Description
The paper analyzes relevant concepts for command & control effectiveness in the German disaster response system. The concepts are derived from legal text review, an analogy between military and disaster response domain and interpretations of representatives from major German disaster response organizations. The concepts are integrated into a conceptual model.
393
23rd Bled eConference
eTrust:
Implications for the Individual, Enterprises and Society
J une 20 - 23, 2010; Bled, Slovenia
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German
Disaster Response
Sebastian Richter
Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, Germany
[email protected]
Erich Heumüller
Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, Germany
[email protected]
Ulrike Lechner
Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, Germany
[email protected]
Abstract
The paper analyzes relevant concepts for command & control effectiveness in the
German disaster response system. The concepts are derived from legal text review, an
analogy between military and disaster response domain and interpretations of
representatives from major German disaster response organizations. The concepts are
integrated into a conceptual model.
Keywords: German Disaster Response, Command & Control, Conceptual Model
1 Introduction
Imagine you stay in Munich for vacation and suddenly there is a black out. Small teams
of terrorists cut Munich’s three main power supply lines. What happens next? Water
supply, the traffic network including traffic lights and gas stations, hospitals and the
whole industrial life including financial activities rely on electricity. This scenario
illustrates both the complexity of and our vulnerability in that scenario. To protect cities
like Munich there is a system of disaster management organizations from official
administration and private companies.
To allocate and reallocate but also to plan, manage and supervise all disaster response
capabilities and forces an effective command and control (C2) system able to prepare
forces and lead them during disasters is necessary. Previous studies on German disaster
response operations outline that the overall German disaster response system and its C2
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
394
system work quite well (Kirchbach, Franke, Biele, Minnich, Epple, Schäfer, Unnasch
and Schuster, 2002; Huber, Richter, Römer and Lechner, 2008; Richter, Huber and
Lechner, 2009). In a scenario that calls for collaboration of various organizations and
which requires agility, C2 capabilities are critical. The disaster response system
undergoes a process of transformation to prepare itself for more complex scenarios as
terrorist attacks or large-scale natural disasters. Furthermore, we argue that transforming
the C2 system leverages the effort of transformation, as management in the information
age is fundamentally different from industrial age (Alberts and Hayes, 2003).
To understand which concepts play a major role for transforming the C2 system of the
German disaster management system, we raise three questions of concern. 1) Which
static organizational structure of German
1
disaster response organizations exists and
how does that structure change in case of disaster? 2) Is the analogy between military
domain and disaster response domain regarding C2 appropriate? 3) How do deeply
involved representatives from disaster response organizations interpret influencing
concepts of C2 in the disaster response system? We integrate the analyzed concepts into
one coherent conceptual model that describes influence factors on the overall C2
effectiveness of the German disaster response C2 system.
We did not explicitly raise the question about e-trust and e-applications for better inter-
organisational C2-collaboration. However, this contribution helps to understand the
system of disaster response and can be seen as a very first step also for application
development to support disaster response.
2 Method
We adopt an interpretive approach to our object of inquiry – the German disaster
response system and its C2 system. We are interested in concepts relevant to Germany’s
disaster management and the intersubjective meanings embedded in the social system
with its interactions generated by its people (Rosen, 1991). The meanings of things,
concepts, rules and norms in disaster management organizations arise from people’s
social interactions and are result of an interpretive process by them (Boland, 1979). To
understand these interpretations we conducted interviews with managers of Federal and
Bavarian disaster management organizations. To be able to ask rich questions we
analysed relevant German and Bavarian legal texts/regulations to understand
organizational structure of the disaster response system (see Figure 1).
1
Actauly we analyze the German disaster response system using the federal state of Bavaria as example
as all German federal states are self-governed responsible for disaster response and thus not one fully
integrated German disaster response system exists.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
395
Figure 1: Research Method
A result of the first research phase (Figure 1) is the identification of an analogy between
design principles of military and disaster response C2 systems. In the second phase we
researched this analogy more closely. We were interested whether models developed by
NATO to manage the military transformation process to become more networked to
cope with complex mission scenarios (BMVg, 2004) are known and adopted by the
German disaster managers to inform disaster response system transformation. We
conducted seven semi-structured, problem-focused in-depth interviews (Bortz and
Döring, 2009; Diekmann, 2009) in six German major disaster management
organizations with focus on Bavaria during J une and J uly 2009 (Table 1).
We conducted three interviews at the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster
Assistance (BBK), a Federal Ministry of the Interior office, responsible to support the
Federal Government in all questions of disaster response and to support federal states in
disaster management operations when states requesting coordination support. The BBK
is also responsible for standardization in disaster response education and training. As
Table 1 depicts, the three BBK-interviews were conducted in different sections of BBK.
Interview BBK was conducted in the section responsible for overall disaster response
and its future development. Interview deNIS took place with the head of the section
responsible to develop a standardized disaster response information system and
Interview GMLZ was conducted in the section responsible for the overall disaster
situational picture.
Table 1: Overview of the Interviewees
With Interview THW we interviewed representatives from a Federal force provider and
with Interview BRK a Bavarian force provider. Additionally we interviewed
representatives from various political and administrative levels of the disaster response
system in Bavaria. Figure 2 sketches the process of question development for interview
preparation.
We utilize three central models developed to guideline C2-transformation in military
domain. These models are the Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework
(NCO-CF) developed by Garstka and Alberts (2004), the Command and Control
Approach Space (C2 Approach Space, see Alberts, 2007) and the NATO Network
Enabled Capabilities Command & Control Maturity Model (N2C2M2 developed by
SAS-065, 2009) all basing on the premise that only a networked approach is good
enough to cope with future challenges. We derive working hypotheses from those
models to understand which role the concepts relevant to the C2 system of military
domain play in the disaster response domain. These working hypotheses were the basis
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
396
for interview question development. We identified topics and structured our questions
accordingly. We link the questions to our three objects of interest (see Figure 2). For the
full set of questions and a summary of the C2 models see Heumüller (2009).
Figure 2: Models, Topics and Objects of Interest
3 Results
We firstly describe an overall organizational structure of the Bavarian disaster response
system with its most important organizations and relationships. Secondly, we analyze
the analogy between military domain and disaster response in the field of C2 in terms of
models, scenarios and interpretation of organizational transformation. Thirdly, we
analyse the interpretations of our interviewees to compare them with our findings
regarding relevant C2 concepts. We then aggregate the C2 concepts and develop a
conceptual model integrating the structural findings from law texts and regulations, the
findings from the analogy between military and disaster response domain and the
interpretations of our interviewees. The model describes influence factors on C2
effectiveness in the German disaster response system.
3.1 Bavarian Disaster Response System - Its Organizational Structure
We model the organizational view (Figure 3) with regard to relevant German and
Bavarian law texts and regulations (Grundgesetz, 2009, BayKSGH, 2009, THW-Gesetz,
2009, Zivilschutzgesetz, 2009). Additionally, we triangulate our findings with a case
study on the 2002 Elbe-Flood-Disaster (Richter et al., 2009) and our interviews.
Organizational Structure – Static View
Bavaria as federal state is self-governed responsible for disaster response operations in
its area. The Bavarian disaster management law (BayKSGH, 2009) defines three
hierarchically organized governmental levels of disaster management authority. These
levels are from top to bottom at state level, regional level and county level (Figure 3,
left blue/ dark boxes):
At county level the Lower Disaster Management Authority is primarily
responsible for coping with physical effects of a disaster and coordinates disaster
management units as e.g. fire fighters or medical response.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
397
The Middle Disaster Management Authority at regional level is superior to
county level and is primarily responsible for force coordination and
administrative and political management supporting subordinated counties.
The Higher Disaster Management Authority at state level collocated with the
government of Bavaria and subordinated directly to the Bavarian Ministry of the
Interior is primarily responsible for political management supporting its regions.
The BBK (Figure 3, left blue/ dark box at federal level) - an agency of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior – coordinate upon request by Bavaria large-scale disaster
management operations in case other federal states are affected by disaster as well.
The administrative and political management (Figure 3, left blue/ dark boxes) is
responsible for disaster preparedness including disaster prevention, development of
disaster plans and the evolution of disaster concepts, law texts and regulations. It
supervises and coordinates disaster management trainings with force suppliers. In cases
of disaster the disaster management authorities are responsible for force coordination
for example force allocation, the information of people in affected areas about disaster
development, interaction with media and coordination of public life. In daily business
the disaster management authorities are small departments of about two people at
county level to five at state level. During disasters these authorities constitute the core
headquarters for disaster management operations.
Figure 3: The Overall Organizational Structure of the Bavarian Disaster Response System
The force providers responsible for coping with the disasters in the field are organized
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
398
in Bavarian organizations as fire fighting brigades and police
2
and federal organizations
as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), the German Armed Forces
(Bundeswehr) and the Federal Police.
There are five major Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) supporting disaster
response primarily due to medical rescue, care and all kinds of help necessary during
disasters, depicted by Figure 3, triangles on the right side. These NGOs are the Bavarian
Red Cross (BRK), the Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD), the J ohanniter Unfallhilfe (J UH),
the Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (DLRG, responsible for water rescue) and
the Arbeiter Samariter Bund (ASB). These NGOs have a similar organizational
structure to optimize collaboration with disaster management authorities. All define a
structure with three levels of responsibility at county, regional and state level according
to the political management. Nearly all of the NGOs’ personnel are voluntary as a lot of
fire fighters are as well.
The Organization in Case of Disaster
The Bavarian disaster law defines disaster as an event, endangering or harming life or
health of a highly number of people, natural environment or significant material assets
to a large extent when danger can only be prevented by the co-operation of public
authorities, organizations and force providers under the management of disaster
management authorities (BayKSGH, 2009, I (2)).
To be able managing all assets to prevent from disaster development and protect people
and nature according to the disaster definition, disaster management authorities found
headquarters at every level of authority (Figure 3, green/ dark grey ellipses on the left).
These headquarters consist of personnel from disaster management authorities as core
staff, personnel from other departments of the respective level of government as e.g.
social affairs or financial affairs and consultants or liaison officers from all major force
supplier organizations. Consultants appointed by NGOs, THW and fire brigades provide
information and advice regarding availability and competencies of their respective
organization (Figure 3, red/ dark grey dashed lines). A liaison officer appointed by
Police, Bundeswehr and Federal Police advises and additionally requests forces of the
own organization supporting disaster managers
3
(Figure 3, green/ light grey dashed
lines).
The administrative headquarters are organized as staff elements for the respective
commander. Consultants and liaison officers work in staff-cells. When regular staff
requires information the cells are integrated ad-hoc. Consultants and liaison officers are
evaluated as highly important
4
for disaster managers as they provide the knowledge
necessary to coordinate forces to respond to disaster development.
Laws and regulations describe how headquarters are established – who sends staff and
who runs it. How is this process coordinated practically? This process is crucial for the
overall disaster management operation as all forces suddenly will be coordinated by the
political/ administrative headquarters. This process is relevant to understand the C2
structure of the system.
2
Police forces can take over special disaster management tasks given by the disaster management
authorities dependent on force capacity. Primarily Police has to handle their usual business, which is
public security
3
Source: Interview THW, Interview BRK
4
Source: Interview Munich, Interview GMLZ, Interview Oberbayern
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
399
The leader of the first responders on the spot, typically a fire fighter, becomes incident
commander (ICmdr). He establishes an incident command (IC
5
) and reports to the
administrative superior at county’s Lower Disaster Management Authorities. When an
ICmdr, capable to estimate disaster’s extent, recommends establishing an administrative
headquarters, the administrative manager usually follows and establishes the political/
administrative headquarters at county level and informs superior levels of authority.
With more than one critical spot more ICmdrs become responsible and manage
respective units, always reporting to administrative headquarters. With more than one
county affected the regional headquarters will be established and so on. Thus, the
headquarters are established from bottom to top. The required time until a headquarters
at state level is fully operational can take several days (Kirchbach et al., 2002).
As Figure 3 depicts, the ICmdr is leader and superior to fire brigade, NGO and THW
units. He is not superior to Police, Bundeswehr and federal police units although he
coordinates their missions due to direct communication with their commanders typically
in the IC. Latter units remain in their chain of command. Accordingly, the units of fire
brigades, NGOs and THW shift command with the result that its superior headquarters
is responsible only for coordination purposes as allocation of resources (see Figure 3,
blue/ light grey ellipses and light arrows). The ICmdr becomes full commander
implying that unit’s organization has no further access to the unit until the operation
terminates
6
. Thus, operational headquarters of fire brigades, NGOs and THW only
coordinate tasks insofar as they allocate units for tasks, advise political leaders and
superiors and manage information. On the contrary, operational headquarters of police,
Bundeswehr and federal police are fully operational and manage their own units and
coordinate with ICmdr. This short description of command chains, assignments,
responsibilities and headquarters allocation clarifies how complex the disaster response
system is and which central value C2 has.
Findings
1) All disaster management organizations are hierarchically structured.
Force providers are structured according to the political structure with three
levels of responsibility in Bavaria. This uniformity of structure enables, that all
responsible managers can communicate on their level of responsibility (county,
region, state). Thus, fast and clearly structured information exchange is possible.
2) Many units from fire fighters, NGOs and THW shift their command structure in
case of disaster.
The respective ICmdr is responsible for tactical operations in the field. He fully
commands fire fighters, NGOs and THW units. Unity of command
7
is design
principle (Taylor, 1911; Pearce and Conger, 2003). The ICmdr but also political
leaders in the administrative headquarters are focused leaders (Rost, 1993;
Stewart and Manz, 1995) – second design principle.
3) Political/ Administrative headquarters consist of disaster managers, managers of
other political areas and liaison elements – consultants and liaison officers.
5
The ICmdr is responsible to command and control operations on a small regional area. The IC serves as
his staff to support coordination, planning and communicating orders.
6
Source: Interview THW
7
Unity of command means that only one superior at time exists. Matrix organizations or networks are
different designs.
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
400
Due to the assembly of people with different competencies from political areas
and force suppliers the headquarters become highly interdependent (Gronn,
2002), prerequisite for managing complex missions.
Figure 4: C2 System Concepts - Structure
With regard to the organizational structure of the disaster response system we consider
three concepts significantly influencing C2 effectiveness; 1) C2 effectiveness of each
hierarchically structured organization, 2) effectiveness of the system of liaison elements
and 3) C2 effectiveness of Political/ Administrative headquarters (Figure 4). All three
concepts interact as hierarchically structured organizations send personnel as liaison
elements, which is adequately trained, motivated and effective, or not. Liaison elements
complement Political/ Administrative headquarters and support C2 effectiveness of
these headquarters. The headquarters command and control the hierarchically organized
organizations during disaster missions. Hierarchical organizations’ C2 effectiveness is
moderated by uniformity of structure as it supports C2 effectiveness. Unity of command
and focused leadership are design principles moderating the whole hierarchy-design-
approach and thus the relationship with overall C2 effectiveness (Figure 4).
3.2 The Analogy between Military and Disaster Response Domain
We argue that an analogy between military domain and disaster response exists.
Furthermore it is promising to analyze modern C2 models and its concepts. Holyoak
and Thagard, 1996 argue that analogy means the existence of structural parallels
between base domain (military) and target domain (disaster response). When this
existence is evident, the assertion that a relational structure observable in base domain
can be applied to target domain is sound (Gentner, 1983).
Table 2 depicts strategic ideas of both, military and disaster response domain in column
one and two. The strategic ideas are derived from official German strategy papers
published in the Federal Ministry of Defence (military domain) and the Federal Ministry
of the Interior (disaster response domain)
8
. These ideas are abstracted to C2 relevant
concepts in column three of Table 2.
The three C2 relevant models NCO-CF, C2 Approach Space and N2C2M2, all
developed in the military domain and mentioned in section 2 rely on the assumption of
high (and increasing) mission complexity due to new scenarios as e.g. asymmetric
8
The most important resources of analysis are BMVg (2006b) - the white book of Germany, BMVg
(2004) - the strategic guideline of the Bundeswehr and BMI (2009) - the guideline for modern civil
protection.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
401
threats, the increasing influence of mass media and missions in urban terrain. Exactly
the same characteristics of missions exist in modern disaster management. The military
models support transformational strategies for military organizations implying that a
network C2 approach can handle new challenges best. This so-called net-centricity is
highlighted in the strategic papers for both domains. The key resource of today’s
missions is information as is prerequisite for plans and decisions. Faster and richer
information exchange is key for operational tempo (Alberts, 2007).
Table 2: Similarities between Military and Disaster Response Domain
Findings:
1) Military and disaster response domain are analogous w.r.t. C2 concepts (Table
2).
2) Increasing mission complexity due to new scenarios is the underlying
assumption in both domains.
3) Transformation is a strategically defined change process and necessary to enable
disaster response coping successfully with future challenges.
4) Net-centricity – a robust network structure of all security-relevant organizations
in military and disaster response domain – the so-called whole-of-government
approach – is one key goal of Transformation.
5) Information is one explicitly highlighted resource for modern operations and
information exchange crucial for operational success.
3.3 Conceptual C2 Factors Influencing Disaster Response C2
Effectiveness
We were interested in our interviewees’ interpretations of the concepts of Table 2. We
analyzed 1) whether our concepts are relevant to the interviewees’ organization and 2)
whether more C2 relevant concepts exist in the interviewees’ interpretations and 3)
which relationships exist between these grounded concepts.
Scenarios. Increasing mission complexity due to change of scenarios in scale and
diversity is the central challenge formulated by the strategic concepts of military and
disaster response domain (BMVg, 2006b; BMI, 2009). These new scenarios are
discussed within all interviewed organizations and interviews document that these
scenarios play a major role in planning, training and preparation (see Figure 5, row
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
402
Scenarios). Only the representative from BRK stated that new scenarios play minor role
for BRK, as BRK has to organize first aid and care for injured or evacuated people
however the scenario looks like. The interviewee explained that the scale of disaster is
more important for BRK and new scenarios often imply more injured people and larger
disaster extent. The disaster response system is not responsible for new scenarios. It is
sound to think of scenarios as external factors with regard to the disaster response
system’s artificially defined mental boundary. The system has to cope with the impacts
of these new scenarios as terrorist attacks or disasters caused by migration or climate
change.
Figure 5: Interview-Codings w.r.t the Grounded Concepts
9
Transformation. New scenarios imply a pressure to transform for organizations.
However, the interviewees perceive the concept Transformation, differently (Figure 5,
row Transformation). The strategic level represented by the BBK
10
define a distinct
process named Transformation (as in the Bundeswehr) to clarify the strategic impact
and the disruptive change for the disaster management system (BMI, 2009). The
representatives from operational and tactical levels accept the need of adaption and
change but in a more incremental way. They focus to a lesser extent overall
organizational issues but more coordinative issues at tactical level. For example to
foster a better coordination between BRK and the medical service of the Bundeswehr
due to more mutual training is one special aspect of change relevant for 2010
11
. This
reorganization includes communication, coordination and collaboration processes at
tactical level in the field in special tasks like pitching a large tent for injured people.
9
The rectangles under legend stand for abstact representations of the interviewees statements w.r.t. the
respective concept. Thus, same colour represents statement conformity between interviewees.
10
Source: Interview BBK, Interview deNIS, Interview GMLZ
11
Source: Interview BRK
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
403
Political Will. Our interviewees call for strong political will manifesting in precise
organizational goals. All interview partners expect that the strategic political
management define precisely how to transform the disaster management system. As
long as Transformation as process remains unsupported by clear models how to
transform, the responsible personnel are not able to bring this process to life. As due to
the new scenarios as concrete challenges the idea of Transformation was born, this
process is not an end in itself. Thus, new scenarios of course impact political will
insofar as the pressure to act for political managers significantly increase when new
scenarios bring the disaster response system to shortfall. Thus we think, that political
will is also an external factor for the disaster management system, like new scenarios
are.
Structure (Hierarchical Organization C2 Effectiveness; Liaison Elements Effectiveness;
Political/ Administrative Headquarters Effectiveness). As discussed in section 0 we
consider three concepts influencing overall C2 effectiveness significantly; 1) the C2
effectiveness of each hierarchically structured organization, 2) the effectiveness of the
system of liaison elements and 3) the C2 effectiveness of political/ administrative
headquarters. All disaster response organizations are hierarchically organized with
explicitly defined reporting chains and standardized communication acts manifested in
several reporting forms for e.g. resource requests or mission orders
12
. We asked,
whether inter-organizational communication barriers are an issue. The representative of
THW denied and described the approach that external organizations requesting THW
forces do not have to matter who within THW is the right addressee for the request. It is
task of THW to organize, that the request is passed to right level and person of
responsibility
13
. Our interview partner describes that as an “one face to the customer”
approach to eliminate barriers as much as possible for external requester. The interviews
confirmed support for hierarchical organization designs, notwithstanding the importance
of barrier-free inter-organizational networking (see Figure 5).
Net-Centricity. Increasing mission complexity due to new scenarios requires new
management approaches. One central idea is networking. The so-called net-centricity is
defined as strategic design approach for Bundeswehr (BMVg, 2004) and disaster
management (BMI, 2009). All interviewees consider net-centricity as prerequisite for
solving complex disaster scenarios, having high value for disaster management. They
all accept and support the idea of whole-of-government approaches describing
governmental, non-governmental, profit and non-profit organizations working together
closely in network coalitions to cope with future disasters. The representative from
BRK argues, that networking, as basis for collaboration is even more important between
organizations with similar functions as e.g. BRK and J UH. However, this perception
expresses relatively low levels of task-interdependence (Wageman, 1995) between
BRK-functions and functions of others (e.g. THW). The representatives involved in
overall mission planning highlight the necessity to closely work together in
collaborations
14
. New scenarios increase their task interdependence. E.g. the power
breakdown scenario illustrates how much functionality relies on power supply. Each
player in the urban network of the city of Munich has to be incorporated in planning to
cope with a power breakdown.
Social Networks/ Trust. The strategic visions calling for net-centricity (BMVg, 2006b;
BMI, 2009) left open how these networks should be organized or which nodes and
relations these networks establish. Our interviewees emphasized the importance and
12
Source: Interview THW, Interview Munich
13
Source: Interview THW
14
Source: Interview Munich, Interview BRK, Interview GMLZ, Interview THW
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
404
necessity of personal networks within and across their respective hierarchies to increase
C2 effectiveness within and across the organization (findings of 0). These “small”
networks help establishing networks between the disaster management organizations
and take over a mediation function between hierarchies and net-centricity. Our Bavarian
interview partners participate in a “disaster round table” which is conducted on a regular
basis in a Bavarian pub. These meetings give room to talking, discussing problems and
playing cards and are evaluated by all Bavarian interview partners
15
as being strongly
beneficial for establishing social networks and trust. Directly asked, several
representatives stated that it would be a strong disadvantage for young leaders not
having a solid social network within the disaster management organizations
16
.
Information Exchange. The main intent to build up networks is to enable the required
information exchange between organizations engaged in disaster management.
Information is an increasing successes factor in today’s missions either in military or
disaster management (BMVg, 2004; BMI, 2009). The functional (task), planning
(process) and outcome interdependence (Wageman, 1995; Langfred, 2005) between and
within organizations in missions is a critical influence factor requiring coordination
(Gronn, 2002). In highly dynamic environments like disaster response operations
information is fast aging. This requires permanent information exchange implying the
ability (organizational rules, technical infrastructure) and will (cultural and
organizational rules) to exchange information for planning and coordination purposes.
Our interviewees’ interpretation on information exchange seems to be heterogeneous
(Figure 5, row Information Exchange Intensity). The Interview BBK did not bear the
concept of information exchange explicitly. The Interview deNIS clarified the view that
deNIS as information system offers a service for disaster management at state level. The
IT of deNIS implements the concept that information is offered voluntarily as all
participants accept the requirement and advantage of information exchange. Interview
partners from force providers and operational and tactical level are aware of the
necessity to share information inter-organizationally as barrier-free as possible, albeit
within all organizations information exchange and reporting is explicitly regulated.
Situational Picture. A situational picture informs commander and staff about what is
going on in the field. Usually it allocates tactical units represented by symbols (e.g. one
platoon fire fighters) and its mission plus time estimation (e.g. moving from A to B in
30 min) on a map. The situational picture
17
is really important for headquarters to be
aware which units are engaged or which are ready for new orders. An illustration – in
large-scale disasters the number and units of respondents become overwhelming. For
example more than 100.000 responders helped during the 2002 Elbe-Flood-Disaster
(Richter et al., 2009). Information exchange is crucial for establishing situational
pictures. The management of an inter-organizational valid situational picture is one of
the major challenges in military domain (BMVg, 2006a). The importance of a valid
situational picture and the costs, if such a picture lacks is reported in Kirchbach et al.,
2002 for the Elbe-Flood-Disaster. All interviewees emphasized the importance of a
coherent and valid situational picture for disaster response operations and confirm that
their organizations are willing to allocate required information barrier-free to enable the
whole system to operate well.
Shared Awareness. Shared Awareness captures how and in which stages and phases
organizational members assess their situational environment and negotiate knowledge
15
Source: Interview BBK, Interview THW, Interview Oberbayern, Interview Munich
16
Source: Interview BRK, Interview THW
17
In this paper we emphasize the artefact of this picture whether on a physical map or technically
represented. We do not mean the cognitive picture, shared between e.g. commander and staff.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
405
about the situation, for example in missions (Nofi, 2000). Shared Awareness
conceptualizes overlaps in members’ individual knowledge and information about the
situation and the difference in interpretation. These overlaps enable shared planning and
discussing future courses of action in missions. Shared Awareness is assessed as one of
the key antecedents for success in complex missions (Nofi, 2000; Richter and Lechner,
2009). This concept was not grounded in our interviews, it stems from the most
prominent models in the field (Alberts and Hayes, 2003; Garstka and Alberts, 2004).
Information exchange and situational pictures do have to be integrated in plans and
courses of actions. The concept of shared awareness explains as cognitive model, how
exchanged information in the end influence C2 effectiveness. The mutual cognitive
shared situational picture as concept named shared awareness is basis for shared
planning.
3.4 A Conceptual Model Aggregating Influence Factors on C2
Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
We analyzed different concepts, influencing the overall C2 effectiveness of the German
disaster response system. The result – the concepts and their relationships – is
aggregated by the model as depicted by Figure 6.
Figure 6: External Factors, Structure and Information as Determinants of C2 Effectiveness - a
Conceptual Model
External factors – new scenarios in combination with political will – require a strategic
transformational process of change. One major goal of that change process is the
restructuring of the disaster response system as a whole. Net-centricity seems to be the
future structural concept. Social networks and trust between representatives of all
organizations mediate the structure of system of hierarchies and net-centricity. The idea
of net-centricity is to enable organizations to exchange information as fluid as possible.
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
406
Transformation revaluates the impact of information in modern missions. Information is
key-enabler of planning and integrating all means and assets of the overall disaster
response system. External factors, structure and information as overarching concepts
influence C2 effectiveness. The fit and balanced mix of all three is crucial for high C2
effectiveness.
4 Discussion & Future Developments
We modelled concepts influencing C2 effectiveness in the disaster response domain in
Germany. We identified our concepts in 1) literature and primarily strategic planning
guidelines of the domain, 2) military conceptual C2 models as the analogy with the
military and the disaster response domain is helpful and 3) interviews conducted with
representatives from major disaster response organizations.
Our model can help disaster response managers to identify leverage points to increase
overall C2 effectiveness. Does the organization reflect new scenarios adequately and is
the political will to cope with these scenarios the right way strong enough? Is the
structure and effectiveness of the organization adequate? How can transformation be
supported? Are information exchange processes within the organization and across
sound for complex missions? How and in which ways does the organizational structure
with its cultural and organizational impacts impede information flows? To raise and
answer these questions help to diagnose the organizational fit for future and complex
scenarios for disaster response managers w.r.t. C2 effectiveness.
Understanding modern C2 approaches for future disaster response scenarios is crucial
and the proposed model can help to enable understanding. Future research should
highlight the role of leadership approach in the overall disaster response system as
hierarchies and focused leadership seem to fit but shared leadership fits better with
networks (Gronn, 2002; Pearce and Conger, 2003). Here empirical research is the next
step.
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doc_897878795.pdf
The paper analyzes relevant concepts for command & control effectiveness in the German disaster response system. The concepts are derived from legal text review, an analogy between military and disaster response domain and interpretations of representatives from major German disaster response organizations. The concepts are integrated into a conceptual model.
393
23rd Bled eConference
eTrust:
Implications for the Individual, Enterprises and Society
J une 20 - 23, 2010; Bled, Slovenia
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German
Disaster Response
Sebastian Richter
Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, Germany
[email protected]
Erich Heumüller
Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, Germany
[email protected]
Ulrike Lechner
Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, Germany
[email protected]
Abstract
The paper analyzes relevant concepts for command & control effectiveness in the
German disaster response system. The concepts are derived from legal text review, an
analogy between military and disaster response domain and interpretations of
representatives from major German disaster response organizations. The concepts are
integrated into a conceptual model.
Keywords: German Disaster Response, Command & Control, Conceptual Model
1 Introduction
Imagine you stay in Munich for vacation and suddenly there is a black out. Small teams
of terrorists cut Munich’s three main power supply lines. What happens next? Water
supply, the traffic network including traffic lights and gas stations, hospitals and the
whole industrial life including financial activities rely on electricity. This scenario
illustrates both the complexity of and our vulnerability in that scenario. To protect cities
like Munich there is a system of disaster management organizations from official
administration and private companies.
To allocate and reallocate but also to plan, manage and supervise all disaster response
capabilities and forces an effective command and control (C2) system able to prepare
forces and lead them during disasters is necessary. Previous studies on German disaster
response operations outline that the overall German disaster response system and its C2
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
394
system work quite well (Kirchbach, Franke, Biele, Minnich, Epple, Schäfer, Unnasch
and Schuster, 2002; Huber, Richter, Römer and Lechner, 2008; Richter, Huber and
Lechner, 2009). In a scenario that calls for collaboration of various organizations and
which requires agility, C2 capabilities are critical. The disaster response system
undergoes a process of transformation to prepare itself for more complex scenarios as
terrorist attacks or large-scale natural disasters. Furthermore, we argue that transforming
the C2 system leverages the effort of transformation, as management in the information
age is fundamentally different from industrial age (Alberts and Hayes, 2003).
To understand which concepts play a major role for transforming the C2 system of the
German disaster management system, we raise three questions of concern. 1) Which
static organizational structure of German
1
disaster response organizations exists and
how does that structure change in case of disaster? 2) Is the analogy between military
domain and disaster response domain regarding C2 appropriate? 3) How do deeply
involved representatives from disaster response organizations interpret influencing
concepts of C2 in the disaster response system? We integrate the analyzed concepts into
one coherent conceptual model that describes influence factors on the overall C2
effectiveness of the German disaster response C2 system.
We did not explicitly raise the question about e-trust and e-applications for better inter-
organisational C2-collaboration. However, this contribution helps to understand the
system of disaster response and can be seen as a very first step also for application
development to support disaster response.
2 Method
We adopt an interpretive approach to our object of inquiry – the German disaster
response system and its C2 system. We are interested in concepts relevant to Germany’s
disaster management and the intersubjective meanings embedded in the social system
with its interactions generated by its people (Rosen, 1991). The meanings of things,
concepts, rules and norms in disaster management organizations arise from people’s
social interactions and are result of an interpretive process by them (Boland, 1979). To
understand these interpretations we conducted interviews with managers of Federal and
Bavarian disaster management organizations. To be able to ask rich questions we
analysed relevant German and Bavarian legal texts/regulations to understand
organizational structure of the disaster response system (see Figure 1).
1
Actauly we analyze the German disaster response system using the federal state of Bavaria as example
as all German federal states are self-governed responsible for disaster response and thus not one fully
integrated German disaster response system exists.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
395
Figure 1: Research Method
A result of the first research phase (Figure 1) is the identification of an analogy between
design principles of military and disaster response C2 systems. In the second phase we
researched this analogy more closely. We were interested whether models developed by
NATO to manage the military transformation process to become more networked to
cope with complex mission scenarios (BMVg, 2004) are known and adopted by the
German disaster managers to inform disaster response system transformation. We
conducted seven semi-structured, problem-focused in-depth interviews (Bortz and
Döring, 2009; Diekmann, 2009) in six German major disaster management
organizations with focus on Bavaria during J une and J uly 2009 (Table 1).
We conducted three interviews at the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster
Assistance (BBK), a Federal Ministry of the Interior office, responsible to support the
Federal Government in all questions of disaster response and to support federal states in
disaster management operations when states requesting coordination support. The BBK
is also responsible for standardization in disaster response education and training. As
Table 1 depicts, the three BBK-interviews were conducted in different sections of BBK.
Interview BBK was conducted in the section responsible for overall disaster response
and its future development. Interview deNIS took place with the head of the section
responsible to develop a standardized disaster response information system and
Interview GMLZ was conducted in the section responsible for the overall disaster
situational picture.
Table 1: Overview of the Interviewees
With Interview THW we interviewed representatives from a Federal force provider and
with Interview BRK a Bavarian force provider. Additionally we interviewed
representatives from various political and administrative levels of the disaster response
system in Bavaria. Figure 2 sketches the process of question development for interview
preparation.
We utilize three central models developed to guideline C2-transformation in military
domain. These models are the Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework
(NCO-CF) developed by Garstka and Alberts (2004), the Command and Control
Approach Space (C2 Approach Space, see Alberts, 2007) and the NATO Network
Enabled Capabilities Command & Control Maturity Model (N2C2M2 developed by
SAS-065, 2009) all basing on the premise that only a networked approach is good
enough to cope with future challenges. We derive working hypotheses from those
models to understand which role the concepts relevant to the C2 system of military
domain play in the disaster response domain. These working hypotheses were the basis
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
396
for interview question development. We identified topics and structured our questions
accordingly. We link the questions to our three objects of interest (see Figure 2). For the
full set of questions and a summary of the C2 models see Heumüller (2009).
Figure 2: Models, Topics and Objects of Interest
3 Results
We firstly describe an overall organizational structure of the Bavarian disaster response
system with its most important organizations and relationships. Secondly, we analyze
the analogy between military domain and disaster response in the field of C2 in terms of
models, scenarios and interpretation of organizational transformation. Thirdly, we
analyse the interpretations of our interviewees to compare them with our findings
regarding relevant C2 concepts. We then aggregate the C2 concepts and develop a
conceptual model integrating the structural findings from law texts and regulations, the
findings from the analogy between military and disaster response domain and the
interpretations of our interviewees. The model describes influence factors on C2
effectiveness in the German disaster response system.
3.1 Bavarian Disaster Response System - Its Organizational Structure
We model the organizational view (Figure 3) with regard to relevant German and
Bavarian law texts and regulations (Grundgesetz, 2009, BayKSGH, 2009, THW-Gesetz,
2009, Zivilschutzgesetz, 2009). Additionally, we triangulate our findings with a case
study on the 2002 Elbe-Flood-Disaster (Richter et al., 2009) and our interviews.
Organizational Structure – Static View
Bavaria as federal state is self-governed responsible for disaster response operations in
its area. The Bavarian disaster management law (BayKSGH, 2009) defines three
hierarchically organized governmental levels of disaster management authority. These
levels are from top to bottom at state level, regional level and county level (Figure 3,
left blue/ dark boxes):
At county level the Lower Disaster Management Authority is primarily
responsible for coping with physical effects of a disaster and coordinates disaster
management units as e.g. fire fighters or medical response.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
397
The Middle Disaster Management Authority at regional level is superior to
county level and is primarily responsible for force coordination and
administrative and political management supporting subordinated counties.
The Higher Disaster Management Authority at state level collocated with the
government of Bavaria and subordinated directly to the Bavarian Ministry of the
Interior is primarily responsible for political management supporting its regions.
The BBK (Figure 3, left blue/ dark box at federal level) - an agency of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior – coordinate upon request by Bavaria large-scale disaster
management operations in case other federal states are affected by disaster as well.
The administrative and political management (Figure 3, left blue/ dark boxes) is
responsible for disaster preparedness including disaster prevention, development of
disaster plans and the evolution of disaster concepts, law texts and regulations. It
supervises and coordinates disaster management trainings with force suppliers. In cases
of disaster the disaster management authorities are responsible for force coordination
for example force allocation, the information of people in affected areas about disaster
development, interaction with media and coordination of public life. In daily business
the disaster management authorities are small departments of about two people at
county level to five at state level. During disasters these authorities constitute the core
headquarters for disaster management operations.
Figure 3: The Overall Organizational Structure of the Bavarian Disaster Response System
The force providers responsible for coping with the disasters in the field are organized
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
398
in Bavarian organizations as fire fighting brigades and police
2
and federal organizations
as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), the German Armed Forces
(Bundeswehr) and the Federal Police.
There are five major Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) supporting disaster
response primarily due to medical rescue, care and all kinds of help necessary during
disasters, depicted by Figure 3, triangles on the right side. These NGOs are the Bavarian
Red Cross (BRK), the Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD), the J ohanniter Unfallhilfe (J UH),
the Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (DLRG, responsible for water rescue) and
the Arbeiter Samariter Bund (ASB). These NGOs have a similar organizational
structure to optimize collaboration with disaster management authorities. All define a
structure with three levels of responsibility at county, regional and state level according
to the political management. Nearly all of the NGOs’ personnel are voluntary as a lot of
fire fighters are as well.
The Organization in Case of Disaster
The Bavarian disaster law defines disaster as an event, endangering or harming life or
health of a highly number of people, natural environment or significant material assets
to a large extent when danger can only be prevented by the co-operation of public
authorities, organizations and force providers under the management of disaster
management authorities (BayKSGH, 2009, I (2)).
To be able managing all assets to prevent from disaster development and protect people
and nature according to the disaster definition, disaster management authorities found
headquarters at every level of authority (Figure 3, green/ dark grey ellipses on the left).
These headquarters consist of personnel from disaster management authorities as core
staff, personnel from other departments of the respective level of government as e.g.
social affairs or financial affairs and consultants or liaison officers from all major force
supplier organizations. Consultants appointed by NGOs, THW and fire brigades provide
information and advice regarding availability and competencies of their respective
organization (Figure 3, red/ dark grey dashed lines). A liaison officer appointed by
Police, Bundeswehr and Federal Police advises and additionally requests forces of the
own organization supporting disaster managers
3
(Figure 3, green/ light grey dashed
lines).
The administrative headquarters are organized as staff elements for the respective
commander. Consultants and liaison officers work in staff-cells. When regular staff
requires information the cells are integrated ad-hoc. Consultants and liaison officers are
evaluated as highly important
4
for disaster managers as they provide the knowledge
necessary to coordinate forces to respond to disaster development.
Laws and regulations describe how headquarters are established – who sends staff and
who runs it. How is this process coordinated practically? This process is crucial for the
overall disaster management operation as all forces suddenly will be coordinated by the
political/ administrative headquarters. This process is relevant to understand the C2
structure of the system.
2
Police forces can take over special disaster management tasks given by the disaster management
authorities dependent on force capacity. Primarily Police has to handle their usual business, which is
public security
3
Source: Interview THW, Interview BRK
4
Source: Interview Munich, Interview GMLZ, Interview Oberbayern
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
399
The leader of the first responders on the spot, typically a fire fighter, becomes incident
commander (ICmdr). He establishes an incident command (IC
5
) and reports to the
administrative superior at county’s Lower Disaster Management Authorities. When an
ICmdr, capable to estimate disaster’s extent, recommends establishing an administrative
headquarters, the administrative manager usually follows and establishes the political/
administrative headquarters at county level and informs superior levels of authority.
With more than one critical spot more ICmdrs become responsible and manage
respective units, always reporting to administrative headquarters. With more than one
county affected the regional headquarters will be established and so on. Thus, the
headquarters are established from bottom to top. The required time until a headquarters
at state level is fully operational can take several days (Kirchbach et al., 2002).
As Figure 3 depicts, the ICmdr is leader and superior to fire brigade, NGO and THW
units. He is not superior to Police, Bundeswehr and federal police units although he
coordinates their missions due to direct communication with their commanders typically
in the IC. Latter units remain in their chain of command. Accordingly, the units of fire
brigades, NGOs and THW shift command with the result that its superior headquarters
is responsible only for coordination purposes as allocation of resources (see Figure 3,
blue/ light grey ellipses and light arrows). The ICmdr becomes full commander
implying that unit’s organization has no further access to the unit until the operation
terminates
6
. Thus, operational headquarters of fire brigades, NGOs and THW only
coordinate tasks insofar as they allocate units for tasks, advise political leaders and
superiors and manage information. On the contrary, operational headquarters of police,
Bundeswehr and federal police are fully operational and manage their own units and
coordinate with ICmdr. This short description of command chains, assignments,
responsibilities and headquarters allocation clarifies how complex the disaster response
system is and which central value C2 has.
Findings
1) All disaster management organizations are hierarchically structured.
Force providers are structured according to the political structure with three
levels of responsibility in Bavaria. This uniformity of structure enables, that all
responsible managers can communicate on their level of responsibility (county,
region, state). Thus, fast and clearly structured information exchange is possible.
2) Many units from fire fighters, NGOs and THW shift their command structure in
case of disaster.
The respective ICmdr is responsible for tactical operations in the field. He fully
commands fire fighters, NGOs and THW units. Unity of command
7
is design
principle (Taylor, 1911; Pearce and Conger, 2003). The ICmdr but also political
leaders in the administrative headquarters are focused leaders (Rost, 1993;
Stewart and Manz, 1995) – second design principle.
3) Political/ Administrative headquarters consist of disaster managers, managers of
other political areas and liaison elements – consultants and liaison officers.
5
The ICmdr is responsible to command and control operations on a small regional area. The IC serves as
his staff to support coordination, planning and communicating orders.
6
Source: Interview THW
7
Unity of command means that only one superior at time exists. Matrix organizations or networks are
different designs.
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
400
Due to the assembly of people with different competencies from political areas
and force suppliers the headquarters become highly interdependent (Gronn,
2002), prerequisite for managing complex missions.
Figure 4: C2 System Concepts - Structure
With regard to the organizational structure of the disaster response system we consider
three concepts significantly influencing C2 effectiveness; 1) C2 effectiveness of each
hierarchically structured organization, 2) effectiveness of the system of liaison elements
and 3) C2 effectiveness of Political/ Administrative headquarters (Figure 4). All three
concepts interact as hierarchically structured organizations send personnel as liaison
elements, which is adequately trained, motivated and effective, or not. Liaison elements
complement Political/ Administrative headquarters and support C2 effectiveness of
these headquarters. The headquarters command and control the hierarchically organized
organizations during disaster missions. Hierarchical organizations’ C2 effectiveness is
moderated by uniformity of structure as it supports C2 effectiveness. Unity of command
and focused leadership are design principles moderating the whole hierarchy-design-
approach and thus the relationship with overall C2 effectiveness (Figure 4).
3.2 The Analogy between Military and Disaster Response Domain
We argue that an analogy between military domain and disaster response exists.
Furthermore it is promising to analyze modern C2 models and its concepts. Holyoak
and Thagard, 1996 argue that analogy means the existence of structural parallels
between base domain (military) and target domain (disaster response). When this
existence is evident, the assertion that a relational structure observable in base domain
can be applied to target domain is sound (Gentner, 1983).
Table 2 depicts strategic ideas of both, military and disaster response domain in column
one and two. The strategic ideas are derived from official German strategy papers
published in the Federal Ministry of Defence (military domain) and the Federal Ministry
of the Interior (disaster response domain)
8
. These ideas are abstracted to C2 relevant
concepts in column three of Table 2.
The three C2 relevant models NCO-CF, C2 Approach Space and N2C2M2, all
developed in the military domain and mentioned in section 2 rely on the assumption of
high (and increasing) mission complexity due to new scenarios as e.g. asymmetric
8
The most important resources of analysis are BMVg (2006b) - the white book of Germany, BMVg
(2004) - the strategic guideline of the Bundeswehr and BMI (2009) - the guideline for modern civil
protection.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
401
threats, the increasing influence of mass media and missions in urban terrain. Exactly
the same characteristics of missions exist in modern disaster management. The military
models support transformational strategies for military organizations implying that a
network C2 approach can handle new challenges best. This so-called net-centricity is
highlighted in the strategic papers for both domains. The key resource of today’s
missions is information as is prerequisite for plans and decisions. Faster and richer
information exchange is key for operational tempo (Alberts, 2007).
Table 2: Similarities between Military and Disaster Response Domain
Findings:
1) Military and disaster response domain are analogous w.r.t. C2 concepts (Table
2).
2) Increasing mission complexity due to new scenarios is the underlying
assumption in both domains.
3) Transformation is a strategically defined change process and necessary to enable
disaster response coping successfully with future challenges.
4) Net-centricity – a robust network structure of all security-relevant organizations
in military and disaster response domain – the so-called whole-of-government
approach – is one key goal of Transformation.
5) Information is one explicitly highlighted resource for modern operations and
information exchange crucial for operational success.
3.3 Conceptual C2 Factors Influencing Disaster Response C2
Effectiveness
We were interested in our interviewees’ interpretations of the concepts of Table 2. We
analyzed 1) whether our concepts are relevant to the interviewees’ organization and 2)
whether more C2 relevant concepts exist in the interviewees’ interpretations and 3)
which relationships exist between these grounded concepts.
Scenarios. Increasing mission complexity due to change of scenarios in scale and
diversity is the central challenge formulated by the strategic concepts of military and
disaster response domain (BMVg, 2006b; BMI, 2009). These new scenarios are
discussed within all interviewed organizations and interviews document that these
scenarios play a major role in planning, training and preparation (see Figure 5, row
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
402
Scenarios). Only the representative from BRK stated that new scenarios play minor role
for BRK, as BRK has to organize first aid and care for injured or evacuated people
however the scenario looks like. The interviewee explained that the scale of disaster is
more important for BRK and new scenarios often imply more injured people and larger
disaster extent. The disaster response system is not responsible for new scenarios. It is
sound to think of scenarios as external factors with regard to the disaster response
system’s artificially defined mental boundary. The system has to cope with the impacts
of these new scenarios as terrorist attacks or disasters caused by migration or climate
change.
Figure 5: Interview-Codings w.r.t the Grounded Concepts
9
Transformation. New scenarios imply a pressure to transform for organizations.
However, the interviewees perceive the concept Transformation, differently (Figure 5,
row Transformation). The strategic level represented by the BBK
10
define a distinct
process named Transformation (as in the Bundeswehr) to clarify the strategic impact
and the disruptive change for the disaster management system (BMI, 2009). The
representatives from operational and tactical levels accept the need of adaption and
change but in a more incremental way. They focus to a lesser extent overall
organizational issues but more coordinative issues at tactical level. For example to
foster a better coordination between BRK and the medical service of the Bundeswehr
due to more mutual training is one special aspect of change relevant for 2010
11
. This
reorganization includes communication, coordination and collaboration processes at
tactical level in the field in special tasks like pitching a large tent for injured people.
9
The rectangles under legend stand for abstact representations of the interviewees statements w.r.t. the
respective concept. Thus, same colour represents statement conformity between interviewees.
10
Source: Interview BBK, Interview deNIS, Interview GMLZ
11
Source: Interview BRK
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
403
Political Will. Our interviewees call for strong political will manifesting in precise
organizational goals. All interview partners expect that the strategic political
management define precisely how to transform the disaster management system. As
long as Transformation as process remains unsupported by clear models how to
transform, the responsible personnel are not able to bring this process to life. As due to
the new scenarios as concrete challenges the idea of Transformation was born, this
process is not an end in itself. Thus, new scenarios of course impact political will
insofar as the pressure to act for political managers significantly increase when new
scenarios bring the disaster response system to shortfall. Thus we think, that political
will is also an external factor for the disaster management system, like new scenarios
are.
Structure (Hierarchical Organization C2 Effectiveness; Liaison Elements Effectiveness;
Political/ Administrative Headquarters Effectiveness). As discussed in section 0 we
consider three concepts influencing overall C2 effectiveness significantly; 1) the C2
effectiveness of each hierarchically structured organization, 2) the effectiveness of the
system of liaison elements and 3) the C2 effectiveness of political/ administrative
headquarters. All disaster response organizations are hierarchically organized with
explicitly defined reporting chains and standardized communication acts manifested in
several reporting forms for e.g. resource requests or mission orders
12
. We asked,
whether inter-organizational communication barriers are an issue. The representative of
THW denied and described the approach that external organizations requesting THW
forces do not have to matter who within THW is the right addressee for the request. It is
task of THW to organize, that the request is passed to right level and person of
responsibility
13
. Our interview partner describes that as an “one face to the customer”
approach to eliminate barriers as much as possible for external requester. The interviews
confirmed support for hierarchical organization designs, notwithstanding the importance
of barrier-free inter-organizational networking (see Figure 5).
Net-Centricity. Increasing mission complexity due to new scenarios requires new
management approaches. One central idea is networking. The so-called net-centricity is
defined as strategic design approach for Bundeswehr (BMVg, 2004) and disaster
management (BMI, 2009). All interviewees consider net-centricity as prerequisite for
solving complex disaster scenarios, having high value for disaster management. They
all accept and support the idea of whole-of-government approaches describing
governmental, non-governmental, profit and non-profit organizations working together
closely in network coalitions to cope with future disasters. The representative from
BRK argues, that networking, as basis for collaboration is even more important between
organizations with similar functions as e.g. BRK and J UH. However, this perception
expresses relatively low levels of task-interdependence (Wageman, 1995) between
BRK-functions and functions of others (e.g. THW). The representatives involved in
overall mission planning highlight the necessity to closely work together in
collaborations
14
. New scenarios increase their task interdependence. E.g. the power
breakdown scenario illustrates how much functionality relies on power supply. Each
player in the urban network of the city of Munich has to be incorporated in planning to
cope with a power breakdown.
Social Networks/ Trust. The strategic visions calling for net-centricity (BMVg, 2006b;
BMI, 2009) left open how these networks should be organized or which nodes and
relations these networks establish. Our interviewees emphasized the importance and
12
Source: Interview THW, Interview Munich
13
Source: Interview THW
14
Source: Interview Munich, Interview BRK, Interview GMLZ, Interview THW
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
404
necessity of personal networks within and across their respective hierarchies to increase
C2 effectiveness within and across the organization (findings of 0). These “small”
networks help establishing networks between the disaster management organizations
and take over a mediation function between hierarchies and net-centricity. Our Bavarian
interview partners participate in a “disaster round table” which is conducted on a regular
basis in a Bavarian pub. These meetings give room to talking, discussing problems and
playing cards and are evaluated by all Bavarian interview partners
15
as being strongly
beneficial for establishing social networks and trust. Directly asked, several
representatives stated that it would be a strong disadvantage for young leaders not
having a solid social network within the disaster management organizations
16
.
Information Exchange. The main intent to build up networks is to enable the required
information exchange between organizations engaged in disaster management.
Information is an increasing successes factor in today’s missions either in military or
disaster management (BMVg, 2004; BMI, 2009). The functional (task), planning
(process) and outcome interdependence (Wageman, 1995; Langfred, 2005) between and
within organizations in missions is a critical influence factor requiring coordination
(Gronn, 2002). In highly dynamic environments like disaster response operations
information is fast aging. This requires permanent information exchange implying the
ability (organizational rules, technical infrastructure) and will (cultural and
organizational rules) to exchange information for planning and coordination purposes.
Our interviewees’ interpretation on information exchange seems to be heterogeneous
(Figure 5, row Information Exchange Intensity). The Interview BBK did not bear the
concept of information exchange explicitly. The Interview deNIS clarified the view that
deNIS as information system offers a service for disaster management at state level. The
IT of deNIS implements the concept that information is offered voluntarily as all
participants accept the requirement and advantage of information exchange. Interview
partners from force providers and operational and tactical level are aware of the
necessity to share information inter-organizationally as barrier-free as possible, albeit
within all organizations information exchange and reporting is explicitly regulated.
Situational Picture. A situational picture informs commander and staff about what is
going on in the field. Usually it allocates tactical units represented by symbols (e.g. one
platoon fire fighters) and its mission plus time estimation (e.g. moving from A to B in
30 min) on a map. The situational picture
17
is really important for headquarters to be
aware which units are engaged or which are ready for new orders. An illustration – in
large-scale disasters the number and units of respondents become overwhelming. For
example more than 100.000 responders helped during the 2002 Elbe-Flood-Disaster
(Richter et al., 2009). Information exchange is crucial for establishing situational
pictures. The management of an inter-organizational valid situational picture is one of
the major challenges in military domain (BMVg, 2006a). The importance of a valid
situational picture and the costs, if such a picture lacks is reported in Kirchbach et al.,
2002 for the Elbe-Flood-Disaster. All interviewees emphasized the importance of a
coherent and valid situational picture for disaster response operations and confirm that
their organizations are willing to allocate required information barrier-free to enable the
whole system to operate well.
Shared Awareness. Shared Awareness captures how and in which stages and phases
organizational members assess their situational environment and negotiate knowledge
15
Source: Interview BBK, Interview THW, Interview Oberbayern, Interview Munich
16
Source: Interview BRK, Interview THW
17
In this paper we emphasize the artefact of this picture whether on a physical map or technically
represented. We do not mean the cognitive picture, shared between e.g. commander and staff.
Concepts for Command & Control Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
405
about the situation, for example in missions (Nofi, 2000). Shared Awareness
conceptualizes overlaps in members’ individual knowledge and information about the
situation and the difference in interpretation. These overlaps enable shared planning and
discussing future courses of action in missions. Shared Awareness is assessed as one of
the key antecedents for success in complex missions (Nofi, 2000; Richter and Lechner,
2009). This concept was not grounded in our interviews, it stems from the most
prominent models in the field (Alberts and Hayes, 2003; Garstka and Alberts, 2004).
Information exchange and situational pictures do have to be integrated in plans and
courses of actions. The concept of shared awareness explains as cognitive model, how
exchanged information in the end influence C2 effectiveness. The mutual cognitive
shared situational picture as concept named shared awareness is basis for shared
planning.
3.4 A Conceptual Model Aggregating Influence Factors on C2
Effectiveness in German Disaster Response
We analyzed different concepts, influencing the overall C2 effectiveness of the German
disaster response system. The result – the concepts and their relationships – is
aggregated by the model as depicted by Figure 6.
Figure 6: External Factors, Structure and Information as Determinants of C2 Effectiveness - a
Conceptual Model
External factors – new scenarios in combination with political will – require a strategic
transformational process of change. One major goal of that change process is the
restructuring of the disaster response system as a whole. Net-centricity seems to be the
future structural concept. Social networks and trust between representatives of all
organizations mediate the structure of system of hierarchies and net-centricity. The idea
of net-centricity is to enable organizations to exchange information as fluid as possible.
Sebastian Richter, Erich Heumüller, Ulrike Lechner
406
Transformation revaluates the impact of information in modern missions. Information is
key-enabler of planning and integrating all means and assets of the overall disaster
response system. External factors, structure and information as overarching concepts
influence C2 effectiveness. The fit and balanced mix of all three is crucial for high C2
effectiveness.
4 Discussion & Future Developments
We modelled concepts influencing C2 effectiveness in the disaster response domain in
Germany. We identified our concepts in 1) literature and primarily strategic planning
guidelines of the domain, 2) military conceptual C2 models as the analogy with the
military and the disaster response domain is helpful and 3) interviews conducted with
representatives from major disaster response organizations.
Our model can help disaster response managers to identify leverage points to increase
overall C2 effectiveness. Does the organization reflect new scenarios adequately and is
the political will to cope with these scenarios the right way strong enough? Is the
structure and effectiveness of the organization adequate? How can transformation be
supported? Are information exchange processes within the organization and across
sound for complex missions? How and in which ways does the organizational structure
with its cultural and organizational impacts impede information flows? To raise and
answer these questions help to diagnose the organizational fit for future and complex
scenarios for disaster response managers w.r.t. C2 effectiveness.
Understanding modern C2 approaches for future disaster response scenarios is crucial
and the proposed model can help to enable understanding. Future research should
highlight the role of leadership approach in the overall disaster response system as
hierarchies and focused leadership seem to fit but shared leadership fits better with
networks (Gronn, 2002; Pearce and Conger, 2003). Here empirical research is the next
step.
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