Description
The Turkish economy, once a by-word for hyperinflation and budgetary imprudence, was until recently apparently in the midst of a renaissance.
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briefing paper
After the Boom: Risks to
the Turkish Economy
Fadi Hakura
Europe Programme | August 2013 | Europe BP 2013/02
Summary points
z After a strong post-crisis recovery, Turkish growth slowed sharply to 2.2 per cent
in 2012. The success of Prime Minister Erdo?an’s government has been rooted in
economic prosperity, which will remain a central issue for his popularity.
z Turkey’s economy has been boosted by the rise of socially conservative, export-
oriented entrepreneurs known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, nurtured by business
networking through Islamic social networks, return migration from Germany, free-
market economic policies, and institution-building by the previous secular-inclined
establishment.
z Other strengths of the Turkish economy include successful strategies for the
movement of labour from low- to higher-productivity sectors and poverty reduction.
z The sources of ‘easy’ economic growth from macroeconomic stability and fiscal
discipline have been largely exhausted, however. Turkey’s consumer-driven economic
model cannot sustain consistently high growth rates and is being undermined by
low investment and savings rates, limited export sophistication, pervasive gender
inequality and inefficient use of its ‘demographic dividend’.
z Turkey’s growth potential will be constrained unless it implements productivity-
enhancing reforms before the problems of an ageing population start to be
noticeable around 2025. To avoid reform ‘fatigue’, it should focus on tackling the
main bottlenecks to economic growth: the quality of human capital, and incomplete
reform of governance and institutions.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Introduction
The Turkish economy, once a by-word for hyperinflation
and budgetary imprudence, was until recently apparently
in the midst of a renaissance. As chilling winds swept
through much of the Western world, Turkey was basking
in the warmth of 8–9 per cent growth rates, manageable
inflation and fiscal probity.
The statistics reveal the extent of this startling economic
turnaround. Over the last decade, the world’s 16th largest
economy grew by $383 billion, exports rose from $63
billion to $135 billion and per capita incomes doubled
(in current US dollars) against a backdrop of central
government debt shrinkage from three-figure levels to
46 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).
1
This turnaround was regarded as all the more remarkable
considering the identity of its steward: the Islamist-rooted
Justice and Development Party (JDP). Turkey demon-
strated – at least on the surface – that Islam, democratic
governance and prosperity were perfectly compatible. That
was, undoubtedly, a powerful message to the new Islamist
governments in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and other post-
Arab Spring countries.
Recent protests in Istanbul have revealed the polariza-
tion within Turkey over Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdo?an’s social policies and political leadership style. But
his electoral success has been rooted in Turkey’s economic
prosperity, and the sustainability of high growth rates will
remain a central issue for the endurance of his popularity.
It is therefore important to consider whether Turkey has
the wherewithal to maintain recent growth rates given the
status of its overall policy reforms, the quality of its institu-
tions and current global dynamics.
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate, first by
outlining the major shifts in Turkey’s economy and then
by assessing whether its economic experience provides an
adequate foundation for high future growth rates.
Steady economy
Turkey is a prime case study demonstrating how the effects
of a precipitous economic collapse can be reversed. As the
liberalization of the 1980s went unsupported by sound
macroeconomic policies and institutional reforms, the
economy suffered repeated crises in the following decade:
in 1991, 1994, 1998, 1999 and, worst of all, 2001. Lack of
fiscal discipline and heavy reliance on monetary financing
led to high inflation and real interest rates.
An inadequate regulatory and supervisory framework
for the banking system encouraged financial institutions
to funnel short-term borrowing from depositors into loans
of dubious quality and government securities. Inefficient
state enterprises dominated several economic sectors.
Policy durability was undermined by a succession of short-
lived coalition governments that implemented populist
measures.
Then, under the aegis of former Economy Minister
Kemal Dervi?, Turkey recovered swiftly from the 2001
collapse. He concluded a stand-by agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), liquidated insolvent
banks, privatized state-owned enterprises, liberalized the
energy and telecommunication markets, introduced a
free-floating Turkish lira (TL), created an autonomous
central bank, and set up independent financial and market
regulatory bodies. Turkey’s European Union accession
process and policy continuity under the subsequent single-
party JDP government accelerated the recovery.
2
Erdo?an’s leadership had brought more efficiency and
predictability to economic policy-making since 2002.
Turkey’s central bank had earned plaudits from financial
markets for bringing inflation under control.
3
Credibility
became a cornerstone of Turkish economic, fiscal and
monetary policies, enabling the domestic business commu-
nity and foreign investors to engage in long-term planning
within a more stable political environment.
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-turkey_20752288-table-tur.
World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey.
2 Mihai Macovei, ‘Growth and Economic Crises in Europe: Leaving behind a Turbulent Past’, European Commission (Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate-
General), Economic 386, October 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16004_en.pdf.
3 Emre Alper and Ozan Hatipo?lu, ‘The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Turkey in the Pre- and Post-crisis Period of 2001 in Comparative Perspective: a Case
for Central Bank Independence’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper No. 18426, January 2009, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18426/1/
MPRA_paper_18426.pdf.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
The ‘Anatolian Tigers’
Turkey has witnessed a conspicuous phenomenon in the
Muslim world: the rise of socially conservative, market-
embracing and export-oriented business elites combining
capitalism with piety. A new class of entrepreneurs, leading
mostly family-owned small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), unleashed an industrial renaissance in various
Anatolian cities in the country’s Asian heartland, notably
in Bal?kesir, Denizli, Gaziantep, Kayseri and Konya. They
are challenging the once-unassailable export and invest-
ment dominance of Istanbul, the economic powerhouse
of Turkey.
Boydak Holding, a Kayseri-headquartered furniture
producer, epitomizes the growth of this modern-day rags-
to-riches Islamic capitalism. Founded in 1957, Boydak has
catapulted itself from being a small workshop in Kayseri
to a multi-billion-dollar industrial conglomerate spanning
a bank, a transport company, a trading arm and Turkey’s
largest cable factory.
4
It now exports to over 100 countries.
Kayseri’s ‘economic miracle’ did not spring out of a
vacuum. Islamic social networks facilitated an environ-
ment in which budding entrepreneurs could mingle,
network and negotiate deals.
5
In the words of one writer:
‘They grew up in praying and mosque-going house-
holds, and many got to know one another – and still
network – in Nurcu circles [a pro-business Islamic social
network].’
6
Three other decisive factors fuelled the success of the
‘Anatolian Tigers’. One is return migration: Anatolians
returning from Germany replicated business ideas and
ventures in their home towns.
7
Secondly, free-market
reforms initiated in the 1980s and consolidated under the
JDP fostered entrepreneurship, a widening availability
of commercial loans and aggressive export promotion
in foreign markets.
8
A third, but a commonly ignored,
factor was the importation by the previous secular-
leaning establishment of European political, economic
and social institutions. Turkey stood out for decades
as one of the few countries in the region that enjoyed
a semblance of democratic pluralism, the rule of law, a
modern education system and a viable manufacturing
sector.
Structural change
Turkey’s economy has been moving resources, predomi-
nantly labour, from low-productivity activities, such
as traditional agriculture and informality, to higher-
productivity, modern industries and the tradable sector.
In 2000, manufacturing absorbed a quarter of total
public and private investments; by 2008, the figure was
50 per cent. Similarly, the composition of exports has
reflected this change.
This diversification of investments and exports into the
tradable sector raised the added value of Turkey’s produc-
tive capacities, its ability to compete in global markets and
the private return on invested capital. It is noteworthy that
the post-2000 growth rates according to three different
‘
Turkey has witnessed a
conspicuous phenomenon in the
Muslim world: the rise of socially
conservative, market-embracing
and export-oriented business
elites combining capitalism
with piety
’
4 European Stability Initiative, ‘Islamic Calvinist: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia’, European Stability Initiative, 19 September 2005,
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=69.
5 Pelin Turgut, ‘Anatolian tigers: regions prove plentiful’, Financial Times, 20 November 2006.
6 Vali Nasr, ‘Turkey’s supreme irony: Kayseri’s business globalists’, The Globalist, 8 June 2010, http://www.theglobalist.com/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=8292.
7 Deniz Karc? Korfal?, Ay?en Üstübici and Helene De Clerck, ‘Turkey: Country and Research Reports’, EUMAGINE, 28 September 2010, http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/
pdfs/research-projects-pdfs/eumagine-pdfs/eumagine-project-paper-5-turkey-country-and-research-areas-report.
8 Nicholas Birch, ‘Turkey: “Muslim Calvinists” in Anatolia Show How Piety Can Blend with Modernity’, Eurasia.org, 23 July 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insight/articles/eav072408a.shtml. Simon Cameron-Moore, ‘“Anatolian Tigers” go where Turkey’s diplomacy leads’, Reuters, 13 July 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/13/us-turkey-tigers-idUSTRE66C2Q320100713.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
measures of productivity – GDP per worker, GDP per
capita and manufacturing value added per worker –
exceed those in all previous periods.
9
Poverty reduction
Turkey’s growth performance not only created a new
middle class – which enjoyed the largest gains of
household after-tax income
10
– but also, according
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), ‘reduced income inequality
considerably’.
11
Turkey’s Gini coefficient (where 0 and 1
correspond to complete income equality and inequality
respectively) decreased from 0.403 in 2006 to 0.38
in 2010.
Furthermore, while the income of the richest 10 per cent
in Turkey was about 18 times that of the poorest 10 per cent
in 2005, this ratio had narrowed to 14 times by 2009.
12
Similarly, the proportion of Turks below the poverty line
fell during this period from 20.5 per cent in 2005 to 18.1
per cent in 2009
13
and the rate of child poverty declined
from one-third of children in 2006 to one-quarter in
2010.
14
Poverty and equality indicators have, however,
stagnated since 2010.
There are three main causes of this uptick between
2006 and 2010: a three per cent yearly increase in non-
agricultural employment; a reduction in interest on debt
payments from 22 per cent to 16 per cent of the national
budget, allowing for increased social transfers to the poor;
and a rise in the minimum wage and in the lowest public-
sector earnings by, respectively, 16 per cent and 28 per cent
in real terms (i.e. omitting inflation).
‘Objective 2023’
Erdo?an’s 2011 general election slogan, ‘Hedef 2023’
(‘Objective 2023’), set the ambitious target of tripling the
size of the economy, increasing exports to $500 billion and
joining the world’s top ten economies by 2023, the cente-
nary of the Turkish republic. Average per capita income
would, he predicted optimistically, be $25,000 a year, not
far below that of Spain today.
15
Turkey would need annual growth of nine per cent to satisfy
the prime minister’s expectations, of which 3–4 per cent is
‘guaranteed’ growth assuming a two per cent US dollar infla-
tion and 1–2 per cent yearly appreciation of the Turkish lira.
This means that during the next decade Turkey needs at least
an annual average GDP growth rate of five per cent, grounded
on exports rather than domestic demand.
16
It has been argued that few countries manage to achieve
growth rates of eight per cent on a durable basis. As
reported by a commission of 19 political leaders and
9 Dani Rodrik, ‘The Turkish Economy After the Crisis’, Harvard University, 24 November 2009, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/
Turkish%20economy%20after%20the%20crisis.pdf.
10 Emre Deliveli, ‘Social Implications of Turkish Reforms’, Hürriyet Daily News, 15 April 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/social-implications-of-turkish-
reforms.aspx?pageID=449&nID=44893&NewsCatID=430.
11 ‘Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising’, OECD, December 2011, http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3746,en_2649_33933_49147827_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
12 Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1011.
13 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey.
14 Seyfettin Gürsel, ‘Material deprivation among children’, Today’s Zaman, 22 April 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-313393-material-deprivation-
among-children.html.
15 Gwynne Dyer, ‘Will Turkey grant Erdogan’s dreams?’, Winnipeg Free Press, 11 June 2011, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/westview/will-turkey-
grant-erdogans-dreams-123678784.html?viewAllComments=y.
16 Seyfettin Gürsel, ‘AK Party’s 2023 vision’, Today’s Zaman, 4 October 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-294315-ak-partys-2023
-vision.html.
‘
Erdo?an’s 2011 general
election slogan set the
ambitious target of tripling
the size of the economy,
increasing exports to $500
billion and joining the world’s
top ten economies by 2023
’
g
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
academics from around the world tasked with identifying
important insights on policy levers to help countries
achieve high, sustainable and inclusive growth, economies
confined to a model based on private consumption rarely
witness consistently high growth rates.
17
Turkey, where
private consumption accounts for 70 per cent of national
income, typifies such an economy.
Turkey is categorized as an ‘upper-middle-income’
country by the World Bank (defined as having per capita
income between $3,976 and $12,275).
18
Its GDP per capita
growth rate was between that of Latin America and that of
Asia until recently (see Figure 1). In 2012, its growth was
2.2 per cent.
19
In the case of Turkey, the risks of restrained growth
rates are real and substantial. It needed 55 years to escape
its low-income status,
20
which is comparatively much
easier than achieving the transition from middle-income
to high-income status. Turkey has so far experienced only
the ‘easy’ growth derived from macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion
21
and can no longer simply rely on low-cost labour
resources and the easy adoption of new technology as
sources of growth.
Figure 2 indicates that during the last decade Turkey’s
economy has experienced two episodes of sharp
recession followed by a booming recovery and a subse-
quent period of prolonged deceleration: in 2002–07
and 2008–12. These exemplify an economy hovering
between stagnation and a solid growth cycle, where
domestic demand cannot sustain growth and employ-
ment indefinitely.
22
17 Commission on Growth and Development, ‘The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development’, World Bank, 2008,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Final_Report.pdf.
18 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Upper_middle_income.
19 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
20 Hakan Ta?çi, ‘The real challenge for the Turkish economy’, Today’s Zaman, 22 May 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-281105-the-real-challenge-
for-the-turkish-economy.html.
21 Willem H. Buiter, ‘It’s a long way to Copenhagen’, CEPS Policy Briefs, 1 March 2006, http://www.ceps.eu/book/its-long-way-copenhagen.
22 Cevdet Akçay and Murat Üçer, ‘A Narrative on the Turkish Current Account’, International Journal of Trade and Diplomacy, Vol. 2, Winter 2008,
https://www.simmons.edu/academics/undergraduate/east-asian/docs/Ogus_Binatli_and_Sohrabji-JITD_paper.pdf.
Figure 1: Ratio of GDP growth per capita in Turkey to growth in Latin America and Asia, 1980–2008
Source: Dani Rodrik, ‘Turkey’s Growth Story’, presentation at the conference on ‘Turkey’s Experience with Neo-Liberal Economic Reforms’, London School of
Economics, 28 October 2011.
Notes: 1.0 on the scale represents equal growth.
Asia includes Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.
Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
R
a
t
i
o
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Latin America Asia
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
R
a
t
i
o
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Turkey’s consumption-based economic paradigm has
several characteristics that undermine growth: low invest-
ment and savings rates, limited sophistication of exports,
pervasive gender inequality and inefficient use of its
‘demographic dividend’. Each of these features will be
elaborated in turn below.
Domestic investments and savings
Generally, sustainable growth requires national investment
rates of 25 per cent of GDP or above, counting both public
and private expenditure. Between 2000 and 2010 Turkey’s
rate fluctuated between 15 per cent and 22 per cent of
GDP, and in only four years of these years did it exceed
20 per cent.
23
In addition, the quality of its insufficient investment
rates is wanting. Turkey misallocated investment expen-
ditures from manufacturing towards residential uses and
other non-productive sectors in the post-1980s period;
and this was accompanied by the fact that public and
private investment no longer complemented each other.
24
Istanbul’s skyline testifies to this dash for concrete, which
triggered the recent protests over redevelopment plans for
Gezi Park adjoining Taksim Square, one of few remaining
green spaces in Istanbul; TL 7.5 billion ($4.6 billion) had
been earmarked for urban renewal projects in the city for
2012 alone.
25
High-growth economies need to set aside a consider-
able share of their income as savings, with a national
savings rate of at least 20–25 per cent of GDP, to fund
domestic investment needs. Turkey’s savings rate, on the
other hand, decreased from over 23 per cent in the 1990s
to 12.7 per cent in 2010, the lowest rate since 1980.
26
The
main culprit is plummeting household savings, which
more than offset the increase in savings that would
normally be associated with rising incomes. This is due
to post-crisis credit growth, falling interest rates, rising
23 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS.
24 Sumru Altu? and Ünal Zenginobuz, ‘What has been the Role of Investment in Turkey’s Growth Performance?’, Bo?aziçi University, February 2009,
http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public_html/RePEc/pdf/200902.pdf.
25 Constanze Letsch, ‘Istanbul sees history razed in the name of regeneration’, Guardian, 1 March 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/01/
istanbul-city-urban-renewal.
26 World Bank and Turkey’s Ministry of Development, ‘Sustaining High Growth: The Role of Domestic Saving’, Turkey Country Economic Memorandum,
Synthesis Report (Conference Edition), 14 March 2012, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1331638027014/CEM_
DomesticSavings_fulltext.pdf.
Figure 2: Turkey’s GDP 2000–13, constant prices
Source: IMF, 2012 World Economic Outlook.
*Projected.
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
%
c
h
a
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
house prices, pent-up consumption and the increase
in the middle classes’ share of consumption.
27
As the
economy recovered, this reduced the need for ‘precau-
tionary savings’ (i.e. money saved to guard against the
uncertainty of future income).
28
Unsurprisingly, the ratio of household liabilities to
disposable income has grown from 4.7 per cent in 2002 to
50.6 per cent in 2012.
29
This may indicate the increasing
likelihood of a financial crisis in the near future that will
be exacerbated by the steady rise in the share of consumer
credit in the budgets for the lower- and middle-income
households and by declining rates of home ownership
for the median group of households which constitute
the backbone of the labour force.
30
At 51 per cent of
GDP, Turkey’s net external debt is among the highest for
emerging markets, driven mainly by a surge of private-
sector borrowing.
31
The average debt-to-equity ratio of the
largest 500 firms in Turkey was 120 per cent in 2010 and
141 per cent in 2011, compared with roughly 50 per cent
in the United States and 70 per cent in Europe in 2011.
32
Turkey’s current account deficit (CAD), where national
investments exceed national savings,
33
reached an
unsustainable 10 per cent of GDP in 2011 and is expected
to shrink only gradually in the next few years.
34
Turkey is in
a vicious circle: economic growth drives investment needs
that cannot be satisfied by domestic savings,
35
which causes
addiction to fickle and footloose speculative financial flows
(‘hot money’) to finance its CAD.
36
Owing to the ‘sudden
stop’ of foreign capital inflows in the 2008–09 global finan-
cial crisis, Turkey suffered one of the sharpest subsequent
recessions among emerging markets.
37
Turkey’s persistent CAD is driven primarily by struc-
tural, as opposed to cyclical, factors: a low savings rate,
trade composition, and a heavy dependency on imports
of energy, intermediate and capital goods in relation to
Turkish exports and manufacturing industry.
38
Reliance
on an overvalued lira to control inflation, the inflation
differential relative to other currencies and the exces-
sive importance of intermediate imports mean economic
growth hurts the supply of exports and trade balances.
39
Turkey’s imports of goods and services as a proportion of
GDP rose from 26.2 per cent to 32.7 per cent between 2004
and 2011, while its exports of goods and services rose only
from 23.6 per cent to 23.8 per cent in the same period.
40
27 Murat Üçer and Caroline Van Rijckeghem, ‘The Evolution and Determinants of the Turkish Private Saving Rate: What Lessons for Policy?’, ERF Research
Report Series No. 09-01, February 2009, http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/rr09-02.pdf; Cevdet Akçay and Murat Can A?lak, ‘One Man’s Happiness
is Another’s Agony? Not Necessarily’, Yap? Kredi Bank, Macro Brief, 20 November 2008, http://www.yapikredi.com.tr/enUS/macroeconomic_research/pdf/
macro_briefs/2008-11-20.pdf.
28 Emre Deliveli, ‘Saving private savings II’, Hurriyet Daily News, 19 March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/saving-private-savings-ii.aspx?pageID=449&n
ID=16304&NewsCatID=430.
29 Emre Deliveli, ‘Marcroeconomics 101 for journalists confused by Finance Ministers’, Hurriyet Daily News, 24 June 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
macroeconomics-101-for-journalists-confused-by-finance-ministers.aspx?pageID=449&nID=49321&NewsCatID=430.
30 Alper Duman, ‘Household Debt in Turkey: The Critical Threshold for the Next Crisis’, Izmir University of Economics, Prepared for ECOMOD 2013, April 2013,
http://www.ecomod.net/system/files/HouseholdDebtinTurkeyAlperDuman.pdf.
31 Benjamin Harvey and Taylan Bilgiç, ‘Erdogan’s IMF Triumph Masks Surge in Private Debt: Turkey Credit’, Bloomberg, 14 May 2013, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2013-05-13/erdogan-s-imf-triumph-masks-surge-in-private-debt-turkey-credit.html
32 Vefa Tarhan, @Vefa_Tarhan, 20 June 2013, http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rku9vq.
33 An alternative definition of current account deficit is the sum of imports of goods and services plus net returns on investments exceed the value of goods and services.
34 ‘Turkey posts record current account deficit’, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 February 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-posts-record-current-account-
deficit.aspx?pageID=238&nID=13690&NewsCatID=344.
35 Faz?l Kay?kç?, ‘Discussion on Sustainability of Current Account Deficits in Turkey’, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 74, 2011,
http://www.eurojournals.com/IRJFE_74_08.pdf.
36 ‘Istanbuls and bears’, The Economist, 7 April 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552216.
37 Rodrik, ‘The Turkish Economy After the Crisis’.
38 Mary Stokes and David Rogovic, ‘Mind the (Current Account) Gap in Turkey’, Forbes, 25 August 2010, http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/25/turkey-deficit-
economy-opinions-columnists-doctor-doom.html.
39 Ayla O?u? Binatli and Niloufer Sohrabji, ‘Elasticities of Turkish Trade’, Izmir University of Economics, Working Paper 0906, 2009, http://www.simmons.
edu/undergraduate/academics/ departments/economics/docs/Turkish_trade_elasticities.pdf; Ya?ar Vural and Mahmut Zortuk, ‘Foreign Direct Investment
as a Determining Factor in Turkey’s Export Performance’, Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2011, http://www.ejbe.org/
EJBE2011Vol04No07p13VURAL-ZORTUK.pdf.
40 OECD, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-turkey_20752288-table-tur.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Since Turkey’s export and import growth tend to
move concomitantly, the CAD cannot be effectively dealt
with by depreciation of the lira alone. Thus the foreign
trade and current account deficits are not necessarily
‘sustainable’ (i.e. at a level that prevents a permanent
increase in a country’s external debt-to-GDP ratio)
without slower economic growth and a contraction
of domestic consumption, as happened in 2009 (see
Figure 3), which would reduce the CAD to a more
manageable five per cent of GDP, thereby leaving it
less vulnerable to the vagaries of international finan-
cial flows.
41
This mismatch between global purchasing power and
domestic productive capacity cannot continue to grow
indefinitely. One can measure the former by average
purchasing power (dark blue line in Figure 4) in US
dollars and the latter by average productivity (light blue
line in Figure 4). According to one study, this implies
that Turkey’s ‘average dollar-based income – per capita as
well as per worker, currently running at around $10,000
and $30,000, respectively – is simply too high, compared
to [its] average productivity levels’.
42
As a result, Turkey’s
per capita incomes increased by only 31 per cent (in
constant 2005 US dollars) after stripping out inflation
and exchange-rate effects,
43
rather than the oft-quoted
300 per cent in nominal terms.
The government has not delivered an adequate
policy response so far. It has opted for tax incentives
to encourage indigenous production of intermediate
goods and reduce its import needs – a form of import
substitution – while also increasing government contri-
butions to and tax breaks for private pensions. The
tax incentives are expected to have only a limited
impact on the national savings rate
44
and several econo-
mists have questioned the efficacy of the latter as a
highly complex scheme that does not tackle the root
41 Aysu ?nsel and Faz?l Kay?kç?, ‘Evaluation of Sustainability of Current Account Deficits in Turkey’, Modern Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2012, http://www.
scirp.org/Journal/PaperInformation.aspx?paperID=16805.
42 Murat Üçer, ‘How Should We Read Turkey’s Current Account Deficit?’, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Autumn 2011, http://edam.
org.tr/document/Newsletter%202011-Fall.pdf.
43 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?page=1.
44 Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Murat Üçer, ‘The Evolution and Determinants of the Turkish Private Saving Rate: What Lessons for Policy?’, Powerpoint
presentation, 11 June 2008, at the TÜSIAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Conference on Micro-Macro Perspectives on Private Savings in Turkey,
http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/cvr.pdf.
Figure 3: Turkey’s current account balance, 2001–13 (as % of GDP)
Source: IMF, 2012 World Economic Outlook.
*Projected.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
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causes of the CAD.
45
Instead, considering the argument
that sustainable high economic growth precedes higher
savings, government policy needs to focus on removing
impediments to growth and reducing the vulnerability
resulting from low savings during the transition period.
46
Limited sophistication of exports
A recent IMF paper constructed indices for countries’
‘sophistication of exports’, as measured by the average
income and productivity level associated with all their
exports. This demonstrates that increasing the sophistica-
tion of exports of goods and services can be an important
contributor to overall economic growth. More sophisti-
cated sectors not only create more value-added activities
but also act as ‘engines of growth’, as they generate spillover
effects for the whole economy.
47
Turkey is in the middle of the spectrum of export
sophistication; it has not yet been able to increase its
export sophistication as China and India have done.
48
It
has specialized in stagnant sectors whose share of global
trade has been declining and is generally more competi-
tive in goods with lower relative prices, where minimizing
costs is the strategic issue.
49
High-tech exports – products
with high research and development intensity, such as in
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instru-
ments and electrical machinery – have accounted for just
two per cent of total manufactured goods exports on a
consistent basis since 2002.
50
45 See, for example, Oxford Business Group, ‘Turkey: a Cautious Approach’, 9 May 2012, http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/turkey-
cautious-approach; Emre Deliveli, ‘Turkey: Industrial Policy, New Investment Incentives Scheme and the Current Account’, Emre Deliveli’s Blog, 26 May 2012,
http://www.economonitor.com/emredeliveli/2012/05/26/turkey-industrial-policy-new-investment-incentives-scheme-and-the-current-account/; and Ozan
Acar? and Esen Ça?lar, ‘An Assessment on the New Incentive Package’, TEPAV Note, April 2012, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1336653759-4.
An_Assessment_on_the_New_Investment_Incentive_Package.pdf.
46 Eser Pirgan Matur, Ali Sabuncu and Sema Bahçeci, ‘Determinants of Private Savings and Interaction Between Public and Private Savings in Turkey’, Topics in
Middle Eastern and African Economies, Vol. 14, September 2012, http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume14/PDFS/Saving%20study_V_eas7_1.pdf.
47 Rahul Anand, Saurabh Mishra and Nikola Spatafora, ‘Structural Transformation and the Sophistication of Production’, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/59, February
2012, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1259.pdf.
48 Ibid.
49 Erol Taymaz, Ebru Voyvoda and Kamil Y?lmaz, ‘Uluslararas? Üretim Zincirlerinde Dönü?üm ve Türkiye’nin Konumu’ [‘The Transformation of International
Production Linkages and Turkey’], Koç University – TÜS?AD Economic Research Forum, Yay?n No. EAF-RP/11–01, December 2011, http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/
sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/eaf_rp_1101.pdf.
50 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS?page=1.
Figure 4: Turkey’s global purchasing power versus domestic productive capacity
Sources: World Bank and US Department of Agriculture.
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
US $
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 US $)
Real GDP per capita (constant 2005 US $)
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Pervasive gender inequality
Female emancipation is a critical driver of economic
growth, robust democratic pluralism, and a state’s secu-
rity and stability.
51
Given the status of women in Turkey,
therefore, the probability of maximizing economic afflu-
ence is more challenging. Indeed, the position of women
is a prominent obstacle to the further development and
growth of the ‘Anatolian Tigers’.
52
Turkish women live in a socially conservative society
in which they face significant restrictions. According to
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and the World Economic Forum (WEF), respectively,
Turkey is positioned 101st out of 109 countries for
gender empowerment
53
and 122nd out of 135 for gender
equality.
54
At 31.2 per cent, its female labour force partici-
pation rate – the proportion of working-age women in
employment – is less than half the average of 60 per cent
for the OECD.
55
Social conservatism acts as one of the
chief barriers to female employment, together with the
lack of job opportunities for women in urban environ-
ments, the decline in agricultural employment, poor
education of women, lack of childcare services and inad-
equate working conditions.
56
Excluding women from the labour force is costly.
Assuming a 50 per cent female labour force participa-
tion rate achieving the average level of productivity
($30,000 value added per worker per annum), Turkey’s
annual economic loss amounts to $419 billion. This
is greater than the economy’s GDP gains over the last
ten years.
57
Inefficient use of demographic dividend
Turkey’s youthful population – the median age is 29.2
years
58
– has been a source of vitality for the economy.
The country is going through the ‘demographic window
of opportunity’, where the proportion of the working-age
population (those between 15 and 64 years) is bulging,
while the proportion of the ‘inactive’ youth (below 15
years) and the elderly (65 years and above) is shrinking.
51 The Economist, ‘A Guide to Womenomics: the Future of the World Economy Lies Increasingly in Female Hands’, 12 April 2006, http://www.economist.com/
node/6802551; Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Policy, April 2003, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/
Articles/Articles%20published%20in%20journals_files/The_True_Clash_Inglehart_Norris_Foreign_Policy_2003.pdf; Sabri Ciftci, ‘Modernization, Islam, or
Social Capital: What Explains Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Muslim World?’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 11, November 2010; Valerie
M. Hudson, ‘What Sex Means for World Peace’, Foreign Policy, 24 April 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/24/what_sex_means_for_
world_peace.
52 European Stability Initiative, ‘Islamic Calvinist: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia’, 19 September 2005, http://www.esiweb.org/index.
php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=69.
53 UNDP, ‘New Horizons: UNDP Turkish Monthly Newsletter’, Issue 47, November 2009, http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=2196.
54 Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D. Tyson and Saadia Zahidi, ‘The Global Gender Gap 2011: Rankings and Scores’, World Economic Forum, 2011,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR11/GGGR11_Rankings-Scores.pdf.
55 Gökçe Uysal, ‘More Women are Working’, BETAM, Research Brief 12/134, 26 July 2012, http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
ResearchBrief137.pdf; ‘More women execs recruited as overall female labor lags behind’, Hurriyet Daily News, 8 March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/more-women-execs-recruited-as-overall-female-labor-lags-behind.aspx?pageID=238&nID=15503&NewsCatID=345.
56 Ersin Kalayc?o?lu and Binnaz Toprak, ‘?? Ya?am?, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kad?n’ [‘Women in the Work Force, Top Administration and Politics’], TESEV Yay?nlar?,
Istanbul, 2004; ?dil Göksel, ‘The Reasons of Decreasing Trend of Female Labour Force Participation in Turkey: The Role of Conservatism’, Izmir University of
Economics, April 2011, http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Goksel1.pdfs; World Bank and State Planning Organization, ‘Female
Labor Force Participation: Trends, Determinants and Policy Framework’, Report No. 48508-TR, 23 November 2009,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1268839345767/Female_LFP-en.pdf.
57 Esen Ça?lar made the calculation based on a female labour force participation of 24 per cent. ‘The annual cost of keeping women at home is $574 billion’,
TEPAV Articles, 2 April 2012, http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/kose-yazisi-tepav/s/3165.
58 CIA, World Factbook, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
‘
Female emancipation is a
critical driver of economic
growth … Given the status of
women in Turkey, therefore,
the probability of maximizing
economic affluence is more
challenging
’
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
This translates into reductions of expenditure on educa-
tion and social security, and rising tax revenues.
59
Turkey is heavily dependent, therefore, on favourable
demographics and structural change – the transfer of workers
from low- to higher-productivity sectors – for labour produc-
tivity growth. These factors accounted for 45 per cent of total
growth for the period 1990–2005, with the remainder due to
productivity increases within each economic sector.
60
In that
respect, Turkey’s performance lies between that of Asia and
that of Latin America (see Figure 5).
Yet Turkey cannot rely indefinitely on the demographic
dividend, which normally happens only once and lasts
around 50 years. Moreover, its benefits can be frittered away
without proper education and employment policies.
61
Based
on UN estimates, Turkey’s demographic window of oppor-
tunity will begin to close in 2025.
62
Figure 6 illustrates the
precipitous fall in the Turkish fertility rate between 1962 and
2010. At 2.09 in 2010, the rate was just below the replacement
level of 2.1 necessary to keep population numbers steady.
After about 2025, Turkey’s dependency ratio – i.e.
between those in the labour force and those outside
it – is expected to rise again as the population starts
ageing. This will incur an intergenerational transition of
resources from education to social security, healthcare
and pension provision for the elderly.
Erdo?an views the drop in fertility as a threat to national
security. He has exhorted women to have three children,
and condemned Caesarean births and abortions.
63
He is
particularly apprehensive that the Kurdish community
could be a majority in Turkey in 2038 since the average
birth rate for Kurdish women is more than double the
national rate for Turkish mothers.
64
59 ‘Turkey’s Population Young and Rapidly Expanding’, Euromonitor International, 24 January 2012, http://blog.euromonitor.com/2012/01/turkeys-population-
young-and-rapidly-expanding.html.
60 Sumru Altu?, Alpay Filiztekin and ?evket Pamuk offered a figure of 33 per cent as the contribution of structural change to Turkey’s productivity growth.
‘Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth for Turkey, 1880–2005’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 6 October 2006, http://www.cepr.org/meets/
wkcn/1/1658/papers/Altug.pdf.
61 John Ross, ‘Understanding the Demographic Dividend’, Policy Project, September 2004, http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/generalreport/Demo_Div.pdf.
62 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), ‘Children in the Population’, http://www.unicef.org.tr/en/content/detail/53/children-in-the-population.html.
63 James D. Zirin, ‘Erdogan’s Turkish Spring: Crosscurrents in the Bosphorus’, Forbes, 4 June 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jameszirin/2012/06/04/
erdogans-turkish-spring-crosscurrents-in-the-bosphorus/.
64 Palash R. Ghosh, ‘Turkey: high Kurdish birth rate raises questions about future’, International Business Times, 16 May 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/
articles/341685/20120516/turkey-kurds-demographics-birth-rate-erdogan-babies.htm?page=all.
Figure 5: Decomposition of labour productivity growth, 1990–2005
Source: Dani Rodrik, ‘Turkey’s Growth Story’, presentation at the conference on ‘Turkey’s Experience with Neo-Liberal Economic Reforms’, London School
of Economics, 28 October 2011.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
Asia Latin America Turkey
Due to structural change
Within sectors
%
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Demographers question the accuracy of Erdo?an’s
forecast but concede that on current trends, the
‘balance of power [between Kurds and Turks] could
start shifting’ within 40 or 50 years.
65
Since both
communities prefer endogamy (i.e. marriage within the
same ethnic group), the current evidence suggests the
demographic differential between them will continue
to increase.
66
Nevertheless, Erdo?an’s focus of concern seems
misguided. The central risk is that procrastination on
economic and social reforms is coinciding with the fast-
approaching demographic reversal, due in less than a
generation. According to a 2012 study by the Turkish
Statistical Institute, the share of the population made
up of children aged up to 17 years had dropped from
41.8 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent by 2012 and is set
tumble further to 25.7 per cent by 2023, 19.1 per cent
by 2050 and 17.6 per cent by 2075.
67
Turkey cannot rely
forever on the power of demography to propel produc-
tivity and economic growth.
Prioritization of reforms
This paper has identified low investment and savings rates,
low value-added exports, gender inequality and inefficient
use of its demographic dividend as features of Turkey’s
economic growth model. Does this mean Turkey has to
tackle all these features simultaneously? Arguably, the short
answer is ‘no’ since they may be symptomatic of deeper
issues influencing the trajectory of the economy.
Turkey is normally prescribed a laundry list of economic
reforms to advance its economy beyond middle-income
status. This list looks daunting and endless, thereby
generating anxiety and reform ‘fatigue’ in the govern-
ment. Prioritizing the reform agenda is probably a more
constructive approach. This means tackling the two main
bottlenecks to growth: quality of human capital and incom-
plete reform of governance and institutions.
Human capital
The quality of human capital (i.e. education and training)
remains a major constraint on growth and innovation in
65 Yigal Schleifer, ‘Turkey: What’s behind the AKP’s New Anti-Abortion Agenda?’, Eurasianet.org, 4 June 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/
65490.
66 ?smet Koç and Mehmet Ali Eryürt, ‘Demographic integration through intermarriage of Turks and Kurds in Turkey’, Presentation to European Population
Conference 2010, 1–4 September 2010, http://epc2010.princeton.edu/abstractViewer.aspx?submissionId=100371.
67 Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜ?K), ‘Statistics on Child, 2012’, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13488.
Figure 6: Turkey’s fertility rate, 1962–2010
Source: World Bank.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
Births per woman
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
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Turkey.
68
The sophistication of exports has been linked
with productivity, and productivity with human capital.
69
Ultimately, high educational quality is a fundamental
plank of a competitive economy.
70
Every three years, the OECD ranks the mathematical,
scientific and reading skills of 15-year-old students in
40 countries. Turkey secured the greatest score improve-
ments in this assessment between 2003 and 2009, albeit
from a very low base.
71
This improvement is attributable
to higher education budgets, rising school enrolment,
more classrooms and modernization of the curriculum.
Overall, however, Turkey stands 32nd among 34 OECD
members and 40 per cent of Turkish 15-year-old students
do not achieve a basic level of competence in mathematical
literacy.
72
Turkey is also ranked 90th out of 187 countries by
the UNDP in terms of average duration of education
for 25-year-olds.
73
In addition, the WEF ranked Turkey
respectively 63rd, 74th, and 124th out of 144 countries in
terms of primary education and healthcare, higher educa-
tion and training, and labour market efficiency.
74
Moreover, Turkey’s past accomplishments may
unravel under the recently enacted sweeping educa-
tion reforms
75
that reflect Erdo?an’s desire to nurture a
more ‘religious youth’.
76
These changes have lowered the
age at which parents can send their children to Islamic
schools – imam hatips – and other vocational schools.
More religious courses have been added to the school
curriculum and home-schooling for female students has
been allowed.
77
Turkish schools are already criticized for fostering
conformity, insularity, rote learning and deference to
authority as opposed to critical thinking and individual
initiative.
78
So reinforcing these traits will hardly equip
future generations with the requisite skills to succeed in an
increasingly complex global economic environment.
According to a recent survey of 10,174 young people
aged 15–29 across Turkey, most respondents did not speak
a foreign language; only one in ten had travelled abroad;
one-third did not read newspapers; the most popular
activity was watching television, and ultra-nationalist soap
operas received top ratings.
79
68 ?zak Atiyas and Ozan Bak??, ‘Türkiye’de Büyümenin K?s?tlar?: Bir Önceliklendirme Çal??mas?’ [‘Constraints on Growth in Turkey: A Prioritization Study’], TÜS?AD
Yay?n No -T/2011/11/519, November 2011, http://www.tusiad.org.tr/__rsc/shared/file/Rapor-TRdeBuyumeninKisitlari.pdf.
69 ?zak Atiyas, ‘Uluslararas? Üretim Zincilerinde Dön?üm ve Türkiye’nin Konumu’ [‘The Transformation of International Production Linkages and Turkey’], Koç
University – TÜS?AD Economic Research Forum, Discussant Paper, Sabanc? University, 2 March 2012, http://ref.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/ref.sabanciuniv.edu/
files/2012-03-02_izak_atiyas.pdf.
70 Ozan Acar, ‘PISA Sonuçlar? I????nda Türkiye’nin Rekabet Gücünün De?erlendirilmesi’ [‘Competitiveness Assessment of PISA results for Turkey’], TEPAV, 19
February 2008, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1271251457r2163.PISA_Sonuclari_Isiginda_Turkiye___nin_Rekabet_Gucunun_Degerlendirilmesi.pdf.
71 Bengisu Özenç and Selin Arslanhan, ‘An Evaluation of the PISA 2009 Results’, TEPAV Evaluation Notice, December 2010, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/
files/1292317950-2.An_Evaluation_of_the_PISA_2009_Results.pdf.
72 OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisa2009keyfindings.htm.
73 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 2012’, http://http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103006.html.
74 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, 2012, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf.
75 Gökçe Uysal-Kola?in and Duygu Güner, ‘E?itimin Kalitesinde S?n?rl? ?yile?me’ [‘The modest improvement in the quality of education’], BETAM, Ara?t?rma Notu
10/102, 17 December 2010, http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/ArastirmaNotu102.pdf.
76 ‘Erdo?an resurrects debates of Islamization’, Al-Arabiya News, 9 February 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/09/193621.html.
77 Daniel Dombey, ‘Education reforms divide Turkey’, Financial Times, 14 March 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5c60ca4c-6a0c-11e1-b54f-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz1xgg8Llsh.
78 Jenny White, ‘Turkish Education: Authority or Critical Thinking, Assertive Masculinity or Consensus’, Jenny White’s Blog, 28 March 2008, http://kamilpasha.com/?p=203.
79 Burak Bekdil, ‘The Turkish ideal, too, is youth’, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-turkish-ideal-too-is-youth.aspx?page
ID=238&nID=15943&NewsCatID=398.
‘
Turkey stands 32nd
among 34 OECD members and
40 per cent of Turkish 15-year-
old students do not achieve a
basic level of competence in
mathematical literacy
’
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Education issues further affect Turkey’s economic
prospects indirectly through their impact on ‘interper-
sonal trust’ – the willingness of one party to rely on the
actions of another party – throughout the country’s
human capital. Turkey’s levels of interpersonal trust are
considerably lower than OECD averages (see Table 1).
University-educated educated Turks, especially, are less
than one-quarter as trusting of others as their peers in
other countries. Turkey stands out among the 20 coun-
tries in the survey as the only one where higher
educational attainment correlates with lower feelings
of trust.
80
Such levels of mistrust are deeply damaging to Turkey’s
‘social capital’ (the patterns and qualities of relationships
in a community) and human capital and, by extension,
its economic growth.
81
Communities with high levels of
human capital are typically also characterized by high
levels of social capital in its various forms, and the reverse
effect is also valid.
82
Turkey’s low social capital is not conducive to the
promotion of innovation and wealth creation.
83
The
European Commission has concluded that Turkey is the
least innovative economy in Europe.
84
It had the sixth
lowest labour productivity among OECD countries in
2011 as measured in terms of GDP per hour worked.
This is the most important contributor to the income gap
between Turkey and the EU.
85
Governance and institutions
Another major obstacle to sustainable growth is the weak-
ness of governance and institutions. Turkish society is
seen as tolerant of unequal distributions of power and
inclined to low levels of individual rights.
86
These features
are normally associated with countries where growth rates
are volatile, current account deficits are persistent and the
momentum for reform is rarely robust even in the pres-
ence of positive macroeconomic indicators. In Turkey,
the concentration of political power in the hands of a few
individuals tends to undermine state institutions and does
not encourage an enduring stable political environment
for reform. In August 2011, for example, the government
abruptly curtailed much of the independence of the public
procurement regulator and eight other market regulatory
bodies.
87
Unsurprisingly, Turkey is ranked only 64th out of
144 countries in terms of the efficiency and transparency
of its public institutions, according to the WEF.
88
Throughout Erdo?an’s 11-year single-party government,
the EU accession process has been the principal driver for
reforms. These flourished at the height of that process
but ebbed dramatically when it stalled, even though the
prime minister secured an overwhelming second-term
election victory in 2007. This paralysis of reforms has been
Table 1: Proportion of adults expressing
interpersonal trust, by level of education, 2010
Below upper
secondary (%)
Upper
secondary (%)
Tertiary
(%)
OECD average 34 42 53
Turkey 16 12 12
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010.
80 ‘Learning not to trust? The OECD on Turkish education’, Istanbul Notes, 28 September 2010, http://istanbulnotes.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/learning-not-
to-trust-the-oecd-on-turkish-education.
81 I. Semih Akçomak and Bas ter Weel, ‘Social Capital, Innovation and Growth: Evidence from Europe’, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 3341, http://www.econstor.
eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/35000/1/560201257.pdf.
82 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Education, Diversity, Social Cohesion and “Social Capital”’, OECD, Note for Discussion, 2004, http://www.oecd.org/general/
meetingofoecdeducationministers-raisingthequalityoflearningforall-chairssummary.htm.
83 Francesco Sarracino, ‘Economic Growth and Social Capital: Happily Together Ever After’, CEPS/INSTEAD, Working Paper No. 2011–52, October 2011,
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/catalogue-publications/working-papers-CEPS/2011/52-2011.pdf.
84 European Commission (Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General), ‘Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011’, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
innovation/files/ius-2011_en.pdf.
85 World Bank, ‘Turkey Investment Climate Assessment. Vol. II’, 8 November 2007, http://www.yoikk.gov.tr/dosya/up/eng/ICA%20Volume_II.pdf.
86 Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede and Michael Minkov, Culture and Organizations: Software of the Mind (McGraw Hill, 3rd edn, 2010).
87 Cengiz Aktar, ‘Development at any cost’, Today’s Zaman, 13 June 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-283463-development--at-any-cost.html.
88 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013.
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reinforced by an uncompromising style of leadership as
laid bare by Erdo?an’s reaction to the recent protests in
Istanbul’s Taksim Square, by his determination to intro-
duce a centralized presidency, for which he hopes to run
in 2014, and by the local and general elections scheduled
respectively for 2014 and 2015. Naturally, the fruits of
long-term reform initiatives, such as upgrading the rule of
law or transforming the education system and vocational
training programmes, require focused government atten-
tion and do not conform to the short timelines of electoral
politics; but they are, nevertheless, essential to propel the
Turkish economy forward.
Conclusion
Erdo?an has ruled, until recently, with a steady hand amid
what was a blossoming economy. Turkey has become
a regional force to be reckoned with and for a long
time a darling of financial markets. National self-confi-
dence, political ambitions and economic prowess go hand
in hand.
The prime minister needs to beware, however, of over-
confidence and triumphalism. Past performance based on
‘easy’ growth released by lower inflation and fiscal disci-
pline is no guarantee of future success.
89
Turkey’s growth
strategy suffers from a serious flaw in its excessive reliance
on domestic demand-led growth, putting at risk the sustain-
ability of a fast-paced economy. Given current institutional
and policy constraints, it might struggle to achieve even
modest growth rates of 2–5 per cent and will be vulnerable
to foreign investor sentiments unless it bases growth more
on productivity gains.
Time is of the essence. After about 2025, it is anticipated
that Turkey’s ‘demographic window of opportunity’ will
start closing, population ageing will be in full swing and
its middling prospects for prosperity may well become
the norm.
89 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Penguin), 10 May 2012.
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6
After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Fadi Hakura is the Manager of the Turkey Project and
an Associate Fellow of the Europe Programme
at Chatham House.
Chatham House has been the home of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs for ninety years. Our
mission is to be a world-leading source of independent
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doc_471552251.pdf
The Turkish economy, once a by-word for hyperinflation and budgetary imprudence, was until recently apparently in the midst of a renaissance.
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briefing paper
After the Boom: Risks to
the Turkish Economy
Fadi Hakura
Europe Programme | August 2013 | Europe BP 2013/02
Summary points
z After a strong post-crisis recovery, Turkish growth slowed sharply to 2.2 per cent
in 2012. The success of Prime Minister Erdo?an’s government has been rooted in
economic prosperity, which will remain a central issue for his popularity.
z Turkey’s economy has been boosted by the rise of socially conservative, export-
oriented entrepreneurs known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, nurtured by business
networking through Islamic social networks, return migration from Germany, free-
market economic policies, and institution-building by the previous secular-inclined
establishment.
z Other strengths of the Turkish economy include successful strategies for the
movement of labour from low- to higher-productivity sectors and poverty reduction.
z The sources of ‘easy’ economic growth from macroeconomic stability and fiscal
discipline have been largely exhausted, however. Turkey’s consumer-driven economic
model cannot sustain consistently high growth rates and is being undermined by
low investment and savings rates, limited export sophistication, pervasive gender
inequality and inefficient use of its ‘demographic dividend’.
z Turkey’s growth potential will be constrained unless it implements productivity-
enhancing reforms before the problems of an ageing population start to be
noticeable around 2025. To avoid reform ‘fatigue’, it should focus on tackling the
main bottlenecks to economic growth: the quality of human capital, and incomplete
reform of governance and institutions.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Introduction
The Turkish economy, once a by-word for hyperinflation
and budgetary imprudence, was until recently apparently
in the midst of a renaissance. As chilling winds swept
through much of the Western world, Turkey was basking
in the warmth of 8–9 per cent growth rates, manageable
inflation and fiscal probity.
The statistics reveal the extent of this startling economic
turnaround. Over the last decade, the world’s 16th largest
economy grew by $383 billion, exports rose from $63
billion to $135 billion and per capita incomes doubled
(in current US dollars) against a backdrop of central
government debt shrinkage from three-figure levels to
46 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).
1
This turnaround was regarded as all the more remarkable
considering the identity of its steward: the Islamist-rooted
Justice and Development Party (JDP). Turkey demon-
strated – at least on the surface – that Islam, democratic
governance and prosperity were perfectly compatible. That
was, undoubtedly, a powerful message to the new Islamist
governments in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and other post-
Arab Spring countries.
Recent protests in Istanbul have revealed the polariza-
tion within Turkey over Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdo?an’s social policies and political leadership style. But
his electoral success has been rooted in Turkey’s economic
prosperity, and the sustainability of high growth rates will
remain a central issue for the endurance of his popularity.
It is therefore important to consider whether Turkey has
the wherewithal to maintain recent growth rates given the
status of its overall policy reforms, the quality of its institu-
tions and current global dynamics.
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate, first by
outlining the major shifts in Turkey’s economy and then
by assessing whether its economic experience provides an
adequate foundation for high future growth rates.
Steady economy
Turkey is a prime case study demonstrating how the effects
of a precipitous economic collapse can be reversed. As the
liberalization of the 1980s went unsupported by sound
macroeconomic policies and institutional reforms, the
economy suffered repeated crises in the following decade:
in 1991, 1994, 1998, 1999 and, worst of all, 2001. Lack of
fiscal discipline and heavy reliance on monetary financing
led to high inflation and real interest rates.
An inadequate regulatory and supervisory framework
for the banking system encouraged financial institutions
to funnel short-term borrowing from depositors into loans
of dubious quality and government securities. Inefficient
state enterprises dominated several economic sectors.
Policy durability was undermined by a succession of short-
lived coalition governments that implemented populist
measures.
Then, under the aegis of former Economy Minister
Kemal Dervi?, Turkey recovered swiftly from the 2001
collapse. He concluded a stand-by agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), liquidated insolvent
banks, privatized state-owned enterprises, liberalized the
energy and telecommunication markets, introduced a
free-floating Turkish lira (TL), created an autonomous
central bank, and set up independent financial and market
regulatory bodies. Turkey’s European Union accession
process and policy continuity under the subsequent single-
party JDP government accelerated the recovery.
2
Erdo?an’s leadership had brought more efficiency and
predictability to economic policy-making since 2002.
Turkey’s central bank had earned plaudits from financial
markets for bringing inflation under control.
3
Credibility
became a cornerstone of Turkish economic, fiscal and
monetary policies, enabling the domestic business commu-
nity and foreign investors to engage in long-term planning
within a more stable political environment.
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-turkey_20752288-table-tur.
World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey.
2 Mihai Macovei, ‘Growth and Economic Crises in Europe: Leaving behind a Turbulent Past’, European Commission (Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate-
General), Economic 386, October 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16004_en.pdf.
3 Emre Alper and Ozan Hatipo?lu, ‘The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Turkey in the Pre- and Post-crisis Period of 2001 in Comparative Perspective: a Case
for Central Bank Independence’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper No. 18426, January 2009, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18426/1/
MPRA_paper_18426.pdf.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
The ‘Anatolian Tigers’
Turkey has witnessed a conspicuous phenomenon in the
Muslim world: the rise of socially conservative, market-
embracing and export-oriented business elites combining
capitalism with piety. A new class of entrepreneurs, leading
mostly family-owned small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), unleashed an industrial renaissance in various
Anatolian cities in the country’s Asian heartland, notably
in Bal?kesir, Denizli, Gaziantep, Kayseri and Konya. They
are challenging the once-unassailable export and invest-
ment dominance of Istanbul, the economic powerhouse
of Turkey.
Boydak Holding, a Kayseri-headquartered furniture
producer, epitomizes the growth of this modern-day rags-
to-riches Islamic capitalism. Founded in 1957, Boydak has
catapulted itself from being a small workshop in Kayseri
to a multi-billion-dollar industrial conglomerate spanning
a bank, a transport company, a trading arm and Turkey’s
largest cable factory.
4
It now exports to over 100 countries.
Kayseri’s ‘economic miracle’ did not spring out of a
vacuum. Islamic social networks facilitated an environ-
ment in which budding entrepreneurs could mingle,
network and negotiate deals.
5
In the words of one writer:
‘They grew up in praying and mosque-going house-
holds, and many got to know one another – and still
network – in Nurcu circles [a pro-business Islamic social
network].’
6
Three other decisive factors fuelled the success of the
‘Anatolian Tigers’. One is return migration: Anatolians
returning from Germany replicated business ideas and
ventures in their home towns.
7
Secondly, free-market
reforms initiated in the 1980s and consolidated under the
JDP fostered entrepreneurship, a widening availability
of commercial loans and aggressive export promotion
in foreign markets.
8
A third, but a commonly ignored,
factor was the importation by the previous secular-
leaning establishment of European political, economic
and social institutions. Turkey stood out for decades
as one of the few countries in the region that enjoyed
a semblance of democratic pluralism, the rule of law, a
modern education system and a viable manufacturing
sector.
Structural change
Turkey’s economy has been moving resources, predomi-
nantly labour, from low-productivity activities, such
as traditional agriculture and informality, to higher-
productivity, modern industries and the tradable sector.
In 2000, manufacturing absorbed a quarter of total
public and private investments; by 2008, the figure was
50 per cent. Similarly, the composition of exports has
reflected this change.
This diversification of investments and exports into the
tradable sector raised the added value of Turkey’s produc-
tive capacities, its ability to compete in global markets and
the private return on invested capital. It is noteworthy that
the post-2000 growth rates according to three different
‘
Turkey has witnessed a
conspicuous phenomenon in the
Muslim world: the rise of socially
conservative, market-embracing
and export-oriented business
elites combining capitalism
with piety
’
4 European Stability Initiative, ‘Islamic Calvinist: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia’, European Stability Initiative, 19 September 2005,
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=69.
5 Pelin Turgut, ‘Anatolian tigers: regions prove plentiful’, Financial Times, 20 November 2006.
6 Vali Nasr, ‘Turkey’s supreme irony: Kayseri’s business globalists’, The Globalist, 8 June 2010, http://www.theglobalist.com/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=8292.
7 Deniz Karc? Korfal?, Ay?en Üstübici and Helene De Clerck, ‘Turkey: Country and Research Reports’, EUMAGINE, 28 September 2010, http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/
pdfs/research-projects-pdfs/eumagine-pdfs/eumagine-project-paper-5-turkey-country-and-research-areas-report.
8 Nicholas Birch, ‘Turkey: “Muslim Calvinists” in Anatolia Show How Piety Can Blend with Modernity’, Eurasia.org, 23 July 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insight/articles/eav072408a.shtml. Simon Cameron-Moore, ‘“Anatolian Tigers” go where Turkey’s diplomacy leads’, Reuters, 13 July 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/13/us-turkey-tigers-idUSTRE66C2Q320100713.
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
measures of productivity – GDP per worker, GDP per
capita and manufacturing value added per worker –
exceed those in all previous periods.
9
Poverty reduction
Turkey’s growth performance not only created a new
middle class – which enjoyed the largest gains of
household after-tax income
10
– but also, according
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), ‘reduced income inequality
considerably’.
11
Turkey’s Gini coefficient (where 0 and 1
correspond to complete income equality and inequality
respectively) decreased from 0.403 in 2006 to 0.38
in 2010.
Furthermore, while the income of the richest 10 per cent
in Turkey was about 18 times that of the poorest 10 per cent
in 2005, this ratio had narrowed to 14 times by 2009.
12
Similarly, the proportion of Turks below the poverty line
fell during this period from 20.5 per cent in 2005 to 18.1
per cent in 2009
13
and the rate of child poverty declined
from one-third of children in 2006 to one-quarter in
2010.
14
Poverty and equality indicators have, however,
stagnated since 2010.
There are three main causes of this uptick between
2006 and 2010: a three per cent yearly increase in non-
agricultural employment; a reduction in interest on debt
payments from 22 per cent to 16 per cent of the national
budget, allowing for increased social transfers to the poor;
and a rise in the minimum wage and in the lowest public-
sector earnings by, respectively, 16 per cent and 28 per cent
in real terms (i.e. omitting inflation).
‘Objective 2023’
Erdo?an’s 2011 general election slogan, ‘Hedef 2023’
(‘Objective 2023’), set the ambitious target of tripling the
size of the economy, increasing exports to $500 billion and
joining the world’s top ten economies by 2023, the cente-
nary of the Turkish republic. Average per capita income
would, he predicted optimistically, be $25,000 a year, not
far below that of Spain today.
15
Turkey would need annual growth of nine per cent to satisfy
the prime minister’s expectations, of which 3–4 per cent is
‘guaranteed’ growth assuming a two per cent US dollar infla-
tion and 1–2 per cent yearly appreciation of the Turkish lira.
This means that during the next decade Turkey needs at least
an annual average GDP growth rate of five per cent, grounded
on exports rather than domestic demand.
16
It has been argued that few countries manage to achieve
growth rates of eight per cent on a durable basis. As
reported by a commission of 19 political leaders and
9 Dani Rodrik, ‘The Turkish Economy After the Crisis’, Harvard University, 24 November 2009, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/
Turkish%20economy%20after%20the%20crisis.pdf.
10 Emre Deliveli, ‘Social Implications of Turkish Reforms’, Hürriyet Daily News, 15 April 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/social-implications-of-turkish-
reforms.aspx?pageID=449&nID=44893&NewsCatID=430.
11 ‘Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising’, OECD, December 2011, http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3746,en_2649_33933_49147827_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
12 Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1011.
13 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey.
14 Seyfettin Gürsel, ‘Material deprivation among children’, Today’s Zaman, 22 April 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-313393-material-deprivation-
among-children.html.
15 Gwynne Dyer, ‘Will Turkey grant Erdogan’s dreams?’, Winnipeg Free Press, 11 June 2011, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/westview/will-turkey-
grant-erdogans-dreams-123678784.html?viewAllComments=y.
16 Seyfettin Gürsel, ‘AK Party’s 2023 vision’, Today’s Zaman, 4 October 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-294315-ak-partys-2023
-vision.html.
‘
Erdo?an’s 2011 general
election slogan set the
ambitious target of tripling
the size of the economy,
increasing exports to $500
billion and joining the world’s
top ten economies by 2023
’
g
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
academics from around the world tasked with identifying
important insights on policy levers to help countries
achieve high, sustainable and inclusive growth, economies
confined to a model based on private consumption rarely
witness consistently high growth rates.
17
Turkey, where
private consumption accounts for 70 per cent of national
income, typifies such an economy.
Turkey is categorized as an ‘upper-middle-income’
country by the World Bank (defined as having per capita
income between $3,976 and $12,275).
18
Its GDP per capita
growth rate was between that of Latin America and that of
Asia until recently (see Figure 1). In 2012, its growth was
2.2 per cent.
19
In the case of Turkey, the risks of restrained growth
rates are real and substantial. It needed 55 years to escape
its low-income status,
20
which is comparatively much
easier than achieving the transition from middle-income
to high-income status. Turkey has so far experienced only
the ‘easy’ growth derived from macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion
21
and can no longer simply rely on low-cost labour
resources and the easy adoption of new technology as
sources of growth.
Figure 2 indicates that during the last decade Turkey’s
economy has experienced two episodes of sharp
recession followed by a booming recovery and a subse-
quent period of prolonged deceleration: in 2002–07
and 2008–12. These exemplify an economy hovering
between stagnation and a solid growth cycle, where
domestic demand cannot sustain growth and employ-
ment indefinitely.
22
17 Commission on Growth and Development, ‘The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development’, World Bank, 2008,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Final_Report.pdf.
18 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Upper_middle_income.
19 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
20 Hakan Ta?çi, ‘The real challenge for the Turkish economy’, Today’s Zaman, 22 May 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-281105-the-real-challenge-
for-the-turkish-economy.html.
21 Willem H. Buiter, ‘It’s a long way to Copenhagen’, CEPS Policy Briefs, 1 March 2006, http://www.ceps.eu/book/its-long-way-copenhagen.
22 Cevdet Akçay and Murat Üçer, ‘A Narrative on the Turkish Current Account’, International Journal of Trade and Diplomacy, Vol. 2, Winter 2008,
https://www.simmons.edu/academics/undergraduate/east-asian/docs/Ogus_Binatli_and_Sohrabji-JITD_paper.pdf.
Figure 1: Ratio of GDP growth per capita in Turkey to growth in Latin America and Asia, 1980–2008
Source: Dani Rodrik, ‘Turkey’s Growth Story’, presentation at the conference on ‘Turkey’s Experience with Neo-Liberal Economic Reforms’, London School of
Economics, 28 October 2011.
Notes: 1.0 on the scale represents equal growth.
Asia includes Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.
Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
R
a
t
i
o
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Latin America Asia
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
R
a
t
i
o
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Turkey’s consumption-based economic paradigm has
several characteristics that undermine growth: low invest-
ment and savings rates, limited sophistication of exports,
pervasive gender inequality and inefficient use of its
‘demographic dividend’. Each of these features will be
elaborated in turn below.
Domestic investments and savings
Generally, sustainable growth requires national investment
rates of 25 per cent of GDP or above, counting both public
and private expenditure. Between 2000 and 2010 Turkey’s
rate fluctuated between 15 per cent and 22 per cent of
GDP, and in only four years of these years did it exceed
20 per cent.
23
In addition, the quality of its insufficient investment
rates is wanting. Turkey misallocated investment expen-
ditures from manufacturing towards residential uses and
other non-productive sectors in the post-1980s period;
and this was accompanied by the fact that public and
private investment no longer complemented each other.
24
Istanbul’s skyline testifies to this dash for concrete, which
triggered the recent protests over redevelopment plans for
Gezi Park adjoining Taksim Square, one of few remaining
green spaces in Istanbul; TL 7.5 billion ($4.6 billion) had
been earmarked for urban renewal projects in the city for
2012 alone.
25
High-growth economies need to set aside a consider-
able share of their income as savings, with a national
savings rate of at least 20–25 per cent of GDP, to fund
domestic investment needs. Turkey’s savings rate, on the
other hand, decreased from over 23 per cent in the 1990s
to 12.7 per cent in 2010, the lowest rate since 1980.
26
The
main culprit is plummeting household savings, which
more than offset the increase in savings that would
normally be associated with rising incomes. This is due
to post-crisis credit growth, falling interest rates, rising
23 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS.
24 Sumru Altu? and Ünal Zenginobuz, ‘What has been the Role of Investment in Turkey’s Growth Performance?’, Bo?aziçi University, February 2009,
http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public_html/RePEc/pdf/200902.pdf.
25 Constanze Letsch, ‘Istanbul sees history razed in the name of regeneration’, Guardian, 1 March 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/01/
istanbul-city-urban-renewal.
26 World Bank and Turkey’s Ministry of Development, ‘Sustaining High Growth: The Role of Domestic Saving’, Turkey Country Economic Memorandum,
Synthesis Report (Conference Edition), 14 March 2012, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1331638027014/CEM_
DomesticSavings_fulltext.pdf.
Figure 2: Turkey’s GDP 2000–13, constant prices
Source: IMF, 2012 World Economic Outlook.
*Projected.
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
%
c
h
a
n
g
e
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
house prices, pent-up consumption and the increase
in the middle classes’ share of consumption.
27
As the
economy recovered, this reduced the need for ‘precau-
tionary savings’ (i.e. money saved to guard against the
uncertainty of future income).
28
Unsurprisingly, the ratio of household liabilities to
disposable income has grown from 4.7 per cent in 2002 to
50.6 per cent in 2012.
29
This may indicate the increasing
likelihood of a financial crisis in the near future that will
be exacerbated by the steady rise in the share of consumer
credit in the budgets for the lower- and middle-income
households and by declining rates of home ownership
for the median group of households which constitute
the backbone of the labour force.
30
At 51 per cent of
GDP, Turkey’s net external debt is among the highest for
emerging markets, driven mainly by a surge of private-
sector borrowing.
31
The average debt-to-equity ratio of the
largest 500 firms in Turkey was 120 per cent in 2010 and
141 per cent in 2011, compared with roughly 50 per cent
in the United States and 70 per cent in Europe in 2011.
32
Turkey’s current account deficit (CAD), where national
investments exceed national savings,
33
reached an
unsustainable 10 per cent of GDP in 2011 and is expected
to shrink only gradually in the next few years.
34
Turkey is in
a vicious circle: economic growth drives investment needs
that cannot be satisfied by domestic savings,
35
which causes
addiction to fickle and footloose speculative financial flows
(‘hot money’) to finance its CAD.
36
Owing to the ‘sudden
stop’ of foreign capital inflows in the 2008–09 global finan-
cial crisis, Turkey suffered one of the sharpest subsequent
recessions among emerging markets.
37
Turkey’s persistent CAD is driven primarily by struc-
tural, as opposed to cyclical, factors: a low savings rate,
trade composition, and a heavy dependency on imports
of energy, intermediate and capital goods in relation to
Turkish exports and manufacturing industry.
38
Reliance
on an overvalued lira to control inflation, the inflation
differential relative to other currencies and the exces-
sive importance of intermediate imports mean economic
growth hurts the supply of exports and trade balances.
39
Turkey’s imports of goods and services as a proportion of
GDP rose from 26.2 per cent to 32.7 per cent between 2004
and 2011, while its exports of goods and services rose only
from 23.6 per cent to 23.8 per cent in the same period.
40
27 Murat Üçer and Caroline Van Rijckeghem, ‘The Evolution and Determinants of the Turkish Private Saving Rate: What Lessons for Policy?’, ERF Research
Report Series No. 09-01, February 2009, http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/rr09-02.pdf; Cevdet Akçay and Murat Can A?lak, ‘One Man’s Happiness
is Another’s Agony? Not Necessarily’, Yap? Kredi Bank, Macro Brief, 20 November 2008, http://www.yapikredi.com.tr/enUS/macroeconomic_research/pdf/
macro_briefs/2008-11-20.pdf.
28 Emre Deliveli, ‘Saving private savings II’, Hurriyet Daily News, 19 March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/saving-private-savings-ii.aspx?pageID=449&n
ID=16304&NewsCatID=430.
29 Emre Deliveli, ‘Marcroeconomics 101 for journalists confused by Finance Ministers’, Hurriyet Daily News, 24 June 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
macroeconomics-101-for-journalists-confused-by-finance-ministers.aspx?pageID=449&nID=49321&NewsCatID=430.
30 Alper Duman, ‘Household Debt in Turkey: The Critical Threshold for the Next Crisis’, Izmir University of Economics, Prepared for ECOMOD 2013, April 2013,
http://www.ecomod.net/system/files/HouseholdDebtinTurkeyAlperDuman.pdf.
31 Benjamin Harvey and Taylan Bilgiç, ‘Erdogan’s IMF Triumph Masks Surge in Private Debt: Turkey Credit’, Bloomberg, 14 May 2013, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2013-05-13/erdogan-s-imf-triumph-masks-surge-in-private-debt-turkey-credit.html
32 Vefa Tarhan, @Vefa_Tarhan, 20 June 2013, http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rku9vq.
33 An alternative definition of current account deficit is the sum of imports of goods and services plus net returns on investments exceed the value of goods and services.
34 ‘Turkey posts record current account deficit’, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 February 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-posts-record-current-account-
deficit.aspx?pageID=238&nID=13690&NewsCatID=344.
35 Faz?l Kay?kç?, ‘Discussion on Sustainability of Current Account Deficits in Turkey’, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 74, 2011,
http://www.eurojournals.com/IRJFE_74_08.pdf.
36 ‘Istanbuls and bears’, The Economist, 7 April 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552216.
37 Rodrik, ‘The Turkish Economy After the Crisis’.
38 Mary Stokes and David Rogovic, ‘Mind the (Current Account) Gap in Turkey’, Forbes, 25 August 2010, http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/25/turkey-deficit-
economy-opinions-columnists-doctor-doom.html.
39 Ayla O?u? Binatli and Niloufer Sohrabji, ‘Elasticities of Turkish Trade’, Izmir University of Economics, Working Paper 0906, 2009, http://www.simmons.
edu/undergraduate/academics/ departments/economics/docs/Turkish_trade_elasticities.pdf; Ya?ar Vural and Mahmut Zortuk, ‘Foreign Direct Investment
as a Determining Factor in Turkey’s Export Performance’, Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2011, http://www.ejbe.org/
EJBE2011Vol04No07p13VURAL-ZORTUK.pdf.
40 OECD, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-turkey_20752288-table-tur.
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Since Turkey’s export and import growth tend to
move concomitantly, the CAD cannot be effectively dealt
with by depreciation of the lira alone. Thus the foreign
trade and current account deficits are not necessarily
‘sustainable’ (i.e. at a level that prevents a permanent
increase in a country’s external debt-to-GDP ratio)
without slower economic growth and a contraction
of domestic consumption, as happened in 2009 (see
Figure 3), which would reduce the CAD to a more
manageable five per cent of GDP, thereby leaving it
less vulnerable to the vagaries of international finan-
cial flows.
41
This mismatch between global purchasing power and
domestic productive capacity cannot continue to grow
indefinitely. One can measure the former by average
purchasing power (dark blue line in Figure 4) in US
dollars and the latter by average productivity (light blue
line in Figure 4). According to one study, this implies
that Turkey’s ‘average dollar-based income – per capita as
well as per worker, currently running at around $10,000
and $30,000, respectively – is simply too high, compared
to [its] average productivity levels’.
42
As a result, Turkey’s
per capita incomes increased by only 31 per cent (in
constant 2005 US dollars) after stripping out inflation
and exchange-rate effects,
43
rather than the oft-quoted
300 per cent in nominal terms.
The government has not delivered an adequate
policy response so far. It has opted for tax incentives
to encourage indigenous production of intermediate
goods and reduce its import needs – a form of import
substitution – while also increasing government contri-
butions to and tax breaks for private pensions. The
tax incentives are expected to have only a limited
impact on the national savings rate
44
and several econo-
mists have questioned the efficacy of the latter as a
highly complex scheme that does not tackle the root
41 Aysu ?nsel and Faz?l Kay?kç?, ‘Evaluation of Sustainability of Current Account Deficits in Turkey’, Modern Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2012, http://www.
scirp.org/Journal/PaperInformation.aspx?paperID=16805.
42 Murat Üçer, ‘How Should We Read Turkey’s Current Account Deficit?’, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Autumn 2011, http://edam.
org.tr/document/Newsletter%202011-Fall.pdf.
43 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?page=1.
44 Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Murat Üçer, ‘The Evolution and Determinants of the Turkish Private Saving Rate: What Lessons for Policy?’, Powerpoint
presentation, 11 June 2008, at the TÜSIAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Conference on Micro-Macro Perspectives on Private Savings in Turkey,
http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/cvr.pdf.
Figure 3: Turkey’s current account balance, 2001–13 (as % of GDP)
Source: IMF, 2012 World Economic Outlook.
*Projected.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
P
e
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c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
causes of the CAD.
45
Instead, considering the argument
that sustainable high economic growth precedes higher
savings, government policy needs to focus on removing
impediments to growth and reducing the vulnerability
resulting from low savings during the transition period.
46
Limited sophistication of exports
A recent IMF paper constructed indices for countries’
‘sophistication of exports’, as measured by the average
income and productivity level associated with all their
exports. This demonstrates that increasing the sophistica-
tion of exports of goods and services can be an important
contributor to overall economic growth. More sophisti-
cated sectors not only create more value-added activities
but also act as ‘engines of growth’, as they generate spillover
effects for the whole economy.
47
Turkey is in the middle of the spectrum of export
sophistication; it has not yet been able to increase its
export sophistication as China and India have done.
48
It
has specialized in stagnant sectors whose share of global
trade has been declining and is generally more competi-
tive in goods with lower relative prices, where minimizing
costs is the strategic issue.
49
High-tech exports – products
with high research and development intensity, such as in
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instru-
ments and electrical machinery – have accounted for just
two per cent of total manufactured goods exports on a
consistent basis since 2002.
50
45 See, for example, Oxford Business Group, ‘Turkey: a Cautious Approach’, 9 May 2012, http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/turkey-
cautious-approach; Emre Deliveli, ‘Turkey: Industrial Policy, New Investment Incentives Scheme and the Current Account’, Emre Deliveli’s Blog, 26 May 2012,
http://www.economonitor.com/emredeliveli/2012/05/26/turkey-industrial-policy-new-investment-incentives-scheme-and-the-current-account/; and Ozan
Acar? and Esen Ça?lar, ‘An Assessment on the New Incentive Package’, TEPAV Note, April 2012, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1336653759-4.
An_Assessment_on_the_New_Investment_Incentive_Package.pdf.
46 Eser Pirgan Matur, Ali Sabuncu and Sema Bahçeci, ‘Determinants of Private Savings and Interaction Between Public and Private Savings in Turkey’, Topics in
Middle Eastern and African Economies, Vol. 14, September 2012, http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume14/PDFS/Saving%20study_V_eas7_1.pdf.
47 Rahul Anand, Saurabh Mishra and Nikola Spatafora, ‘Structural Transformation and the Sophistication of Production’, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/59, February
2012, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1259.pdf.
48 Ibid.
49 Erol Taymaz, Ebru Voyvoda and Kamil Y?lmaz, ‘Uluslararas? Üretim Zincirlerinde Dönü?üm ve Türkiye’nin Konumu’ [‘The Transformation of International
Production Linkages and Turkey’], Koç University – TÜS?AD Economic Research Forum, Yay?n No. EAF-RP/11–01, December 2011, http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/
sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/eaf_rp_1101.pdf.
50 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS?page=1.
Figure 4: Turkey’s global purchasing power versus domestic productive capacity
Sources: World Bank and US Department of Agriculture.
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
US $
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 US $)
Real GDP per capita (constant 2005 US $)
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Pervasive gender inequality
Female emancipation is a critical driver of economic
growth, robust democratic pluralism, and a state’s secu-
rity and stability.
51
Given the status of women in Turkey,
therefore, the probability of maximizing economic afflu-
ence is more challenging. Indeed, the position of women
is a prominent obstacle to the further development and
growth of the ‘Anatolian Tigers’.
52
Turkish women live in a socially conservative society
in which they face significant restrictions. According to
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and the World Economic Forum (WEF), respectively,
Turkey is positioned 101st out of 109 countries for
gender empowerment
53
and 122nd out of 135 for gender
equality.
54
At 31.2 per cent, its female labour force partici-
pation rate – the proportion of working-age women in
employment – is less than half the average of 60 per cent
for the OECD.
55
Social conservatism acts as one of the
chief barriers to female employment, together with the
lack of job opportunities for women in urban environ-
ments, the decline in agricultural employment, poor
education of women, lack of childcare services and inad-
equate working conditions.
56
Excluding women from the labour force is costly.
Assuming a 50 per cent female labour force participa-
tion rate achieving the average level of productivity
($30,000 value added per worker per annum), Turkey’s
annual economic loss amounts to $419 billion. This
is greater than the economy’s GDP gains over the last
ten years.
57
Inefficient use of demographic dividend
Turkey’s youthful population – the median age is 29.2
years
58
– has been a source of vitality for the economy.
The country is going through the ‘demographic window
of opportunity’, where the proportion of the working-age
population (those between 15 and 64 years) is bulging,
while the proportion of the ‘inactive’ youth (below 15
years) and the elderly (65 years and above) is shrinking.
51 The Economist, ‘A Guide to Womenomics: the Future of the World Economy Lies Increasingly in Female Hands’, 12 April 2006, http://www.economist.com/
node/6802551; Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Policy, April 2003, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/
Articles/Articles%20published%20in%20journals_files/The_True_Clash_Inglehart_Norris_Foreign_Policy_2003.pdf; Sabri Ciftci, ‘Modernization, Islam, or
Social Capital: What Explains Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Muslim World?’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 11, November 2010; Valerie
M. Hudson, ‘What Sex Means for World Peace’, Foreign Policy, 24 April 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/24/what_sex_means_for_
world_peace.
52 European Stability Initiative, ‘Islamic Calvinist: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia’, 19 September 2005, http://www.esiweb.org/index.
php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=69.
53 UNDP, ‘New Horizons: UNDP Turkish Monthly Newsletter’, Issue 47, November 2009, http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=2196.
54 Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D. Tyson and Saadia Zahidi, ‘The Global Gender Gap 2011: Rankings and Scores’, World Economic Forum, 2011,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR11/GGGR11_Rankings-Scores.pdf.
55 Gökçe Uysal, ‘More Women are Working’, BETAM, Research Brief 12/134, 26 July 2012, http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
ResearchBrief137.pdf; ‘More women execs recruited as overall female labor lags behind’, Hurriyet Daily News, 8 March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/more-women-execs-recruited-as-overall-female-labor-lags-behind.aspx?pageID=238&nID=15503&NewsCatID=345.
56 Ersin Kalayc?o?lu and Binnaz Toprak, ‘?? Ya?am?, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kad?n’ [‘Women in the Work Force, Top Administration and Politics’], TESEV Yay?nlar?,
Istanbul, 2004; ?dil Göksel, ‘The Reasons of Decreasing Trend of Female Labour Force Participation in Turkey: The Role of Conservatism’, Izmir University of
Economics, April 2011, http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Goksel1.pdfs; World Bank and State Planning Organization, ‘Female
Labor Force Participation: Trends, Determinants and Policy Framework’, Report No. 48508-TR, 23 November 2009,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1268839345767/Female_LFP-en.pdf.
57 Esen Ça?lar made the calculation based on a female labour force participation of 24 per cent. ‘The annual cost of keeping women at home is $574 billion’,
TEPAV Articles, 2 April 2012, http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/kose-yazisi-tepav/s/3165.
58 CIA, World Factbook, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
‘
Female emancipation is a
critical driver of economic
growth … Given the status of
women in Turkey, therefore,
the probability of maximizing
economic affluence is more
challenging
’
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
This translates into reductions of expenditure on educa-
tion and social security, and rising tax revenues.
59
Turkey is heavily dependent, therefore, on favourable
demographics and structural change – the transfer of workers
from low- to higher-productivity sectors – for labour produc-
tivity growth. These factors accounted for 45 per cent of total
growth for the period 1990–2005, with the remainder due to
productivity increases within each economic sector.
60
In that
respect, Turkey’s performance lies between that of Asia and
that of Latin America (see Figure 5).
Yet Turkey cannot rely indefinitely on the demographic
dividend, which normally happens only once and lasts
around 50 years. Moreover, its benefits can be frittered away
without proper education and employment policies.
61
Based
on UN estimates, Turkey’s demographic window of oppor-
tunity will begin to close in 2025.
62
Figure 6 illustrates the
precipitous fall in the Turkish fertility rate between 1962 and
2010. At 2.09 in 2010, the rate was just below the replacement
level of 2.1 necessary to keep population numbers steady.
After about 2025, Turkey’s dependency ratio – i.e.
between those in the labour force and those outside
it – is expected to rise again as the population starts
ageing. This will incur an intergenerational transition of
resources from education to social security, healthcare
and pension provision for the elderly.
Erdo?an views the drop in fertility as a threat to national
security. He has exhorted women to have three children,
and condemned Caesarean births and abortions.
63
He is
particularly apprehensive that the Kurdish community
could be a majority in Turkey in 2038 since the average
birth rate for Kurdish women is more than double the
national rate for Turkish mothers.
64
59 ‘Turkey’s Population Young and Rapidly Expanding’, Euromonitor International, 24 January 2012, http://blog.euromonitor.com/2012/01/turkeys-population-
young-and-rapidly-expanding.html.
60 Sumru Altu?, Alpay Filiztekin and ?evket Pamuk offered a figure of 33 per cent as the contribution of structural change to Turkey’s productivity growth.
‘Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth for Turkey, 1880–2005’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 6 October 2006, http://www.cepr.org/meets/
wkcn/1/1658/papers/Altug.pdf.
61 John Ross, ‘Understanding the Demographic Dividend’, Policy Project, September 2004, http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/generalreport/Demo_Div.pdf.
62 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), ‘Children in the Population’, http://www.unicef.org.tr/en/content/detail/53/children-in-the-population.html.
63 James D. Zirin, ‘Erdogan’s Turkish Spring: Crosscurrents in the Bosphorus’, Forbes, 4 June 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jameszirin/2012/06/04/
erdogans-turkish-spring-crosscurrents-in-the-bosphorus/.
64 Palash R. Ghosh, ‘Turkey: high Kurdish birth rate raises questions about future’, International Business Times, 16 May 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/
articles/341685/20120516/turkey-kurds-demographics-birth-rate-erdogan-babies.htm?page=all.
Figure 5: Decomposition of labour productivity growth, 1990–2005
Source: Dani Rodrik, ‘Turkey’s Growth Story’, presentation at the conference on ‘Turkey’s Experience with Neo-Liberal Economic Reforms’, London School
of Economics, 28 October 2011.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
Asia Latin America Turkey
Due to structural change
Within sectors
%
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Demographers question the accuracy of Erdo?an’s
forecast but concede that on current trends, the
‘balance of power [between Kurds and Turks] could
start shifting’ within 40 or 50 years.
65
Since both
communities prefer endogamy (i.e. marriage within the
same ethnic group), the current evidence suggests the
demographic differential between them will continue
to increase.
66
Nevertheless, Erdo?an’s focus of concern seems
misguided. The central risk is that procrastination on
economic and social reforms is coinciding with the fast-
approaching demographic reversal, due in less than a
generation. According to a 2012 study by the Turkish
Statistical Institute, the share of the population made
up of children aged up to 17 years had dropped from
41.8 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent by 2012 and is set
tumble further to 25.7 per cent by 2023, 19.1 per cent
by 2050 and 17.6 per cent by 2075.
67
Turkey cannot rely
forever on the power of demography to propel produc-
tivity and economic growth.
Prioritization of reforms
This paper has identified low investment and savings rates,
low value-added exports, gender inequality and inefficient
use of its demographic dividend as features of Turkey’s
economic growth model. Does this mean Turkey has to
tackle all these features simultaneously? Arguably, the short
answer is ‘no’ since they may be symptomatic of deeper
issues influencing the trajectory of the economy.
Turkey is normally prescribed a laundry list of economic
reforms to advance its economy beyond middle-income
status. This list looks daunting and endless, thereby
generating anxiety and reform ‘fatigue’ in the govern-
ment. Prioritizing the reform agenda is probably a more
constructive approach. This means tackling the two main
bottlenecks to growth: quality of human capital and incom-
plete reform of governance and institutions.
Human capital
The quality of human capital (i.e. education and training)
remains a major constraint on growth and innovation in
65 Yigal Schleifer, ‘Turkey: What’s behind the AKP’s New Anti-Abortion Agenda?’, Eurasianet.org, 4 June 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/
65490.
66 ?smet Koç and Mehmet Ali Eryürt, ‘Demographic integration through intermarriage of Turks and Kurds in Turkey’, Presentation to European Population
Conference 2010, 1–4 September 2010, http://epc2010.princeton.edu/abstractViewer.aspx?submissionId=100371.
67 Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜ?K), ‘Statistics on Child, 2012’, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13488.
Figure 6: Turkey’s fertility rate, 1962–2010
Source: World Bank.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
Births per woman
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
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After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy
Turkey.
68
The sophistication of exports has been linked
with productivity, and productivity with human capital.
69
Ultimately, high educational quality is a fundamental
plank of a competitive economy.
70
Every three years, the OECD ranks the mathematical,
scientific and reading skills of 15-year-old students in
40 countries. Turkey secured the greatest score improve-
ments in this assessment between 2003 and 2009, albeit
from a very low base.
71
This improvement is attributable
to higher education budgets, rising school enrolment,
more classrooms and modernization of the curriculum.
Overall, however, Turkey stands 32nd among 34 OECD
members and 40 per cent of Turkish 15-year-old students
do not achieve a basic level of competence in mathematical
literacy.
72
Turkey is also ranked 90th out of 187 countries by
the UNDP in terms of average duration of education
for 25-year-olds.
73
In addition, the WEF ranked Turkey
respectively 63rd, 74th, and 124th out of 144 countries in
terms of primary education and healthcare, higher educa-
tion and training, and labour market efficiency.
74
Moreover, Turkey’s past accomplishments may
unravel under the recently enacted sweeping educa-
tion reforms
75
that reflect Erdo?an’s desire to nurture a
more ‘religious youth’.
76
These changes have lowered the
age at which parents can send their children to Islamic
schools – imam hatips – and other vocational schools.
More religious courses have been added to the school
curriculum and home-schooling for female students has
been allowed.
77
Turkish schools are already criticized for fostering
conformity, insularity, rote learning and deference to
authority as opposed to critical thinking and individual
initiative.
78
So reinforcing these traits will hardly equip
future generations with the requisite skills to succeed in an
increasingly complex global economic environment.
According to a recent survey of 10,174 young people
aged 15–29 across Turkey, most respondents did not speak
a foreign language; only one in ten had travelled abroad;
one-third did not read newspapers; the most popular
activity was watching television, and ultra-nationalist soap
operas received top ratings.
79
68 ?zak Atiyas and Ozan Bak??, ‘Türkiye’de Büyümenin K?s?tlar?: Bir Önceliklendirme Çal??mas?’ [‘Constraints on Growth in Turkey: A Prioritization Study’], TÜS?AD
Yay?n No -T/2011/11/519, November 2011, http://www.tusiad.org.tr/__rsc/shared/file/Rapor-TRdeBuyumeninKisitlari.pdf.
69 ?zak Atiyas, ‘Uluslararas? Üretim Zincilerinde Dön?üm ve Türkiye’nin Konumu’ [‘The Transformation of International Production Linkages and Turkey’], Koç
University – TÜS?AD Economic Research Forum, Discussant Paper, Sabanc? University, 2 March 2012, http://ref.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/ref.sabanciuniv.edu/
files/2012-03-02_izak_atiyas.pdf.
70 Ozan Acar, ‘PISA Sonuçlar? I????nda Türkiye’nin Rekabet Gücünün De?erlendirilmesi’ [‘Competitiveness Assessment of PISA results for Turkey’], TEPAV, 19
February 2008, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1271251457r2163.PISA_Sonuclari_Isiginda_Turkiye___nin_Rekabet_Gucunun_Degerlendirilmesi.pdf.
71 Bengisu Özenç and Selin Arslanhan, ‘An Evaluation of the PISA 2009 Results’, TEPAV Evaluation Notice, December 2010, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/
files/1292317950-2.An_Evaluation_of_the_PISA_2009_Results.pdf.
72 OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisa2009keyfindings.htm.
73 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 2012’, http://http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103006.html.
74 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, 2012, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf.
75 Gökçe Uysal-Kola?in and Duygu Güner, ‘E?itimin Kalitesinde S?n?rl? ?yile?me’ [‘The modest improvement in the quality of education’], BETAM, Ara?t?rma Notu
10/102, 17 December 2010, http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/ArastirmaNotu102.pdf.
76 ‘Erdo?an resurrects debates of Islamization’, Al-Arabiya News, 9 February 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/09/193621.html.
77 Daniel Dombey, ‘Education reforms divide Turkey’, Financial Times, 14 March 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5c60ca4c-6a0c-11e1-b54f-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz1xgg8Llsh.
78 Jenny White, ‘Turkish Education: Authority or Critical Thinking, Assertive Masculinity or Consensus’, Jenny White’s Blog, 28 March 2008, http://kamilpasha.com/?p=203.
79 Burak Bekdil, ‘The Turkish ideal, too, is youth’, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-turkish-ideal-too-is-youth.aspx?page
ID=238&nID=15943&NewsCatID=398.
‘
Turkey stands 32nd
among 34 OECD members and
40 per cent of Turkish 15-year-
old students do not achieve a
basic level of competence in
mathematical literacy
’
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Education issues further affect Turkey’s economic
prospects indirectly through their impact on ‘interper-
sonal trust’ – the willingness of one party to rely on the
actions of another party – throughout the country’s
human capital. Turkey’s levels of interpersonal trust are
considerably lower than OECD averages (see Table 1).
University-educated educated Turks, especially, are less
than one-quarter as trusting of others as their peers in
other countries. Turkey stands out among the 20 coun-
tries in the survey as the only one where higher
educational attainment correlates with lower feelings
of trust.
80
Such levels of mistrust are deeply damaging to Turkey’s
‘social capital’ (the patterns and qualities of relationships
in a community) and human capital and, by extension,
its economic growth.
81
Communities with high levels of
human capital are typically also characterized by high
levels of social capital in its various forms, and the reverse
effect is also valid.
82
Turkey’s low social capital is not conducive to the
promotion of innovation and wealth creation.
83
The
European Commission has concluded that Turkey is the
least innovative economy in Europe.
84
It had the sixth
lowest labour productivity among OECD countries in
2011 as measured in terms of GDP per hour worked.
This is the most important contributor to the income gap
between Turkey and the EU.
85
Governance and institutions
Another major obstacle to sustainable growth is the weak-
ness of governance and institutions. Turkish society is
seen as tolerant of unequal distributions of power and
inclined to low levels of individual rights.
86
These features
are normally associated with countries where growth rates
are volatile, current account deficits are persistent and the
momentum for reform is rarely robust even in the pres-
ence of positive macroeconomic indicators. In Turkey,
the concentration of political power in the hands of a few
individuals tends to undermine state institutions and does
not encourage an enduring stable political environment
for reform. In August 2011, for example, the government
abruptly curtailed much of the independence of the public
procurement regulator and eight other market regulatory
bodies.
87
Unsurprisingly, Turkey is ranked only 64th out of
144 countries in terms of the efficiency and transparency
of its public institutions, according to the WEF.
88
Throughout Erdo?an’s 11-year single-party government,
the EU accession process has been the principal driver for
reforms. These flourished at the height of that process
but ebbed dramatically when it stalled, even though the
prime minister secured an overwhelming second-term
election victory in 2007. This paralysis of reforms has been
Table 1: Proportion of adults expressing
interpersonal trust, by level of education, 2010
Below upper
secondary (%)
Upper
secondary (%)
Tertiary
(%)
OECD average 34 42 53
Turkey 16 12 12
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010.
80 ‘Learning not to trust? The OECD on Turkish education’, Istanbul Notes, 28 September 2010, http://istanbulnotes.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/learning-not-
to-trust-the-oecd-on-turkish-education.
81 I. Semih Akçomak and Bas ter Weel, ‘Social Capital, Innovation and Growth: Evidence from Europe’, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 3341, http://www.econstor.
eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/35000/1/560201257.pdf.
82 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Education, Diversity, Social Cohesion and “Social Capital”’, OECD, Note for Discussion, 2004, http://www.oecd.org/general/
meetingofoecdeducationministers-raisingthequalityoflearningforall-chairssummary.htm.
83 Francesco Sarracino, ‘Economic Growth and Social Capital: Happily Together Ever After’, CEPS/INSTEAD, Working Paper No. 2011–52, October 2011,
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/catalogue-publications/working-papers-CEPS/2011/52-2011.pdf.
84 European Commission (Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General), ‘Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011’, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
innovation/files/ius-2011_en.pdf.
85 World Bank, ‘Turkey Investment Climate Assessment. Vol. II’, 8 November 2007, http://www.yoikk.gov.tr/dosya/up/eng/ICA%20Volume_II.pdf.
86 Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede and Michael Minkov, Culture and Organizations: Software of the Mind (McGraw Hill, 3rd edn, 2010).
87 Cengiz Aktar, ‘Development at any cost’, Today’s Zaman, 13 June 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-283463-development--at-any-cost.html.
88 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013.
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reinforced by an uncompromising style of leadership as
laid bare by Erdo?an’s reaction to the recent protests in
Istanbul’s Taksim Square, by his determination to intro-
duce a centralized presidency, for which he hopes to run
in 2014, and by the local and general elections scheduled
respectively for 2014 and 2015. Naturally, the fruits of
long-term reform initiatives, such as upgrading the rule of
law or transforming the education system and vocational
training programmes, require focused government atten-
tion and do not conform to the short timelines of electoral
politics; but they are, nevertheless, essential to propel the
Turkish economy forward.
Conclusion
Erdo?an has ruled, until recently, with a steady hand amid
what was a blossoming economy. Turkey has become
a regional force to be reckoned with and for a long
time a darling of financial markets. National self-confi-
dence, political ambitions and economic prowess go hand
in hand.
The prime minister needs to beware, however, of over-
confidence and triumphalism. Past performance based on
‘easy’ growth released by lower inflation and fiscal disci-
pline is no guarantee of future success.
89
Turkey’s growth
strategy suffers from a serious flaw in its excessive reliance
on domestic demand-led growth, putting at risk the sustain-
ability of a fast-paced economy. Given current institutional
and policy constraints, it might struggle to achieve even
modest growth rates of 2–5 per cent and will be vulnerable
to foreign investor sentiments unless it bases growth more
on productivity gains.
Time is of the essence. After about 2025, it is anticipated
that Turkey’s ‘demographic window of opportunity’ will
start closing, population ageing will be in full swing and
its middling prospects for prosperity may well become
the norm.
89 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Penguin), 10 May 2012.
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Fadi Hakura is the Manager of the Turkey Project and
an Associate Fellow of the Europe Programme
at Chatham House.
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