A workable formula
coutesy: The Economic Times
MANOJ PANT
IN THIS column last month (May 12) I had argued why implementing the reservations as currently envisaged is likely to be a poor strategy: both from the point of view of perceived benefits to the backward castes and the expected political gains to the ruling party. The many articles written on this issue over the last month or so make it clear that there are two issues that the ‘Oversight Committee’ set up to review the implementation of the reservation formula must keep in mind. One, that in expanding the scale of higher education the availability of seats for general candidates would not fall and, two, that there should be no compromise on merit. To this must be a third criterion which the anti-reservationists have rightly emphasised: that there must be no division of the student community on caste lines. In various media reports some authors have suggested implementing the reservation formula along the lines currently in use at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. In this article I will discuss the JNU formula and show how it may accommodate both the theoretical and empirical objections to reservations.
But first the JNU formula. As currently operated, five points are added to marks obtained by socially deprived students in the entrance examination. An additional five points are given if the candidate is also a female. These marks are then compared with the marks of the students in the general category to work out the merit list for those offered admission. Let us see how this method can satisfy multiple criteria.
Consider the theoretical arguments against reservation. First, it is argued that quotas to OBC students militates against merit in that OBC students would have no incentive to compete against general category students. This is a valid complaint as quotas create two separate streams in education. In other words, rather than create a level-playing field you are running two separate tournaments! It is argued by protagonists of quotas that the OBC candidates cannot compete against general category students. The answer lies in what one might call Arrow’s second optimality theorem. The theorem argues that by altering the initial conditions an optimal and equitable allocation (of university seats) can be achieved by any competitive system even if the initial distribution of talents is unequal. In this case the JNU formula does this by adding ‘deprivation points’ to socially backward groups. Even more important, the JNU system does not divide students along caste lines as the deprivation points are added before the final list of students is published. Finally, no specific numerical quota needs to be specified in such a system.
But the system has an additional advantage. Many anti-reservation writers have argued that backwardness represents only one aspect of deprivation. There are also other (and some would argue more important) indicators of deprivation with gender and income being the most important. In his discussion of ‘identity politics’ Amartya Sen has argued that the difficulty is that an individual has ‘multiple identities’. It is then difficult to argue which identity is more important (in electoral politics) as this may vary from circumstance to circumstance. It is clear then that the JNU system can easily accommodate the problem of ‘variable identities’ through the granting of deprivation points for different indicators of backwardness.
Consider the empirical objections to reservations. The ruling dispensation seems to think that the answer lies in increasing the total number of seats to make sure no ‘non-OBC’ student is deprived. There are two objections to this. First, the most crucial constraint is the lack of qualified teachers. It would be futile to view such capacity constraints in higher education as merely an ‘administrative constraint’ which can be solved by simply higher budgetary allocations.
Second, if the non-OBC students are not to be disadvantaged then a system of quotas cannot be implemented. Consider this in little more detail. Suppose there are a hundred seats of which 77 are available to general quota students and 23 to the SC/ST category. If now the 27% quota is to be implemented and non-OBC students are to have as many seats as before, then the total number of seats must increase to 127. But in this case the SC/ST quota would increase to 29 seats (23% of 127) and OBC seats to 34 leaving only 64 for general category students. In general, one cannot satisfy the non-OBC students and implement any numerical quota at the same time.
The charm of the JNU system lies in accommodating diverse demands without leading to any division of students on caste lines. This must be the cornerstone of any formula worked out. Else the higher education superstructure will crumble overtime.
• Many have suggested implementing the reservation formula along the lines of the one in use at JNU
• The JNU system does not divide students along caste lines as the deprivation points are added before the final list is published
• This system can easily accommodate the problem of ‘variable identities’
coutesy: The Economic Times
MANOJ PANT
IN THIS column last month (May 12) I had argued why implementing the reservations as currently envisaged is likely to be a poor strategy: both from the point of view of perceived benefits to the backward castes and the expected political gains to the ruling party. The many articles written on this issue over the last month or so make it clear that there are two issues that the ‘Oversight Committee’ set up to review the implementation of the reservation formula must keep in mind. One, that in expanding the scale of higher education the availability of seats for general candidates would not fall and, two, that there should be no compromise on merit. To this must be a third criterion which the anti-reservationists have rightly emphasised: that there must be no division of the student community on caste lines. In various media reports some authors have suggested implementing the reservation formula along the lines currently in use at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. In this article I will discuss the JNU formula and show how it may accommodate both the theoretical and empirical objections to reservations.
But first the JNU formula. As currently operated, five points are added to marks obtained by socially deprived students in the entrance examination. An additional five points are given if the candidate is also a female. These marks are then compared with the marks of the students in the general category to work out the merit list for those offered admission. Let us see how this method can satisfy multiple criteria.
Consider the theoretical arguments against reservation. First, it is argued that quotas to OBC students militates against merit in that OBC students would have no incentive to compete against general category students. This is a valid complaint as quotas create two separate streams in education. In other words, rather than create a level-playing field you are running two separate tournaments! It is argued by protagonists of quotas that the OBC candidates cannot compete against general category students. The answer lies in what one might call Arrow’s second optimality theorem. The theorem argues that by altering the initial conditions an optimal and equitable allocation (of university seats) can be achieved by any competitive system even if the initial distribution of talents is unequal. In this case the JNU formula does this by adding ‘deprivation points’ to socially backward groups. Even more important, the JNU system does not divide students along caste lines as the deprivation points are added before the final list of students is published. Finally, no specific numerical quota needs to be specified in such a system.
But the system has an additional advantage. Many anti-reservation writers have argued that backwardness represents only one aspect of deprivation. There are also other (and some would argue more important) indicators of deprivation with gender and income being the most important. In his discussion of ‘identity politics’ Amartya Sen has argued that the difficulty is that an individual has ‘multiple identities’. It is then difficult to argue which identity is more important (in electoral politics) as this may vary from circumstance to circumstance. It is clear then that the JNU system can easily accommodate the problem of ‘variable identities’ through the granting of deprivation points for different indicators of backwardness.
Consider the empirical objections to reservations. The ruling dispensation seems to think that the answer lies in increasing the total number of seats to make sure no ‘non-OBC’ student is deprived. There are two objections to this. First, the most crucial constraint is the lack of qualified teachers. It would be futile to view such capacity constraints in higher education as merely an ‘administrative constraint’ which can be solved by simply higher budgetary allocations.
Second, if the non-OBC students are not to be disadvantaged then a system of quotas cannot be implemented. Consider this in little more detail. Suppose there are a hundred seats of which 77 are available to general quota students and 23 to the SC/ST category. If now the 27% quota is to be implemented and non-OBC students are to have as many seats as before, then the total number of seats must increase to 127. But in this case the SC/ST quota would increase to 29 seats (23% of 127) and OBC seats to 34 leaving only 64 for general category students. In general, one cannot satisfy the non-OBC students and implement any numerical quota at the same time.
The charm of the JNU system lies in accommodating diverse demands without leading to any division of students on caste lines. This must be the cornerstone of any formula worked out. Else the higher education superstructure will crumble overtime.
• Many have suggested implementing the reservation formula along the lines of the one in use at JNU
• The JNU system does not divide students along caste lines as the deprivation points are added before the final list is published
• This system can easily accommodate the problem of ‘variable identities’