Lanka Yes No No
Suriname Yes No No
Swaziland Yes Yes No
Switzerland Yes Yes No
Syria Yes Yes No
Taiwan Yes Yes No
Tajikistan No No No
Tanzania Yes No No
Thailand Yes Yes No
Togo Yes Yes No
Tonga Yes Yes No
Trinidad and Tobago Yes Yes No
Tunisia Yes Yes No
Turkey Yes Yes No
Uganda Yes Yes No
Ukraine Yes No No
United Arab Emirates Yes No No
UK Yes No No
USA Yes Yes No
Uruguay Yes Yes No
(continued)
Table IX.
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.
whether bank directors and of?cials are legally liable for the accuracy of
information disclosed to the public;
.
whether banks must publish consolidated accounts;
.
whether banks must be audited by certi?ed international auditors;
.
whether 100 percent of the largest ten banks are rated by international rating
agencies;
.
whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public;
.
whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures to the public;
.
whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, enter the income statement
while the loan is still non-performing;
.
whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital; and
.
whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was paid
the last time a bank failed.
Thus, the maximum value of the private monitoring index is 12 and the minimum
value is 0, where larger values indicate greater regulatory empowerment of the
monitoring of banks by private investors.
Figure 11 shows the change in the index of private monitoring from Surveys I to IV.
Positive values in this ?gure indicate that private monitoring strengthened over time,
while negative values signify a reduction in the degree to which of?cial policies support
the monitoring of banks by private investors. As shown, there is great diversity in
terms of whether regulations associated with private monitoring have strengthened or
weakened. Once again, relatively small countries such as the Philippines, Finland and
Tajikistan were generally those that reduced private monitoring to the greatest degree,
while comparatively large countries like France, India and the USAincreased it the most.
On average, there was a slight increase in private monitoring, such that average value of
the private monitoring index was 7.7 in 1999 and it was 7.9 in 2011.
To determine whether countries increased or decreased private monitoring powers
following the global ?nancial crisis, we compare the index values for Surveys III and IV.
If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Vanuatu Yes Yes No
Venezuela Yes Yes No
Virgin Islands, British Yes No No
Yemen Yes Yes No
Zimbabwe Yes Yes No
TOTAL
Yes 127 105 23
No 11 33 118
N/A 4 4 1
Table IX.
Bank regulation
and supervision
153
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(
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Table Xshows that about half of the countries increased such powers, with the other half
decreased the extent to which of?cial regulatory and supervisory policies encourage and
facilitate the monitoring of banks by private investors.
III.D.2 External governance. Building on the private monitoring index, we construct a
broader index of the degree to which regulations facilitate external governance by debt
and equity holders. The index is composed of the answers fromspeci?c survey questions:
Figure 11.
Change in the index of
private monitoring from
Surveys I to IV
Finland
Philippines
Tajikistan
Burundi
Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
El Salvador
Gibraltar
Guernsey
Malaysia
Malta
Oman
Portugal
Suriname
Armenia
Belize
Bhutan
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Egypt
Guatemala
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Macao, China
Mauritius
Namibia
New Zealand
Panama
Qatar
Slovenia
Tonga
Virgin Islands, British
Argentina
Bahrain
Botswana
Bulgaria
Gambia
Guyana
Honduras
Israel
Jordan
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Moldova
Morocco
Peru
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Belgium
Cayman Islands
China
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Jamaica
Kenya
Lesotho
The Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
Austria
Chile
Cyprus
Greece
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Malawi
Maldives
Slovakia
Trinidad and Tobago
Bangladesh
Ghana
Mexico
Seychelles
United States
Belarus
France
India
–4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Less empowerment Greater empowerment
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:
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6
2
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a
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6
(
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)
(1) Is an audit by a professional external auditor required for all commercial banks
in your jurisdiction?
(2) Are speci?c requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out?
(3) Are auditors licensed or certi?ed?
(4) Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor’s report?
(5) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to
discuss their report without the approval of the bank?
(6) Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory
agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in
illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
(7) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?
(8) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement
while the loan is still performing?
(9) Are ?nancial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering
all bank and any non-bank ?nancial subsidiaries?
(10) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?
(11) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public?
(12) Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or
misleading?
(13) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement
while the loan is still non-performing?
(14) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with International
Accounting Standards (IAS)?
(15) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with US Generally Accepted
Accounting Standards (GAAS)?
(16) Is subordinated debt allowable as part of capital?
Increase Decrease
Bangladesh Italy Argentina Iceland
Belarus Kenya Armenia Jordan
China Kyrgyz Republic Australia Lebanon
Denmark Latvia Bahrain Luxembourg
El Salvador Lithuania Bosnia and Herzegovina Malta
France Macao, China Botswana Moldova
Germany Mexico Bulgaria Oman
Greece The Netherlands Burundi Peru
Guatemala South Africa Canada Portugal
Hungary Spain Cayman Islands Sri Lanka
India Suriname Finland Switzerland
Indonesia Thailand Ghana Trinidad and Tobago
Ireland USA Gibraltar Venezuela
Israel Guyana
Table X.
Did countries increase or
decrease private
monitoring powers
following the global
?nancial crisis?
Bank regulation
and supervision
155
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(
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)
(17) Is subordinated debt required as part of capital?
(18) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks?
(19) What percentage of the top ten banks is rated by international credit rating
agencies (e.g. Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s)?
(20) How many of the top ten banks are rated by domestic credit rating agencies?
The values of the external governance index range from 0 to 19, with higher values
indicating a great degree of external governance.
Figure 12 shows the change in the index of external governance from Surveys I to IV,
where the positive values indicate an increase of external governance. Of the 42 countries
providing data for both Surveys I and IV, 37 tightened external governance, three
(Malaysia, Panama, and Fiji) eased it, and two (Argentina and Finland) made no changes.
On average, the index values increased from12.6 in 1999 to 15.3 in 2011. We then examine
how counties changed their external governance following the recent banking crisis.
Table XI shows information of countries with data available for both Surveys I and IV.
Of 33 countries, 22 tightened external governance, and 11 eased it from 1999 to 2011.
III.E. Explicit deposit insurance schemes
Policies associated with insuring the deposits of banks may also shape the performance
of banking systems. Countries often adopt deposit insurance to prevent bank runs.
When depositors attempt to withdraw their funds all at once, some illiquid but solvent
individual banks may be forced into insolvency and there is also the potential for
contagious bank runs on otherwise healthy banks. Thus, many countries enact deposit
insurance schemes to reduce the probability of systemic crises. But, deposit insurance
can encourage excessive risk-taking by banks by reducing the incentives of depositors
to monitor bank executives and curtail excessive risk taking. Thus, the precise design
of deposit insurance schemes, including coverage limits, scope of coverage, whether
coinsurance is a feature, sources of funding, premia structure, and management and
membership requirements, may materially shape bank and depositor behavior.
We construct an index of deposit insurer power to measure each country’s deposit
insurance regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. In particular, the deposit
insurance index is composed of the following individual questions from the surveys:
(1) Does the deposit insurance agency/fund administrator have the bank
intervention authority as part of its mandate?
(2) Does the deposit insurance authority by itself have the legal power to cancel or
revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank?
(3) Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations against
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank
directors or other bank of?cials?
(4) Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations
against laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against
bank directors or other bank of?cials?
The values of the deposit insurance index range from 0 to 4, with higher values
indicating more power.
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6
2
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6
(
P
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)
Tighten Ease
Armenia Cyprus Liechtenstein Seychelles Egypt New Zealand
Australia Estonia Luxembourg Singapore Hong Kong, China Panama
Belgium Honduras Malawi USA Lithuania South Africa
Botswana Indonesia Nigeria Uruguay Malaysia Spain
Chile Italy Pakistan Moldova UK
Croatia Jamaica Peru The Netherlands
Table XI.
Did countries tighten or
ease external governance
following the global
?nancial crisis?
Figure 12.
Change in the index
of external governance
from Surveys I to IV
Malaysia
Panama
Fiji
Argentina
Finland
Hong Kong, China
Bulgaria
Croatia
Honduras
Moldova
United Kingdom
Australia
Botswana
Egypt
Estonia
New Zealand
Pakistan
Uruguay
Ireland
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Iceland
Jamaica
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Macao, China
Peru
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
The Netherlands
Lithuania
United States
Indonesia
Nigeria
Armenia
Malawi
Chile
Guatemala
Seychelles
Italy
–2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Less governance Greater governance
Bank regulation
and supervision
157
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4
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2
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a
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2
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(
P
T
)
Figure 13 shows the change in the index of deposit insurance from Surveys I to IV. The
positive numbers indicate anincrease of deposit insurance power. There are 75 countries
providing data for both Surveys I and IV. Of these countries, 22 increased the power and
18 decrease it, while 35 countries made no changes. On average, there was a very slight
increase in deposit insurance power, such that the average value of the index was 1.06 in
1999 and 1.08 in 2011.
As Table XII shows, 98 of the 143 countries responding to Survey IV had established
a deposit insurance protection system for banks. Such schemes are most common
among high-income countries and least common among low-income countries. The table
also shows that there are a number of differences in:
Figure 13.
Change in the index of
deposit insurance from
Surveys I to IV
Oman
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Liechtenstein
Peru
Slovenia
Venezuela
Cyprus
Guatemala
Indonesia
Philippines
Nigeria
Germany
Korea, Rep.
Russia
Ukraine
Armenia
Austria
Bahrain
Belarus
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Colombia
Denmark
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
Gibraltar
Greece
Honduras
Hong Kong, China
India
Isle of Man
Jordan
Lebanon
Lithuania
Moldova
The Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Romania
Singapore
Slovakia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
United States
Chile
Malaysia
France
Argentina
Ireland
Latvia
Luxembourg
Malta
Mexico
Morocco
Norway
Tanzania
Thailand
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Turkey
United Kingdom
Kenya
Bangladesh
Belgium
Jamaica
Croatia
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3
Less power
More power
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N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
Y
e
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Y
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Y
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N
o
N
o
Y
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Y
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Y
e
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N
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Y
e
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N
o
C
y
p
r
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N
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D
e
n
m
a
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k
Y
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N
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N
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N
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N
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Y
e
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N
o
D
o
m
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n
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c
a
n
R
e
p
u
b
l
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c
Y
e
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Y
e
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Y
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Y
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Y
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Y
e
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N
o
N
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N
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N
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N
o
E
c
u
a
d
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r
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N
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N
o
N
o
N
/
A
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
E
l
S
a
l
v
a
d
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r
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
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N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
Explicit deposit
insurance protection
system
Bank regulation
and supervision
159
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
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V
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R
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T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
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t
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t
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?
A
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e
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y
a
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r
e
a
,
R
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p
.
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/
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N
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o
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s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
JFEP
5,2
160
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
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V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
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?
A
r
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s
M
e
x
i
c
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
M
o
z
a
m
b
i
q
u
e
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
M
y
a
n
m
a
r
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
h
e
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
r
w
a
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
O
m
a
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
e
r
u
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
161
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
I
s
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
y
s
t
e
m
c
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
?
A
r
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
?
T
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
y
p
e
i
s
:
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
F
o
r
e
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g
n
b
a
n
k
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u
b
s
i
d
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a
r
i
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s
F
o
r
e
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g
n
b
a
n
k
b
r
a
n
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h
e
s
F
o
r
e
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g
n
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
I
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
d
e
p
o
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t
s
D
e
p
o
s
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t
s
o
f
t
h
e
f
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e
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g
n
b
r
a
n
c
h
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s
o
f
d
o
m
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t
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c
b
a
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k
s
D
e
p
o
s
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t
s
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
e
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g
n
s
u
b
s
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d
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a
r
i
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s
o
f
d
o
m
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s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
d
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p
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s
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t
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r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
P
e
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d
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p
o
s
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t
o
r
P
e
r
d
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p
o
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t
o
r
p
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r
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
O
t
h
e
r
P
o
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
u
e
r
t
o
R
i
c
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
R
u
s
s
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
e
r
b
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
p
a
i
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
r
i
L
a
n
k
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
w
a
z
i
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
y
r
i
a
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
a
i
w
a
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
T
a
j
i
k
i
s
t
a
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
T
o
n
g
a
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
T
u
n
i
s
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
T
u
r
k
e
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
U
g
a
n
d
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
JFEP
5,2
162
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
I
s
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
y
s
t
e
m
c
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
?
A
r
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
?
T
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
y
p
e
i
s
:
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
u
b
s
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d
i
a
r
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e
s
F
o
r
e
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g
n
b
a
n
k
b
r
a
n
c
h
e
s
F
o
r
e
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g
n
c
u
r
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n
c
y
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
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n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
d
e
p
o
s
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t
s
D
e
p
o
s
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t
s
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
e
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g
n
b
r
a
n
c
h
e
s
o
f
d
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m
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s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
D
e
p
o
s
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t
s
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
s
u
b
s
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d
i
a
r
i
e
s
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
d
e
p
o
s
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t
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
P
e
r
d
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p
o
s
i
t
o
r
P
e
r
d
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p
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s
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t
o
r
p
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r
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n
s
t
i
t
u
t
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o
n
O
t
h
e
r
U
K
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
U
S
A
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
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s
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m
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s
Table XII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
163
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n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
.
whether participation by banks is compulsory; and
.
the scope of coverage.
Of the countries providingdata, 95 require domestic banks toparticipate, while 86 (62) also
require foreign bank subsidiaries (foreign bank branches) to participate. Roughly
three-fourths of the countries provide coverage for foreign currency deposits but at the
same time exclude interbank deposits. The most common type of deposit insurance
coverage is per depositor per institution rather thanper depositor or per depositor account.
We next examine how countries changed their deposit insurance regimes following
the recent banking crisis. Since Survey III provides information just before the global
?nancial crisis and Survey IV provides similar information right after the crisis fully
emerged, we provide information on whether or not changes were made in the coverage
provided by the deposit insurance system in selected advanced countries. All these
countries suffered a banking crisis, which makes it useful to determine whether any
important changes were made in their deposit insurance schemes. Table XIII shows
that four countries that reported that they had a formal coinsurance feature as part of
their deposit insurance schemes prior to the global ?nancial crisis eliminated this
feature in 2011. In addition, two countries that had not had deposit insurance fees
based on some assessment of risk made a switch to include them from Surveys III to IV,
while one country did the reverse.
An additional point that should be made before concluding this section is the
resolution of insolvent banks. To the extent that a bank is a subsidiary of a holding
company, an issue that arises is whether the deposit insurance supervisory authority or
other regulatory authority is able to seize the holding company or just a subsidiary
bank. In the USA, the regulatory authorities have been only able to seize and resolve
subsidiary banks, not the parent holding companies, until the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act in 2010. In this case, insolvent banks were seized and resolved by the regulatory
authorities, while the parent holding companies were handled by bankruptcy courts.
Information provided by Survey IV indicates that in 73 countries the insolvency
framework is the same for holding companies and banks, but different in 59 countries.
III.F. Restrictions on entry into banking
The degree of competition in banking depends importantly on entry barriers.
Regulators in most countries do not allow just anyone to enter the banking system, but
rather screen entrants to better assure they are “?t and proper.” By imposing the fairly
basic requirements identi?ed above before a banking license is accepted or rejected,
those allowed to enter may be of higher quality and thereby enhance the overall
performance of the banking industry.
We construct an entry into banking index to measure each country’s requirements
of entering into banking and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. In particular, this
index is based on whether or not the following information is required of applicants for
a banking license:
.
draft by-laws;
.
intended organizational chart;
.
?nancial projections for ?rst three years;
.
?nancial information on main potential shareholders;
JFEP
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R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Is there formal coinsurance, that
is, are depositors explicitly
insured for less than 100 percent
of their deposits?
Do deposit insurance fees
charged to banks vary
based on some assessment
of risk?
Country Survey III Survey IV Survey III Survey IV
Algeria Yes N/A Yes N/A
Angola N/A No N/A No
Argentina No No Yes Yes
Armenia No No Yes No
Australia N/A No N/A No
Austria No No No No
Bahrain Yes Yes No No
Bangladesh No No No Yes
Belarus No No No No
Belgium No No Yes No
Bosnia and Herzegovina No No No No
Brazil No No No No
Bulgaria No No No No
Canada No No Yes Yes
Chile Yes Yes N/A N/A
Colombia Yes No Yes Yes
Croatia No No No No
Cyprus No No No No
Czech Republic Yes N/A No N/A
Denmark No No No No
Dominican Republic N/A No N/A No
Ecuador N/A No N/A Yes
El Salvador No No No Yes
Estonia Yes No No No
Ethiopia N/A No N/A No
Finland No No Yes Yes
France No No Yes Yes
Germany Yes No No Yes
Gibraltar Yes Yes No No
Greece No No No Yes
Guatemala Yes No No No
Guernsey N/A No N/A No
Honduras N/A No No No
Hong Kong, China No No Yes Yes
Hungary Yes No Yes Yes
Iceland Yes No No No
India No No No No
Indonesia Yes No No No
Ireland Yes Yes No No
Isle of Man N/A No N/A No
Italy No No Yes Yes
Jamaica No No No No
Japan N/A N/A No N/A
Jersey N/A No N/A No
Jordan N/A No No No
(continued)
Table XIII.
Changes in deposit
insurance scheme prior to
and post the global
?nancial crisis
Bank regulation
and supervision
165
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R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Is there formal coinsurance, that
is, are depositors explicitly
insured for less than 100 percent
of their deposits?
Do deposit insurance fees
charged to banks vary
based on some assessment
of risk?
Country Survey III Survey IV Survey III Survey IV
Kazakhstan No N/A Yes N/A
Kenya No No Yes No
Korea, Rep. N/A No No No
Kosovo N/A N/A N/A Yes
Kyrgyz Republic N/A N/A N/A No
Latvia No Yes No Yes
Lebanon Yes No No No
Lesotho N/A Yes N/A Yes
Liechtenstein N/A No No No
Lithuania yes No no No
Luxembourg No No No No
Macao, China N/A No N/A N/A
Macedonia No N/A No N/A
Malaysia No No Yes Yes
Malta Yes No N/A No
Mexico No No No Yes
Moldova No No No No
Montenegro No No No No
Morocco Yes No No No
Mozambique No No No Yes
Myanmar No Yes No No
Namibia No No No No
The Netherlands No No No No
Nicaragua Yes No Yes Yes
Nigeria No No No Yes
Norway No No Yes Yes
Oman N/A No No No
Paraguay N/A No N/A No
Peru No No Yes Yes
Philippines No No Yes No
Poland Yes No No No
Portugal Yes No Yes Yes
Puerto Rico N/A Yes N/A Yes
Romania No No Yes No
Russia Yes No No No
Serbia N/A No N/A No
Sierra Leone N/A No N/A No
Singapore Yes No Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes No No No
Slovenia No No No No
Spain No No No No
Sri Lanka N/A No N/A Yes
Swaziland N/A No N/A N/A
Sweden No N/A No N/A
(continued)
Table XIII.
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O
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2
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1
6
(
P
T
)
.
background/experience of future directors;
.
background/experience of future managers;
.
sources of funds to be used to capitalize the new bank; and
.
market differentiation intended for the new bank.
The values of the index of entry into banking range from 0 to 8, with higher values
indicating greater stringency.
Figure 14 identi?es the change in the index of entry into banking fromSurveys I to IV.
The selected countries are the ones providing data both for Surveys I and IV. Among the
136 countries, 35 countries increased the entry into banking requirements, 16 decreased
the requirements, and 85 countries did not make changes. On average, there was a slight
increase in entry into banking requirements, such that the average value of the index
was 7.5 in 1999 and it was 7.8 in 2011.
III.G. Additional information
Clearly, the number of questions asked in all four surveys is far too large to provide an
adequate discussion of all of them in this paper. Indeed, it took over 100 pages in our
book (Barth et al., 2006, Chapter 3) that focused only on Survey I to describe the data.
The online dataset that we make available, however, provides details on each question
in each survey, the formulas for constructing each of the indexes discussed above, and
all of the information on several other indexes of bank regulation and supervision.
Thus, this paper provides an introduction to the online dataset, but is not a complete
description of every aspect of these data.
Is there formal coinsurance, that
is, are depositors explicitly
insured for less than 100 percent
of their deposits?
Do deposit insurance fees
charged to banks vary
based on some assessment
of risk?
Country Survey III Survey IV Survey III Survey IV
Switzerland No No No No
Taiwan No No Yes Yes
Tajikistan Yes Yes Yes No
Tanzania No N/A No No
Thailand N/A No N/A No
Trinidad and Tobago No No No No
Turkey N/A No N/A Yes
Uganda Yes No Yes Yes
Ukraine N/A No N/A No
UK Yes No No No
USA N/A No N/A Yes
Uruguay Yes No No Yes
Venezuela No No No No
Virgin Islands, British N/A No N/A No
Yemen N/A N/A N/A Yes
Zimbabwe Yes No No No
Note: Advanced economies that suffered the global ?nancial crisis are italisized
Table XIII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
167
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
To provide additional summary information on Survey IV and advertise the enormous
heterogeneity of bank regulatory and supervisory policies across countries, Tables AIII,
AIV and XIV give the values of key regulatory and supervisory policies for different
cuts of the data. The minimum and maximum values in Table AIII are useful because
they help indicate whether an item is measured as an index, in days, as a percentage or
as a pure number. This table shows that there is substantial variation in the values of
the different items across the various countries, with the number of countries providing
information also indicated. Table AIV provides the average values for the same
items included in the Table AIII with the countries grouped into different categories
based on income level, development status and whether or not an offshore center.
Table XIV further advertises the lack of uniformity in various regulations and
supervisory practices in countries around the world.
Figure 14.
Change in the index
of entry into banking
requirements:
Surveys I-IV
Croatia
Qatar
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Greece
Isle of Man
Liechtenstein
Malawi
Norway
South Africa
Tanzania
Jersey
Korea, Rep.
Hong Kong, China
Armenia
Bangladesh
Cayman Islands
China
El Salvador
Gambia
Gibraltar
Guernsey
Guyana
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Malaysia
Maldives
New Zealand
Pakistan
Philippines
Turkey
United States
Argentina
Burundi
Egypt
France
India
Israel
Macao, China
Puerto Rico
Seychelles
Trinidad and Tobago
Kuwait
Germany
Chile
Finland
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
More power Less power
JFEP
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n
i
a
l
o
f
t
h
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a
p
p
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a
t
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n
s
f
o
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b
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n
k
l
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d
.
I
n
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
a
p
p
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c
a
t
i
o
n
9
0
3
3
5
7
C
a
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
p
a
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t
i
e
s
o
w
n
c
a
p
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t
a
l
i
n
a
b
a
n
k
?
1
4
0
1
3
5
5
W
h
i
c
h
r
i
s
k
s
a
r
e
c
o
v
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d
b
y
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t
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l
a
t
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m
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m
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m
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q
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C
r
e
d
i
t
r
i
s
k
1
3
9
1
3
8
1
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h
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f
t
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e
f
o
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l
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w
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l
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a
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a
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T
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1
c
a
p
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t
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l
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c
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u
b
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r
d
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n
a
t
e
d
d
e
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t
1
3
3
1
8
1
1
5
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
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g
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t
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m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
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w
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d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
d
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
1
3
3
1
3
1
2
I
s
a
n
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
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o
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a
l
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x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
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d
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t
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r
r
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q
u
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r
e
d
f
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r
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
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c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
1
4
2
1
4
2
0
I
f
y
e
s
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
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t
o
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h
a
v
e
t
o
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
O
b
t
a
i
n
a
p
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f
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s
s
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o
n
a
l
c
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t
i
?
c
a
t
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o
n
o
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p
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a
s
p
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i
?
c
e
x
a
m
t
o
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a
l
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f
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a
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h
1
3
7
1
3
1
6
A
r
e
s
p
e
c
i
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c
r
e
q
u
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m
e
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f
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t
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n
a
t
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o
f
t
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a
u
d
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t
s
p
e
l
l
e
d
o
u
t
?
1
4
1
1
2
1
2
0
D
o
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
r
e
c
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i
v
e
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c
o
p
y
o
f
t
h
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f
o
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l
o
w
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
T
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
’
s
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e
p
o
r
t
o
n
t
h
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
1
4
3
1
4
3
0
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
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t
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n
s
u
r
a
n
c
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a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
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r
a
t
o
r
h
a
v
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t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
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n
g
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
s
p
a
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t
o
f
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t
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m
a
n
d
a
t
e
?
c
.
B
a
n
k
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
9
9
2
7
7
2
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
b
y
i
t
s
e
l
f
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
c
a
n
c
e
l
o
r
r
e
v
o
k
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
o
r
a
n
y
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
?
9
8
2
4
7
4
H
a
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
e
v
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
l
a
w
s
,
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
b
y
l
a
w
s
(
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
?
9
4
1
5
7
9
T
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
y
p
e
i
s
:
b
.
P
e
r
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
9
7
1
7
8
0
W
e
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
w
h
o
l
l
y
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
(
t
o
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
f
l
e
g
a
l
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
i
m
e
a
b
a
n
k
f
a
i
l
e
d
?
6
7
5
0
1
7
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XIV.
Information for selected
other questions included
in Surveys I-IV
Bank regulation
and supervision
169
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
I
-
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
N
u
m
b
e
r
a
n
s
w
e
r
i
n
g
y
e
s
N
u
m
b
e
r
a
n
s
w
e
r
i
n
g
n
o
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
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f
y
l
o
a
n
s
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n
d
a
d
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a
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a
s
n
o
n
-
p
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r
f
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r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
a
.
S
i
g
n
i
?
c
a
n
t
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
d
i
f
?
c
u
l
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
b
o
r
r
o
w
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r
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n
d
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
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t
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o
n
i
n
i
t
s
c
r
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d
i
t
w
o
r
t
h
i
n
e
s
s
1
3
7
1
2
1
1
6
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
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i
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t
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a
c
c
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n
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t
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c
l
a
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s
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f
y
l
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a
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s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
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s
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o
n
-
p
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f
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r
m
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g
[
.
.
.
]
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b
.
B
r
e
a
c
h
o
f
c
o
n
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r
a
c
t
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e
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g
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d
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y
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s
t
o
r
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
1
3
6
1
2
7
9
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
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t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
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a
c
c
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n
t
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l
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f
y
l
o
a
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a
d
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a
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a
s
n
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n
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p
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f
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r
m
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n
g
[
.
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]
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.
R
e
s
t
r
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c
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r
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n
g
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i
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e
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c
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o
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r
a
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f
o
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c
o
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o
m
i
c
o
r
l
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g
a
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r
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a
s
o
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s
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a
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i
n
g
t
o
t
h
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b
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
’
s
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
d
i
f
?
c
u
l
t
y
,
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
l
e
n
d
e
r
w
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n
o
t
o
t
h
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r
w
i
s
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c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
)
1
3
9
1
2
4
1
5
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
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t
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r
i
a
a
r
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a
k
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c
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f
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d
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n
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p
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r
m
i
n
g
[
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.
.
]
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d
.
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
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b
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n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
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r
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t
h
e
r
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
1
3
6
1
2
6
1
0
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
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t
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r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
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a
c
c
o
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t
t
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c
l
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f
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l
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a
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p
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m
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g
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]
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.
D
a
y
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p
a
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d
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e
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t
a
t
u
s
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p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
d
a
y
s
)
1
3
4
1
2
7
7
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
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r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
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c
c
o
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n
t
t
o
c
l
a
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s
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f
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o
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n
s
a
n
d
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d
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a
s
n
o
n
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p
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m
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n
g
[
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.
]
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f
.
E
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
o
f
c
o
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l
a
t
e
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l
,
g
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a
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t
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a
n
d
/
o
r
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t
h
e
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c
r
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d
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t
m
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t
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g
a
t
e
s
1
3
4
8
9
4
5
I
f
a
c
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
h
a
s
m
u
l
t
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p
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o
a
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s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
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a
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d
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f
t
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m
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l
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i
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a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
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f
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m
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n
g
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a
r
e
a
l
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t
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e
x
p
o
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u
r
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a
u
t
o
m
a
t
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c
a
l
l
y
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
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d
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
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n
g
a
s
w
e
l
l
?
1
3
5
7
6
5
9
D
o
y
o
u
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
w
r
i
t
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o
f
f
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
l
o
a
n
s
a
f
t
e
r
a
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
t
i
m
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
?
1
4
0
5
3
8
7
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
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Table XIV.
JFEP
5,2
170
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(
P
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)
III.H. Some new information in Survey IV
Survey IV contains all the questions in the three earlier surveys that are necessary to
construct the indices discussed earlier as well as other indices discussed more fully in
Barth et al. (2006) and provided in the online dataset. In addition, the latest survey
includes some new and important questions that were asked due to the global ?nancial
crisis. In particular, given the concern over systemic risk, questions are added to
determine what countries are doing in an effort designed to better assess systemic risk
within the banking sector. Of 133 countries, 90 of them indicate that they have a
specialized department dealing with ?nancial stability and systemic supervision, while
the remaining 43 reported they do not have such a department. Countries in which these
departments exist include Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands,
Spain, and the UK. Denmark, Switzerland and the USA report not having established a
specialized department dealing with ?nancial stability and systemic supervision.
Figure 15 shows the factors that countries consider inassessingsystemic riskwithinthe
banking sector. The factor that regulators in the most countries consider is bank capital
ratios (113), while the least mentioned factor is stock market prices (46). Countries that
report that all of the factors are considered include Austria, Iceland, The Netherlands,
Portugal, the UKandthe USA. These are advancedcountries that suffereda bankingcrisis.
Some other advanced economies that suffered a banking crisis, like France, Germany and
Ireland, do not indicate that they consider any of the factors indicated in the ?gure.
There are still other new questions asked in Survey IV that are important, especially
given the most recent global ?nancial crisis. Some of the questions as well as the number of
countries respondingandtheir collective answers are reportedinTable XV. These questions
focus on external auditors, remuneration or compensation, insolvency framework for bank
holding companies and banks, stress tests, counter-cyclical regulations, and the supervision
of the systemic institutions verses non-systemic ones. Once again, there is in most cases a
substantial divergence from uniformity in the answers. Focusing on just the advanced
Figure 15.
Bank supervisory criteria
for assessing systemic risk
46
48
79
84
92
93
99
100
101
104
113
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Stock market prices
Housing prices
FX position of banks
Bank leverage ratios
Bank provisioning ratios
Bank profitability ratios
Bank non-performing loan ratios
Growth in bank credit
Sectoral composition of bank loan
portfolios
Bank liquidity ratios
Bank capital ratios
Note: Number of countries reporting yes for each factor
Bank regulation
and supervision
171
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7
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r
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t
s
1
2
6
2
2
1
0
4
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XV.
Some new information
in Survey IV
JFEP
5,2
172
D
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5
6
1
4
4
2
Table XV.
Bank regulation
and supervision
173
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
countries listed in Table XII, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland report that supervisors
delegate part of their supervisory tasks to external auditors, whereas France, Spain, the UK
and the USA do not. All of these advanced countries report that remuneration or
compensation is evaluated as part of the supervisory process to ensure that they do not lead
to excessive risktaking, withthe exceptionof Belgiumas regards the boardof directors. The
same countries, moreover, all report that theyconduct stress tests anddo so at the banklevel.
Six of the 16 countries extend the tests to the system-wide level. The last item to be
mentioned here is whether countries impose any restrictions or limits on the size of banks to
address the issue of systemic risk. Of the 63 countries providing information, only 11 report
such size restrictions or limits, including Iceland and Ireland.
The last new piece of information that is provided in Survey IV is the statutory
corporate tax rate on domestic bank income. Figure 16 shows the substantial variance
in tax rates among the countries, which range from a low of 0 to a high of 45 percent.
Guyana reports the highest tax rate, while six other countries report that there is no tax
imposed on domestic bank income. As regards the USA, it reports the ?fth highest tax
rate, with 108 countries reporting lower tax rates.
III.I. Convergence
Since SurveyI in1999, national regulatoryauthorities aroundthe worldhave met at various
international institutions and conferences. Thus, it is natural to assess whether bank
regulatory and supervisory practices have converged across countries. Though there are
many ways to assess convergence, Table XVI provides some simple summary statistics.
Table XVI provides information on the degree to which the major bank regulatory
survey indexes that we constructed have tended to converge from Surveys I (1999) to
IV (2011). We provide information on:
.
overall restrictions on bank activities;
.
entry into banking requirements;
.
bank capital regulations;
.
of?cial supervisory powers;
.
private monitoring; and
.
external governance.
For each index, we only include countries for which we have data for Surveys I and IV.
We provide two types of measures of convergence. First, we simply provide the
normalized standard deviation in Surveys I and IVfor each index. Second, we assess the
number of countries that are x percent different from the median value, where x equals
10, 25, 30, and 50 percent.
Although for a few of the indexes, the data suggest material convergence, Table XV
does not suggest broad-based convergence of bank regulatory and supervisory
practices. In particular, the indexes:
.
entry into banking requirements,
.
bank capital regulations, and
.
external governance exhibit notable convergence in that there is less divergence
across countries in Survey IV than there is in Survey I.
JFEP
5,2
174
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Suchconvergence is less noticeable inthe other regulatoryandsupervisoryindexes. Overall,
as of 2011, there is greater cross-country divergence in bank regulation and supervision.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper and the associated online database, we provide a new database on bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries that covers the period from 1999
Figure 16.
Statutory corporate tax
rate on domestic
bank income
Guyana
Bangladesh
Brazil
Puerto Rico
United States
Suriname
Israel
Angola
Argentina
Burundi
Ethiopia
Gambia
Jordan
Malta
Morocco
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Uruguay
Namibia
Belgium
France
Jamaica
Colombia
Seychelles
Italy
Guatemala
Australia
Bhutan
Costa Rica
India
Kenya
Malawi
Nepal
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Sierra Leone
Spain
Swaziland
Tanzania
Thailand
Uganda
Portugal
Cook Islands
Fiji
Mexico
Norway
South Africa
United Kingdom
Samoa (Western)
Finland
Austria
Botswana
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ghana
Honduras
Indonesia
Lesotho
Malaysia
Maldives
The Netherlands
Syria
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
Zimbabwe
Belarus
Greece
Madagascar
Gibraltar
Luxembourg
Armenia
Croatia
Egypt
Russia
Slovenia
Taiwan
Turkey
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Iceland
Chile
Singapore
Hong Kong, China
Germany
Iraq
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Mauritius
Palestinian Territory
Ireland
Liechtenstein
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Isle of Man
Jersey
Kyrgyz Republic
Paraguay
Serbia
Bahrain
Belize
Cayman Islands
Estonia
Vanuatu
Virgin Islands, British
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Bank regulation
and supervision
175
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
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R
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I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
M
e
d
i
a
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e
d
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t
a
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d
a
r
d
d
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i
a
t
i
o
n
1
0
%
2
5
%
3
0
%
5
0
%
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Table XVI.
Was there a convergence
or divergence in
regulation and
supervision overtime?
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through 2011. This database builds directly on four World Bank Surveys of bank
regulation and supervision around the world. The database that we offer differs fromthe
underlyingsurveydata intwo keyrespects: we address manyinconsistencies andmissing
observations in the core survey responses and we construct a range of indexes to provide
information on key banking policies. Providing the indexes is crucial for comparing bank
regulatory and supervisory policies across countries and for assessing howthese policies
change over time because the underlyingsurveys are enormous andcomplex. The surveys
include hundreds of questions, such that it is dif?cult to form impressions of banking
sector policies by examining these individual questions one by one. Thus, we construct
summary indexes fromthe individual questions to measure key features of the regulatory
andsupervisoryapproaches towhat banks cando, capital standards, the powers of of?cial
supervisory agencies, regulations on the entry of new banks, the degree to which the
authorities encourage the monitoring of banks by private investors, the nature of the
deposit insurance regime, and an assortment of other policies towards banks.
There is substantial heterogeneity of bank regulatory and supervisory policies across
countries. And, although there has been some convergence over the last dozen years for
some types of banking sector policies, bank regulatory and supervisory policies remain
impressively diverse in 2011. This diversity in regulatory regimes provides enormous
scope for research examining both the causes of these policy differences and the impacts
of banking policies on the performance of banks, and the associated rami?cations for the
overall ?nancial sector and real economy.
Notes
1. On documenting systemic crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008). On the linkages between
recent banking stresses and policy defects, Barth et al. (2012).
2. The literature on ?nance, growth, poverty, and the distribution of economic opportunities
is quite large, and is reviewed by Levine (2006) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2010).
3. Available at:http://zapatopi.net/kelvin/quotes/
4. We sometimes use the term “regulation” to describe a wide-array of banking policies and
compliance mechanisms.
5. The responses to the survey were received in 1998 through 2000, but the majority of the
answers refer to policies in the year 1999.
6. More speci?cally, the survey was coordinated by The World Bank’s Mar? ´a Soledad Mart? ´nez
Per? ´a and Martin Cihak, with input from numerous bank regulation experts both inside and
outside The World Bank. PKF (UK) and Auxilium helped with compiling and following up
on the survey responses. The survey was ?nanced in part with support from the UK
Department for International Development (DFID).
7. Our dataset is posted at:http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm.
The World Bank posts the data from Survey IV at:http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTGLOBALFINREPORT/0,contentMDK:23267421,pagePK:
64168182,piPK:64168060,theSitePK:8816097,00.html. The World Bank posts the data for
earlier years at:http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/
0,contentMDK:20345037,pagePK:64214825,piPK:64214943,theSitePK:469382,00.html
8. One problem that arises when comparing bank assets across countries is that different
countries may use different accounting standards. As Table AVI shows, most countries use
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), while only six use US GAAP. When one
converts US bank assets from US GAAP to IFRS, total bank assets increase by roughly
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$5 trillion in 2012, which is largely due to measuring derivatives on a gross rather than net
basis (Barth and Prabha, 2012). The biggest effect that different accounting standards will
have in measuring a country’s bank assets is likely to be in the USA, and even then
concentrated at the biggest banks, which account for the bulk of all derivatives.
References
Barth, J. and Prabha, A. (2012), “Breaking (banks) up is hard to do: new perspective on too big to
fail”, Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 12-16, available at:http://?c.
wharton.upenn.edu/?c/papers/12/12-16.pdf
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2001), “Bank regulation and supervision: a new database”,
in Litan, R. and Herring, R. (Eds), Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, The
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Philadelphia, PA.
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2006), Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern,
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2008), “Bank regulations are changing: for better or worse?”,
Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 537-563.
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2012), Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cihak, M., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Soledad, M., Peria, M. and Mohseni-Cheraghlou, A. (2012), “Bank
regulation and supervision of banks around the world: a crisis update”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 6286.
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2008), “Systemic banking crises: a new database”, IMF Working
Paper, No. 224.
Further reading
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2004), “Bank regulation and supervision: what works best”,
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 12, April, pp. 205-248.
Appendix 1. Guide to database on bank regulation and supervision
Part 1: entry into banking
1.1 What body/agency grants commercial banking licenses? Please include the name of licensing
agency. If more than one, please describe their respective licensing roles.
1.2 Do you have the authority to take legal action against those entities that undertake banking
activities without a given license?
1.3 Is more than one license required (e.g. one for each banking activity, such as deposit-taking,
consumer lending, etc.)?
1.3.1 If more than one license is needed, please indicate the maximum number required.
1.4 What is the minimum capital entry requirement for commercial bank operations of the
following types? Enter amount (in thousands of local currency) as of end of 2010 for each option
below (please state currency):
a. Domestic bank.
b. For a subsidiary of a foreign bank.
c. For a branch of a foreign bank.
1.4.1 Does the minimum capital entry requirement vary depending on the nature of the banking
businesses that are licensed?
1.4.1.1 If Yes, Please explain.
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1.4.2 Are the sources of funds to be used as capital veri?ed by the regulatory/supervisory
authorities?
1.4.3 Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other
than cash or government securities?
1.5 Can initial capital contributions by prospective shareholders be in the form of borrowed
funds?
1.6 Which of the following are legally required to be submitted before issuance of the banking
license?
a. Draft bylaws.
b. Intended organizational chart.
c. Structure of Board (composition, committees, functions).
d. Market / business strategy.
e. Financial projections for ?rst three years.
f. Financial information on main potential shareholders.
g. Background/experience of future board directors.
h. Background/experience of future senior managers.
i. Source of funds to be used as capital.
1.7 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010), how many applications for commercial banking licenses
from domestic entities (i.e. those 50 percent or more domestically owned) have been: enter
number of applications for each option below:
a. Received.
b. Denied.
c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.8 Are foreign entities prohibited from entering through the following?
a. Acquisition.
b. Subsidiary.
c. Branch.
d. Joint venture.
1.9 If acquisitions of domestic banks by foreign banks are not prohibited, what is the maximum
percentage of foreign ownership that is legally allowed?
1.10 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010), how many applications fromforeign banks to enter through
the acquisition of a domestic bank were: enter number of applications for each option below?
a. Received.
b. Denied.
c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.11 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010) how many applications from foreign banks to enter
through a new subsidiary were: enter number of applications for each option below?
a. Received.
b. Denied.
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c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.12 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010) how many applications from foreign banks to enter by
opening a branch were: enter number of applications for each option below?
a. Received.
b. Denied.
c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.13 What were the primary reasons for denial of the applications in questions 1.7, 1.10, 1.11 and
1.12?
a. Capital amount or quality.
b. Banking skills.
c. Reputation.
d. Incomplete application.
e. Other (please explain).
1.14 In general, how long (in number of months) has it taken for a new banking license to be
issued, from receipt of the application to ?nal disposition?
Part 2: ownership
2.1 Please state the bank ownership level thresholds as of end of 2010 (if they exist) that would
trigger evaluation and approval requirements by the supervisor (e.g. requirements to obtain
regulatory approval once the share of bank ownership by an individual, family or group reaches
a certain percentage).
2.2 What are the requirements for evaluation/approval of signi?cant bank shareholders?
a. Minimum level of education.
b. Minimum level of ?nancial and/or banking-related experience.
c. Financial capacity to support bank capital.
d. No criminal record.
e. No bankruptcy record.
f. Lack of con?ict of interest.
g. Other (please explain).
2.3 Is there a maximum percentage of a bank’s equity that can be owned by a single owner?
2.3.1 If yes, what is the percentage as of end of 2010?
2.3.2 Please specify any differences that exist for domestic versus foreign owners.
2.4 Does the regulator have the legal authority to oppose the ultimate (bene?cial) owner when
assessing bank ownership?
2.5 Do laws or regulations require the ultimate (bene?cial) owner and controller of a bank to be
publicly disclosed?
2.5.1 Can related parties own capital in a bank?
2.5.2 If yes, what are the maximum percentages associated with the total ownership by a
related party group (e.g. family, business associates, etc.)
2.6 Can non-?nancial ?rms own voting shares in commercial banks? Please see options provided
and select option that best characterizes your banking sector:
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a. Non-?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank.
b. Non-?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank, but prior
authorization or approval is required.
c. Limits are placed on ownership of banks by non-?nancial ?rms, such as maximum
percentage of a commercial bank’s capital or shares.
d. Non-?nancial ?rms cannot own any equity investment in a commercial bank.
2.6.1 What fraction of capital in the largest ten banks (in terms of their domestic assets) is owned
by commercial/industrial and/or ?nancial conglomerates? If there are fewer than ten banks, use
that number in your answer. Your response should re?ect the situation as of end of 2010.
2.7 Can non-bank ?nancial ?rms (e.g. insurance companies, ?nance companies, etc.) own voting
shares in commercial banks? Please see options provided and select option that best characterizes
your banking sector:
a. Non-bank ?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank.
b. Non-bank ?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank, but prior
authorization or approval is required.
c. Limits are placed on ownership of banks by non-bank ?nancial ?rms, such as maximum
percentage of a commercial bank’s capital or shares.
d. Non-bank ?nancial ?rms cannot own any equity investment in a commercial bank.
Part 3: capital
Overview of regulatory capital adequacy regime
3.1 Which regulatory capital adequacy regimes did you use as of end of 2010 and for which
banks does each regime apply to (if using more than one regime)? Mark the appropriate response
below and specify for which types of banks each regime applies:
a. Basel I.
b. Basel II.
c. Leverage ratio.
d. Other (please explain).
3.2 Which risks are covered by the current regulatory minimum capital requirements in your
jurisdiction? Please specify all applicable risks.
a. Credit risk.
b. Market risk.
c. Operational risk.
d. Other risks (please explain).
3.3.1 What was the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.3.2 What was the minimum required non risk-based regulatory capital ratio as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
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3.4.1 What was the actual risk-based capital ratio of the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.4.2 What was the actual non risk-based capital ratio of the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.5 What was the actual Tier 1 capital ratio of the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.6 The regulatory minimum capital requirements are applied [. . .]
a. On a solo basis at the individual bank level.
b. On a consolidated basis at every banking group or subgroup level.
c. On a consolidated basis for the non-bank holding company (if it exists) that is the parent
entity of a bank.
d. On a solo basis at the holding company level.
3.6.1 Do you require banks to perform an internal assessment of their capital adequacy against
their economic capital?
3.6.2 If so, do you review internal assessments performed by banks?
3.7 Does your agency have the legal authority to require additional capital that is over-and-above
the minimum required capital for individual banks if deemed necessary?
Basel I regime (please complete if applicable)
3.8 Do you apply different risk weights than those in the Basel Committee’s original Basel I
framework for any material exposures (e.g. corporate lending, mortgage loans, consumer loans,
loans to government, etc.)?
3.8.1 If so, please describe these differences along with the speci?c risk weights that are being
applied.
3.9 In case you plan to move to the Basel II framework, what is the target calendar year of
adoption?
Basel II regime (please complete if applicable)
3.10 What variants are offered to banks in calculating capital requirements for credit risk?
a. Simpli?ed standardized approach (SSA).
b. Standardized approach (SA).
c. Foundation internal ratings-based approach (F-IRB).
d. Advanced internal ratings-based approach (A-IRB).
3.11 What was the impact of moving to Basel II on the overall regulatory capital level of the
banking system? Please select the option that best characterizes the situation in your jurisdiction:
a. Increased substantially.
b. Increased slightly.
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c. Neutral/little change.
d. Decreased slightly.
e. Decreased substantially.
Regulatory leverage ratio (please complete if applicable)
3.12 What is the regulatory leverage ratio that you are using based on [. . .]?
a. Minimum capital to asset multiples.
b. Maximum assets to capital multiples.
c. Other. Please explain.
3.13 The leverage ratio is applied [. . .]
a. On a solo basis at the individual bank level.
b. On a consolidated basis at every banking group or subgroup levels.
c. On a consolidated basis for the non-bank holding company (if it exists). that is the parent
entity of a bank.
3.14 Which concept of capital is used in calculating the leverage ratio?
a. Total equity capital.
b. Total regulatory capital.
c. Only Tier 1 capital.
d. Other (please explain).
3.15 Are off-balance sheet items included (either in notional amounts or risk-weighted) in assets
when calculating the leverage ratio?
3.16 What was the actual leverage ratio for the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
De?nition of capital
3.17 Which of the following are legally allowed in regulatory capital and which are the minimum
(or maximum) percentages? Enter Yes or No and include corresponding minimum (or maximum)
percentages for each option below:
a. Common equity:
minimum.
maximum.
b. Tier 1:
minimum.
maximum.
c. Tier 2:
minimum.
maximum.
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d. Tier 3:
minimum.
maximum.
e. Other (please explain):
minimum.
maximum.
If other, please explain.
3.18 Which of the following items are allowed as part of Tier 1 capital and in what
percentages? Enter Yes or No and include corresponding percentages for each option below:
a. Hybrid debt capital instruments.
b. Asset revaluation gains (or revaluation reserves).
c. Subordinated debt.
3.18.1 Which of the following items are allowed as part of Tier 2 capital and in what percentages?
Enter Yes or No and include corresponding percentages for each option below:
a. Hybrid debt capital instruments.
b. General provisions.
c. Asset revaluation gains (or revaluation reserves).
d. Subordinated debt.
3.18.2 What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
3.18.3 Are the following items deducted from regulatory capital? Enter Yes or No for each option.
If the response is no, please explain their treatment.”
a. Goodwill: Please explain.
b. Deferred tax assets: Please explain.
c. Intangibles.Please explain.
d. Unrealized losses in fair valued exposures: Please explain.
e. Investment in the capital of certain banking, ?nancial and insurance entities which are
outside the scope of consolidation: Please explain.
Part 4: activities
4.1 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in securities activities?
a. A full range of these activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. A full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be
conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent.
c. Less than the full range of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in
another part of a common holding company or parent.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.2 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in insurance activities?
a. A full range of these activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. A full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be
conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent.
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c. Less than the full range of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in
another part of a common holding company or parent.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.3 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in real estate activities?
a. A full range of these activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. A full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be
conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent.
c. Less than the full range of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in
another part of a common holding company or parent.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.4 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in non-?nancial businesses except those
businesses that are auxiliary to banking business (e.g. IT company, debt collection company, etc.)?
a. Non-?nancial activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. Non-?nancial activities must be conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common
holding company or parent.
c. Non-?nancial activities may be conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common
holding company or parent, but subject to regulatory limit or approval.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.4.1 Can banks own voting shares in non-?nancial ?rms? Please mark the option that best
characterizes the situation in your jurisdiction:
a. A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in any non-?nancial ?rm.
b. A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in a non-?nancial ?rm but ownership is limited
based upon a bank’s equity capital.
c. A bank can only acquire less than 100 percent.If so, please mention the maximum % which
can be owned.
d. A bank may not have any equity investment in a non-?nancial ?rm whatsoever
4.5 In your jurisdiction, what type of ?nancial conglomerate structures involving banks are
allowed?
a. Conglomerates whose parent is a bank.
b. Conglomerates whose parent is a non-bank ?nancial institution (e.g. insurance company or
securities ?rm).
c. Conglomerates whose parent is a non-?nancial institution (e.g. non-operating ?nancial
holding company).
Part 5: external auditing requirements
Appointment and dismissal of auditors
5.1 Is an audit by a professional external auditor required for all commercial banks in your
jurisdiction?
5.1.1 If yes, does the external auditor have to [. . .]?
a. Obtain a professional certi?cation or pass a speci?c exam to qualify as such.
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b. Register with an appropriate public and/or professional body.
c. Have a minimum required bank auditing experience.
d. Be approved or reviewed by the supervisor (e.g. by having a pre-de?ned list of approved
auditors or by providing written approval).
5.1.2 Are speci?c requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out?
5.2 Are there mandatory rotation requirements (i.e. limits on the number of consecutive years
audited) in place for the [. . .]
a. Lead auditor (engagement/concurring partner).
b. Auditing ?rm.
5.3 Are banks required to promptly report to the banking supervisor any change of external
auditor and the reasons for the change?
5.3.1 Are banks required to nominate more than one external auditor?
Auditing standards – scope of work
5.4 Do laws or regulations require auditors to conduct their audits in accordance with
International Standards on Auditing (ISA)?
5.5 Do regulations explicitly prohibit auditing ?rms from providing non-audit services to the
banks whose ?nancial accounts they audit?
Audit ?ndings and reports
5.6 Is the audit report on the ?nancial statements of a bank required to be publicly disclosed
together with these ?nancial statements?
5.7 Do supervisors receive a copy of the following [. . .]:
a. The auditor’s report on the ?nancial statements.
b. The auditor’s letter to bank management.
c. Other communication to the audit committee.
5.8 Are auditors required to promptly inform banking supervisors when they intend to issue
quali?ed opinions on the accounts?
5.8.1 Are auditors required to promptly inform banking supervisors when they identify
information that could affect the safety and soundness of a bank?
5.9 Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
Relationship between the banking supervisor and external auditor
5.10 Does the banking supervisor have the right to meet with the external auditors and discuss
their report without the approval of the bank?
a. No.
b. Yes, it happens on a regular basis.
c. Yes, it happens on an exceptional basis.
5.11 Are external auditors subject to independent oversight by [. . .]?
a. Ministry of Finance or other government department.
b. Specialized public entity (e.g. independent audit regulator).
c. Banking supervisory agency.
d. Other (please explain).
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5.12 In cases where the supervisor identi?es that the bank has received an inadequate audit, does
the supervisor have the powers to take actions against [. . .]:
a. The bank.
b. The external auditor.
5.12.1 How many actions have been taken by the supervisor in the past ?ve years (2006-2010)
against [. . .]?
a. The bank.
b. The external auditor.
5.13 Do supervisors delegate part of their supervisory tasks to external auditors?
a. No.
b. Yes, as part of the regular supervisory process.
c. Yes, on an exceptional basis.
5.14 Among the ten biggest banks in your country, how many are audited by one of the “big
four” accounting ?rms (PwC, KPMG, E&Y, Deloitte)?
Part 6: bank governance
Use text ?eld below for additional notes if questions in this section are not speci?c enough.
Please remember to include number of questions to which you refer in your notes.
6.1 Have you issued speci?c guidelines or requirements that explicitly address the following
areas in the governance of commercial banks?
a. Establishment of Audit Committee.
b. Establishment of Compensation Committee.
c. Requirement for a majority of independent directors in board.
d. Requirement for a majority of independent directors in Audit and Compensation
Committees.
e. Structure of remuneration packages for Board directors and senior management.
f. Public disclosure of remuneration packages for Board directors and senior
management.
g. Board directors’ responsibility for accurate and truthful ?nancial and regulatory reporting,
including public disclosure.
h. Separation of the roles of CEO and Board chairperson.
i. Provisions covering related party transactions.
j. Fit and proper requirements for Board and senior management.
k. Existence of independent risk management function within the bank.
6.2 Do the above guidelines or requirements apply uniformly to all banks (e.g. including
state-owned and foreign banks)?
6.3 How many enforcement actions have you taken over the past ?ve years (2006-2010) based
on a breach of any of the above bank governance requirements?
6.4 Does the supervisor exercise approval authority with respect to the appointment
of [. . .]?
a. Board directors.
b. Senior bank management.
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6.5 Is the remuneration or compensation of the following individuals evaluated as part of the
supervisory process to ensure that they do not lead to excessive risk-taking?
a. Board directors.
b. Senior bank management.
c. Other bank staff (e.g. traders).
6.5.1 If so, does the supervisory agency have the authority to take regulatory action when it
considers that the remuneration or compensation is excessive?
6.6 Does the regulatory de?nition of related parties include the following [. . .]?
a. Signi?cant/controlling shareholders.
b. Board directors.
c. Relatives of signi?cant/controlling shareholders and board directors.
d. Business interests of signi?cant/controlling shareholders, board directors, and their relatives.
6.7 Is there a regulatory limit on related party exposures?
6.7.1 If so, what is the limit as a percentage of a bank’s regulatory capital?
6.8 Have you introduced changes to the bank governance framework in your country as a result
of the global ?nancial crisis? Mark the appropriate response below and explain where
appropriate.
a. New requirements on executive compensation.
b. Independence of the board.
c. Chief risk of?cer direct reporting line to the board or board committee.
d. Existence of a board risk committee.
e. Other (please explain).
Part 7: liquidity and diversi?cation requirements
Risk concentrations
7.1 Are banks limited in their lending to a single borrower or a group of inter-related borrowers?
7.1.1 If yes, what is the limit as a percentage of a bank’s regulatory capital?
7.1.2 Are there any exempted items (e.g. cash secured lending, government or government
guaranteed lending, etc.) in applying the limits?
7.2 Are there any regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding asset diversi?cation?
If yes, please explain.
7.2.1 Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad?
Regulatory liquidity requirements
7.3 Are there regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding the following aspects of
banks’ liquidity management?
a. Diversi?cation of funding sources.
b. Contingency funding plans, including stress testing.
7.3.1 If so, do they also apply for foreign branches?
a. Diversi?cation of funding sources.
b. Contingency funding plans, including stress testing.
7.4 Are the following requirements in place in your jurisdiction?
a. Banks’ liquidity management of foreign currencies.
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b. Central Bank reserve and/or deposit requirements.
c. Regulatory minimum ratio on liquid assets (e.g. as a percentage of total balance sheet or
deposit base).
d. Maturity mismatches/”gap” limits.
7.4.1 Are banks required to hold reserves in foreign currencies or other foreign-denominated
instruments in order to ful?ll the requirements listed above?
Part 8: depositor (savings) protection schemes
Organizational arrangements
8.1 Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system for commercial banks?
8.2 Is there a legally separate deposit insurance agency?
a. Yes.
b. No – within central bank.
c. No – within banking supervision agency.
d. No – within Ministry of Finance.
e. Other (please explain).
8.2.1 The insurance fund is managed by [. . .]:
a. the private sector alone.
b. jointly by private/public of?cials.
c. the public sector alone.
8.3 Is the deposit insurance fund used for purposes other than depositor protection (e.g. liquidity
provision to banks)?
8.4 Does the deposit insurance agency/fund administrator have the following powers as part of
its mandate?
a. Bank examination authority.
b. Authority to access information collected by banking supervisors.
c. Bank intervention authority.
d. Method of failure resolution authority.
e. Paybox authority.
8.4.1 Does the deposit insurance authority by itself have the legal power to cancel or revoke
deposit insurance for any participating bank?
8.4.2 Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations against laws,
regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other bank
of?cials?
8.4.3 Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations against
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other
bank of?cials?
Membership and coverage
8.5 Is participation in the deposit insurance system compulsory for the following banking
entities?
a. Domestic banks.
b. Foreign bank subsidiaries.
c. Foreign bank branches.
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8.6 Are the following types of deposits excluded from deposit insurance coverage?
a. Foreign currency deposits.
b. Interbank deposits.
c. Deposits of the foreign branches of domestic banks.
d. Deposits of the foreign subsidiaries of domestic banks.
8.7 The deposit insurance coverage type is:
a. Per depositor account.
b. Per depositor.
c. Per depositor per institution.
d. Other (please explain).
8.8 What is the basic deposit insurance limit per category of insured deposits as of end of 2010?
Please enter amount in thousands of local currency.
8.9 Is the coverage amount indexed to prices?
8.10 Is there formal coinsurance, i.e. are ALL depositors explicitly insured for less than 100
percent of their deposits?
8.11 What percentage of the total deposits of participating commercial banks was actually
covered by the scheme as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
8.11.1 As a share of total assets, what is the value of large denominated debt liabilities of banks
(e.g. subordinated debt, bonds, etc.) that are de?nitely not covered by any explicit or implicit
savings protection scheme?
Funding
8.12 Is there an ex ante fund/reserve to cover deposit insurance claims in the event of the failure
of a member bank?
8.13 Funding is provided by [. . .]:
a. Government.
b. Banks.
c. Combination/other (please explain).
8.13.1 If prefunded, what is the ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets as of end of 2010?
8.14 Do deposit insurance fees/premiums charged to banks vary based on some assessment
of risk?
8.15 Is the premium assessed on a participating bank’s [. . .]?
a. Insured deposits.
b. Total deposits.
c. Total assets.
d. Other (please explain).
Depositor reimbursement
8.16 What event triggers a claim for payment by the deposit insurance system?
a. Court-declared bank bankruptcy.
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b. Banking supervisor decision.
c. Deposit insurance agency/fund administrator decision.
d. Other (please explain).
8.17 From the time of the event’s trigger, within how many days is the deposit insurance scheme
legally obligated to fully reimburse insured depositors?
Other relevant information
8.17.1 In general, how long (in days) does it take in practice to pay depositors in full?
8.17.2 Were insured depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) the last
time a bank failed?
8.17.3 Were any deposits not explicitly covered by the deposit insurance scheme at the time of
failure compensated the last time a bank failed (excluding funds later paid out in liquidation
procedures)?
8.18 What happens when the deposit insurance fund is insuf?ciently large to be able to fully
refund depositors?
a. Call on banks for the shortfall.
b. Call on the Ministry of Finance for the shortfall.
c. Borrow money.
d. Limit payouts.
e. Other (please explain).
8.18.1 Has such a situation occurred in the last ?ve years (2006-2010)?
8.19 Have you introduced changes to your deposit protection system as a result of the global
?nancial crisis? Mark the appropriate response below and explain where appropriate.
a. Expansion of coverage (types of exposures, nature of depositors, etc.).
b. Increase in amount covered.
c. Temporary inclusion of guarantees on bank debt.
d. Government guarantee of deposits and bank debts.
e. Other (please explain).
Part 9: asset classi?cation, provisioning, and write-offs
Asset classi?cation
9.1 Do you have an asset classi?cation system under which banks have to report the quality of
their loans and advances using a common regulatory scale?
9.1.1 If so, please provide the type and number of different asset classi?cation categories
(e.g. 1-5, AAA-CCC, etc.) that you are using in this system.
9.1.2 Please specify whether it [. . .]:
a. Applies to all commercial banks.
b. Covers all types of borrowers (e.g. including government).
c. Covers all loans and advances to a borrower.
d. Imposes a uniform classi?cation requirement for speci?c borrowers (e.g. government
and/or state-owned enterprises can only be graded at or above a certain category).
9.1.3 After how many days is a loan in arrears classi?ed as [. . .]?: provide numbers for each of the
three loan categories listed.
a. Sub-standard?
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b. Doubtful?
c. Loss?
9.2 Which criteria are taken into account to classify loans and advances as non-performing [. . .]?:
a. Signi?cant ?nancial dif?culty of the borrower and deterioration in its creditworthiness.
b. Breach of contract (e.g. default or delinquency in interest or principal payments).
c. Restructuring (i.e. concession granted, for economic or legal reasons relating to the
borrower’s ?nancial dif?culty, that the lender would not otherwise consider).
d. Borrower bankruptcy or other ?nancial reorganization.
e. Days past due status (please specify number of days).
f. Existence of collateral, guarantees and/or other credit mitigants.
g. Other (please explain).
9.3 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the bank’s income statement while the
loan is classi?ed as non-performing?
9.4 Are banks allowed to upgrade the classi?cation of a loan or advance immediately after it has
been restructured?
9.5 If a customer has multiple loans and advances and one of them is classi?ed as
non-performing, are all the other exposures automatically classi?ed as non-performing as well?
Provisioning of classi?ed loans
9.6 Are there minimum levels of speci?c provisions for loans and advances that are set by the
regulator?
9.6.1 If so, are these linked to the regulatory asset classi?cation system mentioned in question
9.1 above?
9.6.2 Please specify whether these minimum speci?c provisioning rules [. . .]:
a. Allow for the value of the collateral to be deducted from the amount of a loan or advance
before provisioning is applied.
b. Apply to all commercial banks.
c. Cover all types of borrowers (e.g. including government).
d. Cover all loans and advances to a borrower.
e. Impose uniform provisioning requirements for speci?c borrowers (e.g. loans to government
and/or state-owned enterprises do not require provisions).
9.6.3 What is the minimum provisioning required as loans become [. . .]:
a. Sub-standard?
b. Doubtful?
c. Loss?
9.7 Is there a regulatory requirement for general provisions on loans and advances?
9.7.1 If so, what are general provisions based on?
a. Percentage of gross loans.
b. Statistical/counter-cyclical system of provisioning.
c. Other – please explain.
Write-offs
9.8 Do you require banks to write off non-performing loans after a speci?c time period?
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9.8.1 If so, what is the maximum time (in months) that a loan or advance can be
non-performing before it has to be written off?
Other
9.9 Up to what level (if any) are the following types of provisions tax deductible?
a. Speci?c provisions.
b. General provisions.
Part 10: accounting/information disclosure
Scope of accounting consolidation
10.1 Are banks required to prepare consolidated accounts for accounting purposes?
Accounting standards
10.2.1 Are applicable accounting standards for banks in your country prepared in accordance
with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)?
a. At individual bank level.
b. At consolidated level.
10.2.2 Are applicable accounting standards for banks in your country prepared in accordance
with IFRS?
a. At individual bank level.
b. At consolidated level.
10.2.3 If response to 10.2.1 and 10.2.2 is no, please explain each case under options a and b:
a. Any major deviations between local and international accounting standards.
b. Which authority in your country sets the accounting standards for banks (e.g. banking
supervisor, accounting board, etc.)
10.2.4 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan
is still performing?
10.2.5 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the
loan is non-performing?
Public disclosure standards
10.3 Are all banks operating in your country (including foreign bank branches) required to make
available to the public their annual ?nancial statements?
a. On an individual basis.
b. On a consolidated basis (if applicable).
10.4 Are banks required to submit their ?nancial statements to the banking supervisor prior to
public disclosure?
10.4.1 If yes, respond to yes or no to each option provided below:
a. Is the supervisor required to review them?
b. Can the supervisor require changes to them before they are published?
10.5 Do banks disclose to the supervisors [. . .]?
a. Full audited ?nancial statements.
b. Off-balance sheet items.
c. Governance and risk management framework.
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d. Regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio.
e. Transactions with related parties.
f. Any other material information (i.e. information which omission or misstatement could
change or in?uence the assessment or decision of a user relying on that information for
making decisions).
g. Scope of consolidation (including reasons for not including certain entities, where
appropriate).
10.5.1 Do banks disclose to the public [. . .]?
a. Full audited ?nancial statements.
b. Off-balance sheet items.
c. Governance and risk management framework.
d. Regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio.
e. Transactions with related parties.
f. Any other material information (i.e. information which omission or misstatement could
change or in?uence the assessment or decision of a user relying on that information for
making decisions).
g. Scope of consolidation (including reasons for not including certain entities, where appropriate).
10.5.2 Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading?
10.6 Do supervisors require banks to publicly disclose [. . .]:
a. All ?nes and settlements resulting from non-compliance with regulations.
b. Other information not required by ?nancial reporting standards (e.g. prudential reports).
If so, please explain.
10.7 Are commercial banks required by supervisors to have external credit ratings?
10.8 How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by international
credit rating agencies (e.g. Moody’s, Standard and Poor)?
10.9 How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by domestic
credit rating agencies?
Part 11: discipline/problem institutions/exit
Enforcement
11.1 Please indicate whether the following enforcement powers are available to the
supervisory agency:
a. Cease and desist-type orders for imprudent bank practices.
b. Forbearance (i.e. to waive regulatory and supervisory requirements).
c. Require a bank to meet supervisory requirements (e.g. capital, liquidity, etc.) that are
stricter than the legal or regulatory minimum.
d. Require bank to enhance governance, internal controls and risk management systems.
e. Require bank to apply speci?c provisioning and/or write-off policies.
f. Require banks to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses.
g. Restrict or place conditions on the types of business conducted by bank.
h. Withdraw the bank’s license.
i. Require banks to reduce/restructure their operations (e.g. via asset sales and branch
closures) and adjust their risk pro?le.
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j. Require banks to reduce or suspend dividends to shareholders.
k. Require banks to reduce or suspend bonuses and other remuneration to bank directors and
managers.
l. Suspend or remove bank directors.
m. Suspend or remove managers.
n. Require commitment/action from controlling shareholder(s) to support the bank with new
equity (e.g. capital restoration plan).
11.1.1 Are bank regulators/supervisors required to make public formal enforcement actions,
which include cease and desist orders and written agreements between a bank
regulatory/supervisory body and a banking organization?
11.2 Please indicate how many times any of the above enforcement actions in the last ?ve years
(2006-2010):
a. Have been contested in court.
b. Have been overturned by the court.
11.3 Does the supervisory agency operate an early intervention framework (e.g. prompt
corrective action) that forces automatic action when certain regulatory triggers/thresholds are
breached?
11.3.1 If so, what triggers/thresholds are used for initiating automatic actions?
a. Breach of minimum regulatory capital adequacy ratio.
b. Breach of other regulatory requirements (e.g. liquidity ratio, ?t and proper criteria).
c. Evaluation of likely non-viability given trends and risk factors.
d. Other (please specify).
Resolution
11.4 Is there a separate bank insolvency framework that is distinct from that of non-?nancial
?rms?
11.4.1 Is the insolvency framework the same for bank holding companies and banks? If not
please explain the differences.
11.5 Which authority has the powers to perform the following problem bank resolution
activities?
Enter the initials of the corresponding authority from the following list of options: BS – bank
supervisor, C – court, DIA – deposit insurance agency, BR/AMC – bank restructuring or asset
management agency, OTH – other – please specify).”
a. Declare insolvency:Other – please specify.
b. Supersede shareholders’ rights: Other – please specify.
c. Remove and replace bank senior management and directors: Other – please specify
d. Undertake bank resolution mechanisms: Other – please specify
e. Appoint and oversee a bank liquidator/receiver: Other – please specify
11.6 Is court approval required for the following bank resolution activities?
a. Declare insolvency.
b. Supersede shareholders’ rights.
c. Remove and replace bank senior management and directors.
d. Undertake bank resolution mechanisms.
e. Appoint and oversee a bank liquidator/receiver.
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11.7 Can the bank shareholders appeal to the court against a resolution decision of the banking
supervisor?
11.7.1 If yes, how many appeals were made in the past ?ve years (2006-2010)?
11.7.1.1 Of which, how many were successful?
11.8 Can a resolution action against a bank continue if a court action is ?led, or does the court
appeal lead to the suspension of such action until a ruling is made?
11.9 Which mechanisms are provided in existing legislation to resolve a problem bank prior to its
closure and liquidation?
a. Open bank assistance.
b. Purchase and assumption transaction (with or without government support).
c. Government intervention (e.g. via conservatorship or nationalization).
d. Bridge bank.
e. Other (please specify).
11.10.1 How many banks were resolved in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.10.2 How many banks were liquidated in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.11.1 What proportion of banking system assets were resolved in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.11.2 What proportion of banking system assets were liquidated in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.12 Have you introduced signi?cant changes to the bank resolution framework in your country
as a result of the global ?nancial crisis?
a. Introduce a separate bank insolvency framework.
b. Implement coordination arrangements among domestic authorities.
c. Other, please explain.
Part 12: supervision
Institutional structure and mandate
12.1 What body/agency supervises commercial banks for prudential purposes?
a. The Central Bank.
b. A single bank supervisory agency/superintendency.
c. Multiple bank supervisory agencies/superintendencies including the Central Bank.
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d. Multiple bank supervisory agencies/superintendencies excluding the Central Bank.
e. Other (please explain).
12.1.1 Are there any banks that are not under the jurisdiction of this agency?
If yes, please explain.
12.2 Is the body/agency in charge of supervising banks also responsible for the supervision of
the following ?nancial sectors?
a. Insurance.
b. Securities.
c. Pension funds.
d. Other (please explain).
12.3 Does the body/agency have a speci?c mandate set out in written form?
12.3.1 If so, which of the following ?nancial system responsibilities does the mandate also
include?
a. Systemic/?nancial stability.
b. Market conduct.
c. Consumer protection.
d. Prevention of ?nancial crime (anti-money laundering / combating ?nancing of terrorism).
e. Competition/antitrust policy.
f. Financial market access/development.
g. Deposit insurance.
h. Bank restructuring/resolution.
i. Other (please explain).
12.3.2 Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure?
12.4 To whom is the supervisory agency legally responsible or accountable?
a. The head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister).
b. The Finance Minister or other cabinet level of?cial.
c. A legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress.
d. Other (please explain).
12.5 How is the head of the supervisory agency appointed?
a. Decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister).
b. Decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority.
c. Decision of a legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress.
d. Other (please explain).
12.5.1 Is the appointment based on a recommendation by an external expert or panel of
experts?
12.6 Does the head of the supervisory agency have a ?xed term?
12.6.1 If yes, how long (in years) is the term?
12.6.2 Is there a maximum number of terms?
12.6.3 If yes, please respond how many terms are permitted.
12.7 Can the head of the supervisory agency be removed by [. . .]?:
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a. Decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister).
b. Decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority.
c. Decision of a legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress.
d. Other (please explain).
12.8 Does the supervisory agency need to obtain approval from the government in order to [. . .]?
a. Issue binding secondary regulations for the banking sector.
b. Determine its budget.
c. Obtain funding.
d. Hire and ?re senior staff.
e. De?ne salaries and bene?ts structure of staff.
f. De?ne its organizational structure.
12.9 Can individual supervisory staff be held personally liable for damages to a bank caused by
their actions or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of their duties?
12.9.1 If so, has individual supervisory staff been held personally liable in the last ?ve years
(2006-2010)?
12.10 Can the supervisory agency be held legally liable for damages to a bank caused by its
actions?
12.10.1 If so, has the supervisory agency been held legally liable in the last ?ve years
(2006-2010)?
12.11 Is a formal consultation process with the industry and the public required prior to the
introduction of new regulations?
12.12 If an infraction of any prudential regulation is found in the course of supervision, must
it be reported?
12.12.1 Are there mandatory actions that the supervisor must take in these cases?
12.12.2 Who authorizes exceptions to such actions?
12.12.3 How many exceptions were granted during the last ?ve years (2006-2010)?
Supervisory approach
12.13 Please rank from 1 to 3 (1 being the most important) the relative importance placed on
the following activities in banking supervision. Place ranking next to each option.
a. Analysis and monitoring of compliance and trends observed from reported prudential
returns.
b. Review of the accuracy of reports and of regulatory compliance.
c. Assessment of the risk pro?le, strategic direction, ?nancial condition, internal governance
and controls, and risk management.
12.14 The internal organization of banking supervision can be best characterized as [. . .]:
a. Integrated on-site and offsite activities for each entity under a senior/managing supervisor.
b. Resident supervisory teams in large systemic complex banks and groups.
c. Existence of specialized examiners (e.g. treasury, IT, risk management) that can be used
across different banks.
12.15 Which of the following best describes the bank risk rating methodology used by your
agency?
a. A rating system using only ratios and indicators built with reported information.
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b. A rating system combining quantitative information with qualitative assessments of
management and controls.
c. A broader risk rating system combining quantitative and qualitative measures of inherent
risk, management and controls, and residual risk by type of bank activity and/or risk
category.
d. Other (please explain).
12.16 Is the intensity and frequency of supervisory activities explicitly linked to the bank’s risk
rating?
12.17 Is the risk rating disclosed to the bank’s board?
12.18 Do you undertake on-site inspections for material foreign operations (whether in the form
of branches or subsidiaries) of your banks or do you only rely on host country supervisors?
12.19 How many onsite examinations per bank were performed in the last ?ve years (2006-2010)?
12.20 How frequently are onsite inspections conducted in large and medium size banks?
Consolidated supervision
12.21 If you do not have an integrated ?nancial supervisory agency covering all signi?cant
?nancial institutions, how is a ?nancial group with signi?cant banking activities supervised?
a. The banking supervisory agency/body is legally empowered to act as the
“lead/supplemental supervisor” and supervises on a consolidated basis.
b. The banking supervisory agency/body is nominated as the “lead/supplemental supervisor”
under informal arrangements between the relevant parties and supervises on a
consolidated basis.
c. There is no “lead/supplemental supervisor” but there is coordination between ?nancial
supervisors formalized in MOUs.
d. Other (please explain).
Systemic supervision
12.22 Is there a specialized department in your agency dealing with ?nancial stability and
systemic supervision?
12.22.1 Which of the following factors do you consider in assessing systemic risk?
a. Bank capital ratios.
b. Bank leverage ratios.
c. Bank pro?tability ratios.
d. Bank liquidity ratios.
f. Growth in bank credit.
g. Sectorial composition of bank loan portfolios.
h. FX position of banks.
i. Bank non-performing loan ratios.
j. Bank provisioning ratios.
k. Stock market prices.
l. Housing prices.
m. Other (please specify).
12.23 Is your agency responsible for publishing a ?nancial stability report?
12.24 If your agency is not directly responsible for publishing a ?nancial stability report, do you
provide input to the responsible agency for such a report?
12.25 Do you conduct stress test as part of the process of assessing systemic stability?
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12.26 If you conduct stress tests, at what level are they performed [. . .]?
a. At the bank level.
b. At the system wide level.
c. Other, please explain.
12.27 Do you have any counter-cyclical regulations or tools to dampen boom/bust cycles in credit
?ows? Enter Yes or No and enter date (in format: MM/DD/YYYY) when they came or will come
into effect.
a. Counter-cyclical capital requirements.
Date:
b. Counter-cyclical loan to value ratios.
Date:
c. Granular capital requirements based on loan to value ratios.
Date:
d. Counter-cyclical provisioning requirements.
Date:
e. Temporary restrictions on dividend and bonuses distribution.
Date:
12.28 Do you supervise systemic institutions in a different way than non-systemic ones?
12.29 If yes, do you have any tools to oversee more closely and/or limit the activities of
large/interconnected institutions? Enter Yes or No and enter date (in format: MM/DD/YYYY)
when they came or will come into effect:
a. Additional capital requirements.
Date:
b. Additional liquidity requirements.
Date:
c. Asset/risk diversi?cation requirements.
Date:
d. Restrictions/limits on activities.
Date:
e. Restrictions/limits on size of institution.
Date:
f. Additional corporate taxes for large institutions.
Date:
g. Closer or more frequent supervision.
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Date:
h. Restrictions on the group’s legal structure.
Date:
i. Other.
Date:
If Other, please explain.
Supervisory staff
12.30 How many professional bank supervisors are there in total (excluding all support functions
and management)?
12.31 Of those, how many are specialized in speci?c bank functions (e.g. IT, treasury) or risks
(e.g. credit / market / operational risk)?
12.32 What percentage of the supervisors has graduated from a four year college/university?
12.33 What percentage of the supervisors has post-graduate degrees such as MBAs, CPA or CFAs?
12.34 How many hours of training (at the supervisory agency or elsewhere) on average have
supervisors had in the last year?
12.35 What is the annual average salary of a senior supervisor (someone with ten or more years
of experience in bank supervision)? (In thousands of local currency)
12.36 What was the annual total budget for banking supervision during 2010? (In thousands of
local currency).
12.37 What was the source of this funding?
a. Allocation from government budget.
b. Fees and assessments paid by regulated banks.
c. Other (please explain).
12.38 Howmany of the bank supervisors have more than ten years experience in bank supervision?
12.39 What is the average tenure of banking supervisors (i.e. what is the average number of years
that staffs have been supervisors)?
Part 13: banking sector characteristics
Size
13.1 How many commercial banks were there at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.1.1 Of all deposit taking institutions in your country, what fraction of their assets is held by
just commercial banks at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.2 What were the total assets of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of local
currency)
2008
2009
2010
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13.3 What was the total equity of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of local
currency)
2008
2009
2010
13.4 What were the total deposits of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of
local currency)
2008
2009
2010
13.5 What were the total loans of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of local
currency)
2008
2009
2010
Structure of the banking sector
13.6 Of commercial banks in your country, what percent of total assets was held by the ?ve
largest banks at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.6.1 Of commercial banks in your country, what percent of total deposits was held by the ?ve
largest banks at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.7.1 What percent of the banking system’s assets was in banks that were government-controlled
(e.g. where government-owned 50 percent or more equity) at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.7.2 What percent of the banking system’s assets was in banks that were foreign-controlled
(e.g. where foreigners owned 50 percent or more equity) at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
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13.8 What percent of the total foreign-owned bank assets in your domestic banking system was
held in branches as opposed to other juridical forms (e.g. subsidiaries) at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
Performance
13.9 What was the after-tax return on equity for the commercial banking system at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.10 What was the aggregate net interest margin for the commercial banking system at the end
of [. . .]? ðIn thousands of local currencyÞ
2008
2009
2010
13.11 What percent of the commercial banking system’s total gross income was in the form of
non-interest income in at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.12 What were the aggregate operating costs to assets ratio for the commercial banking system
in at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.13 What was the ratio of non-performing loans (gross of provisions) to total gross loans at the
end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.14 What was the ratio of speci?c provisions to gross non-performing loans at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.15 What was the ratio of general provisions to total gross loans at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
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Asset and liabilities composition
13.16 What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets was foreign-currency
denominated at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.17 What percent of the commercial banking system’s liabilities was foreign-currency
denominated at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.18 What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets was in public sector claims at the
end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.19 What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets is funded with deposits at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.20 What percentage of total bank assets were residential real estate loans at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.21 What percentage of total bank assets were commercial real estate loans at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.22 What percentage of residential real estate loans were securitized at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
Other
13.23 What is the statutory corporate tax rate on domestic bank income as of end of 2010?
13.24 What was the effective tax rate on the aggregate commercial banking system’s pre-tax
income at the end of 2010?
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Part 14: consumer protection
14.1 Does your agency have the responsibility to implement, oversee and/or enforce any aspect of
?nancial consumer protection laws and regulations that apply to banks?
a. Yes.
b. No, ?nancial consumer protection laws and regulations are implemented, overseen and
enforced by other government agencies.
c. Other, please describe.
14.2 If your agency has the responsibility to implement, oversee and/or enforce any aspect of
?nancial consumer protection laws, is there a separate unit or team designated to work on
consumer protection in your agency?
a. Yes.
b. No.
c. Does not apply.
14.3 What actions can your agency take to enforce consumer protection laws and regulations?
a. Issue warnings to ?nancial institutions.
b. Require providers to refund excess charges.
c. Require providers to withdraw misleading advertisements.
d. Impose ?nes and penalties.
e. Issue public notice of violations.
f. Withdraw the offending provider’s license to operate.
g. Other, please specify.
14.4 Please indicate the number of times the actions stated above in 14.3 were taken in the past
?ve years (2006-2010):
a. Issue warnings to ?nancial institutions.
b. Require providers to refund excess charges.
c. Require providers to withdraw misleading advertisements.
d. Impose ?nes and penalties.
e. Issue public notice of violations.
f. Withdraw the offending provider’s license to operate.
g. Other, please specify.
14.5 By law or regulations, are banks required to notify consumers in writing of pricing, terms
and conditions of ?nancial products prior to signing an agreement?
14.6 By law or regulation, which of the following are part of the disclosure
requirements mentioned in 14.5 that banks need to comply with upon signing any ?nancial
product contract:
a. Plain language requirement (clear and simple language that can be readily understood by
any customer).
b. Local language requirement.
c. Prescribed standardized disclosure format (e.g. one-page “Key Facts” document).
d. Clearly spell out recourse rights and processes.
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14.7 By law or regulation, which of the following are part of the disclosure requirements
mentioned in 14.5 that banks need to comply with upon signing a deposit contract:
a. Annual percentage yield and interest rate.
b. Method of compounding.
c. Minimum balance requirements.
d. Fees and penalties.
e. Early withdrawal penalties.
14.8 By law or regulation, which of the following are part of the disclosure requirements
mentioned in 14.5 that banks need to comply with upon signing a credit contract:
a. Annual percentage rate using a standard formula.
b. Fees.
c. Computation method (average balance, interest).
d. Required insurance.
14.9 By law or regulation, are banks required to provide their customers with a periodic
statement of their accounts?
a. Yes, periodic statement must be provided free of charge with the following frequency:
i. Monthly.
ii. Quarterly.
iii. Annually.
iv. Other.
b. No, but a statement can be provided free of charge upon customer request.
c. No, but customer can purchase this additional service.
d. Regulations do not specify.
14.10 By law or regulation, which of the following are parts of the disclosure requirements for
periodic statements for deposit products?
a. Annual percentage yield calculated using a standard formula.
b. Amount of interest earned.
c. Fees imposed.
d. Account balance.
14.11 By law or regulation, which of the following are parts of the disclosure requirements for
periodic statements for credit products?
a. All transactions concerning the account for the period covered by the statement.
b Annual percentage rate (applied during the period).
c Interest charged for the period.
d. Fees charged for the period.
e. Minimum amount due.
f. Date due.
g. Outstanding balance.
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14.12 Are there speci?c provisions in the existing laws or regulations that restrict:
a. Deceptive advertising.
b. Unfair or high-pressure selling practices.
c. Abusive collection practices.
d. Unauthorized use of client data or breach of client con?dentiality.
14.13 Does any law or regulation set standards for complaints resolution and handling by
?nancial institutions, including:
a. Requirement for ?nancial institutions to implement procedures and processes for resolving
customer complaints.
b. Timeliness of response by ?nancial institution.
c. Accessibility (i.e. can a complaint be ?led with a local branch, by phone, etc.)
14.14 Is there a system in place that allows a customer of a ?nancial institution to seek affordable
and ef?cient recourse with a third party (a ?nancial ombudsman or equivalent institution) in the
event that the customer’s complaint is not resolved to the customer’s satisfaction under internal
procedures of the relevant ?nancial institution?
a. Yes, ?nancial ombudsman.
b. Yes, general ombudsman.
c. Yes, a mediation service.
d. No, dispute has to be resolved in court.
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Appendix 2
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Albania X X
Algeria X X
Angola X X
Anguilla X X
Antigua and Barbuda X X
Argentina X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X
Aruba X X
Australia X X X X X
Austria X X X X X
Azerbaijan X X
Bahrain X X X X X
Bangladesh X X X
Belarus X X X X X
Belgium X X X X X
Belize X X X
Benin X X X
Bhutan X X X X X
Bolivia X X X
Bosnia and Herzegovina X X X X X
Botswana X X X X X
Brazil X X X X X
Bulgaria X X X X X
Burkina Faso X X X
Burundi X X X X X
Cambodia X X
Cameroon X X
Canada X X X X X
Cayman Islands X X X
Central African Republic X X
Chad X X
Chile X X X X X
China X X X
Colombia X X X
Congo, Rep. X X
Cook Islands X X
Costa Rica X X X
Coˆte d’Ivoire X X X
Croatia X X X X X
Cyprus X X X X X
Czech Republic X X X
Denmark X X X X X
Dominica X X
Dominican Republic X X
Ecuador X X
Egypt X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea X X
(continued)
Table AI.
Countries participating in
the World Bank surveys
JFEP
5,2
208
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Estonia X X X X X
Ethiopia X X
Fiji X X X
inland X X X X X
France X X X X X
Gabon X X
Gambia X X X
Georgia X
Germany X X X X X
Ghana X X X X X
Gibraltar X X X X X
Greece X X X X X
Grenada X X
Guatemala X X X X X
Guernsey X X X X X
Guinea X
Guinea-Bissau X X X
Guyana X X X X X
Honduras X X X X X
Hong Kong, China X X X
Hungary X X X X X
Iceland X X X X X
India X X X X X
Indonesia X X X
Iraq X
Ireland X X X X X
Isle of Man X X X
Israel X X X X X
Italy X X X X X
Jamaica X X X
Japan X X X
Jersey X X X
Jordan X X X X X
Kazakhstan X X X X X
Kenya X X X X X
Korea, Rep. X X X X X
Kosovo X X
Kuwait X X X X X
Kyrgyz Republic X X X X X
Latvia X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X
Lesotho X X X X X
Liechtenstein X X X X X
Lithuania X X X X X
Luxembourg X X X X X
Macao, China X X X X X
Macedonia X X X
Madagascar X X
Malawi X X X
Malaysia X X X X X
(continued)
Table AI.
Bank regulation
and supervision
209
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Maldives X X X
Mali X X X
Malta X X X X X
Mauritius X X X X X
Mexico X X X X X
Moldova X X X X X
Montenegro X
Montserrat X X
Morocco X X X X X
Mozambique X X
Myanmar X
Namibia X X X
Nepal X X
The Netherlands X X X X X
New Zealand X X X X X
Nicaragua X X X
Niger X X X
Nigeria X X X X X
Norway X X X
Oman X X X X X
Pakistan X X X
Palestinian Territory X
Panama X X X X X
Papua New Guinea X X
Paraguay X X
Peru X X X X X
Philippines X X X X X
Poland X X X X X
Portugal X X X X X
Puerto Rico X X X
Qatar X X X
Romania X X X X X
Russia X X X X X
Rwanda X X
Saint Kitts and Nevis X X X
Saint Lucia X X
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines X X
Samoa (Western) X X X
Saudi Arabia X X X
Senegal X X X
Serbia X
Serbia & Montenegro X
Seychelles X X X X X
Sierra Leone X
Singapore X X X X X
Slovakia X X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X
Solomon Islands X
South Africa X X X X X
Spain X X X X X
(continued)
Table AI.
JFEP
5,2
210
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Sri Lanka X X X X X
Sudan X
Suriname X X X
Swaziland X X
Sweden X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
Syria X X
Taiwan X X X X X
Tajikistan X X X X X
Tanzania X X
Thailand X X X X X
Togo X X X
Tonga X X X
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X
Tunisia X X
Turkey X X X
Turkmenistan X X
Turks and Caicos Islands X X
Uganda X X
Ukraine X X
United Arab Emirates X X
UK X X X X X
USA X X X X X
Uruguay X X X
Vanuatu X X X X X
Venezuela X X X X X
Vietnam X
Virgin Islands, British X X X X X
Yugoslavia X
Yemen X
Zambia X
Zimbabwe X X X
Total number of countries 118 151 143 143 84
Total number of questions 180 275 300 270
Table AI.
Bank regulation
and supervision
211
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
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1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 3
H
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(
c
o
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e
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)
Table AII.
World Bank Survey IV –
countries classi?ed by
income and region
(total 136 countries)
JFEP
5,2
212
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
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2
1
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6
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4
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n
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y
2
0
1
6
(
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T
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Table AII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
213
D
o
w
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l
o
a
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y
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N
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6
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4
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0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 4
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c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
B
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
1
3
7
2
.
9
4
3
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
b
)
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
1
3
1
2
.
2
2
2
.
0
0
0
.
6
7
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
3
.
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
1
4
0
0
.
9
7
1
.
0
0
0
.
1
7
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
b
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
e
n
t
r
y
1
3
5
2
.
7
0
3
.
0
0
0
.
6
3
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
(
c
)
E
n
t
r
y
i
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
1
4
3
7
.
8
2
8
.
0
0
0
.
4
6
5
.
0
0
8
.
0
0
4
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
4
0
5
.
0
4
5
.
0
0
1
.
5
3
2
.
0
0
7
.
0
0
(
b
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
4
2
2
.
2
9
2
.
0
0
0
.
7
6
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
(
c
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
i
n
d
e
x
1
4
0
7
.
3
6
8
.
0
0
1
.
7
2
2
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
(
d
)
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
b
y
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
w
n
e
r
5
0
4
6
.
5
8
2
2
.
5
0
4
0
.
4
4
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
5
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
1
4
2
1
0
.
7
4
1
1
.
0
0
2
.
4
4
5
.
0
0
1
4
.
0
0
(
1
)
P
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
1
3
8
4
.
4
8
6
.
0
0
2
.
1
1
0
.
0
0
6
.
0
0
(
2
)
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
1
3
3
2
.
1
1
2
.
0
0
1
.
0
9
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
(
3
)
D
e
c
l
a
r
i
n
g
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
p
o
w
e
r
1
2
9
1
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
1
0
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
(
b
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
1
4
3
1
.
1
4
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
2
0
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
c
)
L
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
8
3
5
5
4
.
7
5
6
3
0
.
0
0
1
8
9
.
9
8
1
5
3
.
0
0
1
2
6
0
.
0
0
(
d
)
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
8
5
1
6
2
.
8
2
1
7
0
.
0
0
4
4
.
3
0
0
.
0
0
3
0
0
.
0
0
(
e
)
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
/
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
1
4
1
1
.
4
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
6
4
0
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
6
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
1
1
1
3
.
9
3
2
.
6
7
4
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
2
5
.
2
6
(
b
)
B
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
e
a
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
9
9
4
2
.
1
5
1
9
.
5
0
5
7
.
3
2
0
.
4
1
3
2
8
.
4
2
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table AIII.
Information on bank
structural, regulatory,
supervisory and deposit
insurance variables
JFEP
5,2
214
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
n
M
e
d
i
a
n
S
D
M
i
n
i
m
u
m
v
a
l
u
e
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
v
a
l
u
e
(
c
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
t
e
n
u
r
e
1
1
0
8
.
5
5
8
.
0
0
3
.
9
5
1
.
0
0
2
1
.
0
0
(
d
)
O
n
s
i
t
e
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
1
1
9
4
.
0
6
4
.
0
0
2
.
9
0
0
.
0
0
1
8
.
0
0
(
e
)
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
1
3
2
1
.
9
2
2
.
0
0
0
.
8
1
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
7
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
C
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
1
3
7
0
.
9
6
1
.
0
0
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
b
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
1
5
5
7
.
3
5
7
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
(
c
)
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
1
4
2
3
.
5
6
4
.
0
0
0
.
5
7
1
.
3
3
4
.
0
0
(
d
)
N
o
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
1
2
9
0
.
3
4
0
.
0
0
0
.
4
8
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
e
)
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
e
x
1
2
2
7
.
7
9
8
.
0
0
1
.
4
0
4
.
0
0
1
1
.
0
0
8
.
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
1
0
0
1
.
1
0
1
.
0
0
1
.
2
6
0
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
b
)
E
x
t
r
a
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
1
0
2
0
.
7
2
1
.
0
0
0
.
4
5
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
c
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
o
u
t
d
e
l
a
y
4
1
1
0
1
.
7
1
3
0
.
0
0
1
8
9
.
5
8
1
.
0
0
1
0
9
5
.
0
0
(
d
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
s
-
t
o
-
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
5
2
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
1
0
.
1
9
2
0
.
0
6
0
0
.
8
1
(
e
)
M
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
i
n
d
e
x
8
9
1
.
1
1
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
2
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
9
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
(
a
)
B
a
n
k
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
1
2
2
7
1
.
8
9
7
5
.
1
4
1
9
.
9
7
1
4
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
(
b
)
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
b
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
1
1
7
4
9
.
3
4
4
8
.
6
0
3
3
.
6
6
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
(
c
)
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
1
1
8
1
5
.
3
1
8
.
8
5
1
8
.
0
6
0
.
0
0
7
3
.
7
0
(
d
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
n
e
w
b
a
n
k
s
1
2
8
1
1
.
7
1
5
.
0
0
3
4
.
0
6
0
.
0
0
3
7
1
.
0
0
(
1
)
N
e
w
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
1
2
7
4
.
3
6
1
.
0
0
1
7
.
9
5
0
.
0
0
1
9
2
.
0
0
(
2
)
N
e
w
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
1
2
3
7
.
6
8
3
.
0
0
1
7
.
8
0
0
.
0
0
1
7
9
.
0
0
(
e
)
N
o
e
n
t
r
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
1
2
6
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
2
9
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
1
)
N
o
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
2
5
0
.
6
3
1
.
0
0
0
.
4
8
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
2
)
N
o
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
2
3
0
.
8
5
1
.
0
0
0
.
3
6
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
f
)
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
n
t
r
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
d
e
n
i
e
d
1
0
8
0
.
1
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
3
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
1
)
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
1
0
8
0
.
0
9
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
2
)
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
1
2
4
0
.
1
1
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
8
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
Table AIII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
215
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 5
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
H
i
g
h
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
U
p
p
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
i
n
c
o
m
e
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
o
r
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
e
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
1
.
B
a
n
k
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
1
.
3
6
1
.
9
2
2
.
1
6
2
.
0
5
1
.
3
7
1
.
9
7
1
.
7
1
(
b
)
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
2
.
4
8
2
.
5
4
2
.
7
7
2
.
5
2
2
.
3
3
2
.
6
3
2
.
5
0
(
c
)
R
e
a
l
e
s
t
a
t
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
2
.
6
0
2
.
9
1
3
.
2
2
3
.
0
5
2
.
5
0
3
.
0
2
3
.
0
0
2
.
M
i
x
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
/
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
B
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
2
.
6
7
2
.
8
3
3
.
2
9
3
.
1
4
2
.
6
3
3
.
0
6
2
.
5
0
(
b
)
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
2
.
2
0
2
.
0
0
2
.
2
9
2
.
6
0
2
.
2
3
2
.
2
5
2
.
0
0
3
.
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
0
.
9
8
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
6
1
.
0
0
(
b
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
e
n
t
r
y
2
.
8
8
2
.
7
0
2
.
6
7
2
.
3
0
3
.
0
0
2
.
5
6
3
.
0
0
(
c
)
E
n
t
r
y
i
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
7
.
6
7
7
.
8
7
7
.
9
7
7
.
8
6
7
.
7
4
7
.
8
6
7
.
7
1
4
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
5
.
2
6
4
.
9
5
5
.
2
2
4
.
6
4
5
.
1
3
5
.
0
3
4
.
8
6
(
b
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
.
8
1
2
.
4
9
2
.
5
5
2
.
6
4
1
.
6
5
2
.
5
3
2
.
2
1
(
c
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
i
n
d
e
x
7
.
0
7
7
.
4
6
7
.
8
4
7
.
3
6
6
.
7
7
7
.
6
1
7
.
0
7
(
d
)
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
b
y
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
w
n
e
r
4
7
.
6
4
6
5
.
8
1
3
9
.
4
9
2
4
.
3
6
4
7
.
0
0
4
5
.
9
0
4
1
.
6
7
5
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
1
0
.
8
0
1
0
.
9
5
1
0
.
6
3
1
0
.
4
9
1
0
.
6
7
1
0
.
7
5
1
1
.
1
1
(
1
)
p
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
4
.
2
1
4
.
1
3
4
.
9
7
5
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
4
.
6
3
4
.
5
4
(
2
)
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
2
.
1
8
2
.
4
0
1
.
9
2
1
.
8
6
2
.
0
9
2
.
1
0
2
.
5
0
(
3
)
D
e
c
l
a
r
i
n
g
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
p
o
w
e
r
0
.
8
2
1
.
3
1
0
.
8
2
1
.
0
5
0
.
7
8
1
.
0
6
0
.
9
0
(
b
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
1
.
3
7
1
.
1
0
0
.
9
6
0
.
7
4
1
.
4
9
0
.
9
8
1
.
5
5
(
c
)
L
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
5
2
3
.
6
0
4
9
1
.
4
8
5
6
7
.
5
9
6
5
4
.
7
3
5
3
7
.
6
3
5
5
9
.
6
2
5
2
4
.
0
0
(
d
)
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
3
0
.
6
9
1
6
6
.
8
8
1
6
9
.
2
3
1
8
2
.
5
0
1
0
4
.
5
0
1
7
0
.
0
3
1
8
5
.
0
0
(
e
)
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
/
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
1
.
6
0
1
.
3
3
1
.
1
8
1
.
3
6
1
.
6
1
1
.
3
1
1
.
5
0
6
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
2
.
3
0
5
.
3
9
5
.
3
6
2
.
2
0
2
.
3
2
4
.
9
5
0
.
8
6
(
b
)
B
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
e
a
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
1
9
.
5
1
5
2
.
6
6
4
2
.
0
2
1
7
.
7
7
2
0
.
4
4
4
3
.
4
2
5
.
8
3
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table AIV.
Information on bank
structural, regulatory,
supervisory and deposit
insurance variables:
averages by income level
JFEP
5,2
216
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
H
i
g
h
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
U
p
p
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
i
n
c
o
m
e
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
o
r
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
e
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
(
c
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
t
e
n
u
r
e
8
.
4
9
9
.
7
6
7
.
8
3
8
.
0
8
8
.
8
3
8
.
7
8
6
.
8
1
(
d
)
O
n
s
i
t
e
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
3
.
8
2
4
.
1
4
4
.
4
0
4
.
6
2
4
.
1
9
4
.
2
0
2
.
6
4
(
e
)
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
2
.
0
8
1
.
9
4
1
.
8
7
1
.
8
2
2
.
1
1
1
.
9
2
1
.
6
7
7
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
C
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
0
.
9
8
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
7
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
6
0
.
9
3
(
b
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
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e
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n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
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a
t
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g
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n
c
i
e
s
7
0
.
2
4
5
9
.
5
2
4
8
.
4
2
1
5
.
0
0
7
5
.
3
3
5
0
.
9
2
5
4
.
4
0
(
c
)
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
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n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
3
.
6
0
3
.
4
9
3
.
6
1
3
.
4
1
3
.
6
3
3
.
5
3
3
.
5
7
(
d
)
N
o
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
0
.
2
2
0
.
4
2
0
.
4
2
0
.
4
0
0
.
1
9
0
.
4
0
0
.
5
0
(
e
)
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
e
x
8
.
3
5
7
.
6
6
7
.
4
6
7
.
4
3
8
.
4
4
7
.
6
3
7
.
4
3
8
.
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
1
.
0
8
0
.
9
3
1
.
1
2
1
.
6
4
1
.
2
3
1
.
1
0
0
.
1
1
(
b
)
E
x
t
r
a
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
0
.
6
8
0
.
7
3
0
.
8
0
0
.
7
3
0
.
7
2
0
.
7
7
0
.
1
1
(
c
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
o
u
t
d
e
l
a
y
9
0
.
8
3
4
5
.
7
9
2
2
5
.
6
7
1
8
0
.
0
0
6
7
.
5
0
1
2
4
.
2
0
9
0
.
0
0
(
d
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
s
-
t
o
-
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
1
1
0
.
1
8
0
.
0
1
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
1
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Table AIV.
Bank regulation
and supervision
217
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Table AV.
Groupings of countries
by development status
JFEP
5,2
218
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
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2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 7
Corresponding author
James R. Barth can be contacted at: [email protected]
IFRS GAAP
Armenia Denmark Italy Maldives Singapore Angola
Australia Egypt Jamaica Malta Slovakia Ecuador
Austria Estonia Jersey Mauritius Slovenia Nigeria
Bahrain Ethiopia Jordan Montenegro South Africa Puerto
Rico
Bangladesh Fiji Kenya Morocco Spain Tunisia
Belarus France Korea, Rep. Namibia Sri Lanka USA
Belgium Germany Kosovo The Netherlands Swaziland
Belize Ghana Kuwait New Zealand Syria
Bhutan Gibraltar Kyrgyz
Republic
Nicaragua Tajikistan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Greece Latvia Norway Tanzania
Botswana Guatemala Lebanon Pakistan Tonga
Brazil Guyana Lesotho Palestinian
Territory
Trinidad and
Tobago
Bulgaria Honduras Liechtenstein Philippines Turkey
Burundi Hong
Kong
Lithuania Poland Uganda
Canada Iceland Luxembourg Portugal Ukraine
Chile Indonesia Macao, China Qatar United Arab
Emirates
China Iraq Madagascar Romania UK
Croatia Ireland Malawi Serbia Uruguay
Cyprus Isle of
Man
Malaysia Seychelles Zimbabwe
Notes: Countries whose accounting standards for banks are in accordance with BOTH IRS AND
GAAP are Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Panama,
Samoa (Western), Switzerland, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Virgin Islands (British), and Yemen; countries
whose accounting standards for banks are in accordance with NEIHER IRS NOR GAAP are
Argentina, Benin, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Finland, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Niger, Paraguay, Peru,
Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Taiwan, Thailand, and Togo
Table AVI.
Are applicable
accounting standards for
banks in your country
prepared in accordance
with IFRS or US
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
(GAAP)?
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected]
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Bank regulation
and supervision
219
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2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
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2
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(
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22. Franziska M. Bremus. 2015. Cross-border banking, bank market structures and market power: Theory
and cross-country evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance 50, 242-259. [CrossRef]
23. Changjun Zheng, Badar Nadeem Ashraf. 2014. National culture and dividend policy: International
evidence from banking. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 3, 22-40. [CrossRef]
24. Anastassios A. Drakos, Georgios P. Kouretas, Chris Tsoumas. 2014. Ownership, interest rates and
bank risk-taking in Central and Eastern European countries. International Review of Financial Analysis
. [CrossRef]
25. Matej Marin?, Vasja Rant. 2014. A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes. Journal of Financial
Stability . [CrossRef]
26. Aktham I. Maghyereh, Basel Awartani. 2014. The effect of market structure, regulation, and risk on
banks efficiency. Journal of Economic Studies 41:3, 405-430. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
27. Gregor N.F. Weiß, Denefa Bostandzic, Sascha Neumann. 2014. What factors drive systemic risk during
international financial crises?. Journal of Banking & Finance 41, 78-96. [CrossRef]
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doc_312556087.pdf
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011
J ames R. Barth Gerard Caprio J r Ross Levine
Article information:
To cite this document:
J ames R. Barth Gerard Caprio J r Ross Levine, (2013),"Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries
from 1999 to 2011", J ournal of Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 5 Iss 2 pp. 111 - 219
Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381311329661
Downloaded on: 24 January 2016, At: 21:46 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 8 other documents.
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Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
Puspa Amri, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg, (2011),"International comparisons of bank regulation,
liberalization, and banking crises", J ournal of Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 3 Iss 4 pp. 322-339 http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381111182909
Wenling Lu, David A. Whidbee, (2013),"Bank structure and failure during the financial crisis", J ournal of
Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 5 Iss 3 pp. 281-299http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/J FEP-02-2013-0006
Mikael Petitjean, (2013),"Bank failures and regulation: a critical review", J ournal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance, Vol. 21 Iss 1 pp. 16-38http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13581981311297803
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Bank regulation and supervision
in 180 countries from
1999 to 2011
James R. Barth
Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, USA and
Milken Institute, Santa Monica, California, USA
Gerard Caprio Jr
Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, USA, and
Ross Levine
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors’ approach is based upon the quanti?cation of
hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the
powers of of?cial supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance
mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank
regulatory and supervisory policies.
Findings – It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in
many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes
over the past decade despite the worst global ?nancial crisis since the Great Depression.
Research limitations/implications – The data are based on survey responses and this requires
that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure
greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses
in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well-functioning banking
systems.
Originality/value – The authors’ data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers
and researchers to examine cross-country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies
over time.
Keywords Financial institutions, Banks, Government policy, Regulation, Financial control,
Comparative ?nancial systems
Paper type Research paper
I. Introduction
Motivating an investigation of bank regulation and supervision is easy. One can point
to the global banking crisis of 2007-2009, the banking problems still plaguing many
European countries in 2013, and the more than 100 systemic banking crises that have
devastated economies around the world since 1970. All these crises re?ect, at least
partially, defects in bank regulation and supervision[1]. One can also point to research
showing that banks matter for human welfare beyond periodic crises. Banks in?uence
economic growth, poverty, entrepreneurship, labor market conditions, and the economic
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1757-6385.htm
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Vol. 5 No. 2, 2013
pp. 111-219
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
1757-6385
DOI 10.1108/17576381311329661
Bank regulation
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opportunities available to people[2]. Thus, examining the type and impact of bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in countries is a critical area of inquiry.
The problem, however, is that measuring bank regulation and supervision around
the world is hard. Hundreds of laws and regulations, emanating from different parts of
national and local governments, de?ne policies regarding bank capital standards, the
entry requirements of new domestic and foreign banks, bank ownership restrictions,
and loan provisioning guidelines. Numerous pages of regulations in most countries
delineate the permitted activities of banks and provide shape and substance to deposit
insurance schemes and the nature and timing of the information that banks must
disclose to regulators and the public. And, extensive statutes de?ne the powers of
regulatory and supervisory of?cials over banks – and the limits of those powers. There
are daunting challenges associated with acquiring data on all of the laws, regulations,
and practices that apply to banks in countries and then aggregating this information into
useful statistics that capture different and important aspects of regulatory regimes. This
helps explain why the systematic collection of data on bank regulatory and supervisory
policies is only in its nascent stages. Yet, without sound measures of banking policies
across countries and over time, researchers will be correspondingly constrained in
assessing which policies work best to promote well-functioning banking systems, and in
proposing socially bene?cial reforms to banking policies in need of improvement.
In this paper, we offer a new database on bank regulation and supervision for more
than 180 countries, covering the period from 1999 through 2011. Although we do not
assess the impact of banking sector policies on banks or the broader economy, we do
seek to contribute to research on the design and implementation of policies by providing
useful measures of bank regulation and supervision. As reportedly argued by the great
scientist Lord Kelvin in the nineteenth century, “f you cannot measure it, you cannot
improve it”[3].
Our database builds on four surveys sponsored by The World Bank. About 16 years
ago, The World Bank asked us to assemble the ?rst cross-country database on bank
regulation and supervision. With guidance and help from bank supervisors, ?nancial
economists, and World Bankstaff, we developed and implemented an extensive survey[4].
We had bank regulatory of?cials complete the survey – and often had several of?cials
fromthe same country complete the survey in order to verify the consistency of responses.
Survey I covered 118 countries, included over 300 questions, and was mostly completed in
1999[5]. For the second survey, we extended and revised the questionnaire based on input
from World Bank staff, country of?cials, and academics. The World Bank released
Survey II in2003, which provides informationon bank regulatoryand supervisorypolicies
in 2002. Survey II includes information from 151 counties covering over 400 questions.
SurveyIII was postedonThe WorldBank’s website inthe summer of 2007, andit provides
information on banking policies in 2006 for 142 countries. In these ?rst three surveys, we
were extensively involved in writing the questionnaire, implementing the survey, and
assembling the data. For Survey IV, we played a less prominent role in managing the
survey[6]. Speci?cally, we helped The World Bank conduct a major revision of the
questionnaire, but we did not implement the survey. Released in 2012, Survey IVprovides
information on banking policies in 125 countries for 2011. Overall, the surveys cover
180 countries, althoughthe number varies fromone surveytothe next as alreadyindicated.
The dataset that we make available online differs from the survey responses posted
by The World Bank in two key regards[7]. First, we devote considerable effort to
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identifying and resolving inconsistencies and missing values by reviewing each of
the four surveys individually and by considering the time-series of answers for each
country. For example, there are cases when a country provides the same information
about a technical regulatory rule in Surveys I, II, and IV, but provides a different answer
for Survey III, or a country provides the same answers in Surveys I, III, and IV, but
gives a different response for Survey II. In such cases, we examine country documents
and web sites to assess whether there is any reason for such odd changes and reversals
in policies to assess whether this represents a coding mistake or an actual change
in policy. As another example, for each missing data entry, we reviewed national
publications and contacted national regulatory of?cials in an effort to complete the
dataset to a greater degree. Although we are certain that the resultant dataset is less
than perfect, we believe this review process has yielded a more comprehensive and
accurate set of data.
The second, and perhaps more important, dimension along which our data differs
from the survey responses posted by The World Bank involves the construction of
indexes. For each of the four surveys, we provide summary indexes of major categories
of bank regulatory and supervisory policies. This is crucial because of the size of the
surveys. There are hundreds of questions in each survey, many with sub-questions and
sub-components of those sub-questions. As a result, there are limitations to formulating
sound impressions about either differences in policies or cross-time changes in policies
from the raw survey data. Consequently, besides providing the answers to all the
individual survey questions, we aggregate the responses to individual questions into
indexes that summarize notable aspects of bank regulation and supervision. We
construct indexes of policies on capital, ownership, the activities of banks, the entry of
new banks, the powers of supervisors, the ability of private investors to monitor bank
behavior and to govern banks, deposit insurance features, loan classi?cation and
provisioning practices, and many other areas of bank regulation and supervision. The
result of this effort is the construction of more than 50 indexes. We provide a detailed
description of the construction of the indexes in the online dataset.
The dataset also provides information on the organization of regulatory agencies
and the size and structure of the overall banking system. We document whether there
is a single regulator or multiple regulators and whether countries authorize their central
banks to play a key role inbanksupervision. We also document the size of each country’s
banking system, the concentration of the system, and the role of government owned and
foreign-owned banks and how these characteristics have changed over time. The
dataset, therefore, facilitates analyses of the relationships among the organization of
national banking authorities, the details of ?nancial regulation and supervision, and the
size and structure of the banking system. Moreover, researchers can easily combine
these data with other datasets to explore the factors that explain banking sector policies,
and the consequences of those policies for a variety of outcomes.
Besides describing the data, this paper provides a wealth of cross-country and
cross-time comparisons. We analyze changes in bank regulatory and supervisory
practices over time, examine the degree to which banking policies have converged
across countries, and document howthe organization of bank regulatory authorities and
the size and structure of the banking system differ around the world. Although there is
some convergence along some dimensions of bank regulation, there remains substantial
heterogeneity in policies, organization, and structure.
Bank regulation
and supervision
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of
the survey. Section III discusses the indices of bank regulatory and supervisory policies
regarding permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of the of?cial
supervisory entities, transparency, private monitoring, and external governance of banks,
deposit insurance schemes, barriers to entry, loan provisioning. Section III also examines
the extent to which bank regulations and supervisory practices have been converging
across countries during the tumultuous period since 1999. Section IV concludes.
II. An overview of the survey data
The extensive database on bank regulation and supervision (presented in the online
datasethttp://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm) is based on four
surveys conducted by The World Bank. Appendix 1 contains the entire list of questions
from Survey IV, while the online dataset contains the questions for each of the four
surveys. As noted above, the surveys pose questions on a wide array of bank regulatory
and supervisory policies. These include: entry into commercial banking, ownership of
bank restrictions, capital standards, allowable activities for banks, external auditing
requirements, governance of banks, liquidity and diversi?cation requirements, deposit
protection schemes, asset classi?cation and provisioning practices, accounting and
informationdisclosure requirements, supervisorypowers associated for dealing withbanks
in ?nancial duress, and the structure, mandate, staf?ng, and procedures of supervisory
agencies. In addition, some information is available on the characteristics of banking
systems, and Survey IVobtains newinformation on efforts designed to enable regulators to
better address issues of systemic risk and consumer protection regulations in banking.
The surveys cover a broad cross-section of countries. Figure 1 shows the countries that
responded to the various surveys, and Table AI provides detailed information on those
that responded to each of the surveys. Table AII lists the countries that responded to
Survey IV, sorting them by region and per capita GDP levels. It is clear that coverage is
fairly good, with countries represented fromall parts of the world and all levels of income.
The fewest number of countries responding are in the lower income category with small
populations. For the four surveys, 118 countries responded to Survey I, 151 countries
responded to Survey II and 143 countries responded to both Surveys III and IV. Of these
countries, 73of themrespondedtoall four surveys. Barthet al. (2001, 2006, 2008) assess the
results of Surveys I-III, while Cihak et al. (2012) discuss some of the data from Survey IV.
Before de?ning and reviewing the bank regulation and supervision data, we begin in
Table I by documenting cross-country differences in key banking system indicators,
using Survey IV for illustrative purposes. As shown, Table I provides information
on banking system size, the number of banks, the proportion of banking assets in
government-owned banks (where a bank is considered government-owned if 50 percent
or more of the shares are controlled by the government), the proportion of banking assets
in foreign-owned banks, the number of of?cial bank supervisors per bank in the country,
and the percent of the ten largest banks in a country that are rated by one of the major
international ratings agencies.
For many of the banking system indicators depicted in Table I, the range of
variation is impressive. Some examples will illustrate this point. Luxemburg has the
highest ratio of bank assets-to-GDP at a striking 1,942 percent, while Iraq has the
lowest ratio at 18 percent[8]. These ?gures are not surprising given that Luxemburg is
a very small country with internationally active banks, whereas Iraq is still recovering
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from a recent war. The share of bank assets that is foreign-owned ranges from a high
of 100 percent in several offshore ?nancial centers to 0 percent in Ethiopia. In the case
of government ownership of bank assets, the share ranges from 0 percent for several
countries to 74 percent in India (China did not respond to this question, but available
information indicates the ?gure exceeds 90 percent. In the 2007 survey China did
respond and reported the share was slightly less than 70 percent, but this only
captured the four big state-owned banks. The ?gure exceeds 90 percent even earlier if
one includes all state or government-owned banks). Banking density also seems to
vary to an astonishing degree, though much less so once one removes offshore banking
centers, such as the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, and Seychelles. The median
number of banks per 100,000 people is 0.4, with the lowest ?gure being 0.01 for India.
Large banks control a substantial share of bank assets, with the median share of the
top ?ve banks being 73 percent, and yet although most or all big banks are audited by
international (so it is hoped, more arms-length) ?rms, in a distressing number of cases
no large banks are so audited, such as in Botswana and Iceland.
Besides providing a snapshot of the structure of banking systems in 2011, the data also
illustrate the evolution of banking systems since 1999. As shown in Figure 2, many
countries have experienced rapid growth in the ratio of bank assets to GDP from
Surveys I (1999) to IV(2011). Figure 2 provides informationonall countries for whichthere
are data for both Surveys I and IV. In Figure 2, we graph all countries with greater than
1 percent growth from Surveys I to IV in the left panel and all countries with less
than 21 percent growth in the right panel. In 44 countries the ratio increased, while it
decreased in eight countries. Figure 3 shows the maximumratio of bank assets to GDPfor
each country across all four surveys and the survey when this maximum occurred. It is
also seen in the ?gure that most of countries reported the highest ratio in Survey IV.
Figure 1.
Countries participating in
the World Bank surveys
Bank regulation
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3
8
1
2
.
7
1
0
0
B
u
r
k
i
n
a
F
a
s
o
N
/
A
1
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
B
u
r
u
n
d
i
3
5
1
7
0
.
1
8
7
4
9
1
6
3
.
3
N
/
A
C
a
n
a
d
a
1
9
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
8
6
0
N
/
A
0
.
8
7
0
C
a
y
m
a
n
I
s
l
a
n
d
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
4
3
7
.
5
3
8
0
1
0
0
0
.
1
0
C
h
i
l
e
1
0
7
7
4
0
.
1
7
4
1
9
3
9
4
.
1
6
0
C
h
i
n
a
1
8
9
N
/
A
0
.
0
2
6
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
4
2
3
1
0
.
0
4
6
3
6
2
0
2
5
.
3
7
0
C
o
o
k
I
s
l
a
n
d
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
0
0
8
9
2
0
.
8
0
C
o
s
t
a
R
i
c
a
6
4
4
7
0
.
3
7
8
5
4
3
1
7
.
4
7
0
C
o ˆ
t
e
d
’
I
v
o
i
r
e
N
/
A
1
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
1
1
6
6
9
0
.
7
7
5
4
8
9
3
.
3
1
0
C
y
p
r
u
s
7
2
9
N
/
A
3
.
5
6
9
1
3
5
0
.
8
3
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
Some basic differences
in banking systems
around the world
JFEP
5,2
116
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
2
4
5
N
/
A
2
.
2
8
3
1
2
1
N
/
A
7
0
D
o
m
i
n
i
c
a
n
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
3
3
2
2
0
.
1
8
7
3
1
8
1
0
.
8
8
0
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
3
6
2
9
0
.
2
7
0
1
7
2
4
N
/
A
E
g
y
p
t
6
4
2
7
0
.
0
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
1
.
8
7
0
E
l
S
a
l
v
a
d
o
r
6
3
4
0
0
.
2
8
5
6
9
3
1
0
.
1
5
0
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
1
4
0
N
/
A
1
.
3
9
3
0
9
9
3
.
9
0
E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a
2
5
N
/
A
0
.
0
2
8
4
6
1
0
1
.
7
N
/
A
F
i
j
i
7
8
6
5
0
.
6
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
5
8
0
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
2
5
6
N
/
A
1
.
8
9
1
0
7
4
0
.
7
6
0
F
r
a
n
c
e
3
6
8
N
/
A
1
.
1
8
7
2
1
2
N
/
A
1
0
0
G
a
m
b
i
a
6
0
1
4
0
.
8
7
2
0
8
0
1
.
4
0
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
1
2
4
N
/
A
2
.
3
2
5
3
2
1
2
N
/
A
1
0
0
G
h
a
n
a
3
7
1
4
0
.
1
4
5
1
0
5
1
5
.
4
0
G
i
b
r
a
l
t
a
r
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
7
9
0
1
0
0
0
.
5
0
G
r
e
e
c
e
2
1
2
N
/
A
0
.
2
7
8
1
1
2
1
6
.
1
8
0
G
u
a
t
e
m
a
l
a
4
6
2
3
0
.
1
8
0
2
1
0
1
0
.
4
8
0
G
u
e
r
n
s
e
y
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
2
5
7
4
2
1
0
0
G
u
i
n
e
a
-
B
i
s
s
a
u
N
/
A
6
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
G
u
y
a
n
a
6
3
3
0
0
.
8
9
7
0
5
6
3
.
8
0
H
o
n
d
u
r
a
s
7
3
4
9
0
.
2
6
9
1
5
0
6
.
7
7
0
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
,
C
h
i
n
a
7
0
5
N
/
A
2
.
7
4
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
.
1
1
0
0
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
7
0
5
N
/
A
0
.
3
6
3
4
8
3
3
.
9
8
0
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
1
9
3
1
1
5
1
.
6
1
0
0
4
1
0
5
0
I
n
d
i
a
8
0
5
1
0
.
0
1
3
8
7
4
7
8
.
3
1
0
0
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
4
7
2
6
0
.
1
5
0
3
8
3
4
7
.
7
9
0
I
r
a
q
1
8
9
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
4
8
3
N
/
A
1
7
2
2
1
6
3
1
.
6
1
0
0
I
s
l
e
o
f
M
a
n
N
/
A
N
/
A
3
6
.
2
7
0
0
1
0
0
0
.
2
1
0
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
Bank regulation
and supervision
117
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
I
s
r
a
e
l
1
4
8
N
/
A
0
.
2
9
4
0
3
6
.
5
5
0
I
t
a
l
y
2
0
4
N
/
A
1
.
3
6
6
0
.
1
1
8
0
.
9
1
0
0
J
a
m
a
i
c
a
5
0
2
6
0
.
3
9
5
0
9
5
1
1
.
4
2
9
J
e
r
s
e
y
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
6
5
1
8
1
0
0
0
.
1
1
0
0
J
o
r
d
a
n
N
/
A
7
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
4
0
K
a
z
a
k
h
s
t
a
n
N
/
A
3
9
0
.
2
7
2
2
3
1
7
1
.
1
1
0
0
K
e
n
y
a
N
/
A
3
3
0
.
1
5
0
5
3
7
1
.
4
8
0
K
o
r
e
a
,
R
e
p
.
1
1
2
1
0
2
0
.
0
3
8
0
2
2
7
7
N
/
A
1
0
0
K
o
s
o
v
o
5
6
3
5
0
.
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
3
.
1
3
8
K
u
w
a
i
t
1
1
9
7
1
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
0
0
K
y
r
g
y
z
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
2
6
N
/
A
0
.
4
5
5
2
0
4
6
2
.
6
0
L
a
t
v
i
a
N
/
A
N
/
A
1
.
3
5
9
1
6
6
9
1
.
3
N
/
A
L
e
b
a
n
o
n
N
/
A
7
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
5
0
L
e
s
o
t
h
o
5
7
1
5
0
.
2
1
0
0
3
9
7
1
.
3
N
/
A
L
i
e
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
i
n
N
/
A
N
/
A
4
7
.
2
9
2
2
9
4
0
.
3
2
0
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
8
6
N
/
A
0
.
6
8
0
0
8
1
3
.
1
9
0
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
1
9
4
2
N
/
A
2
9
3
1
5
9
4
0
.
3
4
0
M
a
c
a
o
,
C
h
i
n
a
2
3
8
5
7
5
.
2
7
3
0
.
2
9
9
0
.
6
3
0
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r
2
4
N
/
A
0
.
0
5
8
2
0
1
0
0
1
.
9
0
M
a
l
a
w
i
3
7
1
6
0
.
1
8
3
9
2
9
2
.
3
0
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
2
0
3
1
2
0
0
.
1
5
9
0
2
2
7
.
5
9
0
M
a
l
d
i
v
e
s
9
8
5
7
1
.
9
9
8
3
9
6
1
1
.
8
0
M
a
l
i
N
/
A
1
8
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
M
a
l
t
a
8
1
4
N
/
A
6
.
3
7
1
0
8
6
0
.
7
2
0
M
a
u
r
i
t
i
u
s
1
1
2
8
9
1
.
4
6
5
1
6
8
1
.
9
2
0
M
e
x
i
c
o
4
2
1
9
0
.
0
4
7
4
1
3
8
5
1
0
.
8
1
0
0
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
6
0
3
4
0
.
4
6
9
1
3
4
2
3
.
1
0
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
9
6
6
8
1
.
7
7
7
N
/
A
8
8
4
1
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
JFEP
5,2
118
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
8
8
6
9
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
M
o
z
a
m
b
i
q
u
e
3
7
2
8
0
.
1
9
2
0
9
2
N
/
A
0
M
y
a
n
m
a
r
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
a
m
i
b
i
a
7
0
5
5
0
.
2
1
0
0
0
8
6
3
.
3
2
5
N
e
p
a
l
6
5
5
6
0
.
1
2
6
2
4
1
7
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
h
e
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
4
6
9
N
/
A
0
.
5
8
4
1
4
N
/
A
2
.
8
1
0
0
N
e
w
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
2
0
5
N
/
A
0
.
4
8
4
3
9
5
0
.
4
1
0
0
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a
6
4
3
1
0
.
2
9
6
1
2
4
3
.
7
4
4
N
i
g
e
r
N
/
A
1
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
5
2
2
9
0
.
0
2
4
8
0
6
1
6
.
7
1
0
0
N
o
r
w
a
y
5
3
N
/
A
0
.
6
7
6
0
3
0
0
.
8
1
0
0
O
m
a
n
4
9
4
3
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
7
0
P
a
k
i
s
t
a
n
4
7
2
1
0
.
0
2
5
1
2
1
5
9
7
.
3
0
P
a
l
e
s
t
i
n
i
a
n
T
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
y
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
7
8
0
6
2
4
.
1
5
0
P
a
n
a
m
a
2
6
9
8
4
2
.
7
4
7
1
1
6
2
1
.
3
1
0
0
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
5
4
3
9
0
.
2
6
7
6
4
0
2
.
8
N
/
A
P
e
r
u
4
2
2
4
0
.
1
8
7
0
4
9
1
1
.
9
4
0
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
7
0
3
0
0
.
0
4
5
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
.
2
1
0
0
P
o
l
a
n
d
7
4
N
/
A
0
.
1
4
9
2
2
6
2
6
.
8
9
0
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
3
1
4
N
/
A
1
.
1
7
4
2
3
2
2
1
8
0
P
u
e
r
t
o
R
i
c
o
N
/
A
N
/
A
0
.
3
5
9
1
8
2
1
1
0
0
Q
a
t
a
r
1
2
2
4
4
1
7
4
N
/
A
0
4
.
4
9
0
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
6
1
4
0
0
.
1
5
7
8
8
4
3
.
6
6
0
R
u
s
s
i
a
7
5
4
4
0
.
7
4
8
4
1
1
8
4
.
3
N
/
A
S
a
m
o
a
(
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
)
5
5
4
7
2
.
2
1
0
0
0
7
1
2
0
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
N
/
A
2
6
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
Bank regulation
and supervision
119
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
S
e
r
b
i
a
8
3
5
0
0
.
5
4
5
1
8
7
4
1
.
9
0
S
e
y
c
h
e
l
l
e
s
1
0
9
2
4
8
.
1
9
4
3
1
6
9
1
.
4
0
S
i
e
r
r
a
L
e
o
n
e
3
0
1
0
0
.
2
7
4
3
8
6
2
2
.
6
0
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
6
7
6
1
1
3
3
.
2
3
9
0
7
1
1
.
1
1
0
0
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
8
4
N
/
A
0
.
3
7
2
1
9
4
2
.
7
N
/
A
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
1
4
3
N
/
A
0
.
9
6
0
5
1
2
8
1
.
5
5
0
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
1
3
0
8
0
0
.
1
9
2
0
.
1
2
8
3
.
4
1
0
0
S
p
a
i
n
3
7
6
N
/
A
0
.
7
6
4
0
8
1
1
0
0
S
r
i
L
a
n
k
a
5
4
2
7
0
.
1
7
3
5
9
1
4
1
.
7
1
0
0
S
u
r
i
n
a
m
e
4
9
2
4
1
.
7
8
8
3
3
2
1
0
.
7
1
1
S
w
a
z
i
l
a
n
d
4
4
2
5
0
.
4
N
/
A
1
6
8
4
2
.
3
N
/
A
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
5
4
8
1
9
3
4
.
2
6
7
1
6
1
2
0
.
2
9
0
S
y
r
i
a
7
9
N
/
A
0
.
1
6
9
7
1
0
3
.
3
1
0
T
a
i
w
a
n
2
6
1
N
/
A
0
.
1
7
3
1
8
1
1
9
.
4
9
0
T
a
j
i
k
i
s
t
a
n
2
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
8
4
1
4
6
N
/
A
0
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
3
6
1
5
0
.
1
6
4
5
4
9
1
.
8
0
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
1
2
2
1
0
2
0
.
0
5
6
3
1
8
7
1
3
.
1
1
0
0
T
o
g
o
N
/
A
3
1
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
o
n
g
a
5
9
4
4
2
.
9
1
0
0
1
3
8
7
1
.
7
6
7
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
7
7
3
2
0
.
6
9
5
2
4
4
6
7
.
9
N
/
A
T
u
n
i
s
i
a
N
/
A
6
5
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
8
0
T
u
r
k
e
y
8
9
4
3
0
.
1
6
0
3
2
1
7
6
.
3
1
0
0
U
g
a
n
d
a
2
8
1
4
0
.
1
6
1
3
7
5
3
.
6
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table I.
JFEP
5,2
120
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
T
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
c
l
a
i
m
s
o
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
/
G
D
P
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
p
e
r
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
p
e
o
p
l
e
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
w
n
e
d
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
1
0
0
6
2
0
.
4
3
7
1
7
4
8
1
.
8
N
/
A
U
n
i
t
e
d
A
r
a
b
E
m
i
r
a
t
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
5
0
U
K
6
0
7
2
0
6
0
.
5
6
8
2
6
1
8
0
.
8
1
0
0
U
S
A
8
4
5
7
2
.
1
4
7
0
N
/
A
0
.
3
1
0
0
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
6
4
2
3
0
.
4
7
5
4
6
5
4
1
2
.
1
1
0
0
V
a
n
u
a
t
u
1
2
8
6
8
1
.
7
1
0
0
1
4
8
6
1
.
5
7
5
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
l
a
2
8
2
1
9
0
.
1
6
2
3
3
1
7
N
/
A
N
/
A
V
i
r
g
i
n
I
s
l
a
n
d
s
,
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
N
/
A
N
/
A
5
.
5
9
5
4
9
5
0
.
8
6
7
Y
e
m
e
n
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
Z
i
m
b
a
b
w
e
4
9
N
/
A
0
.
2
5
4
8
4
6
1
.
6
1
0
0
H
i
g
h
1
,
9
4
2
2
0
6
4
3
7
.
5
1
0
0
7
4
1
0
0
2
5
.
3
1
0
0
L
o
w
1
8
6
0
.
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
.
1
0
M
e
d
i
a
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Table I.
Bank regulation
and supervision
121
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Bank concentration and ownership have also changed materially. We again illustrate
changes in concentration and ownership between Surveys I and IVfor all countries that
have information for both surveys. Figure 4’s right panel shows that some countries
have experienced sharp reductions in bank concentration, which is measured by the
share of assets in the ?ve largest banks. Most of the countries that experienced these
pronounced reductions in concentration have small ?nancial systems. Figure 4’s left
panel shows even more countries experienced notable increases in concentration,
includingGermany, Malaysia, Turkey, Spain, Italy, Brazil, Chile, Australia, SouthKorea,
Canada, and the USA. Across all countries that provided data on bank concentration for
Surveys I and IV, the average level of bank concentration was 66 percent in Survey I and
70 percent in Survey IV, indicating a 4 percentage point increase in average bank
concentration.
In many countries, state ownership of banks also changed appreciably between
Surveys I and IV, where state ownership is de?ned as the proportion of banking assets
in government-owned banks (where a bank is considered government-owned if
50 percent or more of system’s assets are owned by the government). Figure 5 shows
that a substantial number of countries experienced large decreases in state ownership,
especially in such big countries as Germany, India, and Russia, where state ownership
was particularly large in 1999. As with all of the ?gures, we include those countries
with data in both Surveys I and IV. A number of countries also reported large increases
in the share of bank assets controlled by state-owned banks. The most striking case is
the UK with an increasing share amounting to 26 percent in 2010, due to the bailout of
the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008, while the corresponding share was 0 percent in the
?rst survey. For those countries with data on state ownership of banks for both
Surveys I and IV, the average percentage of total bank assets in state-owned banks
was 21 percent in 1999 and 15 percent in 2011.
Figure 2.
Total bank assets/GDP
Panama
Macao, China
Indonesia
Philippines
Morocco
Jamaica
Oman
Argentina
Malta
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Switzerland
The Netherlands
Spain
France
Belgium
Portugal
Venezuela
Denmark
Greece
New Zealand
Italy
Malaysia
Canada
Israel
Slovenia
South Africa
Vanuatu
Germany
Thailand
Kuwait
Mauritius
Korea, Rep.
Chile
Brazil
United States
India
Russia
Poland
Nepal
El Salvador
Romania
Gambia
Moldova
Tonga
Nigeria
Botswana
Guatemala
Mexico
Peru
Ghana
Tajikistan
-100% 100% 300% 500% 700% 900% -100% 100% 300% 500% 700% 900%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Survey IV Survey I minus IV Survey I Survey IV minus I
JFEP
5,2
122
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Figure 3.
Highest total bank
assets/GDP ratio based
on Surveys I-IV
0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600% 700% 800%
Tajikistan (IV)
Kyrgyz Republic (IV)
Ghana (III)
Peru (IV)
Mexico (IV)
Burundi (III)
Armenia (IV)
Guatemala (IV)
Botswana (IV)
Nigeria (IV)
Argentina (I)
Kenya (I)
Lesotho (IV)
Bolivia (II)
Bhutan (III)
Kazakstan (III)
Moldova (IV)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (IV)
Sri Lanka (III)
Romania (IV)
Bangladesh (IV)
Oman (I)
El Salvador (III)
Honduras (IV)
Poland (IV)
Russia (IV)
Belarus (IV)
Trinidad and Tobago (IV)
India (IV)
United States (IV)
Lithuania (IV)
Morocco (I)
Philippines (I)
Slovakia (II)
Guyana (III)
Hungary (IV)
Brazil (IV)
Bulgaria (IV)
Chile (IV)
Korea, Rep. (IV)
Latvia (III)
Croatia (IV)
Kuwait (IV)
Egypt (III)
Germany (IV)
Thailand (II)
South Africa (IV)
Estonia (IV)
Slovenia (IV)
Vanuatu (II)
Israel (IV)
Seychelles (II)
Virgin Islands,British (III)
Australia (III)
Canada (IV)
Malaysia (IV)
Italy (IV)
New Zealand (IV)
Greece (IV)
Jordan (III)
Mauritius (III)
Denmark (IV)
Finland (IV)
Taiwan (IV)
Macao, China (II)
Portugal (IV)
Lebanon (III)
Austria (IV)
France (IV)
Spain (IV)
Panama (I)
Belgium (III)
The Netherlands (III)
Iceland (III)
Ireland (III)
Switzerland (III)
United Kingdom (IV)
Singapore (IV)
Cyprus (IV)
Malta (IV)
Luxembourg (II)
Guernsey (II) 6,500%
3,300%
814%
Survey with highest ratios for
countries
Survey I: 6
Survey II: 8
Survey III: 19
Survey IV: 49
Bank regulation
and supervision
123
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
One of the most signi?cant changes, and one that has greatly complicated the world of
bank regulation and supervision, is the dramatic increase in the share of total bank assets
in foreign-owned banks, as shown in Figure 6. The share of total bank assets in foreign-
ownedbanks is de?nedas the proportionof bankingassets inforeign-ownedbanks, where
a bank is considered foreign-owned if 50 percent or more of system’s assets are foreign-
owned. From Surveys I to IV, 76 percent of the countries experienced an increase in
the share of bank assets in foreign-owned banks. Across all countries that provided data
for both surveys, the average percentage of bank assets in foreign-owned banks was
Figure 4.
Percentage of assets
accounted for by ?ve
largest banks
Lesotho
Guyana
Trinidad and Tobago
Jamaica
Israel
Seychelles
Liechtenstein
Belgium
Peru
Canada
El Salvador
Belarus
Denmark
Malawi
Korea, Rep.
Guatemala
Gibraltar
Greece
Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Chile
Slovakia
Kazakhstan
Brazil
Honduras
Switzerland
Italy
Spain
Turkey
Malaysia
Kyrgyz Republic
Argentina
Philippines
Panama
United States
Luxembourg
Germany
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Botswana
Gambia
Malta
Finland
Estonia
Burundi
New Zealand
Mauritius
Lithuania
The Netherlands
Cyprus
Russia
Ghana
Qatar
Puerto Rico
China
Thailand
Macao, China
Moldova
Bangladesh
Venezuela
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Kenya
Romania
Poland
Nepal
Nigeria
Armenia
Guernsey
India
Austria
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Survey I Survey IV minus I Survey IV Survey I minus IV
Figure 5.
Percentage of total bank
assets government owned
Belarus
Sri Lanka
Slovenia
Argentina
Venezuela
Liechtenstein
United Kingdom
Nepal
Trinidad and Tobago
Kazakhstan
Portugal
Kyrgyz Republic
Chile
Puerto Rico
Switzerland
Tajikistan
The Netherlands
Vanuatu
Tonga
Philippines
Moldova
Austria
Botswana
Guernsey
Luxembourg
Kenya
Virgin Islands, British
Hungary
New Zealand
Mauritius
Denmark
South Africa
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
India
Maldives
Romania
Bangladesh
Russia
Iceland
Burundi
Bhutan
Jamaica
Brazil
Lesotho
Malawi
Lithuania
Indonesia
Poland
Qatar
Taiwan
Germany
Ghana
Croatia
Turkey
Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Korea, Rep.
Slovakia
Mexico
Finland
Guyana
Bulgaria
Italy
Nigeria
Greece
Panama
Guatemala
El Salvador
Cyprus
Armenia
Peru
Macao, China
Honduras
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Survey I Survey IV minus I Survey IV Survey I minus IV
JFEP
5,2
124
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
47 percent in 2011, up from 29 percent in 1999. This substantial increase emphasizes the
importance of cross-country coordination in the resolution of big banks that operate
globally.
Beyond these general characteristics of banking systems, there are also cross-country
differences inthe organizationof bankregulatoryandsupervisoryinstitutions. Tables II-IV
provide information on whether countries have single or multiple supervisory authorities
for commercial banks, whether the bank supervisor is in the central bank or a separate
agency (or both, in the case of multiple supervisors), and whether there is a single ?nancial
supervisor for the entire ?nancial system, respectively. Table II shows that the vast
majority of countries have a single bank supervisory authority: 126 countries have a single
bank supervisory authority, while only ten have multiple authorities, including the USA.
Table III provides information on whether the central bank is a bank supervisory
authority. It is seen that in 89 countries the central bank is the only such authority. In
contrast, in 38 countries the central bank is not a supervisory authority at all. The
remaining nine countries that provide information indicate that the central bank is one
among multiple supervisors, with the USA being one of these countries.
Since banks are not the only ?nancial ?rms, information was also requested as to
whether a country has a single ?nancial supervisory authority or multiple authorities.
Table IV provides information on the scope of coverage by ?nancial supervisory
authorities in countries. In 101 countries there are multiple authorities covering the
?nancial sector, while in 25 countries there is a single authority covering the entire
?nancial sector. Most of the countries with a single authority are relatively small in
terms of both population and GDP.
III. Aggregating the data: the art and science of forming indices
There are formidable conceptual challenges to aggregating the information contained
in the answers to detailed questions from the surveys into meaningful and usable
measures of bank regulatory and supervisory practices. While fully aware of the
Figure 6.
Percentage of total bank
assets foreign owned
Cayman Islands
Macao, China
Estonia
Lesotho
Jamaica
Slovakia
El Salvador
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Malta
Mexico
Romania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Gambia
Korea, Rep.
Finland
Singapore
Seychelles
Mauritius
Armenia
Panama
Poland
Maldives
Guyana
Honduras
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Chile
Cyprus
Indonesia
Malawi
Slovenia
Belarus
Portugal
Malaysia
Greece
Russia
Italy
Austria
Brazil
Kazakhstan
Turkey
Burundi
Switzerland
Germany
Guatemala
India
Bangladesh
Tajikistan
Nigeria
Liechtenstein
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Countries with increasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Guernsey
Tonga
Gibraltar
New Zealand
Botswana
Luxembourg
Ghana
Argentina
Nepal
Venezuela
Puerto Rico
Bhutan
Australia
Qatar
Philippines
Spain
Thailand
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Countries with decreasing ratios from Survey I to IV
Survey I Survey IV minus I Survey IV Survey I minus IV
Bank regulation
and supervision
125
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Table II.
Countries with single
vs multiple bank
supervisory authorities
JFEP
5,2
126
D
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w
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l
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d
b
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P
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r
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t
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h
Table III.
Countries with the central
bank as a supervisory
authority
Bank regulation
and supervision
127
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
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e
d
b
y
P
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N
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1
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4
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0
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6
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Scope of supervisory
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challenges, we have formulated a set of indexes with the goals of measuring major
features of each country’s regulatory and supervisory regime and gauging how these
features have evolved over time. Table V shows a full list of variables in the dataset
with the de?nition, quanti?cation, and speci?c questions for each variable.
In the paper, we describe some of the indexes and provide some cross-country and
time-series comparisons. In the online data ?le, we show precisely how each aggregate
index is constructed fromthe individual components of the survey. We also organize the
data ?le, so that it is easy for researchers to construct their own indexes from the
individual responses.
III.A. Scope of bank activities and ?nancial conglomerate variables
National regulators license banks and specify permissible activities. Countries may
restrict banks to a narrow range of activities, or allow them to engage in a broad array.
Since the scope of activities helps de?ne what is meant by a “bank” and since the scope
of permissible activities differs across countries, banks are not the same across countries.
Furthermore, bank regulations de?ne the extent to which banks and non-banks may
combine to form ?nancial (i.e. bank and non-bank ?nancial) or mixed (i.e. bank and
non-bank non-?nancial) conglomerates.
From the survey questions, we construct indexes of the degree to which national
regulations restrict banks from engaging in:
.
securities activities;
.
insurance activities; and
.
real estate activities.
More speci?cally, securities activities refers to securities underwriting, brokering, dealing,
and all aspects of the mutual fund industry. Insurance activities involve insurance
underwriting and selling. And real estate activities refer to real estate investment,
development, and management. The index values for securities, insurance, and real estate
range from1 to 4, where larger values indicate more restrictions on banks performingeach
activity. In particular, four signi?es prohibited, three indicates that there are tight
restrictions on the provision of the activity, two means that the activity is permitted but
with some limits, and one signals that the activity is permitted.
For each of these three bank activity indexes, Figure 7 provides information on the
distribution of countries by the degree of restrictive ness for Surveys I and IV. The data
?le contains this information by country for all four surveys. The ?gure shows that
securities activities are the least restricted of the bank activities, while real estate
activities are the most restricted. Focusing on Survey IV, only nine of 124 countries
actually prohibit banks from engaging in securities activities. In contrast, 42 countries
prohibit them from engaging in real estate activities. With respect to insurance,
19 countries prohibit banks from engaging in this type of activity. Guyana and Uganda
are the only countries that completely prohibit banks from engaging in all three
activities (securities, insurance, and real estate). However, 12 other countries either
completely prohibit or put speci?c some restrictions on all of these activities.
As illustrated, there is great cross-country variability in the degree to which countries
restrict banks from engaging in different activities. The regulatory notion of a bank,
therefore, differs markedly across countries – and, this de?nition changes over time
within the same country, which is also shown in Figure 7. For example, Kosovo,
Bank regulation
and supervision
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c
o
m
p
a
n
y
o
r
p
a
r
e
n
t
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
.
I
)
þ
(
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
I
.
I
I
I
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
.
I
)
þ
(
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
I
.
I
I
I
)
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Information on bank
regulatory, supervisory
and deposit insurance
variables
JFEP
5,2
130
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
2
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
c
o
n
g
l
o
m
e
r
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
B
a
n
k
o
w
n
i
n
g
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
b
a
n
k
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
a
¼
1
;
b
¼
2
;
c
¼
3
;
a
n
d
d
¼
4
4
.
4
W
h
a
t
a
r
e
t
h
e
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
u
n
d
e
r
w
h
i
c
h
b
a
n
k
s
c
a
n
e
n
g
a
g
e
i
n
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
e
x
c
e
p
t
t
h
o
s
e
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
a
u
x
i
l
i
a
r
y
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
(
e
.
g
.
I
T
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
,
d
e
b
t
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
,
e
t
c
.
)
?
a
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
c
a
n
b
e
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
i
n
b
a
n
k
s
b
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
m
u
s
t
b
e
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
i
n
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
,
o
r
i
n
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
p
a
r
t
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
o
n
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
o
r
p
a
r
e
n
t
c
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
m
a
y
b
e
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
i
n
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
,
o
r
i
n
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
p
a
r
t
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
o
n
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
o
r
p
a
r
e
n
t
,
b
u
t
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
t
o
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
l
i
m
i
t
o
r
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
d
.
N
o
n
e
o
f
t
h
e
s
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
c
a
n
b
e
d
o
n
e
i
n
e
i
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
s
o
r
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
,
o
r
i
n
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
p
a
r
t
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
o
n
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
o
r
p
a
r
e
n
t
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
o
w
n
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
b
a
n
k
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
a
¼
1
;
b
¼
2
;
c
¼
3
;
a
n
d
d
¼
4
2
.
6
C
a
n
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
o
w
n
v
o
t
i
n
g
s
h
a
r
e
s
i
n
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
a
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
b
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
,
b
u
t
p
r
i
o
r
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
i
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
c
.
L
i
m
i
t
s
a
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
o
n
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
b
y
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
’
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
s
d
.
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
c
a
n
n
o
t
o
w
n
a
n
y
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
o
w
n
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
b
a
n
k
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
a
¼
1
;
b
¼
2
;
c
¼
3
;
a
n
d
d
¼
4
2
.
7
C
a
n
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
(
e
.
g
.
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
?
n
a
n
c
e
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
e
t
c
.
)
o
w
n
v
o
t
i
n
g
s
h
a
r
e
s
i
n
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
a
.
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
b
.
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
m
a
y
o
w
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
,
b
u
t
p
r
i
o
r
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
i
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
c
.
L
i
m
i
t
s
a
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
o
n
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
b
y
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
’
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
s
d
.
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
c
a
n
n
o
t
o
w
n
a
n
y
e
q
u
i
t
y
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
i
n
a
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
c
o
n
g
l
o
m
e
r
a
t
e
s
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
I
.
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
I
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
I
.
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
I
I
.
I
I
I
)
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
131
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
3
.
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
e
n
t
r
y
/
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
m
a
y
o
w
n
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
m
a
y
e
n
t
e
r
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
(
L
o
w
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
.
8
A
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
e
n
t
e
r
i
n
g
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
?
a
.
A
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
b
.
S
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
c
.
B
r
a
n
c
h
d
.
J
o
i
n
t
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
E
n
t
r
y
i
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
l
e
g
a
l
s
u
b
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
o
b
t
a
i
n
a
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
1
.
6
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
a
r
e
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
b
e
s
u
b
m
i
t
t
e
d
b
e
f
o
r
e
i
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
?
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
a
.
D
r
a
f
t
b
y
l
a
w
s
1
.
6
(
a
)
þ
1
.
6
(
b
)
þ
1
.
6
(
e
)
þ
1
.
6
(
f
)
þ
1
.
6
(
g
)
þ
1
.
6
(
h
)
þ
1
.
6
(
i
)
þ
1
.
6
(
d
)
b
.
I
n
t
e
n
d
e
d
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
h
a
r
t
d
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
/
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
e
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
?
r
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
f
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
m
a
i
n
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
g
.
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
/
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
t
u
r
e
B
o
a
r
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
h
.
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
/
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
t
u
r
e
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
i
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
s
t
o
b
e
u
s
e
d
a
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
n
t
r
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
d
e
n
i
e
d
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
r
e
d
e
n
i
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
[
1
.
7
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
0
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
b
)
]
/
[
1
.
7
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
0
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
a
)
]
1
.
7
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
f
r
o
m
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
(
i
.
e
.
t
h
o
s
e
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
o
w
n
e
d
)
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
0
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
1
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
a
n
e
w
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
2
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
y
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
a
b
r
a
n
c
h
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
r
e
d
e
n
i
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
.
7
(
b
)
/
1
.
7
(
a
)
1
.
7
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
f
r
o
m
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
(
i
.
e
.
t
h
o
s
e
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
o
w
n
e
d
)
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
132
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
a
r
e
d
e
n
i
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
[
1
.
1
0
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
b
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
b
)
]
/
[
1
.
1
0
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
1
(
a
)
þ
1
.
1
2
(
a
)
]
1
.
1
0
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
,
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
1
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
a
n
e
w
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
1
.
1
2
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
?
v
e
y
e
a
r
s
(
2
0
0
6
-
2
0
1
0
)
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
e
n
t
e
r
b
y
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
a
b
r
a
n
c
h
w
e
r
e
a
.
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
.
D
e
n
i
e
d
4
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
?
e
c
t
s
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
r
i
s
k
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
d
e
d
u
c
t
s
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
e
l
o
s
s
e
s
f
r
o
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
b
e
f
o
r
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
d
e
q
u
a
c
y
i
s
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
3
.
1
(
a
)
þ
3
.
2
(
a
)
þ
3
.
2
(
b
)
þ
3
.
1
8
.
3
(
d
)
*
3
þ
1
(
i
f
3
.
1
8
.
2
,
0
.
7
5
)
3
.
1
W
h
i
c
h
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
d
e
q
u
a
c
y
r
e
g
i
m
e
s
d
i
d
y
o
u
u
s
e
a
s
o
f
e
n
d
o
f
2
0
1
0
a
n
d
f
o
r
w
h
i
c
h
b
a
n
k
s
d
o
e
s
e
a
c
h
r
e
g
i
m
e
a
p
p
l
y
t
o
(
i
f
u
s
i
n
g
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
o
n
e
r
e
g
i
m
e
)
?
a
.
B
a
s
e
l
I
3
.
2
W
h
i
c
h
r
i
s
k
s
a
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
a
.
C
r
e
d
i
t
r
i
s
k
3
.
1
8
.
2
W
h
a
t
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
g
a
i
n
s
i
s
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
3
.
1
8
.
3
A
r
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
d
e
d
u
c
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
d
.
U
n
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
l
o
s
s
e
s
i
n
f
a
i
r
v
a
l
u
e
d
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
s
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
f
u
n
d
s
m
a
y
b
e
u
s
e
d
t
o
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
l
y
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
z
e
a
b
a
n
k
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
l
y
v
e
r
i
?
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
1
.
4
.
2
A
r
e
t
h
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
o
f
f
u
n
d
s
t
o
b
e
u
s
e
d
a
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
v
e
r
i
?
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
/
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
.
4
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
.
4
.
3
a
n
d
1
.
5
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
.
4
.
2
þ
1
.
4
.
3
þ
1
.
5
1
.
4
.
3
C
a
n
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
d
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
o
r
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
i
n
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
b
e
d
o
n
e
w
i
t
h
a
s
s
e
t
s
o
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
c
a
s
h
o
r
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
?
1
.
5
C
a
n
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
b
y
p
r
o
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
b
e
i
n
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
d
f
u
n
d
s
?
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
i
n
d
e
x
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
V
.
I
)
þ
(
I
V
.
I
I
I
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
I
V
.
I
)
þ
(
I
V
.
I
I
I
)
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
133
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
5
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
t
o
t
a
k
e
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
5
.
1
0
a
¼
0
;
b
o
r
c
¼
1
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
5
.
9
,
5
.
1
2
,
(
b
)
,
1
2
.
3
.
2
,
1
0
.
5
(
b
)
,
1
1
.
1
(
f
)
,
1
1
.
1
(
j
)
a
n
d
1
1
.
1
(
k
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
1
.
5
(
a
)
,
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
a
n
d
1
1
.
5
(
c
)
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
¼
1
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
¼
0
;
a
n
d
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
¼
0
5
.
1
0
þ
5
.
9
þ
5
.
1
2
(
b
)
þ
1
2
.
3
.
2
þ
1
0
.
5
(
b
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
f
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
j
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
k
)
*
2
þ
1
1
.
5
(
a
)
þ
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
*
2
þ
1
1
.
5
(
c
)
*
2
5
.
9
A
r
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
e
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
a
n
y
p
r
e
s
u
m
e
d
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
i
n
i
l
l
i
c
i
t
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
,
f
r
a
u
d
,
o
r
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
u
s
e
?
5
.
1
0
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
r
i
g
h
t
t
o
m
e
e
t
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
t
h
e
i
r
r
e
p
o
r
t
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
?
a
.
N
o
b
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
b
a
s
i
s
c
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
n
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
a
l
b
a
s
i
s
5
.
1
2
I
n
c
a
s
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
i
d
e
n
t
i
?
e
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
h
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
a
n
i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
a
u
d
i
t
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
t
a
k
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
[
.
.
.
]
b
.
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
1
0
.
5
D
o
b
a
n
k
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
O
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
h
e
e
t
i
t
e
m
s
1
1
.
1
P
l
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
f
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
t
o
c
o
v
e
r
a
c
t
u
a
l
o
r
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
o
s
s
e
s
j
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
o
r
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
t
o
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
k
.
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
o
r
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
b
o
n
u
s
e
s
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
r
e
m
u
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
1
1
.
5
W
h
i
c
h
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
o
f
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
a
.
D
e
c
l
a
r
e
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
c
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
b
a
n
k
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
1
2
.
3
.
2
C
a
n
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
o
r
c
e
a
b
a
n
k
t
o
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
t
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
?
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
134
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
P
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
p
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r
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t
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a
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t
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s
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s
u
c
h
a
s
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
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t
e
m
o
r
e
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o
m
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e
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p
o
n
d
i
n
g
t
o
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
1
.
3
*
[
1
1
.
1
(
a
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
f
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
j
)
þ
1
1
.
1
(
k
)
*
2
þ
1
2
.
3
.
2
]
1
1
.
1
P
l
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
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e
t
h
e
r
t
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o
r
c
e
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e
n
t
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
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o
t
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e
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p
e
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a
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e
a
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d
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e
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i
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t
y
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o
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t
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e
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e
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r
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e
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e
q
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e
q
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i
r
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s
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D
o
e
s
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p
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k
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e
.
g
.
p
r
o
m
p
t
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o
r
r
e
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t
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v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
a
t
f
o
r
c
e
s
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
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c
a
c
t
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n
w
h
e
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
t
r
i
g
g
e
r
s
/
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
s
a
r
e
b
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
?
1
2
.
3
.
2
C
a
n
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
o
r
c
e
a
b
a
n
k
t
o
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
t
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
?
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
e
a
t
r
o
u
b
l
e
d
b
a
n
k
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
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t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
)
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
¼
1
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
¼
0
;
a
n
d
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
¼
0
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
þ
1
1
.
5
(
c
)
*
2
1
1
.
5
W
h
i
c
h
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
o
f
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
:
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
,
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
,
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
c
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
b
a
n
k
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
D
e
c
l
a
r
i
n
g
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
d
e
c
l
a
r
e
a
d
e
e
p
l
y
t
r
o
u
b
l
e
d
b
a
n
k
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
t
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
5
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
¼
1
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
¼
0
.
5
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
¼
0
;
a
n
d
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
6
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
1
.
5
(
a
)
þ
1
1
.
5
(
b
)
1
1
.
5
W
h
i
c
h
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
o
f
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
:
B
S
¼
B
a
n
k
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
,
C
¼
C
o
u
r
t
,
D
I
A
¼
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
B
R
/
A
M
C
¼
B
a
n
k
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
o
r
A
s
s
e
t
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
,
O
T
H
¼
O
t
h
e
r
-
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
.
”
a
.
D
e
c
l
a
r
e
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
O
t
h
e
r
–
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
135
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
m
a
y
e
n
g
a
g
e
i
n
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
w
h
e
n
c
o
n
f
r
o
n
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
l
a
w
s
a
n
d
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
i
m
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
l
e
s
s
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
)
1
1
.
1
P
l
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
1
(
b
)
b
.
F
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
(
i
.
e
.
t
o
w
a
i
v
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
a
n
d
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
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o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
1
.
3
,
1
2
.
1
2
a
n
d
1
2
.
1
2
.
1
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
1
.
1
(
b
)
þ
1
1
.
3
þ
1
2
.
1
2
þ
1
2
.
1
2
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1
1
1
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3
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e
s
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r
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a
n
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a
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(
e
.
g
.
p
r
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m
p
t
c
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r
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t
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o
n
)
t
h
a
t
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e
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m
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a
c
t
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n
c
e
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t
a
i
n
r
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g
u
l
a
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r
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r
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r
s
/
t
h
r
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s
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l
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s
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e
d
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1
2
.
1
2
I
f
a
n
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n
f
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t
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n
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f
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n
y
p
r
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e
n
t
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r
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u
l
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t
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n
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n
d
i
n
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e
c
o
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r
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e
o
f
s
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p
e
r
v
i
s
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o
n
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m
u
s
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i
t
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e
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e
d
?
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2
.
1
2
.
1
A
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
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a
n
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a
t
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r
y
a
c
t
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o
n
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a
t
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p
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r
m
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t
a
k
e
i
n
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e
s
e
c
a
s
e
s
?
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o
u
r
t
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n
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l
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m
e
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t
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h
e
d
e
g
r
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t
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p
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t
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t
y
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i
g
h
e
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v
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l
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e
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n
d
i
c
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t
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l
e
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p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
)
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e
s
¼
1
;
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o
¼
0
(
1
i
f
1
1
.
6
(
a
)
¼
1
1
.
6
(
b
)
¼
1
1
.
6
(
c
)
¼
1
1
.
6
(
d
)
¼
1
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
1
1
.
6
(
e
)
þ
1
1
.
7
1
1
.
6
I
s
c
o
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r
t
a
p
p
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v
a
l
r
e
q
u
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r
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d
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
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o
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
?
a
.
D
e
c
l
a
r
e
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
d
.
U
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
e
b
a
n
k
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
b
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
e
d
e
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
r
i
g
h
t
s
c
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
a
n
d
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
b
a
n
k
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
e
.
A
p
p
o
i
n
t
a
n
d
o
v
e
r
s
e
e
a
b
a
n
k
l
i
q
u
i
d
a
t
o
r
/
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
r
1
1
.
7
C
a
n
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
a
p
p
e
a
l
t
o
t
h
e
c
o
u
r
t
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
a
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
?
L
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
T
h
e
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
l
o
a
n
s
i
n
a
r
r
e
a
r
s
a
s
s
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
a
n
d
l
o
s
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
I
f
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
l
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
,
t
h
e
a
c
t
u
a
l
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
d
a
y
s
b
e
y
o
n
d
w
h
i
c
h
a
l
o
a
n
i
n
a
r
r
e
a
r
s
m
u
s
t
b
e
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
t
h
e
n
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
,
a
n
d
?
n
a
l
l
y
l
o
s
s
a
r
e
s
u
m
m
e
d
9
.
1
.
3
(
a
)
þ
9
.
1
3
(
b
)
þ
9
.
1
3
(
c
)
(
d
a
y
s
)
9
.
1
.
3
A
f
t
e
r
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
d
a
y
s
i
s
a
l
o
a
n
i
n
a
r
r
e
a
r
s
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
.
.
.
?
a
.
S
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
?
b
.
D
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
?
c
.
L
o
s
s
?
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
T
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
a
s
l
o
a
n
s
b
e
c
o
m
e
s
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
a
n
d
l
o
s
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
)
T
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
t
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
w
h
e
n
a
l
o
a
n
i
s
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
i
v
e
l
y
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
d
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
,
a
n
d
l
o
s
s
.
I
f
a
r
a
n
g
e
i
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
,
t
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
i
s
u
s
e
d
9
.
6
.
3
(
a
)
þ
9
.
6
.
3
(
b
)
þ
9
.
6
.
3
(
c
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
9
.
6
.
3
W
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
a
s
l
o
a
n
s
b
e
c
o
m
e
[
.
.
.
]
?
a
.
S
u
b
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
?
b
.
D
o
u
b
t
f
u
l
?
c
.
L
o
s
s
?
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
136
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
a
r
e
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
,
v
e
r
i
?
a
b
l
e
,
q
u
a
n
t
i
?
a
b
l
e
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
f
o
r
a
s
s
e
t
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
b
a
n
k
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
t
o
m
a
k
e
l
o
a
n
s
a
b
r
o
a
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
7
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
7
.
2
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
7
.
2
þ
7
.
2
.
2
7
.
2
A
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
r
u
l
e
s
o
r
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
a
s
s
e
t
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
?
7
.
2
.
2
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
m
a
k
i
n
g
l
o
a
n
s
a
b
r
o
a
d
?
6
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
t
e
n
u
r
e
T
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
e
n
u
r
e
o
f
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
Y
e
a
r
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
1
2
.
3
9
W
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
e
n
u
r
e
o
f
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
(
i
.
e
.
w
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
y
e
a
r
s
t
h
a
t
s
t
a
f
f
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
)
?
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
f
r
o
m
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
n
?
u
e
n
c
e
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
2
.
4
T
o
w
h
o
m
i
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
a
b
l
e
?
c
.
A
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
v
e
b
o
d
y
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
o
r
C
o
n
g
r
e
s
s
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
b
a
n
k
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
2
.
9
C
a
n
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
s
t
a
f
f
b
e
h
e
l
d
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
l
y
l
i
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
t
o
a
b
a
n
k
c
a
u
s
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
i
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
r
o
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
c
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
g
o
o
d
f
a
i
t
h
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
i
r
d
u
t
i
e
s
?
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
a
b
l
e
t
o
m
a
k
e
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
l
y
o
f
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
A
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
o
f
f
o
u
r
y
e
a
r
s
o
r
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
¼
1
;
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
f
o
u
r
y
e
a
r
s
o
r
n
o
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
¼
0
1
2
.
6
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
h
e
a
d
o
f
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
h
a
v
e
a
?
x
e
d
t
e
r
m
?
1
2
.
6
.
1
I
f
y
e
s
,
h
o
w
l
o
n
g
(
i
n
y
e
a
r
s
)
i
s
t
h
e
t
e
r
m
?
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
-
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
S
u
m
o
f
(
V
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
V
)
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
S
u
m
o
f
(
V
I
.
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
V
I
.
I
V
)
M
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
T
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
,
o
r
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
f
o
r
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
n
a
t
i
o
n
’
s
b
a
n
k
s
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
2
.
1
W
h
a
t
b
o
d
y
/
a
g
e
n
c
y
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
e
s
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
f
o
r
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
c
.
M
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
b
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
/
s
u
p
e
r
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
2
.
1
W
h
a
t
b
o
d
y
/
a
g
e
n
c
y
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
e
s
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
f
o
r
p
r
u
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
b
.
A
s
i
n
g
l
e
b
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
s
u
p
e
r
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
n
c
y
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
B
a
n
k
S
i
n
g
l
e
v
s
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
T
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
o
r
n
o
t
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
s
i
n
g
l
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
137
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
7
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
C
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
c
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
d
o
r
c
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
5
.
1
*
5
.
1
.
1
(
a
)
5
.
1
I
s
a
n
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
5
.
1
.
1
I
f
y
e
s
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
o
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
O
b
t
a
i
n
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
c
e
r
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
p
a
s
s
a
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
e
x
a
m
t
o
q
u
a
l
i
f
y
a
s
s
u
c
h
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
T
h
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
0
.
8
/
1
0
*
1
0
0
i
f
1
3
.
1
.
9
,
1
0
.
8
/
1
3
.
1
i
f
1
0
.
8
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
(
e
.
g
.
,
M
o
o
d
y
’
s
,
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
a
n
d
P
o
o
r
)
?
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
3
.
1
,
1
0
1
3
.
1
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
2
0
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
T
h
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
0
.
9
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
?
1
3
.
1
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
N
o
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
w
e
r
e
f
u
l
l
y
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
i
m
e
a
b
a
n
k
f
a
i
l
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
1
i
f
8
.
1
¼
0
o
r
8
.
1
7
.
2
¼
0
0
i
f
8
.
1
¼
1
a
n
d
8
.
1
7
.
2
¼
1
8
.
1
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
8
.
1
7
.
2
W
e
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
w
h
o
l
l
y
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
(
t
o
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
f
l
e
g
a
l
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
i
m
e
a
b
a
n
k
f
a
i
l
e
d
?
B
a
n
k
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
o
r
u
n
p
a
i
d
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
r
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
o
n
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
s
a
r
e
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
b
a
n
k
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
)
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
0
.
2
.
4
,
1
0
.
1
a
n
d
1
0
.
5
.
2
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
0
.
2
.
5
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
0
.
2
.
4
þ
1
0
.
2
.
5
þ
1
0
.
1
þ
1
0
.
5
.
2
1
0
.
1
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
f
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
1
0
.
2
.
4
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
s
t
i
l
l
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
1
0
.
2
.
5
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
1
0
.
5
.
2
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
l
i
a
b
l
e
i
f
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
d
i
s
e
r
r
o
n
e
o
u
s
o
r
m
i
s
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
?
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
e
x
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
/
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
o
f
?
r
m
s
,
w
i
t
h
h
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
m
o
r
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
o
v
e
r
s
i
g
h
t
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
V
I
I
.
I
þ
(
1
i
f
V
I
I
.
I
I
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
(
1
i
f
V
I
I
.
I
I
I
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
V
I
I
.
I
V
þ
V
I
I
.
V
þ
[
1
i
f
3
.
1
8
(
c
)
¼
3
.
1
8
.
1
(
d
)
¼
1
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
]
þ
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
b
)
þ
1
0
.
5
(
c
)
þ
1
1
.
1
.
1
3
.
1
8
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
1
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
c
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
3
.
1
8
.
1
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
d
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
138
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
0
.
5
.
1
D
o
b
a
n
k
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
O
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
h
e
e
t
i
t
e
m
s
1
1
.
1
.
1
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
s
/
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
m
a
k
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
f
o
r
m
a
l
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
e
a
s
e
a
n
d
d
e
s
i
s
t
o
r
d
e
r
s
a
n
d
w
r
i
t
t
e
n
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
a
b
a
n
k
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
/
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
b
o
d
y
a
n
d
a
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
?
8
.
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
h
a
s
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
t
o
m
a
k
e
t
h
e
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
t
o
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
i
n
a
b
a
n
k
,
t
a
k
e
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
,
a
n
d
h
a
s
e
v
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
a
n
y
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
f
?
c
e
r
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
p
o
w
e
r
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
8
.
4
(
c
)
þ
8
.
4
.
1
þ
8
.
4
.
2
þ
8
.
4
.
3
8
.
4
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
i
t
s
m
a
n
d
a
t
e
?
c
.
B
a
n
k
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
8
.
4
.
1
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
b
y
i
t
s
e
l
f
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
c
a
n
c
e
l
o
r
r
e
v
o
k
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
o
r
a
n
y
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
?
8
.
4
.
2
C
a
n
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
t
a
k
e
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
l
a
w
s
,
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
b
y
l
a
w
s
(
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
?
8
.
4
.
3
H
a
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
e
v
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
l
a
w
s
,
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
b
y
l
a
w
s
(
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
?
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
s
-
t
o
-
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
T
h
e
s
i
z
e
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
R
a
t
i
o
8
.
1
3
.
1
I
f
p
r
e
f
u
n
d
e
d
,
w
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
f
u
n
d
s
t
o
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
s
o
f
e
n
d
o
f
2
0
1
0
?
F
u
n
d
i
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
e
x
i
s
t
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
m
o
r
e
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
)
8
.
1
1
W
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
o
f
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
w
a
s
a
c
t
u
a
l
l
y
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
a
s
o
f
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
8
.
1
1
*
1
3
.
4
/
1
3
.
2
2
0
1
0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
2
W
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
o
f
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
(
I
n
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
o
f
l
o
c
a
l
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
)
2
0
1
0
1
3
.
4
W
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
o
f
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
(
I
n
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
o
f
l
o
c
a
l
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
)
2
0
1
0
V
a
r
i
o
u
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
n
g
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
e
x
i
s
t
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
m
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
)
8
.
1
0
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
m
a
l
c
o
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
,
i
.
e
.
a
r
e
A
L
L
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
l
y
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
f
o
r
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
i
r
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
8
.
1
3
(
b
)
,
8
.
1
4
a
n
d
8
.
1
0
8
.
1
3
F
u
n
d
i
n
g
i
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
[
.
.
.
]
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
a
.
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
8
.
1
3
(
a
)
a
n
d
8
.
1
3
(
c
)
b
.
B
a
n
k
s
Y
e
s
¼
N
o
¼
0
c
.
C
o
m
b
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
/
o
t
h
e
r
(
p
l
e
a
s
e
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
)
8
.
1
3
þ
8
.
1
4
þ
8
.
1
0
8
.
1
4
D
o
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
e
e
s
/
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
d
t
o
b
a
n
k
s
v
a
r
y
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
s
o
m
e
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
o
f
r
i
s
k
?
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
139
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
9
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
B
a
n
k
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
(
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
)
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
5
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
6
.
1
O
f
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
w
a
s
h
e
l
d
b
y
t
h
e
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
B
a
n
k
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
(
a
s
s
e
t
)
T
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
s
s
e
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
5
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
6
O
f
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
w
a
s
h
e
l
d
b
y
t
h
e
?
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
7
.
2
W
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
w
a
s
i
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
(
e
.
g
.
,
w
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
r
s
o
w
n
e
d
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
)
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
r
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
1
3
.
7
.
1
W
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
a
s
s
e
t
s
w
a
s
i
n
b
a
n
k
s
t
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
(
e
.
g
.
,
w
h
e
r
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
o
w
n
e
d
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
)
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
[
.
.
.
]
?
2
0
1
0
1
0
.
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
o
f
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
T
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
o
f
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
s
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
o
f
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
)
5
.
1
I
s
a
n
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
5
.
1
,
5
.
1
.
2
,
5
.
1
.
1
(
a
)
,
5
.
7
(
a
)
,
5
.
9
a
n
d
5
.
1
2
(
b
)
5
.
1
.
1
I
f
y
e
s
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
o
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
O
b
t
a
i
n
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
c
e
r
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
p
a
s
s
a
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
e
x
a
m
t
o
q
u
a
l
i
f
y
a
s
s
u
c
h
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
5
.
1
0
a
¼
0
;
b
o
r
c
¼
1
5
.
1
þ
5
.
1
.
2
þ
5
.
1
.
1
(
a
)
þ
5
.
7
(
a
)
þ
5
.
1
0
þ
5
.
9
þ
5
.
1
2
(
b
)
5
.
1
.
2
A
r
e
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
r
n
a
t
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
s
p
e
l
l
e
d
o
u
t
?
5
.
7
D
o
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
a
c
o
p
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
T
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
’
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
o
n
t
h
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
5
.
9
A
r
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
e
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
a
n
y
p
r
e
s
u
m
e
d
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
s
e
n
i
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
i
n
i
l
l
i
c
i
t
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
,
f
r
a
u
d
,
o
r
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
u
s
e
?
5
.
1
0
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
r
i
g
h
t
t
o
m
e
e
t
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
t
h
e
i
r
r
e
p
o
r
t
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
?
a
.
N
o
b
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
b
a
s
i
s
c
.
Y
e
s
,
i
t
h
a
p
p
e
n
s
o
n
a
n
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
a
l
b
a
s
i
s
5
.
1
2
I
n
c
a
s
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
i
d
e
n
t
i
?
e
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
h
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
a
n
i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
a
u
d
i
t
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
t
a
k
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
[
.
.
.
]
b
.
T
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table V.
JFEP
5,2
140
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
D
e
?
n
i
t
i
o
n
Q
u
a
n
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
T
h
e
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
o
f
b
a
n
k
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
)
1
0
.
1
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
f
o
r
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
?
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
1
0
.
2
.
4
,
1
0
.
1
,
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
b
)
,
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
c
)
a
n
d
1
0
.
5
.
2
1
0
.
2
.
4
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
s
t
i
l
l
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
F
o
r
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
1
0
.
2
.
5
Y
e
s
¼
0
;
N
o
¼
1
1
0
.
2
.
4
þ
1
0
.
1
þ
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
b
)
þ
1
0
.
5
.
1
(
c
)
þ
1
0
.
5
.
2
þ
1
0
.
2
.
5
1
0
.
2
.
5
D
o
e
s
a
c
c
r
u
e
d
,
t
h
o
u
g
h
u
n
p
a
i
d
,
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
/
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
n
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
?
1
0
.
5
.
1
D
o
b
a
n
k
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
O
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
h
e
e
t
i
t
e
m
s
c
.
G
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
r
i
s
k
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
1
0
.
5
.
2
A
r
e
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
l
i
a
b
l
e
i
f
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
d
i
s
e
r
r
o
n
e
o
u
s
o
r
m
i
s
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
?
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
T
h
e
t
y
p
e
o
f
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
u
s
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
)
B
o
t
h
(
a
)
a
n
d
(
b
)
a
r
e
y
e
s
¼
1
;
O
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
¼
0
1
0
.
2
.
2
o
r
1
0
.
2
.
1
1
0
.
2
.
1
A
r
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
i
n
a
c
c
o
r
d
a
n
c
e
w
i
t
h
U
S
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
A
c
c
e
p
t
e
d
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
P
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
s
(
G
A
A
P
)
?
a
.
A
t
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
b
a
n
k
l
e
v
e
l
b
.
A
t
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
l
e
v
e
l
1
0
.
2
.
2
A
r
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
i
n
a
c
c
o
r
d
a
n
c
e
w
i
t
h
I
F
R
S
?
a
.
A
t
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
b
a
n
k
l
e
v
e
l
b
.
A
t
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
l
e
v
e
l
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
a
n
d
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
T
h
e
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
b
y
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
f
o
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
n
k
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
b
a
n
k
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
(
H
i
g
h
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
b
e
t
t
e
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
)
Y
e
s
¼
1
;
N
o
¼
0
(
1
i
f
3
.
1
8
(
c
)
¼
3
.
1
8
.
1
(
d
)
¼
1
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
*
2
þ
1
0
.
7
þ
(
1
i
f
1
0
.
8
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
þ
(
1
i
f
1
0
.
9
¼
1
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
;
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
)
3
.
1
8
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
1
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
c
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
3
.
1
8
.
1
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
a
n
d
i
n
w
h
a
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
?
E
n
t
e
r
Y
e
s
o
r
N
o
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
o
p
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
w
d
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
1
0
.
7
A
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
b
y
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
t
o
h
a
v
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
?
1
0
.
8
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
(
e
.
g
.
,
M
o
o
d
y
’
s
,
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
a
n
d
P
o
o
r
)
?
1
0
.
9
H
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
o
p
t
e
n
b
a
n
k
s
(
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
c
r
e
d
i
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
?
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
i
n
d
e
x
S
u
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(
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)
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(
X
.
I
I
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þ
(
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þ
(
X
.
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(
X
.
I
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
I
I
)
þ
(
X
.
I
V
)
Table V.
Bank regulation
and supervision
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Moldova, Slovakia, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay prohibit insurance and real
estate activities but allow unrestricted securities activities, while three countries grant
banks unrestricted securities, insurance, and real estate powers – Hong Kong, Jersey and
Switzerland. All of these countries, moreover, have a single bank supervisory authority.
We also constructed two indexes of the degree to which national regulations:
(1) restrict banks from owning non-?nancial ?rms; and
(2) restrict non-?nancial ?rms from owning banks.
These particular regulations are quite important and, needless to say, controversial.
Figure 7 shows that the degree of overall ?nancial conglomerates restrictiveness
displays substantial variation across countries. Based on Survey IV, bank ownership of
non-?nancial ?rms is more restricted than non-?nancial ?rm ownership of banks. About
30 percent of the countries prohibit bank ownership of non-?nancial ?rms, whereas only
one of 124 countries prohibits ownership of banks by non-?nancial ?rms. 15 percent
of the countries, including the USA, restrict the mixing of banking and commerce.
Comparing Surveys IV to I, Figure 7 shows that there was a substantial increase in
the number of countries prohibiting bank ownership of non-?nancial ?rms, an increase
to 38 from eight. The opposite is the case for prohibiting banks from engaging in
insurance activities, with a decrease to 19 countries from 40. There was not much of a
change with respect to regulatory restrictions for the other variables in the ?gure over
the 13 year period fromSurveys I to IV. Overall, it seems that most countries allowsome
co-mingling of bank and non-?nancial ?rms.
We also construct anindexof the overall restrictions onbankactivities that measures the
extent to which a bank can both engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities
and own non-?nancial ?rms. We include restrictions on banks owning non-?nancial
?rms in this overall index of because regulations on the extent to which banks may own
non-?nancial ?rms affects the ability of a bank to diversifyrevenue streams and is therefore
Figure 7.
Regulatory restrictions on
bank activities and the
mixing of banking and
commerce:
62
58
7
10
19
18
15
14
16
40
39
43
68
49
29
20
24
45
67
38
14
19
30
27
34
40
47
59
40
44
9
6
19
40
42
48
38
8
1
4
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Unrestricted Permitted Restricted Prohibited
Non financial firm
ownership of
banks
Bank ownership of
nonfinancial firms
Real estate
Insurance
Securities
I
IV
I
IV
I
IV
I
IV
I
IV
Note: percentage distribution of 126 countries in Survey I and 124 countries in Survey IV
by degree of restrictiveness
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similar in some ways to the regulatory restrictions on other activities. Based on four of the
indexes de?ned above, this index of overall restrictions on bank activities can potentially
range from 4 to 16, with higher numbers indicating greater restrictive ness.
Figure 8 shows information on the change in the index of overall restrictions on bank
activities from Surveys I to IV. Positive numbers indicate an increase in restrictions.
As with many features of bank regulation and supervision, there is great cross-country
heterogeneity. Of the countries in the ?gure, 43 of them increased restrictions and
36 countries decreased restrictions. In the case of another 18 countries there was no
change. The country that increased restrictions the most was Seychelles, while the
Figure 8.
Change in the index
of overall restrictions
on bank activities:
Surveys I to IV
–8 –6 –4 –2 0 2 4 6
Iceland, Jamaica, Kuwait,
Virgin Islands British
Bahrain, Burundi, Egypt, Gibraltar,
Liechtenstein, Malawi, Morocco
Australia, Austria, China, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Italy,
Kenya, Kosovo, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, The Nertherland,
Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Spain, United Kingdom
Armenia, Chile, Guernsey, Israel, Malta, Nigeria,
Qatar, SouthAfrica, SriLanka, Tajikistan, Trinidad
and Tobago, United States
Banglades, Canada, Croatia, Denmark,
Estonia, Maldives, Singapore, Taiwan
Urugu
Argentina, Botswana, Cayman Islands,
Cyprus, France, India, Jordan, Macao China,
Panama, Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Korea Rep.,
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland,
Slovakia, Venezuela
Seychelles
Guyana, Moldova, Nepal, Tonga
Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Indonesia, Mexico, Namibia
Belarus, Brazil, Puerto Rico
El Salvador
Romania
Ecuador, Gamibia, Ghana, Ireland, Mauritius,
Oman, Portugal, Russia, Samoa (Western),
Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, Vanuatu
Less restricted More restricted
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country that decreased restrictions the most was Romania. For those countries with data
used to construct index of overall restrictions on bank activities for both Surveys I and
IV, the average index value goes from 7.4 down to 7.2, which means that on average
countries decreased overall restrictions from 1999 to 2011.
We also examine whether countries tightened or eased the overall restrictions on
bank activities following the global ?nancial crisis. This is done by comparing the
index values for Surveys III and IV. Table VI shows that 80 percent of the countries
tightened such restrictions following the crisis.
III.B. Capital regulations
Capital regulations represent a mainstay of banking sector policies around the world.
Many rules and policies determine the precise amount and nature of capital that banks
must hold. In terms of the amount of capital, this is typically characterized in terms
of the ratio of capital to total banks assets. In terms of the nature of capital, there are
policies concerning the de?nition of capital beyond cash or government securities, the
de?nition and valuation of bank assets, and whether the regulatory and supervisory
authorities verify the sources of capital.
We construct indexes of the stringency of bank capital regulations that measure the
amount of capital banks must hold and the stringency of regulations on the nature and
source of regulatory capital. It is composed of the answers from speci?c survey questions:
(1) Is the capital-asset ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle I guidelines?
(2) Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of an individual bank’s
credit risk?
(3) Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of market risk?
(4) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are
deducted from the book value of capital? Market value of loan losses not
realized in accounting books? Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?
Or unrealized foreign exchange losses?
Tighten Ease
Argentina Egypt Lebanon Philippines Bahrain
Armenia Estonia Liechtenstein Poland Brazil
Bangladesh France Luxembourg Russia El Salvador
Belgium Gambia Macao, China Seychelles Hungary
Bhutan Ghana Malawi Singapore Iceland
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Greece Maldives Slovakia Indonesia
Botswana Guatemala Malta South Africa Jamaica
Burundi Guyana Mauritius Spain Kenya
Canada India Mexico Taiwan Kuwait
Cayman Islands Ireland Moldova Thailand Peru
Chile Israel Morocco Trinidad and Tobago Portugal
China Italy The Netherlands UK Romania
Croatia Jordan New Zealand USA Sri Lanka
Cyprus Korea, Rep. Nicaragua Uruguay Switzerland
Denmark Kosovo Oman Venezuela Tajikistan
Ecuador Latvia Panama Virgin Islands, British
Table VI.
Did countries tighten or
ease overall restrictions
on bank activities
following the global
?nancial crisis?
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(5) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
(6) Are the sources of funds to be usedas capital veri?ed bythe regulatory/supervisory
authorities?
(7) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with
assets other than cash or government securities?
(8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? Larger
values of this index of bank capital regulation indicate more stringent capital
regulation.
The maximum possible value is 10, while the minimum possible value is 0. Figure 9
shows the change in the index of bank capital regulations from Surveys I to IV, where
positive numbers indicate an increase in restrictions on bank capital. Of the 107 countries,
65 increased the stringency of capital regulation, 28 decreased them, and 14 made no
changes.
Since Survey IV covers the period after the emergence of the global ?nancial crisis
and the introduction of Basel III, we compare capital regulation before and after the
crisis by examining the change in the capital regulatory restrictions index from
Surveys III to IV. Table VII shows that 79 percent of the countries increased the
stringency of their capital regulations following the crisis, including the USA. Note,
however, that at least up to the time of the latest survey, Austria, Mexico and the UK
had reduced the stringency of their capital regulations in the aftermath of the crisis.
III.C. Of?cial supervisory power
An important aspect of supervision is whether the supervisory authorities possess the
power to obtain information from banks and take an assortment of actions to change
the behavior of banks based on the assessments of the of?cial supervisory authority.
In some cases, the authorities might even be required to take corrective action to
address a problem, and in other cases the authorities may have the discretionary power
to act as they see ?t. Courts, moreover, may intervene in some instances and
thereby limit, delay or even reverse actions taken by the supervisory authorities, but in
other cases, the courts have less power over the regulatory and supervisory agencies.
We construct an index of of?cial supervisory power to measure the degree to which
the country’s bank supervisory agency has the authority to take speci?c actions. It is
composed of the answers from speci?c survey questions:
(1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors
about banks?
(2) Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency about
elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
(3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?
(4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational
structure?
(5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors?
(6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses?
(7) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute:
Bank regulation
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.
dividends;
.
bonuses; and
.
management fees?
(8) Can the supervisory agency supersede the rights of bank shareholders and
declare a bank insolvent?
(9) Can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights?
Figure 9.
Change in the index of
bank capital regulations:
Surveys I-IV
Austria
Mexico
United Kingdom
Argentina
Hungary
Denmark
Gibraltar
Isle of Man
Puerto Rico
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ghana
Liechtenstein
New Zealand
Nigeria
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côted' Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
Armenia
Brazil
Ecuador
Estonia
Finland
Guernsey
Lesotho
Luxembourg
Malta
Mauritius
Nepal
Russia
Seychelles
Slovakia
Chile
Ireland
Jordan
Lebanon
Macao, China
Malaysia
Morocco
Poland
Qatar
Singapore
Burundi
Australia
Belarus
Canada
France
Gambia
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Italy
Jamaica
Kyrgyz Republic
Maldives
Namibia
The Netherlands
Oman
Panama
Samoa (Western)
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Tonga
United States
Vanuatu
Bhutan
Botswana
Fiji
Iceland
India
Israel
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Lithuania
Peru
Virgin Islands, British
Cayman Islands
Bulgaria
Croatia
Guyana
Moldova
Philippines
Romania
Taiwan
Bahrain
Egypt
El Salvador
Indonesia
Latvia
Malawi
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus
Bangladesh
Turkey
Venezuela
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4 6 8
Less stringent More stringent
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(10) Can the supervisory agency:
.
supersede shareholder rights;
.
remove and replace management; and
.
remove and replace directors?
The of?cial supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum value of 0,
where larger numbers indicate greater power.
Figure 10 shows the change in the index of of?cial supervisory powers from
Surveys I to IV, where positive numbers indicate an increase in such powers.
On balance, slightly more countries weakened the powers of their of?cial supervisory
agencies than strengthened those powers. A number of countries indicated no
change, including the USA. One might think that whether a country weakens
or strengthens of?cial supervisory powers would be important for helping
predict whether banks would operate safely and soundly. However, an increase in
supervisory power was not found to be helpful in promoting bank development,
performance, or stability in our earlier work (Barth et al., 2006). Indeed, we found that
in countries with weak democratic institutions, of?cial supervisory power was
associated with increased corruption in the lending process with no corresponding
bene?cial effects on stability.
To determine whether countries tightenedincreased or decreasedof?cial supervisory
powers following the global ?nancial crisis, we compare the index values for Surveys III
and IV. Somewhat surprisingly, Table VIII shows that 45 percent of the countries
decreased such powers.
The surveys also provide information on whether supervisory authorities must
report as well as take mandatory actions when they identify infractions of prudential
regulations. Table IX provides information in this regard. It is interesting that
127 countries indicate that infractions must be reported when found, while in only
11 countries is this not the case. The number of countries that require mandatory
Tighten Ease
Argentina Estonia Kuwait Poland Austria
Australia Fiji Kyrgyz Republic Romania Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bahrain Finland Liechtenstein Seychelles Burundi
Bangladesh Germany Lithuania Singapore Gibraltar
Belarus Greece Macao, China Slovakia Guernsey
Belgium Guyana Malawi Slovenia Hungary
Botswana Honduras Mali Tajikistan Iceland
Brazil India Malta Thailand Isle of Man
Bulgaria Indonesia Moldova Tonga Malaysia
Canada Ireland Morocco Trinidad and Tobago Mexico
Cayman Islands Israel Namibia USA Portugal
Croatia Italy The Netherlands Vanuatu Russia
Cyprus Jamaica Oman Venezuela South Africa
Denmark Jordan Panama Virgin Islands, British Spain
Egypt Kenya Peru Sri Lanka
El Salvador Korea, Rep. Philippines Switzerland
UK
Table VII.
Did countries tighten or
ease bank capital
regulations following the
global ?nancial crisis?
Bank regulation
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actions to be taken when infractions are found is 105, while 33 countries do not require
mandatory actions. Israel is a country that neither requires the reporting of infractions
nor mandatory actions when they are found. The UK and the USA both require the
reporting of infractions, but of these two countries, only the USA requires mandatory
actions. The table also provides information on whether supervisors are legally liable
for their actions. Only 23 countries report that this is the case, whereas in 118 countries
supervisors are not held liable.
Figure 10.
Change in the index of
of?cial supervisory
powers: Surveys I-IV
Kazakhstan
Botswana
Colombia
Lebanon
Paraguay
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Morocco
Ecuador
Gibraltar
Qatar
Tajikistan
Guinea-Bissau
Angola
Samoa (Western)
Armenia
Bahrain
Cyprus
Finland
Ireland
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côted 'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Hong Kong, China
Ukraine
Argentina
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Greece
Guernsey
Jersey
Korea, Rep.
Switzerland
Zimbabwe
Malaysia
Senegal
Togo
Norway
Isle of Man
Mozambique
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Egypt
Fiji
Honduras
Hungary
Jamaica
Lesotho
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Russia
Suriname
Portugal
Nigeria
Australia
Bangladesh
Belize
Cayman Islands
Cook Islands
Ghana
Guatemala
Kenya
Kosovo
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Maldives
Namibia
Oman
Philippines
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Tan zania
Tonga
Uganda
United States
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Puerto Rico
Israel
Bhutan
Croatia
Estonia
Germany
Indonesia
Macao, China
Malta
Turkey
Venezuela
China
Burundi
India
Lithuania
Nepal
Peru
South Africa
Gambia
Latvia
Virgin Islands, British
Mexico
Liechtenstein
Denmark
France
Kyrgyz Republic
Malawi
Moldova
The Netherlands
Romania
Taiwan
Chile
Guyana
Thailand
Singapore
Belarus
Canada
Jordan
Mauritius
Iceland
Italy
Trinidad and Tobago
Seychelles
–10 –8 –6 –4 –2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Less power Greater power
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III.D. Private monitoring and external governance
III.D.1 Private monitoring. Regulatory and supervisory policies can also shape the
incentives and ability of private investors to monitor and exert effective governance
over banks. For example, the degree to which supervisory agencies require banks to
obtain certi?ed audits and/or ratings from international-rating agencies and
disseminate accurate, comprehensive and consolidated information on the full range
of their activities and risk-management procedures may in?uence the quality of private
sector scrutiny of banks. To the extent that national regulatory and supervisory
authorities make bank directors legally liable if information is erroneous or misleading
might similarly in?uence the quality of information provided by banks to private
investors and hence the ability of those investors to monitor and govern banks. And,
the incentives of private investor to obtain and process information and then exert
governance over bank executives will surely be shaped by the degree to which
countries have either credibly demonstrated that they will not bailout investors of
failed banks or indicated their willingness to protect those investors. Thus, private
monitoring is not simply an absence of regulations and supervision. Of?cial supervisory
policies also shape private monitoring by forcing information disclosure and de?ning
the liability and hence incentives of private investors.
We construct an index of private monitoring to examine the degree to which
regulatory and supervisory policies encourage the private monitoring of banks that
builds on an array of individual questions contained in the survey. Speci?cally, the
private monitoring index is composed of information on:
Increase Decrease
Belarus Moldova Angola Ecuador Malaysia
Bhutan The Netherlands Argentina Egypt Maldives
Botswana New Zealand Armenia El Salvador Malta
Burkina Faso Nicaragua Australia Estonia Mauritius
Burundi Niger Austria Fiji Mexico
Finland Norway Bahrain Gambia Morocco
France Oman Bangladesh Germany Nigeria
Greece Peru Belgium Ghana Pakistan
Guatemala Poland Belize Gibraltar Philippines
Guernsey Puerto Rico Benin Hungary Portugal
Guinea-Bissau Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina Indonesia Romania
Guyana Seychelles Brazil Israel Senegal
Iceland Slovakia Bulgaria Jordan Singapore
India Sri Lanka Canada Kazakhstan Slovenia
Isle of Man Suriname Cayman Islands Kenya South Africa
Italy Tajikistan Chile Korea, Rep. Spain
Jamaica Thailand China Kosovo Switzerland
Jersey Togo Colombia Latvia Taiwan
Kuwait Trinidad and Tobago Cook Islands Lesotho Tonga
Kyrgyz Republic Uruguay Coˆte d’Ivoire Liechtenstein Turkey
Lebanon Vanuatu Croatia Lithuania Uganda
Luxembourg Virgin Islands, British Cyprus Macao, China USA
Malawi Zimbabwe Denmark Madagascar
Mali
Table VIII.
Did countries increase
or decrease of?cial
supervisory powers
following the global
?nancial crisis?
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If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Angola Yes Yes No
Argentina Yes Yes Yes
Armenia Yes Yes No
Australia Yes Yes No
Austria Yes Yes No
Bahrain Yes Yes No
Bangladesh Yes Yes No
Belarus Yes Yes No
Belgium Yes No No
Belize Yes Yes No
Benin N/A N/A No
Bhutan Yes Yes Yes
Bosnia and
Herzegovina Yes Yes No
Botswana Yes Yes No
Brazil Yes Yes No
Bulgaria Yes No No
Burkina Faso Yes Yes No
Burundi Yes Yes No
Canada Yes No No
Cayman Islands Yes No No
Chile Yes Yes Yes
Colombia Yes Yes Yes
Cook Islands Yes Yes No
Costa Rica Yes Yes Yes
Coˆte d’Ivoire Yes Yes No
Croatia Yes Yes No
Cyprus Yes No No
Denmark Yes No No
Dominican Republic Yes Yes No
Ecuador Yes No Yes
Egypt Yes Yes No
El Salvador Yes Yes Yes
Estonia Yes No No
Ethiopia Yes Yes No
Fiji Yes Yes No
Finland No Yes No
France Yes No No
Gambia Yes Yes No
Germany Yes Yes No
Ghana Yes Yes No
Gibraltar Yes Yes No
Greece No No No
Guatemala Yes Yes No
Guernsey Yes No No
Guinea-Bissau Yes Yes No
(continued)
Table IX.
Prudential bank
regulations and their
enforcement
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If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Guyana Yes Yes No
Honduras Yes Yes Yes
Hong Kong, China Yes No No
Hungary Yes Yes No
Iceland Yes Yes No
India Yes No No
Indonesia Yes Yes No
Iraq Yes Yes No
Ireland Yes Yes No
Isle of Man Yes Yes No
Israel No No No
Italy Yes No Yes
Jamaica Yes Yes No
Jersey No No No
Jordan N/A Yes No
Kazakhstan Yes Yes No
Kenya Yes Yes No
Korea, Rep. Yes N/A Yes
Kosovo Yes Yes No
Kuwait Yes Yes No
Kyrgyz Republic Yes Yes No
Latvia No Yes Yes
Lebanon Yes N/A Yes
Lesotho N/A N/A No
Liechtenstein No Yes No
Lithuania No No Yes
Luxembourg Yes Yes No
Macao, China Yes No No
Madagascar Yes Yes No
Malawi Yes Yes No
Malaysia Yes No No
Maldives Yes No No
Mali Yes Yes No
Malta Yes No No
Mauritius Yes Yes No
Mexico Yes Yes Yes
Moldova Yes Yes No
Montenegro Yes Yes Yes
Morocco No Yes No
Mozambique Yes Yes Yes
Myanmar Yes Yes Yes
Namibia Yes Yes No
Nepal N/A Yes No
The Netherlands No No No
New Zealand Yes No No
Nicaragua Yes Yes Yes
(continued)
Table IX.
Bank regulation
and supervision
151
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4
6
2
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a
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2
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1
6
(
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)
If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Niger Yes Yes No
Nigeria Yes Yes No
Norway Yes Yes N/A
Oman Yes Yes No
Pakistan Yes Yes No
Palestinian Territory Yes Yes No
Panama Yes Yes Yes
Paraguay Yes Yes Yes
Peru Yes Yes No
Philippines Yes Yes No
Poland Yes No No
Portugal Yes Yes No
Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes
Qatar Yes Yes No
Romania Yes Yes No
Russia No Yes No
Samoa (Western) Yes Yes No
Senegal Yes Yes No
Serbia Yes Yes No
Seychelles Yes Yes No
Sierra Leone Yes Yes Yes
Singapore Yes No No
Slovakia Yes Yes No
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes
South Africa Yes Yes No
Spain Yes Yes No
Sri Lanka Yes No No
Suriname Yes No No
Swaziland Yes Yes No
Switzerland Yes Yes No
Syria Yes Yes No
Taiwan Yes Yes No
Tajikistan No No No
Tanzania Yes No No
Thailand Yes Yes No
Togo Yes Yes No
Tonga Yes Yes No
Trinidad and Tobago Yes Yes No
Tunisia Yes Yes No
Turkey Yes Yes No
Uganda Yes Yes No
Ukraine Yes No No
United Arab Emirates Yes No No
UK Yes No No
USA Yes Yes No
Uruguay Yes Yes No
(continued)
Table IX.
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.
whether bank directors and of?cials are legally liable for the accuracy of
information disclosed to the public;
.
whether banks must publish consolidated accounts;
.
whether banks must be audited by certi?ed international auditors;
.
whether 100 percent of the largest ten banks are rated by international rating
agencies;
.
whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public;
.
whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures to the public;
.
whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, enter the income statement
while the loan is still non-performing;
.
whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital; and
.
whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was paid
the last time a bank failed.
Thus, the maximum value of the private monitoring index is 12 and the minimum
value is 0, where larger values indicate greater regulatory empowerment of the
monitoring of banks by private investors.
Figure 11 shows the change in the index of private monitoring from Surveys I to IV.
Positive values in this ?gure indicate that private monitoring strengthened over time,
while negative values signify a reduction in the degree to which of?cial policies support
the monitoring of banks by private investors. As shown, there is great diversity in
terms of whether regulations associated with private monitoring have strengthened or
weakened. Once again, relatively small countries such as the Philippines, Finland and
Tajikistan were generally those that reduced private monitoring to the greatest degree,
while comparatively large countries like France, India and the USAincreased it the most.
On average, there was a slight increase in private monitoring, such that average value of
the private monitoring index was 7.7 in 1999 and it was 7.9 in 2011.
To determine whether countries increased or decreased private monitoring powers
following the global ?nancial crisis, we compare the index values for Surveys III and IV.
If an infraction of any
prudential regulation is
found in the course of
supervision, must it be
reported?
Are there mandatory
actions that the
supervisor must take
in these cases?
Are supervisors
legally liable for
their actions?
Vanuatu Yes Yes No
Venezuela Yes Yes No
Virgin Islands, British Yes No No
Yemen Yes Yes No
Zimbabwe Yes Yes No
TOTAL
Yes 127 105 23
No 11 33 118
N/A 4 4 1
Table IX.
Bank regulation
and supervision
153
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4
6
2
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a
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2
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1
6
(
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Table Xshows that about half of the countries increased such powers, with the other half
decreased the extent to which of?cial regulatory and supervisory policies encourage and
facilitate the monitoring of banks by private investors.
III.D.2 External governance. Building on the private monitoring index, we construct a
broader index of the degree to which regulations facilitate external governance by debt
and equity holders. The index is composed of the answers fromspeci?c survey questions:
Figure 11.
Change in the index of
private monitoring from
Surveys I to IV
Finland
Philippines
Tajikistan
Burundi
Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
El Salvador
Gibraltar
Guernsey
Malaysia
Malta
Oman
Portugal
Suriname
Armenia
Belize
Bhutan
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Egypt
Guatemala
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Macao, China
Mauritius
Namibia
New Zealand
Panama
Qatar
Slovenia
Tonga
Virgin Islands, British
Argentina
Bahrain
Botswana
Bulgaria
Gambia
Guyana
Honduras
Israel
Jordan
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Moldova
Morocco
Peru
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Belgium
Cayman Islands
China
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Jamaica
Kenya
Lesotho
The Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
Austria
Chile
Cyprus
Greece
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Malawi
Maldives
Slovakia
Trinidad and Tobago
Bangladesh
Ghana
Mexico
Seychelles
United States
Belarus
France
India
–4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Less empowerment Greater empowerment
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:
4
6
2
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a
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2
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1
6
(
P
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)
(1) Is an audit by a professional external auditor required for all commercial banks
in your jurisdiction?
(2) Are speci?c requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out?
(3) Are auditors licensed or certi?ed?
(4) Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor’s report?
(5) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to
discuss their report without the approval of the bank?
(6) Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory
agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in
illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
(7) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?
(8) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement
while the loan is still performing?
(9) Are ?nancial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering
all bank and any non-bank ?nancial subsidiaries?
(10) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?
(11) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public?
(12) Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or
misleading?
(13) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement
while the loan is still non-performing?
(14) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with International
Accounting Standards (IAS)?
(15) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with US Generally Accepted
Accounting Standards (GAAS)?
(16) Is subordinated debt allowable as part of capital?
Increase Decrease
Bangladesh Italy Argentina Iceland
Belarus Kenya Armenia Jordan
China Kyrgyz Republic Australia Lebanon
Denmark Latvia Bahrain Luxembourg
El Salvador Lithuania Bosnia and Herzegovina Malta
France Macao, China Botswana Moldova
Germany Mexico Bulgaria Oman
Greece The Netherlands Burundi Peru
Guatemala South Africa Canada Portugal
Hungary Spain Cayman Islands Sri Lanka
India Suriname Finland Switzerland
Indonesia Thailand Ghana Trinidad and Tobago
Ireland USA Gibraltar Venezuela
Israel Guyana
Table X.
Did countries increase or
decrease private
monitoring powers
following the global
?nancial crisis?
Bank regulation
and supervision
155
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2
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6
(
P
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)
(17) Is subordinated debt required as part of capital?
(18) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks?
(19) What percentage of the top ten banks is rated by international credit rating
agencies (e.g. Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s)?
(20) How many of the top ten banks are rated by domestic credit rating agencies?
The values of the external governance index range from 0 to 19, with higher values
indicating a great degree of external governance.
Figure 12 shows the change in the index of external governance from Surveys I to IV,
where the positive values indicate an increase of external governance. Of the 42 countries
providing data for both Surveys I and IV, 37 tightened external governance, three
(Malaysia, Panama, and Fiji) eased it, and two (Argentina and Finland) made no changes.
On average, the index values increased from12.6 in 1999 to 15.3 in 2011. We then examine
how counties changed their external governance following the recent banking crisis.
Table XI shows information of countries with data available for both Surveys I and IV.
Of 33 countries, 22 tightened external governance, and 11 eased it from 1999 to 2011.
III.E. Explicit deposit insurance schemes
Policies associated with insuring the deposits of banks may also shape the performance
of banking systems. Countries often adopt deposit insurance to prevent bank runs.
When depositors attempt to withdraw their funds all at once, some illiquid but solvent
individual banks may be forced into insolvency and there is also the potential for
contagious bank runs on otherwise healthy banks. Thus, many countries enact deposit
insurance schemes to reduce the probability of systemic crises. But, deposit insurance
can encourage excessive risk-taking by banks by reducing the incentives of depositors
to monitor bank executives and curtail excessive risk taking. Thus, the precise design
of deposit insurance schemes, including coverage limits, scope of coverage, whether
coinsurance is a feature, sources of funding, premia structure, and management and
membership requirements, may materially shape bank and depositor behavior.
We construct an index of deposit insurer power to measure each country’s deposit
insurance regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. In particular, the deposit
insurance index is composed of the following individual questions from the surveys:
(1) Does the deposit insurance agency/fund administrator have the bank
intervention authority as part of its mandate?
(2) Does the deposit insurance authority by itself have the legal power to cancel or
revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank?
(3) Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations against
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank
directors or other bank of?cials?
(4) Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations
against laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against
bank directors or other bank of?cials?
The values of the deposit insurance index range from 0 to 4, with higher values
indicating more power.
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:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
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2
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1
6
(
P
T
)
Tighten Ease
Armenia Cyprus Liechtenstein Seychelles Egypt New Zealand
Australia Estonia Luxembourg Singapore Hong Kong, China Panama
Belgium Honduras Malawi USA Lithuania South Africa
Botswana Indonesia Nigeria Uruguay Malaysia Spain
Chile Italy Pakistan Moldova UK
Croatia Jamaica Peru The Netherlands
Table XI.
Did countries tighten or
ease external governance
following the global
?nancial crisis?
Figure 12.
Change in the index
of external governance
from Surveys I to IV
Malaysia
Panama
Fiji
Argentina
Finland
Hong Kong, China
Bulgaria
Croatia
Honduras
Moldova
United Kingdom
Australia
Botswana
Egypt
Estonia
New Zealand
Pakistan
Uruguay
Ireland
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Iceland
Jamaica
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Macao, China
Peru
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
The Netherlands
Lithuania
United States
Indonesia
Nigeria
Armenia
Malawi
Chile
Guatemala
Seychelles
Italy
–2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Less governance Greater governance
Bank regulation
and supervision
157
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A
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:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Figure 13 shows the change in the index of deposit insurance from Surveys I to IV. The
positive numbers indicate anincrease of deposit insurance power. There are 75 countries
providing data for both Surveys I and IV. Of these countries, 22 increased the power and
18 decrease it, while 35 countries made no changes. On average, there was a very slight
increase in deposit insurance power, such that the average value of the index was 1.06 in
1999 and 1.08 in 2011.
As Table XII shows, 98 of the 143 countries responding to Survey IV had established
a deposit insurance protection system for banks. Such schemes are most common
among high-income countries and least common among low-income countries. The table
also shows that there are a number of differences in:
Figure 13.
Change in the index of
deposit insurance from
Surveys I to IV
Oman
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Liechtenstein
Peru
Slovenia
Venezuela
Cyprus
Guatemala
Indonesia
Philippines
Nigeria
Germany
Korea, Rep.
Russia
Ukraine
Armenia
Austria
Bahrain
Belarus
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Colombia
Denmark
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
Gibraltar
Greece
Honduras
Hong Kong, China
India
Isle of Man
Jordan
Lebanon
Lithuania
Moldova
The Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Romania
Singapore
Slovakia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
United States
Chile
Malaysia
France
Argentina
Ireland
Latvia
Luxembourg
Malta
Mexico
Morocco
Norway
Tanzania
Thailand
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Turkey
United Kingdom
Kenya
Bangladesh
Belgium
Jamaica
Croatia
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3
Less power
More power
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:
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)
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N
o
B
r
a
z
i
l
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
C
a
n
a
d
a
Y
e
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Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
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Y
e
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N
o
C
h
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l
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Y
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Y
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Y
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Y
e
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N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
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Y
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N
o
Y
e
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N
o
N
o
C
o
l
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m
b
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a
Y
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Y
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Y
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Y
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N
o
Y
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N
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N
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N
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Y
e
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N
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C
r
o
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t
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a
Y
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Y
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N
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N
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Y
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Y
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Y
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N
o
C
y
p
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N
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N
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D
e
n
m
a
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k
Y
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Y
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o
N
o
N
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e
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N
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N
o
N
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Y
e
s
N
o
D
o
m
i
n
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c
a
n
R
e
p
u
b
l
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c
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
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Y
e
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Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
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N
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Y
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N
o
E
c
u
a
d
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r
Y
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Y
e
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e
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o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
/
A
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
E
l
S
a
l
v
a
d
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r
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
Explicit deposit
insurance protection
system
Bank regulation
and supervision
159
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
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V
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R
S
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T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
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?
A
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(
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o
K
e
n
y
a
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o
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o
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o
r
e
a
,
R
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p
.
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/
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N
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A
N
/
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o
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s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
JFEP
5,2
160
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
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p
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?
A
r
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e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
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N
o
Y
e
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N
o
N
o
Y
e
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N
o
M
a
c
a
o
,
C
h
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n
a
Y
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e
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N
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o
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o
M
a
l
a
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a
Y
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o
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o
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M
a
l
t
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Y
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M
e
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c
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M
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M
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t
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M
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M
o
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a
m
b
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Y
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N
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N
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M
y
a
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m
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r
Y
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N
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A
N
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A
N
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A
T
h
e
N
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t
h
e
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l
a
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d
s
Y
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Y
e
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Y
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o
N
o
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N
o
Y
e
s
N
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N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a
Y
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Y
e
s
Y
e
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N
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N
o
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Y
e
s
Y
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Y
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N
o
N
i
g
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i
a
Y
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Y
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s
Y
e
s
Y
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Y
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s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
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A
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
r
w
a
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
O
m
a
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
e
r
u
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
P
h
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l
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p
p
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n
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
161
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
I
s
p
a
r
t
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c
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p
a
t
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o
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d
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t
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n
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r
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y
s
t
e
m
c
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m
p
u
l
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f
o
r
t
h
e
f
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l
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n
g
b
a
n
k
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n
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e
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t
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t
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e
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?
A
r
e
t
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l
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T
h
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O
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P
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Y
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Y
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N
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Y
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N
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N
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Y
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N
o
P
o
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t
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g
a
l
Y
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Y
e
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Y
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e
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N
o
Y
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Y
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N
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N
o
Y
e
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N
o
P
u
e
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t
o
R
i
c
o
Y
e
s
Y
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o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
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Y
e
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Y
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Y
e
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R
o
m
a
n
i
a
Y
e
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Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
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N
o
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e
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N
o
N
o
Y
e
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N
o
R
u
s
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a
Y
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Y
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o
N
o
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Y
e
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N
o
N
o
Y
e
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N
o
S
e
r
b
i
a
Y
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o
N
o
N
o
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e
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Y
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Y
e
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N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
Y
e
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Y
e
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Y
e
s
Y
e
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Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
p
a
i
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
r
i
L
a
n
k
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
w
a
z
i
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
S
y
r
i
a
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
a
i
w
a
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
T
a
j
i
k
i
s
t
a
n
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
T
o
n
g
a
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
T
u
n
i
s
i
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
N
/
A
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
T
u
r
k
e
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
U
g
a
n
d
a
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XII.
JFEP
5,2
162
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
I
s
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
y
s
t
e
m
c
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
?
A
r
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
?
T
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
y
p
e
i
s
:
I
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
n
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
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t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
f
o
r
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
?
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
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b
s
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d
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a
r
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s
F
o
r
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g
n
b
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n
k
b
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a
n
c
h
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s
F
o
r
e
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g
n
c
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r
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n
c
y
d
e
p
o
s
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t
s
I
n
t
e
r
b
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n
k
d
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p
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s
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t
s
D
e
p
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s
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t
s
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f
t
h
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f
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r
e
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g
n
b
r
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n
c
h
e
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o
f
d
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m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
D
e
p
o
s
i
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s
Table XII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
163
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n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
.
whether participation by banks is compulsory; and
.
the scope of coverage.
Of the countries providingdata, 95 require domestic banks toparticipate, while 86 (62) also
require foreign bank subsidiaries (foreign bank branches) to participate. Roughly
three-fourths of the countries provide coverage for foreign currency deposits but at the
same time exclude interbank deposits. The most common type of deposit insurance
coverage is per depositor per institution rather thanper depositor or per depositor account.
We next examine how countries changed their deposit insurance regimes following
the recent banking crisis. Since Survey III provides information just before the global
?nancial crisis and Survey IV provides similar information right after the crisis fully
emerged, we provide information on whether or not changes were made in the coverage
provided by the deposit insurance system in selected advanced countries. All these
countries suffered a banking crisis, which makes it useful to determine whether any
important changes were made in their deposit insurance schemes. Table XIII shows
that four countries that reported that they had a formal coinsurance feature as part of
their deposit insurance schemes prior to the global ?nancial crisis eliminated this
feature in 2011. In addition, two countries that had not had deposit insurance fees
based on some assessment of risk made a switch to include them from Surveys III to IV,
while one country did the reverse.
An additional point that should be made before concluding this section is the
resolution of insolvent banks. To the extent that a bank is a subsidiary of a holding
company, an issue that arises is whether the deposit insurance supervisory authority or
other regulatory authority is able to seize the holding company or just a subsidiary
bank. In the USA, the regulatory authorities have been only able to seize and resolve
subsidiary banks, not the parent holding companies, until the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act in 2010. In this case, insolvent banks were seized and resolved by the regulatory
authorities, while the parent holding companies were handled by bankruptcy courts.
Information provided by Survey IV indicates that in 73 countries the insolvency
framework is the same for holding companies and banks, but different in 59 countries.
III.F. Restrictions on entry into banking
The degree of competition in banking depends importantly on entry barriers.
Regulators in most countries do not allow just anyone to enter the banking system, but
rather screen entrants to better assure they are “?t and proper.” By imposing the fairly
basic requirements identi?ed above before a banking license is accepted or rejected,
those allowed to enter may be of higher quality and thereby enhance the overall
performance of the banking industry.
We construct an entry into banking index to measure each country’s requirements
of entering into banking and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. In particular, this
index is based on whether or not the following information is required of applicants for
a banking license:
.
draft by-laws;
.
intended organizational chart;
.
?nancial projections for ?rst three years;
.
?nancial information on main potential shareholders;
JFEP
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164
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E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Is there formal coinsurance, that
is, are depositors explicitly
insured for less than 100 percent
of their deposits?
Do deposit insurance fees
charged to banks vary
based on some assessment
of risk?
Country Survey III Survey IV Survey III Survey IV
Algeria Yes N/A Yes N/A
Angola N/A No N/A No
Argentina No No Yes Yes
Armenia No No Yes No
Australia N/A No N/A No
Austria No No No No
Bahrain Yes Yes No No
Bangladesh No No No Yes
Belarus No No No No
Belgium No No Yes No
Bosnia and Herzegovina No No No No
Brazil No No No No
Bulgaria No No No No
Canada No No Yes Yes
Chile Yes Yes N/A N/A
Colombia Yes No Yes Yes
Croatia No No No No
Cyprus No No No No
Czech Republic Yes N/A No N/A
Denmark No No No No
Dominican Republic N/A No N/A No
Ecuador N/A No N/A Yes
El Salvador No No No Yes
Estonia Yes No No No
Ethiopia N/A No N/A No
Finland No No Yes Yes
France No No Yes Yes
Germany Yes No No Yes
Gibraltar Yes Yes No No
Greece No No No Yes
Guatemala Yes No No No
Guernsey N/A No N/A No
Honduras N/A No No No
Hong Kong, China No No Yes Yes
Hungary Yes No Yes Yes
Iceland Yes No No No
India No No No No
Indonesia Yes No No No
Ireland Yes Yes No No
Isle of Man N/A No N/A No
Italy No No Yes Yes
Jamaica No No No No
Japan N/A N/A No N/A
Jersey N/A No N/A No
Jordan N/A No No No
(continued)
Table XIII.
Changes in deposit
insurance scheme prior to
and post the global
?nancial crisis
Bank regulation
and supervision
165
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H
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R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Is there formal coinsurance, that
is, are depositors explicitly
insured for less than 100 percent
of their deposits?
Do deposit insurance fees
charged to banks vary
based on some assessment
of risk?
Country Survey III Survey IV Survey III Survey IV
Kazakhstan No N/A Yes N/A
Kenya No No Yes No
Korea, Rep. N/A No No No
Kosovo N/A N/A N/A Yes
Kyrgyz Republic N/A N/A N/A No
Latvia No Yes No Yes
Lebanon Yes No No No
Lesotho N/A Yes N/A Yes
Liechtenstein N/A No No No
Lithuania yes No no No
Luxembourg No No No No
Macao, China N/A No N/A N/A
Macedonia No N/A No N/A
Malaysia No No Yes Yes
Malta Yes No N/A No
Mexico No No No Yes
Moldova No No No No
Montenegro No No No No
Morocco Yes No No No
Mozambique No No No Yes
Myanmar No Yes No No
Namibia No No No No
The Netherlands No No No No
Nicaragua Yes No Yes Yes
Nigeria No No No Yes
Norway No No Yes Yes
Oman N/A No No No
Paraguay N/A No N/A No
Peru No No Yes Yes
Philippines No No Yes No
Poland Yes No No No
Portugal Yes No Yes Yes
Puerto Rico N/A Yes N/A Yes
Romania No No Yes No
Russia Yes No No No
Serbia N/A No N/A No
Sierra Leone N/A No N/A No
Singapore Yes No Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes No No No
Slovenia No No No No
Spain No No No No
Sri Lanka N/A No N/A Yes
Swaziland N/A No N/A N/A
Sweden No N/A No N/A
(continued)
Table XIII.
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P
O
N
D
I
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2
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1
6
(
P
T
)
.
background/experience of future directors;
.
background/experience of future managers;
.
sources of funds to be used to capitalize the new bank; and
.
market differentiation intended for the new bank.
The values of the index of entry into banking range from 0 to 8, with higher values
indicating greater stringency.
Figure 14 identi?es the change in the index of entry into banking fromSurveys I to IV.
The selected countries are the ones providing data both for Surveys I and IV. Among the
136 countries, 35 countries increased the entry into banking requirements, 16 decreased
the requirements, and 85 countries did not make changes. On average, there was a slight
increase in entry into banking requirements, such that the average value of the index
was 7.5 in 1999 and it was 7.8 in 2011.
III.G. Additional information
Clearly, the number of questions asked in all four surveys is far too large to provide an
adequate discussion of all of them in this paper. Indeed, it took over 100 pages in our
book (Barth et al., 2006, Chapter 3) that focused only on Survey I to describe the data.
The online dataset that we make available, however, provides details on each question
in each survey, the formulas for constructing each of the indexes discussed above, and
all of the information on several other indexes of bank regulation and supervision.
Thus, this paper provides an introduction to the online dataset, but is not a complete
description of every aspect of these data.
Is there formal coinsurance, that
is, are depositors explicitly
insured for less than 100 percent
of their deposits?
Do deposit insurance fees
charged to banks vary
based on some assessment
of risk?
Country Survey III Survey IV Survey III Survey IV
Switzerland No No No No
Taiwan No No Yes Yes
Tajikistan Yes Yes Yes No
Tanzania No N/A No No
Thailand N/A No N/A No
Trinidad and Tobago No No No No
Turkey N/A No N/A Yes
Uganda Yes No Yes Yes
Ukraine N/A No N/A No
UK Yes No No No
USA N/A No N/A Yes
Uruguay Yes No No Yes
Venezuela No No No No
Virgin Islands, British N/A No N/A No
Yemen N/A N/A N/A Yes
Zimbabwe Yes No No No
Note: Advanced economies that suffered the global ?nancial crisis are italisized
Table XIII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
167
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
To provide additional summary information on Survey IV and advertise the enormous
heterogeneity of bank regulatory and supervisory policies across countries, Tables AIII,
AIV and XIV give the values of key regulatory and supervisory policies for different
cuts of the data. The minimum and maximum values in Table AIII are useful because
they help indicate whether an item is measured as an index, in days, as a percentage or
as a pure number. This table shows that there is substantial variation in the values of
the different items across the various countries, with the number of countries providing
information also indicated. Table AIV provides the average values for the same
items included in the Table AIII with the countries grouped into different categories
based on income level, development status and whether or not an offshore center.
Table XIV further advertises the lack of uniformity in various regulations and
supervisory practices in countries around the world.
Figure 14.
Change in the index
of entry into banking
requirements:
Surveys I-IV
Croatia
Qatar
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Greece
Isle of Man
Liechtenstein
Malawi
Norway
South Africa
Tanzania
Jersey
Korea, Rep.
Hong Kong, China
Armenia
Bangladesh
Cayman Islands
China
El Salvador
Gambia
Gibraltar
Guernsey
Guyana
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Malaysia
Maldives
New Zealand
Pakistan
Philippines
Turkey
United States
Argentina
Burundi
Egypt
France
India
Israel
Macao, China
Puerto Rico
Seychelles
Trinidad and Tobago
Kuwait
Germany
Chile
Finland
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
More power Less power
JFEP
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s
f
o
r
d
e
n
i
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
?
b
.
B
a
n
k
i
n
g
s
k
i
l
l
s
8
9
2
9
6
9
W
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
f
o
r
d
e
n
i
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
?
c
.
R
e
p
u
t
a
t
i
o
n
8
9
2
9
6
0
W
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
t
h
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
f
o
r
d
e
n
i
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
b
a
n
k
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
?
d
.
I
n
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
9
0
3
3
5
7
C
a
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
p
a
r
t
i
e
s
o
w
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
n
a
b
a
n
k
?
1
4
0
1
3
5
5
W
h
i
c
h
r
i
s
k
s
a
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
a
.
C
r
e
d
i
t
r
i
s
k
1
3
9
1
3
8
1
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
1
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
c
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
1
3
3
1
8
1
1
5
W
h
i
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
t
e
m
s
a
r
e
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
T
i
e
r
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
?
d
.
S
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
d
e
b
t
1
3
3
1
3
1
2
I
s
a
n
a
u
d
i
t
b
y
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
i
n
y
o
u
r
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
?
1
4
2
1
4
2
0
I
f
y
e
s
,
d
o
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
o
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
O
b
t
a
i
n
a
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
c
e
r
t
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
p
a
s
s
a
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
e
x
a
m
t
o
q
u
a
l
i
f
y
a
s
s
u
c
h
1
3
7
1
3
1
6
A
r
e
s
p
e
c
i
?
c
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
r
n
a
t
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
s
p
e
l
l
e
d
o
u
t
?
1
4
1
1
2
1
2
0
D
o
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
a
c
o
p
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
a
.
T
h
e
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
’
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
o
n
t
h
e
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
1
4
3
1
4
3
0
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
o
r
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
s
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
i
t
s
m
a
n
d
a
t
e
?
c
.
B
a
n
k
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
9
9
2
7
7
2
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
b
y
i
t
s
e
l
f
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
p
o
w
e
r
t
o
c
a
n
c
e
l
o
r
r
e
v
o
k
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
o
r
a
n
y
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
?
9
8
2
4
7
4
H
a
s
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
/
f
u
n
d
e
v
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
l
e
g
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
l
a
w
s
,
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
b
y
l
a
w
s
(
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
g
e
n
c
y
)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
b
a
n
k
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
b
a
n
k
o
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
?
9
4
1
5
7
9
T
h
e
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
y
p
e
i
s
:
b
.
P
e
r
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
9
7
1
7
8
0
W
e
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
s
w
h
o
l
l
y
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
(
t
o
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
f
l
e
g
a
l
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
)
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
i
m
e
a
b
a
n
k
f
a
i
l
e
d
?
6
7
5
0
1
7
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table XIV.
Information for selected
other questions included
in Surveys I-IV
Bank regulation
and supervision
169
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
S
u
r
v
e
y
I
V
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
I
-
I
V
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
N
u
m
b
e
r
a
n
s
w
e
r
i
n
g
y
e
s
N
u
m
b
e
r
a
n
s
w
e
r
i
n
g
n
o
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
y
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
a
.
S
i
g
n
i
?
c
a
n
t
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
d
i
f
?
c
u
l
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
a
n
d
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
i
t
s
c
r
e
d
i
t
w
o
r
t
h
i
n
e
s
s
1
3
7
1
2
1
1
6
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
y
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
b
.
B
r
e
a
c
h
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
(
e
.
g
.
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
o
r
d
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l
i
n
q
u
e
n
c
y
i
n
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
r
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
1
3
6
1
2
7
9
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
y
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
c
.
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
(
i
.
e
.
c
o
n
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
,
f
o
r
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
o
r
l
e
g
a
l
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
r
e
l
a
t
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
’
s
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
d
i
f
?
c
u
l
t
y
,
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
l
e
n
d
e
r
w
o
u
l
d
n
o
t
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
)
1
3
9
1
2
4
1
5
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
y
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
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s
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
d
.
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
1
3
6
1
2
6
1
0
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
y
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
e
.
D
a
y
s
p
a
s
t
d
u
e
s
t
a
t
u
s
(
p
l
e
a
s
e
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
d
a
y
s
)
1
3
4
1
2
7
7
W
h
i
c
h
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
i
n
t
o
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
t
o
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
y
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
a
s
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
[
.
.
.
]
?
f
.
E
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
o
f
c
o
l
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
,
g
u
a
r
a
n
t
e
e
s
a
n
d
/
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
s
1
3
4
8
9
4
5
I
f
a
c
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
h
a
s
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
l
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
a
n
d
o
n
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
i
s
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
e
d
a
s
n
o
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Table XIV.
JFEP
5,2
170
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(
P
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)
III.H. Some new information in Survey IV
Survey IV contains all the questions in the three earlier surveys that are necessary to
construct the indices discussed earlier as well as other indices discussed more fully in
Barth et al. (2006) and provided in the online dataset. In addition, the latest survey
includes some new and important questions that were asked due to the global ?nancial
crisis. In particular, given the concern over systemic risk, questions are added to
determine what countries are doing in an effort designed to better assess systemic risk
within the banking sector. Of 133 countries, 90 of them indicate that they have a
specialized department dealing with ?nancial stability and systemic supervision, while
the remaining 43 reported they do not have such a department. Countries in which these
departments exist include Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands,
Spain, and the UK. Denmark, Switzerland and the USA report not having established a
specialized department dealing with ?nancial stability and systemic supervision.
Figure 15 shows the factors that countries consider inassessingsystemic riskwithinthe
banking sector. The factor that regulators in the most countries consider is bank capital
ratios (113), while the least mentioned factor is stock market prices (46). Countries that
report that all of the factors are considered include Austria, Iceland, The Netherlands,
Portugal, the UKandthe USA. These are advancedcountries that suffereda bankingcrisis.
Some other advanced economies that suffered a banking crisis, like France, Germany and
Ireland, do not indicate that they consider any of the factors indicated in the ?gure.
There are still other new questions asked in Survey IV that are important, especially
given the most recent global ?nancial crisis. Some of the questions as well as the number of
countries respondingandtheir collective answers are reportedinTable XV. These questions
focus on external auditors, remuneration or compensation, insolvency framework for bank
holding companies and banks, stress tests, counter-cyclical regulations, and the supervision
of the systemic institutions verses non-systemic ones. Once again, there is in most cases a
substantial divergence from uniformity in the answers. Focusing on just the advanced
Figure 15.
Bank supervisory criteria
for assessing systemic risk
46
48
79
84
92
93
99
100
101
104
113
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Stock market prices
Housing prices
FX position of banks
Bank leverage ratios
Bank provisioning ratios
Bank profitability ratios
Bank non-performing loan ratios
Growth in bank credit
Sectoral composition of bank loan
portfolios
Bank liquidity ratios
Bank capital ratios
Note: Number of countries reporting yes for each factor
Bank regulation
and supervision
171
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1
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4
(
c
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d
)
Table XV.
Some new information
in Survey IV
JFEP
5,2
172
D
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5
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1
4
4
2
Table XV.
Bank regulation
and supervision
173
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
countries listed in Table XII, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland report that supervisors
delegate part of their supervisory tasks to external auditors, whereas France, Spain, the UK
and the USA do not. All of these advanced countries report that remuneration or
compensation is evaluated as part of the supervisory process to ensure that they do not lead
to excessive risktaking, withthe exceptionof Belgiumas regards the boardof directors. The
same countries, moreover, all report that theyconduct stress tests anddo so at the banklevel.
Six of the 16 countries extend the tests to the system-wide level. The last item to be
mentioned here is whether countries impose any restrictions or limits on the size of banks to
address the issue of systemic risk. Of the 63 countries providing information, only 11 report
such size restrictions or limits, including Iceland and Ireland.
The last new piece of information that is provided in Survey IV is the statutory
corporate tax rate on domestic bank income. Figure 16 shows the substantial variance
in tax rates among the countries, which range from a low of 0 to a high of 45 percent.
Guyana reports the highest tax rate, while six other countries report that there is no tax
imposed on domestic bank income. As regards the USA, it reports the ?fth highest tax
rate, with 108 countries reporting lower tax rates.
III.I. Convergence
Since SurveyI in1999, national regulatoryauthorities aroundthe worldhave met at various
international institutions and conferences. Thus, it is natural to assess whether bank
regulatory and supervisory practices have converged across countries. Though there are
many ways to assess convergence, Table XVI provides some simple summary statistics.
Table XVI provides information on the degree to which the major bank regulatory
survey indexes that we constructed have tended to converge from Surveys I (1999) to
IV (2011). We provide information on:
.
overall restrictions on bank activities;
.
entry into banking requirements;
.
bank capital regulations;
.
of?cial supervisory powers;
.
private monitoring; and
.
external governance.
For each index, we only include countries for which we have data for Surveys I and IV.
We provide two types of measures of convergence. First, we simply provide the
normalized standard deviation in Surveys I and IVfor each index. Second, we assess the
number of countries that are x percent different from the median value, where x equals
10, 25, 30, and 50 percent.
Although for a few of the indexes, the data suggest material convergence, Table XV
does not suggest broad-based convergence of bank regulatory and supervisory
practices. In particular, the indexes:
.
entry into banking requirements,
.
bank capital regulations, and
.
external governance exhibit notable convergence in that there is less divergence
across countries in Survey IV than there is in Survey I.
JFEP
5,2
174
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
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V
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S
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T
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A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Suchconvergence is less noticeable inthe other regulatoryandsupervisoryindexes. Overall,
as of 2011, there is greater cross-country divergence in bank regulation and supervision.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper and the associated online database, we provide a new database on bank
regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries that covers the period from 1999
Figure 16.
Statutory corporate tax
rate on domestic
bank income
Guyana
Bangladesh
Brazil
Puerto Rico
United States
Suriname
Israel
Angola
Argentina
Burundi
Ethiopia
Gambia
Jordan
Malta
Morocco
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Uruguay
Namibia
Belgium
France
Jamaica
Colombia
Seychelles
Italy
Guatemala
Australia
Bhutan
Costa Rica
India
Kenya
Malawi
Nepal
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Sierra Leone
Spain
Swaziland
Tanzania
Thailand
Uganda
Portugal
Cook Islands
Fiji
Mexico
Norway
South Africa
United Kingdom
Samoa (Western)
Finland
Austria
Botswana
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ghana
Honduras
Indonesia
Lesotho
Malaysia
Maldives
The Netherlands
Syria
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
Zimbabwe
Belarus
Greece
Madagascar
Gibraltar
Luxembourg
Armenia
Croatia
Egypt
Russia
Slovenia
Taiwan
Turkey
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Iceland
Chile
Singapore
Hong Kong, China
Germany
Iraq
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Mauritius
Palestinian Territory
Ireland
Liechtenstein
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Isle of Man
Jersey
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Table XVI.
Was there a convergence
or divergence in
regulation and
supervision overtime?
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through 2011. This database builds directly on four World Bank Surveys of bank
regulation and supervision around the world. The database that we offer differs fromthe
underlyingsurveydata intwo keyrespects: we address manyinconsistencies andmissing
observations in the core survey responses and we construct a range of indexes to provide
information on key banking policies. Providing the indexes is crucial for comparing bank
regulatory and supervisory policies across countries and for assessing howthese policies
change over time because the underlyingsurveys are enormous andcomplex. The surveys
include hundreds of questions, such that it is dif?cult to form impressions of banking
sector policies by examining these individual questions one by one. Thus, we construct
summary indexes fromthe individual questions to measure key features of the regulatory
andsupervisoryapproaches towhat banks cando, capital standards, the powers of of?cial
supervisory agencies, regulations on the entry of new banks, the degree to which the
authorities encourage the monitoring of banks by private investors, the nature of the
deposit insurance regime, and an assortment of other policies towards banks.
There is substantial heterogeneity of bank regulatory and supervisory policies across
countries. And, although there has been some convergence over the last dozen years for
some types of banking sector policies, bank regulatory and supervisory policies remain
impressively diverse in 2011. This diversity in regulatory regimes provides enormous
scope for research examining both the causes of these policy differences and the impacts
of banking policies on the performance of banks, and the associated rami?cations for the
overall ?nancial sector and real economy.
Notes
1. On documenting systemic crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008). On the linkages between
recent banking stresses and policy defects, Barth et al. (2012).
2. The literature on ?nance, growth, poverty, and the distribution of economic opportunities
is quite large, and is reviewed by Levine (2006) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2010).
3. Available at:http://zapatopi.net/kelvin/quotes/
4. We sometimes use the term “regulation” to describe a wide-array of banking policies and
compliance mechanisms.
5. The responses to the survey were received in 1998 through 2000, but the majority of the
answers refer to policies in the year 1999.
6. More speci?cally, the survey was coordinated by The World Bank’s Mar? ´a Soledad Mart? ´nez
Per? ´a and Martin Cihak, with input from numerous bank regulation experts both inside and
outside The World Bank. PKF (UK) and Auxilium helped with compiling and following up
on the survey responses. The survey was ?nanced in part with support from the UK
Department for International Development (DFID).
7. Our dataset is posted at:http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm.
The World Bank posts the data from Survey IV at:http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTGLOBALFINREPORT/0,contentMDK:23267421,pagePK:
64168182,piPK:64168060,theSitePK:8816097,00.html. The World Bank posts the data for
earlier years at:http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/
0,contentMDK:20345037,pagePK:64214825,piPK:64214943,theSitePK:469382,00.html
8. One problem that arises when comparing bank assets across countries is that different
countries may use different accounting standards. As Table AVI shows, most countries use
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), while only six use US GAAP. When one
converts US bank assets from US GAAP to IFRS, total bank assets increase by roughly
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$5 trillion in 2012, which is largely due to measuring derivatives on a gross rather than net
basis (Barth and Prabha, 2012). The biggest effect that different accounting standards will
have in measuring a country’s bank assets is likely to be in the USA, and even then
concentrated at the biggest banks, which account for the bulk of all derivatives.
References
Barth, J. and Prabha, A. (2012), “Breaking (banks) up is hard to do: new perspective on too big to
fail”, Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 12-16, available at:http://?c.
wharton.upenn.edu/?c/papers/12/12-16.pdf
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2001), “Bank regulation and supervision: a new database”,
in Litan, R. and Herring, R. (Eds), Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, The
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Philadelphia, PA.
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2006), Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern,
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2008), “Bank regulations are changing: for better or worse?”,
Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 537-563.
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2012), Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cihak, M., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Soledad, M., Peria, M. and Mohseni-Cheraghlou, A. (2012), “Bank
regulation and supervision of banks around the world: a crisis update”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 6286.
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2008), “Systemic banking crises: a new database”, IMF Working
Paper, No. 224.
Further reading
Barth, J., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2004), “Bank regulation and supervision: what works best”,
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 12, April, pp. 205-248.
Appendix 1. Guide to database on bank regulation and supervision
Part 1: entry into banking
1.1 What body/agency grants commercial banking licenses? Please include the name of licensing
agency. If more than one, please describe their respective licensing roles.
1.2 Do you have the authority to take legal action against those entities that undertake banking
activities without a given license?
1.3 Is more than one license required (e.g. one for each banking activity, such as deposit-taking,
consumer lending, etc.)?
1.3.1 If more than one license is needed, please indicate the maximum number required.
1.4 What is the minimum capital entry requirement for commercial bank operations of the
following types? Enter amount (in thousands of local currency) as of end of 2010 for each option
below (please state currency):
a. Domestic bank.
b. For a subsidiary of a foreign bank.
c. For a branch of a foreign bank.
1.4.1 Does the minimum capital entry requirement vary depending on the nature of the banking
businesses that are licensed?
1.4.1.1 If Yes, Please explain.
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1.4.2 Are the sources of funds to be used as capital veri?ed by the regulatory/supervisory
authorities?
1.4.3 Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other
than cash or government securities?
1.5 Can initial capital contributions by prospective shareholders be in the form of borrowed
funds?
1.6 Which of the following are legally required to be submitted before issuance of the banking
license?
a. Draft bylaws.
b. Intended organizational chart.
c. Structure of Board (composition, committees, functions).
d. Market / business strategy.
e. Financial projections for ?rst three years.
f. Financial information on main potential shareholders.
g. Background/experience of future board directors.
h. Background/experience of future senior managers.
i. Source of funds to be used as capital.
1.7 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010), how many applications for commercial banking licenses
from domestic entities (i.e. those 50 percent or more domestically owned) have been: enter
number of applications for each option below:
a. Received.
b. Denied.
c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.8 Are foreign entities prohibited from entering through the following?
a. Acquisition.
b. Subsidiary.
c. Branch.
d. Joint venture.
1.9 If acquisitions of domestic banks by foreign banks are not prohibited, what is the maximum
percentage of foreign ownership that is legally allowed?
1.10 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010), how many applications fromforeign banks to enter through
the acquisition of a domestic bank were: enter number of applications for each option below?
a. Received.
b. Denied.
c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.11 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010) how many applications from foreign banks to enter
through a new subsidiary were: enter number of applications for each option below?
a. Received.
b. Denied.
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c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.12 In the past ?ve years (2006-2010) how many applications from foreign banks to enter by
opening a branch were: enter number of applications for each option below?
a. Received.
b. Denied.
c. Withdrawn.
d. Accepted.
1.13 What were the primary reasons for denial of the applications in questions 1.7, 1.10, 1.11 and
1.12?
a. Capital amount or quality.
b. Banking skills.
c. Reputation.
d. Incomplete application.
e. Other (please explain).
1.14 In general, how long (in number of months) has it taken for a new banking license to be
issued, from receipt of the application to ?nal disposition?
Part 2: ownership
2.1 Please state the bank ownership level thresholds as of end of 2010 (if they exist) that would
trigger evaluation and approval requirements by the supervisor (e.g. requirements to obtain
regulatory approval once the share of bank ownership by an individual, family or group reaches
a certain percentage).
2.2 What are the requirements for evaluation/approval of signi?cant bank shareholders?
a. Minimum level of education.
b. Minimum level of ?nancial and/or banking-related experience.
c. Financial capacity to support bank capital.
d. No criminal record.
e. No bankruptcy record.
f. Lack of con?ict of interest.
g. Other (please explain).
2.3 Is there a maximum percentage of a bank’s equity that can be owned by a single owner?
2.3.1 If yes, what is the percentage as of end of 2010?
2.3.2 Please specify any differences that exist for domestic versus foreign owners.
2.4 Does the regulator have the legal authority to oppose the ultimate (bene?cial) owner when
assessing bank ownership?
2.5 Do laws or regulations require the ultimate (bene?cial) owner and controller of a bank to be
publicly disclosed?
2.5.1 Can related parties own capital in a bank?
2.5.2 If yes, what are the maximum percentages associated with the total ownership by a
related party group (e.g. family, business associates, etc.)
2.6 Can non-?nancial ?rms own voting shares in commercial banks? Please see options provided
and select option that best characterizes your banking sector:
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a. Non-?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank.
b. Non-?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank, but prior
authorization or approval is required.
c. Limits are placed on ownership of banks by non-?nancial ?rms, such as maximum
percentage of a commercial bank’s capital or shares.
d. Non-?nancial ?rms cannot own any equity investment in a commercial bank.
2.6.1 What fraction of capital in the largest ten banks (in terms of their domestic assets) is owned
by commercial/industrial and/or ?nancial conglomerates? If there are fewer than ten banks, use
that number in your answer. Your response should re?ect the situation as of end of 2010.
2.7 Can non-bank ?nancial ?rms (e.g. insurance companies, ?nance companies, etc.) own voting
shares in commercial banks? Please see options provided and select option that best characterizes
your banking sector:
a. Non-bank ?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank.
b. Non-bank ?nancial ?rm may own 100 percent of the equity in a commercial bank, but prior
authorization or approval is required.
c. Limits are placed on ownership of banks by non-bank ?nancial ?rms, such as maximum
percentage of a commercial bank’s capital or shares.
d. Non-bank ?nancial ?rms cannot own any equity investment in a commercial bank.
Part 3: capital
Overview of regulatory capital adequacy regime
3.1 Which regulatory capital adequacy regimes did you use as of end of 2010 and for which
banks does each regime apply to (if using more than one regime)? Mark the appropriate response
below and specify for which types of banks each regime applies:
a. Basel I.
b. Basel II.
c. Leverage ratio.
d. Other (please explain).
3.2 Which risks are covered by the current regulatory minimum capital requirements in your
jurisdiction? Please specify all applicable risks.
a. Credit risk.
b. Market risk.
c. Operational risk.
d. Other risks (please explain).
3.3.1 What was the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.3.2 What was the minimum required non risk-based regulatory capital ratio as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
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3.4.1 What was the actual risk-based capital ratio of the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.4.2 What was the actual non risk-based capital ratio of the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.5 What was the actual Tier 1 capital ratio of the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
3.6 The regulatory minimum capital requirements are applied [. . .]
a. On a solo basis at the individual bank level.
b. On a consolidated basis at every banking group or subgroup level.
c. On a consolidated basis for the non-bank holding company (if it exists) that is the parent
entity of a bank.
d. On a solo basis at the holding company level.
3.6.1 Do you require banks to perform an internal assessment of their capital adequacy against
their economic capital?
3.6.2 If so, do you review internal assessments performed by banks?
3.7 Does your agency have the legal authority to require additional capital that is over-and-above
the minimum required capital for individual banks if deemed necessary?
Basel I regime (please complete if applicable)
3.8 Do you apply different risk weights than those in the Basel Committee’s original Basel I
framework for any material exposures (e.g. corporate lending, mortgage loans, consumer loans,
loans to government, etc.)?
3.8.1 If so, please describe these differences along with the speci?c risk weights that are being
applied.
3.9 In case you plan to move to the Basel II framework, what is the target calendar year of
adoption?
Basel II regime (please complete if applicable)
3.10 What variants are offered to banks in calculating capital requirements for credit risk?
a. Simpli?ed standardized approach (SSA).
b. Standardized approach (SA).
c. Foundation internal ratings-based approach (F-IRB).
d. Advanced internal ratings-based approach (A-IRB).
3.11 What was the impact of moving to Basel II on the overall regulatory capital level of the
banking system? Please select the option that best characterizes the situation in your jurisdiction:
a. Increased substantially.
b. Increased slightly.
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c. Neutral/little change.
d. Decreased slightly.
e. Decreased substantially.
Regulatory leverage ratio (please complete if applicable)
3.12 What is the regulatory leverage ratio that you are using based on [. . .]?
a. Minimum capital to asset multiples.
b. Maximum assets to capital multiples.
c. Other. Please explain.
3.13 The leverage ratio is applied [. . .]
a. On a solo basis at the individual bank level.
b. On a consolidated basis at every banking group or subgroup levels.
c. On a consolidated basis for the non-bank holding company (if it exists). that is the parent
entity of a bank.
3.14 Which concept of capital is used in calculating the leverage ratio?
a. Total equity capital.
b. Total regulatory capital.
c. Only Tier 1 capital.
d. Other (please explain).
3.15 Are off-balance sheet items included (either in notional amounts or risk-weighted) in assets
when calculating the leverage ratio?
3.16 What was the actual leverage ratio for the banking system as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
De?nition of capital
3.17 Which of the following are legally allowed in regulatory capital and which are the minimum
(or maximum) percentages? Enter Yes or No and include corresponding minimum (or maximum)
percentages for each option below:
a. Common equity:
minimum.
maximum.
b. Tier 1:
minimum.
maximum.
c. Tier 2:
minimum.
maximum.
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d. Tier 3:
minimum.
maximum.
e. Other (please explain):
minimum.
maximum.
If other, please explain.
3.18 Which of the following items are allowed as part of Tier 1 capital and in what
percentages? Enter Yes or No and include corresponding percentages for each option below:
a. Hybrid debt capital instruments.
b. Asset revaluation gains (or revaluation reserves).
c. Subordinated debt.
3.18.1 Which of the following items are allowed as part of Tier 2 capital and in what percentages?
Enter Yes or No and include corresponding percentages for each option below:
a. Hybrid debt capital instruments.
b. General provisions.
c. Asset revaluation gains (or revaluation reserves).
d. Subordinated debt.
3.18.2 What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
3.18.3 Are the following items deducted from regulatory capital? Enter Yes or No for each option.
If the response is no, please explain their treatment.”
a. Goodwill: Please explain.
b. Deferred tax assets: Please explain.
c. Intangibles.Please explain.
d. Unrealized losses in fair valued exposures: Please explain.
e. Investment in the capital of certain banking, ?nancial and insurance entities which are
outside the scope of consolidation: Please explain.
Part 4: activities
4.1 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in securities activities?
a. A full range of these activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. A full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be
conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent.
c. Less than the full range of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in
another part of a common holding company or parent.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.2 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in insurance activities?
a. A full range of these activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. A full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be
conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent.
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c. Less than the full range of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in
another part of a common holding company or parent.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.3 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in real estate activities?
a. A full range of these activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. A full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be
conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent.
c. Less than the full range of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in
another part of a common holding company or parent.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.4 What are the conditions under which banks can engage in non-?nancial businesses except those
businesses that are auxiliary to banking business (e.g. IT company, debt collection company, etc.)?
a. Non-?nancial activities can be conducted directly in banks.
b. Non-?nancial activities must be conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common
holding company or parent.
c. Non-?nancial activities may be conducted in subsidiaries, or in another part of a common
holding company or parent, but subject to regulatory limit or approval.
d. None of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a
common holding company or parent.
4.4.1 Can banks own voting shares in non-?nancial ?rms? Please mark the option that best
characterizes the situation in your jurisdiction:
a. A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in any non-?nancial ?rm.
b. A bank may own 100 percent of the equity in a non-?nancial ?rm but ownership is limited
based upon a bank’s equity capital.
c. A bank can only acquire less than 100 percent.If so, please mention the maximum % which
can be owned.
d. A bank may not have any equity investment in a non-?nancial ?rm whatsoever
4.5 In your jurisdiction, what type of ?nancial conglomerate structures involving banks are
allowed?
a. Conglomerates whose parent is a bank.
b. Conglomerates whose parent is a non-bank ?nancial institution (e.g. insurance company or
securities ?rm).
c. Conglomerates whose parent is a non-?nancial institution (e.g. non-operating ?nancial
holding company).
Part 5: external auditing requirements
Appointment and dismissal of auditors
5.1 Is an audit by a professional external auditor required for all commercial banks in your
jurisdiction?
5.1.1 If yes, does the external auditor have to [. . .]?
a. Obtain a professional certi?cation or pass a speci?c exam to qualify as such.
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b. Register with an appropriate public and/or professional body.
c. Have a minimum required bank auditing experience.
d. Be approved or reviewed by the supervisor (e.g. by having a pre-de?ned list of approved
auditors or by providing written approval).
5.1.2 Are speci?c requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out?
5.2 Are there mandatory rotation requirements (i.e. limits on the number of consecutive years
audited) in place for the [. . .]
a. Lead auditor (engagement/concurring partner).
b. Auditing ?rm.
5.3 Are banks required to promptly report to the banking supervisor any change of external
auditor and the reasons for the change?
5.3.1 Are banks required to nominate more than one external auditor?
Auditing standards – scope of work
5.4 Do laws or regulations require auditors to conduct their audits in accordance with
International Standards on Auditing (ISA)?
5.5 Do regulations explicitly prohibit auditing ?rms from providing non-audit services to the
banks whose ?nancial accounts they audit?
Audit ?ndings and reports
5.6 Is the audit report on the ?nancial statements of a bank required to be publicly disclosed
together with these ?nancial statements?
5.7 Do supervisors receive a copy of the following [. . .]:
a. The auditor’s report on the ?nancial statements.
b. The auditor’s letter to bank management.
c. Other communication to the audit committee.
5.8 Are auditors required to promptly inform banking supervisors when they intend to issue
quali?ed opinions on the accounts?
5.8.1 Are auditors required to promptly inform banking supervisors when they identify
information that could affect the safety and soundness of a bank?
5.9 Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?
Relationship between the banking supervisor and external auditor
5.10 Does the banking supervisor have the right to meet with the external auditors and discuss
their report without the approval of the bank?
a. No.
b. Yes, it happens on a regular basis.
c. Yes, it happens on an exceptional basis.
5.11 Are external auditors subject to independent oversight by [. . .]?
a. Ministry of Finance or other government department.
b. Specialized public entity (e.g. independent audit regulator).
c. Banking supervisory agency.
d. Other (please explain).
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5.12 In cases where the supervisor identi?es that the bank has received an inadequate audit, does
the supervisor have the powers to take actions against [. . .]:
a. The bank.
b. The external auditor.
5.12.1 How many actions have been taken by the supervisor in the past ?ve years (2006-2010)
against [. . .]?
a. The bank.
b. The external auditor.
5.13 Do supervisors delegate part of their supervisory tasks to external auditors?
a. No.
b. Yes, as part of the regular supervisory process.
c. Yes, on an exceptional basis.
5.14 Among the ten biggest banks in your country, how many are audited by one of the “big
four” accounting ?rms (PwC, KPMG, E&Y, Deloitte)?
Part 6: bank governance
Use text ?eld below for additional notes if questions in this section are not speci?c enough.
Please remember to include number of questions to which you refer in your notes.
6.1 Have you issued speci?c guidelines or requirements that explicitly address the following
areas in the governance of commercial banks?
a. Establishment of Audit Committee.
b. Establishment of Compensation Committee.
c. Requirement for a majority of independent directors in board.
d. Requirement for a majority of independent directors in Audit and Compensation
Committees.
e. Structure of remuneration packages for Board directors and senior management.
f. Public disclosure of remuneration packages for Board directors and senior
management.
g. Board directors’ responsibility for accurate and truthful ?nancial and regulatory reporting,
including public disclosure.
h. Separation of the roles of CEO and Board chairperson.
i. Provisions covering related party transactions.
j. Fit and proper requirements for Board and senior management.
k. Existence of independent risk management function within the bank.
6.2 Do the above guidelines or requirements apply uniformly to all banks (e.g. including
state-owned and foreign banks)?
6.3 How many enforcement actions have you taken over the past ?ve years (2006-2010) based
on a breach of any of the above bank governance requirements?
6.4 Does the supervisor exercise approval authority with respect to the appointment
of [. . .]?
a. Board directors.
b. Senior bank management.
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6.5 Is the remuneration or compensation of the following individuals evaluated as part of the
supervisory process to ensure that they do not lead to excessive risk-taking?
a. Board directors.
b. Senior bank management.
c. Other bank staff (e.g. traders).
6.5.1 If so, does the supervisory agency have the authority to take regulatory action when it
considers that the remuneration or compensation is excessive?
6.6 Does the regulatory de?nition of related parties include the following [. . .]?
a. Signi?cant/controlling shareholders.
b. Board directors.
c. Relatives of signi?cant/controlling shareholders and board directors.
d. Business interests of signi?cant/controlling shareholders, board directors, and their relatives.
6.7 Is there a regulatory limit on related party exposures?
6.7.1 If so, what is the limit as a percentage of a bank’s regulatory capital?
6.8 Have you introduced changes to the bank governance framework in your country as a result
of the global ?nancial crisis? Mark the appropriate response below and explain where
appropriate.
a. New requirements on executive compensation.
b. Independence of the board.
c. Chief risk of?cer direct reporting line to the board or board committee.
d. Existence of a board risk committee.
e. Other (please explain).
Part 7: liquidity and diversi?cation requirements
Risk concentrations
7.1 Are banks limited in their lending to a single borrower or a group of inter-related borrowers?
7.1.1 If yes, what is the limit as a percentage of a bank’s regulatory capital?
7.1.2 Are there any exempted items (e.g. cash secured lending, government or government
guaranteed lending, etc.) in applying the limits?
7.2 Are there any regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding asset diversi?cation?
If yes, please explain.
7.2.1 Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad?
Regulatory liquidity requirements
7.3 Are there regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding the following aspects of
banks’ liquidity management?
a. Diversi?cation of funding sources.
b. Contingency funding plans, including stress testing.
7.3.1 If so, do they also apply for foreign branches?
a. Diversi?cation of funding sources.
b. Contingency funding plans, including stress testing.
7.4 Are the following requirements in place in your jurisdiction?
a. Banks’ liquidity management of foreign currencies.
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b. Central Bank reserve and/or deposit requirements.
c. Regulatory minimum ratio on liquid assets (e.g. as a percentage of total balance sheet or
deposit base).
d. Maturity mismatches/”gap” limits.
7.4.1 Are banks required to hold reserves in foreign currencies or other foreign-denominated
instruments in order to ful?ll the requirements listed above?
Part 8: depositor (savings) protection schemes
Organizational arrangements
8.1 Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system for commercial banks?
8.2 Is there a legally separate deposit insurance agency?
a. Yes.
b. No – within central bank.
c. No – within banking supervision agency.
d. No – within Ministry of Finance.
e. Other (please explain).
8.2.1 The insurance fund is managed by [. . .]:
a. the private sector alone.
b. jointly by private/public of?cials.
c. the public sector alone.
8.3 Is the deposit insurance fund used for purposes other than depositor protection (e.g. liquidity
provision to banks)?
8.4 Does the deposit insurance agency/fund administrator have the following powers as part of
its mandate?
a. Bank examination authority.
b. Authority to access information collected by banking supervisors.
c. Bank intervention authority.
d. Method of failure resolution authority.
e. Paybox authority.
8.4.1 Does the deposit insurance authority by itself have the legal power to cancel or revoke
deposit insurance for any participating bank?
8.4.2 Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations against laws,
regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other bank
of?cials?
8.4.3 Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations against
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other
bank of?cials?
Membership and coverage
8.5 Is participation in the deposit insurance system compulsory for the following banking
entities?
a. Domestic banks.
b. Foreign bank subsidiaries.
c. Foreign bank branches.
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8.6 Are the following types of deposits excluded from deposit insurance coverage?
a. Foreign currency deposits.
b. Interbank deposits.
c. Deposits of the foreign branches of domestic banks.
d. Deposits of the foreign subsidiaries of domestic banks.
8.7 The deposit insurance coverage type is:
a. Per depositor account.
b. Per depositor.
c. Per depositor per institution.
d. Other (please explain).
8.8 What is the basic deposit insurance limit per category of insured deposits as of end of 2010?
Please enter amount in thousands of local currency.
8.9 Is the coverage amount indexed to prices?
8.10 Is there formal coinsurance, i.e. are ALL depositors explicitly insured for less than 100
percent of their deposits?
8.11 What percentage of the total deposits of participating commercial banks was actually
covered by the scheme as of end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
8.11.1 As a share of total assets, what is the value of large denominated debt liabilities of banks
(e.g. subordinated debt, bonds, etc.) that are de?nitely not covered by any explicit or implicit
savings protection scheme?
Funding
8.12 Is there an ex ante fund/reserve to cover deposit insurance claims in the event of the failure
of a member bank?
8.13 Funding is provided by [. . .]:
a. Government.
b. Banks.
c. Combination/other (please explain).
8.13.1 If prefunded, what is the ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets as of end of 2010?
8.14 Do deposit insurance fees/premiums charged to banks vary based on some assessment
of risk?
8.15 Is the premium assessed on a participating bank’s [. . .]?
a. Insured deposits.
b. Total deposits.
c. Total assets.
d. Other (please explain).
Depositor reimbursement
8.16 What event triggers a claim for payment by the deposit insurance system?
a. Court-declared bank bankruptcy.
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b. Banking supervisor decision.
c. Deposit insurance agency/fund administrator decision.
d. Other (please explain).
8.17 From the time of the event’s trigger, within how many days is the deposit insurance scheme
legally obligated to fully reimburse insured depositors?
Other relevant information
8.17.1 In general, how long (in days) does it take in practice to pay depositors in full?
8.17.2 Were insured depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) the last
time a bank failed?
8.17.3 Were any deposits not explicitly covered by the deposit insurance scheme at the time of
failure compensated the last time a bank failed (excluding funds later paid out in liquidation
procedures)?
8.18 What happens when the deposit insurance fund is insuf?ciently large to be able to fully
refund depositors?
a. Call on banks for the shortfall.
b. Call on the Ministry of Finance for the shortfall.
c. Borrow money.
d. Limit payouts.
e. Other (please explain).
8.18.1 Has such a situation occurred in the last ?ve years (2006-2010)?
8.19 Have you introduced changes to your deposit protection system as a result of the global
?nancial crisis? Mark the appropriate response below and explain where appropriate.
a. Expansion of coverage (types of exposures, nature of depositors, etc.).
b. Increase in amount covered.
c. Temporary inclusion of guarantees on bank debt.
d. Government guarantee of deposits and bank debts.
e. Other (please explain).
Part 9: asset classi?cation, provisioning, and write-offs
Asset classi?cation
9.1 Do you have an asset classi?cation system under which banks have to report the quality of
their loans and advances using a common regulatory scale?
9.1.1 If so, please provide the type and number of different asset classi?cation categories
(e.g. 1-5, AAA-CCC, etc.) that you are using in this system.
9.1.2 Please specify whether it [. . .]:
a. Applies to all commercial banks.
b. Covers all types of borrowers (e.g. including government).
c. Covers all loans and advances to a borrower.
d. Imposes a uniform classi?cation requirement for speci?c borrowers (e.g. government
and/or state-owned enterprises can only be graded at or above a certain category).
9.1.3 After how many days is a loan in arrears classi?ed as [. . .]?: provide numbers for each of the
three loan categories listed.
a. Sub-standard?
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b. Doubtful?
c. Loss?
9.2 Which criteria are taken into account to classify loans and advances as non-performing [. . .]?:
a. Signi?cant ?nancial dif?culty of the borrower and deterioration in its creditworthiness.
b. Breach of contract (e.g. default or delinquency in interest or principal payments).
c. Restructuring (i.e. concession granted, for economic or legal reasons relating to the
borrower’s ?nancial dif?culty, that the lender would not otherwise consider).
d. Borrower bankruptcy or other ?nancial reorganization.
e. Days past due status (please specify number of days).
f. Existence of collateral, guarantees and/or other credit mitigants.
g. Other (please explain).
9.3 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the bank’s income statement while the
loan is classi?ed as non-performing?
9.4 Are banks allowed to upgrade the classi?cation of a loan or advance immediately after it has
been restructured?
9.5 If a customer has multiple loans and advances and one of them is classi?ed as
non-performing, are all the other exposures automatically classi?ed as non-performing as well?
Provisioning of classi?ed loans
9.6 Are there minimum levels of speci?c provisions for loans and advances that are set by the
regulator?
9.6.1 If so, are these linked to the regulatory asset classi?cation system mentioned in question
9.1 above?
9.6.2 Please specify whether these minimum speci?c provisioning rules [. . .]:
a. Allow for the value of the collateral to be deducted from the amount of a loan or advance
before provisioning is applied.
b. Apply to all commercial banks.
c. Cover all types of borrowers (e.g. including government).
d. Cover all loans and advances to a borrower.
e. Impose uniform provisioning requirements for speci?c borrowers (e.g. loans to government
and/or state-owned enterprises do not require provisions).
9.6.3 What is the minimum provisioning required as loans become [. . .]:
a. Sub-standard?
b. Doubtful?
c. Loss?
9.7 Is there a regulatory requirement for general provisions on loans and advances?
9.7.1 If so, what are general provisions based on?
a. Percentage of gross loans.
b. Statistical/counter-cyclical system of provisioning.
c. Other – please explain.
Write-offs
9.8 Do you require banks to write off non-performing loans after a speci?c time period?
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9.8.1 If so, what is the maximum time (in months) that a loan or advance can be
non-performing before it has to be written off?
Other
9.9 Up to what level (if any) are the following types of provisions tax deductible?
a. Speci?c provisions.
b. General provisions.
Part 10: accounting/information disclosure
Scope of accounting consolidation
10.1 Are banks required to prepare consolidated accounts for accounting purposes?
Accounting standards
10.2.1 Are applicable accounting standards for banks in your country prepared in accordance
with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)?
a. At individual bank level.
b. At consolidated level.
10.2.2 Are applicable accounting standards for banks in your country prepared in accordance
with IFRS?
a. At individual bank level.
b. At consolidated level.
10.2.3 If response to 10.2.1 and 10.2.2 is no, please explain each case under options a and b:
a. Any major deviations between local and international accounting standards.
b. Which authority in your country sets the accounting standards for banks (e.g. banking
supervisor, accounting board, etc.)
10.2.4 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan
is still performing?
10.2.5 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the
loan is non-performing?
Public disclosure standards
10.3 Are all banks operating in your country (including foreign bank branches) required to make
available to the public their annual ?nancial statements?
a. On an individual basis.
b. On a consolidated basis (if applicable).
10.4 Are banks required to submit their ?nancial statements to the banking supervisor prior to
public disclosure?
10.4.1 If yes, respond to yes or no to each option provided below:
a. Is the supervisor required to review them?
b. Can the supervisor require changes to them before they are published?
10.5 Do banks disclose to the supervisors [. . .]?
a. Full audited ?nancial statements.
b. Off-balance sheet items.
c. Governance and risk management framework.
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d. Regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio.
e. Transactions with related parties.
f. Any other material information (i.e. information which omission or misstatement could
change or in?uence the assessment or decision of a user relying on that information for
making decisions).
g. Scope of consolidation (including reasons for not including certain entities, where
appropriate).
10.5.1 Do banks disclose to the public [. . .]?
a. Full audited ?nancial statements.
b. Off-balance sheet items.
c. Governance and risk management framework.
d. Regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio.
e. Transactions with related parties.
f. Any other material information (i.e. information which omission or misstatement could
change or in?uence the assessment or decision of a user relying on that information for
making decisions).
g. Scope of consolidation (including reasons for not including certain entities, where appropriate).
10.5.2 Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading?
10.6 Do supervisors require banks to publicly disclose [. . .]:
a. All ?nes and settlements resulting from non-compliance with regulations.
b. Other information not required by ?nancial reporting standards (e.g. prudential reports).
If so, please explain.
10.7 Are commercial banks required by supervisors to have external credit ratings?
10.8 How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by international
credit rating agencies (e.g. Moody’s, Standard and Poor)?
10.9 How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by domestic
credit rating agencies?
Part 11: discipline/problem institutions/exit
Enforcement
11.1 Please indicate whether the following enforcement powers are available to the
supervisory agency:
a. Cease and desist-type orders for imprudent bank practices.
b. Forbearance (i.e. to waive regulatory and supervisory requirements).
c. Require a bank to meet supervisory requirements (e.g. capital, liquidity, etc.) that are
stricter than the legal or regulatory minimum.
d. Require bank to enhance governance, internal controls and risk management systems.
e. Require bank to apply speci?c provisioning and/or write-off policies.
f. Require banks to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses.
g. Restrict or place conditions on the types of business conducted by bank.
h. Withdraw the bank’s license.
i. Require banks to reduce/restructure their operations (e.g. via asset sales and branch
closures) and adjust their risk pro?le.
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j. Require banks to reduce or suspend dividends to shareholders.
k. Require banks to reduce or suspend bonuses and other remuneration to bank directors and
managers.
l. Suspend or remove bank directors.
m. Suspend or remove managers.
n. Require commitment/action from controlling shareholder(s) to support the bank with new
equity (e.g. capital restoration plan).
11.1.1 Are bank regulators/supervisors required to make public formal enforcement actions,
which include cease and desist orders and written agreements between a bank
regulatory/supervisory body and a banking organization?
11.2 Please indicate how many times any of the above enforcement actions in the last ?ve years
(2006-2010):
a. Have been contested in court.
b. Have been overturned by the court.
11.3 Does the supervisory agency operate an early intervention framework (e.g. prompt
corrective action) that forces automatic action when certain regulatory triggers/thresholds are
breached?
11.3.1 If so, what triggers/thresholds are used for initiating automatic actions?
a. Breach of minimum regulatory capital adequacy ratio.
b. Breach of other regulatory requirements (e.g. liquidity ratio, ?t and proper criteria).
c. Evaluation of likely non-viability given trends and risk factors.
d. Other (please specify).
Resolution
11.4 Is there a separate bank insolvency framework that is distinct from that of non-?nancial
?rms?
11.4.1 Is the insolvency framework the same for bank holding companies and banks? If not
please explain the differences.
11.5 Which authority has the powers to perform the following problem bank resolution
activities?
Enter the initials of the corresponding authority from the following list of options: BS – bank
supervisor, C – court, DIA – deposit insurance agency, BR/AMC – bank restructuring or asset
management agency, OTH – other – please specify).”
a. Declare insolvency:Other – please specify.
b. Supersede shareholders’ rights: Other – please specify.
c. Remove and replace bank senior management and directors: Other – please specify
d. Undertake bank resolution mechanisms: Other – please specify
e. Appoint and oversee a bank liquidator/receiver: Other – please specify
11.6 Is court approval required for the following bank resolution activities?
a. Declare insolvency.
b. Supersede shareholders’ rights.
c. Remove and replace bank senior management and directors.
d. Undertake bank resolution mechanisms.
e. Appoint and oversee a bank liquidator/receiver.
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11.7 Can the bank shareholders appeal to the court against a resolution decision of the banking
supervisor?
11.7.1 If yes, how many appeals were made in the past ?ve years (2006-2010)?
11.7.1.1 Of which, how many were successful?
11.8 Can a resolution action against a bank continue if a court action is ?led, or does the court
appeal lead to the suspension of such action until a ruling is made?
11.9 Which mechanisms are provided in existing legislation to resolve a problem bank prior to its
closure and liquidation?
a. Open bank assistance.
b. Purchase and assumption transaction (with or without government support).
c. Government intervention (e.g. via conservatorship or nationalization).
d. Bridge bank.
e. Other (please specify).
11.10.1 How many banks were resolved in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.10.2 How many banks were liquidated in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.11.1 What proportion of banking system assets were resolved in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.11.2 What proportion of banking system assets were liquidated in [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
11.12 Have you introduced signi?cant changes to the bank resolution framework in your country
as a result of the global ?nancial crisis?
a. Introduce a separate bank insolvency framework.
b. Implement coordination arrangements among domestic authorities.
c. Other, please explain.
Part 12: supervision
Institutional structure and mandate
12.1 What body/agency supervises commercial banks for prudential purposes?
a. The Central Bank.
b. A single bank supervisory agency/superintendency.
c. Multiple bank supervisory agencies/superintendencies including the Central Bank.
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d. Multiple bank supervisory agencies/superintendencies excluding the Central Bank.
e. Other (please explain).
12.1.1 Are there any banks that are not under the jurisdiction of this agency?
If yes, please explain.
12.2 Is the body/agency in charge of supervising banks also responsible for the supervision of
the following ?nancial sectors?
a. Insurance.
b. Securities.
c. Pension funds.
d. Other (please explain).
12.3 Does the body/agency have a speci?c mandate set out in written form?
12.3.1 If so, which of the following ?nancial system responsibilities does the mandate also
include?
a. Systemic/?nancial stability.
b. Market conduct.
c. Consumer protection.
d. Prevention of ?nancial crime (anti-money laundering / combating ?nancing of terrorism).
e. Competition/antitrust policy.
f. Financial market access/development.
g. Deposit insurance.
h. Bank restructuring/resolution.
i. Other (please explain).
12.3.2 Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure?
12.4 To whom is the supervisory agency legally responsible or accountable?
a. The head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister).
b. The Finance Minister or other cabinet level of?cial.
c. A legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress.
d. Other (please explain).
12.5 How is the head of the supervisory agency appointed?
a. Decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister).
b. Decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority.
c. Decision of a legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress.
d. Other (please explain).
12.5.1 Is the appointment based on a recommendation by an external expert or panel of
experts?
12.6 Does the head of the supervisory agency have a ?xed term?
12.6.1 If yes, how long (in years) is the term?
12.6.2 Is there a maximum number of terms?
12.6.3 If yes, please respond how many terms are permitted.
12.7 Can the head of the supervisory agency be removed by [. . .]?:
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a. Decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister).
b. Decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority.
c. Decision of a legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress.
d. Other (please explain).
12.8 Does the supervisory agency need to obtain approval from the government in order to [. . .]?
a. Issue binding secondary regulations for the banking sector.
b. Determine its budget.
c. Obtain funding.
d. Hire and ?re senior staff.
e. De?ne salaries and bene?ts structure of staff.
f. De?ne its organizational structure.
12.9 Can individual supervisory staff be held personally liable for damages to a bank caused by
their actions or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of their duties?
12.9.1 If so, has individual supervisory staff been held personally liable in the last ?ve years
(2006-2010)?
12.10 Can the supervisory agency be held legally liable for damages to a bank caused by its
actions?
12.10.1 If so, has the supervisory agency been held legally liable in the last ?ve years
(2006-2010)?
12.11 Is a formal consultation process with the industry and the public required prior to the
introduction of new regulations?
12.12 If an infraction of any prudential regulation is found in the course of supervision, must
it be reported?
12.12.1 Are there mandatory actions that the supervisor must take in these cases?
12.12.2 Who authorizes exceptions to such actions?
12.12.3 How many exceptions were granted during the last ?ve years (2006-2010)?
Supervisory approach
12.13 Please rank from 1 to 3 (1 being the most important) the relative importance placed on
the following activities in banking supervision. Place ranking next to each option.
a. Analysis and monitoring of compliance and trends observed from reported prudential
returns.
b. Review of the accuracy of reports and of regulatory compliance.
c. Assessment of the risk pro?le, strategic direction, ?nancial condition, internal governance
and controls, and risk management.
12.14 The internal organization of banking supervision can be best characterized as [. . .]:
a. Integrated on-site and offsite activities for each entity under a senior/managing supervisor.
b. Resident supervisory teams in large systemic complex banks and groups.
c. Existence of specialized examiners (e.g. treasury, IT, risk management) that can be used
across different banks.
12.15 Which of the following best describes the bank risk rating methodology used by your
agency?
a. A rating system using only ratios and indicators built with reported information.
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b. A rating system combining quantitative information with qualitative assessments of
management and controls.
c. A broader risk rating system combining quantitative and qualitative measures of inherent
risk, management and controls, and residual risk by type of bank activity and/or risk
category.
d. Other (please explain).
12.16 Is the intensity and frequency of supervisory activities explicitly linked to the bank’s risk
rating?
12.17 Is the risk rating disclosed to the bank’s board?
12.18 Do you undertake on-site inspections for material foreign operations (whether in the form
of branches or subsidiaries) of your banks or do you only rely on host country supervisors?
12.19 How many onsite examinations per bank were performed in the last ?ve years (2006-2010)?
12.20 How frequently are onsite inspections conducted in large and medium size banks?
Consolidated supervision
12.21 If you do not have an integrated ?nancial supervisory agency covering all signi?cant
?nancial institutions, how is a ?nancial group with signi?cant banking activities supervised?
a. The banking supervisory agency/body is legally empowered to act as the
“lead/supplemental supervisor” and supervises on a consolidated basis.
b. The banking supervisory agency/body is nominated as the “lead/supplemental supervisor”
under informal arrangements between the relevant parties and supervises on a
consolidated basis.
c. There is no “lead/supplemental supervisor” but there is coordination between ?nancial
supervisors formalized in MOUs.
d. Other (please explain).
Systemic supervision
12.22 Is there a specialized department in your agency dealing with ?nancial stability and
systemic supervision?
12.22.1 Which of the following factors do you consider in assessing systemic risk?
a. Bank capital ratios.
b. Bank leverage ratios.
c. Bank pro?tability ratios.
d. Bank liquidity ratios.
f. Growth in bank credit.
g. Sectorial composition of bank loan portfolios.
h. FX position of banks.
i. Bank non-performing loan ratios.
j. Bank provisioning ratios.
k. Stock market prices.
l. Housing prices.
m. Other (please specify).
12.23 Is your agency responsible for publishing a ?nancial stability report?
12.24 If your agency is not directly responsible for publishing a ?nancial stability report, do you
provide input to the responsible agency for such a report?
12.25 Do you conduct stress test as part of the process of assessing systemic stability?
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12.26 If you conduct stress tests, at what level are they performed [. . .]?
a. At the bank level.
b. At the system wide level.
c. Other, please explain.
12.27 Do you have any counter-cyclical regulations or tools to dampen boom/bust cycles in credit
?ows? Enter Yes or No and enter date (in format: MM/DD/YYYY) when they came or will come
into effect.
a. Counter-cyclical capital requirements.
Date:
b. Counter-cyclical loan to value ratios.
Date:
c. Granular capital requirements based on loan to value ratios.
Date:
d. Counter-cyclical provisioning requirements.
Date:
e. Temporary restrictions on dividend and bonuses distribution.
Date:
12.28 Do you supervise systemic institutions in a different way than non-systemic ones?
12.29 If yes, do you have any tools to oversee more closely and/or limit the activities of
large/interconnected institutions? Enter Yes or No and enter date (in format: MM/DD/YYYY)
when they came or will come into effect:
a. Additional capital requirements.
Date:
b. Additional liquidity requirements.
Date:
c. Asset/risk diversi?cation requirements.
Date:
d. Restrictions/limits on activities.
Date:
e. Restrictions/limits on size of institution.
Date:
f. Additional corporate taxes for large institutions.
Date:
g. Closer or more frequent supervision.
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Date:
h. Restrictions on the group’s legal structure.
Date:
i. Other.
Date:
If Other, please explain.
Supervisory staff
12.30 How many professional bank supervisors are there in total (excluding all support functions
and management)?
12.31 Of those, how many are specialized in speci?c bank functions (e.g. IT, treasury) or risks
(e.g. credit / market / operational risk)?
12.32 What percentage of the supervisors has graduated from a four year college/university?
12.33 What percentage of the supervisors has post-graduate degrees such as MBAs, CPA or CFAs?
12.34 How many hours of training (at the supervisory agency or elsewhere) on average have
supervisors had in the last year?
12.35 What is the annual average salary of a senior supervisor (someone with ten or more years
of experience in bank supervision)? (In thousands of local currency)
12.36 What was the annual total budget for banking supervision during 2010? (In thousands of
local currency).
12.37 What was the source of this funding?
a. Allocation from government budget.
b. Fees and assessments paid by regulated banks.
c. Other (please explain).
12.38 Howmany of the bank supervisors have more than ten years experience in bank supervision?
12.39 What is the average tenure of banking supervisors (i.e. what is the average number of years
that staffs have been supervisors)?
Part 13: banking sector characteristics
Size
13.1 How many commercial banks were there at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.1.1 Of all deposit taking institutions in your country, what fraction of their assets is held by
just commercial banks at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.2 What were the total assets of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of local
currency)
2008
2009
2010
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13.3 What was the total equity of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of local
currency)
2008
2009
2010
13.4 What were the total deposits of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of
local currency)
2008
2009
2010
13.5 What were the total loans of all commercial banks at the end of [. . .]? (In thousands of local
currency)
2008
2009
2010
Structure of the banking sector
13.6 Of commercial banks in your country, what percent of total assets was held by the ?ve
largest banks at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.6.1 Of commercial banks in your country, what percent of total deposits was held by the ?ve
largest banks at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.7.1 What percent of the banking system’s assets was in banks that were government-controlled
(e.g. where government-owned 50 percent or more equity) at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.7.2 What percent of the banking system’s assets was in banks that were foreign-controlled
(e.g. where foreigners owned 50 percent or more equity) at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
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13.8 What percent of the total foreign-owned bank assets in your domestic banking system was
held in branches as opposed to other juridical forms (e.g. subsidiaries) at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
Performance
13.9 What was the after-tax return on equity for the commercial banking system at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.10 What was the aggregate net interest margin for the commercial banking system at the end
of [. . .]? ðIn thousands of local currencyÞ
2008
2009
2010
13.11 What percent of the commercial banking system’s total gross income was in the form of
non-interest income in at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.12 What were the aggregate operating costs to assets ratio for the commercial banking system
in at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.13 What was the ratio of non-performing loans (gross of provisions) to total gross loans at the
end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.14 What was the ratio of speci?c provisions to gross non-performing loans at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.15 What was the ratio of general provisions to total gross loans at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
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Asset and liabilities composition
13.16 What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets was foreign-currency
denominated at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.17 What percent of the commercial banking system’s liabilities was foreign-currency
denominated at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.18 What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets was in public sector claims at the
end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.19 What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets is funded with deposits at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.20 What percentage of total bank assets were residential real estate loans at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.21 What percentage of total bank assets were commercial real estate loans at the end
of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
13.22 What percentage of residential real estate loans were securitized at the end of [. . .]?
2008
2009
2010
Other
13.23 What is the statutory corporate tax rate on domestic bank income as of end of 2010?
13.24 What was the effective tax rate on the aggregate commercial banking system’s pre-tax
income at the end of 2010?
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Part 14: consumer protection
14.1 Does your agency have the responsibility to implement, oversee and/or enforce any aspect of
?nancial consumer protection laws and regulations that apply to banks?
a. Yes.
b. No, ?nancial consumer protection laws and regulations are implemented, overseen and
enforced by other government agencies.
c. Other, please describe.
14.2 If your agency has the responsibility to implement, oversee and/or enforce any aspect of
?nancial consumer protection laws, is there a separate unit or team designated to work on
consumer protection in your agency?
a. Yes.
b. No.
c. Does not apply.
14.3 What actions can your agency take to enforce consumer protection laws and regulations?
a. Issue warnings to ?nancial institutions.
b. Require providers to refund excess charges.
c. Require providers to withdraw misleading advertisements.
d. Impose ?nes and penalties.
e. Issue public notice of violations.
f. Withdraw the offending provider’s license to operate.
g. Other, please specify.
14.4 Please indicate the number of times the actions stated above in 14.3 were taken in the past
?ve years (2006-2010):
a. Issue warnings to ?nancial institutions.
b. Require providers to refund excess charges.
c. Require providers to withdraw misleading advertisements.
d. Impose ?nes and penalties.
e. Issue public notice of violations.
f. Withdraw the offending provider’s license to operate.
g. Other, please specify.
14.5 By law or regulations, are banks required to notify consumers in writing of pricing, terms
and conditions of ?nancial products prior to signing an agreement?
14.6 By law or regulation, which of the following are part of the disclosure
requirements mentioned in 14.5 that banks need to comply with upon signing any ?nancial
product contract:
a. Plain language requirement (clear and simple language that can be readily understood by
any customer).
b. Local language requirement.
c. Prescribed standardized disclosure format (e.g. one-page “Key Facts” document).
d. Clearly spell out recourse rights and processes.
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14.7 By law or regulation, which of the following are part of the disclosure requirements
mentioned in 14.5 that banks need to comply with upon signing a deposit contract:
a. Annual percentage yield and interest rate.
b. Method of compounding.
c. Minimum balance requirements.
d. Fees and penalties.
e. Early withdrawal penalties.
14.8 By law or regulation, which of the following are part of the disclosure requirements
mentioned in 14.5 that banks need to comply with upon signing a credit contract:
a. Annual percentage rate using a standard formula.
b. Fees.
c. Computation method (average balance, interest).
d. Required insurance.
14.9 By law or regulation, are banks required to provide their customers with a periodic
statement of their accounts?
a. Yes, periodic statement must be provided free of charge with the following frequency:
i. Monthly.
ii. Quarterly.
iii. Annually.
iv. Other.
b. No, but a statement can be provided free of charge upon customer request.
c. No, but customer can purchase this additional service.
d. Regulations do not specify.
14.10 By law or regulation, which of the following are parts of the disclosure requirements for
periodic statements for deposit products?
a. Annual percentage yield calculated using a standard formula.
b. Amount of interest earned.
c. Fees imposed.
d. Account balance.
14.11 By law or regulation, which of the following are parts of the disclosure requirements for
periodic statements for credit products?
a. All transactions concerning the account for the period covered by the statement.
b Annual percentage rate (applied during the period).
c Interest charged for the period.
d. Fees charged for the period.
e. Minimum amount due.
f. Date due.
g. Outstanding balance.
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P
T
)
14.12 Are there speci?c provisions in the existing laws or regulations that restrict:
a. Deceptive advertising.
b. Unfair or high-pressure selling practices.
c. Abusive collection practices.
d. Unauthorized use of client data or breach of client con?dentiality.
14.13 Does any law or regulation set standards for complaints resolution and handling by
?nancial institutions, including:
a. Requirement for ?nancial institutions to implement procedures and processes for resolving
customer complaints.
b. Timeliness of response by ?nancial institution.
c. Accessibility (i.e. can a complaint be ?led with a local branch, by phone, etc.)
14.14 Is there a system in place that allows a customer of a ?nancial institution to seek affordable
and ef?cient recourse with a third party (a ?nancial ombudsman or equivalent institution) in the
event that the customer’s complaint is not resolved to the customer’s satisfaction under internal
procedures of the relevant ?nancial institution?
a. Yes, ?nancial ombudsman.
b. Yes, general ombudsman.
c. Yes, a mediation service.
d. No, dispute has to be resolved in court.
Bank regulation
and supervision
207
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 2
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Albania X X
Algeria X X
Angola X X
Anguilla X X
Antigua and Barbuda X X
Argentina X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X
Aruba X X
Australia X X X X X
Austria X X X X X
Azerbaijan X X
Bahrain X X X X X
Bangladesh X X X
Belarus X X X X X
Belgium X X X X X
Belize X X X
Benin X X X
Bhutan X X X X X
Bolivia X X X
Bosnia and Herzegovina X X X X X
Botswana X X X X X
Brazil X X X X X
Bulgaria X X X X X
Burkina Faso X X X
Burundi X X X X X
Cambodia X X
Cameroon X X
Canada X X X X X
Cayman Islands X X X
Central African Republic X X
Chad X X
Chile X X X X X
China X X X
Colombia X X X
Congo, Rep. X X
Cook Islands X X
Costa Rica X X X
Coˆte d’Ivoire X X X
Croatia X X X X X
Cyprus X X X X X
Czech Republic X X X
Denmark X X X X X
Dominica X X
Dominican Republic X X
Ecuador X X
Egypt X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea X X
(continued)
Table AI.
Countries participating in
the World Bank surveys
JFEP
5,2
208
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Estonia X X X X X
Ethiopia X X
Fiji X X X
inland X X X X X
France X X X X X
Gabon X X
Gambia X X X
Georgia X
Germany X X X X X
Ghana X X X X X
Gibraltar X X X X X
Greece X X X X X
Grenada X X
Guatemala X X X X X
Guernsey X X X X X
Guinea X
Guinea-Bissau X X X
Guyana X X X X X
Honduras X X X X X
Hong Kong, China X X X
Hungary X X X X X
Iceland X X X X X
India X X X X X
Indonesia X X X
Iraq X
Ireland X X X X X
Isle of Man X X X
Israel X X X X X
Italy X X X X X
Jamaica X X X
Japan X X X
Jersey X X X
Jordan X X X X X
Kazakhstan X X X X X
Kenya X X X X X
Korea, Rep. X X X X X
Kosovo X X
Kuwait X X X X X
Kyrgyz Republic X X X X X
Latvia X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X
Lesotho X X X X X
Liechtenstein X X X X X
Lithuania X X X X X
Luxembourg X X X X X
Macao, China X X X X X
Macedonia X X X
Madagascar X X
Malawi X X X
Malaysia X X X X X
(continued)
Table AI.
Bank regulation
and supervision
209
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Maldives X X X
Mali X X X
Malta X X X X X
Mauritius X X X X X
Mexico X X X X X
Moldova X X X X X
Montenegro X
Montserrat X X
Morocco X X X X X
Mozambique X X
Myanmar X
Namibia X X X
Nepal X X
The Netherlands X X X X X
New Zealand X X X X X
Nicaragua X X X
Niger X X X
Nigeria X X X X X
Norway X X X
Oman X X X X X
Pakistan X X X
Palestinian Territory X
Panama X X X X X
Papua New Guinea X X
Paraguay X X
Peru X X X X X
Philippines X X X X X
Poland X X X X X
Portugal X X X X X
Puerto Rico X X X
Qatar X X X
Romania X X X X X
Russia X X X X X
Rwanda X X
Saint Kitts and Nevis X X X
Saint Lucia X X
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines X X
Samoa (Western) X X X
Saudi Arabia X X X
Senegal X X X
Serbia X
Serbia & Montenegro X
Seychelles X X X X X
Sierra Leone X
Singapore X X X X X
Slovakia X X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X
Solomon Islands X
South Africa X X X X X
Spain X X X X X
(continued)
Table AI.
JFEP
5,2
210
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Country Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV All four surveys
Sri Lanka X X X X X
Sudan X
Suriname X X X
Swaziland X X
Sweden X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
Syria X X
Taiwan X X X X X
Tajikistan X X X X X
Tanzania X X
Thailand X X X X X
Togo X X X
Tonga X X X
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X
Tunisia X X
Turkey X X X
Turkmenistan X X
Turks and Caicos Islands X X
Uganda X X
Ukraine X X
United Arab Emirates X X
UK X X X X X
USA X X X X X
Uruguay X X X
Vanuatu X X X X X
Venezuela X X X X X
Vietnam X
Virgin Islands, British X X X X X
Yugoslavia X
Yemen X
Zambia X
Zimbabwe X X X
Total number of countries 118 151 143 143 84
Total number of questions 180 275 300 270
Table AI.
Bank regulation
and supervision
211
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
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N
D
I
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t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 3
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(
c
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e
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)
Table AII.
World Bank Survey IV –
countries classi?ed by
income and region
(total 136 countries)
JFEP
5,2
212
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
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y
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O
N
D
I
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R
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T
Y
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t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
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4
3
)
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8
)
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n
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3
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2
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Table AII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
213
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
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Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 4
V
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a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
1
3
7
1
.
8
0
2
.
0
0
0
.
9
2
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
b
)
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
1
3
8
2
.
5
3
2
.
0
0
0
.
8
2
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
c
)
R
e
a
l
e
s
t
a
t
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
1
3
7
2
.
8
7
3
.
0
0
1
.
0
8
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
2
.
M
i
x
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
/
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
B
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
1
3
7
2
.
9
4
3
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
b
)
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
1
3
1
2
.
2
2
2
.
0
0
0
.
6
7
1
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
3
.
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
1
4
0
0
.
9
7
1
.
0
0
0
.
1
7
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
b
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
e
n
t
r
y
1
3
5
2
.
7
0
3
.
0
0
0
.
6
3
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
(
c
)
E
n
t
r
y
i
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
1
4
3
7
.
8
2
8
.
0
0
0
.
4
6
5
.
0
0
8
.
0
0
4
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
4
0
5
.
0
4
5
.
0
0
1
.
5
3
2
.
0
0
7
.
0
0
(
b
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
4
2
2
.
2
9
2
.
0
0
0
.
7
6
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
(
c
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
i
n
d
e
x
1
4
0
7
.
3
6
8
.
0
0
1
.
7
2
2
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
(
d
)
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
b
y
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
w
n
e
r
5
0
4
6
.
5
8
2
2
.
5
0
4
0
.
4
4
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
5
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
1
4
2
1
0
.
7
4
1
1
.
0
0
2
.
4
4
5
.
0
0
1
4
.
0
0
(
1
)
P
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
1
3
8
4
.
4
8
6
.
0
0
2
.
1
1
0
.
0
0
6
.
0
0
(
2
)
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
1
3
3
2
.
1
1
2
.
0
0
1
.
0
9
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
(
3
)
D
e
c
l
a
r
i
n
g
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
p
o
w
e
r
1
2
9
1
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
1
0
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
(
b
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
1
4
3
1
.
1
4
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
2
0
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
c
)
L
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
8
3
5
5
4
.
7
5
6
3
0
.
0
0
1
8
9
.
9
8
1
5
3
.
0
0
1
2
6
0
.
0
0
(
d
)
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
8
5
1
6
2
.
8
2
1
7
0
.
0
0
4
4
.
3
0
0
.
0
0
3
0
0
.
0
0
(
e
)
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
/
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
1
4
1
1
.
4
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
6
4
0
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
6
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
1
1
1
3
.
9
3
2
.
6
7
4
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
2
5
.
2
6
(
b
)
B
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
e
a
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
9
9
4
2
.
1
5
1
9
.
5
0
5
7
.
3
2
0
.
4
1
3
2
8
.
4
2
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table AIII.
Information on bank
structural, regulatory,
supervisory and deposit
insurance variables
JFEP
5,2
214
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
n
M
e
d
i
a
n
S
D
M
i
n
i
m
u
m
v
a
l
u
e
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
v
a
l
u
e
(
c
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
t
e
n
u
r
e
1
1
0
8
.
5
5
8
.
0
0
3
.
9
5
1
.
0
0
2
1
.
0
0
(
d
)
O
n
s
i
t
e
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
1
1
9
4
.
0
6
4
.
0
0
2
.
9
0
0
.
0
0
1
8
.
0
0
(
e
)
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
1
3
2
1
.
9
2
2
.
0
0
0
.
8
1
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
7
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
C
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
1
3
7
0
.
9
6
1
.
0
0
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
b
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
1
1
5
5
7
.
3
5
7
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
(
c
)
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
1
4
2
3
.
5
6
4
.
0
0
0
.
5
7
1
.
3
3
4
.
0
0
(
d
)
N
o
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
1
2
9
0
.
3
4
0
.
0
0
0
.
4
8
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
e
)
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
e
x
1
2
2
7
.
7
9
8
.
0
0
1
.
4
0
4
.
0
0
1
1
.
0
0
8
.
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
1
0
0
1
.
1
0
1
.
0
0
1
.
2
6
0
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
(
b
)
E
x
t
r
a
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
1
0
2
0
.
7
2
1
.
0
0
0
.
4
5
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
c
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
o
u
t
d
e
l
a
y
4
1
1
0
1
.
7
1
3
0
.
0
0
1
8
9
.
5
8
1
.
0
0
1
0
9
5
.
0
0
(
d
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
f
u
n
d
s
-
t
o
-
t
o
t
a
l
b
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
5
2
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
1
0
.
1
9
2
0
.
0
6
0
0
.
8
1
(
e
)
M
o
r
a
l
h
a
z
a
r
d
i
n
d
e
x
8
9
1
.
1
1
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
2
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
9
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
(
a
)
B
a
n
k
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
1
2
2
7
1
.
8
9
7
5
.
1
4
1
9
.
9
7
1
4
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
(
b
)
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
b
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
1
1
7
4
9
.
3
4
4
8
.
6
0
3
3
.
6
6
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
(
c
)
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
1
1
8
1
5
.
3
1
8
.
8
5
1
8
.
0
6
0
.
0
0
7
3
.
7
0
(
d
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
n
e
w
b
a
n
k
s
1
2
8
1
1
.
7
1
5
.
0
0
3
4
.
0
6
0
.
0
0
3
7
1
.
0
0
(
1
)
N
e
w
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
1
2
7
4
.
3
6
1
.
0
0
1
7
.
9
5
0
.
0
0
1
9
2
.
0
0
(
2
)
N
e
w
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
s
1
2
3
7
.
6
8
3
.
0
0
1
7
.
8
0
0
.
0
0
1
7
9
.
0
0
(
e
)
N
o
e
n
t
r
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
1
2
6
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
2
9
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
1
)
N
o
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
2
5
0
.
6
3
1
.
0
0
0
.
4
8
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
2
)
N
o
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
2
3
0
.
8
5
1
.
0
0
0
.
3
6
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
f
)
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
n
t
r
y
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
d
e
n
i
e
d
1
0
8
0
.
1
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
3
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
1
)
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
1
0
8
0
.
0
9
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
(
2
)
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
d
e
n
i
a
l
s
1
2
4
0
.
1
1
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
8
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
Table AIII.
Bank regulation
and supervision
215
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 5
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
H
i
g
h
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
U
p
p
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
i
n
c
o
m
e
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
o
r
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
e
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
1
.
B
a
n
k
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
1
.
3
6
1
.
9
2
2
.
1
6
2
.
0
5
1
.
3
7
1
.
9
7
1
.
7
1
(
b
)
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
2
.
4
8
2
.
5
4
2
.
7
7
2
.
5
2
2
.
3
3
2
.
6
3
2
.
5
0
(
c
)
R
e
a
l
e
s
t
a
t
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
2
.
6
0
2
.
9
1
3
.
2
2
3
.
0
5
2
.
5
0
3
.
0
2
3
.
0
0
2
.
M
i
x
i
n
g
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
/
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
B
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
n
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
s
2
.
6
7
2
.
8
3
3
.
2
9
3
.
1
4
2
.
6
3
3
.
0
6
2
.
5
0
(
b
)
N
o
n
-
?
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
?
r
m
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
2
.
2
0
2
.
0
0
2
.
2
9
2
.
6
0
2
.
2
3
2
.
2
5
2
.
0
0
3
.
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
b
a
n
k
s
0
.
9
8
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
6
1
.
0
0
(
b
)
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
b
a
n
k
e
n
t
r
y
2
.
8
8
2
.
7
0
2
.
6
7
2
.
3
0
3
.
0
0
2
.
5
6
3
.
0
0
(
c
)
E
n
t
r
y
i
n
t
o
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
7
.
6
7
7
.
8
7
7
.
9
7
7
.
8
6
7
.
7
4
7
.
8
6
7
.
7
1
4
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
5
.
2
6
4
.
9
5
5
.
2
2
4
.
6
4
5
.
1
3
5
.
0
3
4
.
8
6
(
b
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
.
8
1
2
.
4
9
2
.
5
5
2
.
6
4
1
.
6
5
2
.
5
3
2
.
2
1
(
c
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
i
n
d
e
x
7
.
0
7
7
.
4
6
7
.
8
4
7
.
3
6
6
.
7
7
7
.
6
1
7
.
0
7
(
d
)
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
b
y
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
w
n
e
r
4
7
.
6
4
6
5
.
8
1
3
9
.
4
9
2
4
.
3
6
4
7
.
0
0
4
5
.
9
0
4
1
.
6
7
5
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
c
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
1
0
.
8
0
1
0
.
9
5
1
0
.
6
3
1
0
.
4
9
1
0
.
6
7
1
0
.
7
5
1
1
.
1
1
(
1
)
p
r
o
m
p
t
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
4
.
2
1
4
.
1
3
4
.
9
7
5
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
4
.
6
3
4
.
5
4
(
2
)
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
o
w
e
r
2
.
1
8
2
.
4
0
1
.
9
2
1
.
8
6
2
.
0
9
2
.
1
0
2
.
5
0
(
3
)
D
e
c
l
a
r
i
n
g
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
p
o
w
e
r
0
.
8
2
1
.
3
1
0
.
8
2
1
.
0
5
0
.
7
8
1
.
0
6
0
.
9
0
(
b
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
f
o
r
b
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
1
.
3
7
1
.
1
0
0
.
9
6
0
.
7
4
1
.
4
9
0
.
9
8
1
.
5
5
(
c
)
L
o
a
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
5
2
3
.
6
0
4
9
1
.
4
8
5
6
7
.
5
9
6
5
4
.
7
3
5
3
7
.
6
3
5
5
9
.
6
2
5
2
4
.
0
0
(
d
)
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
1
3
0
.
6
9
1
6
6
.
8
8
1
6
9
.
2
3
1
8
2
.
5
0
1
0
4
.
5
0
1
7
0
.
0
3
1
8
5
.
0
0
(
e
)
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
/
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
?
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
1
.
6
0
1
.
3
3
1
.
1
8
1
.
3
6
1
.
6
1
1
.
3
1
1
.
5
0
6
.
O
f
?
c
i
a
l
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
2
.
3
0
5
.
3
9
5
.
3
6
2
.
2
0
2
.
3
2
4
.
9
5
0
.
8
6
(
b
)
B
a
n
k
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
e
a
r
s
p
e
r
b
a
n
k
1
9
.
5
1
5
2
.
6
6
4
2
.
0
2
1
7
.
7
7
2
0
.
4
4
4
3
.
4
2
5
.
8
3
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
Table AIV.
Information on bank
structural, regulatory,
supervisory and deposit
insurance variables:
averages by income level
JFEP
5,2
216
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
H
i
g
h
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
U
p
p
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
m
i
d
d
l
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
L
o
w
e
r
i
n
c
o
m
e
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
o
r
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
e
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
(
c
)
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
t
e
n
u
r
e
8
.
4
9
9
.
7
6
7
.
8
3
8
.
0
8
8
.
8
3
8
.
7
8
6
.
8
1
(
d
)
O
n
s
i
t
e
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
3
.
8
2
4
.
1
4
4
.
4
0
4
.
6
2
4
.
1
9
4
.
2
0
2
.
6
4
(
e
)
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
2
.
0
8
1
.
9
4
1
.
8
7
1
.
8
2
2
.
1
1
1
.
9
2
1
.
6
7
7
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
C
e
r
t
i
?
e
d
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
0
.
9
8
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
7
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
6
0
.
9
3
(
b
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
e
n
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
b
a
n
k
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
7
0
.
2
4
5
9
.
5
2
4
8
.
4
2
1
5
.
0
0
7
5
.
3
3
5
0
.
9
2
5
4
.
4
0
(
c
)
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
3
.
6
0
3
.
4
9
3
.
6
1
3
.
4
1
3
.
6
3
3
.
5
3
3
.
5
7
(
d
)
N
o
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
0
.
2
2
0
.
4
2
0
.
4
2
0
.
4
0
0
.
1
9
0
.
4
0
0
.
5
0
(
e
)
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
e
x
8
.
3
5
7
.
6
6
7
.
4
6
7
.
4
3
8
.
4
4
7
.
6
3
7
.
4
3
8
.
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
a
)
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
p
o
w
e
r
1
.
0
8
0
.
9
3
1
.
1
2
1
.
6
4
1
.
2
3
1
.
1
0
0
.
1
1
(
b
)
E
x
t
r
a
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
n
s
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Table AIV.
Bank regulation
and supervision
217
D
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6
(
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Appendix 6
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Table AV.
Groupings of countries
by development status
JFEP
5,2
218
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
b
y
P
O
N
D
I
C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
Appendix 7
Corresponding author
James R. Barth can be contacted at: [email protected]
IFRS GAAP
Armenia Denmark Italy Maldives Singapore Angola
Australia Egypt Jamaica Malta Slovakia Ecuador
Austria Estonia Jersey Mauritius Slovenia Nigeria
Bahrain Ethiopia Jordan Montenegro South Africa Puerto
Rico
Bangladesh Fiji Kenya Morocco Spain Tunisia
Belarus France Korea, Rep. Namibia Sri Lanka USA
Belgium Germany Kosovo The Netherlands Swaziland
Belize Ghana Kuwait New Zealand Syria
Bhutan Gibraltar Kyrgyz
Republic
Nicaragua Tajikistan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Greece Latvia Norway Tanzania
Botswana Guatemala Lebanon Pakistan Tonga
Brazil Guyana Lesotho Palestinian
Territory
Trinidad and
Tobago
Bulgaria Honduras Liechtenstein Philippines Turkey
Burundi Hong
Kong
Lithuania Poland Uganda
Canada Iceland Luxembourg Portugal Ukraine
Chile Indonesia Macao, China Qatar United Arab
Emirates
China Iraq Madagascar Romania UK
Croatia Ireland Malawi Serbia Uruguay
Cyprus Isle of
Man
Malaysia Seychelles Zimbabwe
Notes: Countries whose accounting standards for banks are in accordance with BOTH IRS AND
GAAP are Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Panama,
Samoa (Western), Switzerland, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Virgin Islands (British), and Yemen; countries
whose accounting standards for banks are in accordance with NEIHER IRS NOR GAAP are
Argentina, Benin, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Finland, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Niger, Paraguay, Peru,
Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Taiwan, Thailand, and Togo
Table AVI.
Are applicable
accounting standards for
banks in your country
prepared in accordance
with IFRS or US
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
(GAAP)?
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected]
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Bank regulation
and supervision
219
D
o
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y
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O
N
D
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C
H
E
R
R
Y
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
Y
A
t
2
1
:
4
6
2
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
1
6
(
P
T
)
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doc_312556087.pdf