United States Senate
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Carl Levin, Chairman
John McCain, Ranking Minority Member
WALL STREET BANK
INVOLVEMENT WITH
PHYSICAL COMMODITIES
MAJORITY AND MINORITY
STAFF REPORT
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INVESTIGATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
RELEASED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
NOVEMBER 20 AND 21, 2014 HEARING
SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Chairman
SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Ranking Minority Member
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
ELISE J. BEAN
Staff Director and Chief Counsel
TYLER GELLASCH
Senior Counsel
JOSEPH M. BRYAN
Professional Staff Member
Armed Services Committee
DAVID KATZ
Senior Counsel
AHMAD SARSOUR
Detailee
ANGELA MESSENGER
Detailee
JOEL CHURCHES
Detailee
MARY D. ROBERTSON
Chief Clerk
ADAM HENDERSON
Professional Staff Member
HENRY J. KERNER
Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Minority
MICHAEL LUEPTOW
Counsel to the Minority
ELISE MULLEN
Research Assistant to the Minority
TOM McDONALD
Law Clerk
TIFFANY EISENBISE
Law Clerk
CHRISTINA BORTZ
Law Clerk to the Minority
ANDREW BROWN
Law Clerk to the Minority
DANICA HAMES
Law Clerk to the Minority
JENNIFER JUNGER
Law Clerk to the Minority
TIFFANY GREAVES
Law Clerk
KYLE BROSNAN
Law Clerk to the Minority
CHAPIN GREGOR
Law Clerk to the Minority
PATRICK HARTOBEY
Law Clerk to the Minority
FERDINAND KRAMER
Law Clerk to the Minority
11/18/14
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
199 Russell Senate Office Building – Washington, D.C. 20510
Majority: 202/224-9505 – Minority: 202/224-3721
Web Address:http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations
WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH
PHYSICAL COMMODITIES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Subcommittee Investigation. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Investigation Overview. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
C. Findings of Fact and Recommendations. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Findings of Fact:
(1) Engaging in Risky Activities. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(2) Mixing Banking and Commerce. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(3) Affecting Prices. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(4) Gaining Trading Advantages . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(5) Incurring New Bank Risks. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(6) Incurring New Systemic Risk . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(7) Using Ineffective Size Limits . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.
(8) Lacking Key Information. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Recommendations:
(1) Reaffirm Separation of Banking and Commerce. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(2) Clarify Size Limits. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(3) Strengthen Disclosures. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(4) Narrow Scope of Complementary Activity . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(5) Clarify Scope of Grandfathering Clause. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(6) Narrow Scope of Merchant Banking Authority. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(7) Establish Capital and Insurance Minimums. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(8) Prevent Unfair Trading. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(9) Utilize Section 620 Study. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(10) Reclassify Commodity-Backed ETFs. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
(11) Study Misuse of Physical Commodities to Manipulate Prices . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
II. BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Short History of Banking Involvement in Physical Commodities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(1) Historical Limits on Bank Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(2) U.S. Banks and Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Risks Associated with Bank Involvement in Physical Commodities.. . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C. Role of Regulators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
(1) Federal Reserve Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
(2) Other Federal Bank Regulators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
(3) Dodd-Frank Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
(4) Other Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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III. OVERSEEING PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A. Expanding Physical Commodity Activities, 2000-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
(1) Expanding Permissible “Financial” Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
(2) Authorizing Commodity-Related “Complementary” Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
(3) Delaying Interpretation of the Grandfather Clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
(4) Allowing Expansive Interpretations of Merchant Banking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
(5) Narrowly Enforcing Prudential Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B. Reviewing Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities, 2009-2013.. . . . . . . . . . 75
(1) Initiating the Special Physical Commodities Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
(2) Conducting the Special Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
(3) Documenting Extensive, High Risk Commodity Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
(a) Summarizing Banks’ Physical Commodities Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
(b) Identifying Multiple Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
(c) Evaluating Risk Management and Mitigation Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
(d) Recommendations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C. Taking Steps to Limit Physical Commodity Activities, 2009-Present. . . . . . . . . . . . 94
(1) Denying Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
(2) Using Other Means to Reconsider Physical Commodity Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . 97
(3) Changing the Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
D. Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
IV. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A. Overview of Goldman Sachs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
(1) Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
(3) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B. Goldman Involvement with Uranium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
(1) Background on Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
(2) Background on Nufcor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
(3) Goldman Involvement with Physical Uranium.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
(a) Proposing Physical Uranium Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
(b) Operating a Physical Uranium Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
(4) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Physical Uranium Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
(a) Catastrophic Event Liability Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
(i) Denying Liability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
(ii) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
(b) Unfair Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
(c) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
(d) Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
(5) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C. Goldman Involvement with Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
(1) Background on Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
(2) Goldman Involvement with Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
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(a) Trading Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
(b) Acquiring the First Colombian Coal Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
(c) Operating the Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
(d) Acquiring the Second Colombian Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
(e) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Coal Mining Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
(a) Catastrophic Event Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
(b) Merchant Banking Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
(c) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
D. Goldman Involvement with Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
(1) Background on Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
(2) Goldman Involvement with Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
(a) Building an Aluminum Inventory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
(b) Acquiring a Warehousing Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
(c) Paying Incentives to Attract Outside Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
(d) Paying Incentives to Retain Existing Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
(i) Deutsche Bank Merry-Go-Round Deal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
(ii) Four Red Kite Merry-Go-Round Deals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
(iii) Glencore Merry-Go-Round Deal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
(e) Benefiting from Proprietary Cancellations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
(f) Benefiting from Fees Tied to Higher Midwest Premium Prices.. . . . . . . . . . . 212
(g) Sharing Non-Public Information.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
(h) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman Involvement with Aluminum.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
(a) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
(b) Aluminum Market Impact.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
(c) Non-Public Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
V. MORGAN STANLEY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
A. Overview of Morgan Stanley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
(1) Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
(3) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
B. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
(1) Background on Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
(a) Trading Natural Gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
(b) Planning to Construct a Compressed Natural Gas Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
(c) Investing in a Natural Gas Pipeline Company. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
(d) Investing in Other Natural Gas Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
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(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Natural Gas Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
(a) Shell Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
(b) Unfair Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
(c) Catastrophic Event Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
(d) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
(e) Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
C. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Crude Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
(1) Background on Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
(a) Building a Physical Oil Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
(b) Conducting Physical Oil Activities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
(c) Exiting the Physical Oil Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Crude Oil Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
(a) Mixing Banking with Commerce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
(b) Multiple Risks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
(c) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
D. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
(1) Background on Jet Fuel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
(a) Storing, Supplying, and Transporting Jet Fuel Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
(b) Supplying Jet Fuel to United Airlines.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
(c) Hedging Jet Fuel Prices with Emirates.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Involvement with Jet Fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
(a) Thin Benefits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
(b) Operational and Catastrophic Event Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
VI. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
A. JPMorgan Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
(1) Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
(2) Historical Overview of Commodities Activities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
(3) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
B. JPMorgan Involvement with Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
(1) Background on Electricity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
(2) JPMorgan Involvement with Power Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
(a) Acquiring Power Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
(b) Requesting Broad Authority for Power Plant Activities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
(c) Conducting Power Plant Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
(a) Manipulating Electricity Prices.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
(b) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance to Cover Potential Losses.. . . . 346
iv
(c) Erecting Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
(4) Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
C. JPMorgan Involvement with Copper.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
(1) Background on Copper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
(2) JPMorgan’s Involvement with Copper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
(a) Trading Copper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
(b) Proposing Copper ETF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan Involvement with Copper.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
(a) Unrestricted Copper Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
(b) ETF Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
(c) Potential Economic Impacts of a Copper ETF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
(d) Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
D. JPMorgan Involvement with Size Limits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
(1) Background on Size Limits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
(2) JPMorgan’s Aggressive Interpretations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
(a) Making Commitments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
(b) Expanding Its Physical Commodity Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
(c) Stretching the Limits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Size Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
(a) Excluding Bank Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
(b) Excluding and Undervaluing Other Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
(c) Operating Without Written Guidance or Standardized Periodic Reports. . . . . 393
(d) Rationalizing Patchwork Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
h h h
v
WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH
PHYSICAL COMMODITIES
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For more than a decade, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has
investigated and presented case histories on the workings of the commodities markets, with the
objective of ensuring well-functioning markets with market-based prices, effective hedging tools,
and safeguards against market manipulation, conflicts of interest, and excessive speculation.
Past investigations have presented case studies on pricing gasoline; exposing a $6 billion
manipulation of natural gas prices by a hedge fund called Amaranth; closing the Enron loophole
impeding energy market oversight; tracing excessive speculation in the crude oil and wheat
markets; exposing the increased role of mutual funds, exchange traded funds, and other financial
firms in commodity speculation; and revitalizing position limits as tools to combat market
manipulation and excessive speculation.
1
This investigation focuses on the recent rise of banks and bank holding companies as
major players in the physical markets for commodities and related businesses. It presents case
studies of three major U.S. bank holding companies, Goldman Sachs,
2
J PMorgan Chase,
3
and
Morgan Stanley that over the last ten years were the largest bank holding company participants
in physical commodity activities. Those activities included trading uranium, operating coal
mines, running warehouses that store metal, stockpiling aluminum and copper, operating oil and
gas pipelines, planning to build a compressed natural gas facility, acquiring a natural gas pipeline
company, selling jet fuel to airlines, and operating power plants.
The United States has a long tradition of separating banks from commerce. The
Subcommittee’s case studies show how that tradition is eroding, and along with it, protections
from a long list of risks and potentially abusive conduct, including significant financial loss,
catastrophic event risks, unfair trading, market manipulation, credit distortions, unfair business
competition, and conflicts of interest. The investigation also highlights how the Federal Reserve
has identified financial holding company involvement with physical commodities as a significant
risk, but has taken insufficient steps to address it. More is needed to safeguard the U.S. financial
system and protect U.S. taxpayers from being forced to bailout large financial institutions
involved with physical commodities.
1
See, e.g., U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations reports and hearings, “Gas Prices: How Are
They Really Set?” S. Hrg. 107-509 (April 30 and May 2, 2002); “U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Recent Policy
has Increased Costs to Consumers But Not Overall U.S. Energy Security,” S. Prt. 108-18 (March 5, 2003); “The
Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat,” S. Prt. 109-65
(J une 27, 2006); “Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,” S. Hrg. 110-235 (J une 25 and J uly 9, 2007);
“Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market,” S. Hrg. 110-235 (J une 25 and J uly 9, 2007); “Excessive Speculation
and Compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act,” S. Hrg. 112-313 (November 3, 2011); and “Compliance with Tax
Limits on Mutual Fund Commodity Speculation,” S. Hrg. 112-343 (J anuary 26, 2012).
2
The terms “Goldman Sachs” and “Goldman” are intended to refer to The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., the financial
holding company, unless otherwise indicated.
3
The terms “J PMorgan Chase” or “J PMorgan” are intended to refer to J PMorgan Chase & Co., the financial holding
company, unless otherwise indicated.
2
A. Subcommittee Investigation
The Subcommittee initiated this investigation in 2012. As part of the investigation, the
Subcommittee gathered and reviewed over 90,000 pages of documents from Goldman Sachs,
J PMorgan, Morgan Stanley, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), as well as from a number of other financial firms and agencies. The
Subcommittee obtained information from them through information requests, briefings,
interviews, and reviews of publicly available information. The Subcommittee participated in 78
interviews and briefings involving the financial institutions, regulators, and other businesses and
agencies. In addition, the Subcommittee spoke with academic and industry analysts, as well as
experts in a variety of fields, including banking law, commodities trading, environmental and
catastrophic risk management, and the aluminum, copper, coal, uranium, natural gas, oil, jet fuel,
and power markets. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and J PMorgan, as well as U.S. federal
banking regulators, other U.S. agencies, and the LME all cooperated with Subcommittee requests
for information.
B. Investigation Overview
The Subcommittee investigation developed case studies involving the three U.S. financial
holding companies with the largest levels of involvement with physical commodities, Goldman
Sachs, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley. Within each case study, the Subcommittee looked at
three specific commodities issues in detail to illustrate the wide variety of physical commodity
activities underway and the particular concerns they raise.
The Goldman case study looks at Goldman’s acquisition of a company called Nufcor
which bought and sold physical uranium and supplied it to nuclear power plants. The case study
also examines Goldman’s ownership of two open-pit coal mines in Colombia and its use of
Colombian subsidiaries to produce, market, and export that coal. In addition, it scrutinizes
Goldman’s involvement with aluminum, including its acquisition of Metro International Trade
Services LLC, a warehouse company with nearly 30 Detroit warehouses containing the largest
London Metal Exchange (LME)-certified aluminum stocks in the United States.
The Morgan Stanley case study focuses on Morgan Stanley’s involvement with natural
gas, in particular its effort to construct a new compressed natural gas facility in Texas and its
involvement with a natural gas pipeline company in the Midwest named Southern Star. It also
examines Morgan Stanley’s involvement with oil storage and transport activities, and its role as a
supplier of jet fuel to United Airlines and as a jet fuel hedging counterparty to Emirates airline.
The J PMorgan case study features J PMorgan’s acquisition of over 30 power plants across
the United States, and subsequent involvement with manipulating electricity payments and
blocking plant modifications to improve grid reliability. The case study also examines
J PMorgan’s involvement with physical copper activities, including massive copper trades, a
multi-billion-dollar copper inventory that operates free of regulatory size limits, and a proposal
to establish a copper-backed exchange traded fund that some industrial copper users view as
potentially creating artificial copper shortages and price increases. In addition, the case study
examines how J PMorgan used loopholes, exclusions, and valuation minimization techniques to
stay under regulatory limits on the size of its physical commodity holdings.
3
In addition to analyzing financial company involvement with physical commodity
activities, the investigation examined the level of oversight exerted by the Federal Reserve,
which has sole authority over bank holding companies in the United States, including bank
holding companies that have elected to operate as “financial holding companies” authorized to
engage in physical commodity activities. In 2009, as part of its effort to analyze risks in the U.S.
financial system after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve identified bank involvement with
physical commodities as an area of concern and initiated a multi-year review of the issue. In an
October 2012 report, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Commodities Team that conducted
the special review issued an internal, staff-level report concluding bank involvement with
physical commodities raised significant concerns that required action. A year ago, the Federal
Reserve signaled that it was considering initiating a rulemaking to reduce the risks associated
with physical commodities, but has yet to issue a proposed rule.
Risky Activities. All three of the financial holding companies examined by the
Subcommittee were engaged in a wide range of risky physical commodity activities which
included, at times, producing, transporting, storing, processing, supplying, or trading energy,
industrial metals, or agricultural commodities. Many of the attendant risks were new to the
banking industry, and could result in significant financial losses to the financial institutions.
One set of risks arose from the sheer size of each financial institution’s physical
commodity activities. Until recently, Morgan Stanley controlled over 55 million barrels of oil
storage capacity, 100 oil tankers, and 6,000 miles of pipeline. J PMorgan built a copper
inventory that peaked at $2.7 billion, and, at one point, included at least 213,000 metric tons of
copper, comprising nearly 60% of the available physical copper on the world’s premier copper
trading exchange, the London Metal Exchange (LME). In 2012, Goldman owned 1.5 million
metric tons of aluminum worth $3 billion, about 25% of the entire U.S. annual consumption.
Goldman also owned warehouses which, in 2014, controlled 85% of the LME aluminum storage
business in the United States. Those large holdings illustrate the significant increase in
participation and power of the financial holding companies active in physical commodity
markets.
In addition to accumulating large inventories, the three financial holding companies
engaged in transactions involving massive amounts of physical commodities. J PMorgan
executed a series of copper trades in 2010 involving more than $1.5 billion, and a series of
aluminum trades in 2011 involving $1.9 billion. In 2012, Goldman twice made purchases of
LME warrants providing title to physical aluminum worth more than $1 billion. In 2012,
Morgan Stanley bought 950,000 barrels of heating oil. These transactions represented outsized
physical commodity trades within their respective markets. Since most physical commodity
transactions are not subject to regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Securities Exchange Commission, or bank regulators, those transactions also represent an area in
which risky conduct may escape federal oversight.
In addition to compiling huge commodity inventories and participating in outsized
transactions, the three financial holding companies chose to engage in commodity-related
businesses that carried potential catastrophic event risks. While the likelihood of an actual
catastrophe remained remote, those activities carried risks that banks normally avoided
altogether. Goldman, for example, bought a uranium business that carried the risk of a nuclear
incident, as well as open pit coal mines that carried potential risks of methane explosions, mining
4
mishaps, and air and water pollution. Its coal mines also experienced extended labor unrest,
which at one point led to requests for police and military assistance to remove a human blockade
preventing entry to the mines, risking injuries, an international incident, or worse. Morgan
Stanley owned and invested in extensive oil storage and transport facilities and a natural gas
pipeline company which, together, carried risks of fire, pipeline ruptures, natural gas explosions,
and oil spills. J PMorgan bought dozens of power plants whose risks included fire, explosions,
and air and water pollution. Throughout most of their history, U.S. banks have not incurred
those types of catastrophic event risks.
In some cases, the financial holding companies intensified their liability risks. Morgan
Stanley formed shell companies to launch construction of a compressed natural gas facility, and
ran the venture entirely with Morgan Stanley employees and resources, opening up the financial
holding company to direct liability if a worst case scenario should occur. Goldman bought two
Colombian coal mines, took control of 100% of the coal sales, and provided other essential
services to its subsidiaries running the business, putting itself at significant financial risk if
potential mining-related accidents were to occur. Goldman also purchased an existing uranium
business and, after its employees left, used Goldman personnel to buy and sell uranium and
supply it to nuclear power plants. J PMorgan took 100% ownership of several power plants,
exposing the financial holding company, as the direct owner, to financial liability should any of
those plants experience a catastrophic event.
At the same time, none of the three financial holding companies was adequately prepared
for potential losses from a catastrophic event related to its physical commodity activities, having
allocated insufficient capital and insurance to cover losses compared to other market participants.
In its recent public filing seeking comment on whether it should impose new regulatory
constraints on financial holding companies conducting physical commodity activities, the
Federal Reserve described a litany of past industrial disasters, including massive oil spills,
railway crashes, nuclear power plant meltdowns, and natural gas explosions.
4
The Federal
Reserve wrote:
“Recent disasters involving physical commodities demonstrate that the risks associated
with these activities are unique in type, scope and size. In particular, catastrophes
involving environmentally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic
damages well in excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the
committed capital and insurance policies of market participants.”
5
When the Federal Reserve Commodities Team, in 2012, analyzed the extent to which a
group of four financial holding companies, including the three examined here, had allocated
capital and insurance to cover “extreme loss scenarios,” it determined that all four had
insufficient coverage, and that each had a shortfall of $1 billion to $15 billion.
6
In other words,
4
See “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding
Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.Reg. 3329 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014)(hereinafter “ANPR”),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-21/pdf/2014-00996.pdf.
5
Id. at 3331.
6
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 498, 509 [sealed exhibit].
See also ANPR, at 3332-3333.
5
if a catastrophic event were to subject a financial holding company to multi-billion-dollar costs
to the same extent as, for example, BP Petroleum in the Deep Water Horizon oil spill disaster,
the financial holding company would not have the capital and insurance needed to cover its
losses which, in turn, might lead to its business partners and creditors reducing their business
activities or lending to the financial holding company, exacerbating its financial difficulties. In a
worst case scenario, the Federal Reserve and ultimately U.S. taxpayers could be forced to step in
with financial support to avoid the financial institution’s collapse and consequential damage to
the U.S. financial system and economy.
Unfair Trading Advantages. A second set of issues involves unfair trading advantages.
When financial holding companies seek permission from the Federal Reserve to engage in
physical commodity activities, a common reason given for approving the activities is that
exposure to the physical market would improve the company’s trading in the corresponding
financial market. For example, in its 2005 application to the Federal Reserve for complementary
authority to participate in physical commodity activities, J PMorgan explained that engaging in
such activities would:
“position J PM Chase in the supply end of the commodities markets, which in turn will
provide access to information regarding the full array of actual produce and end-user
activity in those markets. The information gathered through this increased market
participation will help improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply
vital price and risk management information that J PM Chase can use to improve its
financial commodities derivative offerings.”
7
In the activities reviewed by the Subcommittee, the financial companies often traded in
both the physical and financial markets at the same time, with respect to the same commodities,
frequently using the same traders on the same trading desk. In some cases, after purchasing a
physical commodity business, the financial holding company ramped up its financial trading.
For example, after Goldman bought Nufcor, the uranium company, it increased Nufcor’s trading
activity tenfold, going in four years from an annualized rate of 1.3 million pounds of uranium to
trades involving 13 million pounds. In all of the commodities examined by the Subcommittee,
however, the trades executed by the financial holding companies in a commodity’s physical
markets remained a small percentage of the trades they executed in the corresponding financial
markets, reflecting the greater focus of the financial holding companies on earning substantial
revenues from trading in those financial markets.
In some cases, financial holding companies used their physical commodity activities to
influence or even manipulate commodity prices. J PMorgan, for example, paid $410 million to
settle charges by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that it used manipulative bidding
practices to obtain excessive electricity payments in California and the Midwest. Goldman was
sued by over a dozen industrial users of aluminum claiming that Goldman’s warehouses were
artificially delaying the release of aluminum from storage to boost prices and restrict supplies.
As discussed below, in connection with its warehouses in Detroit, Goldman approved “merry-go-
7
7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000004, at 016.
6
round” transactions in which warehouse clients were paid cash incentives to load aluminum from
one Metro warehouse into another, essentially blocking the warehouse exits while they moved
their metal. Those merry-go-round transactions lengthened the queue for other metal owners
seeking to exit the Detroit warehouses, accompanied by increases in the Midwest Premium for
aluminum. In another troubling development, J PMorgan proposed an exchange traded fund
(ETF) to be backed with physical copper, described below. In filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, some industrial copper users charged that the proposed ETF would
create artificial copper shortages as copper was stockpiled to back the fund, leading to price
hikes and, potentially, manipulation of market prices.
In addition, in each of the three case studies, evidence showed that the financial holding
companies used their physical commodity activities to gain access to commercially valuable non-
public information that could be used to benefit their financial trading activities. For example,
Morgan Stanley’s oil storage and transport activities gave it access to information about oil
shipments, storage fill rates, and pipeline breakdowns. That information was available not only
with respect to its own activities, but also for clients using its storage and pipeline facilities.
Goldman’s warehouse business gave over 50 Goldman employees access to confidential
warehouse information about aluminum shipments, storage volumes, and warrant cancellations.
Its coal mines in Colombia, the number one exporter of coal to the United States, provided
Goldman with non-public information about coal prices, export levels, and environmental
regulatory developments that could affect coal exports. J PMorgan’s power plants gave it
insights into electricity costs, congestion areas, and power plant capabilities and shutdowns, all
of which could be used to advantage in trading activities. In each instance, non-public market
intelligence about physical commodity activities provided an opportunity for the financial
holding company to use the information to benefit its financial trading activities.
U.S. commodities laws traditionally have not barred the use of non-public information by
commodity traders in the same way as securities laws have barred its use in securities trades.
But when large financial holding companies begin to take control of physical commodity
businesses, gain access to large amounts of commercially valuable market intelligence
unavailable to most market participants, and use that information to make large profitable trades
in financial markets, concerns deepen about unfair trading advantages. Those types of concerns
have been magnified by the financial holding companies’ increased involvement with physical
commodities.
Commodity markets used to be dominated by commodity producers and end-users, like
farmers, manufacturers, airlines, and municipalities who relied on the commodity markets to
determine fair prices for critical materials, and to hedge their future price risks. They typically
held 70% of the open interest in the futures markets, while commodity speculators held about
30%. But by 2011, those percentages were reversed, with commodity speculators dominating
U.S. commodity markets, including financial holding companies like the three Wall Street banks
examined by the Subcommittee. Under those changed circumstances, if commodity markets are
to be fair, it is particularly important that large traders like financial holding companies not gain
unfair trading advantages.
Mixing Banking and Commerce. For over 150 years, the United States has generally
restricted banks to the business of banking and discouraged the mixing of banking and
7
commerce. Multiple concerns, discussed in more detail below, have been articulated over the
years to support the separation of banking from commerce, but the case studies discussed in this
Report show how that principle is being eroded.
The case studies show how financial holding companies have taken control of numerous
commercial businesses that have never before been run by a bank or bank holding company.
Morgan Stanley’s effort to construct a compressed natural gas facility, for example, is
unprecedented for a bank or bank holding company, and in direct competition with a similar
project by a private company. Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel supply services also compete directly
with oil and refining companies providing the same services. Goldman’s coal operations are in
direct competition with those of an American company that is the second largest coal producer in
Colombia. In running its power plants, J PMorgan competes with utilities and other energy
companies that specialize in that business. Until recently, banks and their holding companies
focused on financing private sector businesses, rather than acquiring and using subsidiaries to
compete against them.
One key concern when financial holding companies compete against non-bank
companies is that their borrowing costs will nearly always undercut those of their non-bank
competitors. Another advantage is their relatively low capital requirements. The Federal
Reserve Commodities Team determined that, in 2012, corporations engaged in oil and gas
businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover potential losses, while bank holding
company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%, making it much easier for
them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.
8
In addition to those fundamental
economic advantages over non-bank companies, a financial holding company could, in theory,
help its rise in a particular business simply by not providing financing to its rivals. Some experts
have identified less expensive financing, lower capital, and control over credit decisions as key
factors that give financial holding companies an unfair advantage over non-bank competitors and
represent some of the concerns motivating the traditional U.S. ban on mixing banking with
commerce. Avoiding the catastrophic risks described above is another.
Still another set of concerns involves the transitory nature of a financial holding
company’s involvement in any particular physical commodity operation. In most cases, financial
holding companies are looking for short-term financial returns rather than making long-term
commitments to run a business like a power plant or natural gas facility. In addition, financial
holding companies that make so-called merchant banking investments in a commercial company
are constrained by law to sell those investments generally within ten years.
Those relatively short-term investment horizons mean that financial holding companies
are not or may not be willing to develop or dedicate the resources, time, and expertise needed to
make complex infrastructure investments and meet regulatory requirements. For example, in the
case studies, Goldman chose not to upgrade its port in Colombia with new coal loading
equipment, while J PMorgan stalled upgrades to two power plants in California to support grid
reliability, making decisions contrary to the companies participating in those business sectors for
the long haul. Without those investments, however, a financial holding company may place
itself at greater risk of violating regulations or experiencing a catastrophic event. A related
8
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200499.
8
concern is whether decisions by financial holding companies to delay or avoid infrastructure
investments disadvantage competitors who do make those investments and may, in fact, pressure
those competitors to delay or skimp on needed infrastructure as well.
Many physical commodity businesses today rely on a small cadre of experienced
corporations with long term investment horizons to transport oil and gas, mine coal, process
uranium, or generate electricity. Those corporations make expensive infrastructure investments.
The prospect of financial holding companies changing those markets by buying particular
companies, capturing profits, and then pulling out, is a troubling scenario.
Inadequate Safeguards. A final set of issues involves a current lack of effective
regulatory safeguards related to financial holding company involvement with risky physical
commodities. As explained in the following chapters, financial holding companies currently
conduct physical commodity activities under one of three authorities provided in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the so-called complementary, merchant banking, and grandfather
authorities. Despite enactment of that law 15 years ago, the Federal Reserve has yet to address a
host of pressing questions related to how that law should be implemented.
For example, the Federal Reserve has never issued guidance on the scope of the
grandfather authority that allows financial firms that convert to bank holding companies to
continue to engage in certain physical commodity activities. That failure has allowed Goldman
and Morgan Stanley to use expansive readings of the grandfather authority to justify otherwise
impermissible physical commodity activities. The Federal Reserve has also failed to specify
capital and insurance minimums to protect against losses related to catastrophic events. Nor has
it clarified whether financial holding companies can use shell companies to conduct physical
commodity businesses as Morgan Stanley and Goldman have done in their compressed natural
gas and uranium trading businesses. Procedures to force divestment of impermissible physical
commodity activities are also opaque and slow.
One key problem is that the Federal Reserve currently relies upon an uncoordinated,
incoherent patchwork of limits on the size of the physical commodity activities conducted under
various legal authorities, permitting major exclusions, gaps, and ambiguities. In September
2012, for example, according to its own records, J PMorgan held physical commodity assets with
a combined market value of at least $17.4 billion, which was then equal to nearly 12% of its Tier
1 capital of $148 billion, while at the same time calculating its physical commodity assets for
regulatory purposes at $6.6 billion or just 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. J PMorgan was able to report
that lower amount by excluding and minimizing the market value of many of its physical
commodity assets, including billions of dollars in industrial metal held by its subsidiary national
bank. The Federal Reserve has not, to date, objected to J PMorgan’s key exclusions. The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has its own size limit, which applies to its banks, but
those are also ineffective in calculating the actual size of a bank’s commodity holdings. Size
limits subject to massive exclusions provide an illusion of risk management. The existing size
limits on physical commodities need to be reworked to ensure they effectively achieve the
intended limit on financial holding companies’ and banks’ commodities holdings.
9
A final set of problems arise from the lack of essential data. The Federal Reserve only
recently began requiring regular reports from financial holding companies tracking their
compliance with size limits, and has yet to clarify how the market value of commodity holdings
should be calculated for compliance purposes. Commodity-related merchant banking
investments are made by multiple components within a financial holding company – in the
commodities division, proprietary investment units, infrastructure funds, and other capital funds
– but the Federal Reserve does not require a listing of all of those physical commodity
investments on a single report. Instead, the Federal Reserve requires an annual merchant
banking report with such high level aggregate data that it cannot be used to analyze the extent to
which those investments involve physical commodities or the extent to which the data includes
all of the commodity-related investments taking place throughout the financial holding company.
The Federal Reserve does even less with respect to grandfathered physical commodity activities,
not requiring any regular reports at all. Moreover, the availability of public information on
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities is almost non-existent.
Ensuring physical commodity activities are conducted in a safe and secure manner will require
more comprehensive, regular, and publicly available reports from financial holding companies.
In early 2014, the Federal Reserve indicated that it was considering issuing a new
rulemaking to address the risks to the financial system caused by bank involvement with physical
commodities. That announcement was based upon several years of work examining the physical
commodity activities being conducted by financial holding companies. The Federal Reserve’s
focus on the issue has also led all three of the financial holding companies examined by the
Subcommittee to reduce the level and breadth of their physical commodity activities. However,
none of the three has yet exited the area completely, and other financial institutions are
considering entering the field or increasing their physical commodity activities. In addition,
Goldman has said that it considers physical commodities to be a core business it is not leaving.
C. Findings and Recommendations
Findings of Fact
(1) Engaging in Risky Activities. Since 2008, Goldman Sachs, J PMorgan Chase,
and Morgan Stanley have engaged in many billions of dollars of risky physical
commodity activities, owning or controlling, not only vast inventories of physical
commodities like crude oil, jet fuel, heating oil, natural gas, copper, aluminum, and
uranium, but also related businesses, including power plants, coal mines, natural gas
facilities, and oil and gas pipelines.
(2) Mixing Banking and Commerce. From 2008 to 2014, Goldman, J PMorgan,
and Morgan Stanley engaged in physical commodity activities that mixed banking
and commerce, benefiting from lower borrowing costs and lower capital to debt
ratios compared to nonbank companies.
(3) Affecting Prices. At times, some of the financial holding companies used or
contemplated using physical commodity activities, such as electricity bidding
strategies, merry-go-round trades, or a proposed exchange traded fund backed by
10
physical copper, that had the effect or potential effect of manipulating or
influencing commodity prices.
(4) Gaining Trading Advantages. Exercising control over vast physical
commodity activities gave Goldman, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley access to
commercially valuable, non-public information that could have provided
advantages in their trading activities.
(5) Incurring New Bank Risks. Due to their physical commodity activities,
Goldman, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley incurred multiple risks normally absent
from banking, including operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks,
made worse by the transitory nature of their investments.
(6) Incurring New Systemic Risks. Due to their physical commodity activities,
Goldman, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley incurred increased financial, operational,
and catastrophic event risks, faced accusations of unfair trading advantages,
conflicts of interest, and market manipulation, and intensified problems with being
too big to manage or regulate, introducing new systemic risks into the U.S. financial
system.
(7) Using Ineffective Size Limits. Prudential safeguards limiting the size of
physical commodity activities are riddled with exclusions and applied in an
uncoordinated, incoherent, and ineffective fashion, allowing J PMorgan, for
example, to hold physical commodities with a market value of $17.4 billion –
nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital – while at the same time calculating the market
value of its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying with the
Federal Reserve limit at just $6.6 billion.
(8) Lacking Key Information. Federal regulators and the public currently lack key
information about financial holding companies’ physical commodities activities to
form an accurate understanding of the nature and extent of those activities and to
protect the markets.
Recommendations
(1) Reaffirm Separation of Banking and Commerce as it Relates to Physical
Commodity Activities. Federal bank regulators should reaffirm the separation of
banking from commerce, and reconsider all of the rules and practices related to
physical commodity activities in light of that principle.
(2) Clarify Size Limits. The Federal Reserve should issue a clear limit on a financial
holding company’s physical commodity activities; clarify how to calculate the
market value of physical commodity holdings; eliminate major exclusions; and
limit all physical commodity activities to no more than 5% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital. The OCC should revise its 5% limit to protect banks
11
from speculative or other risky positions, including by calculating it based on asset
values on a commodity-by-commodity basis.
(3) Strengthen Disclosures. The Federal Reserve should strengthen financial
holding company disclosure requirements for physical commodities and related
businesses in internal and public filings to support effective regulatory oversight,
public disclosure, and investor protections, including with respect to commodity-
related merchant banking and grandfathered activities.
(4) Narrow Scope of Complementary Activity. The Federal Reserve should
narrow the scope of “complementary” activities by requiring financial holding
companies to demonstrate how a proposed physical commodity activity would be
directly linked to and support the settlement of other financial transactions
conducted by the company.
(5) Clarify Scope of Grandfathering Clause. The Federal Reserve should clarify
the scope of the “grandfather” clause as originally intended, which was only to
prevent disinvestment of physical commodity activities that were underway in
September 1997, and continued to be underway at the time of a company’s
conversion to a financial holding company.
(6) Narrow Scope of Merchant Banking Authority. The Federal Reserve should
tighten controls over merchant banking activities involving physical commodities
by shortening and equalizing the 10-year and 15-year investment time periods,
clarifying the actions that qualify as “routine operation and management” of a
business, and including those activities under an overall physical commodities size
limit.
(7) Establish Capital and Insurance Minimums. The Federal Reserve should
establish capital and insurance minimums based on market-prevailing standards to
protect against potential losses from catastrophic events in physical commodity
activities, and specify the catastrophic event models used by financial holding
companies.
(8) Prevent Unfair Trading. Financial regulators should ensure that large traders,
including financial holding companies, are legally precluded from using material
non-public information gained from physical commodities activities to benefit their
trading activities in the financial markets.
(9) Utilize Section 620 Study. Federal regulators should use the ongoing Section
620 study requiring regulators to identify permissible bank activities to restrict
banks and their holding companies from owning or controlling physical
commodities in excess of 5% of their Tier 1 capital and consider other appropriate
modifications to current practice involving physical commodities.
12
(10) Reclassify Commodity-Backed ETFs. The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and Securities Exchange Commission should treat exchange
traded funds (ETFs) backed by physical commodities as hybrid security-commodity
instruments subject to regulation by both agencies. The CFTC should apply
position limits to ETF organizers and promoters, and consider banning such
instruments due to their potential use in commodity market corners or squeezes.
(11) Study Misuse of Physical Commodities to Manipulate Prices. The Office
of Financial Research should study and produce recommendations on the broader
issue of how to detect, prevent, and take enforcement action against all entities that
use physical commodities or related businesses to manipulate commodity prices in
the physical and financial markets.
13
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on the history of U.S. bank involvement
with physical commodities, including how federal statutes governing permissible bank activities
have changed over time. It also provides background information on the concerns motivating
U.S. efforts to restrict federal banks to the “business of banking” and discourage the mixing of
banking with commerce; the roles played by federal regulators charged with overseeing
commodity-related activities; and the key physical commodity regulatory issues now facing
federal bank regulators.
A. Short History of Banking Involvement in Physical Commodities
For the first 150 years of banks operating in the United States, commodities played a very
limited role in bank activities, in part because federal laws discouraged the mixing of banking
and commerce. More recently, however, in response to bank pressure, federal regulators began
to weaken the separation of banking and commerce. In the 1980s, with the invention of energy-
based commodities that could be traded in futures and swaps markets, U.S. banks began to
increase their commodities activities. In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
which explicitly allowed banks to engage in commercial activities, including activities involving
commodities. Over the next decade, a handful of major U.S. banks not only began to expand
their trading in commodity-based financial instruments, but also to take ownership interests in, or
exert control over, businesses handling physical commodities. The 2008 financial crisis further
boosted bank involvement, when one major bank acquired a securities firm with commodity
investments, and two securities firms with extensive commodity holdings converted to bank
holding companies. Today, a handful of large U.S. banks and their holding companies are major
players in U.S. commodities markets. Those banks not only dominate commodities trading on
financial markets, but also own or exercise control over businesses that produce, store, transport,
refine, supply, and utilize physical commodities, including oil products, natural gas, coal, metals,
and electricity. The current level of bank involvement with critical raw materials, power
generation, and the food supply appears to be unprecedented in U.S. history.
(1) Historical Limits on Bank Activities
In the United States, banks have traditionally operated under laws that restrict them to
engaging in the “business of banking.”
9
The key federal statutory provision authorizes national
banks to engage in:
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating
notes ….”
10
9
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh).
10
Id., originating as the “bank powers clause” of the National Bank Act of 1863, and attaining its current wording in
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), §16. See also “Permissible Securities
Activities of Commercial Banks Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),”
14
Since 1956, bank holding companies have operated under a similar set of restrictions.
11
The
Bank Holding Company Act generally limits companies that own or control a bank to engaging
in banking activities or activities determined by the Federal Reserve “to be so closely related to
banking as to be a proper incident thereto.”
12
According to one expert, the Bank Holding
Company Act was designed to “prevent[ ] a holding company from being used by banking
organizations to acquire commercial firms and to enter activities prohibited to banks
themselves.”
13
The basis for these statutory restrictions is a longstanding U.S. principle that banking
should not mix with other types of commerce.
14
This principle was first manifested in the
charters issued to early banks operating within the United States; those charters typically
prohibited banks from dealing in “merchandise.”
15
New York bank charters, and later New York
banking statutes, also expressly prohibited banks from “dealing or trading in … goods, wares,
merchandise, [or] commodities.”
16
Early U.S. courts generally interpreted the charter and legal
restrictions narrowly, ruling that banks were prohibited from issuing mortgages, investing in real
estate, purchasing stocks as an investment, or operating any non-bank, commercial business.
17
The purpose behind those prohibitions was generally to prevent banks from competing with
Congressional Research Service, No. R41181 (4/12/2010) (hereinafter “2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA”), at
3 (“Banks are institutions of limited power; they may only engage in the activities permissible pursuant to their
charter, which generally limits them to the ‘business of banking’ and all powers incidental to the business of
banking.”).
11
See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, 70 Stat. 134 (1956). See also 1970 amendments, P.L. 91-
607 (12/31/1970).
12
Id.; 12 U.S.C. §1843(a) and (c)(8).
13
“The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United States: an Examination of Principal Issues,” OCC
Economics Working Paper 1999-1, Bernard Shull (hereinafter “Shull”), at 57-58, see also 19,http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/economics-working-papers/1999-1993/wp99-1.pdf.
14
See, e.g., “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities,” Professor Saule Omarova, 98
Minnesota Law Review 265, 268 (2012) (hereinafter “The Merchants of Wall Street”); Shull at 12. The separation
between banking and commerce in the United States has never, however, been absolute. Federal law has, for
example, allowed commercial firms to own industrial banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H), and unitary thrift holding
companies, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D), and has long permitted bank holding companies to retain small equity
ownership stakes in non-financial corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) and (7). A banking expert at a2013 Senate
hearing put it this way:
“The principle of keeping banking separate from commerce can be a useful way to simplify the otherwise
complex U.S. banking laws. Certainly, the basic structure of the National Bank Act and the [Banking
Holding Company] Act reflects this general principle. But this general principle is not a binding legal rule
and does not create an impermeable wall, and reasonable people can disagree as to where the line is and
should be drawn.”
Prepared testimony of Randall Guynn, counsel with Davis Polk & Wardell LLP, before U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, hearing on “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control
Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil Refineries,” (7/23/2013)(hereinafter “Guynn Testimony”), at 20.
15
Shull, at 12.
16
Shull, at 13, footnote 29; see also id. at 15.
17
Id. at 15-16. See also Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (analyzing “hazards” that
arise when bank affiliates become involved with investment banking).
15
other types of businesses and from engaging in risky investments, limiting them instead to
conducting a narrow range of banking activities.
18
Bank Circumvention of Restrictions. U.S. banks have traditionally chafed under the
legal limitations on their activities, and U.S. history is replete with examples of banks willfully
circumventing them. One notorious example, in the early 1900s, involved Wall Street banks that
established affiliates that dealt in securities, insurance, and real estate, and acquired ownership
interests in a wide range of commercial businesses.
19
A few major banks formed so-called
“trusts” that acted as holding companies for massive commercial enterprises, including
businesses that handled physical commodities, such as railroads, oil companies, steel
manufacturers, and shipping and mining ventures.
20
In 1901 and 1907, bank actions to acquire
or trade stocks in commercial corporations contributed to chaotic stock prices and financial
panics, triggering Congressional hearings and legislative reforms.
21
Pujo Hearings. In 1912 and 1913, hearings held by a subcommittee of the U.S. House
Committee on Banking and Currency, known as the “Pujo Committee” after Committee
Chairman Arsene Pujo of Louisiana, confirmed allegations that some Wall Street banks had
acquired control over major commercial enterprises critical to the U.S. economy, while also
asserting control over “the money, exchange, security and commodity markets.”
22
Among other
matters, the hearings disclosed to the public that a handful of major Wall Street banks controlled
hundreds of businesses in the areas of insurance, finance, transportation, and commodities; had
set up interlocking directors with their fellow banks and trusts; had restrained competition; and
had contributed to financial panics through massive stock trading, inadequate capital reserves,
and bad loans.
23
In response to the Pujo or “money trust” hearings as well as pressure from President
Theodore Roosevelt, Congress enacted several laws to break up the banks’ influence over the
economy and increase bank regulation. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which strengthened
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, provided new tools to prevent monopolistic, anti-competitive
18
See Shull, at 10-12, 55. Professor Shull noted that the principle against mixing banking and commerce had roots
as far back as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, writing that, in 1374, “the Venetian senate prohibited bankers
from dealing in copper, tin, iron, lead, saffron, and honey … probably to keep banks from undertaking risky
activities and monopolizing the specified commodities.” Id. at 6.
19
See, e.g., id. at 16; Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630 (“n 1908 banks began the practice
of establishing security affiliates that engaged in, inter alia, the business of floating bond issues and, less frequently,
underwriting stock issues.”).
20
See, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 67-68 (railroad trusts), 81-86 (U.S. Steel
trust), 100-103 (shipping trust), 109 (farm equipment trust), and 123 (copper trust).
21
Id. at 91-93 (describing massive stock trades by J PMorgan’s predecessor bank to acquire control of the Northern
Pacific railroad in 1901, leading to dramatic price volatility in the railroad’s stock price, financial panic by
speculators who had shorted the stock, and the largest stock market crash in a century), and 122-128 (describing the
1907 financial panic which began with a collapse in copper prices and a corresponding plunge in United Copper
stock prices which, in turn, undermined the financial stability of certain trust companies and banks, and threatened
widespread economic damage).
22
See “Money Trust Investigation: Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States,” hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Currency (5/16/1912), HRG-1912-BCU-0017,
Y4.B22/1:M74/2-1,http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1912-bcu-
0017?accountid=45340 (first of multiple days of hearings continuing into 1913), at 4.
23
Id. See also, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 150-156.
16
conduct.
24
The landmark Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Federal Reserve System
to act as a central bank for the United States, required national banks to become members of the
system, imposed capital and reserve requirements on them, and mandated OCC and Federal
Reserve examinations to stop unsafe and unsound banking practices.
25
The Federal Reserve Act
also modestly expanded bank activities by permitting foreign branches and certain loans secured
by farmland, while leaving in place the general prohibition against banks engaging in
commerce.
26
Stock Market Crash of 1929. A dozen years later, the pendulum swung the other way,
and banks gained new statutory authority, under the McFadden Act of 1927, to buy and sell
marketable debt obligations and issue more types of real estate loans.
27
The OCC followed with
regulations permitting federally chartered banks, through affiliates, to underwrite, buy, and sell
both debt and equity instruments.
28
Those expansions in banking powers led to a rapid increase
in bank participation in the securities markets, with banks acting on behalf of both clients and
themselves.
Two years later came the stock market crash of 1929. The ensuing depression and
economic turmoil led to the closure of thousands of banks. A subsequent investigation by a U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency subcommittee, led in part by subcommittee counsel
Ferdinand Pecora, pointed to bank involvement in non-banking activities as a key contributor to
the market’s collapse, including the underwriting and trading of questionable securities, the
repackaging of poorly performing foreign loans into bonds sold to the public, and in the case of
one bank, providing new stocks at below market prices to Administration officials, Members of
Congress, and businessmen considered to be friends of the bank.
29
The Pecora hearings
examined a wide range of banking activities, but did not highlight problems with commodities.
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. In response to the bank closures and Great Depression that
followed the stock market crash, Congress enacted several laws that reinstated restrictions on
bank activities. The most prominent was the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-
Steagall Act after the Congressmen who championed key provisions.
30
The Glass-Steagall Act
explicitly prohibited U.S. banks from dealing in securities or establishing subsidiaries or
24
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, P.L. 63–212.
25
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, P.L. 63-43.
26
Id. See also Shull, at 17.
27
McFadden Act of 1927, P.L. 69-639, §§2(b) and 16.
28
See Shull, at 17.
29
See, e.g., “Stock Exchange Practices,” report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S.Hrg. 73-
1455, (6/6/1934),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/sensep/issue/3912/download/59691/sensep_report.pdf, and
associated hearings from J anuary 1933 to May 1934 (known as the Pecora hearings); The House of Morgan, Ron
Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 352-373; Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-631 (“Congress
was concerned that commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal Reserve System in particular had
both aggravated and been damaged by [the] stock market decline partly because of their direct and indirect
involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative securities.”). The Pecora hearings also disclosed other
problematic bank conduct, including substantial bank loans given to bank officers and later forgiven; interlocking
directors with other banks and trust companies; and nonpayment of taxes by wealthy bankers.
30
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). Senator Carter Glass (D-Virginia) was then a
member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency as well as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee;
Congressman Henry B. Steagall (D-Alabama) was chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency.
17
affiliates that dealt in securities.
31
It also prohibited banks from engaging in securities
transactions undertaken “for its own account” rather than on behalf of a client.
32
In addition, the
law established the federal deposit insurance system to safeguard bank deposits.
33
The new Glass-Steagall prohibitions compelled major U.S. banks to terminate or divest
themselves of their securities trading operations as well as other prohibited activities.
34
Two
prominent banks that spun off their securities operations were J .P. Morgan & Co. and First
Boston.
35
The result was that the banking community essentially split into two groups,
commercial banks which offered deposits, checking services, mortgages, and loans; and
investment banks which traded securities and invested in new businesses.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. In 1956, Congress enacted the Banking Holding
Company Act (BHCA). According to a 2012 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
“A key original goal of the BHCA was to limit the comingling of banking and
commerce, that is, to restrict the extent to which BHCs or their subsidiaries could
engage in nonfinancial activities (more details and historical background are found in
Omarova and Tahyar, forthcoming; Santos 1998; Aharony and Swary 1981; and
Klebaner 1958). This separation is intended to prevent self-dealing and monopoly power
through lending to nonfinancial affiliates and to prevent situations where risk-taking by
nonbanking affiliates erodes the stability of the bank’s core financial activities, such as
lending and deposit-taking (Kroszner and Rajan 1994; Klebaner 1958). To further
enhance stability, BHCs are also required to maintain minimum capital ratios and to act
as a ‘source of strength’ to their banking subsidiaries, that is, to provide financial
assistance to banking subsidiaries in distress.”
36
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Banks and bank regulators respected the Bank Holding
Company Act and Glass-Steagall prohibitions for more than 40 years, and U.S. banking
flourished. By the 1970s, however, some banks began pressing regulators and Congress to allow
them once more to engage in a wider array of commercial and financial activities, including
dealing in securities, insurance, and, for the first time, the growing field of derivatives.
37
In
response to bank pressure, the OCC and Federal Reserve began weakening the Glass-Steagall
restrictions, in particular by expanding the securities and derivatives activities considered to be
within the “business of banking” or “incidental” to banking.
38
In 1998, in direct defiance of
Glass-Steagall prohibitions, Citibank announced that it intended to merge with the Travelers
31
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), §§16, 20, 21, and 32.
32
Id. at §16.
33
Id. at §8.
34
See, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 384-386; Shull at 18.
35
See, Shull at 18; The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 384-386.
36
“A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (7/2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [footnotes omitted].
37
See 2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA, at 8, 28.
38
See id. at 8-15; The Merchants of Wall Street, at 279; Shull at 20, 24. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has published a comprehensive listing of the various activities related to derivatives that national banks are
authorized to engage in. See Comptroller of the Currency, “Activities Permissible for a National Bank, Cumulative”
(April 2012) , at 57-64 .
18
insurance group, and pressed bank regulators and Congress to allow it to create what it described
as the largest financial services company in the world.
39
In 1999, faced with Citibank’s planned merger, regulatory actions that undercut the
Glass-Steagall prohibitions, and a rapidly changing banking landscape in which banks were
conducting an expanding variety of financial activities, Congress enacted the Financial
Modernization Act of 1999. This law is commonly referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
after the Congressmen who championed its enactment.
40
The new law repealed key Glass-
Steagall restrictions on banks and widened the activities authorized for bank holding
companies.
41
In particular, the law explicitly authorized commercial banks to affiliate with other
types of financial companies using a new “financial holding company” structure.
Under the new structure, a bank holding company could elect to also become a “financial
holding company” and own, not only one or more banks, but also any other type of company that
the Federal Reserve determined was “financial in nature,” “incidental” to a financial activity, or
“complementary” to a financial activity, if certain conditions were met.
42
In addition, the law
explicitly authorized bank holding companies to engage in “merchant banking,” meaning they
could buy ownership interests in any company as a private equity investment, so long as the bank
did not try to operate the business itself and held it as a passive investment for a limited period of
time.
43
Together, these provisions significantly weakened the longstanding separation of
banking and commerce.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorized all existing bank holding companies that met
certain capital and operating requirements to elect to become financial holding companies.
44
In
39
See, e.g., “Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion Deal: A New No. 1: Financial Giants
Unite,” Mitchell Martin, New York Times (4/7/1998),http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/07/news/07iht-citi.t.html;
“Citicorp-Travelers Merger Shakes Up Wall Street Rivals,” Patrick McGeehan and Matt Murray, Wall Street
J ournal (4/7/1998),http://online.wsj.com/article/SB891903040436602000.html.
40
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, P.L. 106-102 (1999). Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas) was then
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development. Congressman J im Leach (R-
Iowa) was Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. Congressman Tom Bliley (R-
Virginia) was Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce.
41
See “A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames
Vickery of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (J uly 2012), at 3’http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf .
42
See Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, as amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which states
that a financial holding company:
“may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares of any company engaged in any
activity, that the [Federal Reserve] Board […] determines (by regulation or order) --
(A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or
(B) is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.”
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also authorized banks, subject to certain conditions, to own or
control their own “financial subsidiaries” when established to engage in “’activities that are financial in nature or
incidental to financial activity,’ as well as ‘activities that are permitted for national banks to engage in directly.’”
2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA, at 20-21; 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(A).
43
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
44
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1). To become a financial holding company, a bank holding company had to meet a list
of statutory criteria, including that it and its subsidiary banks were well capitalized and well managed. 12 C.F.R. §
19
addition, the law allowed bank holding companies or other firms that, after enactment of the law,
sought to become a financial holding company, to “grandfather” in certain prior holdings and
businesses rather than divest them.
45
Today, “virtually all” large bank holding companies are
also registered as financial holding companies.
46
In 2000, Congress enacted another law, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act,
which prohibited all federal regulation of the leading type of derivative known as a “swap.”
47
Derivatives are financial instruments that derive their value from another asset.
48
Swaps are
generally bilateral contracts in which two parties essentially make a bet on the future value of a
specified financial instrument, interest rate, or currency exchange rate. By prohibiting federal
regulation of swaps, among other consequences, the law effectively authorized banks to engage
in an unrestricted array of swap activities, including swaps linked to commodities. That law, like
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, further undermined the separation of banking from commerce.
Together, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act
authorized U.S. banks to engage in many financial activities that had been denied to them under
the Glass-Steagall Act, including activities that essentially mixed banking with commercial
activities. Major U.S. bank holding companies soon attained financial holding company status
and began to affiliate with securities and insurance firms. The resulting financial conglomerates
expanded into multiple financial activities, including many that were high risk. Less than ten
years later, major U.S. banks triggered the financial crisis that devastated the U.S. economy and
from which the country is still recovering.
49
(2) U.S. Banks and Commodities
For the first 150 years banks operated in the United States, commodities played a very
limited role in bank activities. It was not until the 1980s, with the invention of energy-based
commodities that could be traded in futures and swaps markets, that U.S. banks began dealing in
U.S. commodities in a substantial way. Over time, with the acquiescence of federal bank
225.82(a) (2013). For a current list of all bank holding companies that have elected to become financial holding
companies, seehttp://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
45
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1843
and (o).
46
“A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (J uly 2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf .
47
The 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act was enacted as a title of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2001, P.L. 106-554.
48
See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website,http://www.sec.gov/answers/derivative.htm
49
For more information on key causes of the financial crisis, see “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis,” hearings
before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-671 to 111-674, Volumes 1-5 (April
2010); “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” a bipartisan report by the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 112-675, Volume 5, (April 13, 2011). See also prepared
testimony of J oshua Rosner, managing director of Graham Fisher & Co., before U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, hearing on “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power
Plants, Warehouses, and Oil Refineries,” (7/23/2013)(hereinafter “Rosner Testimony”), at 3 (“While the actions of
many parties … led us to [the financial] crisis the fact remains that structured products innovated and sold as a result
of the combination of commercial and investment banking, devastated Main Street USA and ravaged consumers and
businesses alike. Banks, which had previously been prevented from investment banking activities, had stimulated
demand for faulty mortgage products.”).
20
regulators, a handful of major U.S. banks began, not only to develop and trade in commodity-
based financial instruments, but also to take ownership interests in, or exert control over,
businesses handling physical commodities. Today, banks are major players in U.S. commodities
markets, not only dominating the trading of commodity-related futures, options, swaps, and
securities, but also owning or exercising control over businesses that produce, store, transport,
refine, supply, and utilize physical commodities. Those commodities include oil products,
natural gas, coal, metals, agricultural products, and electricity.
Early History of Limited Bank Involvement in Commodities. Some experts contend
that, because banks handle money, they have a long history of dealing with commodities,
highlighting commodities that represent “an efficient medium of exchange and store of value,”
such as gold and silver bullion.
50
While that exception to the rule is true, for most of U.S.
history, U.S. banks were not major players in commodity markets.
The first commodities exchange established in the United States was the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT) which opened in 1848, as a central marketplace for the buying and selling of
grain.
51
Almost twenty years later, in 1865, CBOT developed the first standardized futures
contracts that could be traded on the exchange.
52
Over the next 100 years, the commodities
traded on U.S. exchanges grew to encompass a variety of agricultural products. The resulting
trade in futures and options was viewed as a specialized business generally handled by large
agricultural companies and commodity brokers, not banks.
53
At times, especially during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade
of the twentieth century, a handful of major banks acquired ownership interests in businesses that
handled physical commodities, including railroads, oil companies, and shipping and mining
ventures. But bank ownership of those businesses largely halted after the Pujo money trust
hearings and the enactment of restrictions on bank activities. During the 1920s, many banks
began trading stocks and bonds, but largely ignored the agriculturally-based commodity
exchanges. When Congress enacted the first major federal commodities law, the Grain Futures
Act of 1922, banks were not even mentioned in the statute.
54
When banking reforms were put into place after the stock market crash of 1929,
commodities were, again, hardly mentioned in the new statutes, given the paucity of bank
involvement with commodities. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, for example, mentioned
commodities only once, in a section that established a Federal Reserve oversight responsibility to
prevent banks from facilitating undue speculative activity through the issuance of bank credit.
That section directed each regional Federal Reserve Bank to:
50
See, e.g., Guynn Testimony, at 15-16.
51
See CME Group “Timeline of Achievements,”http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-
achievements.html.
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., Merchants of Grain by Dan Morgan (Viking Press 1979)(tracing grain trading and commodities markets
in the United States from the 1800s to the 1970s, and describing the roles played by five major grain merchants, but
making no mention of U.S. banks as market participants).
54
See Grain Futures Act of 1922, P.L. 67-331.
21
“keep itself informed of the general character and amount of the loans and investments of
its member banks with a view to ascertaining whether undue use is being made of bank
credit for the speculative carrying of or trading in securities, real estate, or commodities,
or for any other purpose inconsistent with the maintenance of sound credit conditions.”
55
The Glass-Steagall Act also directed each Federal Reserve Bank to report “any such undue use
of bank credit by any member bank” to the Federal Reserve Board.
56
No provision addressed
any other aspect of bank trading in commodities. Similarly, the landmark Commodities
Exchange Act of 1936, which revamped federal law on commodities markets, mentioned banks
only in passing in a single provision allowing commodity brokers to commingle customer funds
in their corporate bank accounts.
57
Further evidence of bank noninvolvement with commodities comes from extensive bank
statistics compiled by the Federal Reserve over a 60-year period, from 1896 to 1955.
58
The
report published by the Federal Reserve includes a four-page list of banking activities that
occurred during those years, but nowhere mentions commodities.
59
Banks Begin Trading Financial Commodities. It was not until decades later, when
U.S. commodity exchanges began to undergo fundamental change, that banks and other financial
firms began to participate in them. The primary change was an expansion of the concept of
commodities to encompass more than agricultural products. The first expansion occurred during
the 1970s, when commodity exchanges developed standardized foreign currency and interest rate
futures and options contracts that could be traded on the exchanges.
60
In 1979, Goldman Sachs, then a securities firm and not a bank, registered with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), regulator of U.S. futures markets, as a
“Futures Commission Merchant” (FCM) and received authorization to buy and sell futures and
options on regulated exchanges.
61
Three years later, in 1982, Goldman expanded its commodity
operations by purchasing J . Aron & Co., a commodities trading firm that has since become
55
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), § 3.
56
Id.
57
See Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, P.L. 74-674, §5.
58
See “All-Bank Statistics United States 1896 - 1955,” prepared by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, (April 1959), Federal Reserve Archives,http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/allbkstat/1896-
1955/us.pdf (containing historical banking data).
59
Id. at Appendix E, “Composition of Asset and Liability Items,” pages 85-89.
60
See, e.g., CME Group “Timeline of Achievements,”http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-
achievements.html (CME introduced the first foreign currency contracts in 1972, and the first interest rate future in
1975); Fool’s Gold, Gillian Tett (Free Press 2009), at 10-11.
61
See Goldman Sachs & Co. FCM information, National Futures Association (NFA) Background Affiliation Status
Information Center (BASIC) website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uZSsBZcBKLE=&rn=Y. For more information on
Futures Commission Merchants, see NFA “Glossary,”http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx?term=futures+commission+merchant (defining FCM as “[a]n
individual or organization which solicits or accepts orders to buy or sell futures or options contracts and accepts
money or other assets from customers in connection with such orders. Must be registered with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.”). The OCC authorized banks to become commodity exchange members as early as
1975, according to an unpublished letter cited in OCC Interpretative Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986), reprinted in
Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85, 604. See also 2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA, at 10-11, footnote 54.
22
Goldman’s principal commodities trading subsidiary.
62
Goldman initially directed J . Aron &
Co. to expand into the trading of interest rate and currency futures.
63
In 1982, the OCC explicitly authorized national banks to execute and clear trades in
futures contracts.
64
Both J PMorgan
65
and Morgan Stanley,
66
which were not then national banks
or regulated by the OCC, registered as FCMs that year. In 1983, the OCC took the next step and
authorized banks to execute and clear exchange-traded options.
67
That same year, the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), a leading U.S.
commodities exchange, introduced the first standardized futures contracts for crude oil and
heating oil.
68
They were the first energy-related futures traded on a regulated exchange.
Additional standardized futures contracts for natural gas and electricity products followed, and
futures and options trading expanded rapidly.
69
In 1986, the OCC issued a series of letters
interpreting the “business of banking” clause of the National Bank Act to permit national banks
to engage in a widening range of commodity-related trading activities.
70
Also in 1986, Chase Manhattan Bank and Koch Industries reportedly entered into the first
oil-related swap, introducing the concept of swaps linked to the price of a physical commodity.
71
62
See Goldman Sachs’ response to the Subcommittee questionnaire (8/8/2014); PSI-Goldman-11-000001, at 002.
63
See The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, Charles D. Ellis (Penguin Books 2008), at 252-254.
64
OCC Interpretive Letter (7/23/1982), unpublished.
65
See J P Morgan Futures Inc. FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=jSzQxZANWxY=&rn=Y. That FCM license was
withdrawn in 2011. Id. J P Morgan Securities LLC also holds the FCM license that Bear Stearns obtained in 1982.
See J P Morgan Securities LLC FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/Details.aspx?entityid=7YD6PX+m0vo=.
66
See Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=UpygXzt3Ct4=&rn=N.
67
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 260 (6/27/1983). See also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 896 (8/21/2000)(national
bank may purchase options on futures contracts on commodities to hedge the credit risk in its agricultural loan
portfolio).
68
See “NYMEX Energy Complex,” prepared by NYMEX, at 7,http://www.kisfutures.com/NYMEX-energy-
complex.pdf. See also, e.g., Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21
st
Century, Tom Bower (Grand Central
Publishing 2009), at 47.
69
See, e.g., David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, “The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem
of Market Power,” 53 B.C. L. Rev. 131, 152 (2012).
70
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 356 (1/7/1986) (authorizing a bank subsidiary to trade agricultural and
metal futures for clients seeking to hedge bank loans); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 372 (11/7/1986) (authorizing a
bank subsidiary to act as a broker-dealer and market maker for exchange-traded options for itself, its affiliated bank,
and clients); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986), reprinted in Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85,604
(authorizing a bank to provide margin financing to its clients to trade commodities; execute and clear client
transactions involving futures and options in gold, silver, or foreign currencies on exchanges and over the counter;
and direct a subsidiary to become a commodities exchange member). See also “Activities Permissible for a National
Bank, Cumulative,” prepared by the OCC (April 2012), at 57-64 (listing permissible derivative-based activities for
national banks).
71
See “Oil Derivatives: In the Beginning,” EnergyRisk magazine (J uly 2009), at 31,http://db.riskwaters.com/data/energyrisk/EnergyRisk/Energyrisk_0709/markets.pdf. The swap was a bilateral
contract in which, for a four-month period, one party agreed to make payments to the other for 25,000 barrels of oil
per month using a fixed price per barrel, while the other party agreed to make payments using the average monthly
spot price for oil.
23
Other commodity swaps followed, creating a rapidly expanding over-the-counter commodities
market in derivatives, separate and apart from the regulated commodity exchanges.
In 1987, in response to a request, the OCC authorized national banks to engage in
transactions involving commodity price index swaps.
72
The OCC authorized the activity even
though banks were still prohibited from directly investing in physical commodities.
73
A later
OCC Handbook explained:
“A national bank may also enter into derivative transactions as principal or agent when
the bank is acting as a financial intermediary for its customers and whether or not the
bank has the legal authority to purchase or sell the underlying instrument for its own
account. Accordingly, a national bank may enter into derivative transactions based on
commodities or equity securities, even though the bank may not purchase (or may be
restricted in purchasing) the underlying commodity or equity security for its own
account.”
74
At first, the OCC allowed banks to enter into commodity index swaps only on a “matched” basis
to offset risk,
75
but over time relaxed that as well as other, earlier restrictions.
76
In 1991, Goldman Sachs, again operating solely as an investment bank, launched the
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index whose value reflected price changes in a broad basket of
commodity futures.
77
Over the next few years, commodity index trading exploded, accompanied
by a sharp increase in futures trading used to hedge the index transactions.
78
Expansion into Physically-Settled Transactions. At the same time some commercial
and investment banks deepened their involvement with commodity-linked financial instruments,
some began increasing their involvement with physical commodities. One reason was that some
commodity futures contracts, including those involving crude oil, natural gas, and electricity,
allowed transactions to be settled financially or through physical delivery of the specified
72
See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987).
73
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 (9/13/1994), at 5.
74
“Risk Management of Financial Derivatives,” Comptroller’s Handbook (1997), at 68,http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/deriv.pdf.
75
See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987)(authorizing the bank to act as a principal in commodity price
index swaps with clients only on a “matched basis” in which the bank’s commodity price index contract with a
commodity “user” was offset by an index contract with a commodity “producer,” so that “the Bank would be
matched as to index, amount and maturity on each side of the transaction”).
76
See, e.g., OCC No-Objection Letter No. 90-1 (2/16/1990) , reprinted in Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 83,095
(authorizing the bank to engage as a principal in unmatched commodity index swaps with its clients so long as the
swaps were cash settled); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 507 (5/5/1990)(authorizing a bank subsidiary to execute all
types of commodity futures and options for all types of customers, whether or not hedging a bank loan); OCC
Interpretive Letter (3/2/1992)(authorizing bank to engage in unmatched commodity index swaps, warehouse the
swap contracts, and hedge them on a portfolio basis).
77
See “S&P GSCI Commodity Index,” prepared by Goldman Sachs,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-
do/securities/products-and-business-groups/products/gsci/. In 2007, Goldman Sachs transferred the index to
Standard & Poor’s. In 2012, the index was acquired by S&P Dow J ones Indices LLC, a subsidiary of The McGraw-
Hill Companies. See “Our History,” prepared by S&P Dow J ones Indices,http://us.spindices.com/about-sp-
indices/our-history/.
78
See, e.g., “Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market,” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-
155, report at 168-171.
24
commodity. Some banks wanted to be able to settle futures contracts through physical delivery,
contending that physical settlements would give them more flexibility, enable them to engage in
more effective hedging with lower risks and costs, and enable them to compete more effectively
in commodities markets.
79
In response, in 1993, the OCC issued an interpretive letter which greatly expanded the
ability of banks to engage in physical commodity transactions. The letter interpreted the banking
powers clause to allow national banks to hedge permissible banking activities by making or
taking “physical delivery of commodities,” including by taking or delivering documents
providing title to the commodities, such as warehouse receipts or warrants.
80
In addition, the
OCC explicitly authorized banks to engage in related physical commodity activities such as
“storing, transporting, and disposing of the commodities.”
81
The 1993 OCC letter stated that banks could use physically-settled transactions only to
“reduce risk” and only when they would “provide a more accurate hedge than available
exchange-traded or over-the counter transactions.”
82
The OCC required the physically-settled
transactions to be “customer-driven,” prohibited their use for “speculative purposes,” and stated
that they should constitute “only a nominal percentage of a bank’s hedging activities.”
83
To limit
the associated risks, the OCC required the bank to develop management expertise and internal
controls to ensure safe and sound banking practices, submit a “detailed plan” to the OCC, and
obtain “prior written authorization” by the OCC’s supervisory staff before going forward.
84
In 1995, the OCC issued another interpretive letter giving banks broad authority to
engage in physically-settled transactions involving metals, as well as to engage in “ancillary
activities” such as storing, transporting, and disposing of the physical commodities.
85
The OCC
expressed approval of banks taking delivery of the physical commodities through warehouse
receipts or transitory title transactions, noting that “n no case would the Bank take delivery by
receipt of physical quantities … on Bank premises.”
86
The OCC letter directed the bank to
establish risk management procedures in accordance with Banking Circular 277, which had been
issued earlier that year, and also required the bank to implement the additional safeguards first
identified in the 1993 letter.
87
At the time, the Federal Reserve chose not to follow the OCC’s lead in expanding bank
involvement with physical commodities. Instead, in 1997, while the Federal Reserve amended
79
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358, at 359-361; OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368,,at 372.
80
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358 at 358, 359.
81
Id. at 361. See also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 935 (5/14/2002), PSI-OCC-01-000170, at 173 (warning about
additional storage, transportation, environmental, and insurance risks posed by physical commodity transactions).
82
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358, at 358, 365.
83
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 at 368-369.
84
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358, at 358, 366.
85
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368,at 372-374. See also OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 1073 (10/19/2006), PSI-OCC-01-000425 (allowing banks and their foreign branches to engage in
“customer-driven, metal derivative transactions that settle in cash or by transitory title transfer”); OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 693(11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 (allowing banks to buy and sell physical copper).
86
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368, at 369.
87
Id. at 370, 373 - 374.
25
its Regulation Y to broaden the list of permissible bank holding company activities, it declined at
that point to grant bank holding companies broad authority to participate in physically-settled
commodity transactions.
88
Instead, the Federal Reserve continued to generally limit bank
holding companies to trading in cash-settled commodity transactions. Despite that setback,
banks continued to lobby for broader authority to conduct physical commodity transactions.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Expansion. More fundamental change came two years later, in
1999, when Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. That Act created the financial
holding company structure described earlier and authorized banks to affiliate with subsidiaries
engaged in a wider array of financial activities, including trading in commodities.
The law contained four provisions which dramatically increased the ability of banks,
through their financial holding companies, to engage in physical commodities transactions and
related businesses. First, the law allowed financial holding companies to engage in any activity
which the Federal Reserve determined was “financial in nature” or “incidental to a financial
activity.”
89
Second, the law enabled a financial holding company to engage directly in any
nonfinancial, commercial activity which the Federal Reserve determined to be “complementary”
to a financial activity.
90
The Federal Reserve later interpreted that provision to allow financial
holding companies to engage in activities involving physical commodities.
91
Third, the law
allowed financial holding companies to exercise so-called “merchant banking” authority to make
a temporary, passive equity investment in any type of commercial company, including firms
involved with physical commodities.
92
Finally, the law included a special grandfathering
provision that allowed certain financial firms that later became financial holding companies to
continue any commodities activities they had undertaken, directly or indirectly, in the United
States on or before September 30, 1997.
93
According to one analysis, “oon after the enactment of [the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act],
the largest U.S. [financial holding companies] began using their new powers to build physical
commodity trading businesses.”
94
By the time the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999, banks and bank holding
companies had already become interested in expanding their commodity activities for a number
of reasons. Earlier in the decade, Enron Corporation, then a leading U.S. energy company, had
popularized the concept of energy “commodities” that could be traded like stocks and futures.
From 1992 until its collapse in 2001, Enron convinced a number of large U.S. banks to finance
or participate in its energy commodity trades, including entering into over $8 billion in energy
trades with Citigroup and J PMorgan Chase Bank in transactions later exposed as hidden loans.
95
In 1999, Enron also launched an energy commodities electronic trading platform known as
88
62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9311 (Feb. 28, 1997).
89
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
90
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B). The law also defined “financial activity” by referencing the activities that the Federal
Reserve determined were “closely related to banking,” in Regulation Y. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(a).
91
See descriptions of Federal Reserve orders, below.
92
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
93
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act, adding § 4(o).
94
The Merchants of Wall Street, at 26.
95
See “The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse-Volume 1,” Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S.Hrg. 107-618, (J uly 23 and 30, 2002), at 231, 264.
26
EnronOnline to trade energy commodities involving natural gas and electricity.
96
By 2001,
EnronOnline was the leading U.S. energy trading platform.
97
After Enron’s collapse, the
platform was sold and later closed,
98
and some Enron traders were convicted of using the
platform and other schemes to manipulate electricity prices in the western United States.
99
Prior
to that ignoble end, however, Enron’s activities had hastened the development of energy
commodities and bank involvement with them.
Further Expansion. In 2000, Congress enacted the Commodities Futures Modernization
Act (CFMA) which, as explained earlier, barred all federal regulation of swaps, making it
difficult for federal bank regulators to restrict trading of commodity swaps by banks and their
holding companies.
100
The CFMA also barred CFTC oversight of energy and metal commodity
trades executed on electronic exchanges used by large traders.
101
That same year, several
investment banks, including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, joined with major oil
companies to establish the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), an electronic exchange specializing
in commodity-related swaps.
102
Over the next decade, ICE would grow into a leading
commodities exchange.
Around the same time, some banks and financial holding companies began to deepen
their involvement with electricity markets. Beginning in 2002, the OCC issued a series of
interpretive letters expanding bank authority to participate in electricity derivatives and related
businesses. Among other measures, the OCC allowed banks to hedge their transactions by
taking title to electricity commodities,
103
acquire royalty interests in energy reserves, and use
96
For more information about Enron Online, see “Asleep At the Switch: FERC’s Oversight of Enron Corporation,”
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S.Hrg. 107-854, (November 12, 2002), Volumes I-IV, at 238-245.
97
Id. at 238.
98
In 2002, Enron’s trading business was purchased by UBS Warburg, which closed it less than a year later. See,
e.g., “UBS Closing Trading Floor It Acquired From Enron,” New York Times, David Barboza (11/21/2002),http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/21/business/ubs-closing-trading-floor-it-acquired-from-
enron.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.
99
For more information about Enron’s manipulation of electricity prices, see “Asleep At the Switch: FERC’s
Oversight of Enron Corporation,” U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S.Hrg. 107-854, (November 12,
2002), Volumes I-IV, 251-260.
100
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Title I, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, P.L. 106-554.
101
See Section 2(h)(3) of the Commodity Exchange Act, added by CFMA, codified at 7 U.S.C. §2(h)(3). This
exemption was known as the “Enron loophole,” because it was included in CFMA at the request of Enron and
others, and once in place, exempted from federal oversight the energy and metals contracts traded on Enron Online.
See “Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 110-
235 (6/24 and 7/9/2007), at 204, 246-247. The Enron Loophole was later closed. See CFTC Reauthorization Act of
2008, Title XIII of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246 (2008); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
102
See “U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Recent Policy Has Increased Costs to Consumers but Not Overall U.S.
Energy Security,” Minority Staff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Prt. 108-18 (3/5/2003), at
42-43; information provided by Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee (9/29/2014). The firms who
formed ICE were BP Petroleum, Dean Witter, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Royal Dutch/Shell
Group, SG Investment Bank, and Totalfina Elf Group. The OCC also issued several interpretive letters allowing
banks to become members of ICE, ICE Europe, and ICE Trust. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No.1113
(3/4/2009); OCC Interpretive Letter No.1116 (5/6/2009); OCC Interpretive Letter No.1122 (7/30/2009).
103
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 937 (6/27/2002)(allowing banks to engage in customer-driven, cash-settled
derivatives based on electricity prices and in related hedging activities); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 962
(4/21/2003) (allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven, electricity derivative transactions that involve transfer
27
reserve royalty payments to repay loans extended to the reserve owner.
104
The OCC also
authorized national banks to make merchant banking investments in energy-related
businesses.
105
Along the way, the OCC continued to approve bank requests to deal in additional
types of commodities.
106
Still another change came as commercial and investment banks began to devise new
types of securities whose values were linked to commodities. Those securities could then be
traded on U.S. stock exchanges rather than on the less well known and more expensive
commodity exchanges. In some cases, the security explicitly referenced a specific commodity
future; in other cases, it referenced a broad-based index. In still other cases, the value of the
security was supported by an inventory of commodity futures or an inventory of physical
commodities. For example, the first commodity-based Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) in the
United States,
107
backed by gold futures, was traded on the New York Stock Exchange in
November 2004.
108
Since then, multiple ETFs backed by commodity futures or physical
commodities have been approved.
109
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also
approved the trading of futures and options referencing commodity-based ETFs.
110
Designing,
selling, and trading commodity-based securities further deepened bank involvement with
commodities.
of title to electricity”); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1025 (4/6/2005) (allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven
electricity derivative transactions and hedges, settled in cash and by transitory title transfer”).
104
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1117 (5/19/2009) (allowing banks to issue credit to an electricity producer in
return for receiving a limited royalty interest in the producer’s hydrocarbon reserves and receiving payments from
the energy produced from those reserves over a stated term, so-called “Volumetric Production Payment” loans). See
also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1071 (9/6/2006) (allowing banks to become members of Independent Systems
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations that oversee electricity transactions).
105
See, e.g., OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2005-3 (7/20/2005)(construction and operation
of ethanol plant); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2008-1 (7/31/2008)(development of solar
energy facilities); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2009-6 (12/16/2009)(installation of
photovoltaic systems in low-income housing); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2011-2
(12/15/2011)(construction of wind turbines).
106
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1040 (9/15/2005)(allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven
physically settled derivative transactions in emission allowances”); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1060
(4/26/2006)(allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven coal derivative transactions that settle in cash or by
transitory title transfer and that are hedged on a portfolio basis with derivative and spot transactions that settle in
cash or by transitory title transfer”)(emphasis in original); OCC Interpretive Letter No.1065 (7/24/2006)(allowing
banks to engage in cash-settled derivative transactions referencing “petroleum products, agricultural oils, grains and
grain derivatives, seeds, fibers, foodstuffs, livestock/meat products, metals, wood products, plastics and fertilizer”).
107
For more information on exchange traded funds, see NYSE Explanation of ETFs,http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ETFs7109.pdf, or SEC statement regarding ETFs,http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm.
108
See NYSE Information Memo Number 04–59 (November 18, 2004) (trading of streetTRACKS Gold
Shares: Rules 1300 and 1301); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50603 (October 28, 2004),
69 FR 64614 (November 5, 2004) (approval of the listing and trading of streetTRACKS Gold Shares). See also
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1013 (1/7/2005)(authorizing banks to buy and sell ETF shares); 9/30/2010 CFTC
“Request for Comment on Options for a Proposed Exemptive Order Relating to the Trading and Clearing of
Precious Metal Commodity-Based ETFs; Concept Release,” 75 FR 189, at 60412.
109
See “Excessive Speculation and Compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act,” Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S Hrg. 112-313 (11/3/2011), at 176-178.
110
See, e.g., 9/30/2010 CFTC “Request for Comment on Options for a Proposed Exemptive Order Relating to the
Trading and Clearing of Precious Metal Commodity-Based ETFs; Concept Release,” 75 FR 189, at 60412.
28
Commodity Price Rise. Still another factor motivating bank involvement with
commodities was that, beginning in 2000, commodity prices began a sharp and sustained
increase, which continued to accelerate for years.
111
According to the World Bank, between
2003 and 2008, “[a]verage commodity prices doubled in U.S. dollar terms (in part boosted by
dollar depreciation), making this boom longer and stronger than any boom in the 20th
century.”
112
While some have attributed that price rise to market forces of supply and demand,
others have attributed a portion of it to increased commodity speculation fueled by banks and
securities firms trading in U.S. commodities markets. In addition, commodity price volatility
increased over the same period,
113
inviting commodity speculators like the banks to profit from
the price changes.
114
Federal Reserve Expansion. As banks continued to trade financial instruments linked
to commodities, they also continued to lobby the Federal Reserve to loosen its restrictions on
bank holding companies, in particular with respect to physical commodities. In 2003, the
Federal Reserve amended Regulation Y to give bank holding companies more leeway in
physically settled transactions. The amended rule allowed the holding companies to participate
in commodity trades which required them to take or make delivery of documents giving title to
physical commodities on an “instantaneous pass-through basis,” so long as the underlying assets
were approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
115
The Federal Reserve also eliminated
a requirement that holding companies enter into only those commodity contracts that explicitly
permitted financial settlements or terminations. At the same time, like the OCC, the Federal
Reserve continued to discourage holding companies from actually taking possession of the
physical commodities involved in the trades.
116
In addition, beginning in 2003, in response to individual applications, the Federal
Reserve issued a series of orders granting major financial holding companies permission under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to deal in a much wider array of physical commodity activities. In
those orders, the Federal Reserve determined that the activities requested by the financial holding
companies were “complementary” to their trading in commodity derivatives.
117
The earliest order explicitly allowed financial holding companies to buy and sell oil,
natural gas, agricultural products, and other commodities in the physical spot market, and to take
and make delivery of physical commodities to settle commodity-linked derivative
111
See The Merchants of Wall Street, at 300.
112
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads,
DFw47.pdf.
113
See “Speculators and Commodity Prices - Redux”, CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton (February 24, 2012),http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement022412; see also “Global Commodity Markets
– Price Volatility and Financialisation”, Alexandra Dwyer, George Gardner and Thomas Williams (J une, 2011),http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/jun/pdf/bu-0611-7.pdf.
114
See “Derivatives, Innovation in the Era of Financial Deregulation”, Wallace Turbeville (J une, 2013), at 18,
115
68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (7/3/2003); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B).
116
Id. The amended Regulation Y explicitly required holding companies to make “every reasonable effort to avoid
taking or making delivery of the asset underlying the contract.” Alternatively, it allowed financial companies to
participate in instantaneous title transfers to the underlying assets only “by operation of contract and without taking
or making physical delivery of the asset.” 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B)(3) and (4).
117
For more information on the individual orders, see below.
29
transactions.
118
A later order allowed a financial holding company to contract with a third party
to “refine, blend, or otherwise alter” its physical commodities, essentially authorizing it to sell
crude oil to an oil refinery and buy back the refined oil products.
119
The order also allowed the
financial holding company to enter into long-term electricity supply contracts with large
industrial and commercial customers, and to enter into “tolling agreements” and “energy
management” agreements with power generators.
120
Together, these orders explicitly permitted
banks, through their financial holding companies, to engage in a broader set of physical
commodity activities than ever before in U.S. banking history.
To minimize the accompanying risks, the orders also required the relevant financial
holding company to make a number of commitments to limit the size and scope of its physical
commodities activities. For example, each financial holding company had to commit that the
market value of its commodities holdings resulting from trading activities would not exceed 5%
of its consolidated Tier I capital, and that the company would alert the Federal Reserve if and
when the market value exceeded 4%.
121
Despite those and other commitments, the financial
holding companies given complementary authority were able to use that authority to dramatically
increase their physical commodity operations over time.
Financial Crisis Expansion. In 2008, as the financial crisis deepened in the United
States and several large U.S. financial institutions declared bankruptcy or teetered on the edge of
insolvency, U.S. bank acquisitions of weaker financial institutions as well as the sudden
conversion of investment banks into bank holding companies led to even greater U.S. bank
involvement with physical commodities.
In March 2008, for example, essentially at the request of the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan
acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (Bear Stearns), a large investment bank that was then
nearly insolvent.
122
At the time, Bear Stearns had extensive physical commodity holdings,
including commodities that it traded in the spot markets, oil refineries, and power plants.
123
Through its acquisition of Bear Stearns, J PMorgan gained control of all of those physical
commodity activities.
118
2003 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Citigroup, Inc., 89 Fed. Res. Bull., at 508 (12/2003) (hereinafter
“Citigroup Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdf.
119
2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60 (2008)
(hereinafter “RBS Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf.
120
Id. A tolling agreement typically allows the “toller” to make periodic payments to a power plant owner to cover
the plant’s operating costs plus a fixed profit margin in exchange for the right to all or part of the plant’s power
output. As part of the agreement, the toller typically supplies or pays for the fuel used to run the plant. Id. at C64.
An energy management agreement typically requires the “energy manager” to act as a financial intermediary for the
power plant, substituting its own credit and liquidity for the power plant to facilitate the power plant’s business
activities. The energy manager also typically supplies market information and advice to support the power plant’s
efforts. Id. at C65.
121
See, e.g., Citigroup Order,http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdf.
122
See “Bear Stearns, J PMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,” press release issued by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm.
123
See, e.g., 7/2008 Federal Reserve Supervisory Plan, Risk Assessment Program & Institutional Overview of
J PMorgan Chase & Co., FRB-PSI-305013 (identifying Bear Stearns assets being integrated into J PMorgan).
30
Six months later, in September 2008, after Lehman Brothers failed, the Federal Reserve
gave immediate approval to applications from both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to
become bank holding companies with access to Federal Reserve lending programs.
124
Both
firms also elected to become financial holding companies authorized to engage in a broad array
of financial activities. At the time of their conversions, both were heavily invested in a wide
array of physical commodities and related businesses.
125
Four months after that, in J anuary 2009, again in response to the turmoil created by the
financial crisis, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, a troubled investment bank with $650
billion in assets.
126
The acquisition gave Bank of America control over Merrill Lynch’s
extensive commodity holdings, which the bank estimated at “roughly ten times the size” of its
own commodity operations.
127
The new assets included Merrill Lynch’s substantial holdings in
North American physical natural gas and electrical power markets.
128
In 2010, Goldman and J PMorgan participated in additional acquisitions that further
deepened their involvement with physical commodities. In February 2010, Goldman acquired
Metro International, a company with a worldwide network of commodity storage warehouses.
129
Later that year, in two separate transactions, J PMorgan acquired the Royal Bank of Scotland’s
51% ownership stake in RBS Sempra, a joint venture with extensive North American and
European energy and commodity operations involving oil, natural gas, metals, and power
plants.
130
As part of that acquisition, J PMorgan also took ownership of Henry Bath Inc. which,
like Metro International, owned a worldwide network of commodity storage warehouses.
131
From 2009 to 2011, Goldman and J PMorgan extended their reach again, acquiring
ownership stakes in the London Metals Exchange (LME), the leading futures market in metals.
124
See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies, 94 FED. RES. BULL.
C101, C102 (2008), 2008 WL 7861871, at *4 (order approving Goldman Sachs Group’s request to become a BHC
upon conversion of Goldman Bank to a state chartered bank); Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding
Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 94 FED. RES. BULL. C103, C105 (2008),
2008 WL 7861872, at *5 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Sept. 21, 2008) (order approving Morgan Stanley’s request to become a
BHC upon conversion of Morgan Stanley Bank to a bank).
125
See histories of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, below.
126
See 5/4/2010 letter from Bank of America’s legal counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, to the Federal
Reserve providing notice of the bank’s intent to engage in an expanded set of physical commodity activities as a
result of its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, FRB-PSI-500001 - 218, at 013 [sealed exhibit].
127
Id. at 020-021.
128
Id. at 020.
129
See 9/12/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-06-000001 - 021, at 017 (Exhibit C); “Goldman and J PMorgan Enter Metal Warehousing,” Financial
Times, By J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kXv0R8iX. Compare Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2010, at Exhibit 21.1 (including “Metro International Trade Services LLC” as a subsidiary of GS
Power Holdings LLC), with Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009, at
Exhibit 21.1 (not listing GS Power Holdings LLC or Metro International as significant subsidiaries of Goldman
Sachs).
130
J PMorgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, at 184,http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000163/corp10k2011.htm#s50873
1DA912EFDF440782294EA306391.
131
See 7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completed commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/detail/1277505237241.
31
Together, the two banks, through their financial holding companies, became the LME’s largest
shareholders until, in 2012, the shareholders sold the LME to a Hong Kong exchange.
132
Bank Commodities Involvement Today. Today, a handful of large U.S. banks, directly
and through their financial holding companies, are major participants in global commodity
markets. In recent years, J PMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley were the three largest
U.S. participants in physical commodities.
133
Bank of America, Barclays, and Citi were the next
largest participants.
134
Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, and BNP followed them.
135
The largest of those banks, through their financial holding companies, were among the
largest commodity traders in the world and dominated the U.S. commodities futures, options and
swaps markets. OCC data shows that, in 2013, of the commercial banks it tracked, four U.S.
banks – J PMorgan, Bank of America, Citi, and Goldman Sachs – accounted for more than 90%
of commodities derivatives trading and holdings within the U.S. commercial banking system.
136
OCC data also shows that, for all U.S. insured banks over the last five years, the total notional
dollar value of their outstanding commodity contracts, including futures, exchange traded
options, over-the-counter options, forwards, and swaps, has centered around $1 trillion:
NOTIONAL VALUE OF COMMODITY CONTRACTS
137
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Notional value
of commodity
contracts
$979 billion
$1.195 trillion
$1.501 trillion
$1.402 trillion
$1.241 trillion
Source: OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013, Graph 3
132
See, e.g., 6/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMC-11-000001 - 002, at 001;
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001 -
011, at 003, 004; “HKEx and LME announce completion of transaction,” prepared by Hong Kong Exchanges and
Clearing Limited (HKEx) and LME Holdings Limited (12/6/2012),http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-
events/press-releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-announce-completion-of-transaction/.
133
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). Royal Bank of Scotland, which sold its major
commodity holdings to J PMorgan, is no longer active in physical commodity activities in the United States. Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. According to the Federal Reserve, Deutsche Bank has indicated that it is planning to exit its U.S. physical
commodities activities. Id. In August 2014, Deutsche Bank sold certain commodity-related assets to Morgan
Stanley. 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 002. Wells
Fargo acquired its physical commodity activities through its acquisition of Wachovia Bank, which had a Federal
Reserve order to engage in them; Wells Fargo has indicated it plans to continue to engage in physical commodity
activities to a limited extent. Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). According to the Federal
Reserve, Royal Bank of Scotland, which sold its major commodity holdings to J PMorgan in 2010, is no longer
conducting physical commodity activities in the United States. In contrast, BNP engages in physical commodity
activities to a limited extent in the United States. Id. Fortis, which had a Federal Reserve order allowing it to
engage in physical commodity activities, was acquired by ABN Amro Bank which, according to the Federal
Reserve, no longer operates in the United States. Id. UBS and Societe General, each of which had a Federal
Reserve order to engage in physical commodities, no longer engage in those activities, again according to the
Federal Reserve. Id.
136
See OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013, at 1, Graph 4 and 5A,
Tables 1, 2, 9 and 10,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
137
Data is taken from OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013, at
Graph 3,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
32
The data indicates that the dollar value of the banks’ commodity contracts peaked in 2011 at $1.5
trillion, and while it has since declined, the value still exceeds $1.2 trillion.
The physical commodity activities of the four key banks and their financial holding
companies comprise a relatively small percentage of their total commodities activities, which
remain dominated by financial instruments traded on exchanges or over the counter. Public data
depicting the actual size and value of their physical commodities holdings is, however, limited.
One of the few sources of public data is the FR Y-9C report, a quarterly report which bank
holding companies with consolidated assets of $500 million or more are required to file with the
Federal Reserve, providing specified financial information. One of the required information
items is the gross market value of any physical commodities held by the bank holding company
in its trading inventory.
138
The data provided on the FR Y-9C report offers a limited but useful measure of bank
holding company involvement with physical commodities. As one analyst explained:
“The gross market value of FHCs’ physical commodity trading inventory … measures
solely their current exposure to commodity price risk. It does not provide a full picture of
these organizations’ actual involvement in the business of producing, extracting,
processing, transporting, or storing physical commodities.”
139
Despite this limitation, the FR Y-9C reports filed by the holding companies featured in this
Report indicate that, in each of the last five years, the physical commodity holdings in their
trading inventories had a total dollar value of $3 to $26 billion:
GROSS FAIR VALUE OF PHYSICAL COMMODITY TRADING INVENTORIES
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Goldman
Sachs
$3.7 billion $13.1 billion $5.8 billion $11.7 billion $4.6 billion
J PMorgan $10.0 billion
$21.0 billion $26.0 billion $16.2 billion $10.2 billion
Morgan
Stanley
$5.3 billion $6.8 billion $9.7 billion $7.3 billion $3.3 billion
Source: Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, FR Y-9C Reports, Schedule HC-D, Item
M.9.a.(2).
140
138
See “Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies - FR Y-9C,” Schedule HC-D (“Trading
Assets and Liabilities”), Item M.9.a.(2) (“the “Gross Fair Value of Physical Commodities held in Inventory”) for
each bank.
Publicly traded companies provide the same information in their quarterly 10-Q filings with the SEC.
139
The Merchants of Wall Street, at 30 [citations omitted].
140
See National Information Center website –http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20091231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20101231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20111231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20121231.PDF, at 24;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20131231.PDF, at 25;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20091231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20101231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20111231.PDF, at 23;
33
This FR Y-9C data also shows that the value of the physical commodity trading
inventories at the three institutions has fluctuated from year to year, and that their trading
inventories comprised only a small part of the financial holding companies’ overall commodity
activities. That the data provides only a partial picture can be seen by comparing the reported
figures against estimated values used by the Federal Reserve during its special review of bank
involvement with physical commodities. In 2011, for example, a Federal Reserve examination
team estimated that the physical commodity activities at Goldman Sachs had a total value of $26
billion, a total four times greater the $5.8 billion reported by the company on the FR Y-9C report
for 2011.
141
Whether the individual financial holding companies’ physical commodities activities are
valued at billions or tens of billions of dollars, the bottom line is that they are substantial. They
include involvement with metals warehouses, oil storage facilities, oil tankers, oil and gas
pipelines, natural gas facilities, electrical power plants, gold and coal mines, and uranium. Bank
holding companies are supplying crude oil to refineries, jet fuel to airlines, natural gas to
manufacturers, coal to power plants, and electricity to regional power authorities.
The evidence indicates that this substantial level of bank involvement with physical
commodities is a relatively recent phenomenon that has grown significantly in only the last ten
years. The posture of the financial holding companies stands in sharp contrast to the
longstanding U.S. principle against mixing banking with commerce. The current level of bank
involvement with critical raw materials, power generation, and the food supply appears to be
unprecedented in U.S. history.
In the last year, some financial holding companies have taken steps to reduce their
involvement with physical commodities. In 2013, J PMorgan, Morgan Stanley, and Deutsche
Bank announced plans to sell the bulk of their physical commodities businesses; in 2014, all
three sold major holdings.
142
Those actions may have been in response to declining profits in the
commodities field, as well as Federal Reserve pressure to reduce some activities. In contrast,
although Goldman Sachs announced plans to sell a certain portion of its physical commodity
activities, it also informed the Federal Reserve that it planned to continue to pursue physicalhttp://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20121231.PDF, at 24;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20131231.PDF, at 25;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20091231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20101231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20111231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20121231.PDF, at 24;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20131231.PDF, at 25
141
2011 Work Plan, at FRB-PSI-200455, at 465.
142
See, e.g., 9/9/2014 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to Sell TransMontaigne Ownership Stake to
NGL Energy Partners,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/fc833211-9eeb-4616-87ff-
3024b89db7b1.html; 3/19/2014 Mercuria press release, “Mercuria Announces Acquisition of J .P. Morgan Physical
Commodities Business,”http://www.mercuria.com/media-room/business-news/mercuria-announces-acquisition-jp-
morgan-physical-commodities-business; 12/5/2013 Deutsche Bank press release, “Deutsche Bank refocuses its
commodities business,”https://www.db.com/ir/en/content/ir_releases_2013_4413.htm.
34
commodities as a core business line.
143
In addition, other banks, such as Bank of America, have
pending requests to increase their physical commodity activities.
144
B. Risks Associated with Bank Involvement in Physical Commodities
Increased U.S. bank involvement with physical commodities has evolved despite a
longstanding U.S. principle discouraging national banks from operating commercial enterprises.
Multiple concerns have been articulated over the years in support of separating banking from
commerce. In the case of physical commodities, at least seven different concerns have been
identified when banks own or control substantial physical commodities and related businesses:
(1) it provides banks with unfair economic and informational advantages; (2) it distorts credit
decisionmaking; (3) it creates conflicts of interest between banks and their clients; (4) it invites
market manipulation and excessive commodity speculation; (5) it creates inappropriate bank and
systemic risks; (6) it creates undue concentrations of economic power; and (7) it intensifies the
too-big-to-fail problem by creating financial conglomerates that are too big to manage or
regulate.
Unfair Economic Advantages. One key concern with mixing banking and commerce is
that it may provide banks, through their financial holding companies and subsidiaries, with
unfair economic or informational advantages compared to other commercial competitors.
Most banks have access to low cost financing through either the Federal Reserve’s
lending programs or interbank loans bearing low interest rates. National banks have federally
insured deposits, and some are also perceived as too big to fail, factors that generally lower their
lending costs. Nonbank businesses typically do not have the same access to low cost financing,
giving banks a competitive advantage when they operate commercial enterprises.
One expert described the problem this way:
“The growth of big banks is a case of too much of a good thing metastasizing into a bad
thing. What started out with a limited safety net designed to protect the payments system
and to provide a safe place for small, unsophisticated depositors to place their savings has
morphed into an anticompetitive system where government subsidized banks can use
unfair advantage to enter and dominate any market or business, financial or nonfinancial,
that they choose.”
145
143
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). See also, e.g., “Goldman Sachs Stands Firm as
Banks Exit Commodity Trading,” Bloomberg, Ambereen Choudhury (4/23/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...ds-firm-as-banks-exit-commodity-trading.html.
144
See 5/4/2010 letter from Bank of America legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-500001 - 218 (requesting
complementary authority to engage in an expanded set of physical commodity activities as a result of its acquisition
of Merrill Lynch). In addition, in 2012, Toronto Dominion Bank requested complementary authority to engage in
certain physical commodity activities involving natural gas, but has since withdrawn that request. 10/2/2012 letter
from Toronto Dominion Bank legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-500219 – 681; 11/17/2014 email from the
Federal Reserve to the Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002, at 002. Despite the passage of four years, the
Bank of America request remains pending at the Federal Reserve.
145
Rosner Testimony, at 15.
35
In a 2013 editorial opposing bank involvement in commodity speculation, a business
publication wrote:
“The largest U.S. banks are accused of causing problems in markets ranging from energy
to aluminum. … Why are the banks in these businesses in the first place?
Part of the answer is that they’re among the country’s most subsidized enterprises. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Federal Reserve, both backed by taxpayers,
provide an explicit subsidy by ensuring that banks can borrow money in times of market
turmoil. Banks that are big and connected enough to bring down the economy enjoy an
added implicit subsidy: Creditors will lend to them at low rates on the assumption that
the government won’t let them fail. …
Congress could … strictly limit all federally insured banks to the business of taking
deposits, lending, and processing payments.”
146
Unfair Informational Advantages. In addition to low cost financing, major banks that,
through subsidiaries or financial holding company affiliates, own pipelines, warehouses,
shipping operations, or refineries are likely to acquire commercially useful, non-public
information that could benefit their trading activities and perhaps lead to unfair trading
advantages.
Useful non-public information could come from the bank’s own operations or from
observing or assisting actions taken by clients, and include a wide variety of types of data,
including information about commodity price trends, upcoming large transactions, supply
disruptions, transport flows, or regulatory actions. That physical commodity activities can
provide access to commercially valuable non-public information has long been recognized by
both market participants and regulators. In a 2005 application seeking authority to engage in
physical commodity activities, for example, J PMorgan stated that the activities would:
“position J PM Chase in the supply end of the commodities markets, which in turn will
provide access to information regarding the full array of actual produce and end-user
activity in those markets. The information gathered through this increased market
participation will help improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply
vital price and risk management information that J PM Chase can use to improve its
financial commodities derivative offerings.”
147
146
“The Wrong Business for Big Banks,” Bloomberg Businessweek (8/1/2013),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-01/bloomberg-view-the-wrong-business-for-big-banks.
147
7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000004, at 016. See also 12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” PSI-
FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033, at 019 - 020, 032 (“The Complementary Activities will further complement the
Existing Business by providing J PMVEC [J PMorgan’s subsidiary] with important market information. The ability
to be involved in the supply end of the commodities markets through tolling agreements provides access to
information regarding the full array of actual producer and end-user activity in those markets.”).
36
A Federal Reserve analysis of the physical commodity activities conducted by Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs also noted the informational advantage those activities produced:
“In addition to the financial return, these direct investments provide MS [Morgan
Stanley] and GS [Goldman Sachs] with important asymmetrical information on
conditions in the physical markets such as production and supply/demand information,
etc., which a market participant without physical global infrastructure would not
necessarily be privy to.”
148
Since U.S. commodities laws do not currently prohibit using non-public information in
commodities trading in the same way that U.S. securities laws restrict the use of non-public
information in securities transactions, banks can legally obtain and use nonpublic information to
trade in the commodity futures, swaps, and options markets. For example, a bank whose affiliate
has a controlling interest in a refinery could quickly learn of a pending shutdown due to technical
problems and use that inside information to profit from a short position in the commodity
markets. A bank with an affiliate that controls a shipping operation could find out when bad
weather has delayed deliveries and, again, use that information legally to profit in the
commodities markets from shorting prices. Concerns about unfair trading advantages deepen
when the commodities trader is a large financial institution drawing on client data and its own
commodity activities to profit from counterparties.
Those types of unfair informational advantages would not apply to banks whose affiliates
do not own or control physical commodities or related businesses.
Credit Distortions. A second problem with mixing banking and commerce is the
concern that it may distort bank decisions about extending credit to businesses.
The concern is that, if a bank’s affiliate owns or controls a business that handles physical
commodities, the bank may not only extend credit to that business on favorable terms, but also
deny credit to its competitors. A bank that owns or profits from a solar power plant, for
example, may view any request for financing made by that firm in a favorable light. In contrast,
the bank may be reluctant to provide financing to a rival solar power generator or may agree to
lend funds only on more expensive terms. Because of its commercial involvement, the bank’s
credit decisions may no longer utilize objective lending criteria, but may be distorted by the
bank’s desire to see a particular business succeed.
One expert has warned that distorted credit decisions create a number of risks:
“A bank may extend credit to a company in which it has an ownership interest,
independent of the company’s creditworthiness, to assist the company and increase the
value of its stock. Such an extension would conflict with the interest of its depositors, its
safety and soundness, and the integrity of the deposit insurance fund. Further, rival
148
Undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 439 [sealed exhibit].
37
companies, unaffiliated with the banking organization, might be subject to unfair credit
terms.”
149
A related concern is that distorted credit determinations will not be limited to the
enterprises owned or controlled by the bank’s affiliates, but may extend to other businesses as
well. In one scenario, if a bank has an ownership interest in a particular commodity-related
business, it may seek to guide related business opportunities to other clients in which the bank
has invested or provided financing. For example, if the bank’s solar power plant needed
manufacturing equipment, the bank might recommend a manufacturer that has an outstanding
loan with the bank.
The Supreme Court recognized similar problems in a 1971 decision which overturned an
OCC interpretive letter allowing bank subsidiaries to form and sell shares in mutual funds. The
Court identified a litany of “hazards” that could unfold from that business, including credit
problems:
“ince public confidence is essential to the solvency of a bank, there might exist a
natural temptation [by the bank] to shore up the affiliate through unsound loans or other
aid. Moreover, the pressure to sell a particular investment and to make the affiliate
successful might create a risk that the bank would make its credit facilities more freely
available to those companies in whose stock or securities the affiliate has invested or
become otherwise involved. … The bank might exploit its confidential relationship with
its commercial and industrial creditors for the benefit of the [mutual] fund. ... The bank
might make loans to facilitate the purchase of interests in the fund.”
150
The Supreme Court summarized this set of concerns by warning that a bank’s ownership interest
in its affiliate “might impair its ability to function as an impartial source of credit.”
151
Conflicts of Interest. A third problem with mixing banking and commerce is that it
invites conflicts of interest between a bank and its clients. In the case of physical commodities,
those conflicts can arise in multiple settings. If the bank’s affiliate owns a solar power plant, for
example, it may put that plant’s financing interests before those of a client with a rival power
plant. If the bank’s affiliate owns a metals warehouse and the bank trades metals in the futures
market, the bank may time the release of the warehoused metal in ways that benefit the bank’s
own commodities positions and contrary to the interests of its clients. If a bank’s affiliate
supplies crude oil to a refinery while the bank trades oil futures, the bank may delay its oil
deliveries to restrict the supply and boost oil prices in the futures market, increasing the value of
its long positions while decreasing the value of the short positions held by its counterparties.
149
Shull, at 40. See also id. at 58 (“Will [small and new businesses] have less access to credit than rivals who are
affiliated with banks, and, when they obtain credit, will their rates be higher? … Will higher rates compel most
businesses to affiliate with banks if they can?”); Rosner Testimony at 12 (describing a “risk that a bank may choose
to deny lending or underwriting to a competitor of their commercial affiliate … [or] may choose to lend, at
preferential rates, to a commercial affiliate … [or] may, legally or illegally, tie loans to the purchase of a commercial
affiliate’s products”).
150
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631-632 (1971).
151
Id. at 631.
38
Possible conflicts of interest permeate virtually every type of commodity activity. If the
bank’s affiliate leases an electrical power plant, the bank may attempt to use regional pricing
conventions to boost its profits, even at the expense of clients that pay the higher electricity
costs. If the bank’s affiliate mines coal while the bank trades coal swaps, the bank may ask its
affiliate to store the coal rather than sell it to help restrict supplies, and benefit from long swap
positions, while causing its counterparties to incur losses. If the bank’s affiliate operates a
commodity-based exchange traded fund backed by gold, the bank may ask the affiliate to release
some of the gold into the marketplace and lower gold prices, so that the bank can profit from a
short position in gold futures or swaps, even if some clients hold long positions.
Market Manipulation. A fourth problem with mixing banking and commerce is that, in
the context of physical commodities, it invites market manipulation and excessive speculation in
commodity prices. If a bank’s affiliate owns or controls a metals warehouse, oil pipeline, a coal
shipping operation, refinery, grain elevator, or exchange traded fund backed by physical
commodities, the bank has the means to affect the marginal supply of a commodity and can use
those means to benefit the bank’s physical or financial commodities trading positions. If a
bank’s affiliate controls a power plant, the bank can “manipulate the availability of energy for
advantage” or to obtain higher profits.
152
In recent years, banks and their holding companies have settled allegations of price
manipulation by paying substantial fines and legal fees. In J uly 2013, for example, J PMorgan
paid $410 million to settle FERC charges that it used multiple pricing schemes to manipulate the
price of electricity produced by power plants it controlled in California and Michigan, in a matter
explained in more detail below.
153
That same month, FERC charged Barclays Bank with
manipulating electricity prices in California from 2006 to 2008, in order to benefit its swap
positions in other markets, directing it to disgorge $35 million plus interest and pay a penalty
totaling $435 million.
154
Specifically, FERC alleged that Barclays and its traders “engaged in a
coordinated scheme to manipulate trading at four electricity trading points in the Western United
States … by engaging in loss-generating trading of next-day fixed-price physical electricity on
the IntercontinentalExchange … to benefit Barclays’ financial swap positions in those
markets.”
155
Barclays is contesting both the charges and penalty.
152
Rosner Testimony, at 12.
153
See “FERC, J P Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,” FERC News
Release (7/30/2013).
154
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041
(7/16/2013). The CFTC has also charged hedge funds with market manipulation, demonstrating that financial firms
have the means to manipulate commodity futures and swap prices. See, e.g., CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC,
Case No. 07-CV-6682 (DC) (S.D.N.Y.)(7/25/2007); “Amaranth Entities Ordered to Pay a $7.5 Million Civil Fine in
CFTC Action Alleging Attempted Manipulation of Natural Gas Futures Prices,” CFTC Press Release No. 5692-09
(8/12/2013)( describing how, in 2009, the CFTC collected $7.5 million in fines from a hedge fund, Amaranth
Advisors LLC, and its Canadian subsidiary, for attempted manipulation of natural gas futures prices in 2006); CFTC
v. Moncada, Case No. 09-CV-8791 (S.D.N.Y.)(12/4/2012)(describing how, in 2012, the CFTC charged two related
hedge funds, BES Capital LLC and Serdika LLC, with attempted manipulation of wheat futures prices in 2009; they
are contesting the charges).
155
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order To Show Cause and Notice of Proposed Penalty,
141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (10/31/2012). For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with
electricity, below.
39
In another case the prior year, in J anuary 2013, Deutsche Bank settled FERC charges that
it, too, had manipulated electricity prices.
156
FERC alleged that Deutsche Bank had “engag[ed]
in a scheme in which [it] entered into physical transactions to benefit its financial position,”
identifying occasions in 2010 in which the bank made physical electricity trades to offset losses
in electricity-related financial instruments held by the bank.
157
Deutsche Bank admitted the
facts, but neither admitted or denied the violations of law, while paying disgorged profits and a
civil penalty totaling over $1.6 million. In still another case, involving agricultural commodities
rather than electricity, the CFTC reached a settlement, in 2014, with FirstRand Bank, Ltd. of
South Africa on charges of “executing unlawful prearranged, noncompetitive trades involving
corn and soybean futures contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).”
158
The CFTC
found:
“[O]n several occasions, from J une 2009 to August 2011, FirstRand and another foreign-
based company entered into prearranged noncompetitive trades involving CBOT corn
and soybean futures contracts. Before these trades were entered on the CBOT,
employees for FirstRand and the other company had telephonic conferences with each
other during which they agreed upon the contract, quantity, price, direction, and timing of
those trades. These prearranged trades negated market risk and price competition and
constituted fictitious sales, in violation of the [Commodities Exchange Act].”
159
To settle the charges, FirstRand agreed, without admitting or denying the facts or violations of
law, to pay a $150,000 civil penalty and revamp its procedures to prevent future fictitious
trades.
160
These cases are consistent with prior investigations by this Subcommittee which included
evidence of bank participation in commodity trading strategies that, collectively, constituted
excessive speculation in such energy and agricultural commodities as crude oil, natural gas, and
wheat.
161
Banks suspected of engaging in manipulation or excessive speculation in commodity
markets risk civil and criminal investigations, legal expenses, reputational damage, and penalties.
156
See In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC, FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, “Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement,” (1/22/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-
IN12-4-000.pdf.
157
1/22/2013 FERC press release, “FERC Approves Market Manipulation Settlement with Deutsche Bank,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-1/01-22-13.asp;
158
8/27/2014 CFTC press release, “CFTC Orders FirstRand Bank, Ltd. to Pay $150,000 Civil Monetary Penalty for
Unlawfully Executing Prearranged, Noncompetitive Trades on the CBOT,”http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6985-14.
159
Id.
160
See In re FirstRand Bank, Ltd., CFTC Case No. 14-23 (CFTC Administrative Proceedings), “Order Instituting
Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing
Remedial Sanctions,” at 1,http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enffirstrandorder082714.p
df.
161
See, e.g., “The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the
Beat,” report by Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Prt. 109-65 (6/27/2006); “Excessive Speculation in
the Wheat Market,” hearing before Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-155 (7/21/2009).
40
Increased Bank and Systemic Risks. A fifth problem with mixing banking and
commerce in the context of physical commodities is that it imposes a wide range of new and
increased risks on both individual banks and the broader U.S. financial system and economy.
Banks that own or control businesses with physical commodities, either directly or
through their financial holding companies, incur risks that are common in those businesses, but
uncommon in banking. For example, if the BP oil rig that caused a major oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico had instead been owned, leased, or controlled by a bank, that bank would have
confronted multi-billion-dollar liabilities that otherwise would never have threatened its balance
sheet. Similar low-probability but high-risk operational risks affect a wide range of
commodities, including coal, natural gas, and uranium, as well as a wide range of commodity
activities, such as mining, transporting, storing, or refining commodities with toxic properties.
Another set of risks include the expenses and disruptions that may be caused by the sudden
destruction of a major asset such as a power plant, warehouse, or pipeline; major thefts of
physical inventory; or industrial accidents that injure individuals or property. Still another type
of unusual risk is undergoing investigation for possible manipulation of physical commodity
prices, with the attendant legal expenses, reputational damage, and, in some cases, large fines.
Each of those risks does not normally apply to a bank, and would not apply if the bank’s
affiliates did not handle physical commodities.
In addition to the risks imposed on individual banks, physical commodities create
systemic risks. Currently, substantial physical commodity activities have been undertaken by a
handful of the country’s largest banks, each of which qualifies as a systemically important
financial institution. If one of those banks were to suffer an environmental or operational
disaster involving its physical commodities or sudden massive commodity trading losses, the
resulting financial consequences might be difficult to confine to that one bank. For example, if
the bank were to lose market confidence, it might find itself unable to obtain short term
financing, derivatives counterparties, or business partners, or might have to accept higher
expenses to continue to operate. Deposit runs or restricted liquidity could worsen the situation.
If the bank held substantial interests in non-banking commercial enterprises, its troubles could
taint those nonbanking enterprises as well. Regulatory action, and ultimately a U.S. taxpayer
bailout, might be required to prevent contagion spreading from one major bank to other financial
institutions or other sectors of the U.S. economy.
One business publication framed the problem this way in an editorial opposing bank
involvement in physical commodity businesses:
“Subsidized financing – made particularly cheap by the Fed’s efforts to stimulate the
economy with near-zero interest rates – [have] encouraged banks and their clients to
build bigger stockpiles [of commodities] than they otherwise would have, tying up
supplies. If the bets were to go wrong and lead to distress at a big bank, the Fed would
have to provide emergency financing for an activity that taxpayers never intended to
support.”
162
162
“The Wrong Business for Big Banks,” Bloomberg Businessweek (8/1/2013),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-01/bloomberg-view-the-wrong-business-for-big-banks.
41
A related risk, identified by another expert, is that banks, for legal or reputational reasons,
may take on the debts of affiliated commercial companies, creating unanticipated risks not only
to the bank itself, but also possibly systemic risks:
“Unfortunately, reputational risk within a systemically important financial institution can
result in requirements that the firm backstop assets, even those that were legally isolated.
In 2008 Citi was obligated to guarantee and then repurchase $17.4 billion of structured
investment vehicles (SIVs). As a result, the failure of the federal government to backstop
a firm’s reputation against such losses during a time of crisis could exacerbate panics and
lead to contagion and the creation of larger systemic problems.”
163
A second set of systemic risks involves the physical commodities themselves. Banks
whose affiliates horde key industrial metals such as copper, aluminum, or uranium in a
warehouse or an ETF could impose higher costs or a scarcity of raw materials on manufacturers,
technology companies, the automobile sector, nuclear power plants, or other industries. Banks
that manipulate electricity prices could impose higher costs on whole regions of the country.
Banks that supply jet fuel to airlines, coal to power plants, or natural gas to manufacturers could,
if they faltered, affect industries far afield from the banking sector. Ultimately, they could
negatively impact the U.S. economy.
Undue Concentrations of Economic Power. A sixth problem with mixing banking and
commerce in the context of physical commodities involves undue concentrations of economic
power.
164
Banks already occupy a critical role in the U.S. economy, as custodians of the country’s
wealth, facilitators of funding transfers worldwide, and arbiters of credit. Well aware of their
special status, banks have used their access to inexpensive financing and excess deposits to
expand into multiple business sectors. According to Federal Reserve data, at the end of 2011,
the top five U.S. banks alone held assets equal to 56% of the U.S. economy.
165
Enabling major banks to straddle, not only the financial sector, but also key raw material
and energy markets, would further extend their economic power. Industrial metals such as
copper and aluminum are essential in countless U.S. industries, including computers,
automobiles, and manufacturing equipment. Uranium is a critical contributor to nuclear power
plants, as well as certain defense and medical industries. Low cost natural gas is rejuvenating
U.S. manufacturing, as well as heating homes and producing low cost electricity. Economical
electricity generation is fundamental to the entire country, as is reasonably priced crude oil.
Refined oil products such as diesel fuel, heating oil, and jet fuel play critical roles in the U.S.
163
Rosner Testimony, at 7-8.
164
A 2012 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted that separating banking from commerce was, in
part, “intended to prevent self-dealing and monopoly power” by bank holding companies. “A Structural View of
U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (J uly 2012), at 3,http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf .
165
See “Big Banks: Now Even Too Bigger to Fail,” Bloomberg Businessweek, David J . Lynch (4/19/2012),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-19/big-banks-now-even-too-bigger-to-fail (stating: “Five banks –
J PMorgan Chase (J PM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Wells Fargo (WFC), and Goldman Sachs (GS) –
held more than $8.5 trillion in assets at the end of 2011, equal to 56 percent of the U.S. economy, according to the
Federal Reserve. That’s up from 43 percent five years earlier”).
42
economy. Agricultural products, including wheat, corn, and soybeans, not only help feed the
world, but produce biofuels that reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. If banks were to
dominate, not only the financial sector, but also key energy, metals, and agricultural sectors, they
would have even more influence over the economy.
One expert observed that if major banks:
“are allowed to control vast networks of nonfinancial assets, either as principal or agent,
they will have the power to pick winners and losers in the commercial world, not based
on the productivity or competitive advantages of those firms’ operations but as a result of
their own profit motives.”
166
The same expert quoted a warning by the Independent Community Bankers Association:
“Over time, the individual, the small business owner, small towns, and rural countryside
will suffer economically. More power will devolve to fewer and fewer hands, and
economic diversity will wither, and with it, choices.”
167
In the first decade of the twentieth century, a handful of U.S. banks dominated major U.S.
industries, including railroads, oil, mining, and the nascent electrical industry. The Pujo or
money trust hearings concluded that those banks had abused the public trust.
168
Too Big to Manage or Regulate. A final problem with mixing banking and commerce
in the context of physical commodities is that it intensifies the problem of too-big-to-fail banks
by producing complex financial conglomerates that are too big to manage or regulate.
Businesses that conduct commodities-related activities involving the producing, storing,
transporting, and refining of commodities are, in themselves, complex enterprises with multiple
regulatory and practical difficulties. Adding those complexities to the complexities already
attendant to global banks conducting hundreds of billions of dollars of complicated financial
transactions around the world raises regulatory and management problems it would be foolhardy
to ignore or discount.
C. Role of Regulators
Increased bank involvement with physical commodities could not have taken place in the
United States without the acquiescence of federal bank regulators that set the parameters on
permissible bank activities. Because most bank involvement with physical commodities takes
place through the bank’s financial holding company, actions by the Federal Reserve, the
exclusive regulator of bank holding companies, take center stage. Because a few banks also
participate directly in physical commodity activities, actions taken by the OCC, the primary
regulator of national banks, also come into play. In addition, other federal agencies exercise
oversight of certain aspects of physical commodity activities, including agencies that oversee
166
Rosner Testimony at 13.
167
Id., citing Cam Fine of the Independent Community Bankers Association, Chicago Fed Letter, “The Mixing of
Banking and Commerce: A conference summary,” Nisreen H. Darwish, Douglas D. Evanoff, Essays on Issues, The
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 244a (Nov. 2007),http://qa/chicagofed.org/digital_as...ago_fed_letter/2007/cflnovember2007_244a.pdf.
168
Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream, (J ohn Wiley & Sons, 2010), at 106.
43
U.S. commodities markets; electricity markets and energy production; commodity-related
securities; and commodity-related environmental and safety issues.
(1) Federal Reserve Board
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors has exclusive responsibility under the Bank
Company Holding Act of 1956 to regulate holding companies that own or control banks,
including overseeing their involvement with physical commodities.
The Federal Reserve currently oversees nearly 5,000 domestic and foreign-owned bank
holding companies.
169
Less than 150 of those holding companies are major global institutions
with $50 billion or more in assets. In 2011, 26 domestic bank holding companies and 106
foreign-owned bank holding companies reported $50 billion or more in total consolidated
assets.
170
Together, those holding companies reported a combined global value in excess of $70
trillion.
171
Within the Federal Reserve, the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation
(BS&R) oversees bank holding companies. Within BS&R, the Large Institution Supervision
Coordinating Committee (LISCC) coordinates the efforts of the Federal Reserve System to
oversee the largest and most complex bank holding companies and other systemically important
financial institutions.
172
Created in response to the financial crisis of 2008, LISCC was designed
to centralize supervision of those firms and to apply a cross-firm, interdisciplinary approach to
identify and reduce material risks to the U.S. and global banking system.
173
Additional supervisory duties are held by two BS&R subgroups known as the Large
Banking Organizations (LBO) Section and the International Banking Organizations (IBO)
Section. The LBO Section helps oversee domestic bank holding companies that have $50 billion
or more in consolidated assets but are not overseen by LISCC.
174
It works with the examination
and supervisory efforts of the district Reserve Banks; reviews examination and other reports on
bank holding companies and state member banks; and helps develop informal and formal
enforcement actions.
175
The IBO Section helps oversee foreign banking organization that have
$50 billion or more in consolidated U.S. assets but are not overseen by LISCC.
176
It monitors
169
5/23/2012 letter from Federal Reserve System’s Office of Inspector General to the Federal Reserve’s Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation (BS&R) regarding an audit of BS&R efforts to develop enhanced prudential
standards under Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereinafter “5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Inspector General
Letter”), at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf
(stating that, as of March 31, 2011, the Federal Reserve oversaw 4,770 domestic and 179 foreign-owned bank
holding companies).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
See Federal Reserve SR Letter 12-17, “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,”
(12/17/2013), at 2,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
173
See, e.g., testimony of Federal Reserve Governor Daniel K. Tarullo before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, hearing on Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, (6/6/2012),http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20120606a.htm.
174
See Federal Reserve SR Letter 12-17, “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,”
(12/17/2013), at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
175
5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Inspector General Letter, at 4.
176
See Federal Reserve SR Letter 12-17, “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,”
(12/17/2013), at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
44
foreign country developments that could affect supervision of foreign banks operating in the
United States; works with foreign regulators of U.S. banks operating abroad; and provides
Federal Reserve views on supervisory issues and banking trends of international interest.
177
To oversee large bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve assigns a team of
examiners to each institution. In New York, the head of the team is called the Senior
Supervisory Officer (SSO); outside of New York, the team leader is generally called the Central
Point of Contact (CPC).
178
Depending upon the size and complexity of the holding company,
the SSO or CPC examination team has between 10 and 40 members with various areas of
expertise.
179
At larger holding companies, the examination team typically spends four days per
week on site at the assigned institution and one day per week at Federal Reserve offices.
180
The examination team typically develops an annual supervisory plan and conducts
routine and special examinations on a wide range of holding company issues, including capital
and liquidity adequacy, management of core business lines, internal controls, stress testing, and
risk management. Risk specialists may assist or conduct certain examinations. The team
provides written materials summarizing examination results, identifying problems, and requiring
or encouraging corrective actions. Team members also conduct ongoing meetings with the
holding company to monitor developments and communicate concerns. In addition, the
examination team helps prepare the Federal Reserve’s annual rating assessment of the bank
holding company.
According to the Federal Reserve, the BS&R division does not maintain a group of
examiners who specialize in physical commodity issues, nor do SSO and CPC teams typically
include physical commodities specialists.
181
Instead, SSO and CPC teams typically assign
physical commodity related concerns to examiners who also handle other issues.
182
Key Federal Reserve regulatory issues related to physical commodities include
application of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley authorities for permissible financial activities,
nonfinancial complementary activities, merchant banking investments, and grandfathered
commodity activities, as well as enforcement of prudential limits on physical commodity
activities.
(2) Other Federal Bank Regulators
While the Federal Reserve has exclusively responsibility for regulating financial holding
companies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) are charged with overseeing individual national banks and their subsidiaries.
The OCC has primary regulatory authority over national banks, and is charged with, among other
tasks, ensuring those banks comply with the law restricting them to the “business of banking”
and operate in a safe and sound manner. The FDIC exercises secondary authority over national
177
Id. at 4-5.
178
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
45
banks, with its responsibilities centered around protecting the federal deposit insurance system
from losses.
Over the years, the OCC has played a key role in the physical commodities area by
expansively interpreting the scope of the bank powers clause of the National Bank Act to permit
commodity-related activities. As explained earlier, the bank powers clause sets out the
boundaries of permissible activities by national banks. It states that a national bank may
exercise:
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating
notes ….”
183
Both the OCC and the courts have determined that the banking powers granted by this
clause should be interpreted broadly.
184
During the 1980s, when commodity issues first arose,
the OCC reasoned that, since commodities were not expressly mentioned in the bank powers
clause, the key issue was whether they were permissible “incidental powers.” Over the years, the
OCC has used several tests to make that determination. In some interpretive letters, the OCC
used a judicial standard which required only that the commodity-related activity “be ‘convenient
and useful’ in the performance of the bank’s expressly permitted activities.”
185
That non-
demanding standard made it easy for the OCC to find that a variety of commodity-related
activities were permissible.
In another letter, the OCC used a more detailed, four-part test, citing multiple court
decisions as the basis for the standards:
“(1) whether the activity is similar to the types of activities permitted by the Act and not
expressly prohibited … or is not ‘so disconnected with the banking business as to make it
in violation of’ section 24 …
(2) whether the activity is a ‘generally adopted method’ of banks or one in which banks
have traditionally engaged …
(3) whether the activity in question ‘has grown out of the business needs of the country’
… or would ‘promote the convenience of [the bank’s] business for itself or for its
customers” … and
(4) whether the activity is usual and useful to the bank, or is expected of the bank, in
performing its functions in the current competitive climate.”
186
While this test is not explicitly cited in other OCC interpretive letters, its standards seem to
underlie much of the OCC’s analysis. For example, a number of OCC interpretive letters
183
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh).
184
See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257-59, 115 S. Ct.
810 (1995); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), at 5.
185
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 260 (6/27/1983), at 4, citing Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1
st
Cir. 1972); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 356 (1/7/1986), at 2; OCC Interpretive Letter (6/19/1986), at 2; OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 1025 (4/6/2005), at 6.
186
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 494 (12/20/1989), at 11-12 (citations omitted).
46
analogized the bank’s authority to execute commodity-related transactions to its longstanding
authority to act as a financial intermediary, broker, or lender for its clients, and concluded that
the similarity justified finding that the commodity-related activities were permissible under the
bank powers clause.
187
Beginning in the 1990s, OCC interpretive letters often used another approach which
analyzed whether the commodity-related activity:
“(1) [was] functionally equivalent to or a logical outgrowth of a traditional banking
activity; (2) would respond to customer needs or otherwise benefit the bank or its
customers; and (3) involve[d] risks similar to those already assumed by banks.”
188
In 1993, the OCC used that three-part test in its key interpretive letter approving national
banks taking delivery of physical commodities and conducting related activities such as storing,
transporting, and disposing of the commodities.
189
The OCC letter found that taking physical
delivery of commodities was a logical outgrowth of a bank’s other permissible activities and
served as a means to manage the risks arising from those permissible activities.
190
The letter
determined that the bank’s clients would benefit from the bank’s accepting physical commodities
by providing the bank with “more accurate and economical hedges” and by increasing the bank’s
ability to compete in the commodities markets, both of which could lead to reduced prices for
clients.
191
The letter also determined that the bank itself would benefit from using more accurate
hedges that reduced risk.
192
Finally, the OCC letter found that the risks associated with taking
physical delivery of commodities were similar to those in other permissible banking activities.
193
The OCC used the same three-part test in several other interpretive letters allowing banks to
engage in physically-settled commodity transactions.
194
Even after finding that taking physical delivery of commodities was within the business
of banking, however, the OCC routinely placed prudential conditions on the exercise of that
activity, requiring the bank to put into place risk management, documentation, and audit controls
to ensure safe and sound banking practices. As part of that effort, the OCC required a bank,
prior to engaging in any physically-settled commodity transactions, to submit a detailed plan to
the OCC and obtain prior written authorization from its OCC supervisory staff.
195
Another letter
placed limits on the volume of permissible commodities trading.
196
Still others required the
implementation of a bank circular on risk management.
197
187
See, e.g., id. at 16-25; OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987), at 4-6; OCC Interpretive Letter
(3/2/1992), at 3-4; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 (9/13/1994), at 4; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 929 (2/11/2002),
at 4-5.
188
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), at 4.
189
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993).
190
Id. at 5.
191
Id. at 4.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), at 4 (metals); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 937
(6/27/2002), at 7-10 (electricity); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1060 (4/26/2006), at 6-7 (coal).
195
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), at 6.
196
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 507 (5/5/1990), at 3.
197
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 937 (6/27/2002), at 10-11.
47
Another line of OCC interpretive letters extended bank involvement with physical
commodities by approving proposed merchant banking investments in energy-related
businesses.
198
Still another line of OCC letters approved credit arrangements in which energy
producers agreed to repay bank loans by assigning the bank a royalty interest in the producer’s
physical energy reserves.
199
Through its interpretation of the bank powers clause, the OCC continually extended the
scope of national bank involvement with commodities, including physical commodities. Its
decisions allowed national banks and their subsidiaries to execute and clear futures, options and
swaps; become members of commodity exchanges and clearinghouses; engage in physically-
settled transactions involving the delivery of physical commodities; store, transport, and dispose
of physical commodities; invest in commodity-related businesses; and deal with a wide range of
commodities with unique and toxic properties, from oil products to natural gas, metals, uranium,
agricultural products, emissions, electricity, and more. Since bank holding companies are also
restricted to engaging in banking or closely related activities, the OCC’s interpretations
expanded their ability to engage in physical commodity activities as well.
(3) Dodd-Frank Provisions
One set of regulatory issues that is outside the scope of this Report, but may have a
significant future impact, is how implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) will affect bank involvement with physical
commodities.
200
At least five Dodd-Frank provisions have the potential to restrict or reshape bank
involvement with physical commodities. Section 171 requires minimum, risk-based capital and
leverage standards for federally insured banks, their holding companies, and affiliates. If bank
regulators were to determine that physical commodity activities constitute high risk activities,
they could impose minimum capital or leverage standards to mitigate the risk associated with
conducting such activities and discourage, reshape, or reduce bank involvement.
Section 165 authorizes enhanced supervision and prudential standards for large bank
holding companies with assets in excess of $50 billion. It explicitly permits more stringent rules
based on a company’s “capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities (including the
financial activities of their subsidiaries), size” or other factors.
201
If bank regulators were to
determine that physical commodity activities created sufficient risk, they could impose
contingent capital, credit exposure, or leverage standards, concentration limits, stress testing, or
other measures to minimize risk and discourage, reshape, or reduce bank involvement with
physical commodities.
198
See, e.g., OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2005-3 (7/20/2005)(construction and operation
of ethanol plant); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2008-1 (7/31/2008)(development of solar
energy facilities); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2009-6 (12/16/2009)(installation of
photovoltaic systems in low-income housing); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2011-2
(12/15/2011)(construction of wind turbines).
199
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1117 (5/19/2009)(volumetric production payment loans).
200
P.L. 111-208 (7/21/2010).
201
Section 165(a)(2)(A).
48
Section 619, which is part of the Merkley-Levin provisions and includes the so-called
Volcker Rule, prohibits banks and their subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading as well
as hedging or market-making activities that create client conflicts of interest or high risk
exposures. Depending upon implementation of the Volcker Rule’s provisions, this section could
also restrict and reshape some of the physical commodity activities now undertaken by banks,
their holding companies, and affiliates.
Section 111 of the law created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) whose
mission is to identify and address systemic risks to the U.S. financial system. Section 152
created the Office of Financial Research which the FSOC could task with gathering and
analyzing data on possible systemic risks caused by bank involvement with physical
commodities. If the FSOC were to determine that bank involvement in physical commodities
imposed systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it could recommend or take measures to
restrict or restructure those activities.
Finally, Section 620 of the law requires federal bank regulatory agencies to conduct a
study of appropriate banking activities. Work on that study is underway. If the study were to
conclude that conducting physical commodity activities, in whole or in part, is inappropriate for
federally insured banks, their holding companies, or affiliates, the study could recommend
measures to reduce, restructure, or even eliminate some of those activities.
Most of the Dodd-Frank provisions are not fully in effect, and the required Section 620
study is not yet complete. Multiple agencies are in charge of their implementation, and multiple
outcomes are possible. Depending upon agency implementation, each of these Dodd-Frank
provisions offers tools that could be used to discourage, reshape, or reduce bank involvement
with physical commodities.
(4) Other Agencies
In addition to federal banking regulators, other federal agencies also exercise oversight of
various aspects of bank involvement with physical commodities. They include agencies that
oversee U.S. commodities markets; electricity markets and energy production; commodity-
related securities; and a wide range of commodity-related environmental and safety issues.
Commodity Markets. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is charged
with overseeing the fair and orderly operation of commodity futures, swaps, and options markets,
whether trading takes place on an exchange, swap execution facility, or over-the counter. The
CFTC is also charged with preventing, detecting, and punishing commodity price manipulation
and excessive speculation. While the CFTC does not have direct authority over physical
commodity markets, those markets can and do affect prices on the financial markets, and can
lead to misconduct within the CFTC’s jurisdiction. The lack of transparency in many of the
physical markets, as well as the ability of prices or actions in one market to affect prices in
another market, further complicate CFTC oversight. Since major U.S. banks now dominate
commodity swaps and are major traders of commodity futures and options, CFTC oversight
responsibilities include monitoring and reviewing their conduct.
Energy Regulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is charged
with ensuring U.S. electricity prices are just and reasonable. In addition, FERC is charged with
49
ensuring energy reliability, which includes overseeing energy production facilities, distribution
networks, and electrical grids, among other tasks. Its work includes oversight of power plants
run on oil, natural gas, solar, wind, geothermal, biofuel, and other energy sources, as well as
refineries that produce a wide variety of oil-based products, such as jet fuel, heating oil, and
bunker fuel. FERC’s mission also includes preventing price and market manipulation in
electricity markets. Since major U.S. banks have now become participants in many U.S.
electricity markets, FERC oversight responsibilities include reviewing their conduct.
Commodity-Related Securities. While commodity prices used to be the product of
transactions in the physical or financial commodity markets, today they are also affected by
transactions in the securities markets. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
charged with ensuring the fair and orderly operation of U.S. capital markets, including multiple
stock exchanges and security-based swaps markets. The SEC also oversees the issuance and sale
of a wide variety of commodity-related securities, including securities linked to commodity
index swaps and commodity-based exchange traded funds (ETFs). The agency is also charged
with detecting and punishing misconduct, including insider trading, price manipulation, and
securities fraud. Since major U.S. banks often design, administer, and trade commodity-related
securities, SEC oversight responsibilities now include examining their conduct.
Environmental and Safety Oversight. A fourth category of federal agencies with
commodity-related oversight encompasses agencies responsible for overseeing a wide range of
environmental and safety issues. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is
primarily charged with preventing pollution, has oversight responsibilities that affect a broad
range of commodity-related activities, from refineries to smelting facilities, mining operations,
and power plant emissions. The Coast Guard, which is charged with ensuring marine safety and
dealing with water-based oil spills, oversees oil tankers, ships that transport other types of
commodities such as coal, grain, or iron ore, and port facilities used to load and unload
commodity cargos. The responsibilities of the Department of Transportation (DOT) include
oversight of land-based oil storage tanks, oil and gas pipelines, trucks, and railroads, all of which
are used by commodity-related businesses. The Department of Energy issues energy export
licenses and oversees a vast range of energy-related issues. The Mine Safety Administration is
charged with ensuring that U.S. mines operate in a safe manner. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) oversees grain elevators and food safety. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is charged with ensuring safe workplace operations.
This federal agency list is far from exhaustive and does not even begin to address
regional, state, local, or international authorities that may have oversight or regulatory
responsibilities related to physical commodities. As noted earlier, when banks, through their
financial holding companies, initiate activities involving crude and refined oil products, natural
gas, coal, uranium, solar and wind energy, metals, agricultural products, pipelines, shipping,
railroads, refineries, mining, smelting, uranium enrichment, and electricity generation and
distribution, among others, a massive network of complex regulations and overlapping
regulatory authorities follow.
While this Report does not focus on the oversight efforts of non-banking federal
agencies, they, too, play a critical role in the physical commodity activities undertaken by banks
and their holding companies.
50
III. OVERSEEING PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors has exclusive responsibility for regulating
holding companies that own or control banks, and has played a central role in delineating the
extent of their allowable involvement with physical commodities. Prior to enactment of the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the Federal Reserve permitted very little physical commodity
activities. That stance changed after the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act authorized banks and their
holding companies to engage in a broader array of activities, including those involving physical
commodities.
Since then, drawing on authority from either the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or the Bank
Holding Company Act, financial holding companies have engaged in physical commodity
activities which they assert are:
(1) “financial in nature” or “incidental” to financial activities,
(2) non-financial, but found by the Federal Reserve to be “complementary” to financial
activities,
(3) “grandfathered” under the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, or
(4) qualified “merchant banking” investments.
The Federal Reserve’s oversight of the resulting physical commodity activities can be
seen as falling generally into two phases. In the first phase, from 2000 to 2008, the Federal
Reserve generally permitted financial holding companies to expand and deepen their physical
commodity activities. In the second phase, from 2009 to the present, after the financial crisis
raised concerns about hidden risks to the U.S. financial system, the Federal Reserve began to
reconsider bank involvement with physical commodities. A newly created Federal Reserve Risk
Secretariat identified bank involvement with physical commodities as a major emerging risk and
dedicated resources for a multi-year special review of the issue. The special review surveyed ten
financial holding companies’ physical commodity activities, marked the growth in the variety
and dollar value of those activities, and identified multiple concerns including operational,
catastrophic event, and reputational risks, inadequate risk management, insufficient capital and
insurance, and ineffective regulatory safeguards.
While the review was underway, the Federal Reserve began taking some steps to curb
high risk physical commodity activities at bank holding companies, including by halting
previously permitted activities, delaying or denying requests for expanded activities, and
adopting changes to capital rules that increased protections against commodity-related risks. At
the same time, the Federal Reserve left unresolved major issues about what physical
commodities activities were permissible under the law, permitted a wide range of risky activities,
and failed to close loopholes exploited by some financial holding companies to weaken the
impact of limits on the size of their physical commodity holdings. In early 2014, the Federal
Reserve solicited public comment on whether it should propose new regulatory limits on banks
with physical commodities, but has yet to propose a rulemaking.
51
A. Expanding Physical Commodity Activities, 2000-2008
From 2000 to 2008, the Federal Reserve steadily expanded the range of allowable
physical commodity activities by financial holding companies, enabling them to become major
participants in markets for a wide array of commodities, from uranium
202
to natural gas
203
to
electricity.
204
During this phase, among other measures, the Federal Reserve issued orders
explicitly authorizing expanded commodity activities, provided relaxed interpretations of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley provisions on permissible financial, complementary, grandfathered, and
merchant banking activities, and failed to resolve key issues that would limit those activities.
(1) Expanding Permissible “Financial” Activities
Historically, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 has restricted holding companies
that own or control banks to engaging in “banking” activities or activities determined by the
Federal Reserve “to be so closely related to banking … as to be a proper incident thereto.”
205
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 gave financial holding companies greater leeway,
allowing them to engage in any activity, or retain the shares of any company engaged in any
activity, that the Federal Reserve determined was “financial in nature or incidental to such
financial activity.”
206
The Federal Reserve was given sole authority to define which holding
company activities were “financial in nature” or “incidental” to a financial activity.
207
From 2000 to 2008, the Federal Reserve used its new authority to expand the physical
commodity activities that financial holding companies were allowed to conduct. In Regulation
Y, the Federal Reserve had created a non-exclusive list of “permissible nonbanking activities”
for bank holding companies.
208
That lengthy list was revised to include the following
commodity-related activities:
• providing “advice with respect to any transaction in foreign exchange, swaps, and
similar transactions, commodities, and any forward contract, option, future, option on
a future, and similar instruments;”
209
202
See discussion below involving Goldman Sachs.
203
See discussion below involving Morgan Stanley.
204
See discussion below involving J PMorgan.
205
See Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, codified at 12 U.S.C. §1843(a) and
(c)(8).
206
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
207
Under the bank powers clause of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh), the OCC has sole authority to
determine what activities constitute the “business of banking” and so qualify as a “banking” activity, as explained in
Chapter II. Because the OCC is charged with defining banking activities, its determinations necessarily affect the
determinations made by the Federal Reserve regarding what activities are incidental to banking.
208
12 C.F.R. § 225.28. Regulation Y contains the key rules for bank holding companies. It lists permissible
activities for financial holding companies in 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (listing activities that are “financial in nature or
incidental to a financial activity”) and permissible nonbanking activities for all bank holding companies in 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.28 (listing activities that are “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto”). Section 225.86 explicitly incorporates all of the activities listed in Section 225.28.
209
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(6)(iv) (1997).
52
• allowing a subsidiary to register with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant,
execute and clear futures and options on regulated exchanges, and act as an agent to
trade commodities for clients;
210
and
• engaging as principal, subject to some limitations, in “forward contracts, options,
futures, options on futures, swaps, and similar contracts, whether traded on exchanges
or not, based on any rate, price, financial asset (including gold, silver, platinum,
palladium, copper, or any other metal approved by the Board), nonfinancial asset, or
group of assets, other than a bank-ineligible security.”
211
The Federal Reserve also amended Regulation Y to give bank holding companies more
authority to make or take delivery of physical commodities. Originally, Regulation Y limited
bank holding companies to commodity transactions that provided for cash settlement of the
transaction or for the assignment, termination, or offset of any physical commodities, so that a
bank holding company could not be required to take actual delivery of any physical commodity.
In 2003, the Federal Reserve amended the rule to also allow bank holding companies to enter
into commodity contracts that provided for the delivery of physical commodities, so long as the
holding company made “every reasonable effort to avoid taking or making delivery of the asset
underlying the contract” and, if it did take delivery, did so by taking paper title to the
commodities or arranging for their delivery to another party on an “instantaneous, pass-through
basis.”
212
The regulation also limited bank holding companies to trading commodities that had
been approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
213
Over time, the expansion of permissible activities under Regulation Y enabled bank
holding companies to engage in a wider range of commodity-related financial transactions,
including, for the first time beginning in 2003, transactions that could result in their taking or
making delivery of physical commodities.
(2) Authorizing Commodity-Related “Complementary” Activities
The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act also gave the Federal Reserve sole authority to permit
financial holding companies to engage in any activity, or retain the shares of any company
engaged in any activity that the Federal Reserve first determined was “complementary to a
financial activity.”
214
The Federal Reserve has interpreted this statutory provision as allowing it
to permit an activity that “appears to be commercial rather than financial in nature but that is
meaningfully connected to a financial activity such that it complements the financial activity.”
215
210
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(7)(iv) and (v) (1997).
211
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B) (2003); See also See, e.g., 2003 Federal Reserve "Order Approving Notice to
Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity," in response to a request by Citigroup, Inc., 89 Fed.
Res. Bull. 508, 509 (12/2003) (hereinafter "Citigroup Order"),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdfCitibank Order (containing the Federal
Reserve’s summary of commodity related activities authorized by Regulation Y as of 2003).
212
68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (7/3/2003); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B)(3).
213
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B)(4).
214
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
215
See, e.g., Citigroup Order, at 508, 509.
53
During the legislative process leading to enactment of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, this
complementary provision was presented as a way to allow financial holding companies to
engage in a limited amount of low risk activities that would support their banking operations,
such as selling data processing services that took advantage of excess capacity in bank
technology systems.
216
The legislative record contains little or no mention of commodities. In
addition, complementary activities were generally expected to be insignificant relative to the
overall financial activities of the financial holding company and its affiliates.
217
Since
enactment, however, the complementary provision has been used almost exclusively to approve
greater bank involvement with physical commodities,
218
and revenues related to physical
commodities activities have grown into billions of dollars.
Prior Notice and Approval. What constitutes a “complementary” activity is not defined
by the statute. Rather, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act established a process through which such
activities could be authorized by the Federal Reserve on a case-by-case basis.
219
A financial
holding company seeking to rely on the Act’s complementary authority must first notify and
obtain approval from the Federal Reserve of the proposed activities.
220
Under implementing
regulations issued by the Federal Reserve, the financial holding company must file an application
describing each proposed activity, its proposed size and scope, the financial activity to which it
would be complementary, how the proposed activity would complement the financial activity,
the attendant risks, and the “public benefits” that would be produced.
221
In their applications requesting permission to engage in “complementary” commodity
activities, the financial holding companies gave several reasons. One commonly cited reason
was that increased access to information about physical commodity activities would help the
financial holding company in its commodity trading activities, such as in the futures and swaps
markets. For example, in its 2005 application for complementary authority, J PMorgan explained
that engaging in physical commodities activities would:
“position J PM Chase in the supply end of the commodities markets, which in turn will
provide access to information regarding the full array of actual produce and end-user
activity in those markets. The information gathered through this increased market
participation will help improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply
216
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. Hrg. 113-67
(7/23/2013), at 5, written testimony of Saule T. Omarova, Professor of Law, (hereinafter “Omarova Testimony”)http://www.banking.senate.gov/publi...es.View&FileStore_id=6d49a599-f7dc-4c1f-9455-
fa8d891f04c6; “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities,” Professor Saule Omarova,
98 Minnesota Law Review 265, 288 (2012) (hereinafter “The Merchants of Wall Street”); See also 145 Cong. Rec.
H11529 (11/4/1999) (House Banking Chairman Leach: “It is expected that complementary activities would not be
significant relative to the overall financial activities of the organization.”).
217
See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. H11529 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (Statement of Chairman Leach) (“It is expected that
complementary activities would not be significant relative to the overall financial activities of the organization.”).
218
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that all of the complementary orders it has issued, save one,
approved commodities activities. 12/13/2013 Federal Reserve briefing of the Subcommittee. See also Omarova
Testimony, at 5.
219
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j).
220
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a).
221
12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a).
54
vital price and risk management information that J PM Chase can use to improve its
financial commodities derivative offerings.”
222
J PMorgan also stated that it “must have the ability to enter into physically settled transactions” in
order to “compete effectively” in offering commodity-linked products to its customers,
223
and
that the authority would allow them to “hedge … commodities derivatives positions more
effectively and cheaply.”
224
All three reasons indicate that the primary motivating factor for
entering into physical commodity activities was to complement the financial holding company’s
financial activities, including its participation in the commodity-related futures and swaps
markets.
Before approving a request for complementary authority, the Federal Reserve is legally
required to make an explicit finding that the proposed activity meets the statutory requirements
that it would “not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depositary institutions or
the financial system generally,”
225
and that it “can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to
the public … that outweigh possible adverse effects.”
226
The statutory list of possible public
benefits includes “greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency,” while the
list of possible adverse effects includes “undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices, or risk to the stability of the
United States banking or financial system.”
227
Complementary Orders. From 2003 to 2008, the Federal Reserve used its case-by-case
approval process to issue a series of orders and letters authorizing financial holding companies to
engage in a variety of physical commodity activities found to be “complementary” to their
trading in commodity-related financial instruments.
228
Ultimately, thirteen financial holding
companies were approved to engage in various categories of complementary activities, including
purchasing and selling physical commodities in the spot markets,
229
making and taking delivery
of physical commodities to settle derivatives transactions,
230
entering into energy tolling
agreements,
231
and providing energy management services.
232
The first such order, granted in 2003, permitted Citigroup, through its then commodity
trading subsidiary, Phibro, to buy and sell oil, natural gas, agricultural products, and other
commodities in the physical spot markets, and to take and make delivery of physical
222
7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000004 - 028, at 016.
223
Id. at 015.
224
Id.
225
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
226
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(b)(3).
227
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A).
228
See, e.g., Citigroup Order, at 508.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
See 2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” presentation prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (hereinafter, “2011 Work Plan”), FRB-PSI-200455 - 476, at 458.
232
Id.
55
commodities to settle commodity-linked derivative transactions.
233
This was the first time the
Federal Reserve had allowed a bank holding company to buy and sell physical commodities in
the physical spot markets.
To reduce the risks associated with these new activities, the order required Citigroup to
make a number of commitments to limit the size and scope of its physical commodity activities.
Among other measures, the order stated:
• That as a condition of the order, Citigroup must cap the market value of its
commodities holdings resulting from trading activities at 5% of its consolidated Tier I
capital;
• Citigroup must also alert the Federal Reserve if the market value exceeded 4% of its
Tier I capital;
• Citigroup may make or take physical delivery of only those commodities which have
been approved by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for trading
on U.S. futures exchanges, unless it separately obtained permission from the Federal
Reserve;
• Citigroup was not authorized to own, operate, or invest in facilities for the extraction,
transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities; and
• Citigroup was not authorized to process, refine, or otherwise alter commodities.
234
Over the next five years, the Federal Reserve issued similar complementary orders or
letters to eleven other major financial holding companies. Those orders or letters were issued to
UBS
235
and Barclays
236
in 2004; J PMorgan in 2005;
237
Deutsche Bank,
238
Societe Generale,
239
Wachovia,
240
and Fortis
241
in 2006; Bank of America,
242
Credit Suisse,
243
and BNP Paribas
244
in
233
See Citigroup Order. In 2009, Citigroup sold Phibro to Occidental Petroleum Corporation. 10/9/2009 Citigroup
Inc. press release, “Citi to Sell Phibro LLC,”http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/091009a.htm.
234
Id.
235
2004 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity,”
in response to a request by UBS AG, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 (Spring 2004),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_q22004.pdf .
236
2004 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Barclays Bank PLC, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 511 (Autumn 2004),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_q42004.pdf .
237
2006 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by J P Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 (2006)(hereinafter
“J PMorgan Order”)(effective as of November 18, 2005),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf. J PMorgan has subsequently sought
and received additional complementary authority.
238
2006 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Deutsche Bank AG, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C54 (2006),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
239
2006 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Societe Generale, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C113 (2006),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
240
4/13/2006 Federal Reserve letter regarding Wachovia Corporation. PSI-FRB-20-000012-014.
241
9/29/2006 Federal Reserve letter regarding Fortis S.A./N.A., PSI-FRB-19-000027-030; and later 94 Fed. Res.
Bull. C20 (2008),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf.
242
4/24/2007 Federal Reserve letter regarding Bank of America Corporation, PSI-FRB-20-000001-005.
56
2007; and Wells Fargo in 2008.
245
Each permitted the named financial holding company, either
directly or through one or more affiliates, to engage in the same types of physical commodity
activities as Citigroup. In addition, each required the financial holding company to comply with
specified safeguards such as size restrictions, risk management controls, and prohibitions against
owning, operating or investing in “facilities for the extraction, transportation, storage, or
distribution” of commodities, and against processing, refining or altering commodities.
246
In 2008, the Federal Reserve issued a complementary order for the Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS) in which it authorized the firm to engage in an even greater range of physical
commodities activities.
247
First, the RBS Order omitted a limitation in the prior orders that had
restricted the banks to trading commodities that had been approved for trading by the CFTC on
U.S. exchanges. Instead, after describing the relevant over-the-counter (OTC) markets as
“sufficiently liquid,” the order authorized RBS to trade in nickel, butane, asphalt, kerosene,
marine diesel, and other oil products that had not received CFTC approval for trading on U.S.
exchanges.
248
Second, the order allowed RBS to contract with a third party to “refine, blend, or
otherwise alter” its physical commodities, essentially authorizing RBS to sell crude oil to a
refinery and buy back the refined oil products.
249
In still another major expansion, the order
allowed RBS to enter into long-term electricity supply contracts with large industrial and
commercial customers, and to enter into “tolling agreements” and “energy management”
agreements with power generators.
250
Collectively, these authorities gave RBS permission to
243
3/27/2007 Federal Reserve letter regarding Credit Suisse Group, PSI-FRB-20-000006-011.
244
8/31/2007 Federal Reserve letter regarding BNP Paribas, PSI-FRB-19-000012-017.
245
4/10/2008 Federal Reserve letter regarding Wells Fargo & Company, PSI-FRB-19-000018-023.
246
See 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 459.
247
2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60 (2008)
(hereinafter “RBS Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf. The order
applied to both the Royal Bank of Scotland and a joint venture called RBS Sempra Commodities that the Royal
Bank of Scotland had formed with Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company.
248
Id.
249
Id. See also The Merchants of Wall Street, at 304-05. Prior Federal Reserve complementary orders had
prohibited holding companies from engaging in such activities. A few months later, the Federal Reserve provided
the same authority to J PMorgan. See 11/25/2008 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended,
and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000553, at 555 (requesting authority to refine, blend, or alter
physical commodities); 4/20/2009 letter from Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 (granting
J PMorgan’s request). J PMorgan used that authority to set up an arrangement in which it sold crude oil to a refinery
in Philadelphia and bought 100% of the refined oil products. See, e.g., 1/24/2013 “Commodities Physical Operating
Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301379, at 381 (Chart entitled, “Physical Operating Risk Review of Project
Liberty”).
250
RBS Order, at C64. A tolling agreement typically allows the “toller” to make periodic payments to a power plant
owner to cover the plant’s operating costs plus a fixed profit margin in exchange for the right to all or part of the
plant’s power output. As part of the agreement, the toller typically supplies or pays for the fuel used to run the plant.
Id. at C64. An energy management agreement typically requires the “energy manager” to act as a financial
intermediary for the power plant, substituting its own credit and liquidity for the power plant to facilitate the power
plant’s business activities. The energy manager also typically supplies market information and advice to support the
power plant’s efforts. Id. at C65.
57
engage in an unprecedented range of physical commodity activities.
251
At the same time, as in
prior orders, the Federal Reserve conditioned its approval of the new commodity activities on
RBS’ meeting certain prudential requirements, such as adequate risk controls and size
restrictions. After issuing the RBS order, the Federal Reserve granted similar authority to other
financial holdings companies as well.
252
In sum, since the first complementary order was issued less than a dozen years ago, the
Federal Reserve has granted complementary authority for financial holding companies to:
• buy and sell physical commodities like oil, natural gas, metal, and agricultural
products in the physical spot markets;
• take and make delivery of physical commodities to satisfy derivative trades without
Regulation Y’s requirement of taking all reasonable steps to avoid physical delivery;
• enter into tolling agreements and energy management contracts with power plants;
• sell crude oil to refineries and buy back the refined oil products; and
• enter into long term commodity supply contracts.
Without the complementary orders and letters issued by the Federal Reserve, many of
those physical commodity activities would not otherwise have been permissible “financial”
activities under federal banking law.
253
By issuing those complementary orders, the Federal
Reserve directly facilitated the expansion of financial holding companies into new physical
commodity activities.
(3) Delaying Interpretation of the Grandfather Clause
A third legal basis for financial holding companies engaging in physical commodity
activities involves the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s “grandfather” clause. This clause was enacted
over fourteen years ago in 1999, yet its contours have yet to be delineated by the Federal Reserve
in regulation, guidance, or order. Resolving questions about its scope and meaning gained
urgency six years ago, in 2008, after Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank
holding companies and became the first financial institutions to invoke the clause as the legal
basis for engaging in a wide range of physical commodity activities that would not otherwise be
permitted under law.
254
Despite Goldman’s and Morgan Stanley’s increasing reliance on the
251
See also 4/10/2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Wells Fargo & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 (2008),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_q22004.pdf .
252
For example, the Federal Reserve later granted J PMorgan similar complementary authority to engage in refining
and power plant activities. See 4/20/2009 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 - 002
(on refining authority); 6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580 (on power
plant activities).
253
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). It is important to note, however, that neither
Goldman nor Morgan Stanley has requested or received a complementary order; each relies instead on the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley grandfather and merchant banking authorities to conduct much of their physical commodity activities,
as explained in the following sections.
254
Goldman cited the clause in its original application to convert to a bank holding company as justification for
continuing all of its then existing commodity activities. See 9/21/2008 Goldman application to the Board of
Governors to the Federal Reserve System, FRB-PSI-303638, at 648 - 649.
58
grandfather clause to conduct otherwise impermissible commodity activities, in six years, the
Federal Reserve has taken no action to clarify its scope and proper interpretation.
As explained earlier, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause, which appears in
Section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act, provides that any company that becomes a
financial holding company after November 12, 1999, may “continue to engage in … activities
related to the trading, sale, or investment in commodities and underlying physical properties,”
provided that several conditions are met.
255
Those conditions include that:
• the company “lawfully was engaged, directly or indirectly, in any of such activities as
of September 30, 1997, in the United States”;
• the company’s non-authorized commodity assets do not exceed 5% of the company’s
total consolidated assets or any higher threshold set by the Federal Reserve; and
• the company does not permit a subsidiary that is engaged in grandfathered
commodities activities to cross-market its products and services to an affiliated
bank.
256
Differing Interpretations. The grandfather clause states that a firm can “continue” its
commodities activities provided that it was lawfully engaged in “any” of such activities in the
United States as of September 30, 1997. This statutory language has resulted in at least two very
different interpretations of the law, neither of which has been validated to date by the Federal
Reserve.
The first interpretation contends that the grandfather clause should be read narrowly,
reasoning that its sole purpose was to protect firms from having to discontinue or disinvest their
commodity activities or assets upon becoming a financial holding company. It views the
grandfather clause as preserving only those specific commodity activities that originated prior to
the trigger date in 1997, and that were still ongoing in the United States on the date that the firm
converted to a financial holding company. In contrast, the second interpretation contends that
the grandfather clause should be read expansively, so that if a financial holding company’s
subsidiaries, affiliates, or predecessor companies conducted any type of physical commodity
activities in the United States to any degree prior to the trigger date in 1997, then the financial
holding company is entitled to engage in all types of physical commodity activities at any time
into the future, subject only to the 5% cap imposed by the law.
257
The first reading essentially focuses on the word, “continue,” while the second
emphasizes the word, “any.” The Federal Reserve, which, again, has sole authority to interpret
the grandfather clause, has yet to issue any guidance on the correct interpretation.
255
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o).
256
Id.
257
See, e.g., 3/25/2009 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-706298, at 299-300;
Guynn Testimony, at 11.
59
Legislative History. Grandfather clauses, by their nature, typically safeguard existing
activities, rather than authorize new or expanded activities.
258
The legislative history indicates
that, in keeping with that approach, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause was presented
as a way to avoid forcing a firm to discontinue or divest itself of existing commodity activities or
assets in order to become a financial holding company. The Senate Banking Committee
Chairman at the time, Senator Phil Gramm, who offered the amendment that formed the basis for
Section 4(o), entitled it: “Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities
Activities.” The amendment also contained this short explanation of its purpose:
“The above amendment assures that a securities firm currently engaged in a broad range
of commodities activities as part of its traditional investment banking activities, is not
required to divest certain aspects of its business in order to participate in the new
authorities granted under the Financial Services Modernization Act. This provision
‘grandfathers’ existing commodities activities.”
259
The author’s explanation of his amendment indicates it was intended to prevent
divestitures of “existing” commodities activities. It makes no mention of any intent to authorize
new commodities activities or “any” and all commodities activities. Accordingly, the
explanation of the Gramm amendment suggests that the grandfather clause should be read as a
preservation of activities then-existing when a company converted to a financial holding
company status, and not as an authorization to conduct additional or new activities. This reading
is also consistent with the use of the word “continue” in the statutory text.
A second issue is what “existing commodities activities” were intended to be covered by
the clause. With respect to this question, the Committee Report on the bill stated:
“[A]ctivities relating to the trading, sale or investment in commodities and underlying
physical properties shall be construed broadly and shall include owning and operating
properties and facilities required to extract, process, store and transport commodities.”
260
This Committee Report language focuses on protecting from divestment any existing activity
that fits within a broad interpretation of the terms “commodities” and “underlying physical
properties.” Consistent with the explanation of the Gramm amendment, it does not express any
intention to authorize new commodities activities not already underway as of the trigger date and
the date of conversion to a financial holding company.
258
See, e.g., Pac. N.W. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
grandfather clause in a Washington State Department of Wildlife regulation banning import of exotic animals
applied to new sales and imports but allowed the continued possession of animals legally held within the state prior
to the passage of the regulation); see also “definition of ‘grandfather clause,’” Farlex Financial Dictionary
(10/8/2014),http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Grandfather+Clause (defining the term grandfather
clause as “[a] provision included in a new rule or regulation that exempts a business that is already conducting
business in the area addressed by the regulation from penalty or restriction”).
259
Committee Amendment No. 9, “Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities Activities,”
offered by Senator Phil Gramm during committee markup of the Financial Modernization Act, (3/4/1999),http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm.
260
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, H.R. Committee Report No. 104-127, pt. 1, at 97 (5/18/1995).
60
Goldman and Morgan Stanley. From 2000 until 2008, no financial holding company
relied on the grandfather clause to authorize its physical commodity activities.
261
That changed
when Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies during the
depths of the financial crisis in 2008.
In its September 2008 application to become a bank holding company, Goldman
explicitly cited the grandfather clause as authorizing it to continue to conduct its physical
commodity activities.
262
Since then, both Goldman and Morgan Stanley have asserted that the
grandfather clause provides legal authority for them to, not only continue physical commodity
activities underway in 2008, but also renew past activities and engage in entirely new
commodities activities.
In its 2008 application to become a bank holding company, Goldman’s legal counsel
wrote:
“The Section 4(o) exemption does not require that a company have been engaged prior
to September 30, 1997 in all the activities that it seeks to grandfather under Section 4(o)
at the time the company becomes a BHC [Bank Holding Company], rather it only
requires that the company have been engaged prior to that date in commodity-related
activities that were not permissible for a BHC in the United States on that date.”
263
Similarly, in a 2009 letter to the Federal Reserve, Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel wrote:
“[T]he plain language of Section 4(o) authorizes a qualifying financial holding company
to continue to engage in any activities related to trading, selling, and investing in any type
of commodities and related physical properties or facilities, if certain conditions are
satisfied. Section 4(o) does not merely authorize the retention of investments in
commodities or related physical properties or facilities made or held on a certain date.
Instead, it expressly extends to the continuation of any activities related to the trading,
selling, and investing in any type of commodities and related properties or facilities, if
certain conditions are satisfied.”
264
In internal documents, the Federal Reserve has taken note of the Goldman and Morgan
Stanley interpretations of the grandfather clause, observing that the firms have asserted an
expansive reading that allows them to engage in “trading, selling, and investing in any type of
261
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that, to
date, only two financial holding companies, Goldman and Morgan Stanley, have cited the grandfather clause as the
legal basis for engaging in otherwise impermissible physical commodity activities.
262
9/21/2008 “Confidential Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-303638 - 662, at
648 - 649, 661.
263
Id. at 649.
264
3/25/2009 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-706298 - 505, at 298 - 300
(emphasis in original).
61
commodity and its related physical properties or facilities, including mining, processing, storage,
transport, generation and refining, and any related activities.”
265
To better understand the issues related to the grandfather clause, from 2009 to 2011, a
Federal Reserve team of examiners undertook an in-depth review of the two financial holding
companies’ physical commodity activities, including comparing their activities prior to the 1997
trigger date and in 2010.
266
During that review, a detailed status report was prepared indicating
that both financial holding companies had greatly expanded their commodity activities and
incurred numerous new risks, while claiming their new activities were permitted under the
grandfather clause.
267
That internal Federal Reserve report’s findings included the following:
“The scope and size of commodity based industrial activities and trading in physical and
financial commodity markets at MS [Morgan Stanley] and GS [Goldman Sachs] has
increased substantially since 1997.
There are a large number of new commodities traded by these firms today which they did
not trade in 1997 … The new commodities traded today by MS number 37 and GS 35
(this is a representative sampling and represents a lower bound). Several of these
commodity related activities involve substantially new types of risks emanating from
newer deal and investment structures, expansion in new markets (e.g. uranium by GS,
emission credits), and geographic regions ….
Much of the new business conducted by MS and GS is in the form of industrial processes
involving commodities. The expansion of these firms into power generation, shipping,
storage, pipelines, mining and other industrial activities has created new and increased
potential liability due to the catastrophic and environmental risks associated with the
broader set of industrial activities.
Below are examples of industrial processes which are new or greatly expanded today
from 1997:
• Leasing of ships and ownership of shipping companies at MS and GS
• New ownership, and expanded leasing of oil storage facilities at MS
• Ownership of companies owning oil refineries at MS
• Ownership of coal mines and distribution at GS
• New ownership of power plants at GS and expanded ownership at MS
• Leasing of power generation at MS and GS
• Ownership of retail gasoline outlets at MS
• Ownership of royalty interests from gold mining at MS
• Ownership and development of solar panels at GS ….
265
2011 Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 461 [sealed exhibit].
266
See undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 [sealed exhibit].
267
Undated but likely 2010 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
between 1997 and Present,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454 [sealed exhibit].
62
These types of industrial activities are of greater concern as they are held over longer
holding periods than more purely financial activities and are more difficult to value and
risk manage due to the absence of market liquidity. …
More recently, these firms have expanded their investment activity in emerging markets
… [which] are more subject to liquidity risks and price shocks ….
The expansion of these firms into power generation, shipping, storage, pipelines, mining
and other industrial activities has created new and increased potential liability for firms
with access to the federal safety net supporting the banking system for catastrophic event
risk arising from industrial control failures – including environmental liability in
particular – of a type that is difficult for bank supervisors to dimension.
The severity of this risk is in proportion to the potential damage and associated liability
of industrial accidents in handling different commodities. Some, like uranium, may be
more severe than others. …
Furthermore, the scale of bank involvement in industrial commodity processes is not
widely understood – even within the bank regulatory community. As a result, it is
possible that losses within the banking sector arising from these activities will be
surprising and further lead to questions regarding the integration of this industry within
banking.
Lastly, there appears to be differences between banks and industrial energy firms in
income recognition practices, capitalization methods and risk management practices. It is
possible that bank incentives to expand in this industry are affected by their use of mark-
to-market valuation for activities that are otherwise accounted for as accrual income at
energy firms – and rates of capitalization for these activities that are much less than those
used by energy firms. …
The commodities businesses at MS and GS are material drivers of firm profitability,
capitalizing on economics in a wide breadth of commodity markets and activities. Risk
exposures run the gamut from exchange traded futures to leases on power plants and oil
storage facilities to equity investments in coal mines and oil shipping operations.”
268
The report also included the following chart comparing the banks’ commodity activities
in 1997 versus 2010.
269
268
Id. at 428 - 430.
269
Id. at 433.
63
The chart below is a comparison of the range of activities from 1997 to 2010, related to financial contract for the physical settlement and delivery of various
commodity products.
Chart 1
Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley
Sept 97 Dec 10 Sept 97 Dec 10
Agricultural Products Agricultural Products
Barley
Cattle
Cocoa Cocoa Cocoa
Coffee Coffee
Corn Corn Corn
Cotton Cotton
European Rapseed European Rapseed
Foreign Products – Pulp
Hogs Hogs
Rice
Rubber
Soybean Soybean Meal
Soybean Meal Soybean Oil
Soybean Oil Soybeans
Sugar Sugar
Wheat Wheat
Metals Metals
Aluminum Aluminum Aluminum
Cooper Cooper
Bank Eligible* Gold Bank Eligible*** Gold
Lead Lead Lead
Nickel Nickel Nickel
Bank Eligible* Palladium Bank Eligible*** Palladium
Bank Eligible* Platinum Bank Eligible*** Platinum
Rhodium Unknown Rhodium Unknown
Bank Eligible* Silver Bank Eligible*** Silver
Steel Steel
Tin Tin
Zinc Zinc Zinc
“Base Metals”****
Emissions/Renewable Emissions/Renewable
Blue Source Emission Credits Carbon Credits
Ercot Renewable Certificate CER (Certified Emission Reductions)
EU Scheme Emission Certificates ERU (Emission Reduction Units)
Kyoto Emission Credit EUA (European Union Allowances)
PJM Renewable Energy Cert LEC (Levy Exemption Certificates)
Rgnl Greenhouse Gas Init Emissns Nox (Nitrogen Oxide)
VER (Voluntary Emission Reductions) ROCS (Renewable Obligation Cert)
Sox (Sulfer Dioxide)
VER (Voluntary Emission Reductions)
Energies Energies
Butane Bunker Fuel
Coal Coal Coal
Condensate Condensate Crude Oil Crude Oil
Crude Oil Crude Oil Diesel Diesel
Diesel Electricity Electricity
Electricity** Electricity Ethanol
Freight Freight Freight
Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Fuel Oil
Gasoil Gasoil Heating Oil Heating Oil
Heating Oil Heating Oil Jet Fuel Jet Fuel
Jet Fuel Jet Fuel LNG
LNG MTBE
Naptha Naptha Naphtha
Natural Gas Natural Gas Natural Gas Natural Gas
Palm Oil Natural Gas Liquids
Propane RBOB
Temperature Residual Fuel
Unleaded Gasoline Unleaded Gasoline Unleaded Gasoline Unleaded Gasoline
Uranium
Total: 18 Total: 52 Total: 11 Total: 48
Difference: 35 Difference: 37
* The status of trading in these commodities as of 1997 was not reported by the firm, however they
are bank eligible commodities.
** Pursuant to the PBSA with Constellation Energy.
*** The status of trading in these commodities as of 1997 was not reported by the firm,
however they are bank eligible commodities.
**** The firm’s submission only stated “base metals.”
SOURCE: Chart Prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428, at 433.
64
Goldman has cited the grandfather clause as its authority to own and trade uranium
270
and
own coal mines,
271
two activities that it initiated for the first time after converting to a bank
holding company. Similarly, Morgan Stanley has cited the grandfather clause as authority for its
ownership of a global network of oil and natural gas storage facilities and pipelines; leasing over
100 oil tankers, LNG transport barges, and other ships; and recent plans to construct and operate
compressed natural gas facilities in Texas and Georgia.
272
Both cite the grandfather clause as
legal authority for engaging in physical commodity activities which are significantly broader
than otherwise permitted for financial holding companies.
273
Federal Reserve analyses have noted that the banks’ expansive interpretation of the
grandfather clause has not only enabled them to conduct new, high risk physical commodity
activities not otherwise permitted by law,
274
but also created a competitive disparity between
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, one the one hand, and financial holding companies on the
other hand that cannot invoke the grandfather clause.
275
In a 2012 internal analysis, the Federal
Reserve staff wrote:
“[Goldman] continues to engage in commodities-related activities and hold commodities-
related investments that are generally not permissible under section 4 of the BHC [Bank
Holding Company] Act, such as owning and managing power plants and owning storage
facilities. GS has requested that the Board determine certain of these activities and
270
See 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 201043, at 1000 (listing Nufcor as an asset acquired under
Section 4(o)).
271
See Report of Changes in Organizational Structure, FR-Y-10, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (4/14/2010),
GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303 (indicating its coal mine investment was “permissible under [Bank Holding
Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant Banking regulations”); 5/26/2011 Response
from Goldman Sachs to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200600, at 602. But see 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-
PSI-200984 - 201043, at 1000 (indicating CNR, owner of one coal mine, as a merchant banking investment, rather
than grandfathered asset).
272
See, e.g., 9/18/2012 “Morgan Stanley request for a third extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking
activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-
PSI-304905, at 910 (Morgan Stanley “continues to engage in commodities-related activities and hold commodities-
related investments that are generally not permissible under section 4 of the BHC Act, such as owning and managing
power plants and owning storage facilities. MS has requested that the Board determine certain of these activities
and investments are permissible under section 4(o)’s permanent grandfather authority. This request remains under
consideration by the Legal Division.”)[footnote omitted][sealed exhibit]; 9/19/2011 “Morgan Stanley request for a
second extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,”
internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, at 7, FRB-PSI-304896 [sealed exhibit]; 9/12/2014 letter
from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-11-000001 - 008, at 004, 006.
273
See, e.g., 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 459 (stating that the
complementary orders given to the banks would not have allowed them to “own, operate, or invest in facilities for
the extraction, transportation, storage, or distribution” of commodities, nor could a financial holding company
“process, refine, or otherwise alter” commodities) [sealed exhibit].
274
See undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 [sealed exhibit].
275
See 6/21/2011 “Section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act - Commodity-related Activities of Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200936, at 940 [sealed exhibit].
65
investments are permissible under section 4(o)’s permanent grandfather authority. This
request remains under consideration by the Legal Division.”
276
At the time the Federal Reserve wrote that analysis, questions about the proper scope of the
grandfather clause with respect to Goldman and Morgan Stanley had already been pending for
four years, without resolution.
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 gives the Federal Reserve general authority to
interpret and administer the Act, including Sec. 4(o). In particular, Section 5(b) of the Banking
Holding Company Act grants the Federal Reserve broad authority to issue orders and regulations
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act and prevent evasions of it.
277
That broad grant of
authority provides ample legal foundation for the Federal Reserve to issue regulations or orders
delineating the scope of the grandfather clause, including narrowing its interpretation to support
the purposes of Act, which have been described as seeking to “limit the comingling of banking
and commerce,” and “prevent situations where risk-taking by nonbanking affiliates erodes the
stability of the bank’s core financial activities.”
278
Financial holding companies that disagreed
with the Federal Reserve’s interpretation would have an opportunity to challenge it in court
under the Chevron standard requiring deference to administrative determinations.
279
Despite the two banks’ growing investment in otherwise impermissible commodity
activities and the growing disparity between them and other banks from 2008 to 2014, the
Federal Reserve has repeatedly indicated that the permissibility of their activities under the
grandfather clause remains an open and pending issue, while also permitting both financial
institutions to continue and even expand the commodity activities in question.
280
By failing to
276
9/19/2012 “Goldman Sachs’ request for a third extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking activities
pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-
304868 - 875, at 872 [footnote omitted][sealed exhibit]. See also 9/20/2011 “Goldman Sachs’ request for a second
extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal
memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-304860 - 867, at 866 [sealed exhibit]; 7/25/2012
“Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee: Global Commodities,” (hereinafter “2012
Firmwide Presentation”), prepared by Goldman Commodities group, FRB-PSI-200984, at 1000 (listing Cogentrix
and Nufcor as assets acquired under Section 4(o)).
277
Section 5(b) states: “The Board is authorized to issue such regulations and orders … as may be necessary to
enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this Act and prevent evasions thereof.” Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, codified at 12 U.S. Code § 1844.
278
“A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (7/2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [footnotes omitted].
279
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 - 843 (1984) (creating a
two-part analysis for reviewing an agency interpretation of a statue: “First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. …
If, however, the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction of the statute. … Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the issue for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
280
See, e.g., 9/19/2012 “Goldman Sachs’ request for a third extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking
activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, at 5,
FRB-PSI-304868 [sealed exhibit]; 9/18/2012 “Morgan Stanley request for a third extension of time to divest or
66
provide a timely interpretation delineating how the grandfather clause should be applied, the
Federal Reserve effectively enabled both bank holding companies to deepen their involvement in
otherwise unallowable physical commodity activities for more than six years.
In addition, unlike the actions it took to implement the Gramm-Leach-Bliley provision on
complementary authority, the Federal Reserve has failed to impose any regulatory safety and
soundness-based limitations on the volume of activities that may be conducted under the
grandfathering clause.
281
Currently, the only limit on the amount of grandfathered activities is
the statutory requirement that they not exceed 5% of the financial holding company’s “total
consolidated assets.”
282
Given the size of Goldman and Morgan Stanley’s assets, that limit is set
so high as to not function as a restriction at all. In contrast, activities authorized under the
complementary authority may not exceed 5% of the firm’s Tier 1 capital, while the Volcker Rule
limits investments to not more than 3% of a firm’s Tier 1 capital, restrictions which result in
much lower dollar limits on the activities. Under the Federal Reserve’s current practice, a
financial holding company could engage in physical commodity activities under the grandfather
clause that could be orders of magnitude larger than those authorized under the complementary
authority and could even exceed its total Tier 1 capital.
In J anuary 2014, the Federal Reserve solicited public comment on whether it should issue
a rulemaking to impose “additional prudential requirements” on financial holding companies to
ensure commodity activities conducted under the grandfather clause “do not pose undue risks” to
the holding company, an insured bank, or U.S. financial stability.
283
The Federal Reserve asked,
in particular, for suggestions on appropriate “safety and soundness, capital, liquidity, reporting,
or disclosure requirements” for grandfathered activities.
284
Despite passage of nearly a year,
however, the Federal Reserve has taken no further action on this rulemaking effort to curb risks
associated with grandfathered commodity activities not otherwise permitted by law.
(4) Allowing Expansive Interpretations of Merchant Banking
A fourth legal basis for financial holding companies engaging in physical commodity
activities involves the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s merchant banking authority. As with the
grandfather authority, the Federal Reserve has allowed financial holding companies to engage in
an increasing array of commodity-related merchant banking investments.
As explained earlier, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act permitted financial holding companies
to purchase up to a 100% ownership interest in non-financial commercial enterprises for a
limited period of time, subject to certain limitations.
285
In 2001, the Federal Reserve and
conform nonbanking activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the
Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-304905, at 910 [sealed exhibit].
281
For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits, below.
282
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(2).
283
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329, 3336 and Question 23, (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
284
Id.
285
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Section 4(k)(4)(H); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H). See also “Merchant Banking: Mixing
Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” Congressional Research Service, No. RS21134
(10/22/2004), at 1 (“Before [the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act], banking companies could use equity-investing authority
67
Treasury adopted the “Merchant Banking Rule” to spell out some of the parameters of this
authority.
286
To limit the risks associated with merchant banking investments, the Federal
Reserve initially imposed a size limit on those investments, generally prohibiting merchant
banking assets from exceeding 30% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital,
287
but that
size limit was removed in 2002.
288
Qualifying Investments. Neither the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act nor the Merchant
Banking Rule explicitly defines the term “merchant banking.”
289
Instead, both focus on
“qualifying investments.” To qualify as a merchant banking investment under the law and the
Merchant Banking Rule, an investment must meet a number of requirements, including the
following:
• the investment must not be made or held, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. depository
institution;
290
• the investment must be “part of a bona fide … merchant or investment banking
activity,” including investments made for the “purpose of appreciation and ultimate
resale”;
291
• the financial holding company must use a securities affiliate or an insurance affiliate
with a registered investment adviser affiliate to make the investment;
292
• the investment must be held on a temporary basis, “only for a period of time to enable
the sale or disposition thereof on a reasonable basis”
293
and generally for no longer
than ten years;
294
and
only through Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) and other limited powers. Bank holding companies
could own [only] noncontrolling interests in nonfinancial companies: not more than 5% to 10% of voting securities.
[The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] allows [financial holding companies] into the high-risk, high-reward private equity
market.”).
286
See Merchant Banking Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466 (1/31/2001), codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 225, Subpart J , 225.170
et seq.
287
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds); “Capital; Leverage and
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy, Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity
Investments,” 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (1/25/2002) (adopting a final rule that ended the size limit while imposing specific
capital requirements for merchant banking investments).
288
See 67 Federal Register 3786 (2002). The Federal Reserve terminated the size limit after imposing specific
capital requirements for merchant banking investments.
289
The Merchant Banking Rule simply stated that merchant banking activities were “those not otherwise
authorized” under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 C.F.R. § 225.170. See also “Merchant
Banking: Mixing Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” Congressional Research Service,
No. RS21134 (10/22/2004), at 1 (“Merchant banking mixes banking with commerce. The term comes from
European practices, in which bankers financed foreign trade and other high risk ventures undertaken by merchants
such as ship owners and importers for a share of the profits, rather than receiving interest returns from lending.
Taking a stake in a venture made it merchant banking.”)(emphasis in original).
290
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(i); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(d).
291
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(b).
292
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f). A bank can also use a private equity fund that meets
certain requirements to make the merchant banking investment. 12 C.F.R. § 225.173.
293
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(a).
294
12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(1).
68
• the financial holding company generally must not “routinely manage or operate” the
company in which it has made the investment.
295
Financial holding companies can make qualifying investments as the principal or on
behalf of clients.
296
And, in contrast to the complementary powers provision, financial holding
companies generally do not have to obtain prior approval by the Federal Reserve before making
a merchant banking investment.
297
Investment Gains Versus Operational Revenues. The Merchant Banking Rule does
not expressly limit the scope of investments that meet the above criteria. The preamble to the
Rule took the position, however, that the merchant banking authority was not intended to mix
banking and commerce, but to allow financial holding companies to make purely financial
investments. It states that, to “preserv[e] the financial nature” of the merchant banking
investment and “maintai[n] the separation of banking and commerce,” the principal purpose of
the investment must be to make a profit for the financial holding company from the resale or
disposition of its ownership stake and not from the operational revenues derived from running
the nonfinancial business.
298
According to the Congressional Research Service, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
effectively “allows [financial holding companies] into the high-risk, high-reward private equity
market.”
299
Another expert has described the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority
as intended to enable banks to compete with securities firms and venture capital funds in
investing in start-up companies.
300
Routine Management. One key set of issues affecting merchant banking activities
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act involves the extent to which a financial holding company
may exercise control over a business acquired as a merchant banking investment. Those
acquired businesses are referred to in the Merchant Banking Rule as “portfolio companies,” since
they reside within the investment portfolio of the financial holding company.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act states that a financial holding company may not “routinely
manage or operate” a portfolio company. Nevertheless, financial holding companies have long
sought to exercise varied degrees of control over their portfolio companies. Examples include
requiring the portfolio company to first seek the financial holding company’s approval before
295
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(a) and (b)(e).
296
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a).
297
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174(a). However, prior approval may be needed if the proposed investment would cause the
aggregate carrying value of all of its merchant banking investments to exceed the 5% cap.
298
Merchant Banking Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8469 (1/31/2001).
299
“Merchant Banking: Mixing Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” Congressional
Research Service, No. RS21134 (10/22/2004), at 1.
300
See, e.g., Omarova Testimony, at 3; The Merchants of Wall Street, at 281.
69
issuing securities, declaring dividends, or taking other actions deemed “outside the ordinary
course of business.”
301
The extent of control that can be appropriately exercised by a financial holding company
over a portfolio company remains unclear. Generally speaking, from 1999 to 2009, the Federal
Reserve permitted financial holding companies to place a significant number of controls over a
portfolio company related to the governance and funding of the company, without running afoul
of the limitation that the financial holding company may not “routinely manage or operate” that
company.
302
More recently, as explained below, the Federal Reserve has begun to take a more
restrictive approach.
Currently, the extent of control that a financial holding company may appropriately
exercise over a portfolio company is not spelled out in a rule, but is instead set forth largely in a
2001 letter from the Federal Reserve’s then-General Counsel to Credit Suisse First Boston.
303
Some of guidance provided in that letter relates to the overall structure and funding of the
portfolio company. For example, the letter indicated that a bank engaged in merchant banking
may restrict the ability of a portfolio company to issue debt or equity securities,
304
redeem
securities,
305
or amend the terms of securities.
306
The letter also indicated the bank could require
the portfolio company to obtain prior approval by the financial holding company before
declaring dividends “outside the ordinary course of business.”
307
Other types of control delve
more deeply into the portfolio company’s business operations. For example, the Federal Reserve
letter indicated that a bank may place restrictions on a portfolio company’s ability to hire or fire
executives,
308
“[e]nte[r] into a contractual arrangement (including a property lease or consulting
agreement) that imposes significant financial obligations on the portfolio company,”
309
sell
significant assets,
310
adopt or modify a budget for compensation,
311
“[c]reate, incur, assume,
guarantee, refinance or prepay any indebtedness” outside the ordinary course of business,
312
or
“[m]ake, or commit to make, any capital expenditure” outside the ordinary course of business.
313
By allowing financial holding companies engaged in merchant banking to impose those
types of restrictions on their portfolio companies, the Federal Reserve signaled that the financial
holding companies could exercise significant control over their portfolio companies, so long as
the controls related to activities “outside of the ordinary course of business.” More recently, the
301
See, e.g., 12/21/2001 letter from Federal Reserve to Credit Suisse First Boston, FRB-PSI-301593 - 601, at 599
[sealed exhibit] (outlining several types of covenants imposed by a financial holding company that restrict the
financing or operations of a portfolio company).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 596.
305
Id.
306
Id. at 597.
307
Id. at 595.
308
Id. at 598.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
12/21/2001 letter from Federal Reserve to Credit Suisse First Boston, FRB-PSI-301593 - 601, at 597 [sealed
exhibit].
313
Id.
70
Federal Reserve has begun to reject financial holding company reliance on merchant banking
authority to justify certain commodity activities when confronted by evidence that the activities
were conducted by portfolio companies whose day-to-day operations were subject to the control
of the financial holding company.
One example involves J PMorgan which, as part of a larger acquisition in 2010, acquired
ownership of Henry Bath & Sons, a company that owns a global network of metals warehouses.
J PMorgan applied to operate the business as a complementary activity.
314
The Federal Reserve
denied the application.
315
J PMorgan then sought to hold the asset under its merchant banking
authority.
316
In 2013, the Federal Reserve informed the bank that its merchant banking authority
did not cover the Henry Bath acquisition, and that the bank would have to divest the holding,
317
which J PMorgan has since done.
318
Although it did not provide a written explanation of its
reasoning for rejecting J PMorgan’s reliance on its merchant banking authority, the Federal
Reserve told the Subcommittee
319
that it had based its decision on two factors: (1) J PMorgan’s
active integration of the warehouse services into its other commodity activities and routine
advertisement of the warehouse services to its clients; and (2) J PMorgan’s dominant use of the
warehouses, citing information provided by J PMorgan that about 75% of the commodities stored
in the Henry Bath warehouses belonged to J PMorgan or a J PMorgan client.
320
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that in addition to those reasons, the Federal Reserve had communicated its view
that the warehouses were “not a passive investment” being held by J PMorgan.
321
In another instance, the Federal Reserve has pressed J PMorgan to sell three power plants
in which it owns 100% of the shares and is currently holding under its merchant banking
authority.
322
J PMorgan originally acquired the power plants as part of larger acquisitions
related to Bear Stearns in 2008 and RBS Sempra in 2010.
323
J PMorgan first approached the
Federal Reserve about holding all three power plants under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
314
See 6/8/2011 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co.
Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” (hereinafter “2011 Notice to the
Board”) FRB-PSI-300977 - 1052, at 1001 (J PMorgan application to hold Henry Bath metals storage facility as
complementary activity).
315
See 10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 505 [sealed exhibit];
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014)(stating that the Federal Reserve rejected the complementary
request related to Henry Bath during a telephone call and never provided a written explanation).
316
See undated “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry Bath,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve,
FRB-PSI-301532 - 534; Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
317
2012 Summary Report, at 505; undated but likely 2013 “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 300 [sealed exhibits].
318
J PMorgan sold Henry Bath and its warehouses to the Mercuria Group, a commodities and energy company based
in Switzerland in 2014. Subcommittee briefing by Mercuria (9/12/2014).
319
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
320
See 2011 Notice to the Board, FRB-PSI-300977 - 1052, at 1001.
321
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
322
For more information about the power plants, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with electricity, below.
323
See 5/26/2011 “Summary of outstanding legal/commodities issues as of March 2011,” prepared by J P Morgan,
FRB-PSI-304601 - 604, at 602. For more information about these power plants, see discussion of J PMorgan’s
involvement with electricity, below.
71
complementary authority.
324
After the Federal Reserve staff indicated that complementary
authority did not include direct ownership of power plants, the bank invoked its merchant
banking authority to continue its ownership stake in the power plants.
325
While the Federal
Reserve continued to press the bank to sell the power plants, it did not explicitly disallow
J PMorgan’s reliance on its merchant banking authority to own them. As of October 2014,
J PMorgan was attempting to sell all three.
326
These and other examples of commodity-related merchant banking activities discussed
below indicate that financial holding companies still do not have clear guidance on when it is
appropriate to rely on merchant banking authority to own commodity-related businesses, nor are
they clear about what controls may be asserted over their portfolio companies.
Still another issue raised in an internal Federal Reserve report is “the extent to which
banks can engage in commercial/physical commodity activities breaches the separation of
banking and commerce and places industrial activities within the federal safety net.”
327
In other
words, merchant banking losses incurred by banks and their holding companies are effectively
being subsidized by the government and could end up being subsidized by taxpayers through
Federal Reserve loans, FDIC insurance, or other types of federally-financed assistance. Despite
identifying this problem, it is unclear what steps the Federal Reserve has taken to address it.
Growth in Merchant Banking Activities. Since 2001, under the auspices of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the volume and nature of “merchant banking” activities at financial
holding companies, including physical commodity activities, have continued to expand.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), from 2000 to 2013, financial
holding companies have increased their merchant banking holdings from $9.5 billion to $46.2
billion, a fivefold increase.
328
The following charts, prepared with data gathered by CRS at the
Subcommittee’s request, show a steady growth in merchant banking activities over the last ten
years, with twice as many foreign banks as domestic banks participating in merchant banking
activity.
329
324
See 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602
[sealed exhibit].
325
Id. Three months later, energy traders at J PMorgan initiated a scheme to manipulate energy prices in California
and the Midwest, using some of the power plants acquired from Bear Stearns. The bank ultimately paid $410
million to settle charges by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that it had gained $125 million in
unjust profits at the expense of businesses and families who used power in those regions. 7/30/2013 FERC press
release, “J P Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VFlUkvnF9u0.
326
For more information about the current status of these power plants, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement
with electricity, below.
327
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 482.
328
12/20/2013 “Merchant Banking Assets of Financial Holding Companies,” memorandum by CRS, at 5, Tables 1
and 2 (using data provided by the Federal Reserve).
329
Id.
72
Number and Dollar Value of Merchant Banking Assets
of Financial Holding Companies, 2000-2013
Number of Financial Holding Companies
Domestic Foreign
Year Assets Reported
( in U.S. billions)
2000 11 9 $9.5
2001 19 10 $8.3
2002 12 14 $9.1
2003 14 15 $10.7
2004 15 18 $12.0
2005 13 20 $15.50
2006 14 23 $19.90
2007 13 24 $27.10
2008 10 27 $22.60
2009 11 25 $34.00
2010 10 25 $54.00
2011 10 24 $48.50
2012 12 23 $49.40
2013 10 23 $46.20
Source: Congressional Research Service
Because the Federal Reserve does not require financial holding companies to report with
specificity on their merchant banking activities, neither the Federal Reserve nor CRS was able to
indicate what portion of the financial holding companies’ growing merchant banking assets was
tied to commodities versus other types of businesses. It is also unclear the extent to which the
reported data includes all merchant banking activities undertaken by financial holding
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
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4
2
0
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6
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0
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7
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.
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.
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Source: Congressional Research Service
Merchant Bank Holdings From 2000-2013
Domestic FHCs
Foreign FHCs
73
companies. When the Subcommittee reviewed the annual reports that the Federal Reserve
requires financial holding companies to file on their merchant banking activities, the reports
contained only aggregate data on such matters as the acquisition costs, unrealized gains, carrying
values, and publicly quoted values of the merchant banking investments, but no list of individual
projects.
330
The lack of specific information meant the Subcommittee could not determine
whether the data included all of an institution’s commodities-related merchant banking activities.
The lack of data also makes it difficult for regulators or others to monitor the extent to which
financial holding companies are accurately disclosing their merchant banking investments and
complying with the requirements for those activities.
Case Studies. Each of the banks examined by the Subcommittee relied on their
merchant banking authority to conduct at least some commodity activities that might otherwise
be unallowable under the law. Goldman Sachs, for example, cited merchant banking authority as
the legal basis for its ownership of Metro International’s global network of warehouses, as well
as its acquisition of companies that own multiple coal mines and related infrastructure in
Colombia.
331
As explained above, J PMorgan cited merchant banking authority for its ownership
of three power plants and attempted to use that authority for the Henry Bath network of
warehouses.
332
Morgan Stanley cited reliance on merchant banking authority for its acquisition
of Southern Star, a natural gas pipeline company, discussed further below.
333
Each of the banks conducted their commodity-related merchant banking activities both
within and outside of their commodities divisions. Morgan Stanley, for example, engaged in
merchant banking investments involving natural gas, not only through its commodities division,
but also through the Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partnership and Morgan Stanley Global
Private Equity Partnership, both of which operate through its Investment Division.
334
Goldman
made merchant banking investments through its commodities group as well as a “Merchant
Banking Division” that was completely outside of the commodities group.
335
Similarly,
J PMorgan made merchant banking investments through a “Global Real Assets” section of its
330
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies – FR
Y-12,” submitted to the Federal Reserve by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-800005 - 008; Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-800009 -
012; and Goldman, FRB-PSI-800013 - 016.
331
See 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1000 (listing Metro and CNR as merchant banking
investments). For more information about these merchant banking activities, see below. Goldman has also asserted
that its investment in Colombian mines was authorized pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “grandfather”
authority. See Report of Changes in Organizational Structure, FR-Y-10, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (4/14/2010),
GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303 (indicating its coal mine investment was “permissible under [Bank Holding
Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant Banking regulations”).
332
See 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477-510, at 505; 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal
Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed exhibit].
333
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014); Morgan Stanley Investment Management portfolio list,
Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html (including Triana
Energy, a natural gas exploration and production company; Trinity, a carbon dioxide pipeline company; and Sterling
Energy, a natural gas gathering, processing and marketing company).
334
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014); discussion of Morgan Stanley’s merchant banking
activities in that financial holding company’s overview, below.
335
See, e.g., undated organizational chart prepared by Goldman for the Subcommittee, PSI-Goldman-10-000002.
74
Asset Management business segment.
336
The evidence indicated that commodities-related
merchant banking investments were being made by multiple, unrelated units throughout each
financial holding company.
Ongoing merchant banking issues at the financial holding companies include whether
their physical commodity activities qualify as merchant banking investments or improperly mix
banking with commerce; and ensuring that financial holding companies’ merchant banking
activities do not undermine the safety and soundness of the firms.
(5) Narrowly Enforcing Prudential Limits
Still another key regulatory issue has to do with enforcing the statutory, regulatory, and
company-specific prudential limits created to restrict the overall size of a bank’s physical
commodity activities and reduce the related risks. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, its
implementing regulations, and the grants of complementary authority issued by the Federal
Reserve all contain prudential limits on the volume of a holding company’s physical commodity
activities. However, those prudential limits, which generally seek to place a cap on the
investments as a percentage of the firm’s assets or capital, have implementation and enforcement
issues that have not been resolved.
The only statutory limit is in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s grandfather clause which
provides that the dollar value of the physical commodity activities engaged in by the financial
holding company’s subsidiaries under the clause cannot exceed 5% of the subsidiaries’
“aggregate consolidated assets” or 5% of the financial holding company parent’s “total
consolidated assets,” unless the Federal Reserve increases the cap.
337
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not place any statutory limit on activities that may be
conducted under its complementary authority. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve has
conditioned its approval of complementary activities on a commitment by the relevant financial
holding company that the dollar value of its physical commodity holdings will not exceed 5% of
the financial holding company’s consolidated Tier I capital.
338
The Federal Reserve also initially
restricted merchant banking investments to generally no more than 30% of financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, but removed that cap in 2002.
339
The two 5% limits on grandfathered and complementary activities apply to different
attributes (assets versus capital) and are applied and enforced separately.
340
Both limits raise
336
See, e.g., 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at
003 - 004.
337
See Section 103(a) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, P.L. 106-102, codified at 12 U.S.C. §1811.
338
See, e.g., 11/18/2005 “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity,”
prepared by Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20051118/attachment.pdf.
339
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds);10/22/2004 “Merchant
Banking: Mixing Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” prepared by the Congressional
Research Service, at 4; 67 Federal Register 3786 (2002). The Federal Reserve terminated the size limit after
imposing specific capital requirements for merchant banking investments.
340
Federal Reserve briefing of the Subcommittee (12/13/2013).
75
multiple enforcement concerns. One issue is whether financial holding companies are excluding
major categories of assets.
341
For example, a report prepared by the Federal Reserve staff found
that financial holding companies included the dollar value of leases on power plants when
calculating covered assets for purposes of the 5% Tier I capital cap, but excluded leases on
infrastructure, such as oil and gas storage facilities.
342
Another tactic used by one financial
holding company was to exclude the physical commodities held by its bank when calculating the
financial holding company’s physical commodity assets subject to the Federal Reserve’s 5%
complementary limit.
343
A second concern involves how the financial holding companies are valuing their
physical commodity assets for purposes of calculating the limits. During its recent review of
bank involvement with physical commodities, the Federal Reserve uncovered and disallowed
several valuation practices, such as a dubious netting of income from tolling agreements.
344
Still another issue is whether, given the enormous size of the financial holding companies
involved with physical commodities, the 5% limits provide sufficient protection from financial
risk for both the firms and the commodities markets.
345
As of March 2014, the six largest bank
holding companies reported aggregated assets of nearly $10 trillion.
346
The enormous value of
their assets means that even a rigorous 5% Tier 1 capital limit – as opposed to the current porous
one – would permit multi-billion-dollar physical commodity activities which, in the event of
losses, could impact both the financial institutions and the markets. In addition, those limits fail
to prevent massive inflows of capital into the relatively small commodities markets, under the
control of a relatively small number of financial holding companies, raising concerns about
undue economic concentration and market manipulation.
347
Since enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, a handful of financial holding
companies have significantly expanded their involvement with physical commodities. They
have done so despite prudential limits designed to constrain that growth and the attendant risks.
Loopholes and inappropriate interpretations have rendered the limits largely ineffective and in
need of clarification and renewal.
B. Reviewing Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities, 2009-2013
After the financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve, as well as other U.S. bank
regulators, undertook new efforts to identify hidden or under-appreciated risks in the U.S.
banking system. As part of that effort, the Federal Reserve identified financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities as creating risks requiring a special review. The
341
See discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
342
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506.
343
Id. For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
344
For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
345
See, e.g., Rosner Testimony, at 6.
346
See “Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion,” (as of 6/30/2014), Federal Reserve System,
National Information Center,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (reflecting the aggregated
assets of the six largest U.S. banks at $9.8 trillion).
347
In evaluating requests for complementary authority, the Federal Reserve is statutorily required to consider “undue
concentration of resources.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A).
76
resulting special review, which spanned three years, not only surveyed the financial holding
companies’ physical commodity activities, but also identified numerous risks associated with
those activities, including operational risks, inadequate risk management, insufficient capital, and
ineffective regulatory safeguards. It offered multiple recommendations to reduce financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities and ameliorate the associated risks.
(1) Initiating the Special Physical Commodities Review
After the 2008 financial crisis disclosed vulnerabilities in federal oversight of the largest
banks, the Federal Reserve revamped its risk governance system. In 2009, the Federal Reserve
replaced its Large Financial Institutions section with the Large Institution Supervision
Coordinating Committee (LISCC), headed by senior Federal Reserve personnel.
348
The Inspector General for the Federal Reserve System has explained that LISCC was
created to:
“provide strategic and policy direction for supervisory activities across the Federal
Reserve System, improve the consistency and quality of supervision, incorporate
systemic risk considerations, and monitor the execution of the resulting supervisory
program.”
349
In addition to supervisory personnel, LISCC was staffed with economists, quantitative analysts,
payment system specialists, and other experts to enable it to take a multidisciplinary approach to
identifying and analyzing risks affecting systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and
the global banking system.
350
In 2009, LISCC established an Operating Committee composed of senior regulatory
officials to develop prudential standards for and oversee the largest SIFIs within its jurisdiction,
generally those whose assets exceeded $50 billion.
351
To carry out its oversight obligations, the
Operating Committee established several subgroups, including a Risk Secretariat charged with
identifying key risks affecting the SIFIs, setting priorities for investigating those risks, and
providing the resources needed to conduct the risk investigations.
352
In 2009, after weighing investigative priorities and its limited resources, the Risk
Secretariat identified bank involvement with physical commodities as a major emerging risk and
348
5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General letter, at 3,http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf.
349
Id. at 4.
350
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
351
5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General letter, at 3,http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf. In 2012, those
SIFIs included eight domestic and four foreign-owned firms, the majority of which were financial holding
companies of major banks. Id.
352
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).. Other subgroups created by the Operating
Committee include the Capital Performance Secretariat, the Data Team, Products and Processes, the Tactical Action
Group, and Vetting. 5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General letter, at 4,http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf.
77
approved a special review of those activities.
353
Dan Sullivan, then Assistant Vice President and
Department Head of Market Risk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY),
submitted the proposal for a comprehensive review of physical commodity activities, explained
why it should be approved on a priority basis, and agreed to “sponsor” the investigative effort, if
approved.
354
In early 2010, the Risk Secretariat agreed to provide sufficient resources for an in-depth,
multi-firm, multi-year review of the physical commodity activities at financial holding
companies. The special review was designed to accomplish the following objectives:
• “Deepen our understanding of the scope of commodity trading at SIFIs and assess the
inherent risks, the quality of risk reporting and controls, and capital methodologies
with an emphasis on the physical industrial commodity activities. Lead efforts to
develop a complete assessment of risk in commodity related industrial activities
across risk disciplines.
• Assess the broader implications of SIFIs in the commodity markets along with non-
financial traditional firms and the impact on markets.
• Provide product knowledge expertise and analysis in support for NY Banking
Applications and the Legal divisions in NY and the Board on physical commodity
applications (under complementary authority).”
355
(2) Conducting the Special Review
After approving the special review, LISCC’s Risk Secretariat directed formation of a
Commodities Team to perform the work. To gather and analyze information, the Commodities
Team drew from past and ongoing commodities examinations, and conducted its own
investigative work. In October 2012, the team concluded the special review with a private
presentation to Federal Reserve supervisors summarizing its overall findings and
recommendations.
356
The Commodities Team then ceased its active investigation but continued
in existence for nearly a year, assisting Federal Reserve personnel with a variety of physical
commodity issues until dissolving in 2013.
357
Creating the Commodities Team. In the first quarter of 2010, the Risk Secretariat
directed formation of the Commodities Team to conduct the special review.
358
To ensure that
the team had the necessary expertise in physical commodities, risk management, capital
353
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). The Risk Secretariat has also approved other
horizontal, multi-firm investigations including those related to capital stress testing and capital adequacy. See, e.g.,
“Implementing Wall Street Reform: Enhancing Bank Supervision and Reducing Systemic Risk,” hearing before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. Hrg. 112-714 (6/6/2012), at 47, prepared
statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Federal Reserve Governor,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg78813/html/CHRG-112shrg78813.htm.
354
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). See also 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work
Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 467 [sealed exhibit].
355
See 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 468.
356
See 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510 [sealed exhibit].
357
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
358
Id.
78
planning, insurance, and related issues, personnel for the Commodities Team were drawn from
Federal Reserve supervisory ranks and new hires from industry. The Commodities Team had
about a half dozen members at any one time.
359
From the team’s inception, the Project Manager
was Wai Wong, a senior Federal Reserve regulator with expertise in capital markets risk.
360
The team was based in New York, and was housed and supported by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY). It also worked closely with and received assistance from the
Federal Reserve examination teams assigned to the institutions being examined, as well as
Federal Reserve personnel in Washington, D.C., Richmond, and New York.
361
From 2010 to
2012, the Commodities Team members spent the bulk of their time conducting the commodities
review.
362
Developing a Work Plan. To accomplish their work, the Commodities Team drew on a
“discovery review” that had been conducted prior to the team’s formation to justify the larger
investigation,
363
as well as earlier targeted examinations.
364
Those past efforts helped the team
gain a greater understanding of the commodities, products, operations, and risks involved in the
banks’ physical commodity activities.
In 2011, the Commodities Team drew up its own work plan.
365
One part of the 2011
Work Plan, entitled: “Why is this a priority,” gave five key reasons for the special review of
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities:
• “Key business targeted for expansion and growth
359
Id. In addition to Mssrs. Sullivan and Wong, over time other team members and persons associated with the
Commodities Team included Xiaobin Cai, Eric Caban, Philip Etherton, Nathan Fujiki, Irina Gvozd, David Gross,
Lyon Hardgrave, Sarah J ackson, and Michael Nelson. See, e.g., 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 [sealed
exhibit].
360
Id. See also 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, at FRB-PSI-200467. In May 2013, shortly before the
team’s dissolution, he was replaced by Nathan Fujiki, another Commodities Team member. Subcommittee briefing
by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
361
Id.
362
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
363
See undated, but likely 2009 “Scope Discovery Review Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Group Commodities,” prepared
by Federal Reserve Bank New York examiners, FRB-PSI-200511 - 515 [sealed exhibit]; 4/8/2010 “Discovery
Review Product Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Global Commodities,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Commodities
Team, FRB-PSI-303698 - 767 [sealed exhibit]; 5/11/2010 “Goldman Sachs Commodities[:] Discovery Review
Product Memo Vetting Presentation,” prepared by Federal Reserve Commodities Team, FRB-PSI-200586-599)
[sealed exhibit].
364
See, e.g., 5/11/2009 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Product Memo Goldman Sachs Group (GS) Market
Risk Amendment,” prepared by FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-304941 - 959, at 942 (identifying concerns with VAR
modeling used for commodities)[sealed exhibit]; 3/20/2009 letter from Federal Reserve to Morgan Stanley, FRB-
PSI-304613 - 619, at 613 (announcing “target review of Morgan Stanley’s commodities business for six weeks” at
its offices in New York); 10/5/2009 letter from Federal Reserve to Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-304620 - 626, at 620
(announcing “target review of Morgan Stanley’s commodities business for approximately four weeks” at its offices
in London); 10/19/2009 “Scope Memorandum[:] Morgan Stanley Euro Commodities, Control Validation Target
Exam,” prepared by FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-304665 - 672 [sealed exhibit]; 5/24/2010 letter from Federal
Reserve to Morgan Stanley, “Global Oil Trading Review beginning J une 22, 2010,” FRB-PSI-304673 - 677, at 673
(announcing “a control validation review of Morgan Stanley’s global oil trading desks for approximately six weeks”
at its offices in New York).
365
See 2011 Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 472; and 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477, at 480.
79
• Size and complexity of the business
• Weaknesses in Risk Management and Valuation
• Raises issues regarding Commerce vs. Banking
• Capital measures low relative to non-banking players”
366
On the first two points, the 2011 Work Plan noted that “SIFIs exposures are growing and
cover a broad range of commodity physical industrial activities.”
367
It also
observed that several
large financial institutions:
“continue to expand in the physical commodities markets, with an emphasis on leasing
and owning assets such as power plants, oil and natural gas storage facilities, and
transportation assets (e.g. oil tankers or product pipelines). MS has $13.1 billion in
commodity assets, and Goldman Sachs as $26 billion.”
368
On the third point, the 2011 Work Plan noted that “the Management framework used by
banks for physical assets is the same framework used for financial derivatives products,”
369
and
that “most risk measures such as [Value-at-Risk] do not capture many risk components to
physical commodities.”
370
These concerns about risk management weaknesses built upon an
earlier Federal Reserve memorandum finding significant “limitations with VaR calculations due
to the large number of proxies used, unstable correlations and issues with seasonality and manual
processes.”
371
On the fourth point, the Commodities Team was concerned that, by buying, selling and
maintaining ownership interests in physical commodities, banks appeared to be engaging in
commercial activities in direct competition with non-banking firms, contrary to longstanding
principles against mixing banking with commerce.
372
As to the fifth and final point, the Commodities Team was concerned that financial firms
were inadequately prepared for possible losses associated with their physical commodity
activities. In particular, preliminary research had shown that commercial firms engaged in the
same activities retained capital in amounts several times greater than those of banks engaged in
them, raising concerns that banks were not fully protected from financial loss in the case of an
operational failure or catastrophic event.
373
Conducting Examinations. Over the next two years, the Commodities Team conducted
an extensive review of physical commodity activities at ten SIFIs.
374
Goldman Sachs,
J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley received the most attention due to their having the most
366
2011 Work Plan, at FRB-PSI-200471.
367
Id. at 464.
368
Id. at 465 (emphasis omitted).
369
Id. at 466.
370
Id. at 465.
371
Undated “Update on Trading in Commodities,” memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-
200419 - 423, at 419 [sealed exhibit].
372
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
373
Id.
374
Id.; 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200480 [sealed exhibit].
80
extensive commodity holdings and activities. The other seven firms, Bank of America, Barclays
Capital, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and GE Capital, received relatively
less scrutiny because they had less extensive physical commodity activities.
To conduct the review, the Commodities Team used a mix of targeted and routine
examinations and continuous monitoring reviews to collect and analyze needed information.
375
The Team eventually conducted targeted examinations exploring specific commodities issues at
four financial holding companies, J PMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, and
Barclays.
376
It collected additional information about physical commodity activities at Goldman
Sachs, Citigroup, GE Capital, and Deutsche Bank using routine examinations and ongoing,
continuous monitoring reviews.
377
Issuing Reports. In connection with its work, the Commodities Team produced
numerous interim examination reports, memoranda, and analyses documenting various aspects of
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities. These internal reports were
made available to Federal Reserve personnel, but not to the public.
A number of the reports examined the banks selected as case studies for this Report. For
example, a Commodities Team analysis of J PMorgan reported that its “Global Commodities
Group is a strategic priority for the firm, and includes financial and physical capabilities across
oil, gas, power, metals, agriculturals, plastics, environmental markets, and weather.”
378
The
Commodities Team wrote: “Since 2006 the firm [J PMorgan] has significantly grown its physical
activities, largely through acquisition, and has joined the top tier (along with [Morgan Stanley]
and [Goldman Sachs]) among banks in commodities.” A 2009 analysis found that:
“[Goldman Sachs] is one of the largest players in the commodities market and the
business has been a material driver of revenue for the firm. … Goldman’s commodities
business is active in the physical markets, in terms of trading, transporting, and storing
physical commodities as well as owning power generation and other physical assets.”
379
A 2011 targeted examination of Morgan Stanley focused on its power plant activities in
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), and provided in-depth reviews of its insurance
arrangements, operational risk management, regulatory compliance procedures, vendor
management, and internal audit coverage.
380
Among other problems, the examination found that
Morgan Stanley’s operational risk capital calculations improperly excluded key activities, and
that Morgan Stanley had valuation issues, an incomplete database of operational and
environmental incidents, poor vendor management, and insufficient insurance.
375
Id.
376
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200480.
377
Id.
378
Undated but likely 2013 “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,” prepared by FRBNY Commodities
Team, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 300 [sealed exhibit].
379
Undated but likely 2009 “Scope Discovery Review Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Group Commodities,” prepared by
FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-200511 - 515 [sealed exhibit].
380
See 10/30/2011 “Supervisory Assessment – Multiple Exams Product Memo[:] Morgan Stanley Commodities,”
prepared by FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-304747 - 797 [sealed exhibit].
81
Still another set of reports, prepared by the Commodities Team in connection with an
analysis of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause, provided detailed information about the
commodity activities at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley prior to 1997 and more recently.
381
Ultimately, in October 2012, the Commodities Team produced a Summary Report
highlighting key supervisory concerns and offering recommendations to reduce the attendant
risks.
382
This report was presented to Federal Reserve senior management, but not to any
Federal Reserve Governors or the public.
383
(3) Documenting Extensive, High Risk Commodity Activities
The written materials produced by the Commodities Team painted a detailed picture of
the rapidly expanding, complex physical commodity activities underway at major bank holding
companies from the mid-2000s to 2012. The special review documented an unprecedented level
of bank involvement in the energy, metal, and agricultural commodity markets, as well as a wide
range of troubling risks and inadequate risk management practices.
(a) Summarizing Banks’ Physical Commodities Activities
In its 2012 report summarizing the special review, the Commodities Team concluded that
the ten financial holding companies it had examined had “significant footprints in physical
commodity activities.”
384
To provide an overview of the physical commodity activities
involved, the report provided a two-page list of representative bank activities in oil and gas
storage and transport, electrical power generation, shipping, metal warehousing, and coal and
uranium mining.
Oil and Gas. The 2012 Summary Report found that Morgan Stanley then held
“operating leases on over 100 oil storage tank field with 58 million barrels of storage capacity
globally and 18 natural gas storage facilities in US and Europe.”
385
It reported that J PMorgan
had a “significant global oil storage portfolio (25 [million barrel] capacity) … along with 19
Natural Gas storage facilities on lease.”
386
And it noted that Bank of America had “23 oil
storage facilities and 54 natural gas facilities … leased for storage.”
387
Power Generation. The 2012 Summary Report found that J PMorgan had “14 tolling
agreements (operating lease on power plants) of which one is for a power plant that generates
6% of the maximum total output of the California Electricity grid, and potentially up to 12% of
381
See, e.g., undated but likely 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by FRBNY, FRB-PSI-200428-454 [sealed exhibit]; 4/19/2011
“Commodities Activities at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley[:] 4(o) permissibility analysis overlaid on GS and
MS activities,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200944 - 959 [sealed exhibit].
382
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510. [sealed exhibit]
383
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
384
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200485 [sealed exhibit].
385
Id.
386
Id.
387
Id.
82
average electricity demand.”
388
It indicated that J PMorgan had also bought and sold over $1
billion worth of power plants over the prior three years. In addition, the 2012 Summary Report
found that Morgan Stanley owned 6 domestic and international power plants; Bank of America
could make contingent power purchases from several nuclear power plants; and Goldman Sachs
had four tolling agreements and a wholly-owned subsidiary, Cogentrix, withownership interests
in over 30 power plants.
389
Shipping. The 2012 Summary Report found that Morgan Stanley had “over 100 ships
under time charters or voyages for movement of oil product, and was ranked 9
th
globally in
shipping oil distillates in 2009.”
390
It also noted that Morgan Stanley was “[c]urrently growing
its ability to ship Liquefied Natural Gas.” In addition, the Summary Report observed that
J PMorgan and Goldman Sachs had a “total of 20-25 ships under time charters or voyages
transporting oil [and] Liquefied Natural Gas.”
391
Metals. The 2012 Summary Report found that Goldman Sachs owned “Metro
Warehouse which controls 84 metal warehouse/storage facilities globally” and qualified as a
London Metals Exchange storage provider.
392
It also reported that J PMorgan had acquired
“Henry ath metals warehouse (LME certified base metals warehousing/storage worldwide),”
and that J PMorgan’s “total base metal inventory was as high as $8 [billion]” during the first
quarter of 2012.
393
Coal. The 2012 Summary Report found that all of the financial holding companies
reviewed conducted “physical coal trading involv[ing the] shipment of coals.”
394
It also noted
that Goldman Sachs had acquired a Colombian coal mine valued at $204 million, which had also
included associated rail transportation for the coal.
395
Uranium. The 2012 Summary Report also found that Goldman Sachs had conducted “a
uranium trading business that engages in the trading of the underlying commodity.”
396
Altogether, the 2012 Summary Report showed how, in the space of one decade, large
U.S. bank holding companies had developed and expanded multi-billion-dollar commodity
activities involving energy, critical metals, and associated storage and transport functions vital to
U.S. commerce and defense.
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
Id. at 486.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
Id.
395
Id.
396
Id. While the assessment referred to trading “fully enriched uranium,” Goldman told the Subcommittee that it
has not traded any enriched uranium. Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
83
(b) Identifying Multiple Risks
In addition to describing the physical commodity activities underway at ten large
financial holding companies, the special review conducted by the Commodities Team
catalogued, investigated, and analyzed numerous risks and related issues of concern associated
with those activities. Problems included multiple operational risks, weaknesses in risk
management, weak valuation practices, market manipulation concerns, reputational risks,
insufficient capital, and ineffective limits.
The Commodities Team observed that one of the central challenges facing financial
holding companies engaging in physical commodities activities is that the risk management
techniques applicable to the financial world may not translate well to the physical world. Mining
coal, producing electric power, transporting and storing oil and gas, storing uranium, operating a
natural gas compression facility, and owning gasoline stations are all complex businesses with
multiple risks varying from the commonplace to unexpected disasters. Customers can dry up.
Labor can go on strike. Equipment can break down. Inventories can be too high or too low.
Vendors can cause problems. Prices may spike or fall. Regulations can change. Transportation
can become difficult. There can be an environmental, health, or safety event. Some of these
commercial operational risks may be small, while others may be catastrophic.
Rather than survey all of these types of operational risks, the Federal Reserve’s review
focused on the direct risks associated with the storage, transport, production, and supply of
physical commodities. They included the risks associated with a catastrophic event, including
costs not covered by insurance; market and valuation risks including valuation problems leading
to insufficient capital or insurance; and reputational risks such as allegations of price
manipulation or pressures to pay unanticipated costs associated with an affiliate.
Catastrophic Event Risks. One of the greatest challenges in the commodities business
is dealing with the risk of a catastrophic event, such as an oil spill or gas explosion. Identifying
and quantifying those event risks are difficult tasks.
397
In particular, a lack of data on infrequent
events makes it extraordinarily difficult to predict with any accuracy whether, when, and to what
degree they may occur.
398
The 2012 Summary Report found that building risk models for “very infrequent, but high
impact events is very much an art,”
399
and that financial holding companies had very different
approaches to quantifying those risks.
400
According to the special review, for example, both
397
See “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding
Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” prepared by Federal Reserve, 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329 (daily ed. J an.
21, 2014).
398
These prediction challenges are not isolated to the financial world. For example, in the aftermath of the
Challenger shuttle disaster, Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman famously challenged NASA’s probability of total
failure of a space shuttle mission, which was purportedly 1 in 100,000. While challenging the mathematical rigor of
that determination, he noted that some engineers had numbers suggesting failure rates more along the lines of 1 in
200. “Personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle,” Richard Feynman, (6/6/1986),http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt.
399
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 [sealed exhibit].
400
Id.
84
Morgan Stanley and J PMorgan assumed that the maximum dollar loss for a power plant that
experienced a catastrophic event was simply the value of the facility itself, without adding in
costs reflecting such factors as loss of life, property damage, or legal expenses.
401
The special
review determined that Goldman Sachs had developed a power plant destruction loss model, but
it, too, had an upper bound limited to the current value of its most valuable power plant. The
special review noted that Bank of America had no total loss model for its commodity activities at
all.
402
In addition to upper bounds that were set too low, the special review found that financial
holding company model assumptions tended to be “aggressive” and resulted in “lower capital
levels than would be for a stand alone entity.”
403
For example, the review found that J PMorgan
had determined that an oil spill into water would cause the largest potential single loss to the firm
of all of its physical commodities businesses, and estimated that the maximum oil spill loss
would be $497 million.
404
According to the special review, J PMorgan then applied
“diversification benefits” and other assumptions to reduce its estimated capital exposure from
$497 million to about $50 million.
405
The final capital calculation was, thus, one tenth of the
original loss estimate. In another case involving Bank of America, the special review found that
its stand alone capital for its commodity activities was approximately $208 million, with no
capital at all allocated for a catastrophic loss.
406
The 2012 Summary Report summarized the problems with managing catastrophic risks
as follows:
“Modeling for the tail risk or maximum loss for a broad range of physical commodities
activities such as power generation, transportation and refining are difficult to measure
and potentially inadequately capitalized under current framework. Practices for
measuring stress loss are highly disparate [a]cross firms. Use of traditional BHC [Bank
Holding Company] financial risk measure processes and techniques do not appear to be
appropriate for Physical Commodity Activities.”
407
In short, the report found that financial holding companies were not identifying or quantifying
catastrophic event risks in a standard or appropriate way, and most were clearly
underappreciating such risks.
Market and Valuation Risks. The Commodities Team found similar problems with
how financial holding companies valued their physical commodities and associated facilities for
purposes of calculating their market risk. Market risk is the “risk due to factors that affect the
401
Id.
402
Id.
403
Id..
404
Id. at 494.
405
Id. at 493. This $50 million figure stands in sharp contrast to the over $40 billion in losses suffered by BP as a
result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See 2013 “Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013,” prepared by BP, BP
website,http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2013.pdf .
406
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 [sealed exhibit].
407
Id. at 481.
85
overall performance of the financial markets.”
408
It depends upon accurate asset valuations, which
are central to calculating appropriate levels of insurance and capital. The 2012 Summary Report
determined that the financial holding companies were using a variety of valuation methods,
many of which contained significant flaws.
The 2012 Summary Report found, for example, that the financial holding companies
were using different valuation methods in different settings for the same physical commodity
assets, leading to the use of one valuation method for the company’s internal metrics, another for
their capital calculations, and perhaps another for their public reporting. The report determined
that the different valuation methods could lead to profit and loss figures that varied significantly
from revenues reported to the public under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP).
409
The 2012 Summary Report found that, in some cases, this variance exceeded $1
billion.
410
The 2012 Summary Report provided an example involving oil cargoes. It found that, for
its internal performance metrics, Morgan Stanley valued its oil cargos at the highest price
available at any port in the world minus the transportation cost of getting it to its final
destination.
411
By contrast, the report found that, under GAAP, the bank was required to value
its oil cargos using spot market prices.
412
The Summary Report noted that J PMorgan took a
more conservative approach, valuing its oil cargos at the lowest observed destination price for its
internal performance metrics, and using the lower of cost or market prices for its financial
reporting under GAAP.
413
These different approaches led to very different cargo values for
purposes of calculating capital and market risk, with lower cargo values resulting in less capital.
Similarly, when looking at how the banks valued oil when held in storage, the 2012
Summary Report found very different approaches. It determined that Morgan Stanley used a
basket of calendar spread options to calculate the value of its stored oil; J PMorgan used a model
based on the intrinsic value of the highest calendar spread for the oil; and Bank of America used
a Monte Carlo simulation of an option.
414
Again, the three approaches produced different dollar
values, with different consequences for capital and market risk management calculations.
In a third analysis, the 2012 Summary Report found that the financial holding companies
varied somewhat in how they valued physical equipment, such as power plants. It determined
that most held the plants on their books as an investment at cost, and used tolling agreements to
capture the ongoing economic value. Tolling agreements typically capture the value of the
spread between a plant’s output (electricity) and its fuel inputs (coal or gas). The 2012 Summary
Report determined that, while this approach provided a liquid derivative representation of an
illiquid, hard-to-value asset, this method of valuation also had weaknesses that would not be
reflected in stress tests.
415
For example, depending upon how a tolling agreement is worded, a
408
2014 “Market Risk,” Investopedia website,http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketrisk.asp.
409
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200501 - 502 [sealed exhibit].
410
Id. at 495.
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
Id.
414
Id. at 496.
415
Id. at 493, 496.
86
bank may have to make payments to buy output from a power plant that isn’t producing any
power, or have to buy all of the production of a facility whose output is no longer valuable. In
addition, the derivatives-based valuation models might not accurately reflect the nature of the
market risks and price variability associated with specific physical commodity activities.
Placing accurate values on power plants, tolling agreements, and lease arrangements are
critical to financial holding companies setting adequate insurance and capital levels. The 2012
Summary Report warned, however, that the valuation techniques being used by financial holding
companies for their physical commodity activities were not consistent, comprehensive, or
reliable.
Reputational Risk. In addition to catastrophic, market, and valuation risks, the
Commodities Team examined reputational risks associated with physical commodity activities.
The 2012 Summary Report identified two types of reputational risks associated with physical
commodities activities, those associated with allegations of price manipulation and those
associated with being pressured to pay for an affiliate’s losses.
The first type of reputation risk involved the risk of being accused of misusing physical
commodity activities to engage in price manipulation:
“Having access to physical markets gives the firms access to supply/demand information
that is reportedly vital to running a profitable global commodities business. Many of
these physical activities involve warehousing and storing commodity products, and
therefore the control of the supply of certain commodities in specific geographic regions,
which raises the potential for price manipulation issues.”
416
The report stated: “In the past few years, all the banks involved in these markets have been
accused and/or charged of manipulating markets.”
417
The report’s analysis indicated that financial holding companies conducting physical
commodity activities opened themselves up to charges of being engaged in market or price
manipulation. Banks that avoided physical commodity activities were less vulnerable to those
types of allegations. The analysis also identified two different aspects of price manipulation
allegations, accusations regarding misusing inside information to make profitable trades, and
accusations regarding the improper manipulation of supplies to affect commodity prices.
Suspicions related to misuse of non-public information arise from the fact that financial
holding companies conducting commodity trades are simultaneously privy to commodity
decisions being made by numerous clients, some of which may be important market participants.
In addition, financial holding companies operating warehouses, pipelines, or shipping businesses
gain access to non-public information that can be used to make profitable trading decisions.
While commodity laws traditionally have not barred the use of non-public information in the
same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading advantages deepen when the trader is
416
Id. at 492.
417
Id.
87
a large financial institution with access to non-public information about numerous clients as well
as its own extensive commodity activities.
A related concern is when financial holding companies operate businesses that can
directly affect market supplies at the same time they are trading commodity-related financial
instruments on exchanges or over the counter. Cancelling warrants that lengthen a warehouse
queue, causing congestion in electricity markets, or supplying copper to an exchange traded fund
are actions that can and have elicited charges of market manipulation.
418
In recent years, banks and their holding companies have settled allegations of price
manipulation by paying substantial fines and legal fees. For example, in J uly 2013, J PMorgan
paid $410 million to settle charges by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that
the bank had manipulated electricity markets in California and the Midwest, as further described
below.
419
In J anuary 2013, Deutsche Bank paid $1.6 million to settle FERC price manipulation
charges that, in 2010, it had “engag[ed] in a scheme in which [the bank] entered into physical
transactions to benefit its financial position,” including by making physical electricity trades to
offset losses in electricity-related financial instruments held by the bank.
420
Also in 2013,
Barclays Bank contested charges by FERC imposing a $453 million civil penalty on the bank for
“manipulating electric energy prices in California and other western markets between November
2006 and December 2008.”
421
Banks have also been accused by regulators
422
and plaintiffs
423
of
rigging metals markets as well.
The 2012 Summary Report warned: “Reputational risks can be significant with frequent
occurrences and accusations of pricing manipulation.”
424
What the Summary Report failed also
to acknowledge is that price manipulation is not just a matter of reputational risk, but an
increasing area of actual misconduct by bank holding companies leading to civil and criminal
proceedings, violations of law, substantial fines, and enormous legal fees. The Summary Report
contained little analysis and no recommendations on how regulators should oversee or manage
the conflicts of interest inherent in a financial holding company that engages simultaneously in
commodities trading and physical commodity activities like storing, transporting, or supplying
commodities.
418
See, e.g., In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC, FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, Order Approving Stipulation
and Consent Agreement, (1/22/2013 ), 142 FERC at ¶ 61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-IN12-4-000.pdf ; Superior Extrusion v. Goldman Sachs,
(USDC ED Mich.), Complaint, (8/1/2013), at ¶¶ 3, 6, 11.
419
7/30/2013 FERC press release, “J P Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to
Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VDVXWKPD9aQ.
420
1/22/2013 FERC press release, “FERC Approves Market Manipulation Settlement with Deutsche Bank,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-1/01-22-13.asp; In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC,
FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, (1/22/2013 ), 142 FERC at ¶
61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-IN12-4-000.pdf .
421
7/16/2013 FERC press release, “FERC Orders $453 Million in Penalties for Western Power Market
Manipulation,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-16-13.asp#.VDFvefldVu0.
422
See, e.g., “Metals, Currency Rigging Is Worse Than Libor, Bafin Says,” Bloomberg, Karin Matussek and Oliver
Suess, (1/17/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-16/metals-currency-rigging-worse-than-libor-bafin-s-
koenig-says.html. (quoting Elke Koenig, the top financial regulator in Germany).
423
See, e.g., Nicholson v. The Bank of Nova Scotia et al, Case No. 14cv05682 (USDC SD NY), (7/25/2014).
424
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477-510, at 482 [sealed exhibit].
88
The 2012 Summary Report identified a second, very different type of reputational risk
that arises when a financial holding company comes under pressure, for reputational reasons, to
provide financial support for an affiliate or other party that has suffered significant losses or is
suspected of misconduct. The 2012 Summary Report highlighted as an example BP’s decision
to pay damages associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
425
The same risk was evident in
the financial crisis when, for reputational reasons, firms like Bear Stearns and State Street Bank
assumed significant financial obligations incurred by hedge funds with which they were
associated but had no direct legal responsibility.
426
The 2012 Summary Report expressed the opinion that financial holding companies did
not adequately appreciate the reputational risks arising from their involvement with physical
commodity activities.
427
(c) Evaluating Risk Management and Mitigation Practices
After identifying multiple risks associated with physical commodity activities, the 2012
Summary Report discussed ways in which some financial holding companies attempted to
manage and mitigate those risks. The analysis focused in particular on legal structures, use of
third-party vendors, insurance, and capital buffers.
Legal Structures. The 2012 Summary Report found that one of the primary ways that
financial holding companies sought to limit their risk for physical commodity activities was by
creating separate legal structures to conduct the activities.
428
For example, the report found that
Goldman Sachs typically purchased companies that engaged in power generation, rather than
purchased the physical power generation assets directly, in part to shield itself from liability for
activities at the power plant.
429
Similarly, the report found that Goldman Sachs avoided “overt
control of its coal mine business,” by using a subsidiary as the direct owner and by not hedging
its underlying coal exposures, in an attempt to demonstrate the legal distinction between the
financial holding company and its affiliate.
430
The 2012 Summary Report raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of this
approach. It stated:
425
Id. at 482, 492.
426
See 1/2011 “Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in the United States,” prepared by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, at 286,http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173545/http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/fci
c_final_report_full.pdf (explaining how the failure of two Bear Stearns funds led to the government bailout of the
firm itself). See also “Test Case on the Charles,” Raj Date, Cambridge Winter Center for Finantial Institutions
Policy (6/12/2010),http://www.cambridgewinter.org/Cambridge_Winter/Archives/Ent
ries/2010/6/12_TEST_CASE_ON_THE_CHARLES_files/state%20street%20volcker%20061
210.pdf (explaining how State Street bailed out funds that it managed, but then itself needed aid via several
taxpayer-backed programs).
427
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200492.
428
Id. at 488.
429
Id. at 489.
430
Id.
89
“There is no available historical precedent to support … the effectiveness of the ‘legal
structure’ mitigation strategy, rather there have been cases where a company using third
part[y] vendors was itself held liable for environmental damage.
“There have been cases where firms, due for example to action of their employees which
damaged legal protections, have been held legally liable for fines and damages (e.g. the
firm Total was held responsible for the spill of oil on a ship it did not own due to not
following internal policies). …
“The integrity of legal structures cannot be guaranteed as firms could be compelled for
reputational or other reasons to cover damages from an event such as in the Deepwater
Horizon incident when BP incurred losses even though they were not the operator.”
431
In addition, financial holding companies using subsidiaries to conduct physical
commodity activities are exposed to a “Catch-22” legal problem.
432
On the one hand, if the firm
seeks to actively mitigate the risks associated with the physical commodity activities by exerting
control over the subsidiary’s management or operations, its actions will increase the connections
between the parent and the subsidiary and increase the likelihood that any future liability
incurred by the subsidiary will be imputed to the parent, facilitating the piercing of the legal
distinctions between the two corporate entities. On the other hand, if the firm does not exert
control over the subsidiary’s management or operations, then its subsidiary may incur greater
risk, which may or may not ultimately flow back as liabilities to the parent.
433
This tension may be further exacerbated if the subsidiary is held as a merchant banking
investment, which bars the financial company from routinely managing the portfolio
company.
434
While creating separate legal structures may help minimize some of the risks that could
flow back to a financial holding company or its other affiliates, the 2012 Summary Report found
that strategy did not ensure financial holding companies would be protected from risk.
435
Third Party Operators. A related mitigation strategy used by some financial holding
companies to avoid potential liabilities involved outsourcing key functions in physical
431
Id.
432
“Catch -22,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catch-22,
(defines “catch-22” as “a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in
the problem or by a rule”). The term was first introduced in a book entitled, Catch-22, written by J oseph Heller.
433
As the Federal Reserve’s recent rulemaking action examining bank involvement with physical commodity
activities put it: “[C]urrent management techniques designed to mitigate risks, such as frequent monitoring of risk,
requirements to restrict the age of transport vessels, and review of disaster plans of third-party transporters, may
have the unintended effect of increasing the potential that the [financial holding company] may become enmeshed in
or liable to some degree from a catastrophic event.” “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and
Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329, 3332,
prepared by the Federal Reserve, (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
434
Merchant Banking Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466 (1/31/2001), codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 225, Subpart J .
435
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489 [sealed exhibit]. See also “Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
90
commodities activities to unrelated third parties. This strategy included, for example, hiring a
third party contractor to run a power plant or operate an oil tanker. The 2012 Summary Report
raised questions about the efficacy of this strategy, noting that “there have been cases where a
company using third part[y] vendors was itself held liable for environmental damage.”
436
The
report also observed that BP was found responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill despite
the fact that BP was not the legal operator of the oil rig and had hired a third party to run it.
437
The report further noted that some financial holding companies exercised ongoing oversight of
their third party vendors, raising the same concerns associated with a subsidiary – that extensive
oversight could also lead to greater liability in the event of a disaster or misconduct.
The 2012 Summary Report concluded: “Vendor Management practices for physical
commodities need[] to be improved.”
438
After describing several problems, the Summary Report
noted: “Current corporate policies do not readily address the unique relationship and dependency
of physical commodities activities with vendors.”
439
Insurance. Another mitigation strategy examined by the 2012 Summary Report was the
use of different types and levels of insurance by the financial holding companies. The 2012
Summary Report questioned the usefulness of this mitigation strategy, after its research
determined that “nsurance companies reportedly will not insure the full event loss due to their
inability to measure the maximum potential loss.”
440
The 2012 Summary Report found that all financial companies retained some form of
insurance for their physical commodity activities and that “nsurance practices [we]re generally
similar among firms.”
441
At the same time, of the institutions whose insurance was reviewed,
Bank of America, Barclays, Goldman Sachs, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley, the Summary
Report found significant variations in the levels of insurance coverage obtained for commodity-
related activities.
442
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report found that the insurance coverage at the financial
holding companies examined appeared to be insufficient. It noted that “[p]hysical commodities
is a notoriously fat-tailed business with [the] insurer only covering limited losses for some
risks.”
443
The 2012 Summary Report found that “n all cases … insurance for … catastrophic
events is capped at a certain level (typically US $1 billion) and firms cannot cover any amount
beyond the cap through insurance.”
444
It also noted that the financial holding companies used
“aggressive assumptions” to minimize estimated losses from a catastrophic event,
445
and found
that, when comparing capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with
436
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489 [sealed exhibit].
437
Id.
438
Id. at 490.
439
Id.
440
Id. at 481.
441
Id. at 491.
442
Id.
443
Id. at 509. See also id. at 500 (noting that insurance companies “do not have comfortable ways to assess the rail
risk and thus avoid insuring the tails” for catastrophic events, such as multi-billion dollar oil spills).
444
Id. at 491.
445
Id. at 493 - 494.
91
“extreme loss scenarios,” “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by billions of
dollars.
446
The 2012 Summary Report concluded that, in the event of a multi-billion-dollar
catastrophe such as a major oil spill, insurance would not protect a financial holding company
from significant costs.
Capital. A final mitigation strategy examined by the 2012 Summary Report was the
extent to which financial holding companies conducting physical commodity activities held
additional capital to cover potential losses stemming from those activities. The Summary Report
noted that capital can provide significant loss absorption capacity and is a critical component in
risk mitigation and bank regulation, but also concluded that “current levels of capital appear
insufficient to protect against a maximum loss potential.”
447
Federal regulations establish several methods for financial holding companies to calculate
the amount of capital they need, with the amount based in part on the value and riskiness of the
activities it undertakes.
448
The 2012 Summary Report raised concerns about how assets were
being valued for capital calculation purposes, whether some assets were being excluded, and
how the capital rules were being applied. The report noted, for example, that “applying capital
allocation methods that are based on financial mark-to-market methodologies to physical
activities leads to considerably lower capital rations than methods used by non-financial firms
engaged in the same businesses.”
449
The Commodities Team also noted that non-financial firms
engaged in similar physical commodity activities were funded with a capital ratio of about 42%,
whereas the subsidiaries of financial holding companies engaged in those activities had a capital
ratio of roughly 8 – 10%.
450
This wide disparity was found to exist across multiple physical
commodity activities including liquid pipelines, natural gas facilities, and electrical power
operations.
451
The 2012 Summary Report also highlighted weaknesses in the capital allocations for
certain physical commodities activities. After examining how oil and gas were valued during
storage and transportation, as well as how transportation, storage, and power generation facilities
themselves were valued, the Commodities Team found inappropriate valuation methods and
significant gaps in capital charges. For example, the report noted that, while commodity-related
hedges may show up in Value-at-Risk measures, underlying leases or tolling agreements may
incur no capital charge at all.
452
446
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
447
Id. at 481.
448
See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 53059 (2012).
449
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200499.
450
Id. at 499, 507.
451
Id. at 499.
452
Id. at 501 - 502.
92
The 2012 Summary Report concluded: “Current levels of capital appear insufficient to
protect against a maximum loss potential – on a stand alone basis.”
453
In addition, it found that
four major financial holding companies, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, J PMorgan, and
Morgan Stanley, had insufficient capital, even when enhanced with insurance, to cover losses
associated with an extreme loss scenario, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Oil Spill Loss Model, or the Deepwater Horizon oil spill event.
454
Put
another way, the report determined that the financial holding companies could incur significant
net losses far in excess of their insurance and capital loss absorption capabilities in the event of a
catastrophic event.
Prudential Limits. One mitigation strategy discussed in the Summary Report involves
financial holding company compliance with the prudential limits put in place by regulators to
restrict the size of their physical commodity activities. As discussed earlier, the Federal Reserve
granted complementary authority to financial holding companies conditioned upon their limiting
the resulting physical commodity activities to less than 5% of their Tier 1 capital. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act imposed a cap on grandfathered activities, using a much higher limit equal to
5% of the financial holding company’s consolidated assets. Separately, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency imposed caps on the amount of certain physical commodities that
can be held in a national bank.
As more fully explained below, those limits have been subject to various interpretations
that have undermined their collective ability to ensure the safety and soundness of the banks and
holding companies engaged in the physical commodity activities. One key problem is that the
limits have not been considered, applied, or enforced in an integrated fashion.
455
In addition,
some financial holding companies have excluded major categories of commodity-related assets
or used dubious valuation methods when calculating compliance with some of the limits.
456
The
2012 Summary Report noted, for example, that J PMorgan had booked “significant amounts of
base metals in the national bank entity,” and did not include those holdings when calculating the
financial holding company’s compliance with the 5% limit on its complementary activities,
noting that, in September 2012, the financial holding company hit “an all time high in physical
holdings.”
457
In response, the 2012 Summary Report indicated that work was being done to develop a
standard approach for valuing assets and called for better disclosures by financial holding
companies to track compliance with the size limits.
458
At the same time, the Summary Report
failed to discuss better integration or enforcement of existing size limits, or whether the limits
themselves needed to be improved.
453
Id. at 481.
454
Id. at 498.
455
See 4/16/2014 comment letter from Subcommittee Chairman Carl Levin to Federal Reserve, “Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking Related to Physical Commodities Docket No. 1479 and RIN 7100 AE-10,” (hereinafter
“Senator Levin Comment Letter”) ,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124566_481901422162_1.pdf.
456
See discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
457
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200506.
458
Id. at 484.
93
(d) Recommendations
In addition to identifying key risks and evaluating mitigation strategies, the 2012
Summary Report offered a number of recommendations to strengthen Federal Reserve oversight
of financial holding company involvement with physical commodities. Those recommendations
were as follows:
“–While action on the 4o authority is still open, BHCs [bank holding companies] will be
able to conduct physical commodity activities under the 4k permissibility/authority and
Merchant Banking.
–Action points include closer monitoring, strengthen the 4k through the applications
process, higher capital.
–Commodity businesses should be looked at in a stand-alone capacity, capital levels
should be aligned to cover maximum potential loss with a buffer.
–If it was not part of the BHC what amount of capital would be needed as a viable
entity. …
–Firms are utilizing operating leases to extract economic value with minimal capital
charge – propose a way to capitalize these leasing arrangement as would be if treated
under capital leasing[.]
–Increase capital requirement for physical commodities activity – which could include[:]
o Eliminate the diversification benefit for ops risk capital and assign a loss
probability equal to the term of the lease and not a one year period or longer.
o Add a specific risk charge – account for the unique nature of these assets[.]
o Treat operating leases as capital lease and back ‘on the balance sheet[.]’
–Improve corporate risk governance on physical commodities activities and strengthen
stress testing practices[.]
–Require formal reporting of physical commodities exposures such as 9YC, !$A and 14Q
and 5% tier 1 capital limit[.]
–Greater definition of regulatory permissibility.”
459
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittees that these recommendations were reviewed
by senior Federal Reserve managers, but were not submitted directly to any member of the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
460
According to Federal Reserve representatives, the
recommendations were “integral” to the Federal Reserve Board’s decision to reconsider its
position on financial holding company involvement with physical commodities and one of many
factors that led to its decision to request public comment on whether new regulations should be
459
Id. at 483 - 484.
460
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
94
issued.
461
Two years after the recommendations were made, however, the Federal Reserve
declined to identify for the Subcommittee any that had actually been implemented.
462
C. Taking Steps to Limit Physical Commodity Activities, 2009-Present
Since 2008, instead of allowing financial holding companies to continue to expand their
involvement with physical commodities, the Federal Reserve has begun to take steps to curb
high risk physical commodity activities at financial holding companies, including by halting
previously permitted activities, denying or delaying requests for expanded activities, and
adopting changes to capital rules that increase protections against commodities-related risks. In
addition, earlier this year, the Federal Reserve sought public comment on whether it should
propose new regulatory limits on banks’ physical commodities activities.
463
(1) Denying Applications
After ten years of granting financial holding company applications to engage in an
increasingly broad range of physical commodity activities, beginning in 2010, the Federal
Reserve began to deny some requests for expanded commodity activities.
Illiquid Oil Products. One of the first examples of this shift involved the Federal
Reserve’s denial of a request by J PMorgan to trade certain oil-based products known as asphalt,
Canadian or CAD condensate, cutter stock, straight run fuel oil, and marine diesel.
464
These oil
products, which are distillated from crude oil at refineries, are traded in relatively small volumes
in less liquid markets, compared to crude oil.
465
J PMorgan had acquired small stocks of them
when, in 2010, it acquired physical commodity assets from RBS Sempra, a joint venture between
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and a U.S. company known as Sempra Energy.
466
At the
request of RBS, the Federal Reserve had issued a 2008 complementary order allowing RBS and
RBS Sempra Commodities to buy and sell those oil products, even though they were not
approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
467
In August 2010, J PMorgan filed an application with the Federal Reserve for permission
to trade the same oil products as RBS Sempra Commodities.
468
To support its request,
J PMorgan stated in its filing that it “incorporate[d] herein by reference the considerations that the
461
Id.
462
Id.
463
See “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding
Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” prepared by Federal Reserve, 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329 (daily ed. J an.
21, 2014).
464
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505.
465
See 4/18/2011 memorandum by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team, “J PMC Asphalt, Cutter Stock, Fuel
[O]il, Marine Diesel and CAD Condensate Trading Approval Application,” FRB-PSI-300323 - 325, at 324.
466
See 7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
467
RBS Order, at C60.
468
8/18/2010 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” FRB-PSI-
301639 - 647, at 641.
95
Board cited in the RBS Order with respect to the Proposed Commodities.”
469
In October 2010,
the Federal Reserve asked J PMorgan to provide additional information demonstrating that the oil
products retained the “attributes of price transparency, fungibility, and liquidity” that they
possessed in 2008, including information about where and how the commodities were traded.
470
J PMorgan responded ten days later.
471
In April 2011, the Federal Reserve Commodities Team
conducting the special review of financial holding company involvement with physical
commodities provided an analysis indicating that only one of the oil products, CAD condensate,
had “all of the necessary characteristics for permissibility.”
472
It recommended against
approving the trading of the other oil products, due to their illiquidity and lack of a futures
market, and recommended maintaining the same limit on CAD condensate trading that already
applied to J PMorgan’s affiliate J PMC Energy Ventures.
473
After that analysis, the Federal
Reserve sought and received additional information from J PMorgan regarding each of the oil
products.
474
In August 2012, after it had become clear that the Federal Reserve would deny the
request, J PMorgan withdrew its application to trade the oil products.
475
The decision of the Federal Reserve not to approve J PMorgan’s trading request, which
took two years to finalize, is one of the first instances of the Federal Reserve reversing an earlier
grant of authority to engage in an otherwise impermissible commodity activity.
Warehouse Business. A second example of the Federal Reserve’s shift to a more
restrictive interpretation of permissible commodities activities involves the Federal Reserve’s
review of J PMorgan’s request to own and operate Henry Bath & Son Ltd. Henry Bath is a U.K.
company that operates a global network of warehouses that store commodities traded on the
London Metal Exchange (LME), including copper, aluminum, nickel, tin, lead, zinc and steel
billet.
476
Its operations include warehouse services for commodities traded on the LME, NYSE
Liffe or ICE Futures US,
477
as well as off-warrant stocks.
478
As explained earlier, on J uly 1, 2010, as part of a larger acquisition from RBS Sempra,
J PMorgan acquired Henry Bath. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, J PMorgan then had a
two-year grace period to: (1) divest its ownership, (2) obtain a “complementary” order, or (3)
469
Id. at 643.
470
10/18/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301650 - 651 [sealed
exhibit].
471
10/28/2010 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve Ban k of New York, “J PM Chase Request for
Additional Information,” FRB-PSI-301653 - 663.
472
4/18/2011 memorandum by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team, “J PMC Asphalt, Cutter Stock, Fuel [O]il,
Marine Diesel and CAD Condensate Trading Approval Application,” FRB-PSI-300323 - 325.
473
Id. at 325.
474
See, e.g., 12/2/2011 email from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve, with attachment, “Additional Commodities,”
FRB-PSI-301666 - 670; undated submission from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve, “Responses to Requests for
Additional Information,” FRB-PSI-300311 - 313.
475
8/7/2012 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Notice Regarding Application for
Relief in Connection with Complementary Authority,” FRB-PSI-301056; 8/9/2012 letter from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301676; Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
476
9/10/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co's Sixth Response to
J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001 - 013, at 005.
477
Id.
478
Id.
96
conform the investment to comply with merchant banking restrictions.
479
At first, J PMorgan
sought a complementary order to own and operate the Henry Bath warehouses,
480
but in 2011,
the Federal Reserve indicated it would deny the request,
481
and J PMorgan withdrew it.
482
On
J une 29, 2012, the day before its grace period lapsed, the bank sought a one-year extension from
the Federal Reserve so that it could bring the investment into compliance with its merchant
banking authority.
483
Several months later, the Federal Reserve indicated that J PMorgan could
not hold Henry Bath as a merchant banking investment,
484
and gave J PMorgan a one-year
extension to J uly 2013, on the understanding that J PMorgan would use the time to sell the
company.
485
In May 2013, J PMorgan made a request for yet another year, and based upon its
good faith efforts to sell the company, the Federal Reserve gave J PMorgan another year to divest
the holding.
486
In March 2014, J PMorgan reached an agreement to sell certain physical
commodities assets, including Henry Bath, to the Swiss-based commodities and energy firm,
Mercuria.
487
That acquisition was finalized in October 2014.
488
Other Requests. The Federal Reserve’s new reluctance to approve expanded physical
commodities activities was not confined to J PMorgan. It also rejected applications by Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley to trade physical iron ore.
489
It also denied an application by
Goldman Sachs for a joint venture sugar plant in Brazil.
490
In addition, the Federal Reserve delayed making a decision on applications requesting
approval of new physical commodity activities as complementary activities. Bank of America,
for example, has had a complementary application pending since 2010.
491
In 2012, Toronto
479
See undated “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry Bath,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve,
FRB-PSI-301532 - 534, at 532.
480
6/8/2011 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300977 - 1052.
481
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505 (stating the Federal Reserve “[r]ejected” the J PMorgan
application “to hold Henry Bath metals storage facility as 4(k) complimentary activity”); Subcommittee briefing by
J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
482
10/26/2011 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Notice Regarding LME
Metals Warehousing,” FRB-PSI-301636 -637 (withdrawing request).
483
6/29/2012 letter from J PMorgan to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-301061-062. In August,
J PMorgan replaced that request with one for a three-year extension. 8/16/2012 letter from J PMorgan to Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300358 - 359. See also undated “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry
Bath,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-301532 - 534.
484
See 10/3/2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505 (stating the Federal Reserve had “[r]ejected” the J PMorgan
application to hold Henry Bath metals storage facility “under Merchant Banking Authority”); Subcommittee briefing
by Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
485
11/16/2012 letter from Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300338 -340 (granting extension to 7/1/2013);
10/31/2012 Federal Reserve memorandum, “Request by J PMorgan Chase & Company for an extension of time to
divest or conform nonbanking activities,” FRB-PSI-301525 -531.
486
7/11/2013 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301069 - 071.
487
Subcommittee briefing by Mercuria (9/12/2014). See also “J PMorgan sells physical commodities unit to
Mercuria for $3.5 billion,” Reuters, Dmitry Zhdannikov and Chris Peters (3/19/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-jpmorgan-mercuria-idUSBREA2I0LG20140319.
488
See 10/3/2014 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan Completes Sales of Physical Commodities Assets,”http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=874514.
489
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505.
490
Id.
491
5/4/2010 letter from Bank of America legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “Section 4(k)(l)(B) Notification by Bank
of America Corporation of Its Intention to Continue to Engage in Certain Physically-Settled Commodity Trading
97
Dominion Bank submitted an application for complementary authority to engage in certain
physical commodity activities involving natural gas, but withdrew it in 2014.
492
More broadly, in J uly 2013, the Federal Reserve issued a public statement that it was
reconsidering its previously permissive view of “complementary” orders: “The Federal Reserve
regularly monitors the commodity activities of supervised firms and is reviewing the 2003
determination that certain commodity activities are complementary to financial activities and
thus permissible for bank holding companies.”
493
That announcement, now over a year old, has
not yet resulted in a broader policy statement or regulatory proposals on how the Federal Reserve
intends to interpret the Gramm-Leach-Bliley complementary authority.
(2) Using Other Means to Reconsider Physical Commodity Activities
In addition to taking a more restrictive approach to applications for expanded physical
commodity activities, the Federal Reserve has signaled its intention to reconsider financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities using other mechanisms to restrain
physical commodity activities or reduce their attendant risks to the financial system, including
through an ongoing study and regulatory actions.
Section 620 Study. In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. Section 620 of that Act, which was added to the legislation in an
amendment sponsored by Senators J eff Merkley and Carl Levin, requires federal banking
regulators to conduct a review and prepare a report on “the activities that a banking entity may
engage in under Federal and State law, including activities authorized by statute and by order,
interpretation and guidance.”
494
That study, which is ongoing, offers another mechanism to
reconsider financial holding company involvement with physical commodities.
The sponsors of the Section 620 study have explained that it was intended to “address the
risks to the banking system arising from … longer-term instruments and related trading.”
495
Specifically, Section 620:
“directs Federal banking regulators to sift through the assets, trading strategies, and other
investments of banking entities to identify assets or activities that pose unacceptable risks
to banks, even when held in longer-term accounts. Regulators are expected to apply the
Activities and Related Activities, Engage in Energy Tolling Activities and Continue to Provide Certain Asset and
Energy Management Services, through Certain Affiliates,” FRB-PSI-500001 - 218 (providing notice of the bank’s
intent to engage in an expanded set of physical commodity activities as a result of its acquisition of Merrill Lynch);
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (12/13/2013); 11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee,
PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002, at 001.
492
10/2/2012 letter from Toronto Dominion Bank legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “Notice by The Toronto-
Dominion Bank to Engage in Commodity Trading Activities,” FRB-PSI-500219 – 681; Subcommittee briefing by
Federal Reserve (12/13/2013); 11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-21-000001 -
002, at 001.
493
Federal Reserve statement to the New York Times (7/19/20013), copy provided by the Federal Reserve to the
Subcommittee.
494
Section 620(a), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, codified at 12
U.S.C. §5301.
495
156 Cong. Rec. S5870, S5895 (daily ed. J uly 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley).
98
lessons of that analysis to tighten the range of investments and activities permissible for
banking entities, whether they are at the insured depository institution or at an affiliate or
subsidiary, and whether they are short or long term in nature.”
496
It also directs the banking regulators to focus on “any financial, operational, managerial, or
reputation risks associated with or presented as a result of the banking entity engaged in the
activity or making the investment.”
497
The 2012 Summary Report explicitly points to the Section 620 report as a possible
mechanism for clarifying appropriate commodity-related activities for banks and financial
holding companies.
498
Other federal banking regulators have also indicated that physical
commodities activities would be an appropriate topic for the Section 620 study and report. The
report could be used by the Federal Reserve and OCC, for example, to coordinate their
interpretations of permissible physical commodity activities, as well as appropriate safeguards to
reduce risks, including their respective 5% limits on the size of physical commodity holdings.
However, the report is nearly 3 years overdue,
499
and there is no sign of when it may be
completed.
(3) Changing the Rules
In addition to reconsidering financial holding company involvement with physical
commodities by reconsidering its complementary orders and using the ongoing Section 620
study, the Federal Reserve is also making use of its regulatory authority. Recently, together with
other federal regulators, the Federal Reserve issued new capital rules that, in part, addressed
commodity-related concerns. In early 2014, the Federal Reserve also issued an advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking soliciting public comment on whether it should take regulatory action to
address a number of commodity-related issues.
Revising the Capital Rules. In December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision proposed significant revisions to the international framework for regulating bank
capital, often referred to as the Basel III proposal.
500
The Basel III framework revised many of
the mechanisms and criteria used to determine appropriate levels of capital for financial holding
companies, including their commodities activities.
501
On J uly 2, 2013, the Federal Reserve
adopted rules to implement the Basel III framework, and on J uly 9, 2013, the Office of the
496
Id.
497
Section 620(a)(2)(B), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, codified
at 12 U.S.C. §5301.
498
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200506.
499
See Section 620(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
codified at 12 U.S.C. 5301 (indicating study was to be finished in December 2011).
500
See 12/2010 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report “Basel III: International framework for liquidity
risk measurement, standards and monitoring”,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf.
501
See 12/2010 (revised 6/2011) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report “Basel III: A global regulatory
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”, at 15,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
99
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) followed
suit.
502
The new capital rules directly affect how financial holding companies must account for
their physical commodity activities. First, the Basel III framework made a number of changes to
the risk weightings and capital calculations for assets held in a trading book. These changes,
which were implemented in the new federal capital rules, generally can be viewed as marginally
increasing capital requirements for both financial and physical commodity positions held as
trading assets.
503
The Basel III framework, and the corresponding U.S. implementing regulations, also
require financial holding companies to maintain added capital to absorb the risk of counterparty
defaults on a portfolio of OTC derivatives by requiring financial holding companies to make a
credit valuation adjustment on a portfolio basis when calculating their capital requirements.
504
This additional capital requirement may reduce the extent to which financial holding companies
use OTC derivatives in their commodity activities.
In addition, the Basel III framework increased the risk weights for merchant banking
equity exposures, imposing risk weights of 300%, 400%, or 600% on those holdings, depending
in part upon whether the acquired equity was publicly traded and whether the portfolio company
qualifies as an “investment firm.”
505
The capital charges focus on the fact that the financial
holding company’s direct investment is an equity; it does not take into account any risks related
to the portfolio company’s underlying activities. The result is that the merchant banking capital
charge for acquiring a company engaged in trading uranium versus a company operating a small
grocery may be the same, despite the likely significant variance in the risks between those two
investments. In the view of the capital rule, it is the equity holding of the bank that counts, not
the activities of the portfolio company. While the new merchant banking capital rules do not
reflect the risks associated with the underlying portfolio companies, the increased capital charge
for equity investments may lead to reduced merchant banking positions held by financial holding
companies, including merchant banking investments involving physical commodity activities.
Collectively, these changes in how banks calculate capital to insulate against financial
risks have put some downward pressure on banks’ commodity-related activities,
506
including
their physical commodity activities. Although the new capital rules have yet to fully take effect,
some banks have already initiated compliance, resulting in increased capital. Critics note that,
502
“Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition
Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and
Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule; Final
Rule”, 78 Fed. Reg.,62018, 62021-62022 (daily ed. Oct. 11,2013,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-
11/pdf/2013-21653.pdf.
503
See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 53059 (2012).
504
Id.
505
1/1/2014 “Summary of Capital Requirements Applicable to Merchant Banking Investments, Commodities, and
Related Items under the Federal Reserve’s Regulations as of J anuary 1, 2014,” memorandum prepared by the
Federal Reserve FRB-PSI-708382-385, at 384 [sealed exhibit].
506
See, e.g., “Basel III part of 'double whammy' hitting bank commodity trade,” Independent Chemical Information
Service, Seth Freedman, (1/1/2012),http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2012/01/10/9522349/basel-iii-part-of-
double-whammy-hitting-bank-commodity-trade/.
100
while the new rules have increased capital requirements for commodity-related assets and
merchant banking investments, the new rules still fail to fully protect against the potential
monetary risks associated with physical commodity activities, including the risks associated with
catastrophic events, market valuation problems, and other operational and reputational issues.
507
Proposing New Rules for Physical Commodity Activities. On J anuary 21, 2014, the
Federal Reserve issued a notice which outlined the current regulatory landscape governing
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities activities, identified potential
risks and regulatory weaknesses, and requested public comment on whether new regulatory
limits were needed. The notice requested public comment:
“on all aspects of physical commodities activities of BHCs [Bank Holding Companies]
and banks and invites comments on the risks and benefits of allowing … these activities
as well as ways in which risks to the safety and soundness of a FHC [Financial Holding
Company] and … to the financial system can be contained or limited.”
508
In its wide-ranging advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the Federal Reserve noted
the significant increase in physical commodity activities by financial holding companies since
2007, and suggested a fundamental re-thinking of the Federal Reserve’s previously expansive
interpretations of the laws allowing those activities. The notice invited public comment on
twenty-four separate questions.
509
Assessing Risks and Risk Mitigation. In the notice, the Federal Reserve highlighted the
potential danger posed to banks by “tail risks,” such as environmental disasters or other
catastrophic events that affect physical commodity activities. The notice discussed, for example,
such recent catastrophic events as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (which
killed 11 people and has cost BP over $42 billion in losses); a natural gas pipeline rupture in San
Bruno, California (which killed 8 people and will likely cost billions of dollars in damages); a
natural gas power plant explosion in Middletown, Connecticut (which killed 6 people); the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant meltdown in Tohuku, J apan; and the crash and explosion
of a crude oil-laden railway train in Quebec, Canada (which killed 47 people), as evidence that
the “risks of catastrophic events continue.”
510
The notice stated that these “recent catastrophes
suggest that the cost of preventing accidents are high and the costs and liability related to
physical commodity activities can be difficult to limit and higher than expected.”
511
The notice connected these catastrophic event risks to the recent financial crisis, which
exposed the negative consequences of underappreciated tail risks combined with contagion.
512
It
explained that if a financial holding company owned “physical commodities that are part of a
catastrophic event[,] it could suddenly and severely undermine public confidence in the
[financial holding company] or its insured depository institution and undermine their access to
507
Subcommittee briefing by the FDIC (9/3/2014).
508
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 3329 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
509
Id.
510
Id. at 3331
511
Id. at 3329, 3331.
512
Id.
101
funding markets.”
513
The notice raised the concern that, in the case of a large financial
institution denied access to funding markets, the resulting financial problems, if severe enough,
could spread beyond the institution to damage its counterparties and even the broader U.S.
financial system.
The Federal Reserve also observed that “current risk management techniques designed to
mitigate risks, such as frequent monitoring of risk, requirements to restrict the age of transport
vessels, and review of disaster plans of third-party transporters, may [have] the unintended effect
of increasing the potential that the [financial holding company] may become enmeshed in or
liable to some degree from a catastrophic event.”
514
While the notice focused on risks associated with catastrophic environmental disasters, it
did not discuss in detail other risks that also affect many physical commodity businesses. For
example, it did not address the risk of changing regulations or technologies which may render a
physical commodity operation significantly more or less valuable over a short period of time. In
the United States, for example, a combination of market forces and emissions rules has
dramatically altered the fuel source for power generation. While coal used to provide more than
half of U.S. power generation, it is now down to just over one-third, with natural gas largely
filling the void.
515
This dramatic shift has altered world-wide demand for coal and the value of
coal-related commodity activities. Similarly, the Fukushima Diachii nuclear disaster in J apan
had a dramatic chilling effect on the nuclear power industry, lowering the value of uranium-
related commodity activities.
516
The notice similarly did not examine other types of risks that
may materially impact a commodity-related business, such as labor unrest or political
upheaval.
517
Instead, the notice solicited public comment on the nature and types of risks posed
by physical commodity activities, how they were addressed by financial holding companies, and
how the Federal Reserve could enhance protections by further mitigating such risks or limiting
activities.
Assessing Authority. The notice also posed questions regarding the appropriate
application of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley complementary, merchant banking, and grandfather
authorities in the context of physical commodities. The proposal sought comment on whether
complementary commodities activities should be subjected to: (i) increased insurance
requirements, (ii) enhanced capital requirements; or (iii) “absolute dollar limits and caps based
on a percentage of the [financial holding company’s] regulatory capital or revenue.”
518
With
respect to merchant banking authority, it questioned whether merchant banking investments
513
Id. at 3329, 3332.
514
Id.
515
See, e.g., “Natural Gas Dethrones King Coal As Power Companies Look To Future,” National Public Radio,
Christopher J oyce (3/1/2013),http://www.npr.org/2013/03/01/173258342/natural-gas-dethrones-king-coal-as-
power-companies-look-to-future.
516
See, e.g., “Fukushima, 3 Years Later: Disaster Still Lingers,” Mashable, Andrew Freedman (3/11/2014),http://mashable.com/2014/03/11/three-years-after-fukushima/ ; “The Impact of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident
on People's Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy Policy: Silent Movement,” XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology,
Noriko Iwai and Kuniaki Shishido (7/19/2014),
rogram/Paper53522.html.
517
See, e.g., discussion of how these issues affected Goldman’s involvement with coal, below.
518
79 Fed. Reg. at 3333 - 334.
102
should be subject to: (i) increased capital requirements; (ii) caps on the total dollar amount of
such investments; or (iii) enhanced restrictions on the routine management of merchant banking
portfolio companies.
519
With respect to the grandfather clause, the notice asked about its
necessity 15 years after enactment of the law, as well as whether any additional requirements or
limits should be imposed, and how it might be reconciled with the other authorities for
competitiveness reasons, since most financial holding companies cannot invoke the grandfather
clause to authorize additional physical commodity activities.
520
Current Status. The initial comment period for the notice ended April 16, 2014, with
over 17,000 comments having been filed with the Federal Reserve.
521
Comments came from
small business owners, commodity markets participants, public interest groups, financial holding
companies, members of Congress, legal experts, and concerned members of the public.
522
The
vast majority were letters submitted by members of the public expressing support for increased
restrictions on financial holding company involvement with commodity activities. Other letters
generally supported some or all of the activities of financial holding companies in the commodity
markets, including their roles as financiers of physical inventories for producers or consumers.
523
Still others expressed concerns with the risks posed by physical commodity activities to the
financial holding companies, U.S. markets, and U.S. economy, and urged additional restrictions
on the financial holding companies conducting those activities.
524
While the Federal Reserve has
not yet taken further action based on the notice, its issuance of the notice indicates the regulator
is considering taking regulatory action to restrict financial company involvement with physical
commodities and reduce the attendant risks.
D. Analysis
Federal law gives the Federal Reserve key authority to determine financial holding
company involvement with physical commodities. For nine years, from 2000 to 2008, the
Federal Reserve used that authority generally to facilitate financial holding company expansion
into physical commodity activities. In response, large financial holding companies like
Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and J PMorgan expanded their commodity activities and asserted
519
Id. at 3334 - 335.
520
Id. at 3335 - 336.
521
See 2/24/2012 “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial
Holding Companies related to Physical Commodities [R-1479],” Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewAllComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1479&doc_ver=1.
522
Id.
523
Id., see, e.g., 4/16/2014 letter from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, American Bankers
Association, et al to the Federal Reserve, “Comment Letter on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities (Docket No. R-1479; RIN 7100 AE-10),” Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140424/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124557_481903450084_1.pdf.
524
Id. See also, e.g., 4/16/2014 comment letter from Subcommittee Chairman Levin, Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124566_481901422162_1.pdf; 4/16/2014 comment letter from Senators Sherrod Brown and
Elizabeth Warren, Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-
1479/R-1479_041614_124552_376253020070_1.pdf; 4/16/2014 comment letter from Americans for Financial
Reform, Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124629_505856748926_1.pdf .
103
control over vast physical commodity holdings and operations involving the storage, transport,
production, refinement, and trading of oil, natural gas, aluminum, copper, coal, electricity, and
other commodities.
After the financial crisis and a special review conducted by the Federal Reserve raised
concerns about the operational, catastrophic event, valuation, reputational, and systemic risks
posed by physical commodity activities, the Federal Reserve began to reconsider its role.
Beginning in 2010, the Federal Reserve took some initial steps to restrict and reduce financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities. At the same time, the Federal
Reserve failed to resolve ongoing, basic questions about the scope of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
complementary, grandfather, and merchant banking authorities, thereby enabling large financial
holding companies to continue to deepen their involvement with physical commodities. In early
2014, the Federal Reserve announced it was considering issuing new regulations on financial
holding company involvement with physical commodity activities, but nearly a year later has yet
to propose new rules. The Federal Reserve’s failure to resolve key issues related to bank
involvement with physical commodities has weakened longstanding American barriers against
the mixing of banking and commerce as well as longstanding safeguards protecting the U.S.
financial system and economy against undue risk. The following chapters illustrate some of the
consequences.
104
IV. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., a financial holding company since 2008, has described
commodities as one of its core businesses. It currently conducts billions of dollars in physical
commodity activities involving energy, metals, and related businesses, and has expressed a
commitment to continuing in the physical commodities field. This case study examines just
three examples of its physical commodities activities, involving the trading of physical uranium,
the operation of coal mines in Colombia, and possession of a global metals warehousing
business.
A. Overview of Goldman Sachs
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is a global financial services firm incorporated under
Delaware law and headquartered in New York City.
525
It is listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) under the ticker symbol “GS.”
526
In addition to being one of the largest
financial holding companies in the United States, Goldman Sachs conducts operations in more
than 30 countries, has over 32,000 employees, has a market capitalization of $77 billion, and
manages assets of more than $938 billion.
527
In 2013, it reported total consolidated assets of
$912 billion,
528
net revenues of $34.2 billion, and net earnings of $8 billion.
529
Goldman Leadership. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is Lloyd Blankfein, who has held that post since 2006.
530
The
President and Chief Operating Officer is Gary Cohn, and the Chief Financial Officer is Harvey
Schwartz. All three executives started their careers in the firm at its J . Aron & Co. commodities
subsidiary, described below.
531
The Global Head of Commodities, from 2007 to 2012, was
525
7/16/2013 Form 8-K, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.., at cover page [hereinafter 7/16/2013 Goldman Form 8-
K],http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/8k/pdf-attachments/8k-7-16-13.pdf ; see
also “Top Fifty Holding Companies (HC) as of 6/30/2013,” Federal Reserve System, National Information Center,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
526
Undated “Stock Chart,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/stock-
chart/index.html.
527
See undated “Governance at Goldman Sachs[:]Key Facts,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investo...overnance/corporate-governance-documents/key-
facts.pdf; 9/27/2013 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20131001.pdf; 2/28/2013 Form 10-
K, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., at 70 (hereinafter, “2/28/2013 Goldman Form 10-K”),http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/10k/docs/2012-10-K.pdf;“Top Fifty Holding
Companies (HC) as of 6/30/2013,” Federal Reserve System, National Information Center,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
528
See 12/31/2013 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Goldman
Sachs with the Federal Reserve.
529
Undated “Governance at Goldman Sachs: Key Facts,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investo...overnance/corporate-governance-documents/key-
facts.pdf.
530
Undated Goldman biography of Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-
are/leadership/executive-officers/lloyd-c-blankfein.html.
531
See, e.g., “The J . Aron Takeover of Goldman Sachs,” New York Times, Susanne Craig (10/1/2012),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10...of-goldman-sachs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
105
Isabelle Ealet.
532
The current Global Co-Heads of Commodities are Greg Agran and Guy
Saidenberg.
533
The head of Global Commodities Principal Investments is J acques Gabillon.
534
The head of J . Aron & Co. is Ashok Varadhan.
535
(1) Background
Goldman Sachs was formed by Marcus Goldman in 1869, as a small commercial paper
company.
536
It eventually turned to investment banking, specializing in underwriting Initial
Public Offerings for corporations offering stock to the public.
537
After the company lost heavily
in the stock market crash of 1929, it slowly rebuilt its business as a securities firm, providing
investment advice to corporate clients, arranging and executing mergers and acquisitions, and
arranging financing for clients through stock and bond offerings.
538
In 1979, Goldman obtained
a license to trade commodities and, in 1981, launched a major expansion of its commodity
activities.
539
In 1999, Goldman converted from a private partnership to a publicly traded
corporation.
540
Bank Holding Company. In September 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis,
Goldman submitted,
541
and the Federal Reserve approved on the same day,
542
an application for
it to become a bank holding company with access to Federal Reserve lending programs. At the
same time, Goldman converted an industrial bank it held in Utah into a state-chartered bank.
543
532
Undated Goldman biography of Isabelle Ealet, Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-
are/leadership/management-committee/isabelle-ealet.html; “Commodities trading loses its Goldman queen,”
Financial Times, J avier Blas (1/12/2012),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ec8af7f0-3d02-11e1-ae07-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FUdL9Mxe. In 2012, Ms. Ealet was appointed Co-Head of the Securities Division at
Goldman.
533
Subcommittee interview of Greg Agran (10/10/2014).
534
Id.
535
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008.
536
“A Brief History of Goldman Sachs,” WSJ .com,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704671904575193780425970078.html.
537
Id.
538
Id.
539
See Goldman Sachs & Co. FCM information, National Futures Association (NFA) Background Affiliation Status
Information Center (BASIC) website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uZSsBZcBKLE=&rn=Y.
540
“Undated “Governance at Goldman Sachs[:] Key Facts,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investo...overnance/corporate-governance-documents/key-
facts.pdf.
541
See 9/21/2008 “Confidential Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” FRB-PSI-303638 - 662 (applying to
become banking holding companies).
542
See 9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a1.pdf; 9/21/2008 Goldman Sachs press
release, “Goldman Sachs to Become Fourth Largest Bank Holding Company,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archived/2008/bank-holding-co.html. See also “Shift
for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of an Era,” New York Times, Andrew Ross Sorkin and Vikas Bajaj
(9/21/2008),http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank.html.
543
See 9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a1.pdf. The name of the Utah bank was
Goldman Sachs Bank USA. Id.
106
Goldman also elected to become a financial holding company.
544
Goldman has one U.S.
depository and lending bank, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, which is chartered in New York and
insured by the FDIC.
545
One business unit of the bank is called “GS Private Bank,” which serves
high-net worth individuals and families.
546
The bank is also a registered swap dealer.
547
Goldman also owns several banks outside of the United States, including Goldman Sachs
International Bank of the United Kingdom.
548
As of December 31, 2013, Goldman Sachs Bank
USA and Goldman Sachs International Bank reported a total of about $70 billion in savings,
demand, and time deposits.
549
Key Subsidiaries. In addition to its banks, other key U.S. subsidiaries of The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. include Goldman Sachs & Co., which is registered as a U.S. broker-dealer,
futures commission merchant, and swap dealer; Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP, a U.S.
investment advisor; and J . Aron & Co., a swap dealer, and authorized electrical power
marketer.
550
Two key U.K. subsidiaries are Goldman Sachs International, a U.K. broker-dealer
and swaps dealer; and Goldman Sachs Asset Management International, a U.K. investment
advisor.
551
Major Business Lines. According to Goldman, it has four key business segments: (1)
Investment Banking, which includes work related to mergers and acquisitions, restructurings and
spin-offs, debt and equity underwriting, and derivatives transactions; (2) Institutional Client
Services, which facilitates client transactions primarily for corporations, financial institutions,
investment funds, and governments in fixed income, equity, currency and commodity products;
provides financing, securities lending, and other prime brokerage services; and makes markets
and clears client transactions on major stock, options and futures exchanges worldwide; (3)
Investing & Lending, which invests in and originates loans to clients; and (4) Investment
544
See undated “Financial Holding Companies,” Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
545
See undated “Banking,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-
lending/banking/. Goldman also has a U.K. bank, Goldman Sachs International Bank, and an Irish bank, GS Bank
Europe. See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 2,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
546
See undated “Private Wealth Management Services—United States,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we...nt/private-wealth-management/services/united-
states.html.
547
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 22,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf; undated “Banking,”
Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/banking/.
548
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 2,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
549
Id. at 15; undated “Banking,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-
lending/banking/; undated “Private Wealth Management Services—United States,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we...nt/private-wealth-management/services/united-
states.html.
550
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 2, 22,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
551
Id.
107
Management, which provides investment management and brokerage services, investment
products, and wealth advisory services to high net worth individuals.
552
Commodities. The Institutional Client Services business segment includes Global
Commodities, also referred to by Goldman as “GS Commodities,” which is Goldman’s leading
commodities-related business unit. In 2013, GS Commodities had a total of about 235
employees.
553
According to Goldman, GS Commodities “provides financial and physical risk
management solutions to a wide range of global clients, including utilities, producers, industrial
users, sovereigns, state owned entities, and financial institutions.”
554
In addition, “GS
Commodities invests in commodity-related businesses to generate returns and to create synergies
within the franchise.”
555
The following chart shows how GS Commodities fits within the
holding company’s organizational structure and its own three main subdivisions:
Source: Organizational chart prepared by Goldman Sachs, PSI-Goldman-10-000002.
One of the subdivisions within GS Commodities is Global Commodities Principal
Investing (GCPI) which “invests as principal in companies/assets linked to the global
commodities trade.”
556
Goldman has described GCPI to its Board of Directors as an entity that
552
Undated “At a Glance,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/at-a-glance/index.html;
6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
553
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of the
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077 - 098, at 078.
554
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011-30, at 015.
555
Id.
556
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 246. See also 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global
108
“seeks attractive risk-adjusted returns … [and] focuse on private companies / assets which are
then held under the Merchant Banking Exemption.”
557
GCPI has sponsored a number of
investment funds which appear to be financed solely by Goldman, with no inclusion of funds
from third party investors. According to Goldman, GCPI investment professionals “do not
operate the businesses in the Group’s portfolio but rather employ experienced management
teams for portfolio companies and supervis[e] investments at [the] board level.”
558
In 2010,
GCPI’s portfolio of investments included 16 projects.
559
According to Goldman, GCPI’s key investments over the years have included an
Australian coal mine, an oil and gas exploration company, a natural gas production company in
the former Soviet Union, a sugar-based ethanol production company in Brazil, and two bulk
carrier shipping joint ventures.
560
Additional key GCPI investments include the Colombian coal
mines and Metro warehousing business, discussed below.
561
GCPI also contributed analysis to
Goldman’s purchase of Nufcor’s uranium trading business, also discussed below.
The key legal entity executing the majority of Goldman’s commodity activities is J . Aron
& Co., a commodities trading firm purchased by Goldman in 1981.
562
GS Commodities books,
for example, the majority of its commodity-related trades, including futures, swaps, options, and
forward transactions, through J . Aron & Co.
563
J . Aron & Co. also acts as “the primary, but not
exclusive, legal entity that engages in market making in commodities and commodity derivative
products” for GS Commodities.
564
In addition, J . Aron & Co. performs some physical
Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by
Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087.
557
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087. In addition, at times, Goldman
also asserted grandfather authority, discussed below, as another potential basis for holding some of the GCPI
investments. See, e.g., 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10 filed by The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303, at 303 (stating that the
investment was “permissible under ][Bank Holding Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the
Merchant Banking regulations.”).
558
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 246.
559
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 265 - 272.
560
Id. at 247; 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of
Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087. See also
3/31/2013 “Commodity, Energy, E&P, Renewable Energy Equity Investments,” chart prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-400065 - 070.
561
See 3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the
Federal Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 265; 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global
Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by
Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087.
562
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008; 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011- 030, at 013.
563
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008.
564
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001-
011, at 002.
109
commodity activities, such as selling coal produced by Goldman’s coal mines.
565
J . Aron & Co.
is authorized to act as a swap dealer and electrical power marketer.
566
It currently has about 33
employees who work out of various Goldman offices; J . Aron & Co. has no separate offices of
its own.
567
Commodities-Related Merchant Banking. Goldman also engages in commodity-
related activities through certain investment funds maintained by its Merchant Banking Division,
depicted on the chart above. Goldman describes the Merchant Banking Division as “the primary
center for Goldman Sachs’ long term principal investing activity … across corporate, real estate
and infrastructure strategies.”
568
The Merchant Banking Division houses, for example, GS
Infrastructure Partners, a subsidiary which Goldman established in 2006, to sponsor a private
equity fund focused on infrastructure projects, including ventures involving electricity, natural
gas, and power generation.
569
GS Infrastructure Partners sponsored a $6.5 billion fund in 2006;
and a second $3.1 billion fund in 2010.
570
Its projects have included, for example, a 2014
investment of more than $1 billion to acquire an 18% stake in Dong Energy, the largest utility in
Denmark, which explores for energy and constructs and operates power plants;
571
an investment
in an electricity distribution network in Finland, Elenia Oy;
572
solar and wind generation projects
in J apan;
573
and 100% ownership of a natural gas transmission and distribution company in
Spain, Endesa Gas.
574
The Merchant Banking Division also houses GS Capital Partners, a much
larger private equity fund used by Goldman to invest in such commodity-related ventures as the
$22 billion buyout of Kinder Morgan Inc., a pipeline company.
575
Still another business unit with commodity-related merchant banking investments, also
depicted in the above chart, is the Special Situations Group. Goldman described this group to its
565
See discussion, below, on Goldman’s involvement with coal.
566
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,”at 2, 22,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
567
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman legal counsel (10/7/2014).
568
Undated “Direct Private Investing,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-
and-lending/direct-private-investing/index.html.
569
See “Direct Private Investing Equity - GS Infrastructure Partners,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we...ng/direct-private-investing/equity-folder/gs-
infrastructure-partners.html.
570
Id.
571
Goldman’s investment in the largely state-owned utility, when announced to the public, sparked widespread
opposition in Denmark, but was nevertheless completed. See, e.g., “A closer look at a Goldman Sachs deal many in
Denmark find rotten,” Financial Times, Richard Milne (1/31/2014),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/92816e68-8a6e-
11e3-9c29-00144feab7de.html#axzz3EdqIlSm5; “Goldman Deal Threatens Danish Government,” New York Times,
Danny Hakim (1/30/2014),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/goldman-deal-threatens-danish-government/.
572
See, e.g., 3/31/2013 “Commodity, Energy, E&P, Renewable Energy Equity Investments,” chart prepared by
Goldman, FRB-PSI-400065 - 070, at 065.
573
Id. at 066.
574
See, e.g., “Goldman Sachs Infrastructure funds acquire remaining 20 % stake in Endesa Gas,”
InfraPPP (11/8/2013),http://infrapppworld.com/2013/11/goldman-sachs-infrastructure-funds-acquire-remaining-20-
stake-in-endesa-gas.html.
575
See “Direct Private Investing Equity-GS Capital Partners,” Goldman
website,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/direct-private-investing/equity-
folder/gs-capital-partners.html. See also “Kinder Morgan Accepts $15 Billion Buyout Offer,” New York Times, J ad
Mouawad (8/28/2006),http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/28/business/29kindercnd.html?_r=1&.
110
Board of Directors as “specializ[ing] in lending to and investing in middle market companies on
a risk-adjusted return basis. Equity investments are held under the merchant banking
exemption.”
576
As of September 2013, the Global Special Situations Group held “19
investments in commodities assets totaling a current book value of $683 [million] vs. a $13
[billion] total portfolio.”
577
They included a U.S. geothermal energy provider, a wind power
company, a solar power plant, a company involved with residential rooftop solar systems, oil and
gas exploration and drilling companies, and coal facilities.
578
In J une 2014, Goldman reported to the Federal Reserve that it held merchant banking
investments with a total value of about $15 billion, but it is unclear how many of those were
commodity related. It is also unclear whether the total included all of Goldman’s various
commodity-related merchant banking investments, including those made through the Global
Commodities Principal Investing unit, Merchant Banking Division, and Special Situations
Group.
579
Commodities Trading. At the same time it conducts a wide range of physical
commodity activities, Goldman trades commodities-related financial instruments, including
futures, swaps, and options, involving billions of dollars each day. Goldman is among the ten
largest financial institutions in the United States trading financial commodity instruments,
according to Coalition Ltd., a company that collects commodity trading statistics.
580
Data
compiled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which applies to national
banks and does not include their holding companies, indicates Goldman is one of the four largest
banks trading commodity-related derivatives.
581
Commodity Revenues. In a 2011 presentation prepared for its Board of Directors,
Goldman stated: “Over the last 5 years, GS Commodities has generated more than $10 [billion]
of pre-tax earnings, with an average margin of ~60%.”
582
The presentation also noted: “In the
last 2 years, margins and market share have declined dramatically as a result of increased
competition from both financial and non financial institutions.”
583
A 2013 presentation to the
Board of Directors included a chart tracing Goldman’s commodity-related revenues over 30
years. The chart showed that commodity revenues were generally under $500 million from 1981
until 2000, and then began to climb, producing four years of relatively high revenues, from 2006
until 2009, before they once more began to decline. The chart included the following figures:
576
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077 - 098, at 093.
577
Id.
578
Id. at 093 - 094.
579
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies – FR
Y-12,” filed by Goldman, FRB-PSI-800013 - 016.
580
See 3/2014 “Global & Regional Investment Bank League Tables – FY2013”, Coalition, Ltd., PSI-Coalition-01-
000013, at 14, 16.
581
2013 “OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013,” at Tables 1 and 2,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
582
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 013.
583
Id. Goldman identified its key financial competitors as Morgan Stanley, J PMorgan, Barclays, and Deutsche
Bank, while its non-financial competitors were Glencore, Vitol, Mercuria, BP, certain large utilities, and certain
private equity funds. Id. at 016.
111
Global Commodities Revenues
Including Franchise and Principal Investments
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
Revenues $1.4
billion
$3.1
billion
$2.9
billion
$3.3
billion
$3.4
billion
$2.2
billion
$2.0
billion
$1.0
billion
$1.3
billion*
*Partial year amount.
Source: 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors
of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 – 098, at 078.
The 2011 presentation stated that as of October 28, 2011: “Physical business now
accounts for approximately 15-20% of total Franchise Revenues and is expected to increase.”
584
The 2013 presentation stated: “Physical activity represents 6 - 17% of our 2012 global franchise
revenues.”
585
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities
Goldman first became involved with commodities when, in 1979, it registered with the
CFTC as a “Futures Commission Merchant” (FCM) and received authorization to buy and sell
futures and options on regulated exchanges.
586
Two years later, in 1981, it purchased J . Aron &
Co., a commodities trading company that then specialized in precious metals and coffee, but
soon began trading interest rate, foreign currency, and crude oil futures and options.
587
In 1991,
Goldman Sachs launched the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), a mathematical
construct that reflects the dollar value of a diversified basket of commodity futures, and allows
investors to invest in commodities by buying and selling financial instruments whose values are
584
09/2013 presentation, “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group,” prepared by Goldman Sachs,
FRB-PSI-624274 - 295, at 279.
585
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 082.
586
See Goldman Sachs & Co. FCM information, National Futures Association (NFA) Background Affiliation Status
Information Center (BASIC) website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uZSsBZcBKLE=&rn=Y. For more information on
Futures Commission Merchants, see NFA “Glossary,”http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx?term=futures+commission+merchant (defining FCM as “[a]n
individual or organization which solicits or accepts orders to buy or sell futures or options contracts and accepts
money or other assets from customers in connection with such orders. Must be registered with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.”). The OCC authorized banks to become commodity exchange members as early as
1975, according to an unpublished letter cited in OCC Interpretative Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986), reprinted in
Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85, 604, PSI-OCC-01-000046-061. See also 4/12/2010 Permissible Securities Activities of
Commercial Banks Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),” prepared by
Congressional Research Service,http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41181_20100412.pdf , at 10-11, footnote 54.
587
See also10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 013. See also 6/18/2009 “Goldman Sachs Permissibility
Study Follow-Up-Commodities,” FRB-PSI-200961-979, at 962 (explaining that J . Aron & Co. is registered with
FERC to sell power at market based rates).
112
linked to the index.
588
The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index led to an explosion in commodity
index trading as well as increased futures trading.
589
According to Goldman, by 1997, operating as a securities and commodities firm and not
as a bank, it was trading in physically settled contracts in base metals, such as aluminum, lead,
nickel, and zinc.
590
Goldman reported to the Federal Reserve that it was doing the same for
contracts involving energy commodities, including crude oil, natural gas, gasoline, heating oil,
and jet fuel;
591
and for agricultural products, including wheat, corn, coffee, cocoa, soybeans, and
sugar.
592
In addition, Goldman indicated that it was engaging in physically settled trades in
“power” through a “joint venture with Constellation Energy.”
593
Goldman also told the Federal
Reserve that, by 1997, it had owned or operated an oil refinery with related pipeline and storage
infrastructure, an oil and gas marketing and distribution company, an upstream oil and gas
producer, and a fertilizer producer.
594
Cogentrix Acquisition. In 2003, Goldman purchased Cogentrix Energy, a company
which developed and operated power plants and had ownership interests in 24 different power
related facilities.
595
That acquisition represented one of Goldman’s earliest forays into electrical
power generation.
596
By 2011, Goldman had sold 80% of the Cogentrix portfolio for a gain of
more than $1.6 billion.
597
But it still retained two coal fired power plants in Florida and
Virginia; and a natural gas burning plant in San Diego.
598
In addition, it had diversified into
renewable energy, taking ownership interests in eight hydroelectric and two wind generation
facilities in Turkey, a solar power plant in California, and a photovoltaic solar power facility
under construction in Colorado.
599
By 2008, Goldman had expanded its commodities activities still further. In a list
prepared for the Federal Reserve, Goldman indicated that, in 2008, it owned or operated a carbon
aggregator, bio-diesel refinery, ethanol producer, and liquefied natural gas developer.
600
It had
588
See, e.g., “A Brief History Of Commodities Indexes,” ETF.com, Adam Dunsby and Kurt Nelson (4/12/2010),http://www.etf.com/publications/jou...-a-brief-history-of-commodities-indexes.html.
589
In 2007, Goldman sold the index to Standard & Poors, and it is now known as the S&P GSCI. See, e.g.,
“Goldman Sachs selling popular commodity index,” Market Watch, (2/6/2007),http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-sachs-selling-popular-commodity-index-to-sp.
590
5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, at FRB-
PSI-200600 - 610.
591
Id. at 600.
592
Id. at 601.
593
Id.
594
Id.
595
10/20/2003 Goldman Sachs press release, “Goldman Sachs to Purchase 100% of Cogentrix,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archived/2003/2003-10-20.html.
596
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014).
597
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 029.
598
Id.
599
Id.
600
5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, at FRB-
PSI-200600 – 610, at 601.
113
also become engaged in shipping vessels and mining coal.
601
In addition, Goldman began
trading aluminum alloy, steel, coal, and liquefied natural gas.
602
Bank Holding Company Status. As indicated earlier, in September 2008, in the midst
of the financial crisis, Goldman became a bank holding company. In its expedited application
filed with the Federal Reserve, Goldman explicitly invoked Section 4(o) of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act as legal authority to “grandfather” its existing commodities activities, that otherwise
would not be permitted for a financial holding company.
603
Constellation Energy Acquisition. After its conversion to a bank holding company,
Goldman continued to expand its physical commodity activities.
604
In 2009, according to the
Federal Reserve, Goldman purchased over 3,000 trading assets involving U.K., French, and
German power and U.K. natural gas; as well as about 60 coal contracts, 20 time and voyage
freight agreements, and 900,000 pounds of uranium ore from Constellation Energy, a U.S. utility
and trading business.
605
Included in that acquisition was Nufcor International, a uranium trading
company which stored and traded uranium ore in various stages of enrichment, as further
described below. A later Federal Reserve examination report noted that, by the end of 2009,
Goldman’s physical commodity inventories included $258 million in oil products, $207 million
in natural gas, $140 million in coal, and $3 billion in metals.
606
As the Federal Reserve began to consider whether it should take a closer look at financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities, an initial analysis contained this
depiction of Goldman:
“[Goldman Sachs] is one of the largest players in the commodities market and the
business has been a material driver of revenue for the firm. … Goldman’s commodities
business is active in the physical markets, in terms of trading, transporting, and storing
physical commodities as well as owning power generation and other physical assets.”
607
601
Id.
602
Id. at 600.
603
9/21/2008 “Confidential Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” FRB-PSI-303638 - 662, at 649, 661. Goldman
wrote: “[A]fter becoming an FHC [financial holding company], Goldman will continue to operate its existing
commodity trading business pursuant to the grandfather exception in Section 4(o) …. Goldman Sachs understands
Section 4(o) to permit it to retain all its existing commodity-related businesses and activities because Goldman
Sachs was engaged, prior to September 30, 1997, in the trading, sale, and investment in commodities and underlying
physical properties that were not permissible for BHCs [bank holding companies] on that date. The Section 4(o)
exemption does not require that a company have been engaged prior to September 30, 1997 in all the activities that it
seeks to grandfather under Section 4(o) at the time the company becomes an FHC; rather, it only requires that the
company have been engaged prior to that date in commodity-related activities that were not permissible for a BHC
in the United States on that date. Goldman meets this test, as well as the 5% of total consolidated assets test in
Section 4(o)(2).” Id. at 648- 649.
604
See 3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Principal Investments,” FRB-PSI-
602243 - 274.
605
See 2/2010 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discovery Review: Global Commodities” prepared by
Goldman,FRB-PSI-601685 - 713, at 698.
606
4/8/2010 “Global Commodities Discovery Review,” FRB-PSI-200516-585, at 523.
607
Undated but likely 2010 “Scope Discovery Review Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Group Commodities,” prepared by
FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-200511 - 515, at 511 [sealed exhibit].
114
Additional Acquisitions. Goldman continued to expand its physical commodity
activities throughout 2010. One of its acquisitions was Metro International Trade Services, the
global metals warehousing business discussed further below.
608
Another was its purchase of a
natural gas trading book from Nexen Inc., a Canadian natural gas business that reportedly bought
and sold about 6 billion cubic feet of gas per day and managed more than 50 billion cubic feet of
gas storage capacity.
609
A third acquisition was taking ownership of a coal mine and related
assets in Colombia, as discussed in more detail below.
610
The Federal Reserve determined that, by 2010, Goldman’s holdings included crude oil
and natural gas exploration and production efforts in the North Sea, Central Asia, and North
Africa; bulk carrier shipping through a joint-venture headquartered in Europe and another in
J apan; and a coal mine in Australia.
611
According to Goldman, by then it was also trading
physical palm oil, rubber, and asphalt.
612
A 2011 presentation by Goldman to its Board of Directors provided these “[e]xamples of
physical client activity”: supplying jet fuel to Delta and Qatar airlines; supplying crude oil
feedstock to Independent Refiner Alon and then purchasing the refined products; and supplying
coal to Utility Drax.
613
It also stated: “We expect a larger increase in Physical activity in
Growth Markets relative to Developed Markets.”
614
The last page of the presentation stated that
Goldman would be able to attribute a high valuation to GS Commodities “if the business was
able to grow physical activities, unconstrained by regulation and integrated with the financial
activities.”
615
In 2011, Goldman also reported to the Federal Reserve that it provided risk management
services to clients involving various types of commodities, including crude oil and refined
products, power and natural gas, coal, freight, emissions and iron ore, base and precious metals,
index products, and agricultural products.
616
Goldman indicated that, in November 2011, it had
608
See 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 014, 027.
609
Id. at 014, 022. See also, e.g., “Goldman expands in commods with Nexen unit buy,” Reuters, J oe Silha and J eff
J ones (5/14/2010),http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/14/us-goldman-nexen-naturalgas-
idUSTRE64D53120100514.
610
See 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 028.
611
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-606243 - 274, at 247. See also “A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks,
Pure Gold,” New York Times, David Kocieniewski (7/20/2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-
shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-gold.html?ref=business; 07/23/2013 Goldman Sachs press release,
“Goldman Sachs on Aluminum and Physical Commodities,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/in-the-
news/archive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-23-13.html.
612
5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” FRB-PSI-200600 – 610, at
600.
613
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 019.
614
Id.. at 021.
615
Id. at 030.
616
11/2011 “Global Commodities Business Overview,” FRB-PSI-000857 - 872, at 858.
115
over 1,000 active clients in its commodities business.
617
Those clients included producers,
consumers, industrial users, central banks, pension funds, wealth managers, and other financial
institutions,
618
with corporate clients accounting for about 45% of its global commodities
clients.
619
In 2011, the Federal Reserve estimated that Goldman had physical commodity assets
worth $26 billion.
620
(3) Current Status
When the Federal Reserve initiated its special review of financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities in 2010, Goldman was one of the ten banks it examined
in detail. Goldman was also featured in the internal Summary Report prepared by the Federal
Reserve’s Commodities Team summarizing the findings of the special review.
621
The nonpublic 2012 Summary Report described Goldman’s wide-ranging physical
commodity activities. They included Goldman’s acquisition of Cogentrix, with its ownership
interests in over 30 power plants;
622
direct ownership of four tolling agreements with other
power plants;
623
direct ownership of Metro, with 84 metal warehouses around the world;
624
the
Colombian coal mines and related assets;
625
as well as the uranium trading business.
626
The
2012 Summary Report also noted that Goldman and J PMorgan together had a “total of 20-25
ships under time charters or voyages transporting oil [and] Liquefied Natural Gas.”
627
In addition to surveying the extent of Goldman’s physical commodity activities, the 2012
Summary Report by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team identified multiple concerns with
those activities. One concern was that Goldman had insufficient capital and insurance to cover
potential losses from a catastrophic event. The report noted at one point that Goldman’s
catastrophic risk valuation methodology for its power plants was to use “simply the current value
of its most valuable power plant,” with no provision for potential expenses stemming from loss
of life, worker disability, facility replacement, or a “failure to deliver electricity under
contract.”
628
At another point, the 2012 Summary Report compared the level of Goldman’s
capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with “extreme loss scenarios,”
and found that “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by $1 to $15 billion.
629
If
617
Id.
618
Id.
619
Id. at 862.
620
2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by FRBNY Commodities Team, FRB-PSI-
200465 - 476, at 465 [sealed exhibit].
621
See 10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by FRBNY Commodities Team, (hereinafter,
“2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 – 510 [sealed exhibit].
622
Id. at 485.
623
Id.
624
Id. at 486.
625
Id.
626
Id.
627
Id. at 486.
628
Id. at 494.
629
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
116
Goldman were to incur losses from its physical commodity activities while maintaining
insufficient capital and insurance protections, the Federal Reserve, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers,
could be asked to rescue the firm.
In 2013, when the Subcommittee asked Goldman about its physical commodity activities,
the financial holding company provided information that, consistent with the Summary Report,
illustrated its far-reaching commodity operations. Goldman reported trading in the physical
commodities of aluminum, copper, gold, lead, nickel, palladium, platinum, silver, tin, zinc, coal,
crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, jet kerosene, and natural gas.
630
Goldman also reported
maintaining substantial inventories of many physical commodities. At the end of 2011 (the latest
year in which complete data was provided to the Subcommittee), those inventories included
approximately 231,000 metric tons of aluminum, 37,000 metric tons of copper, 3,000 metric tons
of nickel, 2.2 million barrels of crude oil, 245,000 barrels of heating oil, 2 million barrels of jet
kerosene, and 106.5 million BTUs of natural gas.
631
In addition, Goldman has continued to own
and operate coal mines in Colombia, supply uranium to power plants, and operate a global
metals warehouse business.
632
Continuing Physical Commodities. Although several other bank holding companies
have begun to exit their physical commodity activities, Goldman executives have indicated that
Goldman remains committed to commodities as a core business.
633
In September 2013, Goldman
CEO Lloyd Blankfein described commodities as a “core, strategic business” for the bank.
634
In
an October 2013 earnings conference call, in response to questions from analysts, Goldman’s
Chief Financial Officer Harvey Schwartz described commodities as an “essential business for
our clients,” and stated: “We have no intention of selling our [commodities] business.”
635
Despite those public statements, in the last two years, Goldman has sold or attempted to
sell certain commodity assets. In 2012, it sold Cogentrix Energy and essentially exited the
business of operating power plants.
636
In 2013, it signaled that Metro International and its
630
2/12/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,”PSI-
GoldmanSachs-01-000001 - 008, at 002 - 004; 2/12/2013 Goldman Response to Subcommittee Questionnaire,
GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R - 003-R.
631
See 2/12/2013 Goldman Response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R - 003-R, at
003-R.
632
See discussion below.
633
See “Goldman Sachs Stands Firm as Banks Exit Commodity Trading,” Bloomberg , Ambereen Choudhury
(4/22/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-22/goldman-sachs-stands-firm-as-banks-exit-
commodity-trading.html.
634
“As rivals fade, Goldman Sachs stands firm on commodities,” Reuters, J onathan Leff and Dmitry Zhdannikov,
(12/6/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/06/us-banks-commodities-idUSBRE9B50S720131206. See
also “Goldman Serves Crucial Physical Commodities Role, Blankfein Says,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore
(9/18/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-18/goldman-serves-crucial-physical-commodities-role-
blankfein-says.html.
635
“Goldman Q3 commodity revenue down ‘significantly’ on Q2” (10/17/2013), Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/goldman-results-commodities-idUSL1N0I70OD20131017.
636
9/6/2012 Carlyle Group press release, “The Carlyle Group to Acquire Cogentrix Energy Assets and Power
Project Development and Acquisition Platform,”http://www.carlyle.com/news-room/news-release-archive/carlyle-
group-acquire-cogentrix-energy-assets-and-power-project-devel.
117
warehouses were up for sale, although it has yet to conclude a transaction.
637
In 2014, Goldman
announced that Nufcor and its uranium trading business were for sale.
638
Goldman told the
Subcommittee that it has yet to receive an acceptable bid for Nufcor and has decided instead to
wind down the business which, due to long-term uranium supply contracts, will require Goldman
to continue supplying uranium to one power plant until 2018.
639
Goldman told the
Subcommittee it is also considering selling its Colombian coal mines.
640
Despite those
statements and actions to sell or shut down certain aspects of its physical commodity activities,
Goldman informed the Subcommittee that it intended to remain active in the commodities
business and will seek to continue its physical commodity activities.
641
637
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/17/2014); “Goldman explores sale of Metro metals warehouse business,”
Reuters, J osephine Mason and David Sheppard (4/11/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/11/us-goldman-
metro-idUSBRE93A0IO20130411.
638
“Goldman puts 'for sale' sign on Iran's old uranium supplier”, Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211.
639
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014).
640
Id.
641
Id.
118
B. Goldman Involvement with Uranium
For the past five years, Goldman Sachs has owned, marketed, and traded physical
uranium and related financial instruments. Goldman initiated its physical and financial trading
of uranium in 2009, a year after it became a bank holding company, by acquiring a longtime
industry leader in the uranium markets, Nufcor International Ltd. Goldman claimed that it had
legal authority to engage in uranium trading under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “grandfather”
clause. Since no Nufcor employees came to Goldman as part of the sale, Goldman employees
ran the business. Within three years of purchase, Goldman increased the volume of Nufcor’s
uranium trading tenfold, from an annualized amount of about 1.3 million pounds to 13 million
pounds, and increased its long-term uranium supply contracts from two to nine utilities with
nuclear power plants. Goldman stored its physical uranium in at least six storage facilities in the
United States and abroad, owned by unrelated parties.
Goldman’s uranium-related activities, which are expected to continue until at least 2018,
raise multiple concerns, including insufficient capital and insurance to protect against a
catastrophic event, unfair competition, and conflicts of interest arising from controlling physical
uranium supplies while trading uranium financial instruments.
(1) Background on Uranium
Uranium (U) is a dense, weakly radioactive, naturally occurring metal
642
that is most
commonly used for power generation and nuclear weapons. It is found in rocks and ores that
make up approximately three percent of the earth’s crust, and so is not considered a rare metal.
643
In its natural form, uranium is found in three different isotopes: Uranium-238, Uranium-
235, and Uranium-234, with U-235, the isotope used for nuclear enrichment, comprising only
about 0.7 percent of natural uranium.
644
To be useful for power generation or military purposes,
the percentage of U-235 in a given sample needs to be increased significantly. Power plants
need uranium to contain about 5% U-235,
645
while military weapons require uranium to contain
at least 90%.
646
642
10/1/2012 “Radiation Protection[:] Uranium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website,http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.html.
643
12/2008 “New Product Memorandum [:] Uranium Trading,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at
049 (hereinafter “12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading”); Being Nuclear: Africans
and the Global Uranium Trade, (The MIT Press, 2012) (hereinafter, “Being Nuclear”), Gabrielle Hecht, at 51
(“ranium wasn’t confined to particular geological formations or geographical locations. The stuff was
everywhere.”).
644
10/1/2012 “Radiation Protection[:] Uranium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website,http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.html.
645
See 10/1/2014 “Uranium Enrichment,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission website,http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html; See also 3/2014 “What is Uranium? How Does it
Work?,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-
cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/.
646
See 3/2014 “What is Uranium? How Does it Work?,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/.
119
To increase the concentration of U-235, uranium must go through a fuel processing cycle.
The process begins when the uranium ore is refined and processed to generate triuranium
octaoxide (U
3
O
8
or U3O8), otherwise known as “yellowcake.”
647
U3O8 is “an inert, stable,
insoluble oxide.”
648
In the next step of the fuel processing cycle, by removing impurities and
combining it with fluorine, the U3O8 is converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF
6
or UF6). The
only conversion plant currently operating in the United States is located in Metropolis,
Illinois.
649
In the next step in the process, the UF6 is enriched to increase the level of U-235.
650
The
enriched UF6 is then solidified and processed into uranium oxide (UO
2
), which can be used to
manufacture nuclear fuel rods for power plants.
651
This multi-step enrichment process was
depicted in the following chart included in a Goldman internal memorandum advocating the
financial holding company’s involvement with uranium trading:
Figure 1. The Uranium Fuel Processing Cycle.
652
Health Risks. The health-related risks of uranium itself as well as from the fuel
processing cycle can be significant. While uranium in its natural form is not considered a
harmfully radioactive substance, it is toxic after processing.
653
Exposure to too much uranium
has been found to increase cancer risk and cause liver damage.
654
Further, various stages of
uranium processing involve strong acids and produce extremely corrosive chemicals that could
cause fires or explosions.
655
647
12/2008 “New Product Memorandum,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 049.
648
Id.
649
Id. (noting other conversion plants in Canada, France, United Kingdom, China, and Russia).
650
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 049.
651
Id.
652
Id.
653
Id. at 50.
654
10/1/2012 “Radiation Protection[:] Uranium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website,http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.html.
655
5/21/2014 “Uranium Conversion,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission website,http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-conversion.html.
120
Regulatory Framework. The regulatory landscape for owning and processing uranium
varies as uranium is enriched and moves closer to useable form for fuel or weapons. In the
United States, a person may not take title to or possession of, or import or export uranium,
without obtaining a general or specific license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).
656
In 1980, the NRC issued a regulation which automatically grants a “general” license,
without any application requirement, to any U3O8 or un-enriched UF6 title holder who does not
physically possess, move, or process the uranium.
657
That regulation effectively allows uranium
owners to buy and sell the uranium without having to obtain a specific U.S. license, so long as
they do not take physical possession of the metal. At the same time, the NRC has imposed
significant licensing requirements on parties involved with the physical transport, handling, and
processing of uranium.
658
Other countries have different regulatory requirements regarding the storage, transport,
enrichment, and trading of uranium. An ongoing regulatory issue is whether uranium should be
treated as nuclear material requiring careful monitoring and trading restrictions, or a profit-
generating commodity freely transferable among parties interested in buying and selling it.
659
Uranium Markets. According to the World Nuclear Association, over 400 nuclear
power plants scattered over 30 countries use uranium to generate about 12% of the world’s
power supply.
660
Those nuclear power plants have created a market for about 160-170 million
pounds of uranium oxide concentrate per year.
661
To meet that demand, uranium is usually
purchased by utilities or power plants directly from the producers using long term supply
contracts.
662
The prices for those contracted deliveries are usually linked to the spot prices of
uranium at the time of delivery.
663
Uranium-related trading can occur in a number of ways, including trading in: (1)
physical uranium at various stages of its life cycle; (2) uranium financial instruments, including
futures, forwards, options, or swaps; (3) certain rights related to uranium, such as “Conversion
656
See Section 62 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 83-703, codified at 42 U.S.C. §2011 (“Unless authorized
by a general or specific license issued by the Commission, which the Commission is hereby authorized to issue, no
person may transfer or receive in interstate commerce, transfer, deliver, receive possession of or title to, or import
into or export from the United States any source material after removal from its place of deposit in nature … ”).
657
10 C.F.R. § 40.21, 45 Fed. Reg. 65531, (Oct. 3, 1980) (“A general license is hereby issued authorizing the receipt
of title to source or byproduct material, as defined in this part, without regard to quantity. This general license does
not authorize any person to receive, possess, deliver, use, or transfer source or byproduct material.”).
658
Subcommittee briefing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (9/23/2014).
659
See, e.g., Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade, (The MIT Press, 2012) (hereinafter, “Being
Nuclear”), Gabrielle Hecht, at 31-36, 56-57.
660
3/2014 “What is Uranium? How Does it Work?,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/.
661
4/2014 “Uranium Markets,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-
cycle/uranium-resources/uranium-markets/ (stating 170 million pounds).
662
Id.
663
Id. Because of the extensive amount of processing required to make uranium useful, only about one third of the
cost of nuclear fuel for a power plant is the cost of the original uranium. Id. Further, the “spot” prices for uranium
are not based on actual transactions, but are instead published by survey services that are integrally involved in these
markets. See 12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 052.
121
Service Certificates” or “Separative Work Units”; and (4) shares of uranium-related companies
or an index that tracks uranium-related companies’ stock prices.
664
Uranium is commonly traded as a physical commodity at two stages in its life cycle:
U3O8 (triuranium octoxide) and as UF6 (uranium hexafluoride).
665
The total volume of those
two physical markets is relatively small.
With respect to uranium financial instruments, CME Group Inc. lists a standardized
uranium-related futures contract for 250 pounds of U3O8.
666
This financially settled contract is
traded on the CME Globex and CME ClearPort trading platforms, and is linked to prices
provided by Ux Consulting Company, LLC.
667
It was established and began trading for the first
time on May 6, 2007.
668
In recent years, the uranium futures market has had relatively few
participants, the U3O8 contract has rarely traded, and open interest has generally remained
relatively low.
669
Uranium can also be traded through two unique financial instruments tied to its
processing cycle. The right to “convert” U3O8 into UF6, represented by a U3O8 “Conversion
Services Certificate,” can be traded on an over-the-counter basis.
670
These certificates grant the
holder a place in line to convert U3O8 to UF6 at a conversion facility.
671
Similarly, a
“Separative Work Unit,” representing the “right” to enrich uranium at a particular enrichment
facility by a particular amount, can also be traded over the counter.
672
Finally, although more removed, investors seeking to profit from changes in uranium
prices may invest in a company engaged in the uranium business or in one or more exchange
traded funds that track stocks of companies involved in uranium.
673
In recent years, the uranium market has experienced significant price fluctuations, based
on massive swings in market sentiment towards nuclear power and technology changes for
alternative sources of energy. Price swings in the U3O8 spot market illustrate the price variance
and increased volatility in recent years.
664
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 030 - 040.
665
Id.
666
See “UxC Uranium U3O8 Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/other/uranium_contract_specifications.html.
667
Id.
668
When it first began trading, the futures contract was on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) Clear
Port and CME Globex platforms. See “CME/NYMEX Uranium Futures (UX) Contract[:]
CME/NYMEX Partners with Ux Consulting to Offer Uranium Futures Contracts,” Ux Consulting Company, LLC
website,http://www.uxc.com/data/nymex/NymexOverview.aspx.
669
There are frequently zero reported trades per day. For example, for the week of September 9-September 16,
2014, only one trade was reported, involving 50 contracts. See “UxC Uranium U3O8 Volume,” CME Group
website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/other/uranium_quotes_volume_voi.html.
670
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
671
Id.
671
Id.
672
Id.
673
For example, an investor could invest in the Global X Uranium ETF, which tracks the Solactive Global Uranium
Index and is traded on NYSE Arca under symbol URA. See “Global X Uranium ETF,” Global X Funds website,http://www.globalxfunds.com/URA.
122
Ux U3O8 Price - Full History (Spot U3O8-Full)
*Chart prepared by Ux Consulting Company, LLC
674
This price history reflects fundamental changes in the uranium market. In particular, in
the mid-2000s, a renewed focus on global warming
675
led to widespread speculation that nuclear
power would expand, leading to an increase in uranium prices. U3O8 spot market prices peaked
at about $135 per pound, at nearly the same time as the U3O8 futures product began trading for
the first time in May 2007.
676
Demand for nuclear power sources then waned, as huge stores of
relatively inexpensive natural gas became available as an alternative energy source. J ust as
prices began to recover amid a renewed push for low carbon dioxideemission energy sources to
counter global warning, the nuclear disaster occurred at the Fukushima Diachii nuclear power
plant in J apan in March 2011. “The accident … called nuclear power’s prospects into question
and the spot price [of U3O8] has declined dramatically since that time.”
677
Governments shut
down nuclear power plants,
678
postponed plans for new ones, and began to shift to other power
sources.
679
From a peak of about $135 per pound in 2007, U3O8 spot market prices have since
fallen to about $40 today.
674
Ux Consulting Company, LLC,http://www.uxc.com/review/UxCPriceChart.aspx?chart=spot-u3o8-full.
675
In May 2006, the movie, “An Inconvenient Truth” was released, for example, which significantly raised
awareness of global warming. See “ 'An Inconvenient Truth': Al Gore's Fight Against Global Warming,” New York
Times, Andrew Revkin (5/22/2006),http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/movies/22gore.html?pagewanted=all.
676
See, e.g., “Uranium stocks rally in advance of NYMEX futures trading,” U3O8.biz, Robert Simpson (5/3/2007),http://www.u3o8.biz/s/MarketComment...97&_Title=Uranium-stocks-rally-in-advance-of-
NYMEX-futures-trading (“The NYMEX will list a uranium futures contract on Monday, May 7, as the energy and
metals exchange looks to capitalize on surging interest in the nuclear fuel.”); Being Nuclear, at 329.
677
2014 Review, prepared by Energy Resources International, Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of
Nuclear Energy, at 5,http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f15/ERI Market Analysis.pdf.
678
Id. at 4 (noting J apan temporarily shut down some nuclear facilities while Germany permanently shut facilities).
679
See, e.g., “Uranium Market,” Uranium Participation Corporation website,http://www.uraniumparticipation.com/s/Uranium_Market.asp (explaining current lower uranium prices).
123
Because the uranium market is volatile and has relatively few participants, it poses
significant risks for those who trade in it. As one website discussing uranium investments
warned: “Uranium futures carry a double whammy of being thinly traded and very volatile.”
680
(2) Background on Nufcor
The Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa (Nufcor), the predecessor to Nufcor
International Ltd., was formed by South African gold mining companies in the 1960s, to process
and market uranium to the nascent nuclear power industry.
681
The companies had previously
sold the bulk of the uranium obtained as a byproduct of their gold mining to the United States
and United Kingdom for military purposes.
682
The creation of Nufcor marked a significant shift in market focus away from military
sales towards commercial power plants, and Nufcor became a supplier of uranium products used
to produce nuclear fuel rods for nuclear power plants around the world.
683
Among other
countries, in the 1970s, Nufcor sold enriched uranium to Iran.
684
In 1999, Nufcor incorporated a new subsidiary in London, Nufcor International Ltd., to
undertake trading in nuclear fuel cycle products and services. Nufcor also created an investment
adviser, Nufcor Capital Ltd., which managed an investment fund, Nufcor Uranium Ltd., for
uranium-related investments.
685
By the mid-2000s, Nufcor and its related affiliates were actively
engaged in owning physical uranium, trading financial products related to uranium, and advising
investors’ on uranium-related investments.
686
On J une 26, 2008, Nufcor was bought by the Constellation Energy Group, a U.S. firm that
operated several nuclear power plants, for about $103 million.
687
680
10/2/2014 “How to Invest in Uranium,” Demand Media, Karen Rogers,http://finance.zacks.com/invest-
uranium-5543.html.
681
“Goldman puts ‘for sale’ sign on Iran’s old uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211.
682
See Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade, (The MIT Press, 2012) (hereinafter, “Being
Nuclear”), Gabrielle Hecht, at 68, 89.
683
See Being Nuclear, at 68 - 69, 72.
684
11/16/2014 email from Professor Gabrielle Hecht to Subcommittee; “Goldman puts 'for sale' sign on Iran's old
uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/goldman-
uranium-idUSL2N0LC0ZV20140211.
685
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 06, Exhibit A, at GSPSICOMMODS00046240.
686
See 2008 Form 10-K for Constellation Energy Group, Inc., filed with the SEC on 2/27/09, at 152 - 153,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9466/000104746909002000/a2190570z10-k.htm.
687
Id. at 1, 152. The two owners of Nufcor at the time were AngloGold Ashanti and FirstRand International.
Constellation Energy’s purchase of Nufcor led to speculation in the press that it “could trigger a trend where utilities
start to trade uranium as a commodity.” “Constellation poised to buy Nufcor Intl,” Mineweb, Anna Stablum
(5/7/2008),http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/content/en/mineweb-fast-news?oid=52522&sn=Detail.
124
(3) Goldman Involvement with Physical Uranium
Goldman’s involvement with physical uranium began with a 2008 proposal by GS
Commodities to get into the business of trading physical and financial uranium products and
processing rights.
688
In 2009, Goldman purchased Nufcor, and expanded its business over the
next five years, resulting in Goldman’s buying millions of pounds of uranium, controlling
inventories of physical uranium at storage facilities in the United States and Europe, and
becoming a long term supplier of physical uranium to nine utilities with nuclear power plants.
Because no employees who conducted Nufcor’s business joined Goldman after the sale,
Goldman employees ran the business. In 2014, for a variety of reasons, Goldman decided it
would sell Nufcor or wind it down. It currently has contractual obligations to supply physical
uranium to one nuclear power plant until 2018.
(a) Proposing Physical Uranium Activities
In December 2008, three months after Goldman became a bank holding company,
Goldman’s commodities group, GS Commodities, sought approval from senior Goldman
management to expand its physical commodity activities to include “trading physical and
financial Uranium products and processing rights.”
689
As a way of initiating this activity, GS
Commodities advocated acquiring Nufcor International Ltd., which was “a recognized name in
the uranium industry,”
690
and which was then owned by Constellation Energy Group.
691
The proposal, which was sponsored by Goldman’s Global Head of Commodities, Isabelle
Ealet, was memorialized in a 2008 “New Product Memorandum.”
692
The memorandum was
submitted to Goldman’s European Federation New Products Committee for approval.
693
The
New Products Committee, which included approximately a dozen Goldman executives, focused
on ensuring that Goldman had the ability to support the proposed new activities from
compliance, legal, tax, and operational perspectives.
694
The New Product Memorandum detailed
Goldman’s understanding of Nufcor’s business activities, highlighted some of the associated
risks, and ultimately recommended purchasing the company.
695
Describing Nufcor’s Business. According to the Goldman analysis in the New Product
Memorandum, Nufcor’s business model was focused around four distinct activities involving the
trading of physical and financial uranium products, the marketing of uranium ore supplied by
688
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
689
Id. Goldman told the Subcommittee that while it may have previously traded in uranium to a minimal degree,
creating a dedicated business line to conduct uranium transactions in the financial and physical markets was a major
change in the nature, scope, and volume of its uranium activities, and necessitated a new product presentation and
approval. Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
690
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
691
Constellation Energy is a longtime operator of nuclear power plants in the United States. See 2008 Form 10-K
for Constellation Energy Group, Inc., filed with the SEC on 2/27/09,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9466/000104746909002000/a2190570z10-k.htm.
692
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
693
Id.
694
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
695
See 12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052.
125
two mining companies, and advising on uranium-related investments.
696
Goldman described the
four business activities as follows:
(1) “Arbitrage across elements and processes in the uranium fuel cycle including time-
spreads and inventory carry trades to capture contango differentials”;
697
(2) “Speculation on individual elements and processes in the fuel cycle”;
698
(3) “Fulfilment of Agency Agreements with two mining companies for the marketing and
sale of U3O8”;
699
and
(4) “Provision of Advisory and Custodian services to Nufcor Capital Ltd, a closed-ended
investment fund that buys and holds UF6 & U3O8.”
700
The Goldman analysis found that Nufcor International Ltd. traded a significant volume of
physical and financial uranium-related products. Its trading activity included:
• 3.6 million pounds of physical U3O8 during 2008;
• 460,000 kilograms of physical UF6 during 2008;
• 1.3 million pounds of U3O8, using exchange based products and bilateral swap
agreements during 2008;
• 760,000 kilograms of uranium in Conversion Service Credits (rights to convert U3O8
to UF6) during 2007; and
• 500,000 kilograms of uranium in Separative Work Units (rights to enrich UF6).
701
In addition, the December 2008 Goldman analysis noted that Nufcor possessed a large inventory
of physical uranium products which, in 2008, included:
• 1.15 million pounds of U3O8;
702
• 200,000 kilograms of UF6; and
• Conversion Service Credits representing 770,000 kilograms of uranium.
703
The Goldman analysis valued the entire portfolio at $47 million dollars, which included a
physical uranium inventory worth $90 million, but also certain uranium forward positions that
were then out of the money by $55 million.
704
696
Id.
697
Id. at 040. See also “Arbitrage,” Investopedia.com,http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp (“The
simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset in order to profit from a difference in the price.”).
698
Id. According to the Goldman analysis, Nufcor then held inventories of U3O8 and UF
6
, as well as uranium
Conversion Service Credits which had been loaned to Honeywell, but were due to return to Nufcor in 2009. Id.
699
Id. According to the Goldman analysis, Nufcor then had annual retainer and sales commission arrangements
with Uranium One and with AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., the South African gold mining consortium. Id.
700
Id.
701
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 040.
702
Id. This figure of 1.15 million pounds of U3O8 was contradicted a few pages later, at FRB-PSI-400046, where
Goldman indicated that Nufcor had only about 623,000 pounds of U3O8, nearly 500,000 fewer pounds than first
indicated at FRB-PSI-400040 in the same memorandum.
703
Id.
704
Id. A few pages later, however, the memorandum indicated that Nufcor had only about 623,000 pounds of
U3O8, and its total physical uranium portfolio had an estimated value of only about $64 million. Id. at 046.
126
Identifying Key Nufcor Risks. In addition to describing Nufcor’s business activities
and current uranium holdings, the New Product Memorandum identified and analyzed a number
of risks associated with taking on Nufcor’s uranium-related activities.
705
They included
valuation and market risks, liquidity risks, catastrophic event liability issues, compliance issues,
regulatory risks, credit risks, inventory management concerns, trade reporting issues, and tax
considerations.
706
The description of those risks informed senior Goldman management that the
proposed uranium-related activities were high-risk. The key risks included the following.
Valuation Risks and Market Risks. A significant portion of the analysis in the New
Product Memorandum focused on trade-related risks, including valuation risks, market risks, and
the consequences of declining uranium prices.
The Goldman analysis warned that obtaining accurate valuations for uranium had a
number of challenges. It stated that there was “no spot market or spot price marker” that an
owner of uranium could use to determine daily uranium prices.
707
Instead, it found that weekly
“spot” prices were published by two consulting firms based on “market sentiment and qualifying
bids,” rather than completed transactions.
708
The Goldman analysis stated that Goldman had not
yet tested the “rigor/robustness” of those weekly price markers.
709
The Goldman analysis also
found that there was “no exchange-traded commodity market for physical uranium products.”
710
The absence of an active physical exchange market, again, made valuing uranium products more
difficult than for other commodities, adding to the risk of holding the assets.
With respect to market risks, the Goldman analysis highlighted uranium’s volatile prices.
It stated that the “disconnect between [fair value] of physical inventory and the lack of [mark-to-
market] on the forward positions may result in [profit and loss] volatility for the Uranium
portfolio.”
711
The Goldman analysis also highlighted Nufcor’s then out-of-the-money net short
position in uranium forwards, concluding that it could give rise to further losses if uranium prices
declined.
712
Those financial instrument losses would be in addition to losses from the declining
value of the physical uranium Nufcor also held.
Operational Risks. In addition to price volatility and valuation issues, the Goldman
analysis identified a number of operational concerns related to physical uranium. One key issue
was whether Goldman’s existing systems could accurately track physical and financial uranium
705
Id. at 042.
706
Id. at 043 - 048.
707
Id. at 042.
708
Id. Reliance on bids rather than completed transactions can result in inaccurate pricing and even abusive
practices. For example, widespread manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR), benchmarks
underpinning trillions of dollars in derivatives, was achieved in part through submissions of inaccurate and
misleading bids, as opposed to actual transactions. See, e.g., 2/6/2013 U.S. Department of J ustice press release,
“RBS Securities J apan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR
Benchmark Interest Rates,”http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/292421.htm.
709
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, at FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 042.
710
Id.
711
Id. at 047.
712
Id. at 045.
127
transactions, given the absence of standardized uranium trade documentation.
713
The
memorandum indicated that trade capturing and reporting mechanisms would need to be
developed so that uranium transactions could utilize Goldman’s existing confirmation,
settlement, and operations systems.
714
The Goldman analysis also noted that personnel would be
needed to manage Nufcor’s physical inventories.
715
Another key issue raised in the memorandum was ensuring that Goldman could manage
its positions through effective hedging. The Goldman analysis indicated that it might be difficult
to hedge particular uranium positions due to the lack of robust trading in the futures market. For
example, the analysis noted that uranium futures were so thinly-traded that Nufcor’s 2008 open
interest of 139,000 pounds of U3O8 futures was about 20% of the overall open interest in the
product.
716
The memorandum warned that hedging significant exposures would be difficult due
to the lack of many counterparties in the market, adding to the risk of holding uranium assets.
The New Product Memorandum also noted that the market was characterized by “long-
term physical participants trading with each other,” which could lead to significant informational
disadvantages for new entrants, like Goldman.
717
Put another way, the memorandum indicated
that it might be difficult for Goldman to fully understand the market at a given time, and that it
could be more readily taken advantage of by other market participants with more experience
trading uranium.
Credit Risks. In contrast to the operational risks, Goldman found that the counterparty
credit risks arising from a Nufcor acquisition were not significant.
718
The Goldman analysis
noted that many of the counterparties in the uranium market were large multinational
corporations or government-related entities, and tended to have strong credit.
719
Goldman also evaluated the credit risks of the third party facilities where Nufcor stored
its uranium.
720
The memorandum examined five companies with storage facilities: Cameco
Corp.;
721
Comurhex;
722
ConverDyn;
723
EURODIF S.A.;
724
and USEC, Inc.
725
The memorandum
713
Id.
714
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 047 - 048.
715
Id. at 047. The memorandum observed that Goldman already had “experience of managing physical unallocated
products for metals and coal,” as well as products with different quality levels, such as coal with different sulfur
content, suggesting that Goldman should also be able to manage the physical uranium inventory. Id.
716
Id. at 042.
717
Id.
718
Id. at 045.
719
Id.
720
Id. at 046.
721
Cameco Corp. is the largest U.S. uranium producer with mines in Wyoming and Nebraska. See “About,”
Cameco Corp. website,http://www.cameco.com/usa/.
722
Comurhex is a subsidiary of AREVA, a French multinational group that specializes in nuclear power plants and
owns a uranium conversion facility in France. See “The History of Comurhex Pierrelatte,” AREVA website,http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-...hex-pierrelatte-from-1959-to-the-comurhex-ii-
project.html.
723
ConverDyn is a partnership between affiliates of Honeywell and General Atomics, and has uranium storage
facilities in Illinois. See “Our Business,” ConverDyn website,http://www.converdyn.com/business/index.html;
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” at PSI-
GoldmanSachs-21-000010 - 004.
128
expressed concern about USEC’s credit profile,
726
and noted that Goldman would not want to
add to that credit exposure if it were to acquire Nufcor.
727
Regulatory Risks. Goldman next assessed the regulatory risks associated with an
acquisition of Nufcor. The memorandum framed the issue as whether Nufcor’s uranium
activities: (1) were consistent with the laws governing all persons regarding uranium, and (2)
would be permitted by its banking regulators.
The New Product Memorandum noted that “ranium processing and storage (in all
forms) is heavily regulated.”
728
It briefly analyzed regulatory issues in the primary jurisdictions
where Nufcor operated: the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, while also
recognizing a need to analyze regulatory requirements in Germany and Sweden.
729
With respect
to the United States, the memorandum stated that “holders of legal title to uranium ore
concentrates and UF6 are required to be licensed,”
730
while also noting that, if Goldman were to
conduct the business so that Goldman would not come into physical possession of uranium, own
any storage facility, or transport any uranium, licensing would likely not be a problem.
731
On the issue of whether Goldman would be permitted by its U.S. and U.K. banking
regulators to engage in uranium-related trading, the memorandum concluded that, in the United
States, the acquisition of Nufcor was “consistent” with the activities in which the firm was
engaged at the time it became a bank holding company, and thus would be eligible for
grandfathering under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
732
Goldman determined that it could treat
physical uranium activities as a “grandfathered” activity despite having never before engaged in
it. With respect to the United Kingdom, the Goldman analysis stated that the proposed uranium
activities gave rise to no additional registration requirements with the U.K. Financial Services
Authority.
733
724
EURODIF S.A. is another AREVA subsidiary and owns a uranium enrichment facility in France. See AREVA
website, “EURODIF S.A.: Uranium Enrichment,”http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-792/eurodif-s-a-georges-
besse-plant-uranium-enrichment.html. The United States government and the United States Enrichment Corporation
previously brought actions against EURODIF S.A. for “dumping” Separative Work Units in the United States. See
United States v. EURODIF S.A., Case No. 07-1059 (U.S.), Opinion (1/26/2009),http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1059.pdf .
725
USEC, Inc. was created by the U.S. Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, later became a publicly-traded
corporation. See “History,” USEC website,http://www.centrusenergy.com/company/history.
726
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 046.
727
Id. Goldman’s assessment of USEC’s credit risk proved accurate, as USEC ultimately declared a Chapter 11
bankruptcy in early 2014. It is expected to emerge from that bankruptcy as a reorganized company under the name
Centrus Energy Corp. in September 2014. See 9/5/2014 USEC press release, “Court Confirms USEC Inc. Plan of
Reorganization,”http://www.usec.com/news/court-confirms-usec-inc-plan-reorganization.
728
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 042.
729
Id. at 043 - 044.
730
Id. at 043.
731
Id. at 045. Goldman told the Subcommittee that it has not been required to obtain any specific license to engage
in uranium trading or take ownership of physical uranium. Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
732
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 044. The
Goldman analysis also noted that uranium trading was “of a type” authorized by the Federal Reserve, since U3O8
futures contract had been approved by the CFTC for trading on exchanges. Id.
733
Id. at 045.
129
Catastrophic Event Liability Risks. Still another set of key risks identified and
discussed in the New Product Memorandum involved potential liability risks for Goldman in
connection with a health, safety, or environmental disaster arising from the proposed uranium
activities. The New Product Memorandum included a lengthy legal analysis focused on the
potential liability of facility owners, facility operators, and the title holders of uranium.
734
It
discussed the applicability of the Price Andersen Act which is triggered by the occurrence of a
“nuclear incident,” meaning nuclear material is released from a facility’s boundaries.
735
It also
discussed the possibility of lawsuits being brought in federal versus state courts. After
enumerating a number of potential liability risks, the New Product Memorandum expressed
confidence that Goldman would not be held liable in the event of a uranium-related event, so
long as it was not the operator of any storage or transport facility involved and did not dictate
how the facility should be operated.
736
The New Product Memorandum’s long list of the risks involved with buying and selling
physical uranium – including valuation, market, operational, credit, regulatory, and catastrophic
event risks – showed it was a high risk business. Despite the risks, a lack of prior uranium
activities, its status as a bank holding company, and public pressure for banks to reduce risks to
avoid taxpayer bailouts, Goldman made the decision to expand into physical uranium activities.
(b) Operating a Physical Uranium Business
On J une 30, 2009, as part of a larger commodities acquisition from the Constellation
Energy Group, Goldman purchased 100% of the shares of Nufcor International Ltd. and Nufcor
Capital Ltd., as well as an 8% ownership stake in the Nufcor Uranium Ltd. investment fund.
737
Goldman relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause as its legal authority to purchase
Nufcor.
738
Nufcor is a U.K. corporation, and its immediate owner is Goldman Sachs Group UK
Limited, a London-based affiliate of the Goldman holding company.
739
Goldman explained to
734
Id. at 043 - 044.
735
Id.
736
Id.
737
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at 002-003.
738
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 7/25/2012 “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business
Standards Committee: Global Commodities,” (hereinafter “2012 Firmwide Presentation”), prepared by Goldman,
FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1000 (indicating Nufcor was “owned under 4(o),” the grandfather clause). Although
Goldman ultimately relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority, several facts suggest that Goldman
may have considered holding Nufcor under its merchant banking authority. For example, Goldman placed J acques
Gabillon on the Nufcor Board of Directors; he was from the Goldman Commodities Principal Investments group,
which oversaw Goldman’s commodities-related merchant banking activities. In addition, Goldman’s New Products
Memorandum stated that Nufcor’s uranium-related “positions will not be [m]arked to market and hence will sit out
of VaR,” a comment which implies that the plan was to hold Nufcor as a merchant banking portfolio company
whose assets would not be valued on a daily basis in Goldman’s trading books, but would instead be held by
Goldman as a separate merchant banking investment. See 12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on
Uranium Trading, at FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 048. In the end, however, Goldman relied on the grandfathering
authority as the legal basis for its physical uranium activities and completely integrated Nufcor’s assets and trading
into its own trading operations.
739
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046240.
130
the Subcommittee that no employees conducting Nufcor’s business stayed on after Goldman
acquired it, and as a result, Goldman employees in the GS Commodities group took on
management of Nufcor’s operations.
740
As a result, Nufcor International Ltd. became a shell
company whose business activities were conducted exclusively by Goldman employees.
741
As
one Goldman document put it, Nufcor’s uranium activities were “treated as [the] firm’s own
activities.”
742
Goldman explained that it also shuttered Nufcor Capital Ltd., which was already
in the course of being wound down at the time of its sale to Goldman.
743
In addition, Goldman
stated that Nufcor Uranium, Ltd., the investment fund which had been organized as a Guernsey
investment company, was later merged into the Uranium Participation Corporation, which is
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
744
Since acquiring Nufcor in 2009, Goldman has used Nufcor International Ltd. to engage in
a wide array of uranium-related activities.
745
The activities included buying and selling physical
U3O8 and physical UF6 on the spot markets; forward contracts to buy and sell physical U3O8
and UF6; options on U3O8 and UF6; uranium futures contracts; and Conversion Service
Credits.
746
Goldman also took ownership of hundreds of thousands of pounds of physical
uranium, and became a supplier of uranium to utilities with nuclear power plants.
747
740
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
741
Id.
742
2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1000 (“Portfolio companies owned under 4(o) include
Cogentrix and Nufcor – treated as firm’s own activities.”).
743
Id. See also 12/31/2011 “Director’s Report and Financial Statements,” prepared by Nufcor International Ltd.,
GSPSICOMMODS00046281 - 290 at 282 (noting that the company had not traded in 2010 or 2011, had terminated
its advisory agreement with its key client, and had also deregistered with the U.K. FSA).
744
Id. On its website, the Uranium Participation Corporation describes itself as “focused solely on investing in
uranium concentrates,” such as U3O8 and UF
6
, “with the primary investment objective of achieving appreciation in
the value of its uranium holdings through increases in the uranium price.” Uranium Participation Corporation
website,http://www.uraniumparticipation.com/s/Home.asp.
745
5/17/2013 “Physical Commodity Review Committee: Meeting Minutes,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-
400053 - 055.
746
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). Although Nufcor also previously traded Separative Work
Units, Goldman has not traded them since the acquisition. 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 002.
747
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at Exhibit B, GSPSICOMMODS00046532.
131
After acquiring Nufcor, Goldman quickly increased the volume of its uranium trading,
eventually surpassing Nufcor’s 2009 benchmark by tenfold, going from an annualized 1.3
million pounds to nearly 13 million pounds in uranium trading per year from 2009 through 2013:
Goldman’s Uranium Trading
2009 – 2013
Year U3O8 Traded (Pounds)
2009 (annualized) 1.3 million
2010 4.7 million
2011 8.2 million
2012 13.7 million
2013 12.8 million
Source: 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee,
“Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 004.
The value of Goldman’s physical uranium inventory also grew steadily, from an estimated $90
million in 2008 to more than $240 million in 2013, even as uranium prices fell:
Goldman’s Physical Uranium Inventory
2010 – 2013
Date Dollar Value
December 31, 2010 $112.8 million
December 31, 2011 $157.8 million
December 31, 2012 $230.3 million
December 31, 2013 $241.8 million
Source: Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2011, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046251; Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial
Statements, for 12/31/2012, at GSPSICOMMODS00046264; Nufcor International Ltd.
Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2013, at GSPSICOMMODS00046278.
In addition, Goldman significantly expanded Nufcor’s uranium supply contracts with
utilities. At the time of acquisition in 2009, through Nufcor International, Ltd., Goldman became
a supplier of uranium to two utilities with nuclear power plants.
748
As of J une 30, 2014, it had
supply contracts with nine utilities located in Florida, New Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina,
Washington state, Wisconsin, and elsewhere.
749
The longest of those supply contracts required
Goldman to deliver uranium to the utility through 2018.
750
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it is also holding a substantial inventory of forward
contracts to buy or deliver over 3 million pounds of uranium over the next four years.
751
In
addition, it is holding U3O8 future positions that mature in each of the next several years,
748
Id. at Exhibit B, GSPSICOMMODS00046532, 533.
749
Id.
750
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 002.
751
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
132
involving hundreds of thousands of pounds of uranium.
752
Most of Nufcor’s positions are held
on a mark-to-market basis, pursuant to Goldman’s valuation policy, and so are subject to daily
price fluctuations.
753
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, in connection with its physical uranium activities
through Nufcor, it has stored U3O8 at three locations: ConverDyn facility in Illinois; Cameco
facility in Canada; and Comurhex facility in France.
754
Each of those facilities converts U3O8
into UF6. In addition, Goldman has stored UF6 at three other locations: Louisiana Energy
Services facility in New Mexico;
755
EURODIF S.A. facility in France; and URENCO facility in
the Netherlands.
756
Each of those facilities enrich UF6.
When asked to summarize its physical uranium activities, Goldman described them as
buying uranium from mining companies, storing it, and providing the uranium to utilities when
they wanted to process more fuel for their nuclear power plants.
757
Goldman indicated that it
was, essentially, financing the storage of the uranium until its buyers were ready to purchase it.
Goldman said that it hedged its physical positions primarily by selling the physical supply
through forward contracts.
758
At the same time Goldman acted as a supplier for the utilities, it
was also speculating on uranium prices by trading uranium futures and other financial products.
Goldman documentation indicates that, in 2012, Goldman briefly considered expanding
its physical uranium activities still further, by getting involved with transporting uranium, but
decided not to go forward.
759
In 2013, GS Commodities personnel proposed expanding
Goldman’s physical uranium trading activities by including enriched uranium products. In May
2013, Goldman’s Physical Commodity Review Committee met to consider the proposal, which
involved buying and selling physical UF6 with enrichment levels up to five percent.
760
The
proposal stated that the enriched uranium would be stored at a Global Nuclear Fuel facility in
North Carolina.
761
Ultimately, Goldman decided against the proposal. Goldman explained to
the Subcommittee that the decision was due, in part, to the departure of a key Goldman employee
who had been a strong proponent of the physical uranium trading business.
762
752
Id.
753
See 10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
19-000001 - 009, at 008 (noting that “all physical uranium futures, forwards, swaps and options are fair valued,”
other than UF6 forwards contracts which are treated as executory contracts and conversion credits are treated as
intangibles); Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014).
754
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
755
The facility is run by URENCO USA, Inc., a subsidiary of URENCO LTD. See “Company Structure,”
URENCO website,http://www.urenco.com/about-us/company-structure/.
756
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
757
Id.
758
Id.
759
See 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1006 (indicating that, on 5/31/2012, a presentation
was made to start a new activity, “Physical vessel transportation of Uranium (U3O8),” that review of that proposal
was then underway); Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
760
See 5/17/2013 “Physical Commodity Review Committee: Meeting Minutes,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-
400053 - 055.
761
Id.
762
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
133
In 2014, Goldman put Nufcor up for sale.
763
Goldman told the Subcommittee that
because it did not receive an acceptable bid for the business, Goldman was in the process of
winding down Nufcor over the next several years.
764
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, as
part of the wind down, it has stopped building its inventory of physical uranium and expects its
physical and financial uranium positions to steadily decrease over the next few years.
765
Goldman explained that it currently has one uranium supply contract that continues until 2018,
766
and expects to complete that contract.
767
When asked why Goldman is exiting the uranium
trading business, a Goldman representative replied that it was because the physical uranium
business was “easy to misunderstand.”
768
Additional possible reasons include lower uranium
prices since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event in J apan, and pressure from the Federal
Reserve regarding the risks of its physical commodity activities.
(4) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Physical Uranium Activities
Goldman’s uranium-related activities, which are expected to continue until at least 2018,
raise multiple concerns, including insufficient capital and insurance to protect against a
catastrophic event, unfair competition, conflicts of interest arising from controlling uranium
supplies while trading uranium financial instruments, and inadequate safeguards.
(a) Catastrophic Event Liability Risks
One of the troublesome aspects of Goldman’s involvement with physical uranium trading
is the risk that if a catastrophic event were to occur involving the release of uranium from a
storage facility, it could cause such severe financial damage to the financial holding company
that the Federal Reserve, and ultimately taxpayers, might be called upon to rescue it. While such
an event is highly unlikely, history has shown that nuclear accidents do occur, and the nature and
extent of liabilities in connection with such an accident are uncertain.
769
(i) Denying Liability
Goldman strenuously denies that its physical uranium activities create a substantial risk
of additional liability for the financial holding company. Goldman recently discussed the
liability issue generally in a publicly-available memorandum that it submitted to the Federal
763
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also “Goldman puts ‘for sale’ sign on Iran’s old
uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-
uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211.
764
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
765
Id.
766
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-
000001 - 006, at 002.
767
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at 005.
768
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
769
The Fukushima Diachii nuclear power plant disaster is a recent example of a nuclear disaster that was highly
unlikely but did occur. Improbable events involving low level nuclear materials have also taken place. See, e.g.,
“Mexico’s Stolen Radiation Source: It Could Happen Here,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Tom Bielefeld
(1/23/2014),http://thebulletin.org/mexico’s-stolen-radiation-source-it-could-happen-here (discussing
instances in which low level nuclear materials were stolen while in transit).
134
Reserve in response to a Federal Reserve request for public comment on whether it should
impose new regulatory constraints on financial holding companies conducting physical
commodity activities.
770
In its public comment, Goldman took the position that its liability for a
commodities-related catastrophic event was limited, making three arguments:
• Most of its commodities pose no risk to the environment;
• Even the commodities that do pose a risk to the environment will not impose liability
on Goldman, because Goldman does not operate the facilities used to store, ship, or
process them; and
• Even if Goldman were assessed “some liability” for an environmental event, it would
not be in an amount large enough to hurt the financial holding company.
771
This generalized analysis differs from an internal analysis contained in Goldman’s 2008
New Products Memorandum on trading uranium, which identified several ways in which
Goldman might, in fact, incur liability as a result of a nuclear-related event. Also omitted from
the public comment letter is Goldman’s decision, in late 2011, to implement an additional layer
of insurance for “contingent, third-party environmental/pollution liability coverage for risks that
could emanate from either our physical trading activities or our investing activities.”
772
While
most insurance policies contain an exclusion for nuclear-related events,
773
Goldman’s insurance
policy included a specific amount of coverage that was not subject to an exclusion for a nuclear
incident involving unenriched uranium.
774
Despite purchasing insurance to help protect it against liability arising from a nuclear
incident or other uranium-related environmental event, Goldman has continued to take the
position that the possibility of incurring that liability is “rare” and that any such liability would
not be “on a scale that could threaten the viability” of the financial holding company.
775
Goldman has publicly pointed out that the “general approach” of most federal
environmental law is to place liability for environmental damages on the owners and operators of
the facilities responsible for the damages.
776
Goldman has publicly argued that it “will not be
subject to liability under well-settled law” for its physical commodity activities, because it avoids
being an “owner” or “operator” of facilities that store or transport commodities.
777
Goldman
770
See 4/16/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. to the Federal Reserve, “Comment Letter on the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of
Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities (Docket No. R-1479: RIN 7100 AE-10),” Federal
Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf (hereinafter “2014 Goldman Comment Letter”).
771
Id. at 4, 13-19.
772
7/9/2013 memorandum from Goldman to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-201245 - 268, at 252.
773
Id. at 253.
774
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at 005.
775
2014 Goldman Comment Letter,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf , at 4.
776
Id. at 14.
777
Id. at 4; 14-16.
135
appears to have taken explicit steps to “avoid[] operator status” and instead “selec[t] qualified
operators,”
778
such as third party vendors to own and operate the storage facilities for its
uranium. Goldman’s legal position appears to rely, in particular, on Bestfoods, a Supreme Court
case delineating when a parent corporation can be held liable for pollution damages caused by a
subsidiary.
779
The legal liability of owners and operators of facilities does not, in and of itself, however,
preclude others from also being found to have liability for environmental damages. In the recent
Deepwater Horizon oil spill case, BP “neither owned the rigs … nor ‘operated’ them in the
normal sense of the word.”
780
Nevertheless, by the end of 2013, BP had recognized over $42
billion in losses from the event.
781
In addition, in September 2014, after a bench trial, a U.S.
court found BP to be “grossly negligent” for its role in the disaster, opening the door to as much
as $18 billion in additional damages.
782
Federal environmental laws do not preclude lawsuits being filed against the holders of
legal title to a commodity like uranium if that uranium were to be involved in a catastrophic
event. As the Federal Reserve has pointed out: “liability may attach to [financial holding
companies] that own physical commodities involved in catastrophic events even if the [financial
holding companies] hire third parties to store and transport the commodities.”
783
There is no
dispute that Nufcor, a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman, is the direct owner of its uranium.
In addition, since Nufcor has no employees of its own, having become a shell entity, Goldman
employees directly manage its business, including dealing directly with Nufcor’s vendors. The
level of Goldman’s direct involvement in Nufcor’s daily operations increases Goldman’s
potential liability for Nufcor’s actions. As a result, if a catastrophic event were to occur
involving uranium owned by Nfcor, at a minimum, Goldman could have to defend itself against
claims in courts here or abroad, under the distinct laws in each jurisdiction.
In addition, as Goldman has recognized, under U.S. law, “a party that knowingly entrusts
a hazardous material to an incompetent operator may be held liable.”
784
A joint memorandum of
law submitted in support of Goldman’s submission to the Federal Reserve explicitly
acknowledged that an owner of environmentally hazardous commodities could be held liable for
778
Id. at 15-16; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
779
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
780
“National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Chief Counsel’s Report,”
at 30,http://www.eoearth.org/files/164401_164500/164423/full.pdf. (noting that BP personnel did, however, specify
how the well was to be drilled).
781
2013 - 14 Annual Report, BP plc, at 9,http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2013.pdf.
782
“BP May Be Fined Up to $18 Billion for Spill in Gulf,” Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, New York
Times, (Sept, 4, 2014),http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/bp-negligent-in-2010-oil-spill-us-judge-
rules.html?_r=1.
783
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.Reg. 3329, at 3332 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-01-21/pdf/2014-00996.pdf.
784
2014 Goldman Comment Letter,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf , at 15.
136
negligently entrusting those commodities to an incompetent transportation or storage operator.
785
Case law includes a number of instances in which, in some jurisdictions, an owner may incur
liability if it entrusts “a dangerous instrumentality” to a party that the owner knew or should have
known was incompetent.
786
To help address those risks, Goldman “maintain an integrated risk management
program of policies, procedures, diligence practices, governance arrangements, approval
processes and insurance coverage.”
787
Goldman also “maintain ‘emergency or event
response’ policies and procedures that are designed to address a situation in which a commodity
that [it] own becomes involved in an accident.”
788
In addition, Goldman has a sophisticated
vendor oversight system to evaluate, among other factors, a vendor’s financial condition,
insurance, and safety record.
789
As Goldman explained to the Federal Reserve in its public
comment letter, it performs those basic checks to gain “confidence that the operator has the
requisite expertise and capabilities to safely handle, store or transport [its] commodities” and
provide a “basis to defeat claims that [it] knowingly entrusted [its] commodities to an
incompetent operator.”
790
Of course, a failure to follow those policies, procedures, and practices
could increase the liability risk for Goldman.
785
See undated, but likely 4/2014 “J oint Memorandum of Law Prepared for SIFMA In Response to the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of
Financial Holding Company Groups Related to Physical Commodities (DOCKET NO. R-1479; RIN 7100AE-10),”
at 30, submitted on behalf of SIFMA by Covington & Burling LLP, Davis Polk &
Wardwell LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Vinson & Elkins LLP,http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589948617 (click on download to access J oint Memorandum of Law).
786
See, e.g., Zokas v. Friend, 134 Mich. App. 437, 443 (Mich. App. Mar. 9, 1984) (noting that, “an owner or lender
who entrusts a person with a dangerous instrumentality may be held liable to a third party who is injured by the
negligent act of the entrustee, where the owner or lender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know,
that the person entrusted was incompetent”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 160 Mich. App. 349, 357 (Mich. App.
May 19, 1987) (recognizing negligent entrustment where (1) the entrustor negligently entrusts the instrumentality to
the entrustee, and (2) the entrustee negligently or recklessly misuses the instrumentality); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); Shaffer v. Maier, Nos. C-900573, C-900600, 1991 WL 256493, at *8 (Ct.
App. Ohio Dec. 4, 1991) (finding that liability can attach when there is entrustment of a chattel, inexperience or
incompetence on the part of the entrustee, and actual or implied knowledge of that inexperience or incompetence on
the part of the entrustor).
787
2014 Goldman Comment Letter, at 13,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf . 3.
788
Id. at 15.
789
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 2014 Goldman Comment Letter, at 16,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf . See also 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations
Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI400077 - 098, at 085 (“Business Intelligence Group (“BIG”) & GS Logistics team in Commodities Operations
conduct diligence and vendor suitability checks on all providers, such as pipeline operators, in line with the firm’s
wider Vendor Management Policy. … Instituted best-in-class shipping, rail and pipeline transportation policies,
enforced by GS Logistics team, include Critical Event Management Policy[.] Periodic review and enhancement of
policies based on industry related ‘events’ e.g.: Quebec rail[.] … Engagement of Internal Audit and third parties to
audit storage, transportation and delivery practices[.] Vendor management review of service providers including
health & safety, environmental and OFAC.”).
790
2014 Goldman Comment Letter, at 16,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf .
137
The extent to which Goldman exercises oversight of the third party vendors for its
uranium activities and requires them to meet Goldman’s standards for reliability and competence
is unclear. Rather than evaluating third parties to assess the competency of its uranium vendors,
as it does with other commodity vendors, Goldman appears to have relied exclusively on the
licenses obtained by the uranium storage and processing facilities it used.
791
Goldman’s vendor
oversight activities, if found insufficient, might cause a state, U.S. federal, or foreign court to
attach some degree of liability to Goldman. For that reason, Goldman could find itself litigating,
on a case-by-case basis, whether it took adequate steps to prevent its commodities from being
given to an incompetent vendor.
Still another set of concerns involves the potential financial impact that a catastrophic
event could have on Goldman even if it were eventually proved correct in court that it had no
legal liability for damages. As the financial crisis demonstrated, parties viewed by the public as
being potentially liable for damages may be shunned by customers as well as potential
counterparties. In the aftermath of a catastrophic event linked to a financial holding company,
market participants could react by withdrawing funds from the holding company or its banks,
refraining from doing business with them, or demanding increased compensation to continue
being exposed to their credit risk. It is not inconceivable that the ability of a financial holding
company to conduct its day-to-day businesses could be threatened as business partners seek to
lessen their financial exposure to the potentially risky party. That type of reaction could worsen
over time if the publicity and magnitude of an event increase.
This aspect of catastrophic event risk means that, even if as a legal matter, Goldman were
found not to be liable for damages arising from a nuclear incident or other uranium-related event,
market participants’ fears that Goldman might incur liability might nevertheless lead to financial
difficulties and even losses for the financial institution.
The likelihood of a nuclear-related event is, of course, remote. However, while Goldman
has publicly dismissed the risk of such an event, that risk may be much greater than Goldman
has, to date, planned for.
(ii) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance
A related issue involves the amount of capital and insurance coverage Goldman has
allocated to protect against potential losses associated with a catastrophic event arising from its
physical uranium activities. Adequate capital and insurance are the key financial safeguards to
prevent a Federal Reserve or taxpayer bailout in the event of substantial losses arising from a
catastrophic event. In part because Goldman has concluded that it has essentially no potential
liability for losses arising from a catastrophic event, and in part due to lax regulatory
requirements, Goldman’s allocations for capital and insurance coverage appear to be inadequate.
In its recent public filing seeking comment on whether it should impose new regulatory
constraints on financial holding companies conducting physical commodity activities, the
Federal Reserve made the following observation:
791
See 10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
19-000001 - 009, at 002 - 003.
138
“Recent disasters involving physical commodities demonstrate that the risks associated
with these activities are unique in type, scope and size. In particular, catastrophes
involving environmentally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic
damages well in excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the
committed capital and insurance policies of market participants.”
792
Consistent with that observation, the facts suggest that financial losses arising from a uranium-
related catastrophe could far exceed all of the capital allocated by Goldman for its entire
commodities business plus any applicable insurance.
Goldman’s capital for its entire commodities portfolio, as of March 2013, was about $3.4
billion, of which the “operational risk” component was about $400 million.
793
In a 2013
memorandum sent by Goldman to the Federal Reserve, Goldman admitted that its capital
allocations included “no explicit scenario for environmental/catastrophic damage for any
business line.”
794
In other words, Goldman apparently holds no added capital to cover the risk to
its commodities business arising from any environmental disaster or catastrophic event,
including one related to its uranium holdings.
In addition, Goldman has apparently calculated its “operational” risk of loss related to the
storage and transportation of all of its physical commodities by selecting a figure equal to the
dollar value of those assets alone, and nothing more.
795
In particular, Goldman has calculated its
operational risk capital so that it corresponds to the “highest dollar value of inventory at a single
location.”
796
That means, for example, if a catastrophic event were to take place involving oil or
uranium, Goldman has calculated that its maximum loss would equal the lost value of the oil or
uranium itself. It did not include additional costs arising from, for example, loss of life, property
damage, pollution cleanup, legal expenses, or the failure to honor any existing contracts to
deliver oil or uranium.
797
In its 2012 Summary Report, the Federal Reserve Commodity Team
noted that Goldman’s catastrophic risk valuation methodology for its power plants was to use
“simply the current value of its most valuable power plant,” with no provision for potential
expenses stemming from loss of life, worker disability, facility replacement, or a “failure to
deliver electricity under contract.”
798
In light of the financial consequences of recent disasters ranging from oil spills to nuclear
meltdowns to power plant explosions, that approach appears highly unrealistic, and produces
capital allocations far below what is needed to safeguard taxpayers. The latest example is BP,
792
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 3329, at 3331 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-01-21/pdf/2014-00996.pdf.
793
7/9/2013 memorandum from Goldman Sachs to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-201245 - 268, at 248.
794
Id. at 250.
795
Id.
796
Id. at 251.
797
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by FRBNY Commodity Team, (hereinafter,
“2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 498.
798
Id. at 494.
139
which has already recognized losses over $42 billion as a result of Deepwater Horizon — an
amount well in excess of the dollar value of the physical oil that was lost.
799
Additionally, many environmental laws, which are intended to protect clean air and
water, for example, are intended to have significant deterrent effects, and thus provide for treble
or even greater penalties for violations. In the event that Goldman were to find itself with
liability under U.S. or foreign environmental laws, Goldman’s liabilities could end up being
many multiples of the damages suffered, as may happen in the BP oil spill case where the court’s
finding of “gross negligence” and “reckless” conduct may produce a fine equal to as much as
$4,300 per barrel for the spill, exceeding the cost of both the spilled oil and the cleanup.
800
Such
findings could also trigger exclusions under established insurance policies, making the insurance
payments unavailable.
801
When the Federal Reserve’s Commodities Team concluded its special review of financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities, it expressed concern that all of the
financial holding companies it examined, including Goldman, had insufficient capital and
insurance coverage to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event.
802
The 2012 Summary
Report prepared a chart comparing the level of capital and insurance coverage at four financial
holding companies against estimated costs associated with “extreme loss scenarios.” It found
that at each institution, including Goldman, “the potential loss exceed[ed] capital and insurance”
by $1 billion to $15 billion.
803
Insufficient capital and insurance coverage increases the risk of a
Federal Reserve or taxpayer bailout were a catastrophic event to occur.
(b) Unfair Competition
A completely different set of concerns raised by Goldman’s physical uranium activities
involves issues related to unfair competition. When Goldman acquired Nufcor in 2008, it was a
leading uranium company that had been in business for 40 years.
804
Goldman’s analysis
indicated Nufcor then had a portfolio of physical and financial uranium holdings worth about
$47 million and an annualized trading volume involving about 1.3 million pounds of uranium.
805
799
2013 “Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013,” prepared by BP p.l.c., BP p.l.c website, at 9,http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2013.pdf.
800
See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2014 WL 4375933 (E.D.
La. Sept. 4, 2014); see also “BP’s ‘gross negligence’ caused Gulf oil spill, federal judge rules,” The Washington
Post, Steve Mufson (9/4/2014),http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bps-gross-negligence-caused-
gulf-oil-spill-federal-judge-rules/2014/09/04/3e2b9452-3445-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html.
801
Subcommittee briefing by Chiara Trabucchi, an expert in financial economics and environmental risk
management (10/7/2014).
802
See 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 498.
803
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499. The recent decision in the BP oil spill case suggests that the “extreme loss” scenarios may entail
expenses beyond those contemplated as recently as 2012.
804
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
805
Id. at 040.
140
Within one year, Goldman more than tripled Nufcor’s trading volume and increased the
value of its inventory by about 40%.
806
Within five years, Goldman had increased Nufcor’s
trading volume by tenfold, increased its physical uranium inventory so that its dollar value more
than doubled despite falling uranium prices, and increased the number of its supply contracts
from two to nine major utilities.
807
By 2013, Goldman controlled millions of pounds of uranium
in storage facilities in the United States and Europe.
This rapid expansion of Nufcor’s uranium activities is attributable, not just to Goldman’s
business acumen, but possibly also to inherent advantages that financial holding companies have
when competing against businesses that are not affiliated with banks. First, a holding company
has access to inexpensive credit from its subsidiary bank, enabling its borrowing costs to nearly
always undercut those of a nonbank corporation. Another advantage is the financial holding
company’s relatively low capital requirements. The Federal Reserve determined that
corporations engaged in oil and gas businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover
potential losses, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8%
to 10%, making it much easier for them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.
808
Less expensive financing and lower capital requirements are the types of inherent bank
advantages that contribute to the traditional U.S. ban on mixing banking with commerce.
(c) Conflicts of Interest
Still another set of issues raised by Goldman’s uranium activities involves conflicts of
interest. The conflicts arise from the fact that the Goldman was trading uranium-related financial
products at the same time it was intimately involved with an array of physical uranium activities.
Goldman’s conduct raises two sets of conflict of interest concerns, one involving non-public
information and the other involving physical uranium supplies.
Because Nufcor had no employees of its own, Goldman employees conducted all of its
business activities and were necessarily privy to all of its non-public information. While
commodities laws traditionally have not barred the use of non-public information by traders in
the same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading advantages deepen when the
commodities trader is a major financial institution that can influence a small and volatile market
like uranium. Goldman’s acquisition of Nufcor gave it access to a substantial amount of
commercially valuable, non-public information about the uranium market. First, Goldman
gained insight into Nufcor’s own physical and financial uranium inventories and trading patterns.
According to Goldman’s analysis, for example, in 2008, Nufcor had 20% of the open interest for
uranium futures,
809
a sizeable market position. Second, by acquiring Nufcor, Goldman gained
information about the mining companies that supplied it with physical uranium as well as the
uranium needs of major utilities. Goldman also gained information about the timing, locations,
806
See 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
21-000001 - 010, at 004; see also Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2011, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046251; Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2012, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046264 (reflecting an increase in uranium inventory holdings from $112.8 million to $157.8
million.
807
See discussion, above.
808
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 499.
809
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 042.
141
and nature of the transport of millions of pounds of uranium, as well as the scheduling and
operations of six major uranium storage facilities and processing centers.
Goldman’s access to that non-public data about physical uranium would have provided
useful market intelligence that Goldman employees could have used to benefit Goldman’s
trading in the physical and financial uranium markets. Non-public information about a uranium
transport delay, processing schedules, or utility shutdowns could have been used to short futures
or make profitable trades on forwards. As shown earlier, after acquiring Nufcor, Goldman
expanded its uranium trading volume tenfold, becoming a more significant market participant. A
major concern is whether Goldman used any non-public information to gain a trading advantage
over other market participants.
A second conflict of interest issue is whether Goldman’s increasing control over uranium
supplies created opportunities for unfair trading advantagesor price manipulation. Goldman
expanded Nufcor’s physical uranium inventory over time until, by 2013, Goldman controlled
millions of pounds of uranium in storage facilities in the United States and Europe. Goldman
also increased the number of its supply contracts from two to nine major utilities across the
United States, Canada, and Europe. Its increased ability to make decisions over the amount and
timing of physical uranium deliveries created market manipulation opportunities that could have
been used to benefit Goldman’s trading activities in the small and volatile uranium market or in
affected electricity markets. Historically, banks and bank holding companies have not exerted
that extent of control over a physical market and have not raised the same type of market
manipulation concerns.
(d) Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of issues involves a lack of regulatory safeguards related to financial holding
company involvement with a high risk physical commodity activity like uranium. Physical
uranium becomes increasingly toxic as it is enriched, is subject to complex regulatory regimes
related to its storage, handling, and transit, and trades in a small, volatile market. It imposes, not
only the catastrophic event risks discussed above, but also financial risks due to volatile prices
and limited counterparties.
Although Goldman had not engaged in physical uranium activities prior to becoming a
bank holding company, it claimed it could do so under the grandfather clause in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act for authority. The Federal Reserve has never ruled on whether Goldman’s
entry into the physical uranium market was an appropriate exercise of the grandfather clause, nor
has it issued general guidance on the proper scope of the grandfather authority.
810
Additionally,
810
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 gives the Federal Reserve broad authority to issue orders and
regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act and prevent evasions of it. See, e.g., Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, § 5(b), codified at 12 U.S. Code § 1844. That broad grant of authority provides
the legal foundation for the Federal Reserve to issue regulations or orders interpreting the scope of the grandfather
clause and setting limits on the size of grandfathered activities to support the purposes of Act, which have been
described as seeking to “limit the comingling of banking and commerce,” and “prevent situations where risk-taking
by nonbanking affiliates erodes the stability of the bank’s core financial activities.” “A Structural View of U.S.
Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of the Federal Reserve Bank of
142
because Goldman relied on the grandfather clause to authorize its uranium activities, those
activities were not subject to the prudential size limit imposed by the Federal Reserve on
complementary activities which, were it to apply, would prohibit physical commodity activities
from exceeding 5% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital. The only cap on the size
of Goldman’s uranium activities was the statutory prohibition that its grandfathering activities
not exceed 5% of Goldman’s consolidated assets of $912 billion,
811
a limit set so high as to be no
meaningful restriction at all.
A final consideration is whether financial holding companies should be allowed to trade
in such a limited and volatile market as that represented by uranium. The Federal Reserve has
generally allowed financial holding companies to trade in any commodity that the CFTC has
approved for trading on an exchange. It has not required that the commodities reach a particular
volume of trading or other measure of liquidity. While U3O8 futures are traded on a CFTC-
regulated exchange, uranium is not a robust market, and often has zero contracts traded in a day.
The illiquid state of the uranium market illustrates the dangers of relying solely on the exchange-
trading requirement to approve financial holding company trading in a particular commodity.
(5) Analysis
Since acquiring Nufcor in 2009, Goldman has owned and traded millions of pounds of
uranium and millions of dollars of uranium-related financial products. The risks attached to
those activities continue to be significant, and Goldman’s efforts to address and mitigate them
have fallen short of what the Federal Reserve has indicated is necessary.
Goldman is not the only financial holding company to have engaged in physical uranium
activities. Deutsche Bank has been another key player in uranium,
812
and J PMorgan has
considered initiating physical uranium activities.
813
It is past time for the Federal Reserve to
enforce needed safeguards on this high risk physical commodity activity.
New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (7/2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [footnotes omitted].
811
See 12/31/2013 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Goldman
with the Federal Reserve, at 13,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20121231.PDF.
812
See, e.g., “Goldman puts ‘for sale’ sign on Iran’s old uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211 (discussing
Deutsche Bank’s involvement in uranium activities).
813
See, e.g., 9/28/2009 “[Global Commodities] BCC Agenda,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-304494-520, at
Appendix 5, FRB-PSI-304520; 2/11/2011 Global Commodities Group Operating Risk Committee Meeting Agenda,
including attachment entitled, “Marketing of Physical Uranium NBIA: Overview of Transaction,” FRB-PSI-302581
- 587, at 584 - 585.
143
C. Goldman Involvement with Coal
For many years, including prior to its 2008 conversion to a bank holding company,
Goldman traded coal futures and other coal-related financial products, as well as arranged for the
shipping and storage of coal for customers such as coal producers, coal traders, and coal-fired
power plants. In 2010, Goldman dramatically expanded its physical coal activities by purchasing
an open pit coal mine in Colombia with related railroad and port assets. In 2012, Goldman
purchased a second coal mine next to the first. Today, in addition to its longstanding coal
trading operations, Goldman is involved with producing, storing, transporting, selling, and
supplying physical coal.
Tracing Goldman’s four-year Colombian coal venture illustrates the many risks involved
with getting into a complex area like coal mining, including operational problems, regulatory
challenges, and environmental and catastrophic event risks. It also demonstrates how the mines’
merchant banking status – an investment that must be sold within ten years – creates a
disincentive for Goldman to make the necessary investments to operate the mines in a safe and
environmentally sound manner, exacerbating its operational and catastrophic event risks.
Additional concerns involve Goldman’s legal authority to get into the coal mining business in the
first place, and the conflicts of interest that arise when a Goldman subsidiary conducts coal
supplies and transport activities, while also trading coal-related financial instruments.
(1) Background on Coal
Coal is a naturally occurring fossil fuel formed from compressed and pressurized plant
matter, found mainly in deposits beneath the earth’s crust.
814
It has been used across the world
as a source of energy for hundreds of years.
815
Today, coal is predominantly used to generate
electricity, produce iron and steel, manufacture cement, and provide a liquid fuel.
816
In 2013, for
example, about 39% of the electricity generated in the United States came from coal-fueled
power plants.
817
The world’s supply of coal is finite, and expert opinions differ as to how much
longer global coal reserves will last.
818
Coal Production. Coal “production” refers to the process by which coal is extracted
from the earth and prepared for commercial use. It typically involves mining the coal from the
ground and treating it to achieve a consistent level of quality for end users.
819
Depending upon
the geology of the coal deposit, extraction of the coal may be accomplished through surface
814
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 2,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
815
Id. at 19.
816
Id. at 20-24.
817
“Electricity in the United States,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/12/2014),http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states.
818
“How Much Coal is Left,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (7/3/2014),http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_reserves.
819
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 7-8,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
144
mining (also called “open pit” mining), underground mining, strip mining, or mountain top
removal.
820
The United States is currently the world’s second-largest coal producer, following
China.
821
In 2012, 1.02 billion tons of coal were produced in the United States, making up
nearly 12% of the coal produced worldwide.
822
Other major coal producers include India,
Indonesia, and Australia.
823
In 2012, Colombia was the world’s eleventh largest producer of
coal,
824
but exported more coal to the United States than any other country, providing about 74%
of total U.S. coal imports in 2013.
825
The majority of the time, coal is used in the country in
which it was produced; only about 18% of the world’s hard coal production reaches the
international market.
826
Coal Infrastructure. Moving coal from a production site to a end-user requires a
complex infrastructure. Coal transport may be via truck, rail, or shipping vessel. Within the
United States, for short distances, coal is typically transferred via conveyor or truck; for longer
distances, rail or barge transport is common.
827
Although less common, coal can also be mixed
with water and transported by pipeline.
828
In addition to transportation infrastructure, after being
mined, coal requires treatment at a coal preparation plant, where impurities are removed to
improve the coal’s quality and value.
829
The level of treatment varies depending upon the coal’s
content and intended use. Coal storage facilities are also often needed and can be found, for
example, at mining sites, ports, and end-users such as utilities. Coal-fired power plants may also
construct containment facilities for spent coal ash, including coal slurry ponds.
830
Coal Markets. Coal trades in both physical and financial markets. In the physical
market, coal prices are typically determined through bilateral contracts, including “direct
supplier-consumer transactions and third-party transactions, and on bids and offers, whether via
820
See 2012 memorandum, “Metals & Mining: Background to Environmental and Social Due Diligence,” prepared
by Goldman, FRB-PSI-300221 - 230, at 223.
821
“International Energy Statistics: Total Primary Coal Production (Thousand Short Tons),” U.S. Energy
Information Administration,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=1&pid=7&aid=1.
822
Id.
823
Id.
824
Id.
825
See “Frequently Asked Questions: From what country does the U.S. import the most coal?,” U.S. Energy
Information Administration (6/13/2014),http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=67&t=2. Colombian coal
imports can outcompete coal produced domestically in the United States. See, e.g., “Coal imports add stress to U.S.
glut,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Anya Litvak (11/9/2014),http://powersource.post-
gazette.com/powersource/companies-powersource/2014/11/09/Coal-imports-add-stress-to-U-S-
glut/stories/201411090069.
826
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 13,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
827
Id. at 9.
828
Id.
829
Id. at 8.
830
“Preventing Breakthroughs of Impounded-Coal-Waste-Slurry Into Underground Mines,” Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Peter R. Michael, Michael W. Richmond, David L. Lane, & Michael J .
Superfesky (2013), at 2,http://wvmdtaskforce.com/proceedings/13/Michael-Paper.pdf.
145
traders, brokers, the over-the-counter market, or secondary deals among consumers.”
831
As
indicated in the following chart, over the last ten years, coal prices have been volatile:
Source: “Historical Coal Prices and Price Chart,” InfoMine Inc.,http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-
prices/coal/all/.
In 2008, coal prices spiked, in particular for “thermal coal” used to fuel electrical power
plants. This price spike took place around the same time that oil prices unexpectedly jumped
and then declined. Since then, coal prices have not returned to their 2008 peak, but have
remained somewhat volatile. While U.S. power generation is shifting away from reliance on
coal as a fuel source, worldwide demand for coal has nevertheless risen due in part to increasing
energy demand from developing countries.
832
Key market participants include coal mines and
distributors, as well as commercial and industrial users such as power plants.
In addition to the physical market, coal is traded in the financial markets using a variety
of financial products, including futures, options, and swaps. The New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX), for example, began offering futures in North American coal in 2001.
833
One of the more commonly traded coal contracts, the Central Appalachian Futures Contract,
tracks prices for 1,550 tons of coal and is available for trading on CME Globex, CME ClearPort,
831
See “Methodology and Specifications Guide: Coal,” Platts (9/2014), at 3,http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/methodologyreferences/methodologyspecs/coalmethodology.pdf.
832
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 39,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
833
See “NYMEX Coal Futures Near-Month Contract Final Settlement Price 2014,” Energy Information
Administration (10/14/2014),http://www.eia.gov/coal/nymex/.
146
and by open outcry.
834
A number of coal-related financial products are also available on the
Intercontinental Exchange.
835
Coal Mining Incidents. Coal mining is an inherently dangerous process with significant
occupational hazards. For example, in the week ending October 31, 2014, a coal mining
accident in China claimed at least 16 lives,
836
and at least 18 people were still trapped in a
flooding coal mine in Turkey.
837
Colombia, in particular, has experienced several deadly mining incidents in recent years.
In 2010, for example, an explosion at a coal mine in Amaga, Colombia, trapped scores of miners
underground,
838
reportedly killing 73 people.
839
A flood in that same mine a few years earlier
killed five miners.
840
On J anuary 26, 2011, a gas explosion at the La Preciosa mine in Sardinata,
Colombia, killed 21 miners and seriously injured six others.
841
Investigators found that the
explosion was likely due to a buildup of methane gas ignited during a shift change in the mine.
842
A similar incident took the lives of 32 employees in that same mine in 2007.
843
In addition to mining disasters, coal mining has produced air and water pollution in the
surrounding communities. In Colombia, the government recently ordered several towns in the
Cesar region to be relocated due to mining-related air pollution.
844
(2) Goldman Involvement with Coal
While Goldman has traded coal in financial and physical markets for years, Goldman
fundamentally expanded its physical coal activities by purchasing an open pit coal mine in
Colombia in 2010, and a neighboring open pit coal mine in 2012. Goldman formed a number of
Colombian entities to function as the mine owners, including CNR, while its primary
commodities trading arm, J . Aron & Co., became the mines’ exclusive coal marketing and sales
834
See contract specifications for the “Central Appalachian Coal Futures Contract,” CME website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/coal/central-appalachian-coal_contract_specifications.html.
835
See coal listings on the IntercontinentalExchange website,https://www.theice.com/products/Futures-
Options/Energy/Coal.
836
“Coal mine accident in far west China kills 16: Xinhua”, Reuters, Kazunori Takada (10/25/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/25/us-china-coal-accident-idUSKCN0IE03320141025.
837
“18 miners trapped in coal mine accident in Turkey,” Associated Press (10/28/2014),http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/18-miners-trapped-coal-accident-turkey-article-1.1989940.
838
“Colombian Coal Mine Blast Kills at Least 18,” New York Times, Simon Romero (6/17/2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/world/americas/18colombia.html.
839
“73 Killed in Coal Mine Blast, Colombian Authorities Say,” Latin American Herald Tribune,http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=359210&CategoryId=12393.
840
“Colombian Coal Mine Blast Kills at Least 18,” New York Times, Simon Romero (6/17/2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/world/americas/18colombia.html.
841
“Colombia Searches for Answers in Mine Blast,” Wall Street J ournal, Dan Molinski (1/28/2011),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704680604576110044086058786.
842
Id. Methane buildup is not a problem specific to mines in Colombia; coal mine methane has been identified as a
serious issue in the United States, China, and India as well. 2012 memorandum, “Metals & Mining: Background to
Environmental and Social Due Diligence,” prepared by Goldman Sachs, FRB-PSI-300221 - 230, at 223.
843
“Colombia Searches for Answers in Mine Blast,” Wall Street J ournal, Dan Molinski (1/28/2011),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704680604576110044086058786.
844
See 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translation provided by Goldman).
147
agent.
845
From 2010 to 2012, Goldman increased the mines’ coal exports, while J . Aron & Co.
purchased about 20% of the output for Goldman’s own activities and sold the remaining 80% to
third parties.
Beginning in 2012, a litany of operational and environmental problems reduced the
mines’ coal exports and revenues. They included mine and railway closures, contractor disputes,
labor unrest, pollution concerns, regulatory limits on mining activities, port access problems,
flooding, and declining coal prices. Despite those problems, Goldman was able to offset losses
through a short coal hedge that, in 2013, produced a nearly $250 million gain.
846
In 2014, due to
ongoing port access problems, the mines did not export any coal.
(a) Trading Coal
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it has traded coal-related financial instruments as
well as physical coal for many years.
847
Its financial trading has included coal-related futures,
swaps, options, forwards and other instruments, both on-exchange and over-the-counter. Its
physical coal activities have included storing, transporting, and supplying physical coal to
various customers, including coal-fired power plants.
Coal trading at Goldman is conducted within the GS Commodities group, by the “U.S.
Natural Gas & Power” unit which, among other activities, operates a coal trading desk.
848
Most
of the trades are booked through J . Aron & Co., Goldman’s leading commodities trading arm.
849
According to Goldman, in its 2009 fiscal year, it bought financially settled coal financial
instruments representing 159 million metric tons of coal and sold 121 million metric tons, of
which Goldman took physical delivery in about 4% of the trades, resulting in deliveries of about
5.2 million metric tons of coal.
850
With respect to its physical coal activities, Goldman informed the Subcommittee that,
during the five year period from 2008 to 2012, it bought and sold millions of metric tons of
coal.
851
For example, in 2008, it purchased about 2 million metric tons and sold about 300,000
metric tons. In 2011, it purchased about 16 million metric tons and sold nearly 18 million metric
tons.
852
It also stored and transported millions of metric tons of coal.
853
For example, in 2008, it
transported about 2 million metric tons, while in 2011 it transported nearly 9 million metric tons
845
11/4/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001 - 003 at 001.
846
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Goldman Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077, at 91.
847
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014). In materials submitted to the Federal Reserve, Goldman
indicated that it began trading coal sometime after 1997. See 5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on
4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-200600 - 610, at 600.
848
See 3/2010 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discovery Review: Global Commodities – US Natural Gas &
Power,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400006 - 015, at 007.
849
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008.
850
3/2010 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discovery Review: Global Commodities – US Natural Gas &
Power,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400006 - 015, at 008.
851
4/30/12 Goldman response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, GSPSICOMMODS00000005.
852
Id.
853
Id. at 006.
148
of coal.
854
Goldman indicated that, in 2012, it stored coal at facilities in Alabama, Florida,
Illinois, Louisiana, and Virginia within the United States, as well as at locations in Colombia,
Europe, and Australia.
855
One reason Goldman deepened its involvement with physical coal was its increasing
involvement with coal-fired power plants. From 1997 to 2001, Goldman entered into a joint
venture with Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Inc. (Constellation Energy) to “create an
arrangement for [the] trading of physically-settled power transactions.”
856
In 1998, as part of
that effort, they jointly formed Orion Energy, a company which purchased power plants across
the country, including plants fueled with coal.
857
In 2002, Orion Energy went public.
858
In 2003, Goldman purchased 100% of Cogentrix Energy LLC, a U.S. company that
developed, owned, and operated power plants.
859
At the time of the acquisition, Cogentrix
owned 24 power plants, 14 of which were coal-fired; over the next ten years, it bought and sold
those and other plants.
860
Cogentrix managed some of the plants’ fuel procurement needs,
including by arranging long term coal supply contracts.
861
According to Goldman, Cogentrix
sold 80% of its ownership interests in a portfolio of power plants to funds managed by Energy
Investors Funds in 2007, and sold the remaining 20% interest in that portfolio in 2011.
862
Even
after that sale, in October 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Commodities Team
wrote that Goldman had tolling agreements with four power plants, while its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Cogentrix, owned 30 power plants in the United States and abroad.
863
According to
Goldman, in December 2012, Cogentrix sold its ownership interests in all of its remaining power
plants to funds managed by the Carlyle Group.
864
Goldman records also show that, in 2007, its Global Commodities Principal Investments
(GCPI) group purchased an ownership interest in an Australian coal mine owned by Syntech
Resources for about $195 million.
865
Goldman held the mine as a merchant banking investment
until it sold the mine four years later in 2011.
866
Goldman also purchased from Constellation
854
Id.
855
4/30/12 Goldman response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, GSPSICOMMODS00000008 - 014.
856
3/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-200600 - 610, at 608 (discussing Goldman’s joint venture with Constellation Energy).
857
Id. at 010.
858
Id. See also, e.g., “Nice work[:] How to make a fortune from a utility,” The Economist (11/22/2001),http://www.economist.com/node/877192.
859
See 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at
003.
860
Id.
861
Id.
862
Id.
863
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200485.
864
Id.
865
See 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087; 1/29/2010 “Global
Commodities Principal Investments: Portfolio Snapshot,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-201213.
866
Id. See also 8/2/2011 “Yancoal Acquires 100% of Syntech Resources,” Yancoal press release,http://www.yancoal.com.au/icms_docs/122173_Yancoal_Acquires_100_of_Syntech_Resources.pdf; “China's
Yanzhou Coal buys Aussie mine for $202m,” The Australian, Matt Chambers (8/3/2011),
149
Energy, in 2009, a book of commodities assets which included a number of coal-related
assets.
867
(b) Acquiring the First Colombian Coal Mine
Goldman’s foray into Colombian coal mining had its roots in Goldman’s 2009
acquisition from Constellation Energy.
868
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, as part of that
Constellation Energy transaction, it acquired an array of coal-related assets, including nearly 700
coal swaps, 58 contracts to buy or sell physical coal, inventories of physical coal, port access
agreements related to coal, and four ship charters related to the shipment of coal.
869
Goldman
told the Subcommittee that one of the coal-related assets was a coal supply contract that
Constellation Energy had with Coalcorp Mining, Inc., a Canadian company that owned a
Colombian coal mine.
870
That contract required Coalcorp to supply Constellation Energy with
2.4 million metric tons of coal over a five-year period from 2009 to 2012, with an option for
another year.
871
According to Goldman, as the successor to that contract, it became an unsecured
creditor of Coalcorp, a company then in financial distress.
872
According to information supplied by Coalcorp to its shareholders, Coalcorp discussed
refinancing its debt with Goldman in September 2009, but the two were unable to reach
agreement on terms.
873
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, to protect itself from the
counterparty credit risk, it began to explore buying Coalcorp’s key asset, the Colombian coal
mine, as part of the consideration for restructuring the coal supply contract.
874
Goldman
indicated that its Global Commodities Principal Investments Group took the lead in examining
the coal mine as a potential merchant banking investment.
875
In J anuary 2010, Goldman and Coalcorp publicly announced that Goldman would
acquire Coalcorp’s La Francia mine.
876
The transaction was comprised of several parts.
877
First,http://www.theaustralian.com.au/bus...oal-buys-aussie-mine-for-202m/story-e6frg906-
1226106981679.
867
See 1/20/2009 Constellation Energy press release , “Constellation Energy Enters into Definitive Agreement to
Divest the Majority of its International Commodities Business,”http://www.constellation.com/
documents/news/264949.pdf.
868
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). Constellation Energy, a U.S. utility and trading business,
sold Goldman “trading positions in gas, power, coal & freight.” 11/2011 “Global Commodities Business
Overview[:] Presentation to the Federal Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-201176 - 188, at 184.
869
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 10/2/2014 chart on coal transactions associated with
Constellation Energy, GSPSICOMMODS00046535.
870
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
871
Id; 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 006.
872
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also, e.g., “Coalcorp fights to avoid forced
bankruptcy,” National Post (1/22/2010),http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=5bd85dd8-112f-4af4-883a-
803594922cf3&sponsor=.
873
1/19/2010 “Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders to be Held on February 22, 2010 and Management
Information Circular,” prepared by Coalcorp Mining Inc. (hereinafter, “2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice”), PSI-
CI-000001 - 030, at 026. See also, e.g., “Coalcorp fights to avoid forced bankruptcy,” National Post (1/22/2010),http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=5bd85dd8-112f-4af4-883a-803594922cf3&sponsor=.
874
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice, at PSI-CI-000020.
875
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
876
See, e.g., 1/21/2010 “Coalcorp announces filing of Management Information Circular for the Special Meeting to
vote on proposed transaction,” Coalcorp press release,http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/703837/coalcorp-
announces-filing-of-management-information-circular-for-the-special-meeting-to-vote-on-proposed-transaction;
150
Goldman would acquire the open-pit mine as well as related mining concessions, infrastructure
assets, and contractual rights. Second, Goldman would acquire a nearby undeveloped mine site
that also had mining concessions. Third, Goldman would acquire Coalcorp’s 8.43% ownership
interest in Ferrocarriles Del Norte de Colombia (Fenoco), a company that operated a 226 km
railway that transported coal from the Cesar mining region to the seaports over 100 miles
away.
878
Railway access was critical to exporting the coal. In addition, as part of the
transaction, Coalcorp would assign to a new Goldman subsidiary the supply contract to deliver
coal to Constellation Energy.
879
On March 19, 2010, Coalcorp and Goldman completed the acquisition for about $200
million.
880
Goldman established several legal entities to own and operate the mines and related
infrastructure.
881
The key Goldman entity was a Colombian corporation, Colombian Natural
Resources I S.A.S. (CNR). CNR and other entities were set up as wholly owned subsidiaries that
were ultimately owned by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc and Goldman, Sachs & Co LLC.
882
The Boards of Directors of the new entities were comprised exclusively of Goldman
employees.
883
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the coal mine was purchased as a merchant
banking investment, and the vast majority of its internal documents also characterize the
transactions in that manner, although forms filed with the Federal Reserve indicate that Goldman
also asserted that its ownership of the Colombian mining operations was permissible under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority.
884
“Coalcorp agrees to sell La Francia coal mine to Goldman Sachs,” Proactiveinvestors.com (1/7/2010),http://www.proactiveinvestors.com/c...rees-to-sell-la-francia-coal-mine-to-goldman-
sachs-3506.html.
877
See 2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice, at PSI-CI-000019 - 020, 026.
878
See “Management and Discussion Analysis, 2010,” prepared by Coalcorp Mining Inc. (hereinafter, “2010
Coalcorp MDA”), at 4,http://www.meliorresources.com/uploads/documents/annualreports/2010 Annual MD&A.pdf (stating
Coalcorp sold its 8.43% stake in Fenoco to Goldman as part of the La Francia transaction in March 2010).
879
See 2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice, at PSI-CI-000020; 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 006. See also 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities Review of
Acquisitions: Colombian Natural Resources,” part of a presentation by Goldman for the Goldman Board of
Directors, FRB-PSI-201063 (valuing the contract at about $50 million); “Coalcorp agrees to sell La Francia coal
mine to Goldman Sachs,” Proactiveinvestors.com (1/7/2010),http://www.proactiveinvestors.com/c...rees-to-sell-la-francia-coal-mine-to-goldman-
sachs-3506.html.
880
“Management and Discussion Analysis, 2011,” prepared by Melior Resources Inc. (formerly Coalcorp Mining
Inc.) (hereinafter, “2011 Melior MDA”), at 3-4,http://www.meliorresources.com/uploads/documents/annualreports/Melior-MDA-2011.pdf; 1/29/2010 “Global
Commodities Principal Investments: Portfolio Snapshot,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602254 - 55.
881
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also undated “CNR Structure Chart,” prepared by
Goldman at the Subcommittee’s request, GSPSICOMMODS00046318.
882
See undated “CNR Structure Chart,” prepared by Goldman at the Subcommittee’s request,
GSPSICOMMODS00046318.
883
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
884
See, e.g., 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10, submitted to the Federal
Reserve by Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303, at 303 (reflecting that the investment
was “permissible under [Bank Holding Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant
Banking regulations.”).
151
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, at the time of the acquisition, Goldman intended to
make minor changes to the mining operations and, within a short period of time, sell the entire
project to Vale S.A., a Brazilian mining company that owned the neighboring El Hatillo mine.
885
That planned sale did not take place.
(c) Operating the Mine
To operate the La Francia mine, CNR retained the same consortium of three companies,
known as Consorcio Minero del Cesar S.A.S. (CMC), that Coalcorp had used.
886
CMC was
responsible for conducting the mining operations, including hiring the miners and other
employees who worked on the site. Goldman also acquired rights to ship the coal out of a
Colombian port known as Santa Marta.
887
During its first two years of operation, the coal mine’s exports and revenues increased
rapidly. At year-end in 2010, CNR, the Goldman subsidiary that owned the La Francia mine,
reported operational revenues from selling the coal at about $66 million.
888
By the end of the
next year, 2011, CNR reported that the mine’s operating revenues from selling coal had tripled to
about $200 million.
889
CNR reported higher revenues even though it had lost its second and
third-largest customers, Glencore and Electroandina S.A., which had collectively accounted for
about one third of CNR’s net operational revenues in 2010.
890
CNR’s financial statement
showed that the lost revenues had been more than made up by its new and largest customer,
Goldman’s commodities subsidiary, J . Aron & Company, which accounted for about $74 million
of its operating revenues.
891
Exclusive Marketing Agreement. Once it acquired the mine, Goldman installed CNR
as “the exclusive marketing and sales agent,” although the terms of the agreement were not
formalized until 2011.
892
In September 2011, CNR entered into a formal Marketing Agreement
with J . Aron & Co., designating it as CNR’s “exclusive agent”
893
to perform the following
services:
885
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
886
See 12/31/11 and 12/31/2010, C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I S.A.S., Financial Statements (hereinafter
“2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements”), GSPSICOMMODS00046319 - 365, at 343.
887
Goldman acquired those port access rights from Vitol in 2010. See “Vitol buys export space at Colombia Santa
Marta port,” Reuters, J ackie Cowhig (1/25/2010),http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/01/25/ac-coal-vitol-colombia-
idUKLDE60O17F20100125.
888
See 12/31/11 and 12/31/2010, C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I S.A.S., Financial Statements (hereinafter
“2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements”), GSPSICOMMODS00046319 - 365, at 324 (applying 2010 US dollar
exchange rate of .000522 as listed on X-rates.com,http://www.x-
rates.com/historical/?from=COP&amount=1&date=2010-12-31).
889
Id. (applying 2011 U.S. dollar exchange rate of .000516 as listed on X-rates.com,http://www.x-
rates.com/historical/?from=COP&amount=1&date=2011-12-31).
890
Id. at 345.
891
Id. (applying 2011 U.S. dollar exchange rate of .000516 as listed on X-rates.com,http://www.x-
rates.com/historical/?from=COP&amount=1&date=2011-12-31).
892
11/4/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001- 003, at 001.
893
9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron & Company,
GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 498.
152
• “Marketing coal to prospective customers,”
• “negotiating the terms of sale and delivery of coal with prospective customers;”
• “procurement of port services;” and
• “procurement of blending coal.”
894
In other words, under the agreement, Goldman’s key commodities trader became the coal mine’s
sole sales agent.
The next month, October 2011, in a presentation to the Goldman Board of Directors,
Goldman’s Global Commodities Group reported that, overall, CNR had “[r]amped up production
/ sales from 1 mt [million metric tons] in 2009 to 2.5 mt in 2011.”
895
The presentation stated that
CNR had also “nstalled J .Aron Coal Desk as marketing agent, increasing customer base from
15 in 2011.”
896
The Global Commodities Group presentation also stated: “2011
projected to be the most profitable year since the assets went into production (2005), with
revenues forecasted to be >$65 [million].”
897
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, after the acquisition, J . Aron & Co. purchased
about 20% of CNR’s coal for itself and sold the other 80% to unrelated third parties.
898
Specifically, Goldman indicated that in 2011, J . Aron & Co. purchased about 710,000 metric
tons from CNR for itself and sold about 1.6 million metric tons of CNR coal to third parties, for
a total of about 2.3 million metric tons.
899
In 2012, J . Aron & Co. purchased about 775,000
metric tons for itself and sold about 3.5 million metric tons of CNR coal to third parties, for a
total of about 4.2 million metric tons.
900
In 2013, the figures were 324,000 metric tons
purchased by J . Aron & Co. and 3.4 million metric tons sold to third parties, for a total of about
3.7 million metric tons.
901
The Colombian coal mine gave Goldman control over a vertically integrated coal
operation. Goldman entities mined the coal, transported it by a railway partly owned by
Goldman, and delivered it to a port facility controlled by Goldman. Another Goldman entity, J .
Aron & Co., negotiated and arranged for 100% of the coal sales. It either bought the coal itself
and arranged for its shipment, or sold it to third parties. The coal purchased by J . Aron & Co.
was transported on Goldman-chartered ships to either the United States or Europe.
894
Id. at 528.
895
10/28/2011“Global Commodities Review of Acquisitions: Colombian Natural Resources,” part of a presentation
prepared by Goldman for the Goldman Board of Directors, FRB-PSI-201063.
896
Id.
897
Id.
898
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008;
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). CNR’s financial statements indicate that, during 2012, J .
Aron & Co. was slated to purchase closer to one-third of its coal. See 2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements, at
Note 16, at GSPSICOMMODS00046342. In 2014, the amount of coal committed to J . Aron & Co. dropped
dramatically to about 275,000 metric tons, likely due to the extended closure of the La Francia mine during 2013,
and CNR’s reduced production. See 12/31/2013 and 12/31/2012 C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I S.A.S.,
Financial Statements (hereinafter “2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements”), at Note 16,
GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 391.
899
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008.
900
Id.
901
Id.
153
Setbacks. Despite its increased coal production, customer base, and revenues,
Goldman’s coal mining operations during 2010 and 2011 also experienced some difficulties.
902
In November 2010, CNR sent Coalcorp a Notice of Claim for indemnification for an alleged
$37.4 million in losses from locomotives not being in working condition and from unpaid import
value-added taxes.
903
In December, CNR sent Coalcorp a second Notice of Claim for
indemnification from $1.1 million in alleged losses due to Coalcorp’s failure to provide title to
one third of the real property intended to be used for a rail spur.
904
In March 2011, Coalcorp –
renamed Melior Resources Inc. in 2011 – settled both claims by paying Goldman-related entities
$6.2 million.
905
In May and August 2010, the Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and
Territorial Development issued resolutions recognizing coal-induced air pollution problems in
the Cesar region and calling for the relocation of families living in certain areas contaminated by
coal dust.
906
Both resolutions explicitly named CNR, among other companies, as needing to
reduce air pollution from its mining operations,
907
and identifying it as one of four companies
that would have to pay relocation expenses.
908
In December 2011, the Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable
Development adopted a resolution that suspended new coal mining activities in “high” pollution
areas, including the Cesar region where Goldman’s coal mine was located, making expansion or
sale of those mining operations more difficult.
909
902
Goldman has confirmed that it “does not operate, possess or own on its balance sheet a major investment in any
coal mine other than [its Colombian mining operations].” 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 005.
903
See “Coalcorp Receives Notice of Claim,” Canada Newswire (11/3/2010),http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=CCJ :CN&sid=azvtX.MEk4LY.
904
See “Coalcorp Receives Notice of Claim,” Bloomberg (12/3/2010),http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0M6GkXe6jhc.
905
See 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 003
(“Coalcorp paid Goldman Sachs about $6.2 million to settle certain claim relating to the La Francia mine
purchase.”); Melior Resources Inc, FY 2012 Management and Discussion Analysis, Consolidated Financial
Statements, at 5-6,http://www.meliorresources.com/uploads/documents/annualreports/MLR-MDA-Oct16-2012-
FINAL.pdf.
906
See 5/20/2010 Resolution No. 0970, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047330 - 334; and 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the
Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translations provided by
Goldman); Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also “Colombia: Coal producers feel out of
favour,” Mining J ournal (5/3/2013),http://www.mining-journal.com/reports/colombia-coal-producers-feel-out-of-
favour?SQ_DESIGN_NAME=print_friendly (noting that the issue of “the re-location of three towns in Cesar away
from the mining site – Plan Bonito, El Hatillo and El Boqueron” remains “unresolved”).
907
See 5/20/2010 Resolution No. 0970, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, at GSPSICOMMODS00047334.
908
See 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, at GSPSICOMMODS00047335.
909
See 12/22/2011 Resolution No. 0335, Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development,
Official Gazette No. 48.294 of 2011, GSPSICOMMODS00047310 - 329 (translation provided by Goldman).
154
(d) Acquiring the Second Colombian Mine
Despite those difficulties, in 2012, rather than sell its Colombian coal mining operation as
planned, Goldman expanded its physical coal activities by purchasing a second coal mine.
Goldman told the Subcommittee that before it could sell its mine to Vale S.A. as it had intended,
Vale announced plans to sell its coal mine and exit Colombia altogether.
910
Goldman told the
Subcommittee that because Vale’s mine was so close to the La Francia mine, it decided to
purchase it and combine the operations, with a view towards selling the integrated mining
operations to a third party in the future.
911
In May 2012, Vale announced the sales agreement, indicating it would sell Goldman an
open-pit working mine, an undeveloped mine site, additional shares in the Fenoco railway, and a
port terminal.
912
The second coal mine was known as El Hatillo, and the new port was called
Río Córdoba. Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments Group again took the lead
on the transaction, forming new subsidiaries for the holdings, which were again set up as
ultimately wholly owned by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and The Goldman, Sachs & Co
LLC.
913
Goldman closed on the approximately $400 million acquisition on J une 22, 2012.
914
In 2013, Goldman’s Global Commodities group reported to the Goldman Board of
Directors that, together, the La Francia and El Hatillo holdings had total coal reserves of about
160 million metric tons and a total production capacity of about six million metric tons per
annum.
915
It also informed the Board that CNR had “significant expansion plans,” including
plans to double the annual output of coal and expanding the site from “2 to 5 open pit operations
over the next 4 years.”
916
In the same presentation to the Board, however, the Global Commodities group also
stated: “Certain operational issues have arisen.”
917
Operational Issues. The September 2013 presentation identified two operational issues.
The first was that, since the acquisition of the first mine, coal prices had declined from about
910
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
911
Id.
912
See, e.g., “Vale Sells Colombia Coal Mines to GS-led Group,” Reuters, Reese Ewing (5/28/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/us-vale-coal-idUSBRE84S00N20120529; “Goldman front-runner for
Vale's Colombian coal ops,” Reuters, J ack Kimball and J acqueline Cowhig (2/14/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/us-colombia-vale-coal-idUSTRE81D19620120214.
913
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 3/31/2013 “Commodity, Energy, E&P, Renewable Energy
Equity Investments,” chart prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400065 - 070, at 068.
914
See undated report, “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR-Y-10 filed by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046304 - 306 (reflecting the J une 22, 2012
acquisition of Colombia Purchase Co., S.A.S. by GS Power Holdings LLC and Goldman Sachs Global Holdings
L.L.C.); 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at
008 (indicating the transaction was settled for “cash consideration of approximately $400 million, subject to certain
adjustments”).
915
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090.
916
Id.
917
Id.
155
$113 per metric ton to $90 per metric ton, a drop of 20%.
918
The presentation stated that an
additional drop of $5 to $7 per metric ton “may trigger a permanent impairment” of the value of
the investment, which was then being carried on Goldman’s books at about $590 million.
919
A second problem identified in the Board presentation involved a J anuary 2013 shipping
incident in which a barge owned by another, unaffiliated company released a large amount of
coal into Colombian waters.
920
As a result, the Colombian government announced that it would
no longer delay compliance with a 2007 law requiring all Colombian ports to install equipment
enabling coal to be loaded directly onto ocean-going vessels, without using a barge.
921
The
procedure used at most Colombian ports was for coal to be loaded from a port terminal onto a
barge, transported farther out to sea, and then transferred from the barge to a larger ship using
cranes and open conveyor systems that produced coal dust and coal spills into the water during
transfers. The Colombian government imposed a J anuary 2014 deadline for all ports to install
direct-loading equipment and stop using barges.
922
Goldman’s Commodities group reported to
the Goldman Board of Directors that CNR currently “barges coal out to sea in order for it to be
loaded onto vessels via floating cranes,” and that upgrading its port facilities with direct loading
equipment would cost about $220 million.
923
The presentation indicated that CNR was
“evaluating alternatives.”
924
While the cost and port equipment issues were serious, additional operational problems
affecting the Colombian mines were not mentioned in the Board presentation. For example, in
2010 and 2011, the Colombian government denied requests by CNR and other companies to
increase coal mining in the Cesar region, limiting Goldman’s expansion plans.
925
Similarly, in
August 2012, the Fenoco railway, which transports the coal from Goldman’s mines to the ports
over 100 miles away, had been shut down for a month due to a pay dispute, slowing coal
delivery.
926
In addition, Goldman, through its subsidiary CNR, became embroiled in an ongoing
dispute with the consortium that operated the mines, Consorcio Minero del Cesar (CMC).
918
Id. at 091.
919
Id.
920
Id.
921
See 8/15/2007 Decree No. 3083, Colombian Transport Ministry, Official Gazette No. 46.721,
GSPSICOMMODS00046536 - 537 (requiring compliance by 6/1/2010); 11/4/2009 Decree No. 4286, President of
the Republic of Colombia, GSPSICOMMODS00046538 - 539 (requiring ports to file monthly progress reports);
3/5/2010 Decree No. 0700, Colombian Transport Ministry, GSPSICOMMODS00046540 - 541 (allowing delayed
filing of progress reports) (translations provided by Goldman).
922
See 2011 Law No. 1450, GSPSICOMMODS00046542 (translation provided by Goldman).
923
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090.
924
Id.
925
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-000001 - 009, at
004; see also12/22/2011 Resolution No. 0335, Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable
Development, Official Gazette No. 48.294 of 2011, GSPSICOMMODS00047310 - 329 (translation provided by
Goldman); 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translation provided by Goldman).
926
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-000001 - 009, at 004.
See also “Colombia’s Fenoco, Coal Railway Workers Agree on Pay Raise,” Reuters (9/18/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/colombia-fenoco-pay-idUSL2N0HE2BB20130918.
156
According to CNR, in November 2012, CMC “informed CNR” that it had assigned the operating
contract to a related company, but CNR refused to “recognize the legality of that assignment,”
rejected invoices from the new company, and essentially stopped paying for work under the
contract.
927
In addition, Goldman told the Subcommittee that CNR had become concerned about
whether CMC was conducting the mining at the sites in accordance with approved plans or was
mining them in a way that could significantly reduce the value of the mines.
928
In J anuary 2013, the consortium sent a letter declaring CNR in breach of the contract and
suspended work at the mine.
929
That same day, miners and other employees who worked for the
consortium walked off the job, abandoning the mine and extensive mining equipment.
930
CNR
described the situation in its certified financial statement as follows:
“On the 21
st
of J anuary of 2013, in a sudden manner, Consorcio Minero del Cesar S. A. S
sent a letter announcing the unilateral termination of the La Francia Mine’s operation
Contract, based on the alleged breach of the Company. In parallel, the mine’s activities
were suspended on the same day and all the machinery of the consortium and of its
members was abandoned on the field. During the next two weeks, the inventory of coal
on the yards was shipped to the port, and from then onwards the mine’s activity was
completely halted. On the 15
th
of April a group of women and children who [were] said
to be relatives of the CMD’S employees blocked the access to the camp of the El Hatillo
mine. In this way, the conflict at the La Francia mine irradiated also to that mine ….
CNR I started several legal actions for the unblocking of the mine, including protection
petitions and police proceedings filed with the mayor of El Paso, as well as a request of
administrative protection before the National Mining Agency ANM. Likewise, a large
number of letters was sent to request the intervention of police and military authorities,
the Governor of Cesar, the office of the Attorney General and the People’s Defender
Office, as well as to the Mines and Interior Ministries, among others.”
931
CNR stated that the blockade of the mine continued, and the mine remained closed for
the next nine months, until September 22, 2013:
“The total blockade of the La Francia mine lasted for 244 days, until the 22
nd
of
September of 2013, and it was lifted thanks to a private agreement in which CNR I paid a
cash bonus of $20,000 to each one of the persons that were still protesting. Once CNR I
resumed the control of the mine, the activities to recover the productive areas were
started, particularly the pumping of water from the pit.”
932
927
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 394.
928
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
929
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 374.
930
Id.
931
Id.
932
Id.
157
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the payments made by CNR to end the blockade were by
check rather than in cash.
933
Goldman further told the Subcommittee that 120 current or former
employees received the USD $10,000 checks.
934
Shortly thereafter, CNR hired a new mine
operator, Excavaciones y Proyectos de Colombia S.A.S. (EPSA).
935
All told, as a result of the dispute with CMC, the La Francia mine produced no coal from
J anuary 21 through September 22, 2013.
936
During the shutdown, Goldman used coal from an
affiliate to meet CNR’s coal supply contracts.
937
When those supplies ran out, some supply
contracts were cancelled or postponed.
938
Still another supply contract required CNR to make a
$237,000 payment to settle the contract breach.
939
Many of the operational problems with the mines were not identified in the 2013
presentation made by the GS Commodities Group to the Goldman Board of Directors, including
the nine-month closure of one mine, the legal dispute with the mine operator, the mine blockade
by women and children, the attempts to obtain police and military assistance, the payments to
protestors, the cancellation, postponement, and settlement of coal supply contracts, and the
associated legal expenses.
940
At the same time, those developments increased the financial,
operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks associated with the mining venture,
presenting issues that do not normally confront a bank or bank holding company.
(e) Current Status
Operational and environmental problems at the Colombian mines have continued
throughout 2014. Coal prices have remained volatile. Even after the La Francia mine reopened,
the labor dispute at the El Hatillo mine continued with a labor union representing about 40% of
the employees.
941
After years of negotiations, “CNR has requested the Ministry of Labor of
Colombia to convene an arbitration panel to decide the dispute.”
942
In J anuary 2014, the
Colombian environmental law precluding the use of barges to load coal onto ships took effect.
Since then, Goldman has been precluded from using its port, which has no direct-loading
equipment.
943
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, as a result, “since J anuary 1, 2014, CNR
has not exported any coal it produced in Colombia.”
944
933
10/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-24-000001 - 003, at 001
(explaining that the amount was in U.S. dollars, whereas the amount reflected in the certified financial statement
was in thousands of Colombian pesos).
934
Id.
935
2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 375.
936
Id..
937
Id. at Note 1.
938
Id.
939
Id.
940
See 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090 - 091.
941
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-000001 - 000009, at 004.
942
Id.
943
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
944
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 004.
158
According to CNR’s financial statement, during 2013, Goldman considered several
alternatives to gain access to a port with a direct-loading system.
945
CNR considered “the
possibility to load its coal at Puerto Nuevo which, being a public port, had to offer access to third
parties.”
946
J ust days before the law was to go into effect, however, the Puerto Nuevo port
announced that it had established an application process which CNR would have to complete to
use the port facilities.
947
According to CNR, the new application process was inconsistent with
Colombian law and effectively precluded CNR from being approved.
948
CNR has not yet been
permitted to use the public port. Goldman also entered into negotiations with Drummond Corp.,
a U.S. company with major coal operations in Colombia, over using its port for CNR coal
exports, but no agreement has yet been reached.
949
In addition, Goldman obtained government
permission to upgrade its Río Córdoba port with direct-loading equipment,
950
but Goldman told
the Subcommittee that the cost was too high to go forward.
951
Because CNR cannot currently export any coal, it has reduced its coal production to
levels well below amounts established in CNR’s agreement with the Colombian National Mining
Agency.
952
While CNR has requested relief from its production obligation due to lack of port
access, as of March 2014, the National Mining Agency had not yet agreed.
953
If the Colombian
government were to take action against CNR for underproduction of coal, Goldman could lose
some or all of its mining rights. In the meantime, while Goldman continues to seek port access,
its mines have been operating at reduced rates, and the coal has been accumulating on site.
954
Goldman told the Subcommittee that CNR is storing the coal in the mine’s yards.
955
In 2013, CNR incurred losses due, in part, to the mine shutdown, reduced sales, and
declining coal prices,
956
but Goldman may not have lost money on its investment. In a
September 2013 presentation to the Goldman Board of Directors, the Global Commodities
Group reported that to offset declining coal prices and CNR’s declining market value, it had
entered into a “short coal hedge” which had to date produced “accounting gains” of $246
945
2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 375.
946
Id.
947
Id.
948
Id.
949
Id.; 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 004.
950
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also “Colombia Oks Goldman Sachs’ Direct Loading
Coal Port Upgrade Works,” Platts Coal Trader International, J aime Concha (8/13/2013), PSI-
PlattsGoldmanCoalStory(8-13-13)-000001.
951
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008;
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
952
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 376.
953
Id.
954
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
955
Id.; 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 376. See also
“Goldman Sachs miner halts coal exports from Colombia,” Reuters, Peter Murphy (1/9/2014),http://finance.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-goldman-sachs-miner-halts-210300373.html.
956
See, e.g., 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, Income Statement, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at
369.
159
million.
957
Those gains may have more than offset the CNR losses. Goldman is also considering
selling the mines.
958
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Coal Mining Activities
Goldman’s coal mining activities illustrate a number of concerns related to financial
holding company involvement with complex physical commodity businesses. In just three years,
Goldman’s coal mines experienced contractor disputes, labor unrest, equipment issues, mine and
railway shutdowns, and flooding, events in addition to the many operational, environmental, and
catastrophic event risks inherent in coal mining. Had those developments combined into a worst
case scenario, they could have imposed severe financial consequences on Goldman – one that in
an extreme case could have necessitated a Federal Reserve, or even U.S. taxpayer, rescue.
The Colombian coal venture also disclosed how the coal mines’ merchant banking status
– as a short-term investment that must be sold within ten years – created a disincentive for
Goldman to pay for long-term infrastructure investments – such as direct-loading port facilities –
needed to operate the mines in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Choosing not to make
those infrastructure investments, in turn, deepened Goldman’s risk of incurring an operational or
environmental disaster in Colombia. Additional concerns illustrated by Goldman’s coal mining
venture involve its legal authority to enter the coal mining business to begin with, and the
conflicts of interest that arise when a financial holding company controls coal supplies and
transport, while trading coal-related financial instruments.
(a) Catastrophic Event Risks
Since acquiring its first Colombian coal mine in 2010, Goldman has incurred multiple
operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks that rarely confront traditional banks or
financial holding companies. When asked by the Subcommittee to describe the types of risks
that can affect coal operations, one Goldman representative summed it up by saying:
“Everything that’s happened to us.”
959
Operational, Environmental, and Catastrophic Event Risks. Colombia’s history is
marked with mining collapses, mining fatalities, and a variety of coal-related incidents and
accidents. In three years, Goldman’s Colombian coal mining operations experienced operational
problems that raised the risk of a similar mining mishap affecting the La Francia or El Hatillo
mines, including disagreements with the mine operator over how to mine the coal, abandonment
of mining equipment on site, an extended mine shutdown, water flooding the mines, and women
and children blocking mine access. Dangerous conditions and contractor and labor disputes, by
their nature, intensify the risk of a catastrophic event, although none has resulted to date.
957
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077 - 098, at 091.
958
See “Mick the Miner in talks to buy Goldman’s Colombian coal,” The Sunday Times, Danny Fortson
(8/17/2014),http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Industry/article1447559.ece.
959
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
160
Goldman’s operational problems were in addition to ongoing environmental problems.
Colombia has a long history of coal-related environmental problems, including air and water
pollution. Goldman had already recognized that mining-related environmental issues require
special attention, as indicated in an internal, non-public Goldman memorandum entitled, “Metals
and Mining: Background to Environmental and Social Due Diligence.”
960
The Goldman
memorandum warned that, as a result of mining operations, “[l]egal claims against the company
might include fines, penalties, prison sentences for staff (arising from pollution, compensation
from communities that have lost land or assets), significant delays in construction/development
of projects/ infrastructure, [and] impaired ability to access new assets based on previous
performance.”
961
The La Francia and El Hatillo mines had already been identified as producing coal-
related environmental problems before Goldman took ownership of them. As a result, a 2010
Colombian resolution explicitly named CNR, among other corporations, as having a
responsibility to reduce the air pollution associated with its mining operations and to contribute
to an ongoing effort to relocate three communities to a less polluted area.
962
In December 2011,
the Colombian government identified the Cesar region, which is the region where the Goldman
mines are located, as a “high pollution area,” and limited the expansion of coal mining
operations there.
963
Those actions by the Colombian government imposed additional costs and
constraints on Goldman’s coal mining activities.
Another environmental development, involving water pollution, also dramatically
impacted Goldman’s coal operations. In J anuary 2013, an affiliate of Drummond Company Inc.
was involved in a coal spill. Due to rough seas, a Drummond barge containing more than 1,800
tons of coal became partially submerged outside of the Drummond Port, and was towed to
shallow water.
964
In connection with its efforts to salvage the ship and its cargo, the crew
released a large amount of coal into Colombian waters, an event that was caught on film.
965
In
response, the Colombian government suspended Drummond’s ship-loading license until it
submitted an improved spill contingency plan.
966
As a result, Drummond lost significant
960
See undated memorandum, “Metals and Mining: Background to Environmental and Social Due Diligence,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-300221 - 230.
961
Id. at 225.
962
See 5/20/2010 Resolution No. 0970, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047330 - 334; and 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the
Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translations provided by
Goldman).
963
See 12/22/2011 Resolution No. 0335, Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development,
Official Gazette No. 48.294 of 2011, GSPSICOMMODS00047310 - 329 (translation provided by Goldman).
964
See 2012 “Statement by Drummond Ltd. – Barge Accident Internal Investigation Results,” prepared by
Drummond Company Inc.,http://www.drummondco.com/barge-accident-internal-investigation-results/.
965
See “Colombia Suspends Drummond’s Coal Ship-Loading License,” Bloomberg, Alex Emery & Oscar Medina
(2/6/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/colombia-suspends-drummond-ship-loading-license-
agency-says.html.
966
Subcommittee briefing by Drummond Company, Inc. (9/16/2014). See also “Colombia Lifts Drummond Coal
Export Ban,” Colombia Reports, J oey O’Gorman (3/1/2013),http://colombiareports.co/colombia-lifts-drummond-
coal-export-ban/; “The Colombian Mining Locomotive Has Halted,” Environmental J ustice Organisations,
Liabilities and Trade, J oan Martínez-Alier (2/14/2013),http://www.ejolt.org/2013/02/the-colombian-mining-
locomotive-has-halted/.
161
revenues while also being required to pay at least $3.6 million in fines.
967
In addition, the
Colombian government imposed the J anuary 2014 deadline on port compliance with the 2007
direct-loading law that had not been enforced on a mandatory basis until then. In response,
Drummond paid $360 million to upgrade its port with direct-loading equipment.
968
The 2013
Drummond shipping accident graphically demonstrated how environmental disasters can lead to
regulatory actions, fines, legal expenses, lost profits, and reputational damage. The same types
of environmental disasters create catastrophic event risks for Goldman’s coal mining operations.
Still another category of catastrophic event risk confronting Goldman’s mining
operations involves the labor unrest at its mines. Labor relations in Colombia have long been
volatile and politically sensitive, especially with respect to coal mining. In 2013, the months-
long human blockade by women and children at the Goldman mines created a potentially
explosive situation. During the dispute, CNR asked the mayor, police, military, and other
Colombian authorities for assistance.
969
Had those requests been granted, actions to end the
blockade could have produced a worst case scenario involving arrests, injuries, and a political
backlash that, potentially, could have led to condemnation of Goldman, not only in Colombia,
but in other parts of the world.
Insufficient Capital and Insurance. While the risk that a catastrophic event will cause
severe damages to Goldman’s coal mines is remote, it must be addressed to protect U.S.
taxpayers from being asked to step in after a disaster strikes. The primary tool used by financial
holding companies to address catastrophic event risk is to allocate sufficient capital and
insurance to cover potential losses. According to a 2012 Federal Reserve analysis, however,
Goldman has failed to allocate sufficient capital or insurance to cover those potential losses.
970
As indicated in the prior section, Goldman has strenuously denied any liability for costs
associated with a catastrophic event involving its physical commodity activities, which may have
contributed to its failure to allocate sufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses.
971
As explained earlier, Goldman has attempted to limit its liability by structuring its physical
commodity activities to take place through subsidiaries, but Goldman’s reliance on legal
structures provides no guaranteed shield from liability, lawsuits, or legal expense.
972
Moreover,
967
“Colombia Bans Coal Loading by 2nd-Biggest Producer Drummond,” Bloomberg, Andrew Willis and Oscar
Medina (1/14/2009),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-08/drummond-s-coal-loading-halted-as-colombia-
pulls-port-license.html.
968
See 3/31/2014 Drummond press release, “Drummond Restarts Port Operations with an Investment of US$360
Million in a Modern Direct Ship Loading System,”http://www.drummondco.com/drummond-restarts-port-
operations-with-an-investment-of-us360-million-in-a-modern-direct-ship-loading-system/.
969
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 374.
970
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509.
971
See discussion in section on uranium, above.
972
See id., as well as the Federal Reserve’s analysis in its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.Reg. 3329, at 3331 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014) (“Recent disasters involving
physical commodities demonstrate that the risks associated with these activities are unique in type, scope, and size.
In particular, catastrophes involving environmentally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic
damages well in excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the committed capital and insurance
policies of market participants.”); 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489 (FRBNY Commodities Team wrote:
“There is no available historical precedent to support .. the effectiveness of the ‘legal structure’ mitigation strategy,
162
Goldman has opened itself up to potential liability under a Bestfoods analysis
973
by the extent of
its involvement with CNR operations. Its key commodities subsidiary, J . Aron & Co., controls
100% of CNR’s coal marketing and sales, manages its port procurements and coal blending
operations, and is one of CNR’s largest purchasers of coal.
974
Goldman indicated to the
Subcommittee that its dispute with CNR’s mine operator, CMC, stemmed in part from its
concern that CMC was not following a Goldman-approved plan regarding how the CNR mining
operations should be conducted.
975
Goldman also appears to have made the decision not to pay
for direct-loading equipment at the primary port used to export the coal. Those and other actions
suggest that Goldman personnel were involved with the day-to-day operations and management
of the Colombian coal mining operations, increasing Goldman’s potential liability in the event of
a catastrophic event.
Because a court in the United States, Colombia, or another jurisdiction might hold
Goldman liable for the actions of its mining-related entities and any disaster involving them,
Goldman should, but has not, allocated sufficient capital and insurance to cover potential
losses.
976
According to a Federal Reserve analysis in 2012, as explained in the earlier section,
the potential losses associated with an “extreme loss scenario” affecting Goldman or its peer
institutions would exceed the capital and insurance coverage at each financial holding company
by $1 billion to $15 billion.
977
That shortfall leaves the Federal Reserve, and U.S. taxpayers, at
risk of having to provide financial support to Goldman should a catastrophic event occur.
Short Term Disincentive. Still another issue raised by Goldman’s coal mining
operations is the effect of its relatively short-term investment horizon. Goldman holds CNR and
its other Colombian subsidiaries as a merchant banking investment that must be sold within ten
years, which for the La Francia mine means by 2020. Currently, that is a six-year investment
horizon. When the Colombian government required its ports to install direct-loading equipment
to reduce coal-related pollution by J anuary 2014, Drummond Inc., a U.S. company with a long
history of coal mining in Colombia, spent $360 million to upgrade its port.
978
CNR did not,
because as Goldman explained to the Subcommittee: “CNR evaluated the prospect of upgrading
the Rio Cordoba port facilities to make them compliant with the direct-loading regulations but
determined that it was not economically feasible to pursue such an initiative.”
979
Goldman
calculated the cost of upgrading the port at about $220 million.
980
It decided spending that
amount of money to upgrade the port in Colombia did not make economic sense.
rathe[r] there have been cases where a company using third part[y] vendors was itself held liable for environmental
damage.”).
973
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
974
See 9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron &
Company, GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 498.
975
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
976
See prior analysis; 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509.
977
See prior analysis; 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509.
978
See 3/31/2014 Drummond press release, “Drummond Restarts Port Operations with an Investment of US$360
Million in a Modern Direct Ship Loading System,”http://www.drummondco.com/drummond-restarts-port-
operations-with-an-investment-of-us360-million-in-a-modern-direct-ship-loading-system/.
979
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008.
980
See 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 091.
163
According to an environmental risk management expert consulted by the Subcommittee,
that type of financial calculus is representative of a broader phenomenon taking place across the
United States and around the world.
981
A number of large financial holding companies have
made merchant banking investments in industrial facilities, such as power plants, pipelines,
natural gas facilities, and refineries, that may require expensive investments to operate in a safe
and environmentally sound manner. To the degree the financial holding companies plan to hold
those facilities for relatively short periods of time, they may be less inclined to dedicate the
financial resources, time, and expertise needed for operational and environmental
improvements. According to the expert, in general, the payback period for such improvements
tends to be long term, which can be in direct tension with the financial holding company’s goal
of realizing short term profit targets and maximizing immediate investment returns.
982
The
reluctance to make improvements places the financial holding companies at potentially greater
risk of environmental and financial consequences should a mishap arise when compared to peers
that upgrade their infrastructure.
In the expert’s view, the transitory nature of merchant banking investments suggests that
the financial holding companies are betting on the probability that a facility in which they are
invested will not face a financially material catastrophic event during the years in which that
physical asset forms part of their portfolio.
983
Of particular concern is whether, in so doing, the
financial holding companies are actively limiting disclosure of the potential long-tailed
environmental risk associated with their investments, and also failing to adequately hedge their
financial responsibilities should an environmental event arise.
984
The expert pointed out the existence of established case law that presumes a legal shield
between a parent or holding company and its subsidiary facility. However, she also cautioned
that recent events suggested a potentially shifting landscape with respect to the standards and
conditions under which a corporate parent may be held financially responsible for the actions of
its subsidiary following a catastrophic environmental event. This increased uncertainty calls into
question reliance by the financial holding companies on a legal shield as a reasonable risk
management strategy to hedge the consequences from a catastrophic environmental event. To
the degree such a shield fails, and insufficient resources exist for the financial holding companies
to meet their financial responsibilities, then the burden for responding to an environmental
incident may well rest with U.S. taxpayers and the general public.
985
Still another concern is whether financial holding companies that delay or avoid
infrastructure investments may gain an unfair, short-term competitive advantage over market
participants who do make long-term investments in infrastructure. Equally troubling is whether
decisions by financial holding companies to delay or avoid infrastructure investments may
pressure its competitors to delay or skimp on needed infrastructure as well.
981
Subcommittee briefing by Chiara Trabucchi, Principal at Industrial Economics, Inc. an expert in financial
economics and environmental risk management (10/6/2014).
982
Id.
983
Id.
984
Id.
985
Id.
164
If the bet by a financial holding company is lost and a catastrophic event were to take
place, the affected financial holding company could be confronted with billions of dollars in
damages. It could also start to lose customers and counterparties due to perceptions regarding its
liability for those damages, or it could be forced to accept higher costs to convince third parties
to bear the added credit risk of doing business with the financial holding company, its
subsidiaries, and its bank. As the financial crisis demonstrated, even a large, well-capitalized
financial institution can experience liquidity problems that it cannot overcome without financial
assistance from the Federal Reserve or, ultimately, U.S. taxpayers.
In September 2013, Goldman’s Global Commodities Group told the Goldman Board of
Directors that CNR had “significant expansion plans” for Colombia, including plans to double
the annual output of coal at the mines and expand from “2 to 5 open pit operations over the next
4 years.”
986
To protect U.S. taxpayers, the Federal Reserve should ensure Goldman allocates
sufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event affecting those
coal mines in Colombia.
(b) Merchant Banking Authority
A second set of completely different issues goes to Goldman’s legal authority to be in the
coal mining business at all. Goldman has indicated that the legal foundation for its Colombian
mine operations is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority.
987
Goldman’s
extensive relationships with its Colombian coal mining operations raise questions, however,
about the extent to which they qualify as merchant banking investments.
The law does not require a financial holding company to notify or obtain prior approval
from the Federal Reserve for a merchant banking investment.
988
Rather, a company simply
makes the investment, and asserts its authority to do so after the investment is made. If the
Federal Reserve determines that the investment does not meet the qualifications for merchant
banking authority, then the financial holding company may assert other authority for the
investment.
989
If the investment is viewed as not qualifying for any authority, then the Federal
Reserve may force divestiture.
990
In this case, Goldman told the Subcommittee that it did not notify or obtain prior
permission from the Federal Reserve before buying the Coalcorp and Vale coal mining
986
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090.
987
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also , e.g., 7/25/2012 “Presentation to Firmwide
Client and Business Standards Committee,” (hereinafter 2012 Firmwide Presentation”), by Goldman Global
Commodities group, FRB-PSI-200986 - 1007, at 1000 (indicating CNR investment was a merchant banking asset).
Compare with 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10 filed by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303, at 303 (stating that the investment
was “permissible under ][Bank Holding Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant
Banking regulations.”).
988
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
989
Id.
990
Id. See also earlier discussion in Chapter 3, for example, regarding J PMorgan’s assertion of legal authority to
retain Henry Bath & Sons, Inc.
165
operations.
991
After making each of the two acquisitions, Goldman filed FR Y-10 forms with the
Federal Reserve, which are used to alert the agency to changes in the financial holding
company’s organizational structure and, in this case, provided notice that Goldman had
established new subsidiaries in Colombia.
992
Through the filing of the forms, Goldman alerted
the Federal Reserve to its investments shortly after they were made. It appears, however, that the
Federal Reserve examiners were likely unaware of the extent of Goldman’s involvement with the
day-to-day operations with its Colombian subsidiaries.
To qualify as a merchant banking investment, the investment must meet a number of
criteria, including that the financial holding company must not “routinely manage or operate” the
company in which it has made the investment.
993
Goldman has acknowledged this limitation in
internal materials.
994
In this case, Goldman installed its own employees as the directors of the
boards of its Colombian subsidiaries; no non-Goldman directors were selected. Goldman also
ensured that it had a formal right to approve important decisions.
995
In addition, Goldman’s key commodities subsidiary, J . Aron & Co., became CNR’s
“exclusive” agent to market, negotiate the terms of sale, and arrange for the delivery of all of the
coal produced in Colombia.
996
Goldman reported to its Board of Directors in 2011, that J . Aron
& Co. had increased CNR’s customer base from less than five to more than fifteen customers.
997
J . Aron & Co. was also given exclusive authority to procure “port services” for CNR – services
critical to the export of CNR coal – as well as exclusive authority to procure “coal blending”
services for CNR, which are critical to ensuring the quality of the coal to be sold.
998
From at
least 2011 to 2013, before CNR’s exports stopped, J . Aron & Co. used its authority to exercise
complete control over CNR’s mining output, buying about 20% of the coal for itself and
negotiating and effectively controlling the sale of the other 80% as well.
999
In addition, J . Aron
991
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
992
See 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10, filed by The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046301-303 (reflecting the March 19, 2010 acquisition
of Colombian Nautural Resources I, S.A.S. by GS Power Holdings LLC); undated “Report of Changes in
Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10, filed by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve,
GSPSICOMMODS00046304 - 307 (reflecting the J une 22, 2012 acquisition of Colombia Purchase Co., S.A.S. by
GS Power Holdings LLC and Goldman Sachs Global Holdings LLC.).
993
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (a)-(b), (e).
994
See, e.g., 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200986 - 1007, at 1000 (identifying CNR as a merchant banking
asset and noting that “Firm personnel not permitted to engage in ‘routine management’ absent extraordinary
circumstances” and “Merchant Banking authority not available for investments that are extension of firm’s own
activities”).
995
See 1/29/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments: Portfolio Snapshot,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-201213 - 232, at 215.
996
See 9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron &
Company, GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 498; see also 11/4/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001 - 003 at 001. Goldman has told the Subcommittee that it did not
discuss with the Federal Reserve its “intention to at as CNR’s agent/broker to market coal.” 9/19/2014 letter from
Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 005.
997
See 10/28/2011“Global Commodities Review of Acquisitions: Colombian Natural Resources,” part of a
presentation prepared by Goldman for the Goldman Board of Directors, FRB-PSI-700011-030, at 028.
998
9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron & Company,
GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 500.
999
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008.
166
& Co. appears to have arranged to buy coal at prices that were, at times, materially lower than
the prices charged to unaffiliated customers.
1000
Another sign of Goldman’s extensive involvement with CNR was the representation to
the Subcommittee that part of CNR’s dispute with its mining contractor, CMC, stemmed from a
concern about whether CMC was implementing plans approved by Goldman on how the mining
should be conducted to preserve the value of the sites.
1001
Depending upon the extent to which
Goldman’s involved itself in the details of CNR’s mining activities via Goldman-approved plans
and CNR implementation of those plans, Goldman may have been exercising a level of control
beyond what is permitted for a merchant banking portfolio company. Still another sign of
Goldman’s control over CNR was its role in deciding against spending $220 million to upgrade
CNR’s port with direct-loading equipment. While that decision is not a routine management
matter, its dramatic impact on CNR’s day-to-day operations and the reality that Goldman was the
only possible source of financing for that investment suggest Goldman was exercising significant
influence over CNR’s operations.
Still another piece of evidence of the close relationship between Goldman and CNR
involves Goldman’s hedging decisions. In its 2012 Summary Report, the FRBNY Commodities
Team wrote: “Goldman avoids the appearance of overt control of its coal mine business by not
hedging its underlying coal exposure to maintain legal protection.”
1002
In other words, Goldman
had indicated to the Federal Reserve that it used a subsidiary as the direct owner of its coal
mining operations and didn’t hedge its coal exposures, as a way of demonstrating the legal
distinction between the financial holding company and its affiliate.
1003
Internal Goldman
documents indicate, however, that Goldman did, in fact, use hedging to offset its coal exposure
and the reduced value of its CNR holdings.
1004
In a 2013 presentation to the Goldman Board of
Directors, the Goldman Global Commodities Group reported that it held a “short coal hedge” to
offset declining coal prices and CNR’s declining market value, and that the hedge had produced
“accounting gains” of $246 million.
1005
Goldman’s coal-related hedge is one more sign of the
close links between Goldman and CNR.
Goldman personnel appear to have been involved with CNR’s day-to-day marketing,
sales negotiation, procurement of coal blending and port services, and export decisions, activities
that appear to involve Goldman in the routine management of the company in the “ordinary
course of business.” Drummond, Inc., a U.S. company that is Colombia’s second-largest
1000
See discussion above; See 2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 16, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046342.
1001
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
1002
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489.
1003
Id.
1004
Goldman legal counsel told the Subcommittee that the hedge was consistent with “the shareholder of a portfolio
company … implement[ing] hedges to protect it against the possibility that the value of its investment may decline
as a result of changes in the prices of commodities produced by the portfolio company.” 11/4/2014 letter from
Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001 - 03 at 02. That said, the Goldman-
prepared presentation noted that “[g]ains in coal prices would result in hedge losses but would not result in a mark
up of the coal mine asset value.” 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to
the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 091.
1005
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 091.
167
producer of coal, told the Subcommittee that Drummond conducts its own marketing, sales, and
shipping arrangements.
1006
When asked whether it ever outsourced those functions, Drummond
representatives responded that producing, marketing, and selling coal was its business. Yet,
Goldman’s wholly-owned portfolio companies in Colombia have “outsourced” 100% of those
day-to-day functions to Goldman’s primary commodities trading subsidiary. Goldman further
entwined itself with CNR by approving mining plans, controlling major investment decisions,
and hedging its exposure to CNR’s declining market value.
The Federal Reserve has authorized financial holding companies, in connection with their
merchant banking activities, to impose a limited set of restrictions on the portfolio companies in
which they have invested, so long as the restrictions address matters that are outside the scope of
ordinary business, such as restricting the portfolio company’s authority to fundamentally change
its capital or debt structure, or fundamentally alter its business without the approval of the
holding company.
1007
The Subcommittee is unaware of any Federal Reserve guidance, however,
that would permit a financial holding company to control 100% of a portfolio company’s
marketing and sales. To the contrary, when the Federal Reserve discovered that J PMorgan was
marketing Henry Bath warehousing services to clients as an integral part of its overall
commodity-related services, the Federal Reserve disallowed J PMorgan’s treatment of Henry
Bath as a separate merchant banking investment and required J PMorgan to divest itself of the
holding.
1008
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2010 – more than a year before the formal
marketing contract was signed between J . Aron & Co. and CNR – Goldman assured its
examiners that it was taking care not to become involved in the daily management and operation
of its portfolio companies, in connection with its efforts to use legal structures to shield the
holding company from legal liability.
1009
Goldman’s statements, however, appear inconsistent
with the actual level of involvement of Goldman personnel in the day-to-day activities of CNR.
To clarify the scope of the merchant banking authority, the Federal Reserve should analyze and
determine whether Goldman’s level of involvement with CNR, like J PMorgan’s level of
involvement with Henry Bath, disqualifies CNR as a merchant banking investment.
Should the Federal Reserve disallow CNR as a merchant banking investment, Goldman
might try to assert that its coal mining activities are still permissible under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley grandfathering authority. But Goldman has already admitted that, prior to the statutory
trigger date in 1997, it did not trade coal, either physically or financially. In light of that
admission, and the fact that Goldman purchased the Colombian coal mines after it became a
bank holding company, there should be no reason for the Federal Reserve to treat CNR as a
grandfathered activity protected from divestment.
1006
Subcommittee briefing by Drummond Company, Inc. (9/16/2014).
1007
See earlier discussion in Chapter 3; 12/21/2001 letter from Federal Reserve to Credit Suisse First Boston, FRB-
PSI-301593 - 601, at 596 - 597.
1008
See discussion of Henry Bath warehouses in Chapter 3, above. See also 2012 Summary Report, at 505; undated
but likely 2013 “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 -
302, at 300 [sealed exhibits].
1009
See 3/17/2010 “Minutes of GS Commodities Review Legal Meeting,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, FRB-PSI-602360 - 370, at 361 [sealed exhibit].
168
(c) Conflicts of Interest
A final set of issues involves potential conflicts of interest. Goldman trades coal in both
the physical and financial markets at the same time, using the same traders sitting at the same
coal trading desk, generally executing those trades through J . Aron & Co. CNR’s activities
provide those traders with access to commercially valuable, non-public information about coal
operations in Colombia, the largest exporter of coal to the United States, including information
about coal production, labor disputes, regulatory actions, port facilities, and coal shipments. The
J . Aron traders handling CNR’s marketing, sales, and shipments are also active in physical and
financial coal markets. The fact that Goldman shorted coal in 2013, explained its actions
internally as a response to declining coal prices and CNR’s declining market value, and, by
September 2013, booked accounting profits from that short position of nearly $250 million,
suggests a close connection between its financial trading and physical coal activities. That
Goldman’s coal traders may be in the position to use the non-public information obtained from
CNR to inform their financial trades with counterparties lacking the same access is troubling.
(4) Analysis
All of the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee were heavily
involved with coal trading, although not with coal mining. Goldman’s four-year experience with
investing in open-pit coal mines in Colombia exposed a litany of operational, environmental, and
catastrophic event risks to the holding company, exacerbated by a mine shutdown, contractor
disputes, abandoned mining equipment, flooded mines, labor unrest, environmental regulatory
actions, port access problems, and declining coal prices. Goldman’s control, through J . Aron &
Co., over 100% of CNR’s coal marketing, sales and deliveries, among other activities, increases
the potential for Goldman to be held legally liable in the event of a catastrophic event and
underscores the need for it to allocate increased capital and insurance to cover potential losses.
The same activities raise questions about whether Goldman is inappropriately relying on
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority to justify Goldman’s entry into the coal
mining business. Potential conflict of interest issues also call out for additional oversight and
preventative safeguards. It is past time for the Federal Reserve to enforce needed safeguards on
this high risk physical commodity activity.
169
D. Goldman Involvement with Aluminum
After it became a bank holding company in 2008, in addition to expanding its physical
commodity activities involving uranium and coal, Goldman substantially increased its
involvement with aluminum. In 2010, it purchased Metro International Trade Services LLC
(Metro), owner of a global network of warehouses that store actual metal, including aluminum.
Metro’s warehouses are approved by the London Metal Exchange (LME) to store metals traded
on its exchange. Under Goldman’s ownership, Metro implemented practices to aggressively
attract and retain aluminum in its Detroit warehouses.
Over the next few years, Metro loaded aluminum into its Detroit warehouses at an
historic rate, building a virtual monopoly of the U.S. LME aluminum storage market. Metro
attracted the aluminum in part by paying “freight incentives” to metal owners to store their metal
in the Detroit warehouses. In addition, Metro entered into “merry-go-round” transactions with
existing warehouse clients in which it paid them millions of dollars in incentives to join or stay
in the exit line, known as the “queue,” to load out metal, move the metal from one Metro
warehouse into another, and then place it back on warrant. Those merry-go-round transactions
lengthened the metal load out queue to exit the Metro warehouse system, blocked the exits for
other metal owners seeking to leave the system, and helped ensure Metro maintained its
aluminum stockpiles while earning a steady income. Metro’s queue grew to an unprecedented
length, forcing metal owners to wait, at times, up to nearly two years to get their metal out of
storage in Detroit.
As the Detroit warehouse queue grew, so did the Midwest aluminum premium, a
component of the aluminum price. Higher Midwest Premium prices increased aluminum costs
for U.S. aluminum buyers and weakened their ability to hedge their price risks, affecting
aluminum users in the defense, transportation, beverage, and construction sectors. Some
industrial users of aluminum charged that the dysfunctional aluminum market inflated overall
aluminum costs by $3 billion. While long queues and increasing Midwest Premium prices were
hurting aluminum users, the LME has said that the emergence of increasing premiums
“convey[ed] an advantage to the expertise of merchants and brokers, who have built-up strong
modelling capabilities around premiums and queues.”
1010
Goldman, through its control of the Metro Board of Directors, approved Metro practices
that lengthened Metro’s queue, at the same time Goldman was ramping up its own aluminum
trading operations. Between 2010 and 2013, Goldman built up its physical aluminum stockpile
from less than $100 million in 2009, to more than $3 billion in aluminum in 2012. At one point
in 2012, Goldman owned about 1.5 million metric tons of aluminum, worth $3.2 billion, more
than 25% of annual North American aluminum consumption at the time. Goldman also engaged
in massive aluminum transactions, acquiring hundreds of thousands of metric tons of metal in
one series of transactions in 2012, and more than 1 million metric tons in another series of
transactions later in the year. That same year, Goldman made large cancellations of warrants
1010
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 29,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
170
totaling about 300,000 metric tons of aluminum stored at Metro in Detroit, contributing to the
lengthening of the queue.
The fact that Goldman engaged in extensive aluminum trading at the same time it was
approving practices leading to a long warehouse queue has given rise to serious questions about
the integrity of the aluminum market. Those doubts have been fueled, in part, by a perception
that Goldman is benefiting financially from the longer queue and using non-public information
gained through its ownership of Metro to benefit its trading activities. Metro and Goldman
information barrier policies prohibit the sharing of confidential warehouse information with
those engaged in aluminum trading.
(1) Background on Aluminum
Aluminum is one of the most actively traded base metals in the world, with complex
physical and financial markets, and volatile prices that, at times, appear disconnected to
fundamental forces of supply and demand.
Using Aluminum. Aluminum is a durable, versatile, light-weight base metal made by
extracting aluminum oxide, commonly known as alumina, from bauxite ore. It is used in a wide
variety of applications including in the transportation, construction, and consumer goods
markets.
1011
General Motors Corp., for example, indicated that its 2012 U.S.-sold vehicles
would contain an average of 370 pounds of aluminum, providing, among other applications, 90%
of the engine block and all cylinder heads.
1012
Aluminum also plays an important role in the
defense and aerospace industry and is a critical raw material for the production of military
aircraft
1013
and ships.
1014
As of 2009, the most recent year for which figures were available, the
U.S. Department of Defense consumed about 3% of annual U.S. aluminum production.
1015
The United States is the world’s fourth largest aluminum producer behind China, Russia,
and Canada.
1016
In 2013, U.S. primary aluminum production (as opposed to production from
1011
See undated “Aluminum Consumption by Regions in 2013 and 2025” Rusal website,http://www.rusal.ru/en/aluminium/consumers.aspx; “Ford’s Epic Gamble: The Inside Story,” Fortune, Alex Taylor
III (7/24/2014),http://fortune.com/2014/07/24/f-150-fords-epic-gamble/ (Ford’s new all-aluminum truck).
1012
U.S. Geological Survey 2011 Yearbook on Aluminum,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/aluminum/myb1-2011-alumi.pdf, citing “GM sees 2011 sales at
12–13 mil units,” Platts Metals Week, v. 82, no. 38,(9/19/2011), at 15. See also “The Changing Demand for
Aluminum in North America,” Open Markets, a CME publication, Samantha Azzarello (3/18/2014),http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/7855/the-changing-demand-for-aluminum-in-north-america (discussing rising
aluminum demand in cars).
1013
See, e.g., undated “Defense[:] Military Aircraft,” Kaiser Aluminum website,http://www.kaiseraluminum.com/markets-we-serve/aerospace/defense/military-aircraft/.
1014
One shipbuilding company, Austal USA, told the Subcommittee that it uses 2.5 million pounds of aluminum in
each J oint High Speed Vessel it produces for the U.S. Navy and 3.5 million pounds in each Littoral Combat Ship.
Subcommittee briefing by Austal USA. (10/30/2014).
1015
See 12/2005 “China’s Impact on Metals Prices in Defense Aerospace,” prepared by U.S. Department of
Defense, at 1-2,http://www.acq.osd.mil/mibp/docs/china_impact_metal_study_12-2005.pdf; 1/25/2014 email from
Office of the Secretary of Defense to Senate Armed Services Committee staff, “Aluminum,” PSI-OSD-01-000001.
1016
2/2014 “Aluminum Production,” prepared by Mineral Resources Program, U.S. Geological Survey,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/aluminum/mcs-2014-alumi.pdf.
171
scrap aluminum) was more than 1.9 million metric tons.
1017
North American aluminum
consumption is expected to be about 6.4 million metric tons in 2014.
1018
Aluminum Infrastructure. A complex infrastructure is required to produce useable
aluminum. Bauxite mines produce bauxite ore, which must be ground, mixed with chemicals,
and subjected to heat and pressure to extract the alumina.
1019
The extracted alumina is then
transformed into liquid aluminum through a smelting process.
1020
The liquid aluminum is mixed
with other metals to form aluminum alloys which are molded or cast into ingots. Depending on
the intended use, aluminum ingots can be fabricated into rolls or other shapes.
1021
Aluminum is
non-toxic and can be stored for years without problems.
1022
Aluminum recycling provides
another important source of the metal.
1023
Aluminum Markets. Aluminum is bought and sold in both physical and financial
markets. Physical aluminum is typically sold directly from producers to industrial end users.
Most aluminum produced by smelters is sold directly to companies that use the metal to make
their products. Physical aluminum can be sold through long or short term supply contracts or
through ad hoc purchases made on “spot” markets. Physical aluminum prices are typically
established, in part, by referencing aluminum prices in the financial markets.
In the financial markets, aluminum can be sold using a variety of financial instruments,
including futures, options, swaps, and forwards. Those financial instruments can be bought or
sold on public commodities exchanges, like the London Metal Exchange (LME) or the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME), or through over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. Published
aluminum prices on the exchanges, most commonly the LME’s “Official Price” for aluminum,
play an important role as the reference price in contracts for physical aluminum.
Physical aluminum contracts typically establish the aluminum price using several pricing
components which, when combined, produce an “all-in” aluminum price. One key component is
the LME Official Price for aluminum as of a specific date or as an average over a specified
period. That price is established through trading on the LME exchange and is generally
recognized for aluminum as the “global reference for physical contracts.”
1024
The second key
pricing component is a regional “premium,” which is intended to reflect the availability of
1017
A metric ton is equal to 1000 kilograms or about 2,200 pounds. See 9/10/2014 “ U.S. Primary Aluminum
Production,” prepared by The Aluminum Association,http://www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/USPrimaryProduction082014.pdf.
1018
See undated “Capitalizing on Opportunities, Minimizing Risks,” Alcoa website,http://www.alcoa.com/sustainability/en/info_page/vision_risks.asp.
1019
See undated “Adding Value From the Ground Up,” Alcoa website (interactive webpage teaching the stages of
making aluminum),http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/about_alcoa/dirt/addingvalue_2.htm. See also undated “How
it’s Made,” Hydro website,http://www.hydro.com/en/About-aluminium/How-its-made/ (webpage showing how
aluminum is made from “bauxite, through production, use and recycling”).
1020
Id.
1021
Id.
1022
“Aluminum 101,” The Aluminum Association website,http://www.aluminum.org/aluminum-
advantage/aluminum-101.
1023
Id.
1024
Undated “LME Official Price,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/pricing-and-data/pricing/official-price/.
172
aluminum in a particular geographic area and the cost of delivering aluminum there.
1025
The
relevant premium for aluminum sold in the United States is the “Midwest Aluminum Premium”
(Midwest Premium). Midwest Premium prices are published by a company called Platts, which
derives it by conducting surveys of the contract prices between physical spot market aluminum
buyers and sellers for delivery of the metal.
1026
Large aluminum users typically closely monitor
the LME and Midwest Premium prices, since both prices will largely determine the all-in price
they will pay for aluminum in contracts with aluminum producers.
1027
Aluminum Prices. Over the past five years, aluminum prices have been volatile, with
all-in prices sometimes swinging by as much as $400 per metric ton within a month.
1028
The
following graph depicts the aluminum all-in price, LME futures price, and Midwest Premium
price from 2008 to 2014. The Midwest Premium price has climbed dramatically, both in dollar
terms and as a percentage of the all-in price.
1025
A third pricing component in physical aluminum contracts may be the cost of producing for delivery a particular
shape or aluminum alloy. So-called “product premiums” are not a focus of the Subcommittee’s Report. See
3/31/2014 Alcoa, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2014, at 45,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4281/000119312514157120/d701633d10q.htm.
1026
See 6/2014 “Methodology and Specifications Guide,” prepared by Platts, at 2,https://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/methodologyreferences/methodologyspecs/metals.pdf.
1027
See, e.g., Subcommittee briefing by Austal USA (10/30/2014). Austal told the Subcommittee that it purchases
millions of pounds of aluminum each year to build ships for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Austal
explained that, under its DOD contract, any increase in the purchase price of physical aluminum was shared 50% by
the company and 50% by DOD, which meant that increased aluminum costs required additional U.S. taxpayer
dollars. Austal indicated that it continually monitors both the LME and Midwest Premium prices.
1028
Subcommittee briefing by Austal USA (10/30/2014).
173
Source: Prepared by Subcommittee using data provided by Novelis.
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
For many years, the Midwest Premium was a relatively small portion of the all-in price
for physical aluminum. In recent years, however, it has grown more volatile and has
dramatically increased in both real dollar terms and as a proportion of the all-in price. That
development has had an adverse impact on many industrial aluminum users who believe that
higher Midwest Premium prices decrease their ability to hedge price swings and lead to higher
all-in prices for aluminum.
1029
Aluminum Trading on the London Metal Exchange. The London Metal Exchange
(LME) is the dominant market in the world for trading aluminum, copper, and other base metals.
The exchange is physically located in London and falls within the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The LME is empowered by the FCA to act as
the primary regulator for its market.
1030
1029
See, e.g., Subcommittee briefing by Novelis, (11/3/2014).
1030
See undated “Regulation,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/regulation/.
$0
$50
$100
$150
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$300
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4
Aluminum Prices, 2008 to 2014
All-in Price LME Price Midwest Premium (Right-Axis)
174
The LME is owned by London Metals Exchange, which is owned by LME Holdings
Limited.
1031
For many years, the LME was a member-owned organization, and several large
banks, including Goldman, J PMorgan, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup, held its
shares.
1032
In late 2012, the LME shareholders sold 100% of their shares to Hong Kong
Exchanges and Clearing Ltd., which is now the sole owner of the LME.
1033
The LME offers many types of financial products for trading on the exchange, including:
• Futures – contracts that obligate parties to buy or sell a specified amount and type of
metal at a specified price on a specified future date; and
• Options – similar to futures contracts except that parties have the option rather than
an obligation to buy or sell the metal at the specified date and price.
1034
Those financial products can be used to trade a variety of base metals on the LME, such as
aluminum and copper.
Every day, the LME publishes official prices for each metal traded on the exchange. For
aluminum, those include the “cash” price and a “three month” futures price. LME prices,
especially the daily LME Official Price, have become benchmarks for aluminum physical
contracts.
1035
Aluminum market participants also use LME futures to hedge their exposure to
changes in aluminum prices,
1036
although, as shown in the chart above, over the last two years,
there has been an increasing gap between the LME price and the all-in price consumers actually
pay for aluminum. That growing difference between the LME price and the all-in aluminum
price has made the LME price a less effective hedging tool.
LME Warrants. Parties trading LME futures contracts can generally settle those
contracts in one of two ways. The first and most common method is called offsetting. Under
that settlement method, a party’s obligation to deliver or take delivery of metal under an LME
futures contract can be negated by their entering into an equivalent but opposite transaction, such
1031
See 12/6/2012 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) and LME Holdings Ltd. press release,
“HKEx and LME Announce Completion of Transaction,”http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-events/press-
releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-announce-completion-of-transaction/.
1032
Id.; “LME Shareholders OK HKEx Takeover Pact,” Resource Investor, Philip Burgert (7/25/2012),http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2012/07/25/lme-shareholders-ok-hkex-takeover-pact.
1033
See 12/6/2012 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) and LME Holdings Limited press release,
“HKEx and LME Announce Completion of Transaction,”http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-events/press-
releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-announce-completion-of-transaction/.
1034
See undated “Trading[:] Contract Types,” London Metal Exchange website,https://www.lme.com/trading/contract-types/.
1035
In many U.S. physical aluminum contracts, for example, the parties agree to deliver a specified amount of
aluminum on a specified date at the then-prevailing LME Official Price, plus the Midwest Premium, plus other
specified amounts such as a product premium or additional delivery charge.
1036
While some aluminum users hedge their price risk using the LME futures market, several others told the
Subcommittee that they typically do not hedge their positions on the LME itself, but instead engage in bilateral swap
transactions with banks or other market participants to hedge aluminum prices. Even in those instances, however,
the Subcommittee was told that the LME price is often the reference price in those swap agreements. See, e.g.,
Subcommittee briefing by Anheuser Busch (10/9/2014).
175
as buying a short to match a long position. This settlement method offers a purely financial
option, since funds can be used to purchase the necessary offsetting positions.
The other way to settle an LME contract is to deliver or take delivery of LME “warrants,”
documents that convey actual legal title to specific lots of metal stored in LME-approved
warehouses.
1037
This settlement option results in ownership of physical metal. In order for
physical metal to be used to settle an LME trade, it must be “warranted” by the LME as meeting
certain quality and quantity requirements and being maintained in a warehouse approved by the
LME. In the case of aluminum, the LME warrant conveys title to a specific lot of 25 metric tons
of “high grade primary aluminum” stored in an LME-approved warehouse.
1038
While physical settlement is relatively rare, the LME has emphasized its importance:
“This presence, or threat, of delivery has the result of constantly ensuring that the LME
price is in line with the physical market price. It also enables industry to sell material via
the Exchange delivery system in times of over supply, and use the LME as a source of
material in times of extreme shortage.”
1039
The LME warranting system has, for much of its history, enabled the LME to function as a
market of last resort for market participants seeking to buy metal. Put simply, the owner of a
future, through the warrant settlement system, could expect to receive title to metal on a specific
date at a specific price. In addition, the LME explained, the ownership of warrants could be
utilized as a “backstop” for negotiations in a financial transaction.
1040
If an owner of metal under LME warrant decided to remove its aluminum from the LME
warehouse, the owner would have to take steps to have its warrants “cancelled.”
1041
To cancel
the warrants, the owner must notify the warehouse holding the metal, and the warehouse must
complete the necessary paperwork and notify the LME, which monitors the amounts of metal
stored in each LME-approved warehouse. It is only after the warrants are cancelled, the owner
of the metal has settled outstanding rent and other warehouse charges, and the owner has
1037
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by London Metal
Exchange, at 7,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf (One LME aluminum warrant equals 25 metric tons of the metal).
1038
See “Futures Contract Specifications[:] LME Aluminum Futures,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/aluminium/contract-specifications/futures/ (reflecting a number of
specifications regarding the appropriate volume and characteristics of the aluminum). The LME also has warrants
for certain aluminum alloys that can be traded on the exchange; they convey title to a specific lot of 20 tons of
A380.1, 226 or AD12.1 aluminum alloy. See “Futures Contract Specifications[:] LME Aluminum Alloy Futures,”
LME website,http://www.lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/aluminium-alloy/contract-specifications/futures/ .
1039
See undated “FAQ: Why is the physical delivery important for minor metals futures?” LME website,http://www.lme.com/about-us/faqs/#.
1040
See 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by London Metal
Exchange, at 68,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1041
See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York),
Complaint (4/11/14), at ¶ 147.
176
provided the warehouse with shipping instructions that the metal is placed in a queue for load-
out from the LME warehouse.
1042
For most of LME’s history and at most warehouses, metal owners could load out metal
stored in an LME warehouse within a few days or weeks. Over the past several years, however,
long lines or “queues” to load out metal from some LME-approved warehouses have developed,
in particular with respect to aluminum. In some cases, warrant owners have had to wait months,
a year, or even longer to take possession of warranted aluminum. As discussed more fully
below, in the United States, as the queue has grown, the difference between the LME official
price and the all-in market price for physical aluminum has widened, reducing the effectiveness
of the LME price as a hedge for aluminum prices.
LME Warehouses. While the LME does not own or operate the warehouses where
aluminum and other exchange-traded metals are stored, it enters into a standard, non-negotiable
Warehouse Agreement with the warehouse owners, allowing them to store LME-warranted metal
in exchange for compliance with the terms and conditions of the Warehouse Agreement.
1043
Currently, more than 700 LME-approved warehouses are in operation.
1044
LME-
approved warehouses are located in many countries around the globe and store a vast volume of
metals. For many years, LME warehouses were owned by independent warehousing companies
that did not engage in commodities trading. Beginning in 2010, however, many of those
warehouse companies were bought by bank holding companies or trading houses with extensive
commodity trading operations.
1045
Some of the key global networks of LME-approved warehouses are operated by Metro,
which is owned by Goldman;
1046
Henry Bath & Sons, which was recently sold by J PMorgan to
Mercuria Energy Trading;
1047
Pacorini Metals, which is owned by Glencore, a commodities
trading house; NEMS Ltd. (recently renamed Impala Terminals) which was acquired by
Trafigura, a commodities trading and logistics company; and C. Steinweg Handelsveem, an
independent warehousing firm unaffiliated with a trading company.
1048
1042
See 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-
000001 - 011, at 008.
1043
See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York),
Complaint (4/11/2014), at ¶ 156; Opinion and Order (8/25/2014) (ECF No. 564), at 9.
1044
See undated “Approved Warehouses,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/trading/warehousing-and-
brands/warehousing/approved-warehouses/.
1045
See, e.g., “Metals Warehousing: The Perfect Hedge & The Perfect Storm?,” Hard Assets Investor, Tom Vulcan
(3/23/2012),http://www.hardassetsinvestor.com/features/3567-metals-warehousing-the-perfect-hedge-a-the-perfect-
storm.html.
1046
See “Goldman and J PMorgan enter metal warehousing,” Financial Times, J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CkHqTn7n .
1047
See 10/3/2014 Mercuria press release, “Mercuria Closes Acquisition of J .P. Morgan Chase Physical
Commodities Business,”http://www.mercuria.com/media-room/business-news/mercuria-closes-acquisition-jp-
morgan-chase-physical-commodities-business.
1048
See “Metals Warehousing: The Perfect Hedge & The Perfect Storm?,” Hard Assets Investor, Tom Vulcan
(3/23/2012),http://www.hardassetsinvestor.com/features/3567-metals-warehousing-the-perfect-hedge-a-the-perfect-
storm.html.
177
Aluminum Trading on the CME. The CME Group Inc. owns four exchanges on which
commodity-related financial products are traded, including futures, options, and swaps linked to
aluminum.
1049
The CME Group is primarily regulated by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In 2012, the CME Group began offering a new financial product related to aluminum
called the “Aluminum MW U.S. Transaction Premium Futures” contract. That futures contract
was made available for trading on COMEX, one of the CME Group’s commodity exchanges. It
represented the first exchange-traded product allowing aluminum market participants to manage
price risks associated with the Midwest Premium for aluminum.
1050
In May 2014, the CME
Group launched a second new aluminum-related product for trading on COMEX, a futures
contract for delivery of physical aluminum in North America. CME described the new contract,
which is intended to be an all-in price, as designed to increase price transparency for aluminum
and enable market participants to better manage price risks than is currently possible using LME
futures.
1051
To date, however, both of the new CME aluminum products have been thinly
traded.
1052
Aluminum Trading in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market. Aluminum and
aluminum-related derivatives are also traded over-the-counter (OTC), which means they are
traded outside official exchanges like the LME and COMEX.
Aluminum-related swaps executed in the OTC market are often customized to address
specific issues. They include, for example, swaps designed to permit aluminum market
participants to hedge their price exposure to the all-in price of aluminum, the LME price, or the
Midwest Premium, which has been steadily increasing in price and volatility over the last few
years.
1053
The Subcommittee has been told that large financial institutions, including Goldman,
and major aluminum consumers have traded those aluminum swaps in the OTC market.
1054
Another type of aluminum trading that takes place in the OTC market, outside of the
exchanges, involves trading LME warrants for aluminum lots held in different warehouse
locations.
1055
That trading takes place, because the value of aluminum is affected by where it is
1049
See undated “Driving Global Growth and Commerce,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/. The four exchanges are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME),
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and the Commodity Exchange
(COMEX) which is a division of the NYMEX.
1050
See 8/9/2013 CME Group press release, “CME Group Announces the First Aluminum Midwest Premium
Contracts Traded,”http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=784335. At the
time of its introduction, the CME said it was offering the product, because “n the past three years, the premium
increased from $0.04/lb to close to $0.09/lb and it is now a larger component of the aluminum consumer’s cost and
risk. This contract enables market participants in North America to better manage their price risk.” Undated “FAQ:
Aluminum MW US Transaction Premium Platts (25MT) Swap Futures,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/files/faq_aluminum_mw_us_transaction_premium_swap.pdf.
1051
See 3/18/2014 CME Group press release, “CME Group to Launch North American Physically Delivered
Aluminum Futures,”http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20140318-907146.html.
1052
Subcommittee briefing by CFTC (9/2/2014).
1053
See 9/17/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
15-000001, at 03.
1054
See, e.g., Subcommittee briefing by Anheuser-Busch (10/9/2014).
1055
Subcommittee briefing by London Metal Exchange (8/1/2014).
178
located and how long it may take to remove the aluminum from the warehouse. For example,
warrants for aluminum held in a warehouse with a long queue may be worth less than warrants
for aluminum held in a warehouse with no queue. Relative values of warrants for aluminum held
in different locations may change by the day as warehouse queues lengthen or shorten.
Because OTC trades are not subject to the same reporting as those that occur on regulated
exchanges, it is difficult to determine the overall size of the OTC aluminum market and the types
of financial instruments that are most common.
Relationship Between Warehouse Queues and Aluminum Prices. A critical factor
affecting aluminum trading in recent years has been an unprecedented growth in the size of
physical aluminum inventories at LME-approved warehouses, as industrial demand for the metal
plummeted during the financial crisis and metal owners sought to sell or store their excess
stocks.
1056
The increase in aluminum inventory was particularly dramatic at Metro’s Detroit
warehouses. At the same time the physical aluminum inventories increased, warrant holders
with metal in the Metro Detroit warehouses experienced increasingly long queues before they
could remove their aluminum from the warehouses. Those queues, over time, have been highly
correlated with the increases in the Midwest Premium prices.
At the end of February 2010, just after Goldman acquired Metro, the Midwest Premium
was approximately $134 per metric ton.
1057
It has since steadily climbed to over $400.
1058
In
dollar terms, the Midwest premium climbed over 300% in just a few years. Over the same
period, the queue went from about 40 days to over 600 days.
1059
As depicted in the chart below, the increase in the Midwest Premium has been highly
correlated with the growth of the queue at Metro’s Detroit warehouses.
1056
See 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 20,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1057
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
1058
Id.
1059
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
179
Source: Prepared by the Subcommittee using information provided by Harbor Aluminum. See undated
“HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs HARBOR's MW
Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
Between 2010 and 2014, the changes in queue length at the Metro warehouses in Detroit and the
changes in the Midwest Premium price had a correlation coefficient of approximately 0.89, an
exceptionally high correlation.
1060
Many market participants, including many large aluminum users, contend that the longer
queues are pushing up the Midwest Premium, which is intended to reflect, in part, storage costs,
and that the increased Midwest Premium prices result in higher all-in aluminum prices. The
Aluminum Users Group, a coalition of large manufacturers including Novelis, Coca Cola,
MillerCoors, and others, wrote to the LME that market “distortions” due to long queues had
resulted in physical premiums that “are at least double their normal levels.”
1061
In 2013, a
MillerCoors representative testified before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee that the queues
had cost his company “tens of millions of dollars in excess premiums over the last several
years.”
1062
1060
Subcommittee calculation using information provided by Harbor Aluminum. See undated “HARBOR's
estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs HARBOR's MW Transactional
Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
1061
10/29/2012 letter from Aluminum Users Group to LME, PSI-AlumUsersGroup-01-000010-012.
1062
“Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
180
Prominent aluminum analysts agree with that view. J orge Vazquez of Harbor Aluminum
Intelligence, a leading industry analyst, has said that the emergence of long queues led directly to
higher premiums, commenting that warehouse practices were “being used as a platform to
inorganically inflate aluminum premiums at the expense of the aluminum consumer and at the
benefit of some warehouses, banks and trading companies.”
1063
In contrast, the LME and Goldman contend that longer queues have not affected the all-in
price for aluminum. Although both the LME and Goldman concede that the queue has affected
premium prices and the relative proportions of the all-in price attributable to the premium price
versus the LME price, they assert that the effect of the longer queue has been to drive the LME
portion down and the premium portion up, leaving the all-in price substantially unchanged.
1064
That analysis is a minority view, according to briefings provided to the Subcommittee by
numerous aluminum market participants and experts. Alcoa, the largest U.S. aluminum
producer, told the Subcommittee, for example, that the LME and premium prices are not
inversely related, but move independently of one another.
1065
In a recent filing with the SEC,
Alcoa wrote that the LME price and the aluminum premium each “has its own drivers of
variability.”
1066
Mr. Vazquez, the aluminum analyst, agreed with that view, indicating to the
Subcommittee that “there has been no empirical study or evidence or modeling that suggests
changes in LME prices and the Midwest Premium are inversely related,” as the LME and
Goldman have suggested.
1067
In fact, the LME and Midwest Premium prices can and often have
moved in the same direction.
The Subcommittee’s investigation found that, while there was disagreement about the
impact of the queue on the level of the all-in aluminum price, there was broad consensus that the
queue had affected Midwest Premium prices. The investigation also found that the price impacts
of the queue had created problems for aluminum users like beverage can producers and
automobile manufacturers who actually use aluminum, because the increasing difference
between the all-in price and the LME futures price made hedging price risk through the LME
market increasingly ineffective.
1068
A number of commercial users told the Subcommittee that
the lack of effective hedges damages planning and impacts revenues.
1069
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals,
MillerCoors LLC, at 9,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm.
1063
“Aluminum Premiums To Fall After LME Warehouse Plan?” Metal Miner, (11/8/2013),http://agmetalminer.com/2013/11/08/aluminum-premium-to-fall-after-lme-warehouse-plan/. ; Subcommittee
briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
1064
See 10/31/2013 “The Economic Role of a Warehouse Exchange” prepared by Goldman Sachs Commodity
Research (The development of the queues has not affected the total ‘physical’ price for aluminum),
GSPSICOMMODS00047511 - 545; 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,”
prepared by LME, at 24,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf (“[L]ong queues reduce the value of warrants, and . . . it was these
lower-value warrants which were being used to settle LME contracts and set LME price.”).
1065
Subcommittee briefing by Alcoa (8/5/2014);
1066
3/31/2014 Alcoa, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2014, at 45,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4281/000119312514157120/d701633d10q.htm.
1067
Subcommittee briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
1068
This was, in fact, the explicit reasoning used by the CME when it introduced its Aluminum MW U.S.
Transaction Premium contract in 2012. Undated, “FAQ: Aluminum MW US Transaction Premium Platts (25MT)
181
Historically, industrial users seeking to hedge their aluminum price risk over time used
futures, forwards, or swap transactions linked to LME prices. Trading records show that, in the
five years prior to Goldman’s purchase of Metro, the LME price as a percentage of the all-in
price for aluminum averaged over 95%, making LME futures a fairly effective hedge against all-
in aluminum price increases.
1070
Since 2010, however, the portion of the all-in price attributable
to the LME price has fallen steadily. For example, in J anuary 2014, the LME price made up
about 75% of the all-in price, eroding the value of LME futures as a hedge for aluminum’s all-in
price.
1071
At the same time, the Midwest Premium has grown in both in dollar terms and as a
percentage of the all-in aluminum price. At the end of February, 2010, just after Goldman
acquired Metro, the Midwest Premium was about $134, or about 6% of the all-in price. By the
end of J anuary 2014, the Midwest Premium was over $450, comprising about 22% of the all-in
price.
1072
Compounding the problem for aluminum users has been the difficulty in hedging the
growing premium portion of the all-in aluminum price. While the CME Group now offers
futures to manage price risks associated with the Midwest Premium, those new products are still
thinly traded.
1073
The end result is that aluminum users have been less able to hedge their price
risk and more susceptible to price changes due – not to market forces of supply and demand – but
to increased Midwest Premium prices highly correlated with longer warehouse queues.
According to industry aluminum users, those factors have cost manufacturers and consumers
billions of dollars.
1074
At the same time the increasing Midwest Premium prices have been causing problems for
aluminum users, the LME has said that the emergence of increasing premiums “convey[ed] an
advantage to the expertise of merchants and brokers, who have built-up strong modelling
capabilities around premiums and queues.”
1075
In other words, the increases in the Midwest
Premium have benefited aluminum traders.
(2) Goldman Involvement with Aluminum
Over the last five years, Goldman has dramatically increased its physical aluminum
activities. Beginning in 2010, it took control of a network of LME-approved warehouses, and
helped the warehouses in Detroit accumulate the largest stockpile of LME warranted aluminum
Swap Futures,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/files/faq_aluminum_mw_us_transaction_premium_swap.pdf.
1069
For example, one manufacturer who uses aluminum to build warships told the Subcommittee that its inability to
effectively hedge the all-in price has resulted in its taking costly measures, including buying substantial amounts of
physical aluminum to hold it for future use. Subcommittee briefing by Austal (10/30/2014).
1070
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
1071
Id.
1072
Id.
1073
Subcommittee briefing by CFTC staff (9/2/2014) .
1074
See, e.g., “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals,
MillerCoors LLC, at 9,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm .
1075
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 29,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
182
in the United States. It also dramatically increased its own physical inventory, building its
physical aluminum holdings from less than $100 million in 2009 to more than $3 billion at one
point in 2012. In addition, from 2009 until late 2012, Goldman had a significant ownership stake
in the LME itself, the primary exchange for trading aluminum. In short, Goldman owned
aluminum, traded in aluminum-related financial products, owned part of the exchange where
those products were traded, owned warehouses where aluminum was stored, and its warehouse
sat on the committee advising on the rules for how warehouses should operate. Those activities
made Goldman an increasingly influential participant in the aluminum markets.
(a) Building An Aluminum Inventory
Prior to 2010, Goldman’s physical aluminum activities appear to have been relatively
small. From 2008 to 2009, Goldman’s aluminum holdings fluctuated between about 1,600 and
44,000 metric tons, representing between $2 million and just under $100 million in assets.
1076
At
the time Goldman acquired Metro in February 2010, Goldman actually owned no physical
aluminum at all.
1077
As shown in the graph below, however, Goldman’s aluminum inventory
then began to skyrocket.
*Totals for 2012 and 2013 reflect Goldman Sachs aluminumholdings at the close of highest and lowest months
during those years. Physical holdings may have exceeded or been lower than month-ending figures.
Source: See 2/20/2013 letter fromGoldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
Goldman-02-000001, attaching Goldman chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R, at 2-R; 4/30/2014 letter from
Goldman letter to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-000001, Exhibit D, at 13.
1076
See 2/20/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
Goldman-02-000001, attaching Goldman chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R, at 2-R.
1077
Id. at GSPSICOMMODS00000001, at 2-R.
M
e
t
r
i
c
T
o
n
s
183
By the end of 2010, less than a year after purchasing Metro, Goldman’s physical
aluminum holdings grew to approximately 95,000 metric tons worth about $240 million. By the
fall of 2011, Goldman had nearly 350,000 metric tons worth more than $860 million.
1078
The
trend continued in 2012; by year’s end, Goldman’s aluminum holdings exceeded 1.5 million
metric tons worth more than $3.2 billion dollars.
1079
In early 2013, the company sold about half
of its aluminum.
1080
In September 2013, Goldman’s aluminum holdings totaled about 714,000
metric tons, with a market value of about $1.3 billion.
1081
One reason for the dramatic increase in Goldman’s physical aluminum trading was its
decision to expand its aluminum trading desk. In an interview, Christopher Wibbelman, Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Metro, explained that around the time Goldman purchased the
warehouse business, he was asked by Goldman to recommend some physical aluminum experts
with whom Goldman’s trading desk could discuss the aluminum market.
1082
He indicated that,
shortly thereafter, Goldman hired two aluminum traders he had recommended.
1083
Goldman’s
physical aluminum trading soon after began to increase and its inventory to grow.
In addition to its rapidly expanding aluminum trading operations, between mid-2009 and
the end of 2012, Goldman more than quadrupled its stake in the London Metal Exchange.
1084
By
2012, Goldman was second only to J P Morgan as the exchange’s largest shareholder.
1085
(b) Acquiring a Warehousing Business
Goldman also deepened its involvement with aluminum by purchasing Metro
International Trade Services LLC (Metro), the owner of a global network of LME-approved
warehouses that stored a variety of metals, including aluminum.
1086
Under Goldman’s
ownership, Metro implemented unprecedented practices to aggressively attract and retain
aluminum in its Detroit warehouses. Over the next few years, Metro’s Detroit warehouses
accumulated the largest stockpile of LME warranted aluminum in the United States.
According to Goldman, in 2009, it was approached by representatives of Metro about
buying the company.
1087
In February 2010, Goldman acquired Metro for about $450 million.
1088
1078
Id.
1079
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman letter to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-000001 -
006, at Exhibit D, GSPSICOMMODS00004116.
1080
Id.
1081
Id.
1082
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1083
Id.
1084
See 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-
000001 - 011, at 003, 004.
1085
See, e.g., “London Metal Exchange shareholders vote on takeover,” Reuters (7/24/2012),http://articles.chicagotribune.com/...t-lmevotel6e8ioig6-20120724_1_hkex-lme-board-
shareholders (“The LME's top shareholder is J PMorgan, with 1.4 million shares, followed by Goldman with 1.23
million.”).
1086
See 9/12/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-06-000001 - 021, at 017 (Exhibit C); “Goldman and J PMorgan Enter Metal Warehousing,” Financial
Times, J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kXv0R8iX. Metro is a Delaware corporation.
1087
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
184
Goldman’s purchase of Metro was the first of a series of warehouse acquisitions by financial
firms that were also involved in trading metals.
1089
Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments (GCPI) group conducted the
analysis and took the lead in the Metro acquisition.
1090
J acques Gabillon, a Goldman executive
based in London, led the GCPI effort and later became Chairman of Metro’s Board of
Directors.
1091
Goldman has said publicly that it does not consider Metro a “strategic business” for the
financial holding company.
1092
Goldman told the Subcommittee that its decision to buy Metro
was instead driven by: (1) the warehouse company’s potential to generate rental income arising
from storage of a glut of metal in the market (due to reduced demand from the financial crisis
and recession); and (2) the potential for the warehouse company’s rental income to act as a
counter-cyclical source of income compared to Goldman’s trading revenues.
1093
In 2011,
Goldman projected internally that, by April 2013, the Metro investment would have “returned
more than the full invested capital and continue to pay out substantial annual dividends.”
1094
At the time of the acquisition in 2010, Goldman stated publicly that Metro would
“continue to operate independently,” and the company’s top management remained largely in
place.
1095
Metro’s senior executives at the time of acquisition, including Christopher
1088
8/3/2011 “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-707486-500, at 493. Compare Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31,
2010, at Exhibit 21.1 (including “Metro International Trade Services LLC” as a subsidiary of GS Power Holdings
LLC), with Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009, at Exhibit 21.1 (not
listing GS Power Holdings LLC or Metro International as significant subsidiaries).
1089
A few months later, J PMorgan acquired Henry Bath & Sons which, like Metro, owned a global network of
warehouses storing aluminum and other metals traded on the LME. See, e.g., “Goldman and J PMorgan enter metal
warehousing,” Financial Times, J avier Blas (3/2/ 2010),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CkHqTn7n. In March 2010, Trafigura, a commodities trading and logistics company,
purchased NEMS Ltd. another LME-approved warehousing company. See 3/10/2010 Trafigura press release,
“Trafigura Beheer B.V. has acquired metal warehousing company NEMS Ltd.,”http://www.trafigura.com/media-
centre/latest-news/18580/#.U7rxFvldVu0. In September 2010, Glencore International, a commodities trading
company, purchased the Pacorini Group’s LME-warehousing assets. See “Glencore completes deal for Pacorini
Metal,” Reuters, Michael Taylor (9/14/2010),http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/14/pacorini-metals-
idUSLDE68D0RR20100914. The Pacorini warehouse in Vlissingen is the only other warehouse in the world with
lengthy aluminum queues.
1090
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1091
Id.
1092
7/31/2013 “LME Warehousing and Aluminum,” Goldman Sachs website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-r...hive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-31-
13.html.
1093
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014); Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/10/2014).
1094
8/3/2011 “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-707486 - 500, at 493.
1095
See “Goldman and J PMorgan enter metal warehousing,” Financial Times, J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CkHqTn7n.; “Wall Street, Fed
Face off Over Physical Commodities,” Reuters, David Sheppard, J onathan Leff, and J osephine Mason (3/2/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/us-fed-banks-commodities-idUSTRE8211CC2012030.
185
Wibbelman, Mark Askew, and Michael Whelan, had each been with the company for more than
a decade, and were seasoned leaders intimately familiar with the warehousing business.
1096
At the same time, however, Goldman installed a new Board of Directors at Metro that
consisted exclusively of Goldman employees, including several executives in the company’s
Global Commodities group.
1097
The following chart identifies the Goldman employees who
served on the Metro Board at some point during the last five years:
Goldman Employees Who Served as Metro Board Members
2009 to 2014
Goldman Employee Goldman Department From Date To Date
Agran, Gregory Global Commodities 2/1/2010 12/1/2011
Attwood Scott, Victoria* Securities Div Compliance 2/1/2010 11/16/2012
Bulk, Maxwell* Global Deriv Ops Mgmt 2/1/2010 7/1/2014
Gabillon,J acques GCPI head 2/1/2010 CURRENT
Haynes, Oliver* Securities Div Compliance 10/30/2012 4/1/2014
Holzer, Philip EQ PIPG Sales 2/15/2010 3/1/2014
Murphy, Ken Archon** 3/1/2010 5/1/2011
Mancini,Robert* Assetco*** 2/1//2010 12/1/2012
McDonogh, Dermot Controllers' Admin 3/1/2010 CURRENT
Siewert, Richard Media Relations 10/1/2012 CURRENT
Weiss, Michael Securities Div Compliance 1/23/2013 CURRENT
West, Owen Natural Gas Trading 11/28/2011 CURRENT
*Former Goldman employee
**Archon refers to Archon LP, which is the predecessor to Goldman Sachs Realty Management LP.
***Assetco likely refers to GCPI, which stands for Global Commodities Principal Investments group.
Source: 8/15/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-000001 -
009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225; 11/11/2014 Briefing by Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee (describing Archon and Assetco).
In its documentation, Goldman indicated that it relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
merchant banking authority to purchase the Metro warehousing business.
1098
That authority
requires a financial holding company making a merchant banking investment to refrain from
becoming involved in the routine management of the portfolio company and that it sell the
company within ten years of acquisition.
1099
Despite Goldman’s assertions that it was “not
involved in the day-to-day management of the company,”
1100
after the acquisition, many
1096
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1097
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225.
1098
See 7/25/2012 Goldman “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee: Global
Commodities,” FRB-PSI-200984, at 1000.
1099
See discussions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority in Chapter 2 and 3, above.
1100
7/31/2013 “LME Warehousing and Aluminum,” Goldman Sachs website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-r...hive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-31-
13.html.
186
business decisions by Metro required review and approval by Metro’s Board of Directors or a
Board subcommittee, both of which were comprised entirely of Goldman employees.
1101
Goldman has stated that “under the rules governing its purchase, we have to sell it within
ten years from the date we bought it.”
1102
Because Goldman characterized the Metro acquisition
as a merchant banking investment, it did not notify or obtain prior permission from the Federal
Reserve.
(c) Paying Incentives to Attract Outside Aluminum
Soon after its acquisition by Goldman, Metro significantly increased its spending on
“freight incentives” to entice aluminum owners to move metal into its Detroit warehouses.
Those financial incentives led to Metro’s loading aluminum into its Detroit warehouses at an
historic rate, resulting in Metro’s expanding its Detroit operations, building the largest aluminum
stockpile in the United States, and constructing a near monopoly of the U.S. LME aluminum
storage market. The unprecedented warehouse queues that were developed at Metro’s Detroit
warehouses forced metal owners to wait months, a year, or at one point nearly two years to get
their metal out of storage.
Storing an Aluminum Glut. Beginning in 2008, the financial crisis led to an
unprecedented increase in the aluminum inventories at LME-approved warehouses, as industrial
demand for the metal plummeted and metal owners sought to sell or store their excess stocks.
1103
As reflected in the graph below, between the end of J anuary 2008 and the end of February 2010,
global stocks of LME-warranted aluminum more than quadrupled, from less than 1 million to
more than 4.5 million metric tons.
1104
Inventories of LME-warranted aluminum in the United
States alone saw a similar dramatic increase, from less than 400,000 to nearly 2.1 million metric
tons over the same period.
1105
1101
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014). Approval was required, for example, for each
of the six merry-go-round deals described below.
1102
7/31/2013 “LME Warehousing and Aluminum,” Goldman Sachs website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-r...hive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-31-
13.html.
1103
See, e.g., 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 20,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1104
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
1105
Id.
187
Source: Prepared by the Subcommittee using information provided by Novelis. See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-
06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
Metro was a prime beneficiary of the increasing aluminum stockpiles. Whereas in
J anuary 2008, less than 400,000 metric tons of LME warranted aluminum were in storage in the
entire United States,
1106
by the end of February 2010, Metro’s Detroit warehouses alone were
storing about 915,000 metric tons.
1107
Over the next two years, Metro’s Detroit aluminum stocks
continued to grow, reaching about 1 million metric tons in J anuary 2011, and about 1.4 million
metric tons by February 2012.
1108
A year later in 2013, they remained at nearly 1.4 million
metric tons
1109
and, by February 2014, Metro’s Detroit aluminum stocks stayed steady about 1.5
million metric tons, nearly all of which was on LME warrant.
1110
1106
Id.
1107
See 3/11/2010 “MITSI Holdings LLC[:] Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman
(hereinafter “3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting”), GSPSICOMMODS00009519 - 542, at 534.
1108
See 2/15/2011 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009492 - 505, at 500 (hereinafter “2/2011 MITSI Board Meeting”); 3/21/2012 “MITSI
Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009423 - 449,
at 429.
1109
See 3/26/2013 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009355, at 360, 363.
1110
See 3/24/2014“MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009268, at 273, 276.
0.00
1,000,000.00
2,000,000.00
3,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
6,000,000.00
M
e
t
r
i
c
T
o
n
s
Gl obal LME Al umi num St ock s
188
Its increased aluminum inventories were accompanied by significant gains in Metro’s
share of the U.S. LME aluminum storage market. According to internal materials provided to
Metro’s Board of Directors, in early 2012, Metro’s share of the U.S. LME aluminum storage
market stood at 70%.
1111
By February 2013, it topped 78%.
1112
A year later, in 2014, the
company’s share of the U.S. LME aluminum storage market exceeded 85%.
1113
To accommodate the increased aluminum inflows, Metro expanded its operations in
Detroit, tripling the number of its warehouses from about 9 or 10 in 2010, to nearly 30 in
2014.
1114
Paying Freight Incentives. Metro’s near-monopoly of the U.S. LME aluminum storage
market was built on the aluminum stored in its Detroit warehouses. In J anuary 2008, only
52,000 metric tons of LME-warranted aluminum was stored in LME-approved warehouses in
Detroit; by February 2014 Metro’s Detroit warehouses had more than 1.5 million metric tons,
1115
an astounding increase. According to the LME, “revenues generated by large stocks allowed
warehouses to offer incentives to attract more metal and this exacerbated the problem.”
1116
In
other words, the more metal Metro had, the more rent it received, and the more incentives it
could afford to pay.
Metro’s increasing budget allocation for aluminum freight incentives supports that
analysis. In early 2010, just after Goldman acquired the company, Metro paid nearly $37 million
in freight incentives to attract aluminum to its warehouses.
1117
That figure doubled in one year
to nearly $79 million in 2011, grew to nearly $103 million in 2012, and reached nearly $129
million in 2013, an increase of nearly 350% over four years.
1118
The rapid increase in freight payments took place with the knowledge and approval of the
Goldman employees sitting on Metro’s Board of Directors. The freight incentive payment
amounts were a regular part of the business review conducted by the Metro Board, using figures
supplied by Metro management. In fact, in the very first Board meeting conducted after
Goldman’s acquisition of Metro, the new Board of Directors, comprised of exclusively Goldman
employees, discussed freight incentives as a factor that would affect the company’s monthly cash
requirements.
1119
1111
3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 431.
1112
3/26/2013 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009355, at 360, 363.
1113
3/24/2014 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009268, at 273, 276.
1114
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1115
See undated Novelis internal data, prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001; 3/24/2014 MITSI Holdings
LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009268, at 273.
1116
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 24,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1117
See 9/17/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-15-000001 - 007, at 006
(Exhibit A).
1118
Id.
1119
See 3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009519, at 530.
189
The growth in incentive payments was controversial, since it resulted in Metro’s affecting
the flow of physical aluminum in the U.S. marketplace.
1120
In October 2012, a coalition of large
aluminum users wrote to the LME complaining about “distortions” in the aluminum market,
including warehouse incentives that “lure[d] metal away from the physical market” and
contributed to increases in the Midwest Premium.
1121
J orge Vazquez, a leading aluminum
analyst, told the Subcommittee that while warehouse incentives have long been part of the
aluminum market, it was a completely new phenomenon to have a warehouse company, in this
case Metro, capture a critical mass of aluminum, use rent revenues from that critical mass to
increase its incentive payments, and outbid others in the market for aluminum.
1122
Warning Against Exceptional Inducements. The LME warehousing agreement, which
sets the rules by which LME warehouses operate, warns against “artificially” affecting the metals
markets by “Warehouses giving exceptional inducements”:
“[T]the proper functioning of the market through the liquidity and elasticity of stocks of
metal under Warrant should not be artificially or otherwise constrained by Warehouses
giving exceptional inducements or imposing unreasonable charges for depositing or
withdrawing metals, nor by Warehouses delaying unreasonably the receipt or dispatch of
metal, save where unavoidable due to force majeure.”
1123
The LME’s warehousing agreement has long provided the LME with authority to
investigate all charges levied. Since April 2014, it has also had the right to compel warehouse
companies to provide information about their activities, “including, without limitation, details of
all inducements paid to attract the load-in of metal and details of the provenance of loaded-in
metal, including information about metal which may have been previously in that Warehouse, or
in another facility operated by the same Warehouse or member of the Warehouse’s group.”
1124
In addition, under the agreement, the LME can “impose additional load-out requirements on a
Warehouse which the Exchange considers to have intentionally created or caused, or attempted
to create or cause, a queue by the use of inducements or any other method.”
1125
The LME’s authority to investigate and impose additional load-out requirements on
warehouses that intentionally create queues is designed to detect and prevent unfair warehouse
practices.
1126
In 2013, the LME stated in a report that warehouse inducements were “possibly[]
1120
Warehouses offering incentives directly compete against buyers offering more than the LME price to aluminum
sellers. As the LME put it, “[t]he warehouse incentive often underpins the willingness of merchants to bid a
premium for producers’ excess metal.” 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,”
prepared by LME, at 27,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf
1121
See 10/29/2012 letter from Aluminum Users Group to the London Metal Exchange, PSI-AlumUsersGroup-01-
000010.
1122
Subcommittee interview of J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
1123
4/1/2014 “Terms and conditions applicable to all LME listed warehouse companies,” prepared by LME, at
Clause 9.3.1, LME_PSI0001406.
1124
Id. at Clause 9.3.3 - 9.3.4.
1125
Id.
1126
The LME’s powers to investigate and take inforcemant actions related to inducements may be limited.
However, the LME has introduced amendments to its warehousing agreement that may enhance its powers,
including by providing the LME with the power to compel warehouses to provide details of the inducements they
190
relatively commonplace,” but it had “not historically had cause to investigate” them.
1127
In
December 2013, however, as discussed in more detail below, the LME opened an investigation
into the inducements paid by Metro related to aluminum.
1128
The investigation included
examining the freight incentives Metro paid to attract metal owners whose aluminum was already
stored within its Detroit warehouses.
1129
(d) Paying Incentives to Retain Existing Aluminum
Under Goldman’s ownership, Metro’s efforts to build aluminum stocks in its Detroit
warehouses using incentives were not limited to offering freight incentives to attract so-called
“free metal” from outside its warehouses. Metro also offered millions of dollars in incentives to
a few large metal owners whose aluminum was already stored inside the Metro warehouse
system. Most of those transactions involved Metro paying millions of dollars in incentives for a
financial firm to cancel its warrants on metal held in Metro warehouses; join the queue to exit the
Metro warehouse system; upon reaching the head of the queue, load out the metal from one
Metro warehouse and re-load it into another Metro warehouse nearby; and later re-warrant the
aluminum. Those “merry-go-round” deals resulted, not only in Metro’s retaining the metal
inside its system, but also in lengthening its load-out queue and essentially blocking other metal
owners from exiting Metro warehouses. When asked to identify all of these types of deals,
Goldman identified six involving over 600,000 metric tons of aluminum.
1130
Metro also saw four large proprietary aluminum cancellations involving about 500,000
metric tons of aluminum held by Goldman or J PMorgan whose warrant cancellations further
lengthened the Detroit warehouse queue. In addition, Metro disclosed 13 transactions in which it
received “break fees” from metal owners who withdrew aluminum from its U.S. warehouses
earlier than planned and where the amount of those fees was linked to the Midwest Premium
price. By obtaining fees linked to a rising Midwest Premium, Metro could potentially benefit
financially in still another way from maintaining a long queue.
pay, and the LME may impose additional load-out requirements on warehouses that it determines have intentionally
created or caused or attempted to creat or cause, a queue by the use of inducements or any other method. 11/7/2014,
“Consultation on Changed to the Warehouse Agreement,” prepared by LME,https://www.lme.com/~/media/files/notices/2014/2014_11/14%20319%20w149%20consultation%20on%20changes
%20to%20the%20warehouse%20agreement.pdf.
1127
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 55,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf. See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-
md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York), Declaration of Mark Bradley in Support of the London Metal Exchange’s
Motion to Dismiss All Complaints (5/23/2014), LME_PSI0000696, at 700 (representatives of both Metro and
Pacorini, the companies that own warehouses with significant queues, sit on the LME’s Warehousing Committee).
1128
12/4/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046656 [sealed exhibit].
1129
12/6/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046658 [sealed exhibit]; 3/10/2014 letter from LME
to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046827 [sealed exhibit].
1130
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon, (10/14/2014); 10/22/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-22-000001. As discussed below, one of the six deals involved warrants that had
already been cancelled and were already in the queue to exit the warehouse. In that deal, Metro paid incentives for
the owner to stay in the queue, load out its metal from one Metro warehouse into another, and place the metal on
warrant.
191
Lengthening the Queue and Blocking the Exits. Warehouse income depends upon the
rent and other fees paid by metal owners storing metal. Warehouses that pay freight incentives
to attract aluminum can offset that cost through higher rents, longer rental periods, or additional
fees. A warehouse queue, which requires metal owners to wait in line – paying rent until they
exit – offers one way to boost rental income. If the metal owner at the head of the queue has a
large amount of metal, it may take weeks or months to load it out, essentially blocking the exits
for other metal owners still waiting in line and paying rent.
A queue forms when metal owners cancel their warrants and seek to load out their metal
from a warehouse at a rate that exceeds the LME’s daily warehouse load-out requirement. The
LME specifies the minimum amount of metal that a warehouse must load-out each day.
Between 2003 and 2011, the LME’s minimum load-out rate was 1,500 metric tons per day for
the largest LME warehouses, such as Metro’s Detroit warehouses.
1131
In April 2012, the LME
increased that number to a rate ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 metric tons a day, depending upon a
warehouse’s closing stock level.
1132
In November 2013, the LME adopted a rule that would
have linked a warehouse’s load-in rate to its load-out rate as of April 2014, but the rule was
subjected to a court challenge.
1133
Metro nevertheless began voluntarily complying with the new
rule in April.
1134
After the court challenge failed, the LME announced on October 27, 2014, that
it would proceed with the rule.
1135
The new rule provides that, as of February 2015, a warehouse
which has a queue over 50 days and which continues to load in metal, will be subject to
additional load-out requirements aimed at reducing the queue and preventing new queues from
forming in the future.
1136
Together, the LME’s rules create a minimum daily load out rate for LME-approved
warehouses; they do not place any cap on the amount of metal that may be loaded out each day.
A warehouse may always load out more than the specified minimum. According to Goldman,
however, while the LME sets a minimum rather than maximum daily rate, “it is well understood
by market participants that LME warehouses have an incentive to maximize inventory and rent
and are likely to deliver metal at the minimum load-out rate.”
1137
Despite the emergence of long
1131
See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York),
Opinion and Order (4/11/2014), at LME_PSI0001137 - 167, at 149; Undated “Europe-Economics Analysis
Conducted for the LME,” Executive Summary, at 1, LME website,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Studies/Warehouse%20minimum%20loading%20out%20rates/E
urope%20Economics-Summary.pdf.
1132
See 11/17/2011, “Changes to LME Policy for Approval of Warehouses in Relation to Loading Out Rates –
Result of Consultation With Warehouse Companies,” prepared by LME, LME_PSI0001085 - 089.
1133
11/10/2014 email from LME to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-06-000001 - 003, at 002.
1134
Id.
1135
11/10/2014 email from LME to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-06-000001 - 003, at 002.
1136
LME Policy Regarding the Approval of Warehouses, Revised 1 February 2015, LME, LME_PSI0002257 -
2278. The new rule does not address the issue of whether numerous warehouses may share a single load-out queue,
nor does it make any determinations on the appropriateness of the incentives and penalties that contributed to the
queue at Metro.
1137
See 8/6/2013 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Reputational Risk Questions MITSI Holdings LLC,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700124 - 150, at 129.
192
queues under Goldman’s ownership, Metro has largely continued the practice of loading out
aluminum at, and not above, the LME’s minimum daily rate.
1138
In addition, the LME does not require Metro to apply the minimum load out rate to each
one of its warehouses, but rather allows Metro to apply the load-out rate on a collective basis, to
all of Metro’s warehouses in the Detroit area as a whole. As a result, Metro has combined all of
its Detroit warehouses into a single warehouse system for purposes of the LME minimum load-
out rate, created a single exit queue for the entire system, and generally allowed metal to exit the
system at, but not above, the LME minimum daily rate.
1139
Metal owners who get to the head of
the Metro Detroit queue typically use all of the available exit “slots” to load out their metal, so
that no one else can load out metal at the same time.
Goldman and Metro’s use of the LME load-out rate as a maximum rather than minimum
load-out rate has been targeted as an abusive practice in over a dozen class action suits.
1140
At a
2013 Senate hearing, one commercial aluminum user had this to say:
“[W]hat’s happening is that the aluminum we are purchasing is being held up in
warehouses controlled and owned by U.S. bank holding companies, who are members of
the LME, and set the rules for their own warehouses. These bank holding companies are
slowing the load-out of physical aluminum from these warehouses to ensure that they
receive increased rent for an extended period time. Aluminum users like MillerCoors are
being forced to wait in some cases over 18 months to take physical delivery due to the
LME warehouse practices or pay the high physical premium to get aluminum today. This
does not happen with any of the other commodities we purchase. When we buy barley
we receive prompt delivery, the same with corn, natural gas and other commodities. It is
only with aluminum purchased through the LME that our property is held for an
extraordinary period of time, with the penalty of paying additional rent and premiums to
the warehouse owners, until we get access to the metal we have purchased.”
1141
The LME told the Subcommittee that it did not maintain records of queues before 2010,
but the view of its personnel was that any queues that may have existed prior to that year were
“short-lived” and the result of inclement weather or other discreet events such as a labor
strike.
1142
That changed in 2010, the same year Goldman purchased Metro.
1138
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S.Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager,
Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 3 - 4,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-
113shrg82568.htm.
1139
Subcommittee interview of Leo Prichard (10/6/2014).
1140
See In Re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121435 (USDC
SDNY)(8/29/2014)(describing allegations contained in multiple the class action lawsuit complaints).
1141
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S.Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager,
Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 3 - 4,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-
113shrg82568.htm.
1142
9/5/2014 letter from The London Metal Exchange to Subcommittee, LME_PSI0000001 - 004, at 002.
193
Beginning in 2010, as reflected in the graph below, Metro’s Detroit warehouses
developed a queue which, overall, grew longer and longer each year.
1143
In March 2010, just
after Goldman purchased Metro, the Detroit warehouses had a queue that was slightly more than
40 days.
1144
A year later, in March 2011, the Detroit queue had more than tripled, exceeding 150
days.
1145
By March 2012, it had doubled again, to nearly 300 days.
1146
The queue passed 500
days in October 2013, and 600 days two months later.
1147
In May 2014, the queue to get
aluminum out of Metro’s Detroit warehouses reached a stunning 674 days.
1148
That meant an
aluminum owner seeking to remove its aluminum from the Detroit warehouses would have to
wait in line – paying rent – for almost two years.
Source: Prepared by the Subcommittee using information provided by Harbor Aluminum. See undated
“HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs HARBOR's MW
Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
Large aluminum users have denounced the Detroit queue as unreasonable and damaging
to aluminum markets, and have called the LME’s current warehousing system “dysfunctional
and prone to manipulation.”
1149
In addition, as described above, the increases in the Metro
1143
The queue length records were compiled by Harbor Aluminum using LME records, and produced to the
Subcommittee. See “HARBOR’s estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses,”
prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1144
Id.
1145
Id.
1146
Id.
1147
Id.
1148
Id.
1149
9/9/2013 letter from Aluminum Users Group to LME, “13/208:A201;W076,” PSI-AlumUsersGroup-01-000002,
at 004.
194
Detroit queue were highly correlated with increases in the aluminum Midwest Premium over the
same time period which, in turn, became a growing component of the all-in price of aluminum.
Some industrial aluminum users have charged that the longer queues led to higher Midwest
Premium prices, costing their companies millions of dollars.
1150
More broadly, one aluminum
user, MillerCoors, estimated that the dysfunctional aluminum market had imposed an estimated
“additional $3 billion expense on companies that purchase aluminum.”
1151
While long queues
and increasing Midwest Premium prices were hurting aluminum users, the LME has said that the
emergence of increasing premiums “convey[ed] an advantage to the expertise of merchants and
brokers, who have built-up strong modelling capabilities around premiums and queues.”
1152
In
addition, as described earlier, at the same time Goldman was approving Metro practices that
lengthened its queue, it was ramping up its own aluminum trading operations.
Driving the Queue Length. The Subcommittee investigation found that a significant
contributor to the Detroit queue length was a number of large warrant cancellations by a small
group of financial institutions, including Deutsche Bank; Red Kite, a London hedge fund;
Glencore, a commodities trading firm based in Switzerland; J PMorgan; and Goldman. Deutsche
Bank, Red Kite, and Glencore were all involved in “merry-go-round” deals in which aluminum
was loaded out of one Metro warehouse and loaded into another. The cancellations involving
J PMorgan and Goldman involved metal that they held for themselves. Each of the five financial
firms cancelled 100,000 metric tons or more, an amount that would have been unprecedented for
Metro’s Detroit warehouses just a few years earlier.
Merry-Go-Round Deals. Metro’s merry-go-round deals took place in 2010, 2012, and
2013. According to a Metro executive, the deals began in the summer of 2010, just a few
months after Goldman acquired Metro, when Metro became concerned that owners of aluminum
in its warehouses were removing the metal from its warehouses and storing it elsewhere, leading
to a loss of revenue.
1153
In an effort to curb that loss, Metro executives and the Metro Board of
Directors, composed exclusively of Goldman employees, made a strategic decision to – for the
first time – “market” Metro incentives to metal owners that already had metal stored in Metro’s
warehouses.
1154
Ultimately, those efforts led to at least six deals with three customers: Deutsche Bank,
Red Kite, and Glencore.
1155
Although each deal involved millions of dollars, none was
1150
“Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals,
MillerCoors LLC, at 9,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm.
1151
Id., prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 4.
1152
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 29,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1153
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1154
Id.
1155
Subcommittee interviews of J acques Gabillon, (10/14/2014) and Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014). See also
10/22/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-22-000001.
195
formalized in a signed contract.
1156
Instead, details were spelled out in an unsigned contract,
emails, and invoices.
1157
In each deal, Metro provided financial incentives to the owner of the aluminum stored in
its warehouses to: (1) wait in the queue; (2) upon reaching the head of the queue, load out its
metal from a Metro warehouse; (3) deliver the metal to another nearby Metro warehouse; and (4)
warrant the metal while in the second Metro warehouse. Each deal led to aluminum being
loaded out of one Metro warehouse in Detroit and loaded right back into another, a practice that
one Metro forklift operator later told the New York Times amounted to a “merry-go-round of
metal.”
1158
Because Metro used a single exit queue for all of its Detroit warehouses combined, when
a warehouse client in a merry-go-round deal got to the head of the queue and started loading out
metal, that client essentially blocked the exits for any other metal owner seeking to leave the
Metro Detroit warehouse system. In addition, instead of 1,500 or 3,000 metric tons of aluminum
leaving the Metro warehouse system each day as envisioned by the LME’s daily minimum load
out requirement, in the merry-go-round deals, the aluminum that left the Detroit warehouses
nearly all came right back into the Metro warehouse system.
1159
The net impact for Metro was
that, each day in which the front of the queue was occupied by a metal owner executing a merry-
go-round deal, its warehouses lost virtually no metal. At the same time, the merry-go-round
deals made money for Metro, not only by preventing the loss of metal, but also by helping to
lengthen the Detroit queue, extending the period during which other metal owners had to pay
rent to Metro.
Increases in the Detroit queue length were highly correlated with increases in the
Midwest Premium, which ultimately affected the entire aluminum market. Goldman, through its
employees on the Metro Board of Directors, reviewed and approved each of the merry-go-round
deals that lengthened the queue, and throughout the years in which the merry-go-round
transactions took place, Goldman actively traded aluminum.
(i) Deutsche Bank Merry-Go-Round Deal
Goldman acquired Metro in February 2010, and Metro conducted its first merry-go-round
deal in September 2010, with DB Energy Trading, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank.
1160
It
involved 100,000 metric tons of aluminum, most of which was loaded out of one Metro
warehouse and immediately loaded into another. The transaction was not suggested by Deutsche
Bank, but by Metro personnel, and reviewed and approved by Metro senior executives and the
1156
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1157
See, e.g., Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro (6/21/2013), GSPSICOMMODS00046873; Red Kite Master Fund Ltd.
invoice to Metro (11/13/2012), GSPSICOMMODS00046876.
1158
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014); “A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure Gold,”
New York Times, David Kocieniewski,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-
to-banks-pure-gold.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
1159
The vast majority of the metal that came back into a Metro warehouse was ultimately placed back on warrant,
while, as of earlier this year, a fraction of it had not been placed on warrant.
1160
9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
196
Metro Board of Directors’ Commercial Decisions Subcommittee, composed exclusively of
Goldman employees.
1161
According to Deutsche Bank, the 100,000 metric tons of aluminum at issue was held by
Deutsche Bank for its own account as part of a so-called “cash and carry” trade.
1162
Consistent
with its general practice, Deutsche Bank entered into negotiations with Metro’s agent seeking
discounted rent.
1163
According to Deutsche Bank, Metro declined to provide the discounted rent
directly, but suggested instead that Deutsche Bank move the metal to a cheaper off-warrant
storage site at other Metro warehouses.
1164
According to Deutsche Bank, Metro proposed that
Deutsche Bank cancel the warrants for the aluminum stored in the LME-approved warehouses,
wait in the queue to load out the metal, transport the aluminum to other Metro warehouses, and
after a period of less expensive or free rent, re-warrant the metal.
1165
While both Deutsche Bank and Metro have acknowledged to the Subcommittee that the
proposed transaction did, in fact, occur, no formal written contract was signed by both parties.
Instead, the terms of the agreement were spelled out in a contract that was signed by Deutsche
Bank employees,
1166
but which Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman told the Subcommittee was
never signed by Metro.
1167
The Subcommittee understands that an agreement was nevertheless
reached generally in line with the terms of the contract signed by Deutsche Bank.
The agreement involved Deutsche Bank cancelling warrants associated with 100,000
metric tons of aluminum stored in Metro’s Detroit warehouses, requesting “the maximum
number of [load-out] Slots” in the queue, loading the metal out of the warehouses, and
transporting the metal to other Metro warehouses in Detroit.
1168
By requesting the “maximum
number of Slots,” Deutsche Bank essentially ensured that the aluminum in the deal would fill
Metro’s load-out requirement from the day the first lot of Deutsche Bank metal reached the front
of the queue until all of its aluminum was loaded out, which would take more than 65 business
days at the minimum load out rate of, then, 1,500 metric tons per day. The agreement also
1161
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1162
Subcommittee briefing by Deutsche Bank legal counsel (10/22/2014). A “cash and carry” trade occurs when a
trader buys physical metal, often through LME warrants, and enters into a forward contract to sell the metal at a
specified price on a specified date in the future. The trader seeks to set a price in the forward contract that will
exceed the cost of storing, insuring, and financing the purchase of the metal during the period until the sale is
executed. The prolonged “contango” in the aluminum market during 2011 and 2012, in which future aluminum
prices were higher than current prices, made these types of trades profitable. Banks and their holding companies,
with access to low-cost financing, increasingly entered into cash and carry trades. For more information on these
trades, see, e.g., “Aluminum Premiums Seen by Rusal Exceeding 500 on Demand,” Bloomberg, Agnieszka
Troszkiewicz (6/3/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-03/aluminum-premiums-seen-by-rusal-
exceeding-500-on-demand.html; 11/7/2014 email form Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-
000001 - 003, at 002.
1163
11/7/2014 email from Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-000001 - 003, at 002.
1164
Subcommittee briefing with Deutsche Bank legal counsel (10/22/2014).
1165
Id.
1166
See 9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
1167
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1168
9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
197
involved Metro capping Deutsche Bank’s rent while its aluminum was in the queue waiting to be
loaded out.
1169
According to the unsigned contract, Deutsche Bank was responsible for paying $42.95
per metric ton in costs to move the metal from one Metro warehouse to another. However, the
contract also contained a provision in which Metro committed to pay the bank the same amount,
$42.95, for every metric ton of metal that was subsequently re-warranted and stored at a Metro
warehouse. The effect was to offset Deutsche Bank’s costs so long as its aluminum was re-
warranted and stored in another Metro warehouse, essentially enabling Deutsche Bank to move
its metal to the new location for free.
1170
In addition, according to Deutsche Bank, Metro then
provided the bank with discounts equal to “roughly 15 cents/ton/day for the period from
September 15, 2010 to February 16, 2011,” a substantial savings.
1171
Finally, the agreement imposed a substantial penalty on Deutsche Bank if it elected to do
anything other than re-load the aluminum into a new Metro Detroit warehouse and re-warrant it.
The agreement provided that, if Deutsche Bank sold the metal to a third party at any point during
the five months covered by the deal, it would have to pay Metro a fee of $65 per metric ton, or
about $6.5 million for 100,000 metric tons of aluminum.
1172
The agreement essentially provided Deutsche Bank with the rent discount it had sought,
but instead of applying the discount in a straightforward manner to the aluminum already stored
in a Metro warehouse – a discount permissible under LME rules – Metro required Deutsche
Bank to cancel its warrants, join the queue, leave the warehouse, and move its metal to a new
Metro warehouse. The question is why Metro imposed that merry-go-round process as the
condition for Deutsche Bank’s rent discount.
There appears to have been no logistical reason to move the metal outside of the LME-
approved storage space. None of the Metro Board of Directors presentations from that period
discuss a shortage of LME-approved storage space. To the contrary, they show LME inventory
levels in Detroit dropping immediately following the deal.
1173
Further, Metro CEO Christopher
Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that he was not aware of any shortage of LME-storage
capacity in Metro’s Detroit facilities at that time.
1174
The most immediate consequence of the transaction was Deutsche Bank’s cancellation of
warrants on 100,000 metric tons of aluminum, which immediately contributed to the queue at the
Detroit warehouses. On September 15, 2010, there was a short queue in Detroit of about 20
days.
1175
One week later, on September 22, 2010, a few days after Deutsche Bank cancelled the
1169
Id.
1170
As stated by Deutsche Bank’s legal counsel, “the net cost to Deutsche Bank of moving this metal was zero.”
11/7/2014 email from Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-000001 - 003, at 002.
1171
Id.
1172
9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
1173
See, e.g., 11/15/2010 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009559 - 574, at 566.
1174
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1175
See undated “HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs
HARBOR's MW Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
198
warrants, Metro had a queue of nearly 120 days, a significant portion of which was attributable
to the bank’s warrant cancellation.
1176
The presence of that nearly 120-day queue meant that any
metal owner that cancelled warrants after September 22, 2010, would not only have to wait
behind Deutsche Bank for their metal to be loaded out of the warehouse, but would also have to
pay rent to Metro while waiting.
Of the original 100,000 metric tons of aluminum subject to the deal, approximately
70,000 metric tons left one Metro warehouse for another Metro warehouse in Detroit, and were
then re-warranted.
1177
The remaining 30,000 metric tons were placed back on warrant before
they were actually loaded out.
1178
Thus, in the end, all 100,000 metric tons were back on warrant
at Metro at the end of the deal. The re-warranting of that metal ensured that if Deutsche Bank
wanted to exit the Metro warehouse system in the future, it would have to rejoin the queue once
more before it could take possession of its aluminum.
Expressing Concerns. Metro’s merry-go-round transaction with Deutsche Bank raised
concerns with at least one senior Metro executive. In early December 2010, Mark Askew,
Metro’s Vice President of Marketing, sent an email to Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman
expressing concerns about the Deutsche Bank deal.
1179
Mr. Askew relayed that a customer had
“asked about rumours they’d heard on 100 k cancellation in Sep[tember] that we were blocking
others.”
1180
The only 100,000 metric ton cancellation in September at Metro was the one
involving Deutsche Bank. The rumor, as relayed by Mr. Askew, focused explicitly on whether
Metro was “blocking others.”
Mr. Askew’s email also expressed his own concern about the transaction: “I remain
concerned, as I have expressed from [the] start, regarding ‘Q management’ etc (esp in light of
conversation Michael said he had with Paco on the same a few weeks back).”
1181
Mr.
Wibbelman explained to the Subcommittee that Mr. Askew had “never liked the idea” of
offering financial incentives to existing Metro customers.
1182
Mr. Wibbelman denied that the
Deutsche Bank deal was designed to help put a queue in place to block other clients from quickly
leaving the Detroit warehouses.
1183
As explained earlier, the longer Metro Detroit warehouse queue had two immediate
consequences. It forced other metal owners to wait in line before they could exit and pay rent to
Metro while waiting. In addition, the longer queue was highly correlated with higher Midwest
Premiums which, according to some experts and industrial users, increased the all-in price for
1176
Id.
1177
11/7/2014 email from Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-000001 - 003
1178
Id.
1179
12/4/2010 email from Mark Askew, Metro, to Christopher Wibbelman, Metro (12/4/2010),
GSPSICOMMODS000047422.
1180
Id.
1181
Id. The Subcommittee was told that “Paco” referred to a competitor, Pacorini Metals, which operated a metals
warehouse in Vlissingen, Netherlands, which was also developing an unprecedented queue. Subcommittee
interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014).
1182
Id. Mr. Wibbelman further told the Subcommittee that he believed that part of Mr. Askew’s dislike of the deals
was that Mr. Askew was not a part of them and was not compensated for them as a salesperson. Id.
1183
Id.
199
aluminum. Higher aluminum prices increased the value of aluminum stockpiles and could also
be used to benefit trading activities in the aluminum market.
(ii) Four Red Kite Merry-Go-Round Deals
Metro conducted four merry-go-round deals with Red Kite, a London-based hedge fund
that is active in the physical commodities markets. In each of the years 2011, 2012, and 2013,
Red Kite, through either Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. or Red Kite Management Ltd., was one of
Metro’s top ten customers.
1184
The four merry-go-round deals all took place in 2012, and
involved a total of nearly 440,000 metric tons of aluminum.
1185
Approximately 410,000 metric
tons were loaded out of Metro warehouses and right back into other Metro warehouses.
1186
Because a small amount of metal never left Metro, a total of nearly 95% of the nearly 440,000
metric tons of aluminum either never left Metro or was loaded out of Metro only to be loaded
back in to Metro warehouses. Each of the four Red Kite deals, like the Deutsche Bank deal, was
reviewed and approved by Metro senior executives and the Goldman employees on the Metro
Board’s Commercial Decisions Subcommittee.
1187
First Three Red Kite Deals. The first three deals with Red Kite took place from
J anuary through March of 2012. In those transactions, Metro offered financial incentives for
Red Kite to cancel warrants on a combined total of 250,000 metric tons of aluminum, wait in
line, load out the metal from Metro warehouses, load it back into other Metro warehouses, and
re-warrant the metal.
1188
The incentives offered by Metro included: (1) paying a “day one” cash
incentive to the metal owner when the metal warrants were cancelled,
1189
(2) offering a period of
free rent, and (3) paying another cash incentive for re-warranting.
1190
As in the Deutsche Bank
deal, each transaction required Red Kite to pay a substantial cash penalty to Metro if Red Kite
did anything other than re-load the metal into a Metro warehouse and re-warrant it.
1191
The
terms for all three deals, each of which involved millions of dollars, were set out, not in formal
signed contracts, but in emails and invoices.
1192
Expressing Additional Concerns. Around the same time that Metro entered into the
first of the series of Red Kite deals, in February 2012, the Metro Vice President of Marketing,
Mark Askew, sent an email to Michael Whelan, Metro’s Vice President of Business
1184
See 10/20/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, GSPSICOMMODS00047431 - 432.
1185
See 12/19/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009332 - 354, at 348 (indicating a combined total of 410,000 metric tons, which later
increased by another 30,000 metric tons, when the final deal rose from 160,000 to nearly 190,000 warrants).
1186
Id.
1187
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1188
See 3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 437.
1189
This incentive may have been intended to off-set fees associated with the subsequent loading out of metal.
1190
3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 437.
1191
Id.
1192
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
200
Development, copying Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman and Metro Chief Operating Officer
Leo Prichard, again expressing concerns about engaging in “queue management.”
1193
Neither Mr. Wibbelman nor Mr. Prichard responded.
1194
Mr. Whelan responded to Mr.
Askew’s email by defending the transaction:
“[W]e are not participating in queue management. We have done an off warrant storage
deal with a customer who was going to remove the metal and place [it] in an off warrant
warehouse. We were able to provide an off-warrant storage option and make a
commercial deal that doesn’t in any way violate the rules of the LME.”
1195
While Mr. Whelan’s email described the Red Kite deal as “off warrant storage,” all of the
250,000 metric tons of metal involved in the first three deals were subsequently re-warranted.
1196
So were the approximately 160,000 tons of aluminum moved to new Metro warehouses in the
fourth and final deal. In addition, while Mr. Whelan stated that the merry-go-round transactions
did not violate LME rules, Metro told the Subcommittee it had never actually consulted with the
LME to obtain its view of the deals.
1197
Although Mr. Askew’s concerns about how the queue was being managed were directly
communicated in writing to senior Metro employees on two occasions, J acques Gabillon,
Chairman of the Metro Board of Directors, told the Subcommittee that he was not aware of
them.
1198
While the deals themselves were discussed at Metro’s Board meetings, Mr. Askew’s
concerns appear to have not been.
1199
Minutes from a March 2012 Metro Board meeting where
the “off-warrant deals” were discussed, for example, do not mention Mr. Askew’s concerns or
indicate any discussion of whether the deal was appropriate or consistent with LME rules.
1200
Mr. Askew’s earlier email raised the issue of whether the merry-go-round deals were
being used for “blocking others” – preventing metal owners from gaining possession of their
stored metal within a reasonable period of time. The deals also created a false impression that
metal was leaving the Metro system when, in fact, the metal was simply being moved around.
Another concern is that the merry-go-round deals contributed to a longer warehouse queue
which, in turn, was highly correlated with higher Midwest Premium prices, leading to charges by
industrial users that the queues were distorting the aluminum market and increasing aluminum
1193
2/25/2012 email from Mark Askew, Metro, to Michael Whelan, Leo Prichard and Christopher Wibbelman,
Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00047422, at 423.
1194
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1195
2/25/2012 email from Michael Whelan, Metro, to Mark Askew, Leo Prichard and Christopher Wibbelman,
Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00047422, at 423.
1196
See 12/19/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009332, at 348.
1197
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014) and J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014). As
discussed below, without commenting specifically about Metro, the LME told the Subcommittee that “the LME
would view such behavior as a contravention of the "spirit" of the relevant requirements, it may be difficult to argue
that it constituted a contravention of the "letter" of those requirements.”
1198
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1199
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014) and J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1200
3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423.
201
costs for consumers. There is no record, however, of any of those problems being discussed at
Metro Board meetings at the time.
Fourth Red Kite Deal. After Mr. Askew’s email, Metro entered into a fourth merry-go-
round deal with Red Kite. That fourth and final deal between Red Kite and Metro was the
largest. On November 5, 2012, Metro’s warehouse manager emailed representatives of Red Kite
about a large amount of aluminum that Red Kite was then storing at Metro warehouses in
Detroit.
1201
The metal was being held in the name of Barclays Bank as part of a financing
agreement between the bank and Red Kite.
1202
When the Metro manager emailed Red Kite, the
aluminum was still under LME warrant in the Detroit warehouses.
1203
The Metro email contained terms for another merry-go-round deal under which Red Kite
was to “immediately” cancel warrants for 150,000 metric tons of metal,
1204
place the metal
“asap” in the Detroit queue and, upon reaching the front of the queue, load the metal out of one
Metro warehouse and into another Metro warehouse in the Detroit area.
1205
In exchange, Metro
agreed to pay Red Kite cash incentives totaling $196 per metric ton of metal that completed the
loop and was re-warranted.
1206
The cash incentives had two components. Like the previous Red Kite deals, Metro
promised to pay a “day one” incentive, in this case equal to $36 per metric ton, when Red Kite
cancelled the warrants.
1207
The deal provided a second cash incentive of $160 per metric ton
when the metal was re-warranted.
1208
Together, Red Kite would receive $36 per metric ton upon
cancellation and another $160 per metric ton upon re-warranting at other Metro warehouses, for
a combined cash incentive of $196 per metric ton.
1209
In addition, Metro committed to discount
the rent it would charge Red Kite at the new warehouse locations and, as in other deals, pay the
cost of shipping the metal from one warehouse to the other.
While Red Kite retained the right to either sell the metal when it reached the front of the
queue or move it to a warehouse company other than Metro, as before, the Metro agreement
1201
See 11/5/2012 email from Gabriella Vagnini, Metro, to Barry Feldman, Red Kite, GSPSICOMMODS00046684.
1202
See 9/26/2014 email from Barclays Capital Inc. to Subcommittee, “Barclays [BARC-AMER.FID670446],” PSI-
Barclays-02-000001.
1203
See 11/5/2012 email from Gabriella Vagnini, Metro, to Barry Feldman, Red Kite, GSPSICOMMODS00046684.
1204
Id. The total amount of aluminum in the transaction later increased to nearly 190,000 tons. 4/15/2012 Simmons
& Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850.
1205
11/5/2012 email from Gabriella Vagnini, Metro, to Barry Feldman, Red Kite, GSPSICOMMODS00046684.
1206
See 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850, at 854.
1207
See 3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 437. See also Red Kite Master Fund Limited invoice to Metro (11/13/2012),
GSPSICOMMODS00046876 (reflecting an amount of “USD 36.00 PMT”).
1208
See, e.g., 1/28/2014 Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046879 (reflecting an
amount of “USD 160.00 PMT”); 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A,
GSPSICOMMODS00046850, at 854.
1209
The “day one” incentive may have been intended to offset certain fees and costs associated with loading out the
metal.
202
imposed a penalty if Red Kite did so. Specifically, if Red Kite did not direct the metal back to
Metro warehouses, Red Kite would have to pay Metro a penalty of about $66 per metric ton.
1210
The transaction proposed by Metro involved tens of millions of dollars, but was never
formalized in a signed contract; the November 5 Metro email and a handful of invoices
1211
appear to be the only documentation of the details of the agreement.
1212
Red Kite started
cancelling its warrants just two days later, on November 7, 2012. Over the next six weeks, the
hedge fund continued to cancel warrants as the amount of aluminum included in the deal reached
nearly 190,000 metric tons.
1213
Prior to the deal, the queue in Detroit was just over 300 days
long.
1214
By the end of December, just after the last of Red Kite’s cancellations, the queue was
just under 500 days, with a significant portion of that increase attributable to Red Kite’s warrant
cancellations.
1215
In the end, of the nearly 190,000 metric tons covered by the fourth Red Kite merry-go-
round deal, about 182,000 metric tons were loaded out of Metro warehouses.
1216
Of that, about
160,000 metric tons simply went out of some Metro warehouses and back into other Metro
warehouses.
1217
Thus, nearly 90% of the metal shipped as pursuant to the deal went from Metro
right back to Metro. Metro records show that, pursuant to this deal, Metro arranged for more
than 4,300 truck shipments, moving the metal from some Metro warehouses to other Metro
warehouses in the Detroit area, at a cost of more than $1 million.
1218
That came on top of the
$26 million that Red Kite billed Metro for incentive payments under the deal.
1219
(iii) Glencore Merry-Go-Round Deal
In February 2013, Metro entered into the sixth and final merry-go-round deal disclosed
by Goldman. The deal was struck with Glencore, a Swiss company active in physical
commodity markets. The transaction involved Glencore’s loading out about 91,400 metric tons
of aluminum from Metro warehouses in Detroit, only to load the same amount into other Metro
1210
The $66 per ton fee represented the cost of the $36 prepaid incentive plus an additional $30 per ton. 4/15/2012
Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850, at 854.
1211
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014). See also, e.g., 11/13/2012 Red Kite Master
Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046876 (reflecting an amount of “USD 36.00 PMT”); 12/20/2012
Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046877; 1/28/2014 Red Kite Master Fund Ltd.
invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046878; 1/28/2014 Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS00046879 (reflecting an amount of “USD 160.00 PMT”).
1212
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014)
1213
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, at 4, GSPSICOMMODS00046850.
1214
See undated “HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs
HARBOR's MW Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
1215
Id..
1216
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850. The remaining
21,600 metric tons – totaling about 10% of the original deal amount – were shipped outside of the Metro warehouse
system, because Red Kite had sold the metal to a third party.
1217
The 21,600 tons were purchased from Red Kite and shipped to another warehouse. See 4/15/2012 Simmons &
Simmons letter to London Metal Exchange, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850.
1218
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, shipment spreadsheet, GSPSICOMMODS00046902.
1219
Id. at Invoice Summary, GSPSICOMMODS00046872.
203
warehouses nearby, and warranting the metal. Metro’s records reflect that all of the
approximately 90,000 metric tons simply shuffled between different Metro warehouses.
1220
The Glencore deal differed from Metro’s other merry-go-round agreements in that it did
not require Glencore to first cancel its warrants. That was because the company had already
cancelled the warrants, and the metal was already in the queue to exit Metro’s warehouses.
1221
Prior to execution of the deal, as with the other merry-go-round deals, the Glencore deal was
reviewed and approved by senior Metro executives and by the Metro Board’s Commercial
Decisions Subcommittee, composed exclusively of Goldman employees. In addition, it was
presented to the full Metro Board which, again, consisted solely of Goldman employees.
1222
According to Goldman, the Glencore deal the following components. The first
component, which covered about 50,000 metric tons of aluminum, was similar to past deals, in
that Metro agreed to pay a cash incentive, this time $198 per ton, for any metal that the company
subsequently re-warranted at a Metro warehouse.
1223
The second component involved two physical aluminum swaps. In the first swap, Metro
arranged for Glencore to receive 21,000 metric tons of aluminum free on truck (FOT) in
Baltimore from another metal owner, plus $15 per metric ton from Metro, in return for
Glencore’s delivering to that third party warrants for 21,000 metric tons in Detroit.
1224
Mr.
Wibbelman explained that Metro was able to help arrange the swap, because the owner of the
aluminum in Baltimore had previously committed to shipping more than that amount, which he
estimated at approximately 80,000 metric tons, to Metro.
1225
Mr. Wibbelman explained that
Metro simply asked the metal owner to replace the obligation to deliver 21,000 metric tons to
Metro with an obligation to deliver 21,000 metric tons to Glencore. The second swap involved
Metro’s arranging for Glencore to receive 20,000 metric tons of aluminum FOT in Mobile from
yet another metal owner, plus $20 per metric ton from Metro, in return for Glencore’s again
delivering to that third party warrants for 20,000 metric tons in Detroit.
1226
By engaging in this transaction, Glencore was able to obtain 41,000 metric tons of
aluminum from other warehouses, plus cash. Glencore told the Subcommittee that this
1220
However, according to Glencore, at least 70,000 metric tons was metal that had just previously been on-warrant
at Metro. 11/7/2014 email from Glencore to Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001, at 003. According to
Goldman and Glencore, the deal involved a warrant incentive for 50,000 metric tons, as well as two swaps, one for
20,000 metric tons and another for 21,000. In addition, according to Glencore there was another deal that involved a
separate warrant incentive for 25,000 to 75,000 additional metric tons. 11/7/2014 email from Glencore to
Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001 - 003, at 003.
1221
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850; 11/7/2014 email
from Glencore to Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001 - 003, at 002.
1222
See 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, at 6, GSPSICOMMODS00046839; 12/19/2012 “MITSI
Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009332 - 354,
at 348.
1223
See 6/21/2013 Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046873 (reflecting 50,046.872 metric tons
at $198 per metric ton); Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
1224
See 9/24/2013 Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046875 (reflecting 21,407.022 metric tons
at $15 per metric ton); Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
1225
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014).
1226
See 6/21/2013 Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046874 (reflecting 19,949.939 metric tons
at $20.15 per metric ton); Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
204
transaction also allowed Glencore to save on the costs on shipping metal from Detroit.
1227
According to Glencore, Metro was able to keep approximately 91,000 metric tons in its Detroit
warehouses on warrant, as well as save the costs of shipping 21,000 metric tons of metal to
Detroit from Baltimore.
1228
When the aluminum covered by the merry-go-round deal reached
the head of the queue, each day on which that metal was loaded out, Metro experienced no net
loss of metal, while other metal owners were effectively blocked from leaving the Metro
system.
1229
As a result of the deal, all 91,000 metric tons covered by the deal were subsequently
warranted.
1230
To execute the transaction, Metro arranged for more than 2,200 individual truck
shipments between Metro warehouses in the Detroit area and paid nearly $500,000 for those
shipments.
1231
In addition, a Metro invoice summary indicated that, as of March 2014, the
warehouse had been billed about $11 million by Glencore for the incentive payments under the
agreement.
1232
At about the time of this deal, Michael Whelan, who had taken the lead on this deal as
well as the other merry-go-round transactions, was promoted.
1233
After a more than a dozen
years at Metro, Mark Askew resigned.
1234
Transporting Merry-Go-Round Metal. When asked whether the merry-go-round deals
complied with LME rules, J acques Gabillon, Chairman of the Metro Board of Directors as well
as head of Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments group, told the Subcommittee
that they did.
1235
He stated that, if metal associated with cancelled warrants was loaded back into
the same warehouse from which it came, that would have violated an LME requirement that
precludes warehouses from counting metal that is off warrant but “still on the Warehouse’s
premises” toward their load-out obligations.
1236
But the LME rules did not preclude a warehouse
from loading out metal and then moving into a nearby warehouse belonging to the same
company, according to Mr. Gabillon.
1237
He told the Subcommittee that, to ensure no LME
1227
Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
1228
Id.
1229
While the deal did not involve new cancellations, and so did not, by itself, lengthen the queue, by remaining in
line, it blocked the exits and ensured that metal that would otherwise have been loaded out of Metro’s system stayed
within Metro.
1230
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850. According to
Glencore, approximately 71,000 metric tons of the metal that was ultimately placed on warrant at Metro was
previously on warrant at Metro, while the remaining 20,000 tons were not previously on warrant at Metro.
11/7/2014 email from Glencore to Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001 - 003, at 003. Nevertheless, the net
effect was that Metro kept 91,000 metric tons on warrant at Metro.
1231
Id. at shipment spreadsheet, GSPSICOMMODS00047097.
1232
Id. at Invoice Summary, GSPSICOMMODS00046872.
1233
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1234
See “Marketing vice president Askew quits metals warehouse” Reuters (4/12/2013),
Metrohttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/metals-warehousing-askew-idUSL5N0CZ1HA20130412.
1235
Subcommittee interview with J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1236
Id. See also “Terms and conditions applicable to all LME listed warehouse companies,” LME website, at
¶6.3.2,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Proposed%20revised%20Warehouse
%20Agreement.pdf.
1237
Subcommittee interview with J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
205
violation occurred, Metro had set up a system to exclude the originating warehouse from the list
of possible destinations for metal being loaded out of that warehouse.
1238
While Mr. Gabillon
said that the Metro merry-go-round deals complied with the LME load-out rules, the LME itself
has not, to date, made a public determination on that issue, as discussed below.
The Metro system for transporting metal that was part of a merry-go-round deal produced
some unusual metal movements. For example, on October 2, 2013, several trucks were loaded
with aluminum at a Metro warehouse on Lafayette Street in Mount Clemens, Michigan, destined
for another Metro warehouse about twelve miles away. That same day, several trucks were
loaded with aluminum at a third Metro warehouse in New Baltimore, Michigan, and shipped to
the Lafayette Street warehouse. The next day, the Lafayette Street warehouse again shipped out
several truckloads of aluminum only to be on the receiving end of metal shipments the day after
that.
1239
In short, over the space of two days, the Lafayette Street warehouse saw truckloads of
virtually identical aluminum shipments depart, arrive, depart, and arrive again.
On another occasion, in November, 2013, Metro loaded aluminum out of one warehouse
and moved it into another warehouse about 200 feet away across a parking lot.
1240
Goldman told
the Subcommittee that warehouse personnel didn’t know whether the metal was moved across
the parking lot on the property to the second warehouse, or instead was driven around the block
on public streets.
1241
In any event, multiple trucks trundled tons of aluminum from one
warehouse location to the other just a few feet away.
1242
On another three-day period in December 2013, pursuant to a merry-go-round deal,
trucks carrying tons of aluminum transported that aluminum to and from the exact same
warehouses in a circular pattern at odds with rational warehouse activity. The trucks loaded the
aluminum from the first warehouse, unloaded it at the second, picked up different lots of
aluminum from the second warehouse, and drove it to the first where it was unloaded. Those
trucks bearing similar loads of aluminum did not transport the metal for free, but imposed
substantial costs on Metro to carry out the transactions.
Thousands of similar shipments occurred during the course of Metro’s merry-go-round
deals. In fact, according to Goldman, between February 2010 and J anuary 2014, more than
625,000 tons of aluminum were loaded out of a Metro warehouse in Detroit only to be loaded
right back into another Metro facility in Detroit, all part of the Metro metal merry-go-round.
1243
In the end, while the truck movements created a false impression that metal was actually leaving
the Metro warehouses, in fact, almost all of the metal was simply being moved around the
warehouse system in Detroit.
Reacting to the Metro Merry-Go-Round. Metro’s practice of loading metal out of one
Metro warehouse only to load it back into another Metro warehouse came to the public’s
attention through a J uly 20, 2013, front-page New York Times article that disclosed the practice
1238
Id.
1239
See 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, chart, GSPSICOMMODS00046906 - 615.
1240
See Spreadsheet prepared by Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00046902, at 974 - 975.
1241
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014).
1242
See Spreadsheet prepared by Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00046902, at 974 - 975.
1243
10/22/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-22-000001 - 002, at 002.
206
and raised fresh concerns about the integrity of the aluminum market.
1244
The article quoted a
former Metro forklift operator who described a “merry-go-round of metal,” and indicated that the
practice had become a running joke among some warehouse workers.
1245
On J uly 23, 2013, the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Protection held a hearing on bank involvement with physical commodities, and
focused attention more broadly on the Metro Detroit warehouse queue, raising concerns that it
was distorting the aluminum market and inflating aluminum prices.
1246
One witness from
MillerCoors testified that companies like Metro had created bottlenecks that slowed the removal
of aluminum from their warehouses, and forced metal owners to pay additional rent. He further
testified that those actions had cost MillerCoors “tens of millions of dollars in excess premiums
over the last several years,” and imposed an estimated “additional $3 billion expense on
companies that purchase aluminum.”
1247
In an attempt to quiet the uproar, Goldman issued a
statement offering, as one media report put it, “to speed up delivery of aluminum to users of the
metal and proposed changes to industry rules amid claims that its warehouse unit created
shortages and drove up prices.”
1248
Despite that offer, in August 2013, more than a dozen class action lawsuits were filed
against Goldman, Metro, the LME, and others, by aluminum purchasers claiming:
“[D]efendants together arranged to stockpile aluminum in warehouses in the Midwestern
portion of the United States and delayed load-outs of such aluminum, causing storage
costs to increase. This led to an increase in the Midwest Premium, a price component
that incorporates a number of inputs including storage costs. Plaintiffs allege that their
purchases of aluminum are priced with reference to the Midwest Premium, and that they
therefore paid inflated prices.”
1249
Triggering LME Investigation. Another development from the New York Times article
was that, shortly after its publication, an LME examiner visited Metro and made a number of
inquiries into Metro’s practices. Several months later, on December 4, 2013, the LME notified
Metro that the exchange had opened a formal investigation “into the circumstances surrounding
the movement of primary aluminum between listed warehouses” operated by Metro in
1244
“A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure Gold,” New York Times, David Kocieniewski,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-
gold.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
1245
Id. Concerns about Metro’s lengthening queue and its effect on aluminum markets had begun years earlier. See,
e.g., “Wall Street Gets Eyed in Metal Squeeze,” Wall Street J ournal, Tatyana Shumsky and Andrea Hotter
(6/17/2011),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304186404576389680225394642.
1246
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), opening statement of Subcommittee Chairman Sherrod Brown,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm.
1247
Id., prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 4.
1248
“Goldman Sachs Offers Aluminum to Clients Stuck in Queue,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore and Agnieszka
Troszkiewicz (7/31/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/goldman-sachs-offers-aluminum-to-
clients-stuck-in-queue.html.
1249
See In Re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121435 (USDC
SDNY)(8/29/2014)(court decision describing allegations; it dismissed the class action suits for lack of standing).
207
Detroit.
1250
A few days later, LME sent Metro a request for documents and information about
Metro’s cancellation practices, the inducements it offered to metal owners who participated in
the merry-go-round transactions, and whether Metro considered those metal shipments consistent
with its load-out obligations under LME rules.
1251
The LME also asked why Metro had not
consulted the exchange about the practice before engaging in it.
1252
On J anuary 27, 2014, Metro responded to the LME’s letter.
1253
The response drew upon
information provided by a number of Metro and Goldman employees, including J acques
Gabillon, head of Goldman’s GCPI group and Chairman of Metro’s Board of Directors. Metro’s
response detailed the last Red Kite deal and the Glencore deal described above.
1254
As to the
unusual movements of metal that resulted from the deals, Metro asserted that once the aluminum
was loaded onto a truck, the owner of the metal was entitled to send it anywhere the owner
wanted — including back to Metro. Metro wrote:
“[Metro] considers metal that is loaded free on truck (FOT) at the owner’s instruction, in
accordance with the order of priority required by the LME … to count towards the
operator’s load-out obligations. At that point, the warehouse operator has released
possession of the metal and thus has loaded-out the metal from its warehouse. The LME
has long recognized the right of the metal owner to decide what to do with free metal,
and, as the operator of LME-approved warehouses, Metro is bound to respect the owner’s
instruction.”
1255
Metro stated that, “consistent with LME requirements, Metro deducts metal from its
inventory once a bill of lading has been signed by both Metro and the truck operator.”
1256
Metro
also wrote that LME’s external auditors had reviewed Metro’s operations pursuant to inventory
audits in 2012, and “no material issues” were noted in the Audit Summary or any follow up.
1257
On March 10, 2014, LME sent another letter to Metro, asking for details about Metro’s
vetting and approval process for the deals, and asking for new information, including whether
Metro employees had “brokered” the merry-go-round deals identified in Metro’s J anuary letter,
and whether Metro had considered asking LME “as to the appropriateness” of the deals.
1258
LME also asked whether “Metro consider[ed] that the incentives it offered contributed to the
perpetuation of metal queues in Detroit.”
1259
On April 15, 2014, Metro replied to the LME’s letter.
1260
Metro said that it was “unable
to pinpoint which party first initiated the Transactions.”
1261
As to whether the warehouse
1250
12/4/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046656 [sealed exhibit].
1251
12/6/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046658 [sealed exhibit].
1252
Id.
1253
1/27/2014 letter from Simmons & Simmons to LME, GSPSICOMMODS00046661.
1254
Id. at Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046666. The four previous merry-go-round deals were not within the
time scope of the LME’s document request.
1255
1/27/2014 letter from Simmons & Simmons to LME, GSPSICOMMODS00046661, 662.
1256
Id.
1257
Id.
1258
3/10/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046827, at 828 [sealed exhibit].
1259
Id. at GSPSICOMMODS00046827, 831.
1260
4/15/2012 letter from Simmons & Simmons to LME, GSPSICOMMODS00046834.
208
company had considered asking the LME its view of the deals, Metro stated that the company
“regards its process for reviewing all transactions to be a matter of sound corporate practice and
governance and therefore did not make enquiries to the LME regarding the [Red Kite and
Glencore] Transactions.”
1262
Metro also denied that the merry-go-round deals had contributed to
the perpetuation of the queue stating that “Metro has no influence over warrant
cancellations.”
1263
Metro made that statement even after paying millions of dollars in incentives
for warrant cancellations.
Metro also attempted to justify the incentives offered to Red Kite and Glencore, by
explaining that it was “competing with other storage options available” to those companies.
1264
Metro also continued to assert that the deals were consistent with LME rules:
“Metro does not consider the incentives it offered to be ‘exceptional inducements’ that
‘artificially or otherwise constrained’ the ‘proper functioning of the market through the
liquidity and elasticity of stocks of metal under warrant.’ (Clause 9.3.1 of the Warehouse
Agreement.)”
1265
The Subcommittee is not aware of any correspondence between LME and Metro since Metro’s
April reply. The LME would not comment on the existence or status of the investigation.
1266
The Subcommittee then asked the LME whether it would “consider it a violation of its
load out rule for an owner of multiple warehouses to "load out" metal from one warehouse only
to load it back in to another warehouse owned by the same company in the same geographic
region.” The LME told the Subcommittee that “while the LME would view such behavior as
inconsistent with the "spirit" of the relevant requirements, it may not violate the "letter" of those
requirements because the relevant terms may be susceptible to more than one interpretation.”
1267
The LME has recently initiated a consultation on changes to its warehousing requirements to
stop the practice.
1268
(e) Benefiting from Proprietary Cancellations
In addition to the merry-go-round deals, four large proprietary cancellations by J PMorgan
and Goldman also measurably lengthened the Detroit queue. The J PMorgan cancellations
1261
Id at 837.
1262
Id at 838.
1263
Id at 844.
1264
Id. at 843.
1265
Id at 842.
1266
The LME has consistently declined the Subcommittee’s invitations to discuss the matter, citing the LME’s role
as a regulator. In particular, the LME stated that “as an instrumentality of the government of the United Kingdom
and a market regulator, the LME maintains strict confidentiality of ongoing investigations into approved warehouses
and therefore we are unable to provide further information. … The LME’s confidentiality obligations stem from
multiple sources.” 11/10/2014 letter from LME to Subcommittee, LME_PSI0002459, at 461.
1267
Id..
1268
11/7/2014 “Consultation and Proposed Amendments to the Policies and Procedures Relating to the LME’s
Physical Delivery Network,” prepared by LME,https://www.lme.com/~/media/files/notices/2014/2014_11/14%20318%20a310%20w148%20physical%20network
%20reform%20consultation%20notice.pdf.
209
involved about 200,000 metric tons of aluminum and took place in J anuary and December 2012.
The Goldman cancellations involved more than 300,000 metric tons of aluminum and took place
in May and December 2012.
JPMorgan Cancellations. In J anuary 2012, J PMorgan cancelled warrants for nearly
100,000 metric tons of aluminum held at Metro in Detroit. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee
that the aluminum belonged to J PMorgan Chase Bank, which was not acting as an agent for any
client but was acting on its own behalf, and that the purpose of the cancellation was, in part, to
replenish its readily available stocks of aluminum.
1269
At the beginning of J anuary 2012, the
Detroit queue was approximately 115 days. By J anuary 20, after J PMorgan had cancelled its
warrants for 100,000 metric tons, the queue had increased to 216 days.
1270
A significant portion
of that increase was attributable to J PMorgan’s cancellation. According to J PMorgan, after
waiting about nine months to get through the queue, the majority of the aluminum was shipped
out of the Metro warehouse and into a Henry Bath LME-approved warehouse in Baltimore.
1271
Nearly a year later, in December 2012, J PMorgan cancelled warrants for another
approximately 95,000 metric tons of aluminum. The bank told the Subcommittee that it was the
direct owner of the aluminum, it was not acting on behalf of a client, and the purpose of the
cancellation was to use the aluminum in various future transactions.
1272
In mid-December 2012,
prior to the cancellation, the queue in Detroit was less than 350 days. By the end of that month
the wait for aluminum approached 500 days, with the increase appearing to be largely
attributable to warrant cancellations by J PMorgan, Red Kite, and Goldman.
1273
J PMorgan
waited in the queue for more than one year. In early 2014, the metal was shipped out of the
Metro warehouses.
1274
According to J PMorgan, some of the aluminum was ultimately sold to
clients and the remainder was shipped to other warehouses.
1275
Goldman Cancellations. In 2012, the same year as the J PMorgan cancellations,
Goldman engaged in two large acquisitions of aluminum warrants followed by cancellations of
many of those warrants. The cancellations involved more than 300,000 tons of aluminum worth
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, in 2012, it began to focus on building trading
relationships with aluminum consumers and set out to increase its physical holdings of aluminum
1269
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014).
1270
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1271
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014). At the time, J PMorgan owned the Henry Bath warehouses. In
March 2014, J PMorgan reached an agreement to sell its physical commodities business to Mercuria Energy Group,
including the Henry Bath warehousing business. See Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/14); 3/19/2014
J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan announces sale of its physical commodities business to Mercuria Energy
Group Limited,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1394963095027&c=J PM_Content_C.
1272
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014).
1273
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1274
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014).
1275
Id.
210
to do business with those clients.
1276
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it had determined that
purchasing aluminum warrants on the LME was the most cost-effective way to build its physical
inventory and set out to buy readily available aluminum, meaning aluminum that was not in a
warehouse with a queue, such as Metro.
1277
According to Goldman records, in March 2012, it held about 277,000 metric tons of
aluminum.
1278
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it entered into a large number of LME
futures contracts with warrants for delivery of aluminum in April 2012.
1279
At the same time, the
company sold futures contracts to deliver LME aluminum warrants in May and J une.
1280
At the
time, the vast majority of warrants used to settle LME aluminum trades were associated with
aluminum held in either Detroit or Vlissingen. Since those warrants were associated with
aluminum held in warehouses with long queues, they were the least valuable and the most likely
to be used to settle futures trades.
1281
According to Goldman, its goal was to buy so many LME
warrants for April delivery that at least some of those warrants would be for aluminum held in
warehouses without queues.
1282
Goldman executed the trades in April 2012, which increased its physical aluminum
holdings that month to nearly 780,000 tons of aluminum with a market value of more than $1.6
billion.
1283
According to Goldman, however, the effort to secure warrants in warehouses without
queues was unsuccessful, and the company used many of the warrants it had bought to meet its
May and J une trading commitments.
1284
On May 15, 2012, in the midst of that series of trades, Goldman cancelled warrants
associated with almost 50,000 metric tons of physical aluminum in Metro’s Detroit warehouses.
In mid-J uly 2012, Goldman cancelled warrants for another 45,000 metric tons in Detroit, for a
combined total of 95,000 metric tons.
1285
Prior to Goldman’s first set of cancellations, in mid-
1276
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1277
Id. Finding warrants for aluminum at warehouses without queues was difficult since the two warehouses with
the vast majority of LME warranted aluminum were the Metro warehouses in Detroit and the Pacorini warehouses in
Vlissingen, both of which had long queues for removal of metal. A later public report issued by the LME in
November 2013, noted the problem, observing that, of the aluminum warrants used to settle trades on September 18,
2013, for example, 99% were associated with aluminum in a warehouse with a queue. See 11/2013 “Summary
Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1278
2/20/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, at chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000002-R.
1279
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1280
Id.
1281
Id; Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/10/2014).
1282
Id; See 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001 - 011,
at 007; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1283
2/20/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, at chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000002-R.
1284
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
-011, at 007; Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/10/2014).
1285
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-
000001 - 013, Exhibit C, at 011.
211
May 2102, the queue in Detroit was about 285 days.
1286
By mid-J uly 2012, after the last of
Goldman’s cancellations, it had increased by nearly a third to around 370 days.
1287
A few months later, in December 2012, driven by what Goldman called a “longer-term
strategy to developing our consumer franchise business,” the company again set out to
significantly increase its holdings of physical aluminum.
1288
According to Goldman, discussions
with aluminum consuming clients had identified “interest in having Goldman Sachs serve as a
source of supply for metal in the future and as a counterparty on forward-starting hedge
transactions.”
1289
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, despite its failure to obtain any significant number
of warrants outside of Detroit and Vlissingen during the prior spring, it decided to try the same
strategy again – buying such a large volume of LME warrants that at least some would likely
come from warehouses without queues.
1290
Goldman ultimately purchased LME futures
contracts for December delivery with warrants for more than 1 million tons aluminum, a huge
amount. At the same time, the company sold a large number of futures contracts for J anuary
2013.
1291
In the midst of that series of trades, Goldman’s physical aluminum holdings grew to more
than 1.5 million metric tons of aluminum worth more than $3.2 billion, nearly five times the
amount held just weeks earlier. As with the first attempt, however, Goldman obtained few
warrants for aluminum in a warehouse without a queue. According to Goldman, it then used
about half of the LME warrants to settle its short J anuary contracts. Even after that, at the end of
J anuary 2013, Goldman held nearly 825,000 metric tons of aluminum worth more than $1.76
billion.
1292
Goldman said that the LME warrants that were not used to settle the J anuary contracts
were then cancelled, which significantly increased the queue in Metro’s Detroit warehouses as
well as the queue in the Pacorini warehouses located in Vlissingen, Netherlands where much of
the warranted aluminum was located.
1293
Over just three days in mid-December 2012, Goldman
cancelled warrants for more than 227,000 metric tons of aluminum in Detroit.
1294
1286
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1287
Id.
1288
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007.
1289
Id.
1290
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1291
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007.
1292
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-
000001 - 013, Exhibit D, at 013.
1293
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007.
1294
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-
000001 - 013, Exhibit C, at 011.
212
Why Goldman thought that the second aluminum trade would succeed when the first
failed is unclear, but what is clear is that, for a second time, Goldman’s cancellations lengthened
the Metro Detroit queue. In mid-December 2012, prior to Goldman’s cancelling the warrants,
the queue in Detroit was just under 350 days.
1295
By the end of December 2012, the wait to get
aluminum out of the Metro warehouse system was approaching 500 days, with the increase
largely attributable to warrant cancellations by J PMorgan, Red Kite, and Goldman.
1296
As explained earlier, longer queues in Detroit were highly correlated with higher
Midwest Premiums.
1297
According to Goldman, longer queues and higher Midwest Premiums
would directly impact LME prices.
1298
At the same time Goldman was cancelling its warrants, it
was actively trading financial products tied to the price of aluminum, including the LME price.
(f) Benefiting from Fees Tied to Higher Midwest Premium Prices
Under Goldman’s ownership, Metro entered into a series of transactions that enabled it to
benefit financially from the rising Midwest Premium, which was highly correlated to its own
lengthening queue in Detroit.
As explained above, the Midwest Premium is a key price component in U.S. aluminum
contracts that, along with the LME price, produces the all-in price for physical aluminum. The
premium is intended to reflect, among other factors, storage costs for aluminum. While the
Midwest Premium used to be an inconsequential part of the all-in price, about 4%; over the last
five years, it has increased substantially, and, since J anuary 2014, has been more than 20% of the
all-in price. As shown in a graph earlier, between 2010 and 2014, the increases in the Midwest
Premium have had an extremely high correlation of 0.89 with increases in the length of the
Metro Detroit queue.
1299
In other words, when the queue lengthened, the Midwest premium
almost always increased.
In response to Subcommittee questions, Goldman disclosed that, from 2010 through
2014, in at least 13 arrangements, Metro received payments from some warehouse clients of
amounts that were directly or indirectly tied to the Midwest Premium price.
1300
Agreements that
1295
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses,” prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1296
Id.
1297
For another explanation of the correlation between the queue and the Midwest Premium price, see In Re
Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121435 (USDC SDNY)(8/29/2014)(court
decision summarizing the position taken by aluminum buyers: “LME stored aluminum in the Detroit area
determines the level of the Midwest Premium. As trader rather than user dynamics took root in the LME
warehouses, the level of the Premium became driven by trading dynamics rather than actual supply and demand of
aluminum users. … A direct result of this was to increase storage duration, thus storage costs, thereby increasing
the Midwest Premium.”).
1298
Goldman has strenuously argued, however, that queues simply impact the LME price in relation to the physical
price. Put another way, in Goldman’s opinion, as the queue gets longer, the Midwest Premium gets higher and the
LME price falls, yet the “all in price” remains the same. See “The economic role of a warehouse exchange,”
Goldman, Sachs (10/31/2013), GSPSICOMMODS00047511, at 513.
1299
See chart entitled, “Detroit Queue and Platts MW Aluminum Premium,” above.
1300
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 10, at 002 and
Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046531; and 10/3/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee,
PSI-GolmanSachs-27-000001 and attachment, GSPSICOMMODS46630.
213
potentially link Metro revenues to the Midwest Premium raise conflict of interest concerns, since
a Metro financial interest in the premium price would create an incentive for the company to
develop and maintain longer queues.
Each month since Goldman acquired Metro, Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal
Investment (GCPI) group produced a one-page management brief for Isabelle Ealet, who was
Global Head of GS Commodities until she was promoted to co-head of the Securities Division in
2012.
1301
The Metro management briefs included such information as Metro’s gross year-over-
year profit, inventory projections, and business highlights.
1302
The J une 2011 management brief
stated that “Metro showed another month of record financial performance,” and highlighted
“Extraordinary income from counterparties sharing physical premium with Metro after
delivering metal previously under financing deals into the physical market.”
1303
Ms. Ealet told
the Subcommittee that she did not recall that briefing document and could not explain how
Metro’s counterparties were “sharing physical premium with Metro.”
1304
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the “premium sharing” payments referenced in the
brief and other payments like it were “a means of compensating Metro for, among other things,
rent discounts Metro provided based on the understanding that the customer would hold metal
for a period that is longer than the period for which the customer ultimately held the metal in
Metro’s warehouses.”
1305
Goldman identified 29 agreements between 2010 and 2014 in which a customer paid
Metro a “break fee” for selling physical aluminum that was held at a Metro warehouse under a
discount rent agreement.
1306
Thirteen of those 29 agreements were associated with the sale of
metal stored in Metro warehouses in the United States.
1307
The Midwest Premium was the
applicable premium in those sales. It appears that Metro earned more than $7.3 million in break
fees from those 13 agreements.
1308
Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that Metro got a better deal
out of the break fees than it would have if Metro had simply continued with the discount rent
agreements.
1309
The amounts were also sufficiently large that they were brought to the attention
of the head of Goldman’s Commodities division and described as “Extraordinary income” in
“another month of record financial performance.”
1310
The premium sharing arrangements gave
1301
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1302
See, e.g., 6/2011 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009668.
1303
Id.
1304
Subcommittee interview with Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014).
1305
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001at 002.
1306
Id. The “break fee” refers to a fee paid by the client for breaking the agreement with Metro to keep its metal in a
Metro warehouse for a specified period of time. Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1307
Id. 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001, at 2, and
attachment,GSPSICOMMODS00046531; 10/3/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-
GoldmanSachs-27-00001, and attachment, GSPSICOMMODS00046630.
1308
Id.
1309
Subcommittee interview with Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1310
6/2011 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009668.
214
Metro another financial reward for longer queues,
1311
since longer queues were highly correlated
with higher Midwest Premium prices – higher prices that produced additional income for Metro
through the premium sharing agreements.
(g) Sharing Non-Public Information
A second set of issues involves the extent to which Metro shared commercially valuable,
non-public information with Goldman employees who were involved in commodities and trading
in the aluminum markets.
Background on Information Sharing. In the regular course of business, LME-
approved warehouses acquire information on warehouse metal stocks, current and future metal
shipments, LME warrant cancellations, and warehouse queue lengths that is not available
generally to market participants. The LME has recognized that traders privy to such warehouse
information before it becomes available to the broader market could use that non-public
information to benefit their trading strategies, gaining an unfair advantage over the rest of the
market and their own counterparties. To prevent inappropriate sharing or the misuse of market
sensitive information, the LME has required warehouse companies who are affiliated with
trading companies to set up information barriers between the two.
The LME requirements relating to erecting so-called “Chinese walls” between the
warehouse and trading operations state that “it is essential that personnel engaged in trading
activities in relation to the LME market do not come into possession of any Confidential
Information” from the warehouse, including warehouse stock figures, proposed or actual metal
shipments to or from an LME warehouse, and information relating to the issuance and
cancellation of LME warrants.
1312
The requirements state that such confidential information
may be provided only to certain “Designated Individuals” and that the number of such
individuals at affiliated trading companies should be “kept to a minimum.”
1313
Under LME
requirements, information shared with a trading company “will be confined to common directors
and others who have management responsibility for both entities.”
1314
Prior to its purchase of Metro, Goldman identified the “perception of misuse of
confidential [Metro] information” as a key investment risk.
1315
To address that risk, Goldman
issued a policy to ensure compliance with LME information sharing requirements, warning:
“It is strictly prohibited for Metro to disclose any information about pending metal
deposits or withdrawals or to give any specific information relating to storage terms,
client deals or financing transactions to individuals within [Commodities Sales and
1311
Of course, the principal reward was the ability to charge additional rent to those who may want to exit Metro’s
Detroit warehouses, but were blocked by the queue.
1312
11/17/2011 “Information Barriers Between Warehouse Companies and Trading Companies,” prepared by LME,
at 1-3 (hereinafter, “LME Information Barrier Rules,”),https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2011/2011_11/11_334_A326_W173_Information_Barriers_Between_
Warehouse_Companies_and_Trading_Companies.pdf.
1313
Id. at 4.
1314
Id.
1315
See 8/6/2013 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Reputational Risk Questions MITSI Holdings LLC,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700124 - 150, at 130.
215
Trading or any other Goldman personnel not approved to receive information]. It is also
prohibited for Metro staff to share any information which is reported to or published by
the LME ahead of publication to the market.”
1316
Despite that Goldman policy, and a corresponding one at Metro, the Subcommittee found
that confidential Metro information was made available to dozens of Goldman
employees, including personnel active in trading commodities.
Metro Executives. Metro’s CEO, COO, and Chairman of the Board all told the
Subcommittee that they viewed Metro’s and Goldman’s information barrier policies as
prohibiting them from sharing specific Metro-related information with Goldman
aluminum traders or others involved in trading aluminum.
1317
Beginning in April 2012, the LME began mandating that warehouse companies affiliated
with a trading company engage a third party to ensure that their policies and procedures
complied with the exchange’s information barrier requirements.
1318
Metro hired
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to conduct its 2012 and 2013 reviews.
According to Goldman, the PwC reviews took place over several weeks in which the
auditor independently tested and verified each of the controls put in place by Metro to protect
against inappropriate sharing of confidential warehouse information. Both PwC reviews
concluded that Metro’s assertions that its information barriers were in compliance with LME
requirements were “fairly stated, in all material aspects.”
1319
PwC’s assessments, however, were
limited to reviewing Metro’s information barriers, since the LME requirement applies only to
warehouse companies and not to their affiliated trading companies. PwC did not undertake a
similar review of Goldman.
Goldman Access to Metro Information. For its part, Goldman told the Subcommittee
that internal audits of Goldman’s information barriers have not identified problems. While a
significant number of Goldman employees are authorized under Metro’s and Goldman’s policies
to receive confidential information from Metro, Goldman advised the Subcommittee that
“Compliance has found no unauthorized instances where Metro confidential information was
transmitted to Goldman Sachs sales and trading personnel.”
1320
1316
3/26/2014 “Information Barrier Policy: Metro and Other GS Business and Personnel,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00004059 - 076, at 066.
1317
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014), Leo Prichard (10/6/2014 ), and J acques
Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1318
11/17/2011 “Information Barriers Between Warehouse Companies and Trading Companies,” prepared by LME,
at 6, 7,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2011/2011_11/11_334_A326_W173_Information_Barriers_Between_
Warehouse_Companies_and_Trading_Companies.pdf.
1319
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001-11, at
5.
1320
See 8/6/2013 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Reputational Risk Questions MITSI Holdings LLC,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700124-150, at 133; 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee,
“Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001 - 011, at 010.
216
Goldman’s information barriers policy identifies three categories of “Designated
Individuals” who are permitted access to certain confidential Metro information. One group
consists of certain employees in Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments (GCPI)
group. A second group is made up of Goldman employees who sit on Metro’s Board of
Directors. A third group includes certain senior managers in Goldman’s Securities Division.
1321
Global Commodities Principal Investments. As mentioned above, GCPI is the group
within Goldman’s Global Commodities group that makes equity investments in commodities-
related businesses like power plants and coal mines, and it was GCPI personnel who conducted
the analysis and strategy that led to Goldman’s purchase of Metro.
1322
Ten Goldman employees assigned to GCPI have been authorized to receive monthly data
packages from Metro containing warehouse related confidential information.
1323
GCPI data
packages include information on Metro stock levels, warrant cancellations, deal-specific freight
incentives, rent discounts, and future metal flows, the latter of which is referred to as Metro’s
“deal pipeline.” For example, for the month ending November 2012 the GCPI data packet
showed more than 550,000 tons of metal under contract for delivery to Metro’s Detroit
warehouse. Of that amount, the data packet indicated that only about 110,000 metric tons had
been warranted and that 74,000 metric tons of metal already in the warehouse was awaiting
warranting, the latter figure being particularly sensitive market information because it was not
reflected in public stock reports.
1324
Goldman told the Subcommittee that its GCPI personnel requires detailed non-public
information from Metro on a monthly basis to conduct business planning, estimate cash flows,
and support Metro. Information on Metro’s “deal pipeline,” meaning metal that is under contract
for delivery to Metro warehouses, is information not included in the LME’s public warehouse
stock reports until the metal was delivered and warranted. It is important to prevent such
information from being shared with traders as it could give a trading company an advantage by,
for example, allowing it to better predict spreads between cash and futures aluminum prices.
Such insight could not only inform a firm’s trading strategy but would allow it to assess risks
associated with particular trades.
1325
Goldman Employees on Metro Board. A second group of persons designated to
receive confidential Metro information are the Goldman employees who sit on the Metro Board.
Following its purchase of Metro, Goldman installed a new Board of Directors consisting
exclusively of Goldman employees, more than half of whom were from the Global Commodities
group. Board Members included individuals associated with commodity trading, commodity
operations, and GCPI. One Board Member ran Goldman’s Natural Gas and Power Trading
1321
3/26/2014 “Information Barrier Policy: Metro and Other GS Business and Personnel,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00004059 - 076, at 060, 066.
1322
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (7/16/2014).
1323
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001-009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225.
1324
12/1/2012 MITSI Holdings, LLC, GCPI data packet, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00040203, at 205; 2/19/2010 “Conflict Management Procedures Between Metro and Other GS
Businesses and Personnel,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, FRB-PSI-602457 - 471, at 458.
1325
Subcommittee briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
217
group and was head of GCPI during his time on the Board.
1326
While the composition of the
Board has varied since 2010, it has always been wholly comprised of Goldman employees, many
from Goldman’s Global Commodities group.
1327
Metro supplies each Board member with
information packets which are produced and distributed on a quarterly basis.
1328
Goldman has said that the format of the Board packets “ensures that no market sensitive
non public information is disclosed.”
1329
While less detailed than the data packets provided to
GCPI employees, the Board packets have included substantial information about future expected
metal flows and stock levels. For example, the packet produced for an October 2012 Board
meeting described the “Current Deal Pipeline”
1330
for metal to be delivered to Metro
warehouses, indicated “Metro has another 277 [thousand metric tons] booked,” and “Detroit
continues to be the key inbound location for Metro.”
1331
In another example, information provided to the Board in J une 2013, showed more than
576,000 tons of metal, including 400,000 tons of aluminum, in Metro’s deal pipeline at the end
of May 2013. The Board packet also stated that Detroit “continues to be the key inbound
location for Metro with another 431 [thousand metric tons] of metal expected.”
1332
Again, experts told the Subcommittee that information on existing and upcoming
aluminum flows could be commercially valuable to a trading company by providing insight into
market direction, helping with predictions of future spreads, and informing the strategic direction
for its trading activities.
1333
Senior Goldman Managers. The third and final group of Goldman employees
designated to receive confidential Metro information work for the Goldman Securities Division.
The Securities Division at Goldman oversees the Global Commodities group, including
Commodity Sales, Commodity Trading, and GCPI. Isabelle Ealet is the current co-head of the
Securities Division and is responsible for the Division’s commodity-related business. Prior to
1326
See 12/5/2011 MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009287 - 309, at 290; 3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman ,
GSPSICOMMODS00009519 - 542, at 534 (Gregory Agran left Metro’s Board of Directors at the end of 2011).
1327
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001 - 009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225. See also chart listing Metro Board members, above.
1328
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Goldman-11-000001 - 011, at 009.
1329
3/26/2014 “Information Barrier Policy: Metro and Other GS Business and Personnel,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00004059 - 076, at 063.
1330
3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009519 - 542, at 535
(“Metro’s deal book pipeline consists of a series of committed deals based on verbal agreements with market
counterparties”).
1331
10/4/2012 MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009398 - 422, at 409.
1332
6/19/2013 MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009378 - 397, at 387.
1333
Subcommittee briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
218
being named to that position in J anuary 2012, Ms. Ealet was global head of the Commodities
group.
1334
Beginning in March 2010, Ms. Ealet began receiving monthly reports, called a
“management brief,” that provided her with confidential Metro information, including
information about future metal flows in Metro’s deal pipeline.
1335
For example, a September
2010 brief discussed an off-warrant deal reached for 100,000 metric tons of aluminum at Metro
and included a graph projecting Metro stock balances.
1336
Similarly, a November 2011 brief
stated that Metro expected to put in excess of 100,000 metric tons on warrant the following
month.
1337
Subsequent briefs discussed future metal flows, referring to “strong 2013 pipeline,”
and metal outflows “offset by a strong pipeline and inflows.”
1338
LME’s information barrier requirements state “it is essential that personnel engaged in
trading activities in relation to the LME market do not come into possession of any Confidential
Information”
1339
The LME has told the Subcommittee, however, that “personnel engaged in
trading activities” as discussed in its requirements would not necessarily include executives, such
as Ms. Ealet, even though they supervised trading activities.
1340
According to the exchange,
whether or not the prohibition on access to confidential information applied would depend on the
extent of the supervisor’s involvement in setting trading strategy.
1341
Ms. Ealet told the
Subcommittee that while she was not typically involved in the day-to-day management of
trading, she may become involved in specific trades or issues from time to time.
1342
Other Goldman Employees. At the Subcommittee’s request, Goldman identified more
than 30 additional Goldman employees, other than the groups already discussed, who, since
2010, have been provided access to confidential Metro information.
1343
They include individuals
working in the bank’s Market Risk Management & Analysis, tax, litigation, accounting, audit,
compliance, derivatives, and commodities departments.
1344
1334
“2 Securities Heads Are Latest to Leave Goldman,” New York Times, Susanne Craig (1/11/2012),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/global-securities-co-heads-to-leave-
goldman/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
1335
Subcommittee interview of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014).
1336
9/2010 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009675.
1337
11/2011 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009670.
1338
4/2013 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009664; 9/2013 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by
Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009690.
1339
11/17/2011 “Information Barriers Between Warehouse Companies and Trading Companies,” prepared by LME,
at 1-3,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2011/2011_11/11_334_A326_W173_Information_Barriers_Between_
Warehouse_Companies_and_Trading_Companies.pdf.
1340
Subcommittee briefing by LME (8/1/2014).
1341
Id.
1342
Subcommittee interview of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014).
1343
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001-009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046226.
1344
Id.
219
The Subcommittee interviewed, among others, Gregory Agran, who formerly headed
GCPI and is now the Global co-head of Commodities for Goldman; J acques Gabillon, the
current head of GCPI and Chairman of Metro’s Board of Directors; and Isabelle Ealet, former
Global Head of Commodities and current co-head of Goldman’s Securities Division. Ms. Ealet
and Mr. Agran told the Subcommittee that they could not recall any instance in the past five
years in which any commercially sensitive warehouse information had been shared in violation
of the Goldman information-sharing policy. Nor could either recall any occasion on which a
concern was raised that the information barriers policy had been violated.
1345
Mr. Gabillon recalled one information-sharing related incident that had been registered
by Michael Whelan, a senior Metro executive, who brought that matter to Mr. Gabillon’s
attention in 2013.
1346
According to Mr. Gabillon, the incident involved a Goldman commodities
trader who came to him and expressed unhappiness with a zinc-related transaction involving
Metro in New Orleans.
1347
Mr. Gabillon said the interaction was unusual as it was the only
occasion he could recall in which a trader approached him directly about a Metro-related issue.
Mr. Gabillon said that he told the trader to take the complaint to his own reporting chain. Mr.
Gabillon also said that he reported the incident to compliance.
1348
However, according to Christopher Wibbelman, another senior executive at Metro,
Michael Whelan, the company’s Vice President of Business Development, had registered a
concern about an interaction between a Goldman trader and Mr. Gabillon.
1349
The incident was
apparently the same as that referred to by Mr. Gabillon and discussed above. A J une 2013 email
from Mr. Whelan to Mr. Wibbelman, apparently referring to the interaction, stated that Mr.
Whelan was resigning from the company and identified concerns with Metro’s “Chinese Wall”
policy. Mr. Whelan wrote:
“I have some questions and concerns regarding the Chinese Wall Policy that is in place
which regulates the interaction between Metro International, its customers, and J . Aron
[Goldman’s primary commodities trading subsidiary]. This morning’s confrontation was
extremely questionable.”
1350
Mr. Wibbelman told the Subcommittee he could not recall the details of the “confrontation”
referred to in the 2013 email.
1351
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the bank’s compliance department subsequently
determined that no breach of the LME information barriers policy had occurred with respect to
the incident, but declined to provide any documentation.
1352
Metro’s CEO, Christopher
Wibbelman, told the Subcommittee that he believed that Goldman came to that conclusion, in
1345
Subcommittee interviews of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014) and Gregory Agran (10/14/2014).
1346
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1347
Id.
1348
Id.
1349
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1350
6/14/2013 email from Michael Whelan to Christopher Wibbelman, “Resignation,”
GSPSICOMMODS00047430.
1351
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1352
10/20/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-20-
000001 - 041, at 002 - 003.
220
part, because the LME Chinese Wall policy covers only information that could flow from the
warehouse company to Goldman.
1353
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the compliance
review involved its Legal Department, and asserted and declined to waive attorney-client
privilege in refusing to provide documents related to that review.
1354
All told, nearly 50 Goldman employees, including Commodities executives and traders,
have had access to confidential Metro information, including information that could be
commercially valuable to a trading company.
1355
(h) Current Status
Current relations between Goldman and Metro appear to be strained. In addition, in mid-
2014, Goldman announced it was “exploring” a possible sale of the warehouse business.
Strained Relations. Prior to its acquisition by Goldman, Metro had built a robust
warehousing business. Its senior executives, including Christopher Wibbelman, Mark Askew,
and Michael Whelan, had each been with the company for more than a decade, and had been
intimately involved in its economic well-being.
1356
After being acquired by Goldman, Metro’s executives were required to obtain approval
for a large swath of Metro’s business activities, including each of the merry-go-round deals
described above.
1357
According to Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman, Metro employees found
it, at times, “demanding” to work for Goldman.
1358
He indicated, for example, that Goldman
traders sometimes pressured Metro employees to provide free or discounted rent when storing
metal in the warehouses that Metro found not commercially viable.
1359
Mr. Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that he “never rolled over” to Goldman, and that
Metro was repeatedly told by its Chairman of the Board, J acques Gabillon, that Metro should
always act in the best interests of Metro.
1360
Nevertheless, according to Mr. Wibbelman, at one point, there was what Mr. Wibbelman
called a “falling out” between Metro and Goldman.
1361
The contours of that dispute remain
unclear, with some evidence suggesting that it involved Goldman’s decision to not store zinc in
Metro after receiving an incentive from Metro to store it there.
1362
The dispute was ultimately
raised to Metro’s Chairman of the Board, J acques Gabillon, and Isabelle Ealet, for resolution.
1353
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1354
10/20/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-20-
000001 - 041, at 002 - 003.
1355
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-up Requests,” PSI-Goldman Sachs-17-
000001 - 005, at 002, and Exhibits A and B, PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-000007, 009 (also listed as
GSPSICOMMODS00046225 - 226).
1356
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1357
Id.
1358
Id.
1359
Id.
1360
Id.
1361
Id.
1362
Id.
221
Mr. Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that the matter was resolved, but relations remained
strained. He said that, unlike his former marketing staff, he had not spoken with Goldman’s
traders about sales issues in perhaps eight or nine months.
1363
Resignations and Departures. One of the complicating factors in determining what
happened at Metro is the significant turnover in personnel. Since the end of 2012, key personnel
have left both Metro and Goldman. In February 2013, Mark Askew, Metro’s Vice President for
Marketing resigned after repeatedly raising concerns with Metro’s “queue management.”
1364
Shortly thereafter, despite a recent promotion, Michael Whelan, another senior Metro executive,
resigned, citing concerns with Metro’s “Chinese Wall Policy” in his resignation email.
1365
The
senior aluminum trader at Goldman, who was hired after a referral by Mr. Wibbelman, also
resigned.
1366
Lastly, a Goldman compliance executive who served on Metro’s Board of
Directors also left at about that time to take a new job.
1367
In May 2014, a Goldman spokesman stated publicly that Goldman was “exploring a sale”
of its warehousing business, but as of November 2014, Goldman still owns it.
1368
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman Involvement with Aluminum
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Goldman’s foray into physical aluminum and the
metals warehouse business is the extent to which, within three years, its actions significantly
impacted U.S. aluminum markets. Goldman’s ownership of Metro, Metro’s rise to dominance in
the U.S. LME aluminum storage business, and the long queues to remove metal from Metro have
generated LME rule changes, Senate hearings, a New York Times expose, class action litigation,
and ongoing allegations by industrial aluminum users that Metro’s and Goldman’s actions have
increased aluminum prices and disrupted the aluminum market as a whole. Concerns include
conflicts of interest, access to commercially valuable non-public information, and unfair trading
advantages.
(a) Conflicts of Interest
The facts discovered by the Subcommittee raise at least four different types of conflict of
interest issues, involving the merry-go-round trades, proprietary metal cancellations, premium
sharing, and Goldman’s authority over Metro operations.
Merry-Go-Round Transactions. The merry-go-round trades created multiple conflicts
of interest for Metro and its owner, Goldman. Those warehouse clients were asked to get into or
stay in the warehouse queue to load out their metal. Cancellations of their warrants, which
1363
Id.
1364
12/4/2010 email from Mark Askew, Metro, to Christopher Wibbelman, Metro, GSPSICOMMODS000047422.
1365
6/14/2013 email from Michael Whelan to Christopher Wibbelman, “Resignation,”
GSPSICOMMODS00047430.
1366
“Goldman Sachs heads of metals to retire,” Financial Times, J ack Farchy (10/11/2012),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/497280ba-13d0-11e2-8260-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Ii1Mkdjk.
1367
This compliance staffer joined a Geneva-based commodities trading firm.
1368
See, e.g., “Goldman Puts Metals Warehouse Business Up For Sale,” Wall Street J ournal, Tatyana Shumsky and
Christian Berthelsen (5/20/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303468704579574283591643044.
222
typically involved 100,000 or more metric tons of aluminum, significantly increased the length
of the Metro Detroit queue. The longer queue was highly correlated with higher Midwest
Premium prices, since that premium reflects, in part, metal storage costs, and longer queues
meant increased rental payments. Higher Midwest Premiums, according to most experts with
whom the Subcommittee spoke, also meant higher aluminum prices. Lengthening the queue,
then – “queue management” – could be seen as, not only producing more rental income for
Metro, but also higher prices for the aluminum held or being traded by Goldman.
When a metal owner involved with a merry-go-round trade got to the head of the
warehouse queue, it often took weeks or months to load out its metal, essentially blocking the
exits for all other metal owners until it was done. At the end of the process, the metal owner in
the merry-go-round transaction re-loaded its metal into another Metro warehouse, and in the
overwhelming number of cases, re-warranted the metal. The end result was that the delays
imposed on the other metal owners in the Metro system appear to have had little economic
rationale, but increased revenues to Metro and its owner, Goldman. The merry-go-round trades
also involved an element of deception, since the metal being loaded “out” did not actually leave
the Metro system at all, but went from one Metro warehouse to another.
1369
The LME is still
considering whether such in-system transfers meet its minimum load-out requirement.
The evidence indicates that Goldman personnel, through the Metro Board of Directors
and otherwise, reviewed and approved the merry-go-round deals. That meant senior Goldman
personnel knew of the deals ahead of time, including the size, nature, and, in some instances, the
timing of the cancellations. Goldman personnel acquired that information during the same
period that Goldman itself was accumulating physical aluminum and engaging in substantial
aluminum-related transactions.
In the end, the merry-go-round trades resulted in some clients receiving surreptitious
financial incentives for leaving their metal within the Metro warehouse system while, at the same
time, making it harder for other warehouse clients to exit. The deals resulted in more rent for
Metro, offered trading opportunities for Goldman, and had the effect of distorting the aluminum
market.
Other Warehouse Transactions. Other Metro warehouse transactions also raised
conflict of interest concerns. Like the merry-go-round transactions, the large proprietary
aluminum cancellations by Goldman and J PMorgan added to the Metro Detroit queues, were
correlated with increases in the Midwest Premium price, and blocked the exits for other metal
holders seeking to withdraw metal from the Metro system. Because longer queues also
contributed to increased Metro rental income, Goldman’s proprietary cancellations raised the
conflict of interest concern that its actions added to Metro’s revenues at the expense of Metro’s
clients, while ultimately benefiting Goldman as the owner of Metro.
1369
Metro counted the more than 600,000 metric tons of aluminum loaded “out” in the six merry-go-round deals as
helping it meet the LME’s daily minimum load out requirement, even though it appears that nearly all of that metal
was loaded right back into a Metro warehouse. See 4/15/2014 letter from Metro legal counsel to LME,
GSPSICOMMODS00046834 - 849, at Appendix A, 835; 12/19/2012 MITSI Holdings LLC Board Meeting,
prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009332 - 354, at 348.
223
The premium sharing payments, described earlier, allowed Metro to profit when the
Midwest Premium rose. That type of financial incentive, which was not publicly disclosed,
converts a warehouse company from a neutral actor in the aluminum marketplace to a biased
market participant favoring higher premium prices. The LME has told the Subcommittee,
however, that provided those arrangements did not relate to an LME contract, they would not
violate LME rules prohibiting a warehouse company from taking a direct or indirect interest in
an LME contract.
1370
Influencing Warehouse Management. Still another set of conflict of interest concerns
involved Goldman’s influence over Metro policies and actions. Because Metro was acquired as
a merchant banking investment, Goldman was not permitted under U.S. law to routinely manage
or control Metro. The evidence indicates, however, that Goldman required Metro senior
management to clear many business decisions through the Board of Directors, which was
composed exclusively of Goldman employees. That included Board review and approval of the
merry-go-round deals. Later, when Metro was publicly criticized for its lengthy queues, it was
Goldman who announced that it would swap metal with any aluminum end user waiting in
Metro’s queue.
1371
In addition, Goldman provided significant assistance to Metro’s legal and
compliance functions.
Goldman might contend that Metro’s decisions about financial incentives, including in
the merry-go-round deals, involved millions of dollars and novel arrangements that were not
matters of routine management and so should have been subject to Board oversight. Goldman
may, in fact, have been involved with reviewing and approving all of Metro’s financial incentive
programs. But when a trading company influences the incentives paid by a warehouse company
to attract or retain metal, its actions may, as they did here, end up influencing prices in the
corresponding markets. Similarly, if a trading company influences the incentives paid to metal
owners for cancelling warrants, it also influences the length of the warehouse queue which, as
discussed above, is highly correlated with the Midwest Premium price. The same is true for a
trading company that influences a warehouse company’s load out policies, which have a direct
impact on the warehouse queue. In all of these cases, the trading company’s influence over the
warehouse company’s actions may provide the trading company with trading advantages.
Each of these conflicts is embedded in the larger issue of commodity trading companies
owning commodity warehousing companies. Traditionally, LME-approved warehouses were
owned by companies that were not engaged in trading. It is only in the last five years that a
significant portion of LME-approved warehouses have come under the ownership of companies
that trade in the commodity markets.
1372
That new development raises serious conflict of interest
concerns illustrated by the Metro-Goldman relationship.
1370
10/15/2014 email from LME legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-03-000001 - 004.
1371
See, e.g., “Goldman Sachs Offers Aluminum to Clients Stuck in Queue,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore
(7/31/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/goldman-sachs-offers-aluminum-to-clients-stuck-in-
queue.html.
1372
See earlier discussion.
224
(b) Aluminum Market Impact
The Metro warehouse practices described above also had a broader market impact. In the
last five years, Metro has expanded rapidly and, by early 2014, controlled 85% of the U.S. LME
aluminum storage market. It also developed an extraordinarily long queue that was highly
correlated with the recent, unprecedented increases in the Midwest Premium.
Metro’s warehouse practices in Detroit likely contributed to the Midwest Premium’s
rapid rise since 2010, in both real dollar terms and in its growing percentage of the all-in price of
aluminum. That percentage increase necessarily reduced the percentage of the all-in aluminum
price attributable to the LME reference price, undermining the ability of aluminum users to
effectively hedge their price risks on the LME futures market. Higher premium prices and less
effective hedging tools have caused widespread difficulty for aluminum users facing volatile
aluminum prices, including in the defense, transportation, beverage, and construction sectors.
These facts suggest that changes in aluminum prices over the past several years may not have
been simply the product of fundamental market forces of supply and demand, but also responses
to the warehousing practices and transactions described in this report. To restore the integrity of
warehousing operations and aluminum pricing, it seems essential to separate warehouse
companies from trading companies.
(c) Non-Public Information
A third set of concerns highlighted by Goldman’s physical aluminum activities involves
the issue of a trading company’s gaining unfair advantages through access to commercially
valuable, non-public information. When Goldman acquired Metro, it acquired a company with
vast amounts of commercially valuable, non-public information about aluminum including, with
respect to incoming and outgoing metal shipments, information regarding large cancellations,
metal re-warranting, non-LME metal stockpiles, and queue lengths. As described earlier, access
to that type of information can give a commodity trader an unfair advantage over trading
counterparties.
While both Metro and Goldman have information barrier policies designed to implement
the LME’s requirements, those policies and LME’s rules nevertheless allowed over 50 Goldman
employees, including some with trading and trading management responsibilities, to receive
routine reports with commercially valuable, non-public information from Metro.
1373
For
example, Gregory Agran, sat on Metro’s Board of Directors at the same time he headed a
commodities trading desk for Goldman and worked alongside Goldman aluminum traders on the
same trading floor in New York.
1374
Similarly, Isabelle Ealet, who was, for most of the relevant
period, Head of Global Commodities at Goldman, received information about Metro while, at the
1373
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-up Requests,” PSI-Goldman Sachs-17-
000001 - 005, at 002, and Exhibits A and B, PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-000007, 009 (also listed as
GSPSICOMMODS00046225 - 226).
1374
Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/14/2014).
225
same time, exercising responsibility over all of Goldman’s commodities-related trading
operations, including aluminum trading.
1375
When Goldman acquired Metro and obtained access to non-public Metro information, it
also increased its aluminum trading, hired new aluminum traders friendly with Metro
management, accumulated massive aluminum holdings, engaged in outsized aluminum
transactions, and traded in aluminum-related swaps.
1376
In addition, Goldman employees,
through the Metro Board of Directors and otherwise, reviewed and approved the merry-go-round
deals, which meant Goldman personnel had non-public information about the deals ahead of
time, including the size, nature, and timing of the cancellations.
If Metro or Goldman were to violate the LME’s information barrier requirements, the
LME could rescind approval of Metro’s warehouse system. But doing so could disrupt LME
trading worldwide and damage the LME itself, making it a difficult penalty to impose.
1377
Another problem is that U.S. law today does not prohibit the use of material, non-public
information in commodity transactions in the same manner as securities transactions. For most
of its 200-year history, commodity futures markets were relatively small in size and dominated
by commodity producers and users seeking to hedge price risks. They traditionally controlled
roughly 70% of the futures trading, while speculators controlled only about 30%.
1378
Today,
however, those percentages have reversed, and financial firms – including bank holding
companies – have become the dominant players in commodity markets.
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission adopted a
rule that is intended to implement an “insider trading” prohibition that is similar to the
longstanding prohibition on insider trading in the securities laws.
1379
It is unclear, however, if
the CFTC’s new prohibition applies to the facts described here, and if so, how it might work.
For example, even assuming that the LME rule and Metro information barrier policies
established a sufficient duty to not trade based on non-public warehouse information, it is
unclear whether the scope of the prohibition would cover trading in the physical markets, as
opposed to the financial markets. If markets are to be fair in their operations, larger traders
should be legally precluded from using material non-public information gained from warehouse
ownership to benefit their trading activities in the physical and financial markets for
commodities stored in those warehouses.
1375
Subcommittee interview of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014). Ms. Ealet told the Subcommittee that, despite receiving
written Metro briefings and occasional updates from J acques Gabillon, she exercised little to no oversight of Metro
operations and was generally not involved in individual commodities trading strategies or positions. Id.
1376
See 9/17/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
15-000001 - 015, at 003.
1377
The LME may be in the process of establishing new, more practical penalties and enforcement powers.
11/10/2014 email from LME to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-06-000001 - 003.
1378
See “Excessive Speculation and Compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act,” hearing before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, S. Hrg. 112-313 (11/3/2011) , at 32-33,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg72487/pdf/CHRG-112shrg72487.pdf (testimony of CFTC Chairman Gary Genseler indicating that, 2011,
80% of the oil futures market participants were speculators, as opposed to producers or consumers).
1379
See “Rule 180.1: The CFTC Targets Fraud and Manipulation,” New York Law J ournal, David Mesiter, J ocelyn
Strauber and Brittany Bettman, (4/7/2014),http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202649563488/Rule-1801-
The-CFTC-Targets-Fraud-and-Manipulation?slreturn=20141010180332.
226
In the meantime, a trading company that has access to non-public information from a
warehouse company presents the former with ongoing opportunities to use that information to
benefit its trading activities.
(4) Analysis
All three of the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee were heavily
involved with aluminum trading. In addition, Goldman was not the only financial holding
company that owned a network of LME-approved warehouses. For four years, J PMorgan owned
the Henry Bath network of LME warehouses, although those warehouses operated without
lengthy queues and J PMorgan sold the business in 2014.
Goldman’s aluminum activities and its ownership of Metro illustrate troubling issues
involving conflicts of interest, market distortions, and the potential to gain unfair trading
advantages from non-public information, all of which can arise when a financial holding
company owns a commodity-related business at the same time it is actively trading the same
commodities. Since being acquired by Goldman, Metro’s practices have likely added billions of
dollars in costs to a wide range of aluminum users, from beer makers to car manufacturers to
defense companies that make warships for the Navy. It is past time for the Federal Reserve and
other regulators, including the LME, to adopt and enforce needed safeguards on this high risk
physical commodity activity.
227
V. MORGAN STANLEY
Morgan Stanley has a long history of involvement with a vast array of physical
commodities. For many years prior to becoming a bank holding company in 2008, Morgan
Stanley built up an extensive series of businesses involving oil products, adding natural gas as a
secondary focus in recent years, among other commodities. This case study examines Morgan
Stanley’s involvement with natural gas through trading, investments in a major pipeline
company, and actions to construct its own natural gas compression facility. It also examines
how Morgan Stanley once ran an empire of oil-related commodity activities, including trading,
storing, transporting, and supplying oil products, including supplying jet fuel to airlines. Each of
the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee was heavily involved with oil
and natural gas activities; this case history illustrates common issues involving operational risks
and conflicts of interest.
A. Overview of Morgan Stanley
Morgan Stanley is a large global financial services firm incorporated under Delaware law
and headquartered in New York City.
1380
It is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
under the ticker symbol “MS.”
1381
In addition to being one of the largest financial holding
companies in the United States, Morgan Stanley conducts operations in more than 25 countries
andhas over 55,000 employees.
1382
In 2013, Morgan Stanley reported total consolidated assets
of $833 billion, $32 billion in revenues, and net income of $3.6 billion.
1383
Morgan Stanley Leadership. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of Morgan Stanley is J ames P. Gorman.
1384
He has been Chief Executive Officer since 2010 and
Chairman of the Board since 2012.
1385
His predecessor was J ohn J . Mack. The Chief Operating
Officer is J ames Rosenthal, and the Chief Financial Officer is Ruth Porat.
1386
The Global Co-
Heads of Morgan Stanley Commodities are Simon Greenshields and Colin Bryce.
1387
Three
other senior commodities executives are Peter Sherk, Head of North American Power and Gas;
1380
2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 1,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm.
1381
Undated “Investor Relations,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/ir/
sec_filings.html.
1382
Id.; undated “Global Offices,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/offices/
index.html; undated “Morgan Stanley,” prepared by New York Times, New York Times website,http://dealbook.on.nytimes.com/public/overview?symbol=MS; 6/30/2014 “Holding Companies with Assets Greater
Than $10 Billion,” prepared by the National Information Center using data from the Federal Reserve, Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council website,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
1383
2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 50,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm; 12/31/2013
“Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Morgan Stanley with the
Federal Reserve.
1384
2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 21,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm.
1385
Id.
1386
Id.
1387
1/9/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-624436 -
508, at 450.
228
Deborah Hart, Chief Operating Officer of North American Power and Gas; and Nancy King,
Global Head of Oil Liquids Flow.
1388
(1) Background
Morgan Stanley was formed by former members of J .P. Morgan & Company after
enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
1389
Because the Glass-Steagall Act required the
separation of commercial banking and investment banking activities, in 1935, Henry S. Morgan,
and Harold Stanley left J .P. Morgan & Company, which chose to remain a bank, and formed
Morgan Stanley as a separate securities firm.
1390
Since its formation, the firm has grown
significantly while conducting a wide range of securities, investment, and other financial
activities, including trading in commodities. Morgan Stanley first registered with the CFTC as a
futures commodity merchant in 1982,
1391
and over the next few years began trading oil and
natural gas futures and options.
1392
In 1986, Morgan Stanley became a publicly traded
corporation.
1393
Bank Holding Company. In September 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis,
Morgan Stanley submitted,
1394
and the Federal Reserve approved on the same day,
1395
an
application to become a bank holding company with access to Federal Reserve lending
programs. At the same time, Morgan Stanley converted an industrial bank it held in Utah into a
national bank under supervision of the OCC.
1396
Morgan Stanley also elected to become a
financial holding company.
1397
Today, Morgan Stanley owns two banks with federal deposit
1388
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
005.
1389
Undated “Company History - Interactive Timeline,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/timeline/index.html#/year/1930.
1390
Id.
1391
Undated “Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,” National Futures Association BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=UpygXzt3Ct4=&rn=N.
1392
1/9/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-624436 -
508, at 450; 2/11/2013 presentation “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley for the Subcommittee (hereinafter, “2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview”), PSI-
MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, at 004.
1393
Undated “Company History - Interactive Timeline,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/timeline/index.html#/year/1980.
1394
9/21/2008 “Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by Morgan Stanley for prior
approval to acquire 100% of Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association and thereby become a Bank Holding
Company Pursuant to Section 3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act and a Declaration to become Financial
Holding Company pursuant Section 225.82 of Regulation Y,” prepared by Morgan Stanley and filed with the
Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-302972 - 996 (full capitalization of some words omitted).
1395
9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain
NonBanking Activities,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf; 9/21/2008 Morgan Stanley press
release, “Morgan Stanley Granted Federal Bank Holding Company Status by U.S. Federal Reserve Board of
Governors,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/6933.html.
1396
9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain
NonBanking Activities,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, at 1,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf .
1397
Undated “Financial Holding Companies,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
229
insurance, Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A. and Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A.
1398
At the end of
2013, their combined deposits totaled about $112 billion.
1399
Key Subsidiaries. In addition to its banks, other key Morgan Stanley subsidiaries
include Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, a U.S. broker-dealer and futures commission merchant;
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, another U.S. broker-dealer and futures commission
merchant; and Morgan Stanley Capital Services LLC, a U.S. swap dealer.
1400
Morgan Stanley
Capital Group Inc. is its leading U.S. subsidiary in the commodities area; it is also a swap
dealer.
1401
Its leading U.K. subsidiary is Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc, which is
registered as a broker-dealer.
1402
Major Business Lines. According to Morgan Stanley, it has three primary business
segments: (1) Institutional Securities, which provides financial advisory, capital-raising, lending,
trading, and investment services to institutional clients such as corporations, hedge funds, and
other financial institutions; (2) Wealth Management, which provides similar services to
individual investors “through a network of 16,784 global representatives in 649 locations”; and
(3) Investment Management, which provides equity, fixed income, real estate investing, and
merchant banking activities and services for institutional investors, high net worth individuals,
hedge funds, private equity funds, and real estate funds.
1403
The Institutional Securities
1398
Undated “BankFind Results: Morgan Stanley,” prepared by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),http://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/results.html?name=Morgan+Stanley&fdic=&address=&city=&state=&zip=
(listing seven FDIC registered banks with the “Morgan Stanley” name, but identifying Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A.
and Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A. as the only two banks with active FDIC status). Morgan Stanley Bank,
N.A. is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah and has only one location. It was first established as an industrial
bank on May 25, 1990, as Mountainwest Financial Corp. In 1998, it changed to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Bank,
Inc., and took its current name in 2008, when it also converted into a commercial bank under OCC supervision. See
undated “Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association (FDIC #: 32992),” prepared by FDIC, FDIC website,http://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank=32992&name=Morgan Stanley Bank,%20National%20A
ssociation&searchName=Morgan%20Stanley&searchFdic=&city=&state=&zip=&address=&tabId=1. Morgan
Stanley Private Bank, N.A. is headquartered in Purchase, New York and also owns “Morgan Stanley Trust Office”
in Wilmington, Delaware. Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A was established on August 12, 1996, under the name
“Dean Witter Trust FSB” as a stock savings bank in J ersey City, New J ersey. On March 24, 1998, it changed its
name to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Trust FSB. On December 10, 2001, the bank changed its name again to
“Morgan Stanley Trust.” On J uly 1, 2010, the bank changed to its current name and converted into a commercial
bank under OCC supervision. See undated “Morgan Stanley Private Bank, National Association (FDIC #: 34221),”
prepared by FDIC, FDIC website,http://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank=34221&name=
Morgan%20Stanley%20Private%20Bank,%20National%20Association&searchName=Morgan%20Stanley&search
Fdic=&city=&state=&zip=&address=&tabId=1. See also 6/30/2013 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report, filed with
the SEC on 8/2/2013, at 8-9,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513317186/d542053d10q.htm.
1399
2013 Annual Report for Morgan Stanley, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 98,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm.
1400
7/1/2014 “2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan” (hereinafter “2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan”),
prepared by Morgan Stanley, at 9,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/morgan-stanley-1g-
20140701.pdf.
1401
Id.
1402
Id.
1403
Id. at 9-12. See also 2012 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/26/2013, at 2-6,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513077191/d484822d10k.htm
230
segment’s trading and sales activities include both financial and physical commodity
activities.
1404
Commodities. With respect to commodities, Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that
the “overwhelming majority of business in physical commodities resides in Morgan Stanley
Commodities,” which is part of its Institutional Securities business segment.
1405
“Morgan
Stanley Commodities,” also referred to at times as “Global Commodities” and, in the past, as the
“Worldwide Commodities Group,” is headquartered in Purchase, New York.
1406
In 2013,
Morgan Stanley Commodities managed “365 dedicated front office employees and over 1,000
total employees… covering markets 24 hours per day.”
1407
Within the commodities group, Morgan Stanley maintained five offices, or “desks,”
organized around particular types of commodities: (1) Oil Liquids; (2) North American
Electricity and Natural Gas; (3) European Union and Asia Pacific Electricity and Natural Gas;
(4) Metals; and (5) Other Commodities.
1408
In addition, Morgan Stanley Commodities
maintained a “Principal Investments” office that invested on behalf of Morgan Stanley in
commodity-related businesses; a “Global Marketing” office which marketed physical
commodities and commodity-related services; and a “Commodities Risk Management” office,
which analyzed and monitored risks associated with commodities transactions.
1409
One key legal entity executing activities on behalf of Morgan Stanley Commodities was
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (MSCG), which conducted the bulk of its commodities
trading in the futures, swaps, options, forwards, and spot markets.
1410
MSCG also, through
various subsidiaries, owned key physical commodity businesses,
1411
including the Heidmar
Group, a marine transportation company,
1412
Wellbore Capital LLC, an oil and gas exploration
1404
2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan, at 10; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1405
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee (hereinafter “2013 Morgan Stanley
response to Subcommittee questionnaire”), PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 021, at 1. See also 8/29/2014 “Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” FRB-PSI-00000001 - 009, at 005, 007 (showing
Commodities is part of Institutional Securities); 2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan, at 10; 2012 Morgan Stanley
Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/26/2013, at 3-4,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513077191/d484822d10k.htm. Morgan Stanley
explained to the Subcommittee that its Wealth Management business segment had also maintained, since 2008, a
small inventory of precious metals, but was not otherwise involved with physical commodities. 2013 Morgan
Stanley response to Subcommittee questionnaire, at 6.
1406
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also 5/7/2009 “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley (hereinafter “2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview”),
FRB-PSI-618889 - 908, at 893.
1407
2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview, at 4.
1408
Id. at 011-027. See also 2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 893.
1409
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 893.
1410
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also 2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities
Overview, at 901.
1411
See 2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, Exhibit 21, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242dex21.htm.
1412
8/2/2006 “Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. signs definitive agreement to acquire the Heidmar Group,”
Morgan Stanley press release,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/3767.html.
231
company,
1413
and Wentworth Holdings LLC, a shell company seeking to build natural gas
compression facilities, as described further below.
1414
In addition, MSCG personnel sometimes
executed physical commodity supply contracts, such as contracts to supply jet fuel to airlines as
described below.
1415
Morgan Stanley also owned numerous other subsidiaries involved with
physical commodities, including, for example, TransMontaigne Inc., which operated an oil
storage and pipeline company as described below; MSDW Power Development Corporation,
which developed power plants and solar power companies, and Morgan Stanley Commodities
Trading Hong Kong Holdings Limited.
1416
Commodities-Related Merchant Banking. In addition to its commodities group,
Morgan Stanley engaged in commodity-related activities through certain investment funds and
merchant banking activities undertaken in other areas of the bank. Morgan Stanley’s Investment
Management business segment included a unit called “Merchant Banking and Real Estate
Investments.”
1417
It housed at least two Morgan Stanley partnerships with commodity-related
investments.
1418
The first was Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners LP (MSIP) which Morgan Stanley
established in 2007.
1419
A Morgan Stanley subsidiary, MS Infrastructure GP LP, acted as
MSIP’s general partner; Morgan Stanley employees actually directed and oversaw the
investments; and Morgan Stanley was the largest single investor with a nearly 11% ownership
stake valued at about $430 million.
1420
MSIP raised $4 billion for investments in infrastructure
projects around the world, focused in part on energy and utility projects.
1421
One key holding
was Southern Star Central Corporation which owns natural gas storage facilities and pipelines in
the U.S. Midwest, described further below.
1422
Others were Continuum Wind Energy which
1413
See, e.g., 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001
- 034, at 008, 034.
1414
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
004 (tracing ownership chain from MSCG to Wentworth Holdings LLC).
1415
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1416
Id.
1417
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1418
Id.; 8/29/2014 presentation, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 005; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 326.
1419
8/29/2014 presentation, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009.
1420
Id. at 002, 006, 009 (disclosing $430 million MSIP investment by Morgan Stanley in fund that raised $4 billion
overall); Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014); 10/24/2014 presentation “Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475,
at 456; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321
- 382, at 328.
1421
8/29/2014 presentation, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009, 011; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform
Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 331. See also undated “OECD Assets within
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Portfolios,” prepared by Morgan Stanley Infrastructure,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/portfolio.html.
1422
See 8/23/2012 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Acquires Full Ownership
of Southern Star Central Corp.,”http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/pdf/msin_08232012.pdf.
232
developed and financed wind farms in India; SAESA Group, which is the second largest energy
distributor in Chile; and Zhaoheng Hydropower, which operated hydropower plants in China.
1423
The second partnership within Merchant Banking and Real Estate Investments is Morgan
Stanley Global Private Equity.
1424
Like the infrastructure partnership, a Morgan Stanley
subsidiary acted as the general partner; Morgan Stanley employees actually directed and oversaw
its investments; and Morgan Stanley was the largest single investor with an ownership interest
varying from 23% to 33% since 2008.
1425
Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity has sponsored
five investment funds, some of which have made commodity-related investments. The most
recent fund, for example, has investments in Triana Energy, a U.S. natural gas exploration and
production company; Trinity, a U.S. carbon dioxide pipeline company; and Sterling Energy, a
U.S. natural gas gathering, processing, and marketing company.
1426
In 2013, Morgan Stanley prepared a list of its “Commodities Division Merchant Banking
Investments” and provided it to the Federal Reserve.
1427
The list identified investments in a new
TransMontaigne oil storage facility expected to begin operations in late 2013, an aircraft fuel
storage facility at an airport in the Netherlands, and a number of solar power projects.
1428
The
list did not include any reference, however, to the commodity-related investments made by the
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure or Global Private Equity investment funds.
1429
In J une 2014,
Morgan Stanley reported to the Federal Reserve that it held merchant banking investments with a
total value of about $11 billion, of which about $5 billion was held under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act; it remains unclear how many of those were commodity related and whether the total
included the commodity-related projects in the two investment funds.
1430
Commodities Trading. At the same time it conducts a wide range of physical
commodity activities, Morgan Stanley trades commodities-related financial instruments,
including futures, swaps, and options, involving billions of dollars each day. Morgan Stanley is
among the ten largest financial institutions in the United States trading financial commodity
instruments, according to Coalition Development Ltd., a company that collects commodity
1423
See 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-
400321 - 382, at 333; undated “Home,” on the Continuum Wind Energy website,http://continuumenergy.in/
(providing the company history and stating it is majority-owned by MSIP); 11/8/2011 Morgan Stanley press release,
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Announces Sales of Its Interest in SAESA Group,”http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/pdf/11082011.pdf (indicating MSIP acquired a 50% ownership
interest in SAESA Group in 2008, and sold it in 2011).
1424
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014);10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners[:]
Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 460 [sealed exhibit].
1425
See 5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006,
at 003.
1426
See undated “Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity - Portfolio,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html.
1427
Undated “Commodities Division Merchant Banking Investments,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-
400001 - 382, at 318.
1428
Id.
1429
Id.
1430
6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies - FR Y-
12,” prepared by Morgan Stanley and filed with the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-800009 - 012.
233
trading statistics.
1431
OCC data indicates it is one of the largest financial institutions trading
commodity-related derivatives.
1432
Commodities Revenues. Historically, commodity activities provided a significant
revenue stream for Morgan Stanley. Over time, revenues derived from this area have dropped
substantially. According to an internal Morgan Stanley presentation, in 2008, the commodities
group produced about $3 billion in revenues for the firm,
1433
with “22% and 26% [c]ompound
[a]nnual [g]rowth [r]ates for revenues and [p]rofit efore [t]ax, respectively.”
1434
The Federal
Reserve estimated that, as of March 31, 2011, Morgan Stanley had about $13.1 billion in
commodities-related assets, of which about $9 billion “relate[d] to the ownership and trading of
oil-related commodities” and $900 million “relate[d] to the ownership and trading of electricity
and natural gas in North America.”
1435
In a 2013 presentation to the Subcommittee, however, Morgan Stanley provided data
showing that its commodities revenues had declined every year since 2008.
1436
From a total of
$3 billion in 2008, its net revenues had fallen by two-thirds in 2012, to $912 million.
1437
The oil
liquids desk experienced the greatest drop in revenues, falling from $1.4 billion in 2008, to a
2012 total of $676 million.
1438
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities
According to Morgan Stanley, it first began trading physical and financial commodities
in the early 1980s.
1439
Its first foray was in 1982, after it registered as a futures commissions
merchant, trading precious metals.
1440
Over the next few years, Morgan Stanley also began
1431
9/2014 “Global & Regional Investment Bank League Tables - 1H2014,” prepared by Coalition Development
Ltd., PSI-Coalition-01-000019 - 025, at 020 - 021.
1432
12/31/2013 “OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013,” prepared
by OCC, at Tables 1 and 2,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
1433
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 896; 2013 Morgan Stanley response to Subcommittee
questionnaire, at 5.
1434
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 891.
1435
6/19/2011 internal Federal Reserve email, “MS Commodities details for 4(o) memo,” FRB-PSI-200942-200943,
at 943.
1436
2013 Morgan Stanley Business Overview, at 009.
1437
Id.
1438
Id. See also “Morgan Stanley Said to Cut 10% of Commodities J obs Amid Rut,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore
(6/20/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-06-20/morgan-stanley-said-to-cut-commodities-jobs-as-
revenue-declines.html (“Morgan Stanley is cutting jobs in its commodities business, one of the Wall Street’s three
biggest, after Chief Executive Officer J ames Gorman said revenue the past two quarters was among the unit’s worst
in 18 years.”).
1439
See undated document prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled, “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities
at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs between 1997 and Present,” FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 452 (presenting two
timelines described as having been submitted by Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve “[d]uring exams”) [sealed
exhibit]. The same two timelines appear in an undated document prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled,
“Appendix: Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Timelines” (hereinafter “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities
Timelines”), FRB-PSI-000025 [sealed exhibit]. In addition, one of the timelines appears in 2009 “Morgan Stanley
Global Commodities Overview,” FRB-PSI-618889 – 908, at 892; and in 2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities
Business Overview, at PSI-MorganStanley-01-000011, at 011 - 027.
1440
2009 “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, FRB-PSI-618889 - 908.
234
trading crude oil and natural gas.
1441
In 1984, Morgan Stanley entered into a joint venture with
Transco Energy Company and others to form the Natural Gas Clearinghouse (NGC), which
“brokered and marketed natural gas and gas liquids” and owned pipeline transportation
operations.
1442
In 1985, Morgan Stanley bought out the other investors to acquire sole
ownership, then sold NGC in 1989.
1443
In the late 1980s, according to Morgan Stanley, it also
began intensifying its activities associated with storing oil, chartering oil transport, and refining
oil products.
1444
During all of this period, Morgan Stanley operated, not as a bank, but as a
securities firm that had no restrictions on its commodity-related investments.
During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Morgan Stanley continued to increase
its commodities trading activities as well as its investments in physical commodity businesses.
According to Morgan Stanley, in the 1990s, it expanded into trading base metals and electricity,
while making investments in a hydroelectric power producer, aluminum manufacturer, and steel
rolling mill.
1445
Over time, Morgan Stanley acquired additional interests in power plants,
holding, directly or through subsidiaries, interests in seven power plants (two in the United States
and five abroad), seven wind generation companies, and thirteen solar power generation
companies.
1446
In addition, according to Morgan Stanley, between 1990 and 2000, it invested in the
following commodity-related ventures: a company that produced fertilizer and other agricultural
minerals and chemicals; a pork production facility and packing plant; “the largest methanol
production facility in the U.S.”; and two natural gas companies, one of which owned an interstate
natural gas pipeline and marketing facility.
1447
Other commodity-related holdings included an
investment in the Tennessee Valley Steel Corporation; an entity which owned two major
ethylene production facilities and five processing plants; and a railroad freight transporter.
1448
By September 30, 1997, Morgan Stanley reported that, through Morgan Stanley Capital Group
Inc. and Morgan Stanley & Co. International, it was engaged in a “variety of commodity
derivative and physical commodity transactions … [in] crude oil and oil liquids, natural gas,
electricity and other power and energy commodities and metals.”
1449
In 2000, Morgan Stanley joined other financial institutions and oil companies in founding
the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), an electronic trading facility specialized in commodity-
1441
Id. See also 7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174 - 178
(citing investments in various natural gas producing, processing, and transportation ventures).
1442
5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 171.
1443
Id.
1444
“Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview,” PSI-618889 - 908.
1445
Id. See also 5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 169 - 171.
1446
See 11/27/2009 chart prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled, “Commodities Activities at Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley,” FRB-PSI-200944 - 959, at 952 [sealed exhibit]. See also 8/31/2005 “Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Reply to Morgan Stanley” (hereinafter “FERC Reply”), prepared by FERC, FERC website,http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20050831171232-ER94-1384-030.pdf (listing as parties to a FERC
enforcement action some Morgan Stanley wholly-owned subsidiaries that owned or operated power plants).
1447
5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 169-170; 7/8/2010 letter
from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173. - 182, at 175.
1448
5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 171; 7/8/2010 letter from
Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at175.
1449
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 173.
235
linked financial instruments.
1450
Morgan Stanley further expanded its commodities activities
into the areas of coal and freight (2001), biofuels (2005), emissions (2004), and agriculture
(2007).
1451
Morgan Stanley also became involved with power plants, acquiring 100% ownership
of a number of power plants, including power plants in Nevada, Georgia, and Alabama.
1452
All
of these activities took place prior to Morgan Stanley’s conversion to a bank holding company in
September 2008.
During the twenty-five year period from 1982 to 2007, Morgan Stanley concentrated
significant resources on building its investments related to oil products, acquiring businesses
involved in, not only the trading of oil-linked financial instruments, but also the production,
storage, transport, and delivery of physical oil products, as further explained below. Morgan
Stanley reported that, by 2008, oil liquids accounted for approximately fifty percent of its
Worldwide Commodities Group balance sheet.
1453
In September 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, when Morgan Stanley applied to
become a bank holding company, its application included this description of its commodity
activities:
“The Applicant trades as principal and maintains long and short proprietary trading
positions in the spot, forward and futures markets in several commodities, including
metals (base and precious), agricultural products, crude oil, oil products, natural gas,
electric power, emissions credits, coal, freight, liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) and related
products and indices. The Applicant is a market-maker in exchange-traded options and
futures and OTC options and swaps on commodities, and offers counterparties hedging
programs relating to productions, consumption, reserve/inventory management and
structured transactions, including energy-contract securitizations. The Applicant is also
an electricity power marketer in the U.S. and owns five electricity generating facilities in
the U.S. and Europe. The Applicant owns TransMontaigne Inc. and its subsidiaries, a
group of companies operating the refined petroleum products marketing and distribution
business, and an interest in the Heidmar Group of companies, which provide international
marine transportation and U.S. marine logistics services.”
1454
1450
Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Timelines; “Intercontinental Exchange to Acquire NYSE for $8.2
Billion,” Bloomberg, Nina Mehta & Nandini Sukumar (12/20/12),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-
20/intercontinentalexchange-said-in-merger-talks-with-nyse-euronext.html (explaining the Intercontinental
Exchange as a “12-year-old energy and commodity futures bourse” with Morgan Stanley as its lead adviser).
1451
“2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview”, FRB-PSI-618889 - 908.
1452
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (11/18/2014); 2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the
SEC on 2/25/2014, Exhibit 21,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242dex21.htm.
1453
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at FRB-PSI-000897.
1454
9/21/2008 “Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by Morgan Stanley for prior
approval to acquire 100% of Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association and thereby become a Bank Holding
Company Pursuant to Section 3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act and a Declaration to become Financial
Holding Company pursuant Section 225.82 of Regulation Y,” FRB-PSI-302972 - 996, at 979 (full capitalization of
some words omitted).
236
The application noted that, in 2007, Morgan Stanley had formed a “Merchant Banking Division”
which included “private equity funds and [an] infrastructure investing group.”
1455
Morgan Stanley’s 2008 application also included these overall observations on its
commodities activities, as well as a request for a five-year grace period to “conform or divest any
impermissible activities”:
“Physical commodities may exceed the Federal Reserve’s cap of 5% of Tier 1 capital.
The commodities business extends beyond the Federal Reserve restriction that physical
commodities be limited to those for which derivative contracts have been authorized for
trading on a U.S. futures exchange by the CFTC. … Accordingly, Morgan Stanley
respectfully requests that the Federal Reserve grant a five-year grace period during which
Morgan Stanley can conform or divest any impermissible activities or investments.”
1456
Although Morgan Stanley’s application acknowledged that it might be asked to divest some of
its physical commodity activities, the Federal Reserve did not, in 2008, make that request.
After becoming a bank holding company, Morgan Stanley continued for a number of
years to expand its physical commodity activities. By 2013, Morgan Stanley had accumulated a
long list of commodity-related subsidiaries. They included Heidmar Group, Inc., Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Inc., Morgan Stanley International Holdings, Inc., Morgan Stanley
Petroleum Development LLC, Morgan Stanley Renewables, Inc., MSDW Power Development
Corp., MS Solar Holdings Inc., MS Solar Solutions Corp., Olco Petroleum, South Eastern
Electric Development Corporation, South Eastern Generating Corp., and TransMontaigne Inc.,
each of which had been involved with acquiring interests in businesses that handle physical
commodities.
1457
(3) Current Status
When the Federal Reserve initiated its special review of financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities in 2010, Morgan Stanley was one of the ten banks it
examined in detail. Morgan Stanley was also featured in the October 2012 Summary Report
issued by the Federal Reserve’s Commodities Team summarizing the findings of the special
review.
1458
The 2012 Summary Report described Morgan Stanley’s wide-ranging physical
commodity activities. According to the report, Morgan Stanley held operating leases on more
1455
Id. at 982.
1456
Id. at 986.
1457
See, e.g., 2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, Exhibit 21,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242dex21.htm; undated document
prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled, “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 and Present,” FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 444-446 [sealed exhibit].; 7/8/2010 letter
from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at181.
1458
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510 [sealed exhibit].
237
than one hundred oil storage tank fields with a global storage capacity of 58 million barrels;
1459
“18 natural gas storage facilities in US and Europe with total lease payments as high as
$2[billion]”;
1460
and six power plants, three of which were in the United States.
1461
The 2012
Summary Report also noted that Morgan Stanley had “over 100 ships under time charters or
voyages for movement of oil product, and was ranked 9
th
globally in shipping oil distillates in
2009.”
1462
According to the report, Morgan Stanley also planned to increase its capacity to ship
liquefied natural gas.
1463
The 2012 Summary Report also identified multiple concerns with Morgan Stanley’s
physical commodities operations. One Federal Reserve concern was that Morgan Stanley, like
its peers, had insufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic
event. The report noted at one point that, while Morgan Stanley had calculated a potential oil
spill risk of $360 million, through “aggressive assumptions” and “diversification benefits,” it had
reduced that total by nearly 70% to $54 million, allocating risk capital for only that much smaller
amount.
1464
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report expressed concern that Morgan Stanley had
determined that the “operational and event risks of owning power facilities” was capped at the
dollar value of those facilities in the event of their total loss, with some insurance to cover “the
death and disability of workers” and some facility replacement costs, but leaving all other
expenses, including a “failure to deliver electricity under contract,” to be paid by the holding
company.
1465
At another point, the 2012 Summary Report compared the level of Morgan
Stanley’s capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with “extreme loss
scenarios,” and found that, like its peers, “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by $1
billion to $15 billion.
1466
If Morgan Stanley were to incur losses from its physical commodity
activities while maintaining insufficient capital and insurance protections, the Federal Reserve,
and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, could be asked to rescue the firm.
In 2013, when the Subcommittee asked Morgan Stanley about its physical commodity
activities, the financial holding company provided information that, consistent with the 2012
Summary Report, depicted far-reaching commodity operations. Morgan Stanley reported trading
in the physical commodities of aluminum, copper, gold, lead, palladium, platinum, silver,
rhodium, zinc, coal, crude oil, heating oil, ethanol, fuel oil, gasoline, jet kerosene, naphtha, and
natural gas.
1467
Morgan Stanley also reported maintaining inventories of many physical
commodities. In 2012, the last complete year of data provided to the Subcommittee, those
1459
Id. at 485.
1460
Id.
1461
Id.
1462
Id. at 486.
1463
Id.
1464
Id. at 493 - 494.
1465
Id. at 494.
1466
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
1467
3/4/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-03-000001 - 003, at
003.
238
inventories included 5,300 metric tons of aluminum, 3,600 metric tons of copper, 1.7 million
barrels of crude oil, 5.8 million barrels of heating oil, and 6.2 million barrels of gasoline.
1468
“Optimizing” its Commodity Activities. In September 2014, Morgan Stanley told the
Subcommittee that, while it did not intend to exit the physical commodities business entirely, it
was exiting its “global physical oil merchanting business,” meaning its worldwide business of
buying, selling, storing, and transporting oil for clients, including through its U.S. subsidiary,
TransMontaigne.
1469
Morgan Stanley explained:
“Morgan Stanley has decided to exit certain of its physical commodities business lines,
including its global physical oil merchanting business and its investment in
TransMontaigne, Inc.
Morgan Stanley plans to realign its commodities business to be more client focused. It
plans to continue developing its global commodities business, which is focused on
providing risk management and financing services to its clients across the commodities
space, including risk intermediation, liquidity provision, lending and investor business, as
well as providing supply solutions to its clients.”
1470
On J uly 1, 2014, Morgan Stanley completed the sale of TransMontaigne to NGL Energy
Partners LP for $200 million cash plus an additional $347 million for inventory transferred at
closing.
1471
This sale transferred to NGL Energy a significant portion of Morgan Stanley’s
physical commodity activities, including extensive oil and gas storage and pipeline capacity in
the United States. On December 20, 2013, Morgan Stanley also entered into an agreement with
a subsidiary of Rosneft Oil Company to sell the rest of its global oil merchanting business.
1472
Rosneft is a Russian state-owned corporation that is the country’s largest petroleum company
and third largest gas producer.
1473
Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Rosneft another large
segment of its physical commodity activities, including oil storage facility leases and a large
inventory of oil products. Morgan Stanley has since indicated publicly that the planned sale may
not close due to recent sanctions imposed by the United States on Rosneft in connection with
1468
Id.
1469
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel (9/11/2014); 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley
legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at 003.
1470
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
003.
1471
7/2/2014 NGL Energy press release, “NGL Energy Partners LP Announces Completion of Acquisition of
TransMontaigne GP and Related Assets,”http://www.nglenergypartners.com/investor-relations/news/. See also
“Morgan Stanley to sell oil business TransMontaigne to NGL Energy,” The Wall Street J ournal, J ustin Baer,
(6/9/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanley-sells-stake-in-transmontaigne-to-ngl-1402316959.
1472
6/30/2014 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report , filed with the SEC on 8/5/2014, at 113,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514295874/d763478d10q.htm; 12/20/2013 Morgan
Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to sell global oil merchanting business to Rosneft,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
1473
See 7/16/2014 Treasury press release, “Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial
Services and Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's
Sovereignty,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx.
239
Russia’s incursions into Ukraine.
1474
If the sale does not proceed, Morgan Stanley has indicated
that it will work to locate another buyer for the rest of its oil merchanting business.
1475
In contrast to its efforts to exit its oil merchanting business, in recent years, Morgan
Stanley has taken actions to continue and even expand its physical natural gas holdings. In 2012,
the Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners investment fund acquired a 100% ownership of
Southern Star, a large natural gas pipeline company in the Midwest, as explained below.
1476
In
2013, Morgan Stanley initiated an effort to build, own, and operate compressed natural gas
facilities in Texas and Georgia, as described below.
1477
In August 2014, Morgan Stanley
purchased a large number of natural gas trading book assets from Deutsche Bank, consisting
primarily of financial rather than physical assets, also described below.
1478
In October 2014, however, Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it was
reconsidering its natural gas activities and may sell both Southern Star and its compressed
natural gas project.
1479
In November 2014, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Executive Officer J ames
Gorman gave a public interview in which he indicated that Morgan Stanley was in the process of
“optimizing” its commodities business to eliminate ownership and operation of physical assets:
“We’ve been pretty clear about our commodities businesses. It essentially is two
businesses. We have physical businesses, where we actually own and operate physical
assets. We store fuel, we own pipelines, we ship oil …. And on the other side is the
trading business, where we facilitate trading for people in need to hedge their exposure to
wheat, or pork bellies, or silver, or gold, or whatever commodity. And what I’ve said by
optimizing is, we’re not going to be in the physical side. …. All we’re doing by
optimizing is removing the ownership and operation of [the] physical commodity
plant. What other firms do is their business, that’s what Morgan Stanley is going to
do.”
1480
Morgan Stanley explained to the Subcommittee that these plans apply only to its
commodities division, but not to other areas of the bank, and that the commodities division
would be focusing on “its core strength – providing intermediation, risk management, and supply
1474
See id.; 9/12/2014 Treasury press release, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions within the Russian
Financial Services, Energy and Defense or Related Materiel Sectors,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx; “Morgan Stanley says ‘no assurance’ Rosneft deal will close,” Reuters (10/10/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/morgan-stanley-rosneft-idUSL2N0S524L20141010 .
1475
11/18/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-25-000001 – 008, at
002.
1476
Undated “OECD Assets within Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Portfolios” prepared by Morgan Stanley, Morgan
Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/; 8/29/2014 presentation “Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 – 037;
Subcommittee interview of Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1477
8/29/2014 presentation “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 006.
1478
See 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 -
009.
1479
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley legal counsel (10/22/2014).
1480
11/13/2014 interview of J ames Gorman, Bloomberg,http://www.bloomberg.com/video/morgan-stanley-ceo-
gorman-on-industry-strategy-OPPkV0QFQqC4J AbdcvImYQ.html.
240
services – rather than owning transportation, storage, or other infrastructure assets that are used
in connection with physical commodities.”
1481
Morgan Stanley also wrote:
“Morgan Stanley expects to continue to purchase, sell, and make and take delivery of
physical commodities in connection with its core business of providing intermediation
and risk management to its clients. … Effective hedging strategies include transacting in
physical commodities. Morgan Stanley Commodities division will use fully-vetted third
party owners and operators of any facilities used to transport, store, produce, generate, or
modify those commodities.”
1482
These explanations indicate that Morgan Stanley is reducing its physical commodities activities,
but not exiting the area.
1481
11/18/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-25-000001 – 008, at
004.
1482
Id. at 004 – 005.
241
B. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas
Morgan Stanley has long been an active trader of natural gas. Over the last five years, it
has also used shell companies and merchant banking investments controlled by Morgan Stanley
personnel to invest in an array of physical natural gas businesses. Over the last year, Morgan
Stanley set up three shell companies under the name of Wentworth to build and operate a $355
million compressed natural gas facility in Texas. In one of the first operations of its kind, the
facility is designed to produce containerized gas on a large-scale, primarily for export to Central
America and the Caribbean. In addition, Morgan Stanley has engaged in commodity-related
merchant banking activities through two investment funds it controls, Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners and Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity. Those merchant banking
activities include a large natural gas pipeline company in the Midwest, Southern Star, as well as
natural gas exploration, production, and processing facilities around the country. Because
Morgan Stanley relied on its merchant banking and grandfather authorities, Morgan Stanley did
not notify or obtain prior permission from the Federal Reserve to engage in those physical
natural gas activities.
Morgan Stanley’s physical natural gas activities raise multiple concerns, including using
shell companies to conduct physical commodity activities, unfair competition in commercial
enterprises, insufficient capital and insurance to protect against operational and catastrophic
event risks, conflicts of interest arising from obtaining non-public information about natural gas
supplies and transport, while trading natural gas in the financial markets, and inadequate
safeguards on high risk natural gas activities.
(1) Background on Natural Gas
Natural gas is an odorless, gaseous mixture of hydrocarbons dominated by methane.
1482
It is a primary source of energy in the United States, representing nearly one quarter of U.S.
energy consumption.
1483
In the United States, natural gas consumption is second only to oil,
followed by coal, nuclear, and other energy sources.
1484
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
estimates that one-third of U.S. natural gas consumption goes to “residential and commercial
uses, such as heating and cooking; one-third to industrial uses; and one-third to electric power
production.”
1485
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), natural gas
consumption has increased in the United States over the past five years, particularly in the
1482
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
1483
“Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S Hrg. 110-235 (6/25/2007 and 7/9/2007), at 210 (hereinafter “2007 Subcommittee Hearing”). See
also undated “Uses,” NaturalGas.org,http://naturalgas.org/overview/uses/.
1484
See 7/3/2013 EIA report “Energy sources have changed throughout the history of the United States,”http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11951. In 2013, the United States consumed approximately 26
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. See “Frequently Asked Questions,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=50&t=8.
1485
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
242
industrial sector, due to low prices.
1486
Inexpensive natural gas has been directly linked, for
example, to increased manufacturing and related jobs.
1487
U.S. natural gas exports have also
been growing.
1488
Natural Gas Production. The United States has become a leading producer of natural
gas. According to the American Gas Association:
“Beginning in 2006, domestic natural gas production began to grow and has done so
every year since, primarily due to the development of domestic, onshore, unconventional
resources – specifically shale gas – to the point where the U.S. is now the world’s largest
gas producer.”
1489
EIA has indicated that it anticipates natural gas production will grow by 5% in 2014, and another
2% in 2015, driven by industrial demand.
1490
According to DOE, in recent years, 80% to 90%
of the natural gas used in the United States was produced domestically.
1491
Natural Gas Infrastructure. To produce usable energy from natural gas, an extensive
infrastructure is required. It includes pipelines, initial treatment plants, refineries, and storage
facilities. More than 2.4 million miles of underground pipelines transport natural gas from gas
fields and wellheads to refineries, utilities, residences, and industrial sites, “provid[ing] service to
more than 177 million Americans.”
1492
Initial treatment plants process raw natural gas to ready
it for transport to larger refineries.
1493
Refineries remove additional impurities and fluids to
produce “pipeline quality” dry natural gas.
1494
Storage facilities capture and pressurize gas for
later use. As the American Gas Association has explained:
“Natural gas utilities purchase natural gas during warm-weather months, when it
traditionally costs less, and store it for later use on cold days. Storage can account for half
1486
See 9/2014 “Short-term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” section on “Natural Gas,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1487
See, e.g., “J ob growth expected from cheap natural gas,” USA Today, Paul Davidson (3/27/2012),http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-03-27/natural-gas-manufacturing-
boom/53812740/1 (One estimate was that inexpensive natural gas “could help U.S. manufacturers save $11.6 billion
a year and create more than 500,000 jobs by 2025.”).
1488
See 9/2014 “Short-term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” section on “Natural Gas,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1489
2014 “Natural Gas Supply and Prices,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Supply and Prices.pdf.
1490
“Short-term energy and winter fuels outlook,” (10/07/2014), EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1491
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
1492
2014 “Get the Facts: Pipeline Safety,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Pipeline Safety.pdf.
1493
See, e.g., 1/2006 “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production
and Its Transportation to Market,” prepared by EIA Office of Oil and Gas, at 3,http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf.
1494
Id.
243
of some utilities’ natural gas supplies on winter’s coldest days, contributing to reliable
service.”
1495
Currently, natural gas in storage continues to outpace historical norms.
1496
Exporters of natural
gas use Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) or Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facilities to prepare the
gas for shipment.
Natural Gas Markets. Natural gas prices are determined through two types of markets,
physical and financial. As explained in an earlier Subcommittee report examining the natural
gas market:
“Natural gas prices are determined through the interaction of the two major types of
markets for natural gas: the cash (or ‘physical’) markets, which involve the purchase and
sale of physical quantities of natural gas; and the financial markets, which involve the
purchase and sale of financial instruments whose prices are linked to the price of natural
gas in the physical market.”
1497
In the cash markets, natural gas prices are generally negotiated by the buyers and sellers.
1498
Key market participants are natural gas producers, distributors, utilities, and industrial users.
In the financial markets, natural gas can be traded through a variety of financial
instruments, including futures, swaps, options, and forwards. One key financial instrument,
listed by the CME Group Inc., is a standardized natural gas futures contract for 10,000 mmBtu
(millions of British thermal units) of natural gas.
1499
Known as the Henry Hub natural gas
futures contract, it is the “third-largest physical commodity futures contract in the world by
volume,” and is widely used as a benchmark price for physical natural gas transactions in the
United States.
1500
The contract can be settled financially or through the physical delivery of
natural gas, although physical settlement is atypical.
1501
The contract is traded on the CME
Globex and CME Clearport trading platforms, and by open outcry on the NYMEX floor.
1502
The
natural gas futures market has numerous participants, and Henry Hub futures contracts typically
have substantial open interest on a daily basis. Natural gas can also be traded through a variety
of financially-settled, over-the-counter swaps and options on the Intercontinental Exchange
1495
2014 “Natural Gas Supply and Prices,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Supply and Prices.pdf.
1496
9/2014 “Short-term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” section on “Natural Gas,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1497
2007 Subcommittee Hearing at 224.
1498
Id.
1499
See “Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-
gas_contract_specifications.html?gclid=COeq9vj3tb0CFYhaMgodJ GwAfw.
1500
“Henry Hub Natural Gas Volume,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-
gas/natural-gas_quotes_volume_voi.html?gclid=CN3syN245bwCFRPxOgodghMAzg. It is known as the Henry
Hub futures contract, because the contract price is based on delivery of the natural gas at the Henry Hub in
Louisiana, where a number of natural gas pipelines converge.
1501
Id. See also 2007 Subcommittee Hearing, at 224.
1502
See “Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-
gas_contract_specifications.html?gclid=COeq9vj3tb0CFYhaMgodJ GwAfw.
244
(ICE).
1503
The natural gas financial market as a whole is a large, complex, and active trading
market.
Natural Gas Prices. Natural gas prices have traditionally been volatile.
1504
Seasonal
demand for natural gas, which typically peaks during winter months and drops during summer
months, contributes to the price volatility.
1505
In the physical markets, over time, natural gas
spot market prices have ranged from $3 to $13/mmBtu, with current prices on the low end
around $4.
1506
Natural gas is currently one of the least expensive sources of energy in the United
States.
1507
*Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
1508
Natural Gas Incidents. Natural gas is highly flammable, and leaks can lead to
explosions. Between 1994 and 2013, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) identified 944 serious pipeline
incidents.
1509
PHMSA defines a “serious incident” as one including a fatality or injury requiring
hospitalization.
1510
Those 944 incidents included 362 fatalities and 1,397 injuries.
1511
The data
1503
See “Natural Gas,” ICE website,https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_NatGas_Brochure.pdf.
1504
See id.
1505
Id.
1506
Id.
1507
“Levelized cost and levelized avoided cost of new generation resources in the annual energy outlook 2014,” EIA
Energy Outlook 2014, (05/07/2014),http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm.
1508
“Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (10/1/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm.
1509
See undated “Pipeline serious incident 20 year trend,” PHMSA website,https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages.
1510
See undated “Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, PHMSA website,http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/datastatistics/pipelineincidenttrends.
1511
See undated “Pipeline serious incident 20 year trend,” PHMSA website,https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages.
245
includes incidents involving natural gas distribution, gathering, and transmission, as well as
liquefied natural gas and other hazardous liquids.
1512
Four years ago, the Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) experienced a “deadly”
natural gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno, California.
1513
On September 9, 2010, a natural gas
pipeline operated by PG&E ruptured, releasing large quantities of natural gas which ignited and
started fires in the area surrounding the pipeline.
1514
As a result, eight people died, 51 people
required hospitalization, and 38 homes were destroyed.
1515
According to PHMSA, the estimated
property damage from the explosion was over $220 million.
1516
The California Public Utilities
Commission continues to review the incident and is reportedly considering levying a $1.4 billion
penalty against PG&E, which would be “the biggest safety fine in the state’s history.”
1517
Natural gas storage facilities have also experienced explosions. Perhaps the worst was in
1944 in Cleveland when, as one newspaper described it, “a natural gas tank filled with over
90,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas exploded, destroying everything within a mile-radius in a
wall of fire. The blaze continued uncontrolled for over nine hours.”
1518
Regulatory Framework. Natural gas facilities, including natural gas wellheads, gas
fields, pipelines, gathering processes, initial treatment facilities, refineries, liquefied natural gas
facilities, and compressed natural gas facilities, are heavily regulated. The Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act, for example, authorizes the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to set
minimum safety requirements both for the transportation of natural gas by pipeline and for
natural gas pipeline facilities.
1519
In response, DOT, through its Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, has promulgated an extensive set of safety regulations for pipe
design, equipment maintenance, fire protection, and personnel qualifications, among other
matters.
1520
Compliance with those safety regulations is overseen and enforced primarily by the
states.
1521
To build and operate a natural gas facility also requires permits from the Department
of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, among others.
1522
State agencies must also
1512
See undated “Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, PHMSA website,http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/datastatistics/pipelineincidenttrends.
1513
Undated “Pacific Gas & Electric pipeline rupture in San Bruno, CA,” PHMSA website,http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/facts-and-stats/recent-incidents/sanbruno-ca/. See also “California
pipeline disaster brings more scandal for PG&E,” Bloomberg, Mark Chediak, (9/16/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...e-disaster-brings-more-scandal-for-pg-e.html.
1514
Undated “Pacific Gas & Electric pipeline rupture in San Bruno, CA,” PHMSA website,http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/facts-and-stats/recent-incidents/sanbruno-ca/.
1515
Id.
1516
Id.
1517
See “California pipeline disaster brings more scandal for PG&E,” Bloomberg, Mark Chediak, (9/16/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...e-disaster-brings-more-scandal-for-pg-e.html.
Several plaintiffs have filed a civil suit against PG&E, because of the San Bruno pipeline explosion. See Bou-
Salman v. PG&E Corp., Civ. No. 524283 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013).
1518
“Cleveland East Ohio Gas Explosion,”http://counterspill.org/disaster/cleveland-east-ohio-gas-explosion.
1519
49 U.S.C. § 60102(a)(2).
1520
See 49 C.F.R. § 192.1-192.1015, 193.2001-193.2917.
1521
See, e.g., 2014 “Get the Facts: Pipeline Safety,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Pipeline Safety.pdf.
1522
See 9/3/1953 Executive Order 10485, National Archives,http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/10485.html (granting the Department of Energy power to accept permit
246
be consulted. Under the Natural Gas Act, any entity seeking to import or export natural gas must
first obtain authorization from the U.S. Department of Energy.
1523
In addition, under the Natural
Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversees the construction and operation of
natural gas projects, including certain pipelines and storage facilities, as well as their rates and
charges.
1524
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas
Morgan Stanley has been trading financial instruments linked to natural gas since 1989,
and became involved with conducting physical natural gas activities in the 1990s. In 2010,
through a Morgan Stanley investment fund, it purchased an ownership interest in a natural gas
pipeline company, Southern Star, and in 2012, took full ownership of that company. In 2013,
Morgan Stanley intensified it physical natural gas activities by launching a plan to build and
operate a large-scale compressed natural gas facility in Texas.
(a) Trading Natural Gas
In 2013, Morgan Stanley described itself as “a significant participant in the energy
markets, with substantial activity (both physical and financial)” in natural gas, among other
commodities.
1525
Morgan Stanley has been trading in natural gas since 1989.
1526
Its activities in
the natural gas sector have included “trading and investing in physically-settled forward
contracts, options, futures, options on futures and similar contracts, both over-the-counter and
exchange-listed on natural gas.”
1527
Morgan Stanley has bought and sold physical natural gas
1528
as well as cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
1529
on spot markets. In addition, it has “helped
domestic natural gas producers price hedge” domestic shale gas.
1530
Natural gas trading at Morgan Stanley is conducted within the Commodities group’s
“North America Power/Gas Management Organization,” which, in 2013, had 72 full-time
employees.
1531
The Commodities group tracks revenues by desk rather than individual
applications for natural gas facilities); see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L 91-190, codified
at 42 U.S.C. §4321 (requiring a permit for any large environmental project that receives federal funding).
1523
15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
1524
See 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, at MS-PSI-00000016; “Natural Gas,” FERC website,http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas.asp; Natural Gas
Act, Sections 3 and 7.
1525
2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities: Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, PSI-
MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, 005.
1526
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 177.
1527
Id.
1528
See, e.g., “Deal or No Deal, Morgan Stanley Commodity Trade Shrinks,” WHTC, Matthew Robinson and Scott
Disavino (6/7/2012),http://whtc.com/news/articles/2012/jun/07/deal-or-no-deal-morgan-stanley-commodity-trade-
shrinks/.
1529
See, e.g., id.; “Morgan Stanley LNG traders leave for Glencore – sources,” Reuters (6/6/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/06/morgan-lng-idUSL5N0EI0QD20130606.
1530
2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities: Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, PSI-
MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, at 010.
1531
Id. at 021. This organization is also referred by other, similar names. See, e.g., 1/9/2013 “Morgan Stanley
Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-624436 - 508, at 450 (referring to a
“North American Electricity/Natural Gas” desk).
247
commodity and does not break out financial activities from physical activities.
1532
The following
table shows the net revenues from the desk that handles both electricity and natural gas financial
and physical activities, indicating that, while substantial, those revenues have declined by two-
thirds from 2008 to 2012:
Morgan Stanley Natural Gas and Electricity Net Revenues
2008-2012
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
North American
Power & Gas
$382 million $239 million $384 million $280 million $335 million
Asian Pacific-
European
Power & Gas
$539 million $293 million $179 million $112 million -$21 million
Total $921 million $532 million $563 million $392 million $314 million
Source: 2/11/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-02-000002.
On August 15, 2014, Morgan Stanley expanded its natural gas activities by purchasing a
portfolio of North American natural gas assets from Deutsche Bank.
1533
According to Morgan
Stanley, the portfolio consisted of “listed commodity futures contracts and options on
commodity futures contracts; cash-settled over-the-counter swap and swap option agreements;
and physical forward agreements.”
1534
It stated that no physical commodity infrastructure assets
were part of the transaction.
1535
In addition, Morgan Stanley noted that, of the “13,200 discrete
transactions … only 24 were physically-settled forward contracts”; the rest were financially-
settled.
1536
Morgan Stanley noted that the delivery dates for those transactions ranged from 2014
to 2017.
1537
(b) Planning to Construct a Compressed Natural Gas Facility
In 2013, in a major expansion of its physical natural gas activities, Morgan Stanley
Commodities launched an effort to construct a $355 million compressed natural gas (CNG)
facility in Texas, using shell corporations run by Morgan Stanley personnel.
1538
The objective
was to construct the facility, initiate large-scale compressed natural gas operations, and sell the
containerized gas, primarily by exporting it to countries in Central America and the Caribbean.
1532
2/11/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-02-000001 - 004, at
002.
1533
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
002.
1534
Id.
1535
Id. Deutsche Bank originally entered into these transactions with “five middle-market Canadian gas marketers
and Natural Gas Exchange, Inc., as counterparties.”
1536
Id. Morgan Stanley purchased 22 fixed price natural gas forward agreements and 2 basis transactions. Morgan
Stanley also entered into a swap agreement with the three Deutsche Bank entities. Under the terms of that
agreement Morgan Stanley “agreed to take both the future commodity price and credit risk of the [Deutsche Bank]
contracts being sold.”
1537
Id.
1538
Id. at 008.
248
Compressed natural gas (CNG) is natural gas stored at high pressure in containers of
various sizes.
1539
CNG has most often been used to power vehicles.
1540
CNG has also been
viewed as a way to export natural gas, providing an alternative to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG),
although no large-scale CNG exporting operations currently exist in the United States.
1541
In
November 2013, Emera CNG, LLC, a Canadian energy company, filed the first application
submitted to DOE to export CNG on a large scale; portions of that application are still under
DOE consideration.
1542
Also in 2013, the United States approved construction of a $10 billion
LNG facility in Quintana Island, Texas, known as the “Freeport LNG Project,” to export natural
gas in liquefied form.
1543
Morgan Stanley launched its CNG project around the same time,
seeking to establish a CNG facility in the same general vicinity as the Freeport LNG Project.
Morgan Stanley claimed that it could engage in this new activity under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley grandfather clause, even though it had never before built or run a CNG facility.
Morgan Stanley reasoned that it could act under the grandfather clause, because it had long dealt
with natural gas that is pressurized when it moves through natural gas pipelines, including
pipelines operated by its TransMontaigne subsidiary, even though a plant designed to produce
massive amounts of natural gas for export would require more intensive pressure on a much
larger scale.
1544
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it also had experience building
complex energy facilities, pointing, for example, to its 2000 construction of a 360 megawatt
electrical plant in Nevada known as the Naniwa power plant.
1545
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that when it inquired about the project,
Morgan Stanley explained that it had decided to construct the CNG facility, because it saw a
“market opportunity.”
1546
According to the Wentworth application, Morgan Stanley’s primary
target market is Central American and Caribbean countries that have no existing natural gas
pipelines, and where Morgan Stanley believes CNG can be delivered at a relatively low price.
1547
In a letter to the Subcommittee, Morgan Stanley wrote that “the CNG business is being
developed in order to deliver a cheap and cleaner source of fuel to power generators and other
commercial end users who need access to reliable natural gas supplies … [and to] assure long
1539
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
1540
Id.
1541
Subcommittee briefing by the U.S. Department of Energy (10/14/2014).
1542
Id.; 11/20/2013 “Application of Emera CNG LLC for Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export
Compressed Natural Gas,” Docket No. 13-157-CNG,” filed by Emera CNG, LLC,http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/2013_applications/13_157_cng.pdf. See also
“Two new natural gas export plans set up challenge to controversial policy,” Platts, Brian Scheid (12/27/2013),http://blogs.platts.com/2013/12/27/lng-2projects/.
1543
“Energy Department authorizes additional volume at proposed Freeport LNG facility to export liquefied natural
gas,” (11/15/2013),http://energy.gov/articles/energy-department-authorizes-additional-volume-proposed-freeport-
lng-facility-export. See also, e.g., “U.S. Approves Expanded Gas Exports,” Wall Street J ournal, Keith J ohnson and
Ben Lefebvre (5/18/2013),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324767004578489130300876450.
1544
See undated document, “Draft Talking Points Regarding Commodities Plans to Sell and Export Compressed
Natural Gas,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, PSI-MorganStanley-000001 – 043, at 04 2- 043.
1545
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (11/18/2014).
1546
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve, (9/19/2014).
1547
Id.
249
term delivery of this fuel source.”
1548
Morgan Stanley indicated that the new facility would
deliver CNG to both domestic and foreign clients.
1549
Forming Shell Corporations. To conduct work on the CNG project, on October 21,
2013, Morgan Stanley, through its key commodities subsidiary, Morgan Stanley Capital Group,
formed two wholly-owned shell companies in Delaware, Wentworth Compression LLC and
Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC.
1550
Seven months later, on April 1, 2014, Morgan Stanley
incorporated a third wholly-owned shell company in Delaware, Wentworth Holdings LLC, and
transferred to it the stock of the two earlier companies, so that they became its wholly-owned
subsidiaries. The current Wentworth ownership structure is as follows:
Wentworth Ownership Structure
Source: 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000004.
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that none of the three Wentworth companies has
any employees of its own “at present.”
1551
Instead, all three companies “rely upon the expertise
1548
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001, at 008.
1549
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve, (9/19/2014).
1550
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 at 003.
See also the incorporation papers for the three Wentworth entities, MS-COM-0001 - 006.
1551
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001, at 005.
250
and day-to-day involvement of employees of Morgan Stanley” to carry out their activities.
1552
According to Morgan Stanley, the Wentworth companies utilize “the breadth of the firm,
including support in legal, tax, risk management and many other areas.”
1553
In addition to relying on Morgan Stanley employees for day-to-day operations, the three
Wentworth companies rely on Morgan Stanley Commodities executives for their leadership.
1554
All three Wentworth companies list the same Board members, officers, and managers. The
President and Manager of each company is Simon Greenshields, Global Co-Head of Morgan
Stanley Commodities. The companies also have the same three Vice-Presidents and Managers:
Nancy King, Global Head of Oil Liquids Flow; Peter Sherk, Head of North American Power and
Gas; and Deborah Hart, Chief Operating Officer of North American Power and Gas.
1555
Each of
these individuals is formally employed by Morgan Stanley Capital Group (MSCG) and works for
the Morgan Stanley Commodities group.
1556
In a letter to the Subcommittee, Morgan Stanley
stated that “strategic management and operational decision-making at the Wentworth entities …
is made by MSCG [Morgan Stanley Capital Group] employees.”
1557
In addition to relying on Morgan Stanley for its leadership and employees, the three
Wentworth companies rely on it for office space. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that
none of the Wentworth companies has its own office. Instead, the Wentworth companies have
designated as their place of business the same building used by Morgan Stanley Commodities in
Purchase, New York.
1558
As Morgan Stanley put it: “the principal administrative business for
each of the Wentworth entities is conducted within the Commodities group at Morgan Stanley’s
offices located in Purchase, NY.”
1559
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it formed the Wentworth entities for the sole
purpose of acting as the owner and operator of the CNG facility and to market the containerized
gas. When asked for the origin of the name, Morgan Stanley explained that “in the early phases
of the project,” it had considered locating the CNG facility in the City of Port Wentworth, near
the Port of Savannah in Georgia, but later decided to develop the Texas site first.
1560
Constructing the CNG Facility. Morgan Stanley has expended substantial resources on
the CNG project to date. Among other steps, it has entered into an Engineering, Procurement,
and Construction Agreement with H.P. Industries to design and build the CNG facility.
1561
H.P.
Industries, in turn, has contracted with a third party for the facility design.
1562
Morgan Stanley
1552
Id. at 008.
1553
Id.
1554
Id. at 005.
1555
Id.
1556
Id.
1557
Id. at 006.
1558
See, e.g., In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Application of Wentworth Gas
Marketing LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,” (5/13/2014), at 3,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf (listing the Purchase, New York address as the
“principal place of business” of Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC and Wentworth Compression LLC).
1559
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001-009.
1560
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
004.
1561
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000006.
1562
Id.
251
has selected a possible site for the facility, 50 acres known as Parcel 19, which is owned by the
Port of Freeport in Texas.
1563
H.P. Industries has entered into an access agreement to inspect the
site,
1564
and has hired a professional consulting firm to provide a required site assessment.
1565
H.P. Industries has also commenced a “Phase I environmental review.”
1566
H.P. Industries has
also placed an order for the facility compressors, since they require lead time to procure.
1567
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee it is currently negotiating a lease with Port
Freeport and working to obtain electrical and natural gas pipeline connections for the site.
1568
Morgan Stanley indicated that it had also evaluated potential insurance, but did not plan to obtain
actual insurance until the facility begins construction.
1569
In May 2014, Morgan Stanley filed an application with the Department of Energy’s
Office of Fossil Energy seeking “long-term authorization” to export containerized gas.
1570
The
application was filed in the name of Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, and sought authority to
export 60 billion cubic feet of CNG annually for a 20-year period.
1571
It requested authorization
to “export CNG using intermodal transportation containers via truck and ocean-going carrier” to
any country with which the United States as a Free Trade Agreement.
1572
The application
explained that Wentworth planned to move CNG from Parcel 19 “via truck approximately one
mile to the Port of Freeport,” where it would then be “shipped on vessels charted by Wentworth
Gas to various destinations.”
1573
The application also indicated that, “in the near term,” it
planned to sell CNG to countries in Central America and the Caribbean.
1574
The Department of
Energy granted Wentworth authorization to export CNG in October 2014.
1575
Morgan Stanley estimated the total construction cost for the CNG facility at up to $55
million.
1576
It indicated that fabrication of the natural gas shipping containers would require an
1563
See In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Application of Wentworth Gas
Marketing LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,” (5/13/2014), at 4,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf .
1564
See 5/12/2014 “Access Agreement,” between H.P. Industries LLC and Port Freeport, attached as Appendix C to
“Application of Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,”
(5/13/2014), filed with the U.S. Department of Energy in In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-
63-CNG,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf.
1565
Id.
1566
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000006.
1567
Id.
1568
Id.
1569
Id. at 007.
1570
In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Application of Wentworth Gas Marketing
LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,” (5/13/2014),http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf.
1571
Id. at 1.
1572
Id.
1573
Id. at 4.
1574
Id. at 2.
1575
See In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Order Granting Long-term
Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas by Vessel From a Proposed CNG Compression and Loading
Facility at the Port of Freeport, Texas, to Free Trade Agreement Nations,” (10/7/2014),http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/ord3515.pdf.
1576
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 at 008.
252
“initial investment of up to $300 million.”
1577
Morgan Stanley projected that a second facility in
Georgia would have an “equivalent” cost of $55 million.
1578
Shipping containers for that second
facility would be an additional expense.
Morgan Stanley’s plans to build CNG facilities were not widely known until its DOE
application for export authority was made public and became the subject of a news report.
1579
Some media reports described the effort to set up a large-scale CNG export operation as
unusual.
1580
Others noted that the Morgan Stanley proposal to export 60 billion cubic feet per
year far exceeded the earlier Emera proposal to export 9 billion cubic feet.
1581
Some negative
reactions to the proposal also suggested it may be controversial, with opposition focused
primarily on exporting large amounts of low-cost domestic natural gas to other countries.
1582
Informing the Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve personnel in Washington, D.C. told
the Subcommittee that they first became aware of the Morgan Stanley CNG project when it was
disclosed in the August 2014 media report, nearly a year after Morgan Stanley had begun work
on it.
1583
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it provided “an initial, oral notice” of the
project to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in November 2013, and provided
detailed information in May 2014, in response to a FRBNY request for information about its
grandfather activities.
1584
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that its personnel received
the information in May 2014, but did not focus on the Wentworth project prior to the news
report.
1585
The Federal Reserve also told the Subcommittee that it was still analyzing the CNG
project to determine whether it was an appropriate use of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
grandfathering authority.
1586
When the Subcommittee spoke with the Federal Reserve about the project, the Federal
Reserve representatives indicated they had been under the impression that Morgan Stanley had
1577
Id.
1578
Id. at 007.
1579
See “Morgan Stanley plans natural gas export plant in new commodities foray,” Reuters, Anna Louie Sussman
(8/29/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/29/us-morganstanley-naturalgas-idUSKBN0GT0B320140829.
1580
See, e.g., “Morgan Stanley Forays Into Natural Gas Commodities,” Stocks.org, J ennifer Zhang (8/29/14),http://stocks.org/energy-solar/morgan-stanley-nysems-forays-into-natural-gas-commodities/25180/ (“There has not
been another project like this in the industry.”); “Morgan Stanley subsidiary plans $30 million – $50 million Texas
maritime CNG export facility,” NGV Today (9/3/2014),http://ngvtoday.org/2014/09/03/morg...million-50-million-texas-maritime-cng-export-
facility/ (indicating an energy expert describing it as “one of the first such CNG export projects he was aware of”).
1581
“Morgan Stanley Forays Into Natural Gas Commodities,” Stocks.org, J ennifer Zhang (8/29/14),http://stocks.org/energy-solar/morgan-stanley-nysems-forays-into-natural-gas-commodities/25180/. See also
“Morgan Stanley subsidiary plans $30 million – $50 million Texas maritime CNG export facility,” NGV Today
(9/3/2014),http://ngvtoday.org/2014/09/03/morg...million-50-million-texas-maritime-cng-export-
facility/.
1582
See, e.g., discussion about the Morgan Stanley CNG proposal on CNGchat.com,http://www.cngchat.com/forum/showthread.php?12170-Morgan-Stanley-Wentworth-Gas-Marketing-plan-30-to-
50M-EXPORT-plant-at-Freeport-TX.
1583
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (9/19/2014).
1584
11/18/2014 Morgan Stanley letter to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-25-000001 – 008, at 003; 5/19/2014
letter from Morgan Stanley to FRBNY, PSI-MorganStanley-26-000005 – 044.
1585
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (9/19/2014).
1586
Id.
253
acquired the Wentworth companies as unrelated, pre-existing businesses; the Federal Reserve
indicated that it had not been aware, until informed by the Subcommittee, that the Wentworth
companies were shell corporations formed and run by Morgan Stanley employees.
1587
When
asked, the Federal Reserve representatives indicated that they were unaware of any other
instance in which a financial holding company had formed shell corporations and then used them
to build an industrial facility to handle physical commodity activities.
1588
(c) Investing in a Natural Gas Pipeline Company
Over the past decade, in addition to trading natural gas financial instruments and
launching the CNG construction project, Morgan Stanley has used its merchant banking
authority to invest in an array of physical natural gas businesses, including a large natural gas
pipeline company in the Midwest known as Southern Star. Morgan Stanley’s investment in
Southern Star is through an investment fund called Morgan Stanley Infrastructures Partners LP,
which is located within Morgan Stanley’s Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investing group and
is administered, advised, and overseen by Morgan Stanley personnel.
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partnership. Although Morgan Stanley portrays
Southern Star as owned by an investment fund in which Morgan Stanley holds only a minority
interest, that investment fund, Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners LP (MSIP), is intimately
connected to Morgan Stanley. MSIP was established by Morgan Stanley in 2007, and is
managed by Morgan Stanley employees operating out of Morgan Stanley offices.
1589
Morgan
Stanley was the largest investor in MSIP’s initial infrastructure fund, supplying $430 million.
MSIP owns 100% of Southern Star.
Although MSIP is controlled by Morgan Stanley, it has a complex ownership structure
that reflects different groups of investors and projects. At the apex of the ownership structure is
Morgan Stanley. In the next tier is MS Holdings, Inc., which is wholly owned by Morgan
Stanley.
1590
MS Holdings, in turn, owns 100% of Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, Inc. (MSI).
1591
MSI is the manager of MSIP.
1592
MSI is also a business unit within Morgan Stanley’s Merchant
Banking & Real Estate Investing group.
1593
MSI currently has 37 employees, all of whom are
Morgan Stanley employees in the Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investing group and work
exclusively on MSIP infrastructure projects.
1594
1587
Id.
1588
Id.
1589
See 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 006; 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Southern Star Follow
Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 458; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 326. See also “Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” (8/29/2014), MS-PSI-00000001 at 006.
1590
See 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 456.
1591
Id.
1592
Id. See also 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 002.
1593
See 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 005.
1594
Id. at 008; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
254
The remaining layers of MSIP’s ownership structure grow increasingly complex.
Virtually all of the remaining entities are shell entities with no employees or offices of their own.
One key entity is Morgan Stanley Infrastructure GP LP (MSIGP), which is the general partner of
MSIP. MSIGP is a shell entity with no employees of its own. Its general partner is MSI, and
MSI employees actually administer MSIGP, meaning that, on a practical level, MSI manages
MSIP.
1595
Also included within the ownership structure are multiple limited partnerships and
“feeder vehicles” that group together certain types of investors and “feed” their investment
dollars to MSIP and its infrastructure projects. The following graphic depicts MSIP’s full
ownership structure:
1595
See 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 457; 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of
Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 002 and 006.
255
Source: Chart included in 10/24/14 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, at MS-PSI-00000456.
256
MSIP Investments. MSIP is a closed investment fund with a 15-year term ending in
2022.
1596
MSIP raised about $4 billion for its investments, most of which are ongoing.
1597
To
find investors, MSI “utilize[d] Morgan Stanley’s institutional and wealth management
distribution networks … work[ing] through three sales channels.”
1598
According to Morgan
Stanley, investors contributed about $3.6 billion or nearly 90% of MSIP’s investment capital.
1599
Those investors included pension funds, financial institutions, corporations, endowment funds,
high net worth individuals, and some Morgan Stanley employees.
1600
The remaining 10.74% of
MSIP’s investment capital, about $430 million, came from Morgan Stanley, its single largest
investor.
1601
MSIP has been profitable, with a gross internal rate of return of about 12%.
1602
According to Morgan Stanley, MSIP has several categories of investments including “Energy
and Utilities (oil and gas pipelines, regulated electricity assets, transmission and distribution
systems, and water distribution and treatment).”
1603
Out of a list of 16 MSIP investments
provided by Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, eight involved physical commodity
activities.
1604
They included an electricity, heating, and cooling facility in the United States; a
large electricity distributor in Chile; a natural gas distribution company in Spain; hydropower
plants in China; and a wind power developer and operator in India.
1605
As of March 31, 2013,
Southern Star was MSIP’s largest single investment.
1606
Southern Star. MSIP owns 100% of Southern Star Central Corp., the parent company
of Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline Inc., its wholly owned subsidiary.
1607
MSIP purchased
40% of Southern Star’s shares in 2010, and acquired the remaining 60% in 2012.
1608
Morgan
1596
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 012; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 332.
1597
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 332, 381.
1598
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 351.
1599
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 006 and 009.
1600
Id. at 009; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1601
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009, footnote 1.
1602
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 336.
1603
Id. at 327.
1604
Id. at 333.
1605
Id. See also 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 467; Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners website,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/portfolio.html.
1606
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 336.
1607
See 8/23/2012 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners acquires full ownership of
Southern Star Central Corp.,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/e5a5716e-8ff9-4b44-b073-
ba6255f5b077.html.
1608
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 003; Morgan Stanley corporate website,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/portfolio.html; 8/23/2012 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Partners acquires full ownership of Southern Star Central Corp.,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/e5a5716e-8ff9-4b44-b073-ba6255f5b077.html. MSIP acquired
the remaining shares from GE Energy Financial Services, Inc. (GE), which resulted in a change in control for
257
Stanley relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority to buy the company and,
under the statutory requirements, generally must sell the company within ten years, by 2020.
1609
Southern Star was founded in 1904, and is headquartered in Owensboro, Kentucky.
1610
It
“is the primary gas transmission and natural gas storage facility provider” in certain areas of the
Midwest, with approximately 6,000 miles of pipeline serving Colorado, Kansas, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming.
1611
Its pipeline system has a delivery capacity of
approximately 2.4 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas per day, and its primary function is
delivering gas to local natural gas distributors in its service areas.
1612
Southern Star serves a
number of metropolitan areas including St. Louis, Kansas City, and J oplin in Missouri, and
Kansas City, Wichita, Topeka, and Lawrence in Kansas.
1613
Southern Star operates eight underground natural gas storage fields: seven in Kansas and
one in Oklahoma.
1614
The fields have a “natural gas storage capacity of approximately 47 Bcf
and aggregate delivery capacity of approximately 1.3 Bcf of natural gas per day.”
1615
Southern
Star also has transportation contracts with 127 natural gas shippers, which include:
“regulated natural gas distribution companies, municipalities, intrastate pipelines, direct
industrial users, electrical generators, gas marketers and producers. Central transports
natural gas to approximately 528 delivery points, including natural gas distribution
companies and municipalities, power plants, interstate and intrastate pipelines, and large
and small industrial and commercial customers.”
1616
In addition, Southern Star has 41 compressor stations to facilitate natural gas transport.
1617
Southern Star Ownership. As indicated earlier, Southern Star is wholly owned by
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners LP (MSIP), an investment fund that is administered,
advised, and controlled by Morgan Stanley personnel. According to Morgan Stanley, MSIP uses
a “typical Holding Company, Operating Company ownership structure commonly used for
regulated pipelines” under oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
1618
According to Morgan Stanley, MSI, which manages MSIP, “formed two intermediate
holding companies: MSIP Southern Star, LLC (March 2010) and MSIP Southern Star II, LLC
Southern Star. See Southern Star Central Corp. 10-Q, 09/30/2013, at 8,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034913000016/southernstar10q9302013r189.pdf.
1609
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 014.
1610
See undated “About Southern Star,” Southern Star website,http://www.sscgp.com/about-southern-star/.
1611
Southern Star Central Corp. Form 10-Q for fiscal year ending 6/30/2014, SEC website, at 8,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034914000020/southernstar10q6302014doc.htm.
See also “About Southern Star,” Southern Star website,http://www.sscgp.com/about-southern-star/.
1612
Southern Star Central Corp. Form 10-Q for fiscal year ending 6/30/2014, SEC website, at 8,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034914000020/southernstar10q6302014doc.htm.
1613
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 016.
1614
Southern Star Central Corp. 10-K, 12/31/2013, page 2,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034914000002/southernstar201310kdoc.htm.
1615
Id.
1616
Id.
1617
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 016. According to Southern Star, it is not involved with natural gas production,
refining, or liquefied natural gas. Id. at 019.
1618
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” 8/29/2014, MS-PSI-00000001 at 003.
258
(September 2012) to acquire and hold” MSIP’s ownership interests in Southern Star.
1619
Those
two intermediate holding companies wholly own MSIP-SSCC Holdings LLC (MSIP-SSCC),
which, in turn, owns Southern Star’s parent corporation.
1620
The following graphic is a
simplification of Southern Star’s ownership structure:
Source: 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, at FRB-PSI-00000004.
The two intermediate holding companies are ultimately owned by MSIP, through the
complex ownership structure of limited partnerships and feeder vehicles indicated earlier. The
three entities depicted in the graphic above represent the 380 global investors that have invested
in MSIP.
1621
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, as a result of the MSIP ownership
structure, it ultimately holds a 10.74% indirect ownership interest in Southern Star.
1622
1619
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 003.
1620
Id.
1621
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014). Morgan Stanley explained that Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners A Sub, LP is the feeder vehicle used by foreign investors; Morgan Stanley Infrastructure
Partners LP is the feeder vehicle used by domestic investors; and Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Investors LP is the
feeder vehicle used by Morgan Stanley employees, including former employees. Id.
1622
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” (8/29/2014), MS-PSI-00000001 at 002.
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that the Volcker Rule requires it to reduce its holdings in investment funds
to 3%, but asserted that MSIP was covered by an exception for illiquid funds. Subcommittee briefing by Morgan
Stanley (9/8/2014).
259
Board of Directors. The Southern Star Board of Directors consists of three MSI senior
executives who are also Morgan Stanley employees.
1623
The Board meets quarterly and reviews
information on Southern Star’s financial performance, business activities and development
projects, volume throughput, compliance issues, environmental issues, and capital spending
plans, among other issues.
1624
When asked by the Subcommittee if Southern Star’s Board
presentations were ever given to the Morgan Stanley Commodities group, several MSIP
representatives said “absolutely not.”
1625
In addition to Board meetings, Morgan Stanley indicated that monthly meetings were
held between Southern Star and MSI personnel to discuss business activities.
1626
Morgan
Stanley representatives told the Subcommittee that while its employees worked with Southern
Star management, they were aware that, under the merchant banking statutory restrictions,
Morgan Stanley was prohibited from becoming involved in the company’s day-to-day
operations.
1627
At the same time, Morgan Stanley indicated that its employees had reviewed
Southern Star’s vendors, performed counterparty assessments, utilized Morgan Stanley’s legal
and insurance expertise to assist Southern Star, and exercised oversight over pipeline safety
issues.
1628
In 2010, the Board of Directors, which consists of Morgan Stanley employees,
directed Southern Star to create a Chief Compliance Officer position to oversee pipeline
integrity, safety issues, and regulatory compliance.
1629
Incidents. As a natural gas business, Southern Star faces a range of operational risks,
including pipeline ruptures, natural gas leaks, and damages caused by natural disasters like
tornadoes or earthquakes. According to Morgan Stanley, Southern Star has “a strong safety and
environmental record,” with no material incidents over the past ten years.
1630
According to documents found on the website of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), prior to Morgan Stanley’s acquisition of the company, one of Southern Star’s
pipelines was ruptured in 2006, by an unrelated contractor doing work for a third party.
1631
The
accident occurred on September 29, 2006, in Mound Valley, Kansas. According to the NTSB
materials, Double M Construction Company was doing trenching work for a natural gas well
project.
1632
While trenching, an operator of Double M struck Southern Star’s underground
pipeline, which ran through the property. The ruptured pipeline leaked gas, which then came
into contact with the running trenching machine and caused a large explosion and fire. One
1623
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” (8/29/2014), MS-PSI-00000001 - 37, at
023.
1624
Id.
1625
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1626
Id.
1627
Id.
1628
Id.
1629
Id.
1630
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 026.
1631
U.S. Department of Transportation, “Incident report – gas transmission and gathering systems, Southern Star gas
pipeline,” (10/11/2006), PSI-USDOTIncidentRpt_Oct06-000001. See also “Kansas State Fire Marshal Department
Fire Investigation Summary Report,” (12/12/2006), Case No. 24731, PSI-KSFireMarRpt_Nov06-000001 - 024, at
001-003. See also “Kansas Corporation Commission Report and Recommendation in the matter of the investigation
of Double M Construction, Inc.”, Docket no. 07-MMCP-469-SHO, (11/13/2006), PSI-KSFireMarRpt_Nov06-
000001 - 24, at 013-024.
1632
Id. The owner of the natural gas well project was Admiral Bay Resources, Inc., which had contracted with
Double J Construction Company, who in turn had subcontracted with Double M Construction to do the trenching.
260
Double M Construction employee died, and there was substantial property damage.
1633
The
Kansas State Fire Marshal determined that Southern Star was aware of the illegal trenching near
its underground pipeline before the accident occurred, but did not report it.
1634
When asked why,
Southern Star stated that it did not have an obligation to report the conduct under Kansas law,
which the Fire Marshal determined to be true.
1635
No government agency assessed a penalty
against Southern Star in connection with the incident. Southern Star was named as a defendant
in a wrongful death case filed against Double J Pipeline Construction, which was settled in 2009,
in part with a payment from Southern Star’s insurance policy.
1636
Southern Star’s pipeline infrastructure has also suffered damage due to natural disasters.
In May 2013, Southern Star reported damage to its pipelines in Cement, Oklahoma, after a
tornado hit the town.
1637
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that insurance experts within the Merchant
Banking and Real Estate Investment group have met with Southern Star to discuss the adequacy
and pricing of insurance policies, and helped Southern Star obtain a comprehensive insurance
program.
1638
Its policies include insurance protecting against pollution incidents, well issues,
property damage, damage from sabotage or terrorism, business interruption, and commercial
crime, as well as directors’ and officers’ liability.
1639
Morgan Stanley-Southern Star Relationship. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee
that it had a classic merchant banking relationship with Southern Star, in which it oversaw its
overall business but did not participate in its day-to-day operations.
1640
In response to questions,
Morgan Stanley said that it was not Southern Star’s primary banker and did not loan it
money.
1641
Morgan Stanley indicated that it also did not perform any natural gas trading
activities on behalf of Southern Star.
1642
In addition, according to Morgan Stanley, Southern
Star did not provide physical natural gas or related services to Morgan Stanley, including the
Morgan Stanley Commodities group.
1643
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that
information from Southern Star was shared with MSI employees in the Merchant Banking and
Real Estate Investment Group, but not with anyone in the Morgan Stanley Commodities
group.
1644
1633
Id. Double M Construction was found to have been trenching illegally under Kansas law, because it did not
follow certain protocols. The Kansas State Fire Marshal Department provided a report that concluded the incident
was an accident, and there was no intentionally malicious conduct that led to the explosion. Id.
1634
Id.
1635
Id.
1636
See Foran vs. Double J Pipeline Construction, L.L.C., et al., Docket No. CJ -2007-29 (USDC D. Okla.), “Order
Approving Settlement” (7/31/2009); 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners[:] Southern Star Follow
Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 473 [sealed exhibit].
1637
See “Energy infrastructure largely spared Oklahoma tornado’s fury,” Reuters, (5/21/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/21/us-usa-tornadoes-energy-idUSBRE94K0Q920130521.
1638
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014). See also 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure
Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 032.
1639
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 032.
1640
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1641
Id.
1642
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 036.
1643
Id. at 025.
1644
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
261
MSIP II. Morgan Stanley noted that MSI was sponsoring a second infrastructure
investment fund, MSIP II, which was in the process of raising another $4 billion and would
concentrate on energy, utility, and transportation projects.
1645
Morgan Stanley told the Federal
Reserve that it expected “energy-related infrastructure will constitute a majority of the deal flow
in MSIP II.”
1646
It identified possible “Americas” investments in “hale oil opportunities,”
natural gas gathering, processing, storage and LNG facilities; natural gas fired turbines; and wind
and solar activities.
1647
Morgan Stanley also indicated that “MSI officers will invest $25 million
in MSIP II,” to align their interests with those of investors.
1648
MSIP II has raised about $1.5
billion as of late 2014.
1649
The plans for MSIP II indicate that Morgan Stanley intends to
continue to invest billions of dollars in natural gas and other commodity-related businesses for
years to come.
(d) Investing in Other Natural Gas Facilities
Southern Star is not Morgan Stanley’s only natural gas investment, nor is MSIP the only
Morgan Stanley merchant banking entity that has invested in natural gas. A second is Morgan
Stanley Global Private Equity, a business unit which, like Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, is
located within Morgan Stanley’s Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investing group.
1650
As its
name suggests, Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity is the financial holding company’s leading
private equity investment arm. Currently, Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity has one active
fund, Morgan Stanley Capital Partners V.
1651
Like MSIP, the Morgan Stanley Capital Partners V investment fund was established by
Morgan Stanley and is managed by Morgan Stanley employees operating out of Morgan Stanley
offices. It has an ownership structure almost as complicated as that of MSIP.
1652
Morgan
Stanley is its largest investor, having held an ownership interest of between 23% and 33% in the
fund since 2008.
1653
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that MSIP and Morgan Stanley
Capital Partners V, which are both within the Merchant Banking and Real Estate Investment
group, share senior leadership but not other employees.
1654
In 2013, Morgan Stanley Global
Private Equity had about 50 employees, all of whom were employed by Morgan Stanley.
1655
1645
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 331, 344.
1646
Id. at 352.
1647
Id.
1648
Id. at 346.
1649
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009.
1650
10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 459 [sealed exhibit].
1651
Id. Four predecessor funds sponsored by Morgan Stanley Capital Partners “have either been fully realized or are
in liquidation.” Id.
1652
Id. at 389-390.
1653
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
003.
1654
10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 466.
1655
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 326. In a recent job listing seeking an investment professional for Morgan Stanley Capital
Partners (MSCP), Morgan Stanley wrote: “MSCP employs a fully-integrated Operating Partner model and is unique
among middle market private equity firms in its ability to leverage the global network and resources of Morgan
Stanley to benefit the investment team and management teams with whom we partner to drive value creation.”
October 2014 posting for “Vice President, Morgan Stanley Capital Partners,” LinkedIn,
262
Morgan Stanley Capital Partners V has raised about $1.5 billion.
1656
Its investment
portfolio currently includes at least three natural gas-related investments: Triana Energy, Trinity,
and Sterling Energy.
1657
Triana Energy Investments LLC owns 70% of a natural gas exploration
and production company in West Virginia.
1658
Trinity Investment Holdings, LLC owns 70% of
“one of the largest independent CO2 [carbon dioxide] pipeline systems in the US.”
1659
Sterling
Investment Holdings LLC owns 63% of a natural gas gathering and processing company,
Sterling Energy Investments LLC, and is headquartered in Denver, Colorado.
1660
Like Southern Star, these natural gas companies have Morgan Stanley employees on their
boards of directors and meet on a regular basis with Morgan Stanley personnel. They have
similar operational and environmental risks as Southern Star.
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Natural Gas Activities
Morgan Stanley’s expanding physical natural gas activities raise multiple concerns,
including its decision to build and operate a commercial natural gas business using shell
companies, unfair competition concerns, insufficient capital and insurance to protect against
catastrophic event risks, conflicts of interest arising from controlling natural gas supplies while
trading natural gas financial instruments, and inadequate safeguards.
(a) Shell Companies
Although Morgan Stanley has long traded natural gas and, for the last decade, invested in
merchant banking natural gas businesses, it appears to have never before produced CNG or built
a commercial energy facility. Additionally, the most striking and unusual aspect of Morgan
Stanley’s physical natural gas activities is its recent decision to introduce the use of shell
companies. Morgan Stanley’s formation and use of shell companies, run by Morgan Stanley
employees, to build and operate a CNG facility appears to be an unprecedented use of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority.
By using shell entities with no employees or physical presence of their own, and
installing its own senior executives as the shells’ directors and officers, Morgan Stanley
essentially created a corporate alter ego to operate a new commercial business. Morgan Stanley,
through its shell entities, became the designer, builder, and soon-to-be operator of a new CNG
facility, as well as the marketer and exporter of its products. Morgan Stanley chose, not only for
the first time to start a new physical commodities business, but also to use shell companies tohttps://www.linkedin.com/jobs2/view..._company_other_jobs&trk=job_view_company_othe
r_jobs.
1656
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 326 (listing Merchant Banking and Real Estate Investing Funds, which includes MSCP V);
10/14/2014 email from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, “MS Questions,” PSI-MorganStanley-18-
000001 [sealed exhibit].
1657
See Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity Fund website, portfolio list,http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html. See also 5/21/2013
letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at 004.
1658
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
004.
1659
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
004. See alsohttp://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html.
1660
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
004.
263
initiate construction of a complex, untested natural gas facility with no operational track record
or established market. Its actions raise a number of potential legal, operational, and financial
risks.
Equally troubling is that Morgan Stanley embarked on this course of action, despite its
novel elements, with only an “initial oral notice” to its regulator. While Morgan Stanley
supplied additional information later, it was not until media reports alerted the Federal Reserve
to the CNG project a year after Morgan Stanley began work on it, that regulators focused on the
details. Even then, regulators didn’t understand that Morgan Stanley was using shell companies
with no employees and no prior business activities, and able to operate on a day-to-day basis
only by utilizing Morgan Stanley’s own personnel.
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it is still considering whether the
Wentworth companies represent an appropriate exercise of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather
authority. Since the Wentworth companies represent Morgan Stanley’s first foray into the
physical CNG industry, it cannot contend that the grandfather clause is protecting against the
forced disinvestment of an existing commodity activity. In fact, it is difficult to see how the
word “grandfather” applies. If Morgan Stanley is permitted to proceed, it will represent a major
expansion of the ability of financial holding companies with grandfather authority to enter into
commercial businesses. They will no longer have to buy an existing enterprise; they can start the
business themselves.
1661
Allowing financial holding companies to start commercial businesses
using shell entities managed by their own personnel cannot be reconciled with the longstanding
bar against mixing banking and commerce or the intended scope of the grandfather clause.
In late October 2014, a media report indicated that Morgan Stanley may be considering
selling the Wentworth companies and the CNG project to a third party.
1662
(b) Unfair Competition
A second concern raised by Morgan Stanley’s CNG project is the issue of unfair
competition. Morgan Stanley apparently told the Federal Reserve that it launched the CNG
project because it saw a “market opportunity.” It acted around the same time as another
company, Emera CNG LLC, filed an application to export CNG. The Wentworth application
sought a similar authorization, except that it requested permission to export 60 billion cubic feet
of CNG per year instead of the 9 billion sought by Emera. The competing applications show that
Morgan Stanley, through its Wentworth shell entities, is in direct competition in the natural gas
distribution business with a commercial enterprise.
Morgan Stanley’s ability to compete commercially in an industry in which it has no prior
experience is due, in part, to the inherent advantages that financial holding companies have when
competing against businesses that don’t own banks. Morgan Stanley has immediate access to
inexpensive, ready credit through its bank subsidiary, enabling its borrowing costs to nearly
1661
When Goldman decided to enter the physical uranium business, Goldman acquired an existing company,
Nufcor, whose employees declined to stay on and were replaced with Goldman personnel. In so doing, Goldman
essentially turned a substantive company into a shell. Goldman’s employees then took over a longstanding, well
established business operation and expanded it. Goldman did not start up the business. In its CNG project, Morgan
Stanley has dispensed with taking over an existing business with a track record of success, in favor of initiating a
completely new business enterprise.
1662
See “Morgan Stanley looks at sale of gas export venture,” Financial Times, Gregory Meyer, Tom Braithwaite
and Gina Chon (10/21/2014),http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76c23932-58c7-11e4-a31b-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3GuK83tj9.
264
always undercut those of a nonbank competitor. Another advantage is Morgan Stanley’s
relatively low capital requirements. In 2012, the FRBNY Commodities Team determined that
corporations engaged in oil and gas businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover
potential losses, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8%
to 10%, making it much easier for them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.
1663
Less expensive financing and lower capital are two key factors underlying the traditional
U.S. ban on mixing banking with commerce. Morgan Stanley’s direct competition with an
energy company to construct a CNG export facility is simply not the type of activity that, under
U.S. banking principles, is appropriate for a bank holding company. If Morgan Stanley sees
CNG exports as a good market opportunity, it should be financing or investing in one or more of
the companies entering that business rather than competing to run the business itself.
(c) Catastrophic Event Risks
A third set of concerns involves the catastrophic event risks attached to Morgan Stanley’s
CNG project and investments in Southern Star and other natural gas portfolio companies.
The CNG project, which seeks to produce containerized natural gas on a large scale that
Morgan Stanley describes as “unique,”
1664
and which does not exist in the United States today,
carries numerous risks. Building the facility and arranging for electrical and pipeline
connections raises a host of operational issues, as does moving the natural gas by truck and
vessel. The flammability and explosive nature of natural gas intensify the catastrophic event
risks. Hurricanes, tornados, and floods in Texas compound the problem. Additional financial
risks arise from the absence of an existing market for large scale CNG exports, and the necessity
for CNG exports to compete with LNG exports. Morgan Stanley’s liability for any mishap
affecting the CNG project is particularly acute, since it owns and is in the process of uilding and
operating the facility through shell corporations run by Morgan Stanley employees.
Southern Star, as an established natural gas pipeline company, poses similar catastrophic
event risks. While Morgan Stanley takes the position that it would have little or no liability for a
catastrophic event at Southern Star, because it is a merchant banking investment in which
Morgan Stanley has only an indirect 11% ownership interest, the level of Morgan Stanley’s
control over the investment fund that owns Southern Star makes the liability issue less clear cut.
Southern Star is 100% owned by Morgan Stanley Investment Partners (MSIP), which
was formed by and is closely affiliated with Morgan Stanley, its largest investor. Morgan
Stanley employees manage MSIP, help it find investors, and oversee its investments. Those
Morgan Stanley employees sit in Morgan Stanley offices and control MSIP’s investments.
Morgan Stanley employees also control Southern Star’s Board of Directors, and advise it on
financial, insurance and tax issues. In addition, Morgan Stanley, through its Board Members,
oversees Southern Star vendors and pipeline safety, integrity, and compliance efforts.
As explained earlier, if a catastrophic event were to occur either in the United States or,
in connection with CNG exports to foreign countries, multiple legal theories could be used to try
to assign a portion of the liability to Morgan Stanley. Arguments could be made that Morgan
1663
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200499.
1664
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 at 008.
265
Stanley was the owner and operator of the CNG facility involved in the event, the owner of the
natural gas, or knowingly entrusted the natural gas to an incompetent operator, including
operators in foreign ports and facilities.
1665
Morgan Stanley might be required to defend against
claims in a state court, U.S. federal court, or foreign court, under the different laws in each
jurisdiction. A financial institution viewed as being potentially liable for damages could see
customers or counterparties withdraw funds, refrain from doing business, or demand increased
compensation to continue doing business with the institution in light of its increased credit risk.
Morgan Stanley does not appear to be prepared for those types of unanticipated financial
consequences. In 2012, the FRBNY Commodities Team found that Morgan Stanley had
insufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event.
1666
The
2012 Summary Report prepared a chart comparing the level of capital and insurance coverage at
four financial holding companies, including Morgan Stanley, against estimated costs associated
with “extreme loss scenarios.” It found that at each institution, including Morgan Stanley, “the
potential loss exceed[ed] capital and insurance” by $1 to $15 billion.
1667
That shortfall leaves the
Federal Reserve, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, at risk of having to provide financial support to
Morgan Stanley should a catastrophic event occur.
(d) Conflicts of Interest
Still another set of issues raised by Morgan Stanley’s natural gas activities involves
conflicts of interest. The conflicts arise from the fact that Morgan Stanley trades natural gas
financial products at the same time it is intimately involved with an array of physical natural gas
activities. Its conduct raises questions about two sets of conflict of interest concerns, one
involving non-public information and the other involving natural gas supplies.
While commodities laws do not bar the use of non-public information by traders in the
financial markets in the same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading advantages
deepen when one commodities trader has access to significant non-public information. Morgan
Stanley’s merchant banking investments put Morgan Stanley employees on the boards of
multiple companies involved with different aspects of the natural gas business, from natural
production to pipelines to storage to LNG cargoes to CNG exports. Those board positions
provide Morgan Stanley personnel with access to a massive amount of non-public information
about the physical natural gas market.
When asked about this informational advantage, Morgan Stanley personnel explained
that merchant banking was lodged in a different part of the bank than commodities, and merchant
banking employees did not share non-public information about their portfolio companies with
commodities personnel. The following graphic shows that the Commodities group falls under
the Institutional Securities segment of the financial holding company, while the Merchant
Banking and Real Estate Investments group falls under the Investment Management segment:
1665
See discussion in the Goldman and uranium section above.
1666
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498.
1667
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499. The recent decision in the BP oil spill case suggests that the “extreme loss” scenarios may entail
expenses beyond those contemplated as recently as 2012.
266
Morgan Stanley
Institutional Securities
Group
Wealth Management
Investment
Management
Source: 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” MS-PSI-
00000001 - 037, at 007. “MB & REI” stands for Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investments.
While the two activities are lodged in separate parts of the financial holding company,
and the Subcommittee saw no evidence of the misuse of confidential Southern Star information,
Morgan Stanley commodity traders could gain non-public information from their colleagues
about natural gas activities providing useful market intelligence for natural gas trades. In
addition, the Wentworth shell companies are directly managed by employees in the Commodities
group, meaning all non-public information related to the CNG project would be immediately and
fully accessible to Morgan Stanley natural gas traders. The potential exists for Morgan Stanley
commodity traders to use that non-public information to gain an unfair trading advantage over
other market participants, including their customers and counterparties.
A second conflict of interest issue is whether Morgan Stanley would gain an unfair
degree of control over CNG supplies if it actually completed construction of the planned CNG
facility. The facility is apparently being designed to export 60 billion cubic feet of CNG per
year. Given the infancy of the CNG export market, Morgan Stanley’s plans suggest a significant
market presence. Morgan Stanley’s control over the timing and amount of the CNG it hopes to
export raises questions about whether it could use its exports to benefit its natural gas trading
activities. Those market manipulation concerns, and their accompanying legal, financial, and
reputational risks, would not exist if Morgan Stanley remained a financial intermediary and
trader in the natural gas financial market rather than increasing its involvement in physical
natural gas activities.
(e) Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of issues involves the lack of regulatory safeguards related to financial holding
company involvement with high risk physical natural gas activities. Natural gas is flammable
and explosive. Natural gas prices are unpredictable and volatile. Large scale CNG exports have
no established markets.
[Other groups omitted]
Commodities
[Other groups omitted]
MB & REI
MSI
MSIP
267
Because Morgan Stanley has relied on the grandfather clause to build and operate the
CNG facility and on the merchant banking authority to invest in Southern Star and other natural
gas companies, it has not notified or obtained prior permission from the Federal Reserve to
engage those activities. For its part, the Federal Reserve has failed to issue guidance on the
proper scope of the grandfather clause, including whether it may be used to authorize physical
commodity activities that a holding company has never before conducted. The Federal Reserve
has also failed to require annual disclosure of a comprehensive list of commodity-related
activities undertaken under the grandfather and merchant banking authorities, so that it can learn
of, track, and analyze those activities.
Because Morgan Stanley has relied on the grandfather clause for its CNG project,
Morgan Stanley has not been required by the Federal Reserve to include the market value of that
project when calculating compliance with the complementary physical commodities limit
prohibiting those activities from exceeding 5% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital.
The only cap on the size of Morgan Stanley’s CNG activities is the statutory prohibition that its
grandfathering activities not exceed 5% of Morgan Stanley’s consolidated assets, a limit set so
high as to be no restriction at all. In addition, its commodity-related merchant banking activities
have been allowed to accumulate with no volume limit at all.
Morgan Stanley’s physical natural gas activities disclose that, due to inadequate reporting
requirements, the Federal Reserve is at times left in the dark about important physical
commodity activities being conducted under the grandfather and merchant banking authorities.
They also disclose that the Federal Reserve has failed to put key safeguards in place to limit the
size and risks associated with those activities and to ensure the safe and sound operation of the
financial holding company.
(4) Analysis
Despite the sale of portions of its oil merchanting business, Morgan Stanley remains
heavily involved in physical commodities, as evidenced by its initiation of the CNG project and
ongoing investments in natural gas businesses like Southern Star. Morgan Stanley’s utilization
of the Wentworth shell companies to build and operate a CNG export facility is an
unprecedented and inappropriate use of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority. Its
extensive natural gas merchant banking activities demonstrate the need for a size limit on those
investments. The catastrophic risks presented by its natural gas activities indicate Morgan
Stanley needs to increase its capital and insurance to protect U.S. taxpayers against being called
on to shore up the firm. Potential market manipulation opportunities also call out for stronger
oversight and preventative safeguards.
All of the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee have been
involved with financial and physical natural gas activities. It is past time for the Federal Reserve
to enforce needed safeguards on this high risk physical commodity activity.
268
C. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Crude Oil
For more than 25 years, Morgan Stanley has engaged in extensive physical oil activities.
Prior to its 2008 conversion to a bank holding company, Morgan Stanley built a wide-ranging
physical oil business, including activities associated with producing, storing, supplying, and
transporting oil. As part of that effort, Morgan Stanley purchased companies involved in various
stages of the energy supply chain, such as TransMontaigne, which managed nearly 50 oil storage
sites within the United States and Canada; Heidmar, which managed a fleet of 100 vessels
delivering oil internationally; and Olco Petroleum, which blended oils, sponsored storage
facilities, and ran about 200 retail gasoline stations in Canada. As part of its activities, Morgan
Stanley supplied crude oil to a large European refinery, home heating oil to Northeastern
utilities, and jet fuel to airlines. Over the last few years, Morgan Stanley began to reduce the
extent of its physical oil activities. In 2013, it decided to sell many of its physical oil assets. In
2014, it sold TransMontaigne and some of its oil storage and transport facilities to an unrelated
party. It arranged to sell additional physical oil assets to Rosneft, a Russian state owned
company, only to see that transaction suspended when the United States imposed sanctions on
Rosneft in connection with Russian incursions into Ukraine. In September 2014, Morgan
Stanley told the Subcommittee that it intended to complete its exit from most of its physical oil
business, although it would take longer than planned.
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities present a classic case study of banking mixed
with commerce, raising concerns about financial and catastrophic event risks as well as conflicts
of interest from simultaneously trading both financial and physical oil products.
(1) Background on Oil
Crude oil, also known as petroleum, is a naturally occurring liquid formed through the
heating and compression of organic materials beneath the earth’s crust over an extended period
of time.
1668
Crude oil and the products derived from it – including gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel,
propane, and heating oil – are some of the most commonly used sources of energy in the
world.
1669
The most common method of extracting crude oil from the earth is drilling.
1670
In the
method most commonly used in the oil industry, an extractor drills to the depth at which
geologists believe oil is located. The driller then inserts a tube into the newly drilled hole so that
the oil can flow through to the surface. Oil drilling can take place on land or offshore on a
seabed using a drilling platform. Oil can also be extracted from “oil sands,” typically beds of
sand or clay mixed with water and a form of crude oil.
1671
A third method of extraction involves
1668
See 7/29/2009 “What is Crude Oil? A Detailed Explanation on this Essential Fossil Fuel,” prepared by the
Editorial Department, Oilprice.com website,http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/What-Is-Crude-Oil-A-Detailed-
Explanation-On-This-Essential-Fossil-Fuel.html.
1669
See 6/19/2014 “Oil Crude and Petroleum Products Explained,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website
,http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home.
1670
7/29/2009 “What is Crude Oil? A Detailed Explanation on this Essential Fossil Fuel,” prepared by the Editorial
Department, Oilprice.com, website,http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/What-Is-Crude-Oil-A-Detailed-
Explanation-On-This-Essential-Fossil-Fuel.html.
1671
Id.
269
“hydraulic fracturing,” which typically involves injecting water, sand, and chemicals under high
pressure into petroleum-bearing rock formations such as shale to create new fractures in the rock
and increase oil or natural gas flow to a well.
1672
The bulk of oil production worldwide comes from state-owned oil companies.
1673
Large
privately owned oil companies and smaller independent oil companies also play a key role in oil
production. The five countries with the greatest crude oil production are Saudi Arabia, the
United States, Russia, China, and Canada.
1674
In 2013, about 12.4 million barrels per day were
produced in the United States, comprising roughly 14% of the crude oil produced worldwide.
1675
The United States was also the world’s leading crude oil user during that time, consuming about
18.8 million barrels per day in 2013.
1676
Other prominent oil-consuming nations include China,
J apan, and India.
1677
Crude Oil Infrastructure. Crude oil requires a complicated infrastructure to make the
oil usable for U.S. industry. First, the crude oil must be located and produced, using drilling rigs,
oil sand processing, or hydraulic fracturing techniques. Next, it must be transported, typically by
oil tanker, pipeline, or railway.
1678
Commonly, oil is taken by pipeline to a port, where it is
loaded onto an ocean-going tanker and transported to its ultimate destination.
1679
Within the
United States, oil is typically transported via pipeline, but due to a recent spike in oil production,
despite more than 190,000 miles of pipeline,
1680
the existing U.S. pipeline network cannot reach
or accommodate all of the oil requiring transport within U.S. borders.
1681
Oil companies have
1672
See undated “Hydraulic Fracturing,” prepared by U.S. Geological Society, U.S. Geological Society website,http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/HydraulicFracturing.aspx.
1673
9/30/2014 “Energy in Brief: Who are the major players supplying the world oil market?” U.S. Energy
Information Administration website, ,http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/world_oil_market.cfm. As it is
used here, the term “production” refers to the process by which crude oil is extracted from oil reserves in a particular
place.
1674
See undated “International Energy Statistics: 2013 Petroleum Production,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1&cid=regions,&syid=2013&eyid=2013
&unit=TBPD.
1675
See undated “International Energy Statistics: 2013 Petroleum Production,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1. One barrel
is equivalent to 42 U.S. gallons. 5/22/14 “Frequently Asked Questions,” U.S. Energy Information Administration
website,http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=24&t=10.
1676
See undated “International Energy Statistics: 2013 Petroleum Consumption,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproje...&pid=5&aid=2&cid=regions&syid=2013&eyid=2013&
unit=TBPD.
1677
Id.
1678
9/29/2014 “Transporting Oil and Natural Gas,” American Petroleum Institute website,http://www.api.org/oil-
and-natural-gas-overview/transporting-oil-and-natural-gas.
1679
Id.
1680
See undated “Oil and Natural Gas Overview,” American Petroleum Institute website,http://www.api.org/oil-
and-natural-gas-overview/transporting-oil-and-natural-gas/pipeline/where-are-the-oil-pipelines. See also 2013 “U.S.
Refineries, Crude Oil, and Refined Products Pipelines” prepared by American Energy Mapping, American
Petroleum Institute website,http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-overview/transporting-oil-and-natural-
gas/pipeline/~/media/Files/Oil-and-Natural-Gas/pipeline/US-Pipeline-Map-API-Website3.pdf.
1681
See “Oil boom downside: Exploding trains,” Politico, Kathryn A. Wolfe and Bob King (6/8/2014),http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/exploding-oil-trains-energy-environment-107966.html.
270
increasingly turned to the railway system to transport the excess.
1682
On occasion, they also use
tanker trucks.
1683
The crude oil is typically transported to a refinery to process it into refined oil
products. The United States currently has about 142 oil refineries.
1684
The refined oil products
are typically stored at the refinery until they are transported to a broker or end user, such as a
utility, airline, gasoline station, or industrial plant.
Crude Oil Markets and Prices. Crude oil is the largest and most actively traded
commodity market in the world, with numerous physical and financial trading venues and market
participants.
1685
There are currently hundreds of crude oil and refined oil products available for
trade.
1686
Because of the size of the market and the many participants, crude oil prices are set
globally, typically using U.S. dollars.
1687
Over the last ten years, crude oil prices have been
volatile, with the most notorious price swings in 2008, when oil spiked at $147 per barrel and
then fell to about $32 per barrel, a difference of $115 in less than six months.
1688
This year, from
August to October 2014, crude oil prices fell from about $100 to about $80 per barrel, a 20%
drop in two months.
1689
1682
Id. See also undated “Rail Accidents Involving Crude Oil and Ethanol Releases,” NTSB report by Paul L.
Stancil, NTSB website, at slide 2,https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/presentations/Opening Presentation Rail Accide
nts%20Involving%20Crude%20Oil%20and%20Ethanol%20Releases.pdf.
1683
See 10/31/2013 “EIA’s new map layers provide more detailed information on petroleum infrastructure,” U.S.
Energy Information Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13611.
1684
See 6/25/2014 “Petroleum & Other Liquids,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_cap1_dcu_nus_a.htm.
1685
See undated “Crude Oil Futures Quotes,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-oil/light-sweet-crude.html.
1686
See, e.g., undated “ICE Crude & Refined Oil Products,” prepared by ICE Futures Europe, ICE Futures Europe
website, at 6,https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_Crude_Refined_Oil_Products.pdf.
1687
See 7/2014 “Crude Oil Methodology and Specifications Guide,” prepared by Platts, Platts’ website, at 3, 8,http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Con...s/MethodologySpecs/Crude-oil-methodology.pdf.
See also “Why Do Oil Prices Swing So Wildly?” CBS Money Watch, Cait Murphy (9/1/2009),http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-do-oil-prices-swing-so-wildly/.
1688
See, e.g., undated “Spot Price Series History,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website, “Cushing, OK
WTI Spot Price FOB,”http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D.
1689
Id.
271
Source: 10/8/2014 “Historical Crude Oil Prices and Price Chart,” InfoMine website ,http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/crude-oil/all/.
In the financial markets, crude oil and refined oil products can be traded through a variety
of financial instruments, including futures, swaps, options, and forwards. The most actively
traded crude oil future in the United States is a standardized contract for 1,000 barrels of West
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, which is listed by CME Group Inc.
1690
The WTI contract is
traded on the CME Globex and CME Clearport trading platforms, and by open outcry on the
NYMEX floor.
1691
The contract can be settled financially or through the physical delivery of
WTI, although physical settlement is atypical. Another leading crude oil future is a standardized
contract for 1,000 barrels of Brent crude oil, which is traded on ICE Futures Europe and cash
settled.
1692
It is the most actively traded crude oil future in the world.
1693
Crude oil and refined
oil products can also be traded through a variety of financially-settled, over-the-counter swaps
and options on the Intercontinental Exchange.
1694
1690
See “Crude Oil Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-
oil/light-sweet-crude_contract_specifications.html. The contract price is based upon delivery of WTI crude oil, a
light, sweet crude oil produced in Texas, at Cushing, Oklahoma, where a number of oil pipelines converge.
1691
Id.
1692
See “Brent Crude Futures,” ICE Futures Europe website,https://www.theice.com/products/219/Brent-Crude-
Futures.
1693
See “The Growth of Brent Crude Oil,” Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) website,https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_Brent_Infographic.pdf. The contract price is based upon delivery of Brent
crude oil, a light, sweet crude oil produced in the North Sea.
1694
See oil products listed on the ICE website,https://www.theice.com/products.
272
In the physical market, crude oil and refined oil products are bought and sold in
thousands of trading venues around the world, typically using bilateral contracts. The contracts
are settled using electronic, voice, or in-person transactions involving a variety of producers,
brokers, intermediaries, and end users. Often, Brent and WTI futures prices are used as
benchmark prices in the contracts used to buy and sell physical oil.
Crude Oil Incidents. Extracting, storing, refining, and transporting crude oil, which is
highly flammable, carry ever-present risks of fire and explosion.
1695
They also present a variety
of environmental risks, including oil spills. Past catastrophic events include the 2011 BP
Deepwater Horizon incident involving an oil spill from a deep-sea drilling platform,
1696
the 2010
Kalamazoo River incident involving a ruptured oil pipeline,
1697
and the 1989 Exxon-Valdez
incident involving an oil spill from a shipwrecked oil tanker.
1698
Additionally, crude oil is
extremely toxic and can cause health issues in the event of physical contact, inhalation,
ingestion, or chronic exposure.
1699
Recently, railway transport of oil has also emerged as an environmental and safety issue.
New oilfields using hydraulic fracturing techniques, particularly in the North Dakota Bakken
shale formation, often have no pipeline access, and railroads have increasingly been used to carry
unprecedented volumes of crude oil across the country. According to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the amount of crude oil transported by rail has increased
from about 10,000 carloads in 2005, to 400,000 carloads in 2013.
1700
At a recent forum, the
NTSB described nine “significant” crude oil railway accidents since 2006, involving 2.8 million
gallons of oil.
1701
One of the deadliest oil train crashes occurred in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, on
J uly 6, 2013, when 63 railcars jumped the rails, setting off a chain of explosions and sending
1695
See 2/1/2013 “Safety Data Sheet: Crude Oil, Sweet or Sour,” prepared by J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corp., J P
Morgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobSer...oil.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1320592138413&bl
obheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-
Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
1696
See 1/2011 “Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling,” Report to the President,
prepared by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
1697
See 9/15/2010 prepared testimony of EPA Administrator Lisa P. J ackson, “Enbridge Pipeline Oil Spill new
Marshall, Michigan,” hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/pdfs/enbridge_lpj_testimony_20100915.pdf.
1698
See 5/1989 “The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Report to the President,” prepared by the National Response Team,http://www.akrrt.org/archives/response_reports/exxonvaldez_nrt_1989.pdf.
1699
See 2/1/2013 “Safety Data Sheet: Crude Oil, Sweet or Sour,” prepared by J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corp., J P
Morgan website, at 3,https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobSer...oil.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1320592138413&bl
obheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-
Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
1700
See undated “Rail Accidents Involving Crude Oil and Ethanol Releases,” NTSB report, NTSB website, at slide
2,https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/presentations/Opening Presentation Rail Accide
nts%20Involving%20Crude%20Oil%20and%20Ethanol%20Releases.pdf.
1701
Id. at slide 5. The NTSB reported 16 crude oil and ethanol accidents since 2006. The combined accidents
resulted in “48 fatalities, 281 [derailed tank cars], 2.8 million gallons of crude oil released, 2.0 million gallons of
ethanol released, [and] fires and environmental damage.” Id.
273
burning oil rolling through the small town, resulting in 47 deaths.
1702
The majority of the crude
oil accidents identified by the NTSB occurred in the last eighteen months, five of them since the
J uly 2013 accident: Aliceville, Alabama (November 2103); Casselton, North Dakota (December
2013); New Augusta, Mississippi (J anuary 2014); Plaster Rock, New Brunswick (J anuary 2014);
and Vandergrift, Pennsylvania (February 2014).
1703
Explosions, fires, and oil spills caused
extensive property and environmental damage. While some railroads have voluntarily
strengthened their safety procedures and retrofitted their tank cars and equipment, others have
not.
1704
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Oil
For more than 25 years, Morgan Stanley has been an active participant in physical and
financial oil markets. Acting as an investment bank, the firm began buying and selling both oil
futures and physical barrels of oil in the mid-1980s. Over the next 10 years, Morgan Stanley
gradually increased its involvement in the physical side of the oil industry, purchasing or leasing
oil storage facilities and pipelines; expanding into refined oil products such as heating oil, diesel,
gasoline, and jet fuel; and chartering oil transport ships. From 2006 to 2008, it purchased
companies involved with oil exploration, storage, distribution, pipelines, blending, and even
gasoline service stations. When the financial crisis began roiling markets worldwide, Morgan
Stanley converted to a bank holding company on an emergency basis in September 2008.
Despite its new status as a holding company restricted to the business of banking, with implied
taxpayer backing, Morgan Stanley continued its physical oil activities. In a 2011 internal
analysis, the Federal Reserve wrote that Morgan Stanley “controls a ‘vertically-integrated model’
spanning crude oil production, distillation, storage, land and water transport, and both wholesale
and retail distribution.”
1705
That same year, Morgan Stanley began to reduce its physical oil activities. By 2012, its
revenues were less than half of what they were in 2008.
1706
In 2013, Morgan Stanley began
exiting some of its physical oil activities, and in 2014, took steps to sell major assets.
1707
It has
1702
See 1/21/2014 National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendations, at 2, 6-7,http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/R-14-004-006.pdf (discussing Lac-Mégantic railway derailment). See
also “Who’s liable for the Lac-Mégantic disaster,” Montreal Gazette, Adam Kovac and Riley Sparks (8/10/2013),http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/liable+Mégantic+disaster/8775349/story.html; “The Dark Side of the Oil
Boom,” Politico, Kathryn A. Wolfe and Bob King, (6/8/2014),http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/exploding-
oil-trains-energy-environment-107966.html.
1703
See undated “Rail Accidents Involving Crude Oil and Ethanol Releases,” NTSB report, NTSB website, at slide
4,https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/presentations/Opening Presentation Rail Accide
nts%20Involving%20Crude%20Oil%20and%20Ethanol%20Releases.pdf. See also “The Dark Side of the Oil
Boom,” Politico, Kathryn A. Wolfe and Bob King, (6/8/2014) (analyzing 40 years of federal data showing a
dramatic increase in oil train incidents over the past five years).
1704
See, e.g., 9/2014 “Moving Crude Oil by Rail,” prepared by Association of American Railroads, Association of
American Railroads website,https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-
Papers/Crude%20oil%20by%20rail.pdf.
1705
6/21/2011 “Section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act -- Commodity-related Activities of Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200936 - 941, at 937.
1706
See 2/11/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-02-000001 - 004,
at 002.
1707
See discussion in the overview of Morgan Stanley, above.
274
not yet, however, completely exited the physical oil business, due in part to international
conflicts, and may require another year to do so.
(a) Building a Physical Oil Business
Morgan Stanley first registered with the CFTC as a commodities trader in 1982, initiating
its career as an oil trader in the financial commodity markets.
1708
In a 2010 letter to the Federal
Reserve, Morgan Stanley wrote:
“Morgan Stanley has been trading as principal in crude oil since 1984 and in refined
products since 1985. Over the past 25 years, Morgan Stanley has grown into one of the
preeminent energy trading firms, serving an expansive cross-section of US and foreign
corporations, municipalities and others seeking to access these markets and, as such,
Morgan Stanley provides significant liquidity to these markets.”
1709
Morgan Stanley became active in the physical oil markets around the same time.
According to one oil historian, it began trading crude oil under Louis Bernard, a senior partner at
the firm, and Neal Shear, a commodities trader recruited from J . Aron & Co.
1710
As part of that
effort, the firm also hired two oil traders from oil companies, J ohn Shapiro from Conoco, and
Nancy Kropp from Sun Oil.
1711
The oil historian wrote that, at the same time Morgan Stanley
launched its oil futures trading operation, “[t]o ensure a constant stream of information about the
market’s movements ahead of its rivals,” it leased “a few oil storage containers” in Cushing,
Oklahoma.
1712
As a result, “[h]our by hour, the traders in New York would be aware of whether
there was a surplus or a shortage” of the West Texas Intermediate crude oil that provided the
benchmark price for crude oil futures traded on the NYMEX.
1713
Trading primarily in crude oil, Morgan Stanley gradually increased the size of its oil desk
until, by 1990, it reportedly included 40 people.
1714
In March 1990, Morgan Stanley hired Olav
Refvik, an oil trader from Statoil who, together with J ohn Shapiro, provided the leadership for its
oil commodity activities over the next decade.
1715
By 1993, Morgan Stanley expanded its oil
1708
See undated “Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,” National Futures Association BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=UpygXzt3Ct4=&rn=N. See also 10/10/2014 letter
from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 - 003, at 001.
1709
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174. See also 5/4/2009
“Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Board of
New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, 631 [sealed exhibit] (stating that “Morgan Stanley is one of the largest players
in the physical and financial commodities trading space,” trades “Oil Liquids,” and has been “an active player in the
commodities markets for over 25 years”).
1710
Oil: Money, Politics and Power in the 21st Century, Tom Bower (Grand Central Publishing 2010), at 48 and 49.
1711
Id. at 49.
1712
Id.
1713
Id. See also “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis
(3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570 (indicating that, in 1986, Mr. Shapiro
convinced Morgan Stanley to lease oil storage tanks in Cushing, store low-priced crude oil, and wait for increased
prices).
1714
Bower, at 136.
1715
Id.
275
trading efforts into Canada, Europe and Asia, opening trading desks in Calgary, London,
Singapore, and Tokyo.
1716
Becoming “King of New York Harbor.” At the suggestion of Mr. Refvik, Morgan
Stanley began to lease substantial oil storage facilities, not only in Cushing, Oklahoma, but also
in New York, New J ersey, and Connecticut.
1717
Those facilities were used to store oil
transported to the United States by ship until needed at nearby refineries or shipment to clients
via pipelines that supplied the East Coast. They also enabled Morgan Stanley to store oil while
waiting for better prices. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it entered into its first oil
storage agreement in the New York-New J ersey-Connecticut area with Wyatt Inc. in the late
1980s or early 1990s.
1718
By 1994, it also had oil storage agreements with IMTT-Bayonne in
New J ersey and GATX Terminal Corp. in Staten Island, New York.
1719
Mr. Refvik was
eventually dubbed “King of New York Harbor,”
1720
and reportedly helped integrate Morgan
Stanley’s physical and financial oil trading efforts.
1721
Morgan Stanley records show that, in the month of September 1997, among other
activities, it bought and sold about 7 million of barrels of heating oil, gasoline, and diesel with
over two dozen counterparties in the Northeast.
1722
That same month, it bought and sold about
5.7 million barrels of gasoline with over 40 counterparties in Texas.
1723
It also leased storage
facilities for heating oil, diesel, and kerosene, and at the end of the month, paid taxes on an
inventory of nearly 2 million barrels of heating oil and 951,000 barrels of diesel.
1724
In 1997,
Morgan Stanley also entered into contracts to “process, refine, blend or otherwise alter crude oil
into refined products,” and to transport oil via pipelines and chartered vessels.
1725
(b) Conducting Physical Oil Activities
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities continued to expand over the years and continued
to include storing, supplying, transporting, and processing oil. It conducted those activities
through both its Liquids Oil Desk in the Commodities group and through business subsidiaries
owned by Morgan Stanley Capital Group, its primary commodities trading arm.
Storing Oil. One of Morgan Stanley’s primary physical oil activities was to store vast
quantities of oil in facilities located within the United States and abroad. According to Morgan
1716
Id. at 146.
1717
Id.; 10/10/14 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 -
003, at 001.
1718
10/10/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 - 003, at
001.
1719
Id.
1720
See “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis
(3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570; “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking,
Commerce, and Commodities,” Saule T. Omarova, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 314 (2013).
1721
“Noble Oil Desk Says Goodbye to Refvik, the ‘King of NY Harbor,’” Reuters, David Sheppard (10/23/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/noble-refvik-idAFL1E8LNH2M20121023.
1722
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174.
1723
Id. at 175.
1724
Id.
1725
Id. at 176.
276
Stanley, in the New York-New J ersey-Connecticut area alone, by 2011, it had leases on oil
storage facilities with a total capacity of 8.2 million barrels, increasing to 9.1 million barrels in
2012, and then decreasing to 7.7 million barrels in 2013.
1726
Morgan Stanley also had storage
facilities in Europe and Asia.
1727
According to the Federal Reserve, by 2012, Morgan Stanley
held “operating leases on over 100 oil storage tank fields with 58 million barrels of storage
capacity globally.”
1728
Morgan Stanley leased its storage facilities from its wholly-owned subsidiary,
TransMontaigne which specialized in oil storage and transport services, and from unrelated third
parties. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, of the 40 to 50 million barrels of storage
capacity it leased in 2013, it estimated that about 15 million barrels were leased from
TransMontaigne and about 35 million barrels were leased from unrelated third parties.
1729
Morgan Stanley used its storage facilities to build inventories with millions of barrels of
different types of oil. The following chart provides the total Morgan Stanley inventories for five
types of oil products from 2008 to 2012:
Morgan Stanley Physical Oil Inventories
2008-2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Crude Oil 1.1 million 633,000 12.3 million 1.0 million 1.7 million
Heating Oil 7.3 million 15.2 million 11.4 million 9.0 million 5.8 million
Jet/Kerosene 4.6 million 10.6 million 6.6 million 5.8 million 4.0 million
Gasoline 4.5 million 7.6 million 5.3 million 7.5 million 6.2 million
Fuel Oil 974,000 1.8 million 1.9 million 1.4 million 1.7 million
In Barrels
Source: 3/4/2013 letter fromMorgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-03-000002, 007.
Supplying Oil. In addition to storing oil, over the years, Morgan Stanley became an oil
supplier for a variety of end users. From 2008 to 2013, for example, it supplied crude oil to
several refineries. One contract was with a major European oil and chemical company, Ineos
Group Ltd., which had oil refineries in France and Scotland.
1730
Under their agreement, from
1726
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 - 005, at
001-002.
1727
See, e.g., 5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 634 [sealed exhibit].
1728
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 485 [sealed exhibit]. See
also 2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for the
Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, at 008 (indicating that, in 2013, Morgan Stanley had “~50
million bbl [barrels] of leased oil liquids storage capacity”).
1729
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/11/2013).
1730
See, e.g., undated “Company: Ineos at a glance,” Ineos website,http://www.ineos.com/company/; 7/23/2007
Ineos press release, “Ineos and Morgan Stanley announce oil refining agreement,”http://www.ineos.com/news/ineos-group/ineos-and-morgan-stanley-announce-oil-refining-
277
2008 to 2012, Morgan Stanley provided the Ineos refineries with a total of about 500 million
barrels of crude oil.
1731
Morgan Stanley also entered into crude oil supply agreements with the
Toledo Refining Company LLC in March 2011, and with Delaware City Refining Company
LLC in April 2011, both of which were later assigned to PBF Holding Company LLC.
1732
Both
agreements have since concluded. In addition, in August 2012, Morgan Stanley entered into an
agreement with Paulsboro Refining Company LLC to purchase its refined oil products; that
contract was also later assigned to PBF Holding Company LLC and has since
ended.
1733
Currently, according to Morgan Stanley, it has no oil supply contracts with any
refineries.
Morgan Stanley also has a long history of supplying home heating oil and diesel to
utilities and other customers in the Northeast. According to one oil historian, Mr. Refvik was
responsible for increasing Morgan Stanley’s involvement with refined oil products like heating
oil, diesel, and jet fuel.
1734
Refined oil products represent a complex market with a variety of
logistical, operational, and financial risks, since over 100 types of crude oil are produced
worldwide, require differing refining procedures in summer and winter, and must be delivered to
an appropriate refinery able to serve specific markets.
1735
In 1991, Mr. Refvik reportedly led Morgan Stanley to purchase an insolvent oil refinery
in Connecticut, and use it to supply heating oil and diesel on a daily basis to customers in the
Northeast.
1736
Over the next few years, Morgan Stanley leased additional oil storage facilities in
New J ersey and Connecticut.
1737
In 2001, during an unexpected cold snap, Morgan Stanley
became a leading supplier of home heating oil in the region, reportedly able to sell oil when
others ran out.
1738
Since 2008, Morgan Stanley has held an inventory of millions of barrels of
home heating oil with a total dollar value of as much as $1.3 billion at a time.
1739
In 2011 alone,
Morgan Stanley purchased 950,000 barrels of home heating oil from the U.S. Heating Reserve
when the reserve switched to a different fuel.
1740
agreement/?business=INEOS+Group; “Morgan Stanley to Supply Crude Oil to Ineos,” Reuters, (7/23/2007),http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/23/morgan-stanley-ineos-idUSL2388575320070723.
1731
See 2009 “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview,” FRB-PSI-618889 – 908. See also 10/24/2014
email from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-22-000001 - 003, at 002. See also,
e.g., “ChinaOil Takes over Morgan Stanley’s Ineos Marketing Deal,” Reuters, Chen Aizhu (3/14/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-morgan-ineos-petrochina-idUSBRE82D06E20120314.
1732
10/24/2014 email from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-22-000001 - 003, at
001.
1733
Id.
1734
Bower, at 136; “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann
Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570.
1735
See, e.g., 12/2/2009 “A Detailed Guide on the Many Different Types of Crude Oil,” Oilprice.com website,http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/A-Detailed-Guide-On-The-Many-Different-Types-Of-Crude-Oil.html.
1736
Bower at 138-139.
1737
See “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis
(3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570.
1738
Id.
1739
See 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 003; 3/4/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-03-000002, 007.
1740
See 2/3/2011 DOE press release, “DOE Accepts Bids for Northeast Home Heating Oil Stocks,”http://energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-accepts-bids-northeast-home-heating-oil-stocks; 2/10/2011 DOE press release,
“DOE Completes Sale of Northeast Home Heating Oil Stocks,”http://energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-completes-sale-
278
From at least 2003 to the present, Morgan Stanley has also been a routine supplier of
physical jet fuel to airlines operating in the United States, as described in more detail below. In
addition, it became the major oil supplier to TransMontaigne, which keeps a variety of fuels at its
storage sites across the country to service client needs.
1741
For example, under a “Terminal
Servicing Agreement,” Morgan Stanley Capital Group sold physical refined oil products on a
“just-in-time” basis to TransMontaigne affiliates which then re-sold them to their customers.
1742
Transporting Oil. In connection with its physical oil storage and supply activities,
Morgan Stanley also became an active participant in the transportation of oil.
1743
It focused in
particular on oil tankers, purchasing ownership interests in companies that handled the logistics
for chartering vessels, including the Heidmar Group and Global Energy International, described
below. According to Morgan Stanley, its shipping operation enabled it to transport physical oil
products from less to more expensive markets and to meet its oil supply obligations.
1744
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2009, Morgan Stanley “was ranked 9
th
globally in shipping
oil distillates,” and by 2012, had “over 100 ships under time charters or voyages for movement
of oil product.”
1745
In addition to oil transport ships, Morgan Stanley, through its wholly-owned subsidiary,
TransMontaigne, moved oil via pipelines, trucks, and railroad cars.
1746
In each mode of
transportation, Morgan Stanley focused on leasing, rather than owning, the vessels, vehicles, or
railways used to move the oil.
Producing and Processing Oil. In addition to storing, supplying, and transporting oil,
Morgan Stanley devoted a small portion of its physical oil business to oil exploration and
production. Rather than purchase companies directly engaged in oil exploration or production,
Morgan Stanley acquired a company that provided financing to those companies. In 2006,
Morgan Stanley became the 99.5% owner of Wellbore Capital, LLC, a Dallas firm which
northeast-home-heating-oil-stocks. The U.S. Heating Reserve was established in 2000, to ensure available supplies
at a reasonable cost in the event of an emergency. See undated “Heating Oil Reserve,” U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Fossil Energy website,http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/heating-oil-reserve. In 2011, the
U.S. Heating Reserve was reduced from 2 million to 1 million barrels, and replaced all of the heating oil with diesel,
a cleaner burning fuel. See undated “Heating Oil Reserve,” U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy
website,http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/heating-oil-reserve.
1741
See, e.g., 11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products
Support,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 124.
1742
Id.
1743
See 6/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-06-000001 - 006,
002.
1744
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/11/2013); 2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000001–027, at 016;
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 634, 636 [sealed exhibit].
1745
2012 Summary Report, at 486 [sealed exhibit]. See also 2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000001–027, at 008
(indicating that, in 2013, Morgan Stanley had “~100 vessels on average under time and spot charter”).
1746
See, e.g., TransMontaigne website,http://www.transmontaignepartners.com/map/, and information below.
279
“invest in oil and natural gas exploration and development projects.”
1747
According to its
website, in 2010, Wellbore Capital’s portfolio was valued at $100 million and included oil and
gas working interest investments, including about 90 wells and 65,000 net acres in Texas,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana.
1748
In addition, in 2009, Morgan Stanley acquired a 43.75%
ownership interest in a Wellbore subsidiary, Big C Gathering LLC, which ran a processing
facility for raw crude oil and natural gas.
1749
Acquiring Oil Related Businesses. To conduct its physical oil activities, Morgan
Stanley purchased a number of companies involved in different sectors of the oil market.
According to a 2009 Federal Reserve examination, Morgan Stanley’s “Strategic Transactions
Group,” which designed principal investments for Morgan Stanley within the “Global
Commodities Investments” group, purchased 15 companies from 2006 to 2009.
1750
Three key
acquisitions were TransMontaigne, Olco Petroleum, and Heidmar.
TransMontaigne. On September 1, 2006, in a major expansion of its physical oil
activities, Morgan Stanley purchased TransMontaigne Inc., a company based in Denver,
Colorado and engaged in oil sales, storage, and transport.
1751
TransMontaigne became a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Morgan Stanley Capital Group, the major commodities arm of the financial
holding company, and Morgan Stanley employees took a majority of the seats on
TransMontaigne’s Board of Directors. TransMontaigne became a key contributor to Morgan
Stanley’s physical oil storage, supply, and transport activities.
Through various subsidiaries and affiliates, the TransMontaigne group of companies
offered multiple oil-related supply, storage, and transport services. TransMontaigne Inc.
described itself as “a leading wholesale fuel provider,” offered a variety of unbranded fuels for
sale, and also provided fuel transport services and commercial marine fuel supply.
1752
Its
affiliate, TransMontaigne Partners, provided “integrated terminaling, storage, transportation and
related services for customers engaged in the distribution and marketing of” a variety of oil and
chemical products.
1753
Those products included “gasolines, diesel fuels, heating oil and jet
fuels,” as well as “residual fuel oils and asphalt.”
1754
TransMontaigne’s policy was not to
purchase or market the products that it handled or transported.
1755
1747
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at
008, 034.
1748
See undated “Investments,” Wellbore Capital LLC website,http://www.wellborecapital.com/investments.html.
1749
See 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 031.
1750
See 5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 636 [sealed exhibit].
1751
See 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 029 - 030.
1752
See undated “About TMG,” TransMontaigne Inc. website,http://www.transmontaigne.com/about-tmg/.
1753
2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 5,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm
1754
Id.
1755
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at
013.
280
According to its SEC filings, TransMontaigne maintained storage facilities throughout
the United States, primarily in the Midwest, along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, in Texas,
along the Gulf Coast, and in the Southeast.
1756
Its five key operations involved: (1) receiving
refined oil products from pipeline, ship, barge, or railcar sources and transferring them to storage
tanks located at TransMontaigne terminals; (2) storing the refined oil products in
TransMontaigne tanks; (3) monitoring the volume of the refined products in the tanks; (4)
disbursing the refined oil products out of the tanks using pipelines and other distribution
equipment; and (5) heating residual fuel oils and asphalt stored in the tanks.
1757
In 2013,
Montaigne had nearly 50 storage facilities with a total storage capacity of about 24 million
barrels.
1758
It also had about 140 miles of pipeline.
1759
In addition, the website indicated that a
number of the storage sites could accept or arrange oil delivery or transport via tanker truck,
railway, or vessel.
1760
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, over the years, it typically utilized 60% to
70% of TransMontaigne’s available storage.
1761
In its 2013 annual SEC filing, TransMontaigne
LP reported that “Together, Morgan Stanley Capital Group and TransMontaigne [are] our largest
customer and we receive a substantial majority of our revenue from them.”
1762
According to
Morgan Stanley, in 2012, TransMontaigne – together with all of its subsidiaries -- generated net
revenues totaling nearly $475 million in revenue.
1763
TransMontaigne Inc. is the parent corporation in the TransMontaigne group of
companies. Until 2014, it was 100% owned by Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. which is, in
turn, wholly owned by the Morgan Stanley financial holding company.
1764
Its key subsidiary
was TransMontaigne LP, a publicly traded master limited partnership, over 20% of whose
ownership was retained by Morgan Stanley and TransMontaigne. TransMontaigne LP owned
over a dozen subsidiaries involved in oil storage, distribution, and transportation. The following
chart depicts its ownership structure in 2013.
1765
1756
See 2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 10,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm.
1757
Id.
1758
See undated “Operations Map,” prepared by TransMontaigne, TransMontaigne website,http://www.transmontaigne.com/map/; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1759
See undated “Pipeline Safety,” TransMontaigne website,http://www.transmontaignepartners.com/about-
transmontaigne-limited-partners/pipeline-safety/.
1760
Id.
1761
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1762
2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 36,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm.
1763
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 021, at
017.
1764
2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 6,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm
1765
Id.
281
TransMontaigne also had operations in Canada, held since 2010 through a wholly-owned
subsidiary, TransMontaigne Canada Holdings Inc. The Canadian operations included over 60 oil
terminals, plants, and pipeline operations.
1766
By 2013, TransMontaigne Canada Holdings Inc.
had three subsidiaries: Canadian Canterm Terminals Inc. (CanTerm), TransMontaigne
Marketing Canada Inc. (TMCI), and TMG Canadian Holdings LLC. The first two subsidiaries
were acquired from Olco Petroleum, described below. The following chart depicts the Canadian
companies.
1767
1766
See undated “Corporate Structure,” TransMontaigne Marketing Canada Inc. website,http://web.archive.org/web/20131209060736/http://transmontaignecanada.ca/index-1.html.
1767
Id.
282
Source: 10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-
005, at 002.
CanTerm operated two marine terminals in Montreal and Quebec City, as well as land
terminals to store petroleum, chemical, and other bulk commodities.
1768
Its marine terminals
offered pipeline, dock lines, truck, and railway connections as well as oil blending operations.
1769
TMCI marketed and distributed oil products like gasoline, biodiesel, and heating oil on a
wholesale basis.
1770
TMG Canadian Holdings LLC owned Olco Petroleum, described below.
1768
See 3/27/2014 Vopak press release, “Vopak acquires two distribution terminals in Canada,”http://www.vopak.com/uploads/tx_vopak/news/03-27_Press_release_Canterm_UK.pdf. See also Canterm Canadian
Terminals, Inc. website,http://web.archive.org/web/20130823051055/http://canterm.com/canterm/en/index.htm.
1769
See undated “Vopak Terminals of Canada - Montreal, Quebec,” Vopak website,http://www.vopak.com/north-
america/vopak-terminals-of-canada-montreal-quebec-cbm.html. See also undated, “Vopak Terminals of Canada -
Quebec City,”http://www.vopak.com/overview/terminal-overview/north-americanorth-america/canada/north-
americavopak-terminals-of-canada-quebec-city-cbm.html.
1770
See 4/2/2013 Parkland Fuel Corporation press release, “Parkland Fuel Corporation Enters Quebec Market with
New Supply Agreement and Assumption of TransMontaigne Business,”http://www.parkland.ca/investors/news/news_post?source=http://parkland.mwnewsroom.com/press-
releases/parkland-fuel-corporation-enters-quebec-market-wit-tsx-pki-201304020864113001&type=1 (describing
TMCI assets).
283
In March 2014, Morgan Stanley sold CanTerm to Vopak Terminals QC Inc.
1771
On J uly
1, 2014, Morgan Stanley sold the rest of TransMontaigne – other than its Canadian holdings – to
NGL Energy Partners LP for $200 million plus an additional $347 million for inventory
transferred at closing.
1772
NGL Energy Partners is a publicly-traded company that owns and
operates a variety of energy businesses focused on oil logistics, water treatment services, and
retail propane.
1773
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it sold TransMontaigne as part of
its larger decision to exit the physical oil merchanting business.
1774
Olco Petroleum. A few months after purchasing TransMontaigne, on December 15,
2006, Morgan Stanley acquired a 60% ownership stake in Olco Petroleum Group Inc. (Olco
Petroleum).
1775
Founded in 1986, Olco Petroleum was a Canadian company which blended,
marketed, and distributed refined oil products in Ontario and Quebec, including gasoline,
propane, and biodiesel fuels.
1776
At the time of purchase, it owned a network of over 200 retail
gasoline stations, some with convenience stores or carwashes, in eastern Canada.
1777
Its holdings
included CanTerm, the oil marketing, terminal, and blending company, described above.
1778
In 2006, Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., through TransMontaigne Inc., took
possession of the Olco shares.
1779
In September 2008, the same month Morgan Stanley became
a bank holding company, it acquired the remaining 40% of Olco Petroleum, making Olco
Petroleum a wholly-owned subsidiary of TransMontaigne Inc.
1780
Olco’s gasoline stations were
gradually sold, but its Canadian storage, marketing, and distribution services continued.
1781
In 2010, Morgan Stanley reorganized Olco, which became Olco Petroleum Group
ULC.
1782
That same year, TransMontaigne reorganized its Canadian holdings, creating the new
holding company, TransMontaigne Canada Holdings, Inc.
1783
One of the subsidiaries of the new
1771
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002.
1772
See 7/2/2014 NGL Energy Partners press release, “NGL Energy Partners LP announces completion of
acquisition of TransMontaigne GP and related assets,”http://www.nglenergypartners.com/investor-relations/news/.
See also “Morgan Stanley to sell oil business TransMontaigne to NGL Energy,” The Wall Street J ournal, J ustin Baer
(06/09/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanley-sells-stake-in-transmontaigne-to-ngl-1402316959.
1773
See undated “About Us,” NGL Energy Partners website,http://www.nglenergypartners.com/about-us/.
1774
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/14/2014).
1775
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002; 2/28/2007 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report, filed with the SEC on 4/6/2007, at 34,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312507075695/d10q.htm. See also “Morgan Stanley
bought 60 pct of Olco Petroleum,” Reuters (2/13/2007),http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/13/idUSN1316645820070213.
1776
See undated “Company Overview of OLCO Petroleum Group Inc.,” Bloomberg Businessweek,http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=875628.
1777
Id.
1778
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002.
1779
Id.
1780
Id.; See 2009 TransMontaigne LP Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/8/2010, at 12,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746910001852/a2197078z10-k.htm
1781
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1782
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002.
1783
Id.
284
holding company was TMG Canadian Holdings LLC, which became the holder of 100% of the
Olco shares, as depicted in the chart above.
1784
In addition, Olco’s subsidiary, CanTerm, was
moved out of Olco to become a stand-alone subsidiary of TransMontaigne Canadian Holdings,
Inc., again as shown in the chart above.
1785
As indicated earlier, Morgan Stanley sold CanTerm in March 2014. When Morgan
Stanley sold TransMontaigne to NGL Energy Partners in J uly 2014, it retained TransMontaigne
Canadian Holdings Inc.
1786
As of October 2014, Morgan Stanley still owns that holding
company, along with Olco Petroleum, continuing its involvement with physical oil storage
facilities and pipelines in Canada.
1787
Heidmar. In 2006, a third key acquisition by Morgan Stanley was taking 100%
ownership of the Heidmar Group Inc., a Connecticut marine logistics company which provided
chartering and scheduling services for a fleet of independently owned oil transport vessels.
1788
Two years later, in 2008, Morgan Stanley sold 49% of its ownership interest to Shipping Pool
Investors Inc. and another 2% to Heidmar executives, leaving Morgan Stanley with a 49%
interest in the company.
1789
Morgan Stanley representatives sit on the Heidmar Board of
Directors.
Founded in 1984, Heidmar Holdings, Inc. is “one of the world’s leading commercial
tanker operators with a fleet of approximately 100 ships.”
1790
It helps deliver “crude oil and
blending components which power the world’s cars, planes, trains, trucks, and heat homes
around the globe.”
1791
Heidmar does not own the ships it operates; it works with independent
owners to form pools of vessels that service certain geographic areas.
1792
It then provides
scheduling, chartering, and related logistics services for clients needing to charter a vessel either
for a specific period of time or for a particular voyage.
Additionally, in 2008, Morgan Stanley purchased a “30% interest in Global Energy
International Limited, a Singapore company that provides international marine services and
supplies bunker fuel and other oil products through its own fleet of 23 vessels.”
1793
1784
Id.
1785
Id.
1786
Id.
1787
Id.
1788
See 5/15/2009 “Morgan Stanley Responses to Permissibility Analysis on Commodities Activities Follow-up,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley for the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200405 - 418, at 412; 2009 “Morgan Stanley Global
Commodities Overview,” FRB-PSI-618889 – 908; 7/16/ 2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-Morgan Stanley-07-000001 - 034, at 007 and 030; 5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities
Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at
637 [sealed exhibit].
1789
2012 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/26/2013, at 3,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513077191/d484822d10k.htm; undated “About,”
Heidmar Inc. website,http://www.heidmar.com/history/.
1790
Undated “About,” Heidmar Inc. website,http://www.heidmar.com/what-we-do/.
1791
Id.
1792
Id.
1793
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at
007.
285
Morgan Stanley relied on the ships provided by Heidmar and Global Energy to meet its
oil supply obligations and to locate, buy and transport oil cargoes around the world.
1794
In 2009,
Morgan Stanley shipped about 16.3 million barrels of oil per month in about 165 vessel
movements, using either ships or barges.
1795
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that while it
used to charter about 100 vessels per month, by 2014, it was down to leasing 10 to 15 vessels per
month.
1796
Incidents. Morgan Stanley oil-related subsidiaries occasionally experienced accidents or
incidents involving oil. Since 2006, TransMontaigne, has had 36 incidents recorded in the
database kept by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHSMA).
1797
Two incidents resulted in consent agreements with states.
The first, on October 3, 2006, involved about 70,500 gallons of regular unleaded gasoline which
overflowed the top of a tank in Rogers, Arkansas; the tank was owned and operated by
TransMontaigne Partners LP and its subsidiary Razorback, LLC.
1798
According to the consent
agreement with the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (DOEQ), about 9,000 cubic
yards of contaminated soil had to be excavated and treated on site.
1799
Another 17,800 gallons of
gasoline were also removed.
1800
Another incident took place on J anuary 28, 2010, when a
pipeline ruptured in Fairfax County, Virginia and discharged about 280 gallons of diesel fuel into
a nearby body of water.
1801
TransMontaigne paid a civil fine of about $114,000.
1802
Of the 36
incidents, six involved cargo tank crashes or derailments in which gasoline or diesel fuel were
released and were considered “serious incidents” by the Hazardous Materials Information
System (HMIS).
1803
There were no hazardous materials-related injuries or fatalities in those six
incidents, and the total amount of damages ranged between $146,000 to $553,000.
1804
(c) Exiting the Physical Oil Business
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, in 2013, it decided that it would refocus its
commodities activities to become more “customer driven.”
1805
As part of that decision, Morgan
1794
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 634 [sealed exhibit].
1795
Id.
1796
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1797
See 10/27/2014 “Incident Reports Database Search,” PHSMA Office of Hazardous Materials Safety website,https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/search.aspx (using search term “TransMontaigne” in the
classification of “Shipper/Offeror”).
1798
In re TransMontaigne Partners, L.P., Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality, Consent Administrative
Order, at 2 (5/19/2010),http://www.adeq.state.ar.us/ftproot/Pub/WebDatabases/Legal/CAO/LIS_Files/10-086.pdf.
1799
Id.
1800
Id.
1801
State Water Control Board Enforcement Action – Order by Consent Issued to TransMontaigne Operating
Company L.P. at 3, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (8/4/2011),http://www.deq.virginia.gov/Portals...lOrders/TransMontaigneOperatingAug042011.pdf.
1802
Id. at 4.
1803
See 10/27/2014 “Incident Reports Database Search,” PHSMA Office of Hazardous Materials Safety website,https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/search.aspx (using search term “TransMontaigne” in the
classification of “Shipper/Offeror,” and selecting for crashes or derailments).
1804
Id.
1805
Subcommittee briefings by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014 and 9/11/2014).
286
Stanley told the Subcommittee that “Morgan Stanley has decided to exit certain of its physical
commodities business lines, including its global physical oil merchanting business and its
investment in TransMontaigne, Inc.”
1806
Declining Revenues. In 2009, a Federal Reserve examination reported that Morgan
Stanley’s global oil business had produced nearly 60% of the revenues generated by the
Commodities group and called it “the most important source of revenues.”
1807
According to
Morgan Stanley, while its oil liquids business has generated revenues and profits in every fiscal
year since 2008, its revenues and profits have steadily declined.
1808
The following chart shows
the decline in revenues:
Morgan Stanley Oil Desk Net Revenues
2008-2013
Source: 7/16/2013 and 10/17/2014 letters fromMorgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee,
PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at 005 and PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 - 005, at 003.
To implement its decision to exit the physical oil business, as explained earlier, in J uly
2014, Morgan Stanley sold TransMontaigne to NGL Energy Partners, although it retained some
assets, including TransMontaigne’s holdings in Canada.
1809
Morgan Stanley also attempted to
sell to Rosneft Oil Company a number of the global physical oil assets held by Morgan Stanley
Commodities, primarily through Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. in the United States, and by
Morgan Stanley International Holdings, Inc. internationally.
1810
Morgan Stanley entered into a sales agreement with a subsidiary of Rosneft Oil Company
on December 20, 2013.
1811
Rosneft is a Russian state-owned corporation that is the country’s
1806
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
003.
1807
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 633 [sealed exhibit]. See also 5/7/2009 “Global Commodities
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-618889 - 908, at 897.
1808
7/1/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley to FRBNY, FRB-PSI-302759 - 768, at 768; 10/17/2014 letters from
Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 - 005, at 003.
1809
See 10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 -
005, at 002.
1810
See 10/10/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 -
003, at 002.
1811
See 12/20/2013 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to Sell Global Oil Merchanting Business to
Rosneft,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
Fiscal Year Net Revenues
2008 $1.3 billion
2009 $1.2 billion
2010 $822 million
2011 $677 million
2012 $676 million
287
largest petroleum company and third largest gas producer.
1812
The agreement covered Morgan
Stanley’s physical oil inventories, storage leases, shipping charters, blending services, supply
contracts, and its 49% stake in Heidmar, among other assets.
1813
The transaction was expected to
close during the second half of 2014, after regulatory approvals.
1814
The Federal Trade
Commission provided its approval on J une 17, 2014.
1815
The European Commission provided it
approval on September 4, 2014.
1816
In March 2014, however, as a result of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine’s Crimean
peninsula, the United States government imposed sanctions on a number of Russian individuals
and entities, including companies that operate in the energy sector.
1817
In September 2014, the
United States expanded the sanctions, specifically naming Rosneft as one of the energy
companies.
1818
Morgan Stanley has indicated publicly that, because of the sanctions, the sale
may not be finalized.
1819
If the sale is not concluded, Morgan Stanley has indicated it will
continue to look for a buyer.
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Crude Oil Activities
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities raise multiple concerns, including the wholesale
mixing of banking and commerce; financial, operational and catastrophic event risks; insufficient
capital and insurance coverage to protect against potential losses; conflicts of interest arising
from controlling crude oil supplies while trading crude oil financial instruments; and the need for
stronger safeguards.
1812
See 7/16/2014 U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, “Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities
Within the Financial Services and Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those
Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx.
1813
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/14/2014). See also 6/30/2014 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report,
filed with the SEC on 8/5/2014, at 113,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514295874/d763478d10q.htm; 12/20/2013 Morgan
Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to Sell Global Oil Merchanting Business to Rosneft,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
1814
See 6/30/2014 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report, filed with the SEC on 8/5/2014, at 113,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514295874/d763478d10q.htm.
1815
6/17/2014 “20141062: Rosneft Oil Company; Morgan Stanley,” Federal Trade Commission Premerger
Notification Program, FTC website,http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-
termination-notices/20141062.
1816
“EU executive clears acquisition of Morgan Stanley’s oil unit by Rosneft,” Reuters, (9/4/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-rosneft-morgan-stanley-idUSKBN0GZ0ZP20140904.
1817
See undated “Ukraine and Russia sanctions,” U.S. Department of State website,http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.
1818
See 9/12/2014 U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions
within the Russian Financial Services, Energy, and Defense or Related Material Sectors,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2629.aspx. “Treasury has also imposed sanctions that
prohibit the exportation of goods, services (not including financial services), or technology in support of exploration
or production for Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil, to five
Russian energy companies – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Rosneft – involved in these types
of projects.” Id.
1819
See, e.g., “Morgan Stanley says ‘no assurance’ Rosneft deal will close,” Reuters (10/10/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/morgan-stanley-rosneft-idUSL2N0S524L20141010.
288
(a) Mixing Banking with Commerce
Morgan Stanley spent 25 years building a vast physical oil business, involving producing,
refining, storing, transporting and supplying oil products. That vast commercial physical oil
enterprise is not the type of financial activity that, under U.S. law and practice, was envisioned as
appropriate for a bank or bank holding company.
Because Morgan Stanley was immersed in physical oil activities prior to 1997, and was
still engaged in them when it converted to a bank holding company in 2008, those activities are
more appropriately protected from divestiture by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause
than, for example, its compressed natural gas venture which was begun five years after it became
a bank holding company. But even those Morgan Stanley commercial business activities that are
protected by grandfather status raise the same concerns that led to bans on mixing banking with
commerce in the first place. Those concerns include, as discussed in Chapter 2, unfair economic
advantages due to the bank holding company’s access to inexpensive credit from its subsidiary
bank; unfair informational advantages due to the bank holding company’s access to non-public
information from its commercial and client activities; conflicts of interest that can arise between
the bank holding company and its clients when competing commercially; potential distortions of
credit decisions by an affiliated bank that wants to support its holding company; the dangers of
market manipulation; increased bank and systemic risks arising from industrial activities; and the
undue concentration of economic power that results when a bank holding company becomes a
major player, not only in the provision of credit, but also in a vital energy sector. On top of those
concerns is the reality of a bank holding company with so many complex enterprises in so many
geographic areas that it becomes too big to manage or regulate.
In its 2012 report, the FRBNY Commodities Team that conducted the broad review of
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities expressed “upervisory
[c]oncerns” that their engagement in “commercial/physical commodity activities breaches the
separation of banking and commerce and place industrial activities within the federal safety
net.”
1820
As stated earlier, to conduct its physical oil activities, Morgan Stanley has relied on the
grandfather clause. The grandfather clause has one built-in safeguard – a volume limit
prohibiting grandfathered activities from exceeding 5% of the holding company’s consolidated
assets. For Morgan Stanley, that limit is so high – 5% of $833 billion or $41 billion – that it
functions as no limit at all.
1821
While the Federal Reserve could have imposed a lower limit to
ensure grandfathered activities are operated in a safe and sound manner, it has not yet done so.
1820
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200482 [sealed exhibit]. See also undated but likely early 2011
“Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 429 [sealed exhibit] (expressing concern about “industrial
activities [that have] created new and increased potential liability for firms with access to the federal safety net
supporting the banking system”).
1821
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Morgan
Stanley with the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve website,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/FinancialReport.aspx?parID_RSSD=2162966&parDT=20140630&parRpt
Type=FRY9C&redirectPage=FinancialReport.aspx .
289
The details of Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities illustrate how far financial holding
companies have been allowed to crossthe line between banking and commerce. While Morgan
Stanley is currently reducing its physical oil activities, other banks may attempt to enter the
physical oil business, unless better safeguards are put in place.
(b) Multiple Risks
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil business creates multiple risks that don’t normally
confront a bank. Oil products are flammable and explosive. Oil spill and other catastrophic
event risks surround multiple aspects of Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities, from oil
transport ships, tanker trucks, and railway cars, to ruptured pipelines and storage facilities.
Financial risks also pose a threat, especially in the case of huge oil inventories. From September
to October 2014, crude oil prices fell 20%, from about $100 to $80 per barrel, immediately
depressing the dollar value of physical inventories and disrupting the economics of oil transport
and supply contracts.
Valuation risks are another area of concern. In 2009, Federal Reserve examiners
reviewing Morgan Stanley’s physical commodities activities wrote:
“Examiners noted complex risks around valuation and risk measurement of the oil
storage business. Market risk involved appears material; as per 2008 backtesting results,
the Firm lost $152 [million] on a single trading day … attributable to market movements
in oil storage. Furthermore, differences exist in the income recognition regimes between
GAAP accounting, which requires marking oil in storage to spot prices, and Morgan
Stanley’s internal economic valuation based on the oil storage model ….”
1822
Still another set of concerns involves Morgan Stanley’s efforts to mitigate the risks posed
by its physical oil activities, including from an oil-related incident. The Federal Reserve
Commodities Team found that Morgan Stanley, among other financial holding companies, had
allocated insufficient levels of capital and insurance to cover potential losses. The 2012
Summary Report noted at one point that, while Morgan Stanley had calculated a potential oil
spill risk of $360 million, through “aggressive assumptions” and “diversification benefits,” it had
reduced that total by nearly 70% to $54 million, allocating risk capital for only that much smaller
amount.
1823
The 2012 Summary Report also noted that insurance for catastrophic events in oil
shipping is typically capped at $1 billion, “and firms cannot cover any amount beyond the cap
through insurance.”
1824
In addition, the Federal Reserve Commodities Team determined that the
potential losses associated with an “extreme loss scenario” at four financial holding companies,
including Morgan Stanley, would exceed the capital and insurance coverage at each financial
holding company by $1 billion to $15 billion.
1825
That shortfall leaves the Federal Reserve, and
1822
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 629 [sealed exhibit].
1823
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 - 494 [sealed exhibit].
1824
Id. at 491.
1825
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
290
U.S. taxpayers, at risk of having to provide financial support to Morgan Stanley should a
catastrophic event occur.
In addition to the catastrophic event, valuation, insurance and capital concerns, the
Morgan Stanley case history shows how a multi-million-dollar sale of oil assets can collapse
from unrelated political events. Even exiting the business has risks.
(c) Conflicts of Interest
Morgan Stanley has stated openly that its physical oil activities provide valuable market
information to its traders in the financial markets. Here’s how one 2005 article described Morgan
Stanley’s physical commodity activities and comments by one of its leaders, J ohn Shapiro:
“Having access to barges and storage tanks and pipelines gives the bank additional
options, to move or store commodities, that most energy traders don’t pursue. And by
having its finger on the pulse of the business, it hopes to get a more subtle feel for the
market, a crucial asset to a trader.
‘Being in the physical business tells us when markets are oversupplied or undersupplied,’
says Mr. Shapiro. ‘We’re right there seeing terminals filling up and emptying.’”
1826
A Federal Reserve analysis made a similar point, noting:
“The relationship of the firms [Morgan Stanley and Goldman] with their wholly and
partially owned companies is not that of a passive investor. In addition to the financial
return, these direct investments provide MS [Morgan Stanley] … with important
asymmetrical information on conditions in the physical markets such as production and
supply/demand information, etc., which a market participant without physical global
infrastructure would not necessarily be privy to.”
1827
While U.S. commodities laws do not bar the use of non-public information by traders in
the financial markets in the same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading
advantages deepen when the commodities trader is a major financial institution with access to
significant non-public information.
Additional questions involve whether any Morgan Stanley personnel ever stepped over
the line by playing the physical markets off the financial markets to manipulate oil prices.
1828
Those types of suspicions would not arise if Morgan Stanley were not trading in both the
physical and financial oil markets at the same time.
1826
“Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570.
1827
Undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 439 [sealed exhibit].
1828
See, e.g., “U.S. Suit Sees Manipulation of Oil Trades,” New York Times, Graham Bowley (5/24/2011),http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/business/global/25oil.html?_r=0 (discussing cases charging market
manipulation of oil prices).
291
(4) Analysis
The three financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee were heavily
involved with both financial and physical oil activities. While Morgan Stanley is currently
reducing those activities, it still operates a vast physical oil business. Physical oil activities raise
a host of troubling questions, from catastrophic event risks to valuation problems to financial
risks to market manipulation issues. The risks permeating the physical oil business call out for
increased capital and insurance to cover potential losses and protect taxpayers from being asked
to step in after a disaster. Market manipulation opportunities require additional oversight and
preventative safeguards. It is past time for the Federal Reserve to provide guidance on the scope
of the grandfather clause and enforce overdue safeguards on this high risk physical commodity
activity.
292
D. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel
Morgan Stanley has sometimes explained the benefits of its participation in physical oil
activities by highlighting its role in providing jet fuel to an airline during and after
bankruptcy.
1829
Morgan Stanley has been involved with physical jet fuel for many years, as a
subset of the physical oil activities examined in the prior section. While its jet fuel supply,
transport, credit intermediation, and hedging services have sometimes benefited airlines, they
have also at times imposed costs that hurt rather than helped the airlines involved. In two
specific cases reviewed by the Subcommittee, the airlines appear to have determined that
Morgan Stanley’s services were not worth the cost and have discontinued their participation in
jet fuel agreements with Morgan Stanley.
(1) Background on Jet Fuel
J et fuel is one of several specialized types of fuel derived from crude oil.
1830
During the
refining process, a complex separation procedure divides crude oil into materials needed for
several types of refined oil products, including jet fuel.
1831
The separation process takes place at
crude oil refineries which then store the resulting jet fuel until it is shipped.
1832
Due to the many
different crude oils and refining procedures available, many different grades of jet fuel can be
produced. Morgan Stanley has identified 80 different jet fuel markets around the world.
1833
The primary commercial end-users of jet fuel are airlines. In recent years, jet fuel has
also become the largest annual expense for many airlines. One major domestic airline told the
Subcommittee that its fuel costs were by far its largest expense, totaling $12 billion in 2013,
roughly 34% of its total annual expenses.
1834
A non-U.S. airline also identified jet fuel as its
largest expense, reporting 2013 jet fuel costs of nearly $8.35 billion, 39% of its operating
costs.
1835
1829
See, e.g., 4/17/2014 public comment letter submitted by Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve in connection
with the Federal Reserve’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities
(hereinafter, “2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter”), at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-
1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1830
10/24/2011 presentation, “An Introduction to Petroleum Refining and the Production of Ultra Low Sulfur
Gasoline and Diesel Fuel,” prepared by MathPro, Inc. for the International Council on Clean Transportation, at 2,http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT05_Refining_Tutorial_FINAL_R1.pdf.
1831
Id.
1832
Id.
1833
2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6.
1834
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014). See also 2/20/2014 United Airlines10-K filing with the
SEC, at 6,http://ir.unitedcontinentalholdings.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=83680&p=irol-
SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJ kLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lwYWdlPTk0MTAxMzgm
RFNFUT0wJ lNFUT0wJ lNRREVTQz1TRUNUSU9OX0VOVElSRSZzdWJ zaWQ9NTc%3d#tx624298_10 (listing
its 2013 jet fuel-related expenses at $13.14 billion and its total operating expenses in 2013 as $37 billion).
1835
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 001;
See 2013 - 14 Annual Report, Emirates Group, at 52,http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_report_2014.pdf.
293
Supplying and Transporting Jet Fuel. Most jet fuel suppliers are large oil or refining
companies, including BP, Chevron, Exxon, Shell and Valero, which are not only involved in the
production of jet fuel, but also typically have arrangements in place to transport the fuel to the
airports where it is needed.
1836
J et fuel is most commonly transported via pipelines, oil transport vessels, or tanker
trucks.
1837
After being refined, jet fuel suppliers typically transport the fuel to one of several
large oil storage facilities in the United States.
1838
From there, the fuel is typically transported to
storage tanks at airports.
1839
Since each phase of transportation and storage could corrupt the
quality of the fuel, each phase is heavily regulated, and the jet fuel is closely monitored.
1840
Transporting jet fuel requires adherence to a special set of operation and maintenance
requirements.
1841
For example, jet fuel transportation pipelines must operate within strict
parameters for flow rate, pressurization, filtration, and internal coating to mitigate corrosion.
1842
J et fuel is also classified as a “static accumulator,” and requires treatment with certain additives
while in transit to prevent issues with its electrical conductivity.
1843
Airports are also subject to
extensive regulation regarding how jet fuel is to be delivered, stored, and dispensed for end
use.
1844
Jet Fuel Prices. J et fuel prices have a history of volatility. J et fuel prices vary across the
country and experienced 20% price swings in 2013.
1845
Typically, the price of jet fuel is
determined by referencing the average price from the previous week as recorded by Platts, an
information company that provides benchmark price assessments for a variety of
commodities.
1846
Because the jet fuel market is relatively small, analysts often use the price of
crude oil as an indicator for the price of jet fuel. The recent 20% drop in crude oil prices could
translate into lower jet fuel prices as well.
1847
The following chart tracks the jet fuel price
changes over the past five years.
1836
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1837
“J et Fuel Pipelines and Storage Require Special Operation, Maintenance Considerations,” Anup Sera & Mott
MacDonald, Pipeline and Gas J ournal, Volume 236 No. 12 (December 2009),http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.co...torage-require-special-operation-maintenance-
considerations?page=show.
1838
Id.
1839
Id.
1840
Id.
1841
Id.
1842
Id.
1843
Id.
1844
See, e.g., “Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing,” National Fire Prevention Association § 407(4)-(5) (2012);
“Standard for J et Fuel Quality Control at Airports,” Air Transport Association of America, Specification 103,
Revision 2006.1 (2006); see also “Are You Complying With J et Fuel Regulations?,” Millennium Systems
International (10/3/2014),http://www.millenniumsystemsintl.com/techarticles/airbeat_julaug03.htm.
1845
See “US Airlines Find Fuel for Less in 2013 … But Not Everywhere,” Platts: The Barrel Blog, Matt Kohlman
(8/2/2013),http://blogs.platts.com/2013/08/02/jet-shifts/. See also “Spot Prices: Crude Oil in Dollars per Barrel,
Products in Dollars per Gallon,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website (10/29/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm. .
1846
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1847
“Spot Prices: Crude Oil in Dollars per Barrel, Products in Dollars per Gallon,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website (10/29/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm.
294
Source: “J et Fuel Price,” AirportWatch (10/8/2014),http://www.airportwatch.org.uk/?page_id=2092.
In the financial markets, jet fuel can be traded through futures, options, swaps, and
forwards, both on exchange and over-the-counter. The New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) lists several types of jet fuel options and futures.
1848
The IntercontinentalExchange
(ICE) lists 19 different jet fuel swap contracts.
1849
The financial market for jet fuel is
substantially smaller than the financial market for crude oil, with fewer participants and
outstanding contracts.
1850
U.S. airlines are active in both the physical and financial jet fuel markets. The
Subcommittee was told that, today, U.S. airlines employ a number of different methods to hedge
their jet fuel costs. Many airlines hedge only a portion of their fuel for only specified periods of
time. Of the major U.S. airlines, for example, United Airlines generally hedges a portion of its
jet fuel costs for the next year; Southwest Airline generally hedges a portion of its jet fuel costs
for the next four to five years; and Delta Airlines, which purchased its own jet fuel refinery in
2012, trades aggressively in the jet fuel markets on an ongoing basis; while U.S. Airways and
1848
See “CME Group All Products – Codes and Slate,” CME Group (10/2/2014),http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/products/#pageNumber=1&sortField=oi&sortAsc=false&subGroup=18.
1849
See “ICE OTC Products List: Crude Oil and Refined Products,” Intercontinental Exchange (8/2012),https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_OTC_Cleared_Product_List.pdf.
1850
Compare “Gulf Coast J et (Platts) Up-Down Volume,” CME Group (10/20/2014),http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/ene...st-jet-fuel-vs-nymex-no-2-heating-oil-platts-
spread-swap_quotes_volume_voi.html (listing 100 total jet fuel futures contracts traded on the NYMEX October 20,
2014); with “Crude Oil Volume,” CME Group (October 20, 2014),http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-
oil/light-sweet-crude_quotes_volume_voi.html?foi=O&41927.50656=(listing almost 595,000 total crude oil futures
and options traded on the NYMEX during the same time frame).
295
American Airlines have generally stopped hedging altogether.
1851
Those differing approaches
indicate there is no consensus among end-users on how to effectively control jet fuel price risks.
Jet Fuel Incidents. In addition to financial risks, jet fuel poses both safety and
environmental risks. J et fuel is categorized as a combustible, highly toxic material subject to
regulation under the federal Toxic Substances Control Act.
1852
It is extremely flammable both as
a liquid and a gas, and exposure to certain oxidizing agents or sources of ignition can result in a
flash fire or explosion.
1853
Handling the fuel involves exposure to toxic substances and can
result in physical infirmities.
1854
Transporting high volumes of jet fuel carries the risk of a large-
scale environmental incident, such as an oil spill. J et fuel incidents cover a variety of fact
patterns. Incidents include a tanker truck crash that released 10,000 gallons of jet fuel that
ignited and engulfed a highway ramp;
1855
a 2010 spill of jet fuel from a tanker truck crash in
Massachusetts;
1856
an emergency release of 5,000 gallons of jet fuel into U.S. waters by an
aircraft during an emergency landing;
1857
the theft of a jet fuel tanker truck from a Houston
airport;
1858
and a jet fuel contamination event that caused landing difficulties for an aircraft
carrying 322 passengers.
1859
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel
Morgan Stanley has been participating in physical jet fuel activities since at least 2003.
Since then it has stored and transported millions of barrels of jet fuel per year, while participating
in financial transactions to hedge volatile jet fuel costs. Over a ten-year period from 2003 to
2013, Morgan Stanley became the primary jet fuel supplier for United Airlines. For a four-year
period, from 2004 to 2008, it entered into a series of hedges with the airlines Emirates to manage
its price risks. In both cases, Morgan Stanley’s activities produced mixed results for the airlines.
1851
See, e.g., “US Airlines are Taking the Hedge Off on J et Fuel,” Platts, Matthew Kohlman, David Elward, and Su
Yeen Chong (9/1/2014),http://blogs.platts.com/2014/09/01/us-airlines-hedging/; “How Delta Bought A Refinery
And Wound Up Saving Its Rivals A Ton Of Cash,” Business Insider, Benjamin Zhang (9/1/2014),http://www.businessinsider.com/delta-airlines-fuel-prices-2014-8#ixzz3GhARNyYq; “The ‘Fixer’ at Southwest
Airlines,” CNBC, Kate Kelly (5/2/2012),http://www.cnbc.com/id/47254760#.; Subcommittee briefing by United
Airlines (10/9/2014).
1852
“J et Fuel/Kerosene Hazards Identification,” J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (6/2/2008), at 9-11,https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobSer...el.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1158593470387&blo
bheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-
Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
1853
Id. at 7.
1854
Id. at 5-9.
1855
3/13/2001 Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management press release, “Driver of Tanker Truck
Charged; Tipover Caused Major J et Fuel Spill Last Summer,”http://www.dem.ri.gov/news/2001/pr/0313012.htm.
1856
See, e.g., 6/2010 “After Incident Report[:] Foxboro J et Fuel Tanker Spill,” prepared by MassDEP Field
Assessment and Support Team,http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dep/cleanup/sites/fox610.pdf.
1857
See, e.g., 5/6/2009 Washington State Department of Ecology press release, “Ecology will not take enforcement
action against Asiana Airlines,”http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2009news/2009-102.html.
1858
See, e.g., “Trespasser jumps fence, steals truck with jet fuel from Hobby Airport,” KHOU.com news station
(7/24/2014),http://www.khou.com/story/news/investigations/2014/07/29/12673286/.
1859
Undated description of 4/13/2010 incident, “A333, Hong Kong China, 2010 (LOC RE GND FIRE),” Skybrary,http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/A333,_Hong_Kong_China,_2010_(LOC_RE_GND_FIRE). See also undated
“Misfueling,” prepared by AOPA Air Safety Foundation,http://www.aopa.org/-
/media/Files/AOPA/Home/Pilot%20Resources/ASI/Safety%20Briefs/SB04.pdf.
296
United eventually ended its fuel supply agreement with Morgan Stanley, after determining it
could procure its own jet fuel at a lower cost. The Emirates Airline eventually ended its jet fuel
hedging with Morgan Stanley after its hedging led to an unexpected $440 million expense for the
airline.
(a) Storing, Supplying, and Transporting Jet Fuel Generally
Morgan Stanley has acted as a jet fuel supplier for airlines since at least 2003, when it
won a contract to supply jet fuel to United Airlines.
1860
In 2005, a media report provided this
description of its efforts:
“United Airlines, fighting intense financial pressure, decided in late 2003 it needed a
better way to get fuel to its planes. To get that job done, it went to an unusual place:
Morgan Stanley.
Now, employees of the bank scour the world for jet fuel for the airline. They charter
barges, lease pipelines and schedule tanker trucks, delivering more than a billion gallons
a year to United’s hubs. They even send inspectors to make sure no one tampers with the
stuff.”
1861
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, between 2008 and 2012, it maintained jet
fuel inventories of between 4 million and 10.6 million barrels per year.
1862
The following chart
shows those jet fuel inventories peaking in 2009, maintaining high volumes in 2010 and 2011,
and then declining in 2012:
Morgan Stanley Physical Jet Fuel Inventories
2008-2012
Jet Fuel/Kerosene 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Barrels in Storage 4.6 million 10.6 million 6.6 million 5.8 million 4.0 million
Dollar Value $272 million $934 million $703 million $713 million $521 million
Barrels in Transit 2.6 million 6.6 million 6.5 million 5.7 million 4.1 million
Dollar Value $165 million $594 million $700 million $709 million $532 million
Source: 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-03-000002 - 003.
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it stored its jet fuel at over 50 storage
facilities across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Asia.
1863
They included a small number
of facilities managed by its then wholly-owned subsidiary, TransMontaigne, which had multiple
1860
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). In a 2010 letter to the Federal Reserve, Morgan Stanley
asserted that it had engaged in physical and financial trading of jet fuel “as of September 30, 1997,” but did not
provide any specific evidence showing that it handled physical jet fuel on or before that date. See 7/8/2010 letter
from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174.
1861
“Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110971828745967570,00.html.
1862
7/16/2013 Letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 -
034, at 002 - 003, 022.
1863
4/12/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-04-000001 - 007,
at 005 - 007; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
297
sites in the United States;
1864
by its indirect subsidiary, Canterm Canadian Terminals, which had
storage facilities in Canada;
1865
and by Aircraft Fuel Supply B.V., a Dutch company which
stored jet fuel in the Netherlands and in which Morgan Stanley held a minority ownership
interest.
1866
Morgan Stanley also indicated that, between 2008 and 2012, it transported up to 6.6
million barrels of jet fuel per year, as shown in the above chart.
1867
Morgan Stanley told the
Subcommittee that it purchased jet fuel in markets around the world, and often transported the
fuel by ship to other markets, including ships chartered through its subsidiaries, Heidmar and
Global Energy International.
1868
Its search for lower-cost jet fuel cargoes was illustrated in a
2011 news report which noted that Morgan Stanley had purchased two jet fuel cargoes in
Singapore, each containing “100,000 barrels at 10 cents a barrel over benchmark quotes, the
smallest premium in a week.”
1869
Morgan Stanley was reported as obtaining lower prices than
two other firms described in the article.
1870
According to Morgan Stanley, since 2003, it has supplied jet fuel to a variety of airlines,
including United Airlines, US Airways, American Airlines, Emirates Airlines, Southwest
Airlines, and Societe Air France. To better understand Morgan Stanley’s involvement with jet
fuel, the Subcommittee examined more closely its interactions with two of those airlines, United
and Emirates.
(b) Supplying Jet Fuel to United Airlines
Morgan Stanley, through its subsidiary Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., first entered
into a long-term contract to supply jet fuel to United Airlines in 2003.
1871
Prior to that
agreement, United had been procuring jet fuel for its own operations,
1872
and, according to
Morgan Stanley, maintaining up to a month’s inventory of fuel which was “creating significant
operational overhead and a need for costly financing.”
1873
In 2003, while United was
1864
See discussion in prior section about TransMontaigne.
1865
See discussion in prior section about Canterm.
1866
8/1/2013 Letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-08-000001.
1867
7/16/2013 Letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 002-003, 022.
1868
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also discussion in prior section about Heidmar and
Global Energy International; 2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-
1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1869
“Morgan Stanley Buys J et Fuel at Reduced Premium: Oil Products,” Bloomberg, Yee Kai Pin (10/20/2011),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-...et-fuel-at-reduced-premium-oil-products.html.
1870
Id.
1871
Feb. 2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities: Business Overview, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000010, at 10; 11/3/2009
“Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122; Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1872
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014). See also “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-
Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110971828745967570,00.html.
1873
2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter”), at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-
1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
298
maintaining that inventory and transporting jet fuel, its parent corporation was undergoing
bankruptcy reorganization.
1874
In an effort to free up the cash required to maintain its fuel
supply operations, United issued a general solicitation seeking bids on a contract to take over that
function.
1875
Morgan Stanley won the contract, which was finalized in early 2004, and approved
by the bankruptcy court.
1876
Supplying the Jet Fuel. The agreement originally had a term of three years.
1877
Under
the agreement, United transferred virtually all of its jet fuel assets to Morgan Stanley, including a
jet fuel inventory then worth several hundred million dollars, storage tanks at various locations,
pipeline space, supply agreements, and trading activity, in exchange for a large cash payment
from Morgan Stanley.
1878
Morgan Stanley, for its part, promised to supply jet fuel to United at
market prices using the average jet fuel price during the prior week published by Platts, with a
differential added for certain locations.
1879
United generally paid Morgan Stanley shortly before
delivery of the fuel.
1880
Morgan Stanley agreed to deliver the jet fuel at specified locations, including directly to
storage tanks at some airports.
1881
Morgan Stanley also agreed to purchase any excess stored jet
fuel from United.
1882
Morgan Stanley bore title and all “risk of loss” for the jet fuel stored at an
airport location until United removed the jet fuel from the airport storage facility.
1883
United and Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, under the agreement, Morgan
Stanley supplied “most” of United’s domestic fuel needs, but not all.
1884
United explained that,
for example, at O’Hare Airport where it had substantial fuel requirements, Morgan Stanley
typically delivered a two-week fuel supply right to the airport and allowed United to draw it
1874
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014). See also “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-
Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110971828745967570,00.html.
1875
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1876
Id. See also In re UAL Corp., Case No. 02-B-48191, “Order Authorizing the Debtors to Enter Into a J et Fuel
Supply Agreement With Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 365 and Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 6004 and 6006,” (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 2003).
1877
See 9/2003 “J et Fuel Supply Agreement between Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. and United Air Lines, Inc.
and United Aviation Fuels Corporation,” (hereinafter, “2003 United-Morgan Stanley Supply Contract”), at 20, ¶
10.1, PSI-UnitedAirlines-01-000003 - 044, at 022.
1878
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014); 11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations
Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122
(“Under the agreement MSGC owns and manages the inventories required to support deliveries to UAL and has
been assigned from them, the storage and transportation agreements needed to support this business.”).
1879
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1880
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014); 11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations
Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122
(“Deliveries are via in tank stock transfers and are settled on a prepay basis, one business day prior to delivery.”).
1881
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1882
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014); see also 2003 United-Morgan Stanley Supply Contract,
at 18, ¶ 5.6, PSI-UnitedAirlines-01-000020.
1883
2003 United-Morgan Stanley Supply Contract, ¶ 2.8, PSI-UnitedAirlines-01-000016.
1884
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also11/3/2009
“Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122 (describing the supply agreement as “intended to cover the majority
of United’s demand for fuel at airport locations in the United States”).
299
down as needed, while charging United a financing fee for holding the fuel.
1885
At other
airports, United explained that it helped negotiate supply arrangements with unrelated jet fuel
suppliers, working with Morgan Stanley to ensure the lowest-cost arrangements.
1886
United said
those other jet fuel providers included BP, Chevron, Exxon, Shell and Valero, among others.
1887
United also explained that, at the O’Hare Airport, Unitedt sometimes sold excess fuel to other
airlines, generally once per week to a foreign airline on a spot basis, making a small profit from
the sales, and Morgan Stanley continued that practice.
1888
According to United, under another contract provision, any profits earned from physical
jet fuel trading in connection with the supply contract were split evenly between United and
Morgan Stanley, while any losses from that trading were allocated solely to Morgan Stanley.
1889
According to Morgan Stanley and United, the supply contract was extended several
times, resulting in Morgan Stanley’s acting as United’s primary jet fuel supplier for ten years,
from 2003 to 2013.
1890
Overall, under the agreement, Morgan Stanley supplied United with
between $1 billion and $3 billion of jet fuel per year.
1891
To meet its contractual obligations, Morgan Stanley maintained an extensive jet fuel
inventory at multiple locations.
1892
To protect against price changes in the value of that
inventory and in its ability to meet United’s needs on a cost effective basis, Morgan Stanley told
the Subcommittee that it hedged its fuel holdings with short futures using similar oil products,
such as home heating oil, the price of which tended to rise and fall in tandem with the price of jet
fuel.
1893
In addition, Morgan Stanley charged United margin “on a daily basis, taking into
account both the outstanding exposure for financial and physical trades as well as the profit
sharing balance that may be owed” to the airline.
1894
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that one of the main benefits from the
arrangement for United was that Morgan Stanley’s stronger credit profile enabled it to buy fuel
at less expensive prices than United, which in 2003, was still in bankruptcy proceedings.
1895
1885
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1886
Id.
1887
Id.
1888
Id.
1889
Id.
1890
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1891
10/24/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-24-000001 - 004, at
001-002, [sealed exhibit].
1892
See prior chart and discussion of storage facilities. See also 12/3/2008 memorandum from Federal Reserve ,
“Commodities Overview Meeting Minutes,” FRB-PSI-304806 - 807 (noting that Morgan Stanley provided United
“with 50% of its jet fuel via Transmontaigne.”).
1893
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley, (2/4/2014); Oil: Money, Politics and Power in the 21st Century,
Tom Bower ((Grand Central Publishing 2010), at 137.
1894
11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122.
1895
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also 2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter,
at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-1479_041814_124930_
510776321432_1.pdf.
300
Morgan Stanley said that it sold the fuel to United at better prices than United paid
previously.
1896
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that when the contract began ten years ago, it had
to import most of the jet fuel from Europe and Asia, but that U.S refineries later began producing
more of the fuel, reducing its cost and price volatility.
1897
Morgan Stanley indicated that it
purchased some of the jet fuel from the European refinery with which it had a crude oil supply
contract, Ineos, as well as from a refinery in the United States.
1898
It noted that after United
emerged from bankruptcy, it became less reliant on Morgan Stanley’s credit support.
1899
Exiting the Supply Contract. In 2010, United merged with Continental Airlines, and as
part of that merger, Continental managers initiated a review of United’s fuel operations.
1900
According to United, the new management team determined that Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel
services were costly due to various management and financing fees, and that its credit support
was no longer needed to obtain better fuel prices. Ultimately, the team decided that United
would be better off supplying its own jet fuel and managing its own jet fuel assets.
1901
United told the Subcommittee that it began phasing out Morgan Stanley as its primary
fuel supplier in 2011, and formally ended the contract in 2013.
1902
According to United, it now
issues annual contracts on a location-by-location basis and accepts competitive bids from private
companies to meet its jet fuel needs for the year.
1903
United explained that it generally selected
more than one supplier at each location to prevent supply disruptions and encourage competitive
prices.
1904
United told the Subcommittee that while Morgan Stanley no longer managed its fuel
needs, Morgan Stanley continued to provide it with physical fuel. United indicated that, as of
October 2014, Morgan Stanley was the fifth-largest supplier of jet fuel to United, providing
roughly 6% of United’s fuel purchases.
1905
1896
2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/
20140421/R-1479/R-1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1897
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1898
Id.
1899
Id.
1900
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1901
Id.
1902
Id.
1903
Id.
1904
Id.
1905
Id.
301
(c) Hedging Jet Fuel Prices with Emirates
A second jet fuel relationship involves Morgan Stanley’s role in working with Emirates, a
state-owned airline in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to manage the airline’s jet fuel price
risk.
1906
Emirates operates a transportation hub in Dubai and conducts flights to multiple airports
in the United States.
1907
In 2004, the airline’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the
Board was Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, uncle to the current ruler of Dubai, Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid.
1908
For at least a decade, fuel costs have been the airline’s largest single expense.
1909
In
2005, its fuel bill exceeded $3 billion.
1910
In 2013, its jet fuel costs totaled nearly $8.35 billion,
representing 39% of the airline’s total operating costs.
1911
According to Emirates, it had engaged
in a variety of hedging strategies over the years with a variety of counterparties to manage its
price risk, including crude oil hedges with Morgan Stanley.
1912
The airline indicated that, prior
to 2009, it often had “multiple hedges in place at any one time, covering multiple future
periods.”
1913
Initiating the Hedging. According to both Morgan Stanley and the airline, they began
participating in crude oil hedges to limit Emirates’ jet fuel price risk in 2004.
1914
Morgan
Stanley devised and Emirates agreed to participate in those hedges from 2004 to 2008.
1915
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that the hedges were designed and executed by its
commodities traders based in its London and New York offices.
1916
Morgan Stanley described
1906
The Morgan Stanley-Emirates Airline relationship was discussed in a book released in 2014. See The Secret
Club That Rules the World: Inside the Fraternity of Commodities Traders, Kate Kelly (Penguin Group 2014), at 79-
81.
1907
See, e.g., “Featured Destinations,” Emirates Airline website,http://www.emirates.com/us/english/destinations_offers/destinations/america/index.aspx.
1908
See 2009 - 10 Annual Report, Emirates Group, at 1, 10,http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_report_2010.pdf.
1909
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
001.
1910
See 4/16/2005 report, “Independent auditor’s report to the Government of Dubai,” prepared for Emirates
Airlines by PricewaterhouseCoopers, PSI-Excerpt2005EmiratesAuditor’sReport-000001 - 027, at 014.
1911
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
001. See also 2013 - 14 Annual Report, Emirates Group, at 52,http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_report_2014.pdf (reported in UAE dirhams).
1912
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
002 - 003.
1913
Id. at 001 - 004.
1914
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002; 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 002
- 003.
1915
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002; 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at -
004.
1916
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002. See also 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 -
007, at 004 (“The hedge products and pricing were devised by Morgan Stanley and presented to Emirates. Emirates
302
the hedges as including a “capped double-down swap,”
1917
while Emirates said it used “cap-swap
double-down extendable hedges” as part of the hedging strategy.
1918
The hedges were complex financial structures which included put and call options,
contracts for differences, and other financial instruments.
1919
According to Morgan Stanley, the
hedges were designed with the expectation that crude oil would trade within a specified price
range,
1920
which varied from a range of about $7 to about $40, with the exact prices and price
ranges varying from year to year.
1921
According to the airline, if crude oil prices stayed within
the specified price range, the airline was paid by the counterparty, Morgan Stanley, the hedge
was successful, and the airline saved money on its fuel costs.
1922
If oil prices traded below the
specified range, the airline was required to pay Morgan Stanley.
1923
Emirates told the Subcommittee that it made money from its fuel hedging strategy “in
most years,” including the three years preceding the fiscal year at issue, and that it saved a total
of about $600 million over that three-year period,
1924
or an average of $200 million per year. In
2008, however, crude oil prices spiked, climbing as high as $147 per barrel in J uly and
exceeding the $110 upper bound specified in the hedging agreement then in place between the
airline and Morgan Stanley.
1925
Crude oil prices then plummeted over the next few months. By
early 2009, oil prices were in the $40 range,
1926
below the lower bound specified in the
hedge.
1927
Incurring a $440 Million Loss. Emirates told the Subcommittee that, as a result of the
oil price swings, it incurred substantial losses from the hedge, which gradually added up to
hundreds of millions of dollars owed to Morgan Stanley.
1928
When those unexpected losses
began to accumulate, Morgan Stanley could have but did not offer to renegotiate the terms of the
hedging agreement. Instead, in November 2008, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Executive Officer J ohn
Mack flew to Dubai with Georges Makhoul, then President of Morgan Stanley’s Middle East and
Africa group, and Marc Mourre, then Vice Chairman of Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities
decided which of these products best matched its needs, and for what timeframe, and so it was ultimately
responsible for implementing the hedge.”).
1917
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002.
1918
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 004.
1919
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002.
1920
Id.
1921
Id. See also 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 -
007, at 004.
1922
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
004.
1923
Id.
1924
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 005.
1925
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001, at 003.
1926
See “Spot Prices: Crude Oil in Dollars Per Barrel, Products in Dollars Per Gallon,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration (10/22/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm.
1927
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 005 -
006.
1928
Id.
303
group, to meet with the airline about its financial obligations under the hedge.
1929
The Morgan
Stanley executives met with Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, head of the airlines, and
may have also met with his nephew, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, ruler of Dubai.
1930
In
J anuary 2009, the Investment Company of Dubai provided a credit guarantee to Morgan Stanley
representatives in support of the airline.
1931
The airline settled the hedge by paying Morgan Stanley and other counterparties a total of
$440 million.
1932
This hedging loss is recorded primarily in its financial statement for the 2008-
2009 fiscal year as a $428 million loss, due to timing issues and accounting requirements.
1933
Emirates told the Subcommittee that it was the first time in which a loss had been recorded on its
fuel-related hedges with Morgan Stanley.
1934
The airline described the loss as “unusual” and
“large,” and said that it “had a material impact on Emirates’ annual profit for that financial year,
but it did not threaten the long-term financial viability of the airline.”
1935
Ending Fuel-Related Hedging. Emirates told the Subcommittee that after incurring the
$440 million loss, it changed its policy and stopped entering into hedges related to jet fuel
prices.
1936
The airline wrote: “Emirates is no longer hedging its fuel costs and so it is not
trading with Morgan Stanley on the fuel side.”
1937
The airline has maintained this policy since
2009.
Supplying Physical Jet Fuel. Although Emirates ended its fuel hedging relationship
with Morgan Stanley, the relationship between the two has continued in other capacities. For
example, since 2010, after winning a public competitive bidding process, Morgan Stanley has
supplied Emirates with physical jet fuel at several U.S. airports, including three during 2014.
1938
Morgan Stanley indicated that, since 2010, it has provided about 42 million gallons of jet fuel per
1929
Subcommittee briefings by United (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014); 9/29/2014 letter from Morgan
Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at 003.
1930
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001, at 003
(“A meeting took place in November 2008 between Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, J ahn Mack, George
Makhoul, and Marc Mourre.”); 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 006 (indicating that the client “understands that such a meeting may have taken
place”). See also The Secret Club That Rules the World: Inside the Fraternity of Commodities Traders, Kate Kelly
(Penguin Group 2014), at 81 (stating that the meeting included Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid).
1931
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
003.
1932
Id. at 004; See also 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-
000001 - 007, at 005.
1933
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 005.
The fiscal year for the Emirates Airline was from April 1, 2008 to March 31, 2009.
1934
Id.
1935
Id.
1936
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 001,
006.
1937
Id. at 001 - 007.
1938
Id.; 10/9/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-01-000001 - 00004, at
002 (stating Morgan Stanley supplies physical jet fuel to the Emirates Airline at airports in Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Washington D.C.).
304
year to Emirates, delivering the fuel directly to the airports.
1939
The airline also uses other jet
fuel suppliers in the United States.
1940
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Involvement with Jet Fuel
Morgan Stanley has told the Federal Reserve that its physical jet fuel activities benefit the
airlines and demonstrate why financial holding companies should be permitted to engage in
physical commodity activities.
1941
The activities involving United Airlines and Emirates,
however, provide anecdotal evidence of instances in which Morgan Stanley’s fuel supply and
hedging activities lost, rather than saved, the airlines money.
(a) Thin Benefits
Morgan Stanley has attempted to portray itself as an ally of airlines seeking access to jet
fuel and protection from jet fuel price risks. Citing its dealings with United, Morgan Stanley has
asserted that its ability to purchase, store, and transport physical jet fuel saved United a
significant amount of overhead expenses and the need to obtain expensive financing.
1942
Morgan
Stanley also claimed that its stronger credit profile enabled it to buy jet fuel at lower prices and
pass those savings onto the airline.
1943
In reality, those benefits appear to have been limited to the period during which United
was experiencing financial distress. Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel supply activities assisted the
airline while the parent corporation was going through bankruptcy proceedings. Once the airline
emerged from bankruptcy and regained its financial footing, it decided that Morgan Stanley’s
fuel assistance, with its fees and financing charges, was actually more expensive than if the
airline were to procure its own fuel directly. It began to phase out Morgan Stanley’s role in
2011, and ended it in 2013. United’s action indicates that Morgan Stanley was no longer saving
the airline money on its fuel operations.
The results of the jet fuel hedging provided by Morgan Stanley to Emirates were also
mixed. The complex hedging structures that Morgan Stanley provided to the airline over a four-
year period, from 2004 to 2008, saved the airline money, but cost it significant losses in 2009.
The hedges appeared to reduce the airline’s fuel expenses by about $200 million per year
between 2005 and 2008, but then cost the airline $440 million in the next year – an
unanticipated, material loss. In response, in 2009, Emirates decided to stop hedging its fuel
prices altogether, a policy it has maintained for five years.
The market response to Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel activities is clear: one airline
terminated its fuel supply contract; the other terminated its hedging relationship. Those results
detract from the strength of Morgan Stanley’s claims that its physical jet fuel activities provide
1939
Id.
1940
Id.
1941
See 2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/
20140421/R-1479/R-1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1942
Id.
1943
Id.
305
significant commercial and financial benefits that should be continued. The facts also suggest
that the benefits provided by Morgan Stanley were neither unique nor long-lasting. Other market
participants now compete for the annual fuel supply contracts issued by United Airlines. Still
others offer hedging strategies to Emirates Airline. While Morgan Stanley now provides jet fuel
to both United and the Emirates Airline, plenty of other fuel providers are doing the same.
(b) Operational and Catastrophic Event Risks
Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel activities also continue to carry environmental and catastrophic
event risks. Storing and transporting jet fuel is risky. Fires, explosions, and leaks present threats
that traditional banks and bank holding companies do not confront. Volatile fuel prices also
continually threaten to disrupt the economics of jet fuel supply operations; the 20% drop in crude
oil prices in one month, from September to October 2014, illustrate the price risk. Still another
risk is the small size of the jet fuel market whose limited participants make preventing or
recovering from a financial loss especially difficult.
(4) Analysis
Morgan Stanley is not the only financial holding company to have engaged in physical jet
fuel activities. Goldman has supplied jet fuel to Delta Airlines;
1944
and J PMorgan acquired
substantial jet fuel inventories when it purchased RBS Sempra in 2010,
1945
and held jet fuel
inventory at 28 locations across the United States, Asia, and Europe in 2013.
1946
Both financial
holding companies are incurring the same kinds of risks as Morgan Stanley. Those financial,
environmental, and catastrophic event risks make physical jet fuel activities inappropriate for
banks and bank holding companies. It is past time for the Federal Reserve to enforce needed
safeguards on this high risk physical commodity activity.
1944
See, e.g., 10/28/2011 Goldman presentation to the Goldman Board of Directors, “Global Commodities Physicals
Activities,” FRB-PSI-700019 (“We are contracted to supply jet fuel to Delta Airlines on a just-in-time basis,
reducing the need for them to maintain a large inventory[.]”).
1945
5/26/2010 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-301884 (listing the
acquisition of jet fuel inventories from RBS Sempra).
1946
9/13/2013 response to Subcommittee questionnaire, J PM-COMM-PSI-000001 - 019, at 003-004.
306
VI. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
J PMorgan Chase & Co. (J PMorgan), one of the largest financial institutions in the United
States, conducted among the largest physical commodity activities of any U.S. financial holding
company until its recent decision to exit the area. Prior to 2014, J PMorgan conducted activities
involving crude oil, natural gas, coal, industrial metals, metals storage facilities, and electrical
power generation. At the same time, it was the largest commodities trader of any U.S. financial
institution. This case study focuses on J PMorgan’s acquisition of multiple electrical power
plants, including one that led to a $410 million penalty for manipulating electricity prices; its
extensive copper activities, which operate outside of normal size limits and include a proposal
for a copper-backed exchange traded fund which has raised conflict of interest and market
manipulation concerns among industrial copper users; and its actions to circumvent prudential
limits on the size of its physical commodity activities.
A. JPMorgan Overview
J PMorgan Chase & Co. is a global financial services firm incorporated under Delaware
law and headquartered in New York City.
1947
It is listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) under the ticker symbol “J PM.”
1948
In addition to being the largest financial holding
company in the United States, J PMorgan conducts operations in more than 60 countries with
over 260,000 employees.
1949
As of December 31, 2013, it had a market capitalization of $211
billion and consolidated assets totaling more than $2.4 trillion.
1950
In 2013, J PMorgan reported
net revenues nearing $97 billion and net income of almost $18 billion.
1951
JPMorgan Leadership. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
J PMorgan Chase & Co. is J amie Dimon, who has held those posts since 2006.
1952
The Chief
Operating Officer is Matthew Zames, and the Chief Financial Officer is Marianne Lake.
1953
The
head of the Global Commodities Group, from 2006 to 2014, was Blythe Masters.
1954
She was
recently replaced by two co-heads of the group, J ohn Anderson and Mike Camacho.
1955
J ohn
1947
7/1/2014 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Resolution Plan Public Filing (hereinafter “2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan”),
at 4,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/jpmorgan-chase-1g-20140701.pdf; “Holding
Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion,” (as of 6/30/2014), National Information Center (using Federal
Reserve data),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
1948
Undated “About Us,” J PMorgan website,http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/about-us.htm.
1949
Id.
1950
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 4.
1951
2013 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Annual Report, filed with SEC on 2/20/2014, at 62,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961714000289/corp10k2013.htm.
1952
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 30; undated “Members of the Board,” J PMorgan website,http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/board-of-directors.htm.
1953
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 30.
1954
See 4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 125
(listing Global Commodities Group executives). See also “The Legacy of J PMorgan's Blythe Masters,” Bloomberg
Businessweek, Sheelah Kolhatkar (4/3/2014),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-03/the-legacy-of-
jpmorgans-blythe-masters.
1955
9/19/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to
Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorgan-12-000001 - 003, at 001.
307
Anderson is also the Chief Executive Officer of J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation.
1956
Until he retired in 2013, Francis Dunleavy was the head of Principal Investing within the
Commodities Group.
1957
(1) Background
The modern J PMorgan is the product of a merger between J .P. Morgan & Co. and The
Chase Manhattan Corp. in 2000.
1958
Both J .P. Morgan & Co. and the Chase Manhattan Corp.
were themselves the culmination of multiple bank mergers and acquisitions over time. J .P.
Morgan & Co. was originally Drexel, Morgan & Co., founded by J ohn Piermont Morgan and
Anthony Drexel in New York in 1871, as a merchant banking partnership.
1959
After the Glass-
Steagall Act required the separation of banks and securities firms in 1933, the company chose to
continue operating as a commercial bank.
1960
The Chase Manhattan Corp. was a product of The
Bank of The Manhattan Co., which was founded in 1799, by former U.S. Senator and future U.S.
Vice President Aaron Burr.
1961
Over time, The Bank of The Manhattan Co. merged with a
number of other banks, including the Chemical Banking Corp. in 1996.
1962
After the merger that
produced J PMorgan Chase & Co. in 2000, additional acquisitions followed, including Bank One
Corp., a major Midwestern bank in 2004. During the financial crisis, J PMorgan also acquired, in
2008, the Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
1963
Financial Holding Company Status. On March 13, 2000, pursuant to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, J PMorgan Chase & Co. elected to become a financial holding company.
1964
The holding company owns several banks. Its principal U.S. bank subsidy is J PMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., a large national bank with branches in 23 states.
1965
Another key U.S. bank
subsidiary is Chase Bank USA, N.A., which is J PMorgan’s credit card-issuing bank.
1966
1956
6/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s April 23, 1024
Briefing Follow-Up,” PSI-J PMC-11-000001 - 002, at 001.
1957
See 4/2011 “Global Commodities – Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 125
(listing Global Commodities Group executives). See also “J PMorgan energy exec at center of power-market flap
retires,” Reuters, (11/7/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/us-jpmorgan-commodity-dunleavy-
idUSBRE9A616H20131107.
1958
“The History of J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” J PMorgan website, at 19 (hereinafter, “History of J PMorgan Chase &
Co.”),http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/document/shorthistory.pdf.
1959
Id. at 5.
1960
Id. at 12.
1961
Id. at 2.
1962
Id. at 19.
1963
Id.
1964
See “Institution History for J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” National Information Center (using Federal Reserve data),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionHistory.aspx?parID_RSSD=1039502&parDT_END=99991231
(showing it was actually The Chase Manhattan Corporation that elected to become a financial holding company on
March 13, 2000; following its merger later that year with J PMorgan, the financial holding company changed its
name to J .P. Morgan Chase & Co.).
1965
See 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 5,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-
plans/jpmorgan-chase-1g-20140701.pdf; 2013 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Annual Report, filed with SEC on 2/20/2014,
at 1,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961714000289/corp10k2013.htm.
1966
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 6; 2013 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Annual Report, filed with SEC on
2/20/2014, at 1,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961714000289/corp10k2013.htm.
308
Key Subsidiaries. Two key nonbank U.S. subsidiaries are J .P. Morgan Securities LLC,
its primary registered U.S. broker-dealer, investment advisor, and futures commission merchant;
and J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, which conducts commodities derivatives
transactions as well as physical commodities transactions.
1967
A key U.K. subsidiary is J .P.
Morgan Securities PLC (formerly J .P. Morgan Securities Ltd.) which, among other activities,
deals in commodity derivatives.
1968
Major Business Lines. In its 2014 Resolution Plan, J PMorgan identified five major
business segments. The first is its Corporate and Investment Bank, which provides services
related to fixed income, equities, commodities, and global investment banking, among other
areas.
1969
The second business segment is Commercial Banking, which provides financing,
investment banking, and asset management services to large clients, including corporations,
municipalities, and financial institutions.
1970
The third is Asset Management, which provides
institutional, high-net-worth, and retail investors with global investment services, and currently
manages client assets totaling $2.3 trillion.
1971
The fourth is Corporate/Private Equity, a segment
that includes J PMorgan’s treasury functions, Chief Investment Office, and other major corporate
units for the holding company and bank.
1972
The last is Consumer and Community Banking,
which includes J PMorgan’s retail banking, credit card, mortgage, and lending services.
1973
Commodities Activities. The Corporate and Investment Bank includes the Global
Commodities Group (GCG), which is J PMorgan’s leading commodities-related business unit.
1974
In 2012, the Group had over 600 employees.
1975
GCG is organized around four categories of
physical commodities: metals, energy, agricultural, and environmental.
1976
GCG personnel
conduct financial trades involving those commodities using a variety of financial instruments,
including swaps, forwards, futures, and options. They also provide clients with commodities-
related risk management services, market intelligence, financing, structuring, market-making,
and other services.
1977
GCG personnel also conducted the bulk of J PMorgan’s physical commodity activities.
Those activities included, at times, the purchase, sale, transport, and storage of various
1967
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 5.
1968
9/19/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to
Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorgan-12-000001 - 003, at 002; 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 5-6.
1969
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 7-8.
1970
Id. at 7, 9.
1971
Id. at 7, 9-10.
1972
Id. at 7, 10.
1973
Id. at 7-8.
1974
11/4/2009 “J PM Energy Ventures Energy Corporation [:] Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal
Reserve, FRB-PSI-200611 - 632, at 613 [sealed exhibit]; undated “Commodities,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities.
1975
1/2012 “J P Morgan Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 - 592, at 546. The
number of employees has since decreased. See, e.g., 9/2013 “Self Assessment,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-
301370 - 378, at 374.
1976
See undated “Commodities,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities.
1977
See undated “J .P. Morgan Global Commodities Group – Client Solutions Provider,” prepared by J PMorgan,
FRB-PSI-200822 - 826, at 822; 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9.
309
commodities, including oil products, natural gas products, coal, metals, electricity, and
agricultural products.
1978
In addition, GCG provides clients with a range of physical commodity
services, including risk management solutions, commodity-linked financing, physical hedging
solutions, off-take and supply agreements, and transportation and storage of assets.
1979
In 2014,
J PMorgan reported that the GCG had over 2,200 active clients.
1980
The key legal entity executing activities on behalf of the Global Commodities Group is
J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC).
1981
J PMVEC was formed in 2005, as a
Delaware corporation. It has no U.S. or European employees or offices of its own, and instead
acts through GCG employees.
1982
J PMVEC is the key legal entity that actually executes the bulk
of J PMorgan’s financial and physical commodities trading as well as other commodities-related
activities, either directly or through subsidiaries or affiliates.
1983
One example of the physical commodity activities undertaken by J PMorgan is what the
bank has referred to as “Project Liberty.”
1984
In 2012, using its complementary authority,
J PMVEC entered into a long term oil supply agreement with Philadelphia Energy Solutions
Refining and Marketing (PESRM), a joint venture between the Carlyle Group and Sunoco to
operate one of the largest oil refineries in the United States.
1985
According to J PMorgan, under a
five-year contract, J PMVEC agreed to supply “100% of the crude oil and feedstocks” required
by the refinery and to purchase “the majority of the refined products” as they were produced.
1986
J MPVEC then sold “around half of the refinery products back to Sunoco for its retail distribution
1978
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9.
1979
4/2011 “Our Commodities Franchise and Our Competitive Advantages,” prepared by J .P.Morgan, FRB-PSI-
623086 - 127, at 089.
1980
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9. This figure is down nearly one-third from the 3,000 clients J PMorgan
reported in 2011. See 4/2011 “Our Commodities Franchise and Our Competitive Advantages,” prepared by
J .P.Morgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 089.
1981
See, e.g., 9/16/2005 letter from J PMorgan’s legal counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000478 - 536 (discussing J PMVEC’s activities).
1982
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
1983
Id. See also, e.g., 9/16/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000478 - 536, at 486 (discussing J PMVEC’s activities);
12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-02-
000010 - 059, at 014 (“J PMVEC currently engages as principal in commodity derivatives transactions and offers a
full range of derivatives to its clients across the spectrum of crude oil, coal, electricity and natural gas-related risks.
In addition, J PMVEC enters into physical transactions in the natural gas, crude oil, coal and electricity markets and
makes and takes delivery of these commodities.”).
1984
See 1/24/2013 “Commodities Physical Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301379 - 382, at 381
(chart entitled, “Physical Operating Risk Review of Project Liberty”) (hereinafter, “2013 Project Liberty Chart”);
10/6/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to Follow-Up
Questions,” PSI-J PMorganChase-14-000001 - 009.
1985
10/6/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to
Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorganChase-14-000001 - 009, at 001, 006. J PMorgan undertook this activity after
obtaining permission from the Federal Reserve to use a “third party to alter or refine commodities” on its behalf.
See 11/25/2008 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co.,”
prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000553 - 558 (requesting that authority); 4/20/2009 letter from
Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 - 002 (granting J PMorgan’s request).
1986
2013 Project Liberty Chart, FRB-PSI-301379 - 382, at 381.
310
network” and sold the rest to third parties.
1987
To implement the agreement, J PMVEC leased or
subleased about 14.5 million barrels of storage for crude and refined products on and around the
refinery premises.
1988
The crude oil and feedstocks provided by J PMVEC “arrive[d] via ship
and rail.”
1989
This project illustrates J PMorgan’s intimate involvement with buying,
transporting, storing, and selling key physical commodities.
1990
Commodities-Related Merchant Banking. In addition to GCG, J PMorgan has engaged
in commodity-related activities through certain investment funds and merchant banking activities
undertaken in other areas of the bank. For example, J PMorgan Infrastructure Investments
Group, located within the Global Real Assets section of the Asset Management business
segment, oversees investment funds focused on infrastructure projects.
1991
The Group, through
J PMorgan Investment Management, Inc., has 35 investment professionals who advise and help
manage the J PMorgan Infrastructure Investments Fund.
1992
The Fund, which was established in
2006, and whose general partner is J PMorgan IIF Acquisitions LLC, has raised $3 billion for
investments in power plants, oil and gas pipelines, and electricity distribution assets, among
other projects.
1993
The Fund operates with capital raised from third party investors; according to
J PMorgan, it has not contributed any of its own money to the Fund.
1994
Additional commodity-
related projects have been funded by J .P. Morgan Partners LLC, formerly known as J PMorgan
Capital Partners, a “private equity division of J PMorgan & Co.” that raises capital from third
party investors.
1995
In J une 2014, J PMorgan reported to the Federal Reserve that it held merchant banking
investments with a total value of about $10 billion, but it is unclear how many of those were
commodity related and whether the total included any projects administered by the Infrastructure
Investments or J .P. Morgan Partners funds.
1996
1987
Id.; 10/6/2014 letter from J PMorgan’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses
to Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorganChase-14-000001 - 009, at 002.
1988
Id.
1989
2013 Project Liberty Chart, prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301379 - 382, at 381.
1990
In October 2014, J PMorgan sold Project Liberty to Bank of America. Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan
(10/10/2014).
1991
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003 -
004. For more information about J PMorgan’s Global Real Assets section, see 12/3/2012 “Virginia Port Partners
Proposal for Port of Virginia PPTA,” prepared by J .P. Morgan Asset Management for Virginia’s Office of
Transportation Public-Private Partnerships, at 4,http://www.vappta.org/resources/RREEF and J PMorgan_Detailed%20Proposal.pdf.
1992
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003 -
004; 12/3/2012 letter from J PMorgan IIF Acquisitions LLC and Maher Terminals LLC to Virginia Office of
Transportation Public-Private Partnerships, at 1, and 12/3/2012 “Virginia Port Partners Proposal for Port of Virginia
PPTA,” at 3 - 4,http://www.vappta.org/resources/RREEF and J PMorgan_Detailed%20Proposal.pdf.
1993
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 004;
12/3/2012 letter from J PMorgan IIF Acquisitions LLC and Maher Terminals LLC to Virginia Office of
Transportation Public-Private Partnerships, at 1, and 12/3/2012 proposal at 4,http://www.vappta.org/resources/RREEF and J PMorgan_Detailed%20Proposal.pdf.
1994
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 004.
1995
“J .P. Morgan Partners,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorganpartners. In addition,
some J .P. Morgan Partners professionals formed CCMP Capital Advisors, LLC and Panorama Capital, LLC which
“manage the J PMP investments pursuant to a management agreement entered into with J PMorgan Chase & Co.” Id.
1996
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies - FR
Y-12,” filed by J PMorgan with the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-800005 - 008, at 006.
311
Commodities Trading. At the same time it conducts a wide range of physical
commodity activities, J PMorgan trades commodities-related financial instruments, including
futures, swaps, and options, involving billions of dollars each day. J PMorgan is the largest
financial institution in the United States trading financial commodity instruments, according to
Coalition Development Ltd., a company that collects commodity trading statistics.
1997
OCC
data indicates it is also among the largest financial institution trading commodity-related
derivatives.
1998
Commodity Revenues. According to J PMorgan, at the end of 2013, it had commodity-
related contracts, including swaps, futures, options, and forwards, with a total dollar value of
$763 billion, down from a 2012 year-end total of $1 trillion.
1999
Separately, J PMorgan reported
that, in 2013, its physical commodities activities had a total dollar value of about $10.2 billion,
down from $16.2 billion the year before.
2000
(2) Historical Overview of Commodities Activities
According to J PMorgan Chase & Co., in a short history of the bank, the company was
“built on the foundation of more than 1,000 predecessor institutions.”
2001
They include such
well-known banks as J .P. Morgan & Co., The Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank One, Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., Chemical Bank, The First National Bank of Chicago, and National Bank of
Detroit.
2002
At times, J PMorgan’s predecessor banks were involved with securities or commodity
activities that led to the bank’s being subjected to Congressional scrutiny. As explained earlier,
the 1912 Pujo money trust hearings held by the U.S. House of Representatives focused, in part,
on actions taken by J . Pierpont Morgan and J .P. Morgan and Co. to form “trusts” that acted as
holding companies for massive commercial enterprises, including businesses that handled
physical commodities, such as railroads, oil companies, steel manufacturers, and shipping and
mining ventures.
2003
After the 1929 stock market crash, the Pecora hearings in the U.S. Senate
1997
See 9/2014 “Global & Regional Investment Bank League Tables-1H2014,” prepared by Coalition Development
Ltd., PSI-Coalition-01-00019 - 025, at 020.
1998
2013 “OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013,” prepared by
OCC, at Tables 1 and 2,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
1999
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 23,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/jpmorgan-
chase-1g-20140701.pdf.
2000
See 12/31/2012 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D,
Item M.9.a.(2),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20121231.PDF. See
also12/31/2013 2013 “J PMorgan FR Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR
Y-9C,” Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a.(2),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20131231.PDF.
2001
Undated “The History of J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” J PMorgan website, at 1,http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/document/shorthistory.pdf.
2002
Id.
2003
See “Money Trust Investigation: Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States,” hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, HRG-1912-BCU-0017 (5/16/1912),
Y4.B22/1:M74/2-1,http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1912-bcu-
0017?accountid=45340 (first of multiple days of hearings continuing into 1913); The House of Morgan, Ron
Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 67-68 (railroad trusts), 81-86 (U.S. Steel trust), 100-103 (shipping trust), and 123
(copper trust), 150-156 (Pujo hearings).
312
took testimony from J . P. (“J ack”) Morgan and highlighted actions taken by J . P. Morgan & Co.
in the underwriting and trading of questionable securities, including securities related to utility
companies, and providing new stocks at below market prices to government officials.
2004
In
1935, in response to the Glass-Steagall Act’s mandating the separation of banks and securities
firms, J .P. Morgan & Co. decided to remain a bank and spun off its securities activities to a
newly formed company, Morgan Stanley, discussed above.
2005
JPMorgan Chase Bank. Fifty years later, J PMorgan Chase Bank, began to conduct
financial and, later, physical commodity trades. The bank’s involvement with commodities
followed actions taken by the OCC during the 1980s, permitting national banks to engage in an
increasingly large array of commodity activities. As discussed earlier, the first step was in 1982,
when the OCC explicitly authorized national banks to execute and clear trades in futures
contracts.
2006
A J PMorgan bank affiliate, J .P. Morgan Futures, Inc., registered as a futures
commission merchant that same year.
2007
In 1986, the OCC authorized national banks to trade
commodity-related futures for themselves and on behalf of clients, act as broker-dealers and
market makers for exchange traded options, and provide margin financing to clients trading
commodities.
2008
Also in 1986, Chase Manhattan Bank – another J PMorgan predecessor bank –
entered into reportedly the first oil-related swap with Koch Industries, introducing the concept of
swaps linked to the price of physical commodities.
2009
In 1987, the OCC authorized national
banks to engage in transactions involving commodity price index swaps.
2010
The OCC continued to broaden bank authority to engage in commodity activities during
the 1990s. In 1993, the OCC authorized national banks to hedge permissible banking activities
by making or taking physical delivery of commodities, and to engage in related physical
2004
See, e.g., “Stock Exchange Practices,” report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S.Hrg.
73-1455, (6/6/1934),https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/pdf/Pecora_FinalReport.pdf, and associated
hearings from J anuary 1933 to May 1934 (known as the Pecora hearings); The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow
(Grove Press 1990), at 352-373.
2005
See, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 385.
2006
Undated OCC Interpretive Letter (7/23/1982), unpublished, PSI-OCC-01-000011 - 012.
2007
See J P Morgan Futures Inc. FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=jSzQxZANWxY=&rn=Y. That FCM license was
withdrawn in 2011. Id. In addition, J P Morgan Securities LLC currently holds an FCM license that Bear Stearns
obtained in 1982. See J P Morgan Securities LLC FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/Details.aspx?entityid=7YD6PX+m0vo=.
2008
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 356 (1/7/1986), PSI-OCC-01-000026 - 028 (authorizing a bank subsidiary
to trade agricultural and metal futures for clients seeking to hedge bank loans); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 372
(11/7/1986) PSI-OCC-01-000043 - 044 (authorizing a bank subsidiary to act as a broker-dealer and market maker
for exchange-traded options for itself, its affiliated bank, and clients); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986)
PSI-OCC-01-000046-061, at 047 - 048, 060, reprinted in Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85,604 (authorizing a bank to
provide margin financing to its clients to trade commodities; and to execute and clear client transactions involving
futures and options on exchanges and over the counter).
2009
See 7/2009 “Oil Derivatives: In the Beginning,” EnergyRisk magazine (J uly 2009), at 31,http://db.riskwaters.com/data/energyrisk/EnergyRisk/Energyrisk_0709/markets.pdf. The swap was a bilateral
contract in which, for a four-month period, one party agreed to make payments to the other for 25,000 barrels of oil
per month using a fixed price per barrel, while the other party agreed to make payments using the average monthly
spot price for oil.
2010
See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987), PSI-OCC-01-000100-106, at 106. This letter was
requested by Chase Manhattan Bank, a predecessor to J PMorgan.
313
commodity activities such as “storing, transporting, and disposing of the commodities.”
2011
In
1995, the OCC gave banks broad authority to engage in physically-settled transactions involving
metals, as well “ancillary activities” such as storing, transporting, and disposing of them.
2012
J PMorgan Chase Bank took advantage of each of the OCC grants of authority to expand
the bank’s commodities activities.
2013
In addition to trading commodity futures, forwards, and
options, the bank also conducted derivatives transactions, including derivatives related to
commodities. It was later discovered that, from 1992 to 2001, J PMorgan Chase Bank entered
into twelve energy trades with Enron involving $3.7 billion, in transactions later exposed as
hidden loans that disguised the extent of Enron’s indebtedness.
2014
J PMorgan Chase Bank
eventually became the largest swaps dealer in the United States.
JPMorgan Holding Company. In 1999, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act expanded
permissible activities for bank holding companies, J PMorgan took advantage of the changes in
the law and, in 2000, elected to become a financial holding company under the Act.
2015
Over
time, the holding company also became involved with commodities.
In 2003, due in part to the growing role of banks in commodities under OCC supervision,
the Federal Reserve began to relax its rules regarding commodity activities by financial holding
companies. One of the Federal Reserve’s earlier steps was to give bank holding companies more
leeway to participate in physically settled transactions, allowing them to take or make delivery of
documents giving title to physical commodities on an “instantaneous pass-through basis,” for
commodities approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
2016
Also in 2003, the Federal
Reserve began granting requests by financial holding companies to engage in complementary
commodity activities under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. J PMorgan applied for and received a
complementary order in 2005.
2017
In 2004, J PMorgan acquired Bank One Corporation, a major Midwestern bank. Prior to
that purchase, both J PMorgan Chase & Co. and J PMorgan Chase Bank had the Federal Reserve
2011
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358 - 366, at 365..
2012
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368-374, at 372 - 374; OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 1073 (10/19/2006), PSI-OCC-01-000425 - 432, at 425 (allowing banks and their foreign branches to
engage in “customer-driven, metal derivative transactions that settle in cash or by transitory title transfer”); OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141 (allowing banks to buy and sell physical
copper).
2013
See 9/16/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank, “J PM Chase Application for
Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000478 - 532 (describing its physical commodity activities
over the years).
2014
See “The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse-Volume 1,” Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S. Hrg. 107-618, (J uly 23 and 30, 2002), at 231, 264.
2015
See “Institution History for J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” National Information Center (using Federal Reserve data),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionHistory.aspx?parID_RSSD=1039502&parDT_END=99991231.
2016
See 68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (7/3/2003); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B).
2017
See 7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase
Application for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 103; 9/16/2005 letter from
J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “J PM Chase Application for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000478 - 532. 11/18/2005 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities
Complementary to a Financial Activity,” in response to a request by J P Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull.
C57 (2006),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
314
as their primary regulator. After the acquisition, J PMorgan Chase Bank was classified as a
national bank, and its primary regulator became the OCC.
2018
Bear Stearns Acquisition. The physical commodity profile of J PMorgan expanded
dramatically four years later. In March 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis and essentially
at the request of the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
(Bear Stearns), a large investment bank that was then nearly insolvent.
2019
At the time, Bear
Stearns had extensive physical commodity holdings and was active in a number of physical spot
markets.
2020
Bear Stearns was especially active in the energy markets and used its subsidiary,
Bear Energy, to acquire ownership interests in dozens of power plants.
2021
Through its
acquisition of Bear Stearns, J PMorgan gained control of a vast number of new physical
commodity assets and activities.
UBS Acquisition. In 2009, J PMorgan further expanded its physical commodity
activities when it acquired UBS Commodities Canada Ltd. and UBS AG’s agricultural trading
business.
2022
Those purchases gave J PMorgan an increased presence in the Canadian natural
gas, power and crude oil physical and financial markets, and enlarged its agricultural commodity
holdings.
2023
Refining Authority. Also in 2009, J PMorgan requested, and the Federal Reserve
approved, complementary authority for J PMorgan to “engage a third party to alter or refine
commodities” on its behalf.
2024
J PMorgan later used this authority to sell crude oil to a refinery
and buy back the refined products.
2025
It has also used the authority to hire third parties to blend
heating oil, jet kerosene, and gasoline fuels to produce oil products that meet specific national,
regional, or client standards.
2026
RBS Sempra Acquisition. In 2010, J PMorgan again substantially increased its physical
commodities profile when, in two separate transactions in J uly and October, for $1.6 billion, it
acquired the ownership stake of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in RBS Sempra, a joint
2018
See “Institution Directory for J PMorgan Chase Bank, National Association,” Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation website,https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/confirmation_outside.asp?inCert1=628.
2019
See undated Federal Reserve press release, “Bear Stearns, J PMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,”http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm.
2020
See, e.g., 7/31/2008 “Supervisory Plan, Risk Assessment Program & Institutional Overview of J PMorgan Chase
& Co.” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-305013-030 (identifying Bear Stearns assets being integrated
into J PMorgan) [sealed exhibit].
2021
See 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 -576, at 547; 7/17/2008
memorandum from the OCC to the File, “Quarterly review of risk, performance and significant developments” for
J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-303773 - 818, at 779 - 780 [sealed exhibit](listing Bear Energy assets as of 2008, including
tolling and load agreements, gas storage facilities, gas transport facilities, and power plants). See also “Bear
Stearns’s Trading Unit Draws Interest,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (4/5/2008),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120735754695191559?mod=googlenews_wsj&mg=reno64-wsj.
2022
1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 - 576, at 547.
2023
Id.; “J .P. Morgan to Acquire UBS’ Canadian Energy and Global Agricultural Businesses,” prepared by
J PMorgan,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHoYAtnF5ydo.
2024
See 4/20/2009 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 - 002 [sealed exhibit].
2025
See information on Project Liberty, above.
2026
9/10/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001 - 011, at 006.
315
venture between RBS and Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company.
2027
The two acquisitions
provided J PMorgan with extensive North American and European energy and commodity
operations involving oil, natural gas, metals, coal, plastics, agricultural products, emissions, and
electricity.
2028
J PMorgan’s expanded physical commodity operations included more than 130
new storage and warehousing facilitiesin ten countries.
2029
Henry Bath Acquisition. As part of the RBS Sempra acquisition, J PMorgan took
ownership of Henry Bath & Sons, Ltd., which owned and managed a worldwide network of
commodity storage warehouses licensed by the London Metal Exchange.
2030
The Henry Bath
storage facilities facilitated the holding, making delivery, and taking delivery of physical
commodities, primarily metals but also other commodities.
2031
Through its ownership of Henry
Bath, J PMorgan gained warehousing operations in 19 port locations across the United States,
Europe, Asia, and Middle East.
2032
London Metal Exchange. J PMorgan extended its reach again by inheriting shares and
buying an ownership stake in the London Metals Exchange (LME), the leading futures market in
metals.
2033
J PMorgan became the LME’s largest shareholder, holding an 11% ownership
stake,
2034
until the LME was sold to a Hong Kong exchange in 2012, when J PMorgan sold all of
its shares to the exchange.
2035
In 2013, J PMorgan was appointed a member of a key LME
advisory group that deals directly with the LME Board.
2036
In addition, J .P. Morgan Securities
2027
J PMorgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, at 184,http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000163/corp10k2011.htm#s50873
1DA912EFDF440782294EA306391. See also 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan,
FRB-PSI-301543 - 576, at 547.
2028
See 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 - 576, at 547; 7/1/2010
J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
2029
7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
2030
See id.; undated, “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry Bath ,” FRB-PSI-000580 - 582. See also undated
“Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel Hedging,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200822 - 826, at 824
(listing the licensing authorities as the London Metal Exchange, the London International Financial Futures, Options
Exchange, and Intercontinental Exchange).
2031
See undated “Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel Hedging,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200822 -
826, at 824.
2032
See 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 -576, at 552; undated
“Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel Hedging,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200822 - 826, at 824.
2033
2/13/2013 OCC email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Commodities Quarterly Update,” OCC-PSI-00000374.
2034
6/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMC-11-000001 - 002, at 001.
2035
See, e.g., 12/6/2012 London Metal Exchange press release, “HKEx and LME announce completion of
transaction,”http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-events/press-releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-
announce-completion-of-transaction/.
2036
See, e.g., “LME Starts User Advisory Group After $2.2 Billion Takeover,” Bloomberg, Agnieszka Troszkiewicz
(1/8/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/lme-starts-user-advisory-group-after-2-2-billion-takeover-
1-.html (indicating J PMorgan was one of 14 members of the advisory committee).
316
plc, a U.K. subsidiary, has remained a “Category 1 ring-dealing member” of the LME exchange,
with special trading status on the LME floor.
2037
In J anuary 2012, in a presentation prepared by J PMorgan for its clients, it described its
“growth” in commodities over the prior few years as “consistent and dramatic.”
2038
It stated that
its commodities personnel had acquired “deep expertise across all commodity types (600
employees in 20+locations worldwide)” and an “[e]xpansive financial and physical
platform.”
2039
It stated that “J .P. Morgan’s Global Commodities Group offer[ed] clients a
comprehensive set of market making, structuring, risk management, financing and warehousing
capabilities across the full spectrum of commodity asset classes.”
2040
(3) Current Status
When the Federal Reserve initiated its special review of financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities in 2010, J PMorgan was one of the ten banks it examined
in detail. J PMorgan was also featured in the October 2012 Summary Report issued by the
Federal Reserve’s Commodities Team summarizing the findings of the special review.
2041
The 2012 Summary Report described J PMorgan’s wide-ranging physical commodity
activities. It stated that J PMorgan had a “significant global oil storage portfolio (25 [million
barrel] capacity) … along with 19 Natural Gas storage facilities on lease with an average tenor of
2.8 years”;
2042
“14 tolling agreements … of which one is for a power plant that generates 6% of
the maximum total output in the California Electricity grid, and potentially up to 12% of average
electricity demand;”
2043
“direct ownership of 4 power plants”;
2044
direct ownership of the Henry
Bath global network of metals warehouses;
2045
and an industrial metal inventory that “was as
high as $8 [billion].”
2046
The 2012 Summary Report also noted that J PMorgan and Goldman
together had a “total of 20-25 ships under time charters or voyages transporting oil [and]
Liquified Natural Gas.”
2047
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report identified multiple concerns with J PMorgan’s
physical commodity operations. One concern was that J PMorgan had insufficient capital and
insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event. The report noted at one point that,
while J PMorgan had calculated a potential oil spill risk of $497 million, through “aggressive
assumptions” and “diversification benefits,” it had reduced that total by nearly 90% to $50
2037
See undated “Membership[:] Ring dealing,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/en-
gb/trading/membership/category-1-ring-dealing/j_p_morgan-securities-plc/.
2038
1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 -576, at 547.
2039
Id. at 546.
2040
Id. at 547.
2041
See 10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team” (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477-510 [sealed exhibit].
2042
Id. at 485.
2043
Id.
2044
Id.
2045
Id. at 486.
2046
Id.
2047
Id. See also 4/2011 “Global Commodities – Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at
095 (indicating J PMorgan then had “13 Time Chartered Vessels”).
317
million, allocating risk capital for only that smaller amount.
2048
The 2012 Summary Report also
noted that J PMorgan had determined that the “operational and event risks of owning power
facilities” was capped at the dollar value of those facilities in the event of their total loss, with
some insurance to cover “the death and disability of workers” and some facility replacement
costs, but leaving all other expenses, including a “failure to deliver electricity under contract,” to
be paid by the holding company.
2049
At another point, the 2012 Summary Report compared the
level of J PMorgan’s capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with
“extreme loss scenarios,” and found that “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by $1
billion to $15 billion dollars.
2050
If J PMorgan were to incur losses from its physical commodity
activities while maintaining insufficient capital and insurance protections, the Federal Reserve,
and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, could be asked to rescue the firm.
The 2012 Summary Report expressed concerns about J PMorgan attempts to expand its
physical commodity activities still further. It described several recent instances in which the
Federal Reserve had denied J PMorgan requests for new activities, including trading oil products
not approved by the CFTC for trading on exchanges, and keeping rather than divesting its
ownership of the Henry Bath warehouses.
2051
The 2012 Summary Report also noted that
J PMorgan had booked “significant amounts of base metals in the national bank entity” that,
together with the bank’s other physical commodities, produced aggregate holdings of “10.0% of
tier 1 capital as of Sept ’12 … an all time high in physical holdings.”
2052
As discussed below, a
J PMorgan report to the Federal Reserve, together with other information provided to the
Subcommittee, indicates that, in September 2012, it actually had about $17.4 billion in physical
commodity assets (excluding its holdings of gold, silver, and commodity-related merchant
banking assets), which was then equal to nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital.
2053
At the time,
J PMorgan was subject to a Federal Reserve limit that prohibited its physical commodity assets
from exceeding 5% of its Tier 1 capital, but J PMorgan had interpreted that limit to allow it to
exclude major categories of assets, bringing its total below the 5% limit.
2054
In 2013, when the Subcommittee asked J PMorgan about its physical commodity
activities, the financial holding company provided information that, consistent with the Federal
Reserve’s 2012 Summary Report, illustrated its far-reaching commodity operations. J PMorgan
reported trading in the physical commodities of cocoa, coffee, aluminum, copper, gold, lead,
nickel, palladium, platinum, silver, tin, zinc, coal, crude oil, electricity, heating oil, gasoline, jet
2048
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 [sealed exhibit].
2049
Id. at 497.
2050
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
2051
Id. at 505.
2052
Id. at 506.
2053
See 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators,
FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at 387. See also discussion of J PMorgan’s compliance with the 5% limit, below, including
its decision to exclude its bank’s assets when calculating its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying
with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2054
For more information, see discussion below on J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits.
318
kerosene, and natural gas.
2055
J PMorgan also reported maintaining inventories of many physical
commodities. In 2011 (the last complete year of figures provided to the Subcommittee), those
inventories included, at various times, as much as 3.3 million metric tons of aluminum (an
amount which is more than half of U.S. aluminum consumption that year
2056
), 200,000 metric
tons of copper, 100,000 metric tons of lead, 6.4 million barrels of crude oil, 3.6 million barrels of
heating oil, 900,000 barrels of gasoline, 3.4 million barrels of jet kerosene, and 51.9 billion cubic
feet of natural gas.
2057
In addition, J PMorgan reported owning or controlling tolling agreements
at 31 power plants.
2058
When J PMorgan first met with the Subcommittee, it indicated that the holding company
was in the process of exiting the physical commodity business. In 2013, it sold about half its
power plants.
2059
In March 2014, J PMorgan announced publicly that it had reached agreement to
sell a large portion of its physical commodities operations, including its physical oil, gas, power,
warehousing facilities, and energy transportation operations, to Mercuria Energy Group Ltd. for
approximately $3.5 billion.
2060
When the sale was finalized in October 2014, only about one-
third of the assets actually went to Mercuria, at a cost of about $800 million.
2061
J PMorgan told
the Subcommittee that it had sold most of the remaining two-thirds to other buyers, including its
metals inventory, oil supply contract with a Philadelphia refinery, and other assets.
2062
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that, as of October 2014, it had dramatically reduced its
involvement with physical commodities.
2063
2055
9/10/13 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001-013, at 002 -
005. See also 9/2013 “Global Commodities Compliance Self Assessment,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-
301370 - 378, at 372.
2056
See undated “Primary Aluminum Consumption, 2011-2013,” European Aluminum Association website,http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-consumption-in-world-regions/ (indicating that North
American primary aluminum consumption in 2011 was 5.1 million metric tons).
2057
3/22/13 J PMorgan legal counsel letter to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015 - 018, at 018.
2058
See 2014 J PMorgan chart, “Power Plants Owned or Controlled via Tolling Agreements, 2008 to present,” J PM-
COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
2059
7/26/2013 “J .P. Morgan to Explore Strategic Alternatives for its Physical Commodities Business,”https://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=780681; “From Refineries To Power
Plants — A Rundown Of J P Morgan's Huge Portfolio Of Physical Assets,” Reuters, J onathan Leff and David
Sheppard (7/28/2013),http://www.businessinsider.com/jp-morgan-portfolio-of-physical-assets-2013-7.
2060
3/19/2014 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan announces sale of its physical commodities business
to Mercuria Energy Group Limited,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1394963095027&c=J PM_Content_C; 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9.
2061
10/3/2014 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan Completes Sales of Physical Commodities Assets,”http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=874514; Subcommittee briefing by
J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2062
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2063
Id. See also “J PMorgan has not ‘exited physical commodities’ despite sale,” Financial Times, Neil Humes
(11/3/2014),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/00a2ae9e-60e7-11e4-894b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IF0BzSSM
(quoting J ohn Anderson, co-head of the J PMorgan Global Commodities Group: “It’s a bit of a misnomer to say we
have exited physical commodities. … We won’t move crude around anymore but we will finance oil in tanks.”).
319
B. JPMorgan Involvement with Electricity
J PMorgan is an active trader in the physical and financial electricity markets. It entered
the power plant business for the first time in 2008, when in the midst of the financial crisis, at the
request of the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan acquired the assets of Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns
controlled over two dozen power plants at the time. As part of that transaction, J PMorgan
acquired “tolling agreements” that enabled it to supply fuel to the power plants and then sell the
power they produced to wholesalers. J PMorgan also acquired direct ownership interests in a
number of power plants. In 2010, J PMorgan increased its power plant activities by acquiring
control over four more power plants, including two from a larger acquisition of physical
commodity assets from RBS Sempra. At its height, J PMorgan owned or had rights to the energy
output of 31 power plants across the country. According to one 2013 press report, J PMorgan
controlled “more than 2,950 megawatts of electricity through such deals, enough to power every
one of Indiana's 2.8 million homes.”
2064
When J PMorgan acquired its power plants, it did not have authority to own or operate
them, and sought broad authority from the Federal Reserve to conduct power plant activities.
The Federal Reserve eventually authorized J PMorgan to enter into tolling agreements, energy
management contracts, and long-term supply contracts with power plants, but declined to
authorize J PMorgan to take direct ownership of a commercial power plant as a complementary
activity. J PMorgan responded by asserting merchant banking authority to retain its direct
ownership of the three power plants. J PMorgan also entered into several disputes with state and
federal electricity regulators over how it was conducting its power plant activities. In J uly 2013,
J PMorgan paid $410 million to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to settle
charges that it used manipulative bidding tactics that produced excessive wholesale electricity
payments in California and Michigan. Also in 2013, FERC ordered J PMorgan to stop blocking
the modification of two California power plants to improve grid reliability. In 2014, under
pressure from the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan began exiting the power plant business.
J PMorgan’s power plant activities raise multiple concerns, including market
manipulation, insufficient capital and insurance to protect against catastrophic event risks, and
inadequate safeguards to stop financial holding company involvement with impermissible
physical commodity assets.
(1) Background on Electricity
Electricity is a physical product that is produced from the conversion of natural resources
such as oil, gas, uranium, solar energy, water, or wind into a flow of electrons.
2065
Electricity is a
personal and commercial necessity today, providing lighting and heating for residential homes,
businesses, and governments, while powering computers, electronic devices, machines, and an
increasing number of vehicles. Since electricity is produced by a flow of electrons, it is not
2064
“J PMorgan's U.S. power plants and energy trading deals,” Reuters (7/25/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/jpmorgan-ferc-idUSL1N0FV0KF20130725.
2065
“Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 1,http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
320
easily stored and, in most cases, must be produced as required. Supply and demand change
continuously, leading to great variations in price.
Electricity Production. Electricity is different from most physical commodities in that it
is a secondary energy source – that is, it is produced through the conversion of other
commodities, including coal and natural gas.
2066
According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, in 2013, about 39% of the 4 trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity generated in the
United States came from power plants fueled by coal.
2067
Power plants fueled by natural gas
provided roughly 27% of the U.S. electricity supply.
2068
Other prominent sources of electricity in
the United States include nuclear energy, hydropower, and renewable energy sources such as
solar and wind energy.
2069
Electricity Infrastructure. The process of providing electricity for end users in the
United States involves three major types of infrastructure. First, electricity is produced at one of
the 5,800 major power plants across the country or at one of many smaller generation
facilities.
2070
Second, the electricity is transported across a series of high voltage transmission
lines to more localized population centers across the country.
2071
As of 2008, the United States
contained approximately 450,000 miles of those power lines.
2072
Third, local distribution systems
transport the electricity to its final destination in homes, businesses, and government offices,
either by overhead power lines or underground cables.
2073
This three-step process is summarized
in the following graphic:
2066
Id. at 1.
2067
“Electricity in the United States,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/12/2014),http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states.
2068
Id.
2069
“What is U.S. electricity generation by energy source?,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/12/2014),http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3.
2070
“Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure,” American
Society of Civil Engineers (2011), at 15,http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Failure_to_Act/SCE41 report_Final-lores.pdf.
2071
Id.
2072
Id.
2073
Id.
321
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission website,
http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Failure_to_Act/SCE41 report_Final-lores.pdf
Electricity has been generated and transported in this fashion since the development of
interconnected power lines in the 1920s.
2074
Due to the complexity of the system and aging
infrastructure, the United States currently faces increasing grid reliability problems.
2075
Electricity Markets. Electricity markets have two main components: retail and
wholesale.
2076
As the names suggest, the retail market concerns the sale of electricity to end-
users or consumers, while the wholesale market involves the sale of electricity between
producers, distributors, traders, and electric utilities.
2077
Within the wholesale market, electricity
is traded like any other commodity in both physical and financial trading venues.
Physical electricity is traded in two primary markets: the day-ahead market and the real-
time market. As its name suggests, the day-ahead market produces binding schedules for the
production and consumption of electricity one day before it is needed.
2078
Because of the
difficulty inherent in storing electricity, the day-ahead market is as forward-looking a market as
exists in the electricity markets. The real-time market operates to cover the differences between
2074
Id. at 16.
2075
See, e.g., “U.S. Electrical Grid Gets Less Reliable as Outages Increase and R&D Decreases,” Professor Massoud
Amin, Director of the Technological Leadership Institute, University of Minnesota (2011 with updates),http://tli.umn.edu/blog/security-te...ets-less-reliable-as-outages-increase-and-rd-
decreases/.
2076
“Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 37,http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
2077
Id.
2078
Id. at 64.
322
what is provided for in the day-ahead market and the amount of electricity actually needed by
end-users during the day.
2079
The real-time market is significantly smaller than the day-ahead
market, accounting for only about 5% of total scheduled energy use.
2080
Both the day-ahead and
real-time markets are subject to oversight by Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)and
independent system operators (ISOs),
2081
which are independent, membership-based, non-profit
organizations that “ensure reliability and optimize supply and demand bids for wholesale electric
power.”
2082
In addition to the physical markets, electricity can be traded in financial markets, using a
variety of financial products, including electricity-related futures, swaps, and options.
Electricity-related financial products are available on regulated exchanges and over the counter.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), for example, has offered electricity futures since
1996.
2083
One of the more widely traded is a financially-settled futures contract tracking prices
for 40 megawatts-hours of electricity during real-time peak hours, which can be traded
electronically or by open outcry on the floor of the NYMEX.
2084
Electricity futures, options, and
swaps are also available on the Intercontinental Exchange
2085
and Nodal Exchange, a CFTC-
registered exchange focused on electricity financial products for North American power
markets.
2086
Participants in the electricity financial markets include power providers and
suppliers seeking to hedge price risk, as well as speculators seeking to profit from changes in
electricity prices.
2087
While much smaller than the crude oil and natural gas markets, electricity
markets are nevertheless active, with many participants.
2088
Electricity Prices. Electricity prices are typically volatile in the short term, due to the
inability to store electricity and sudden swings in demand and supply due to weather, plant
shutdowns, and other factors.
2089
Electricity prices have also been subject to high profile cases of
2079
Id. at 65.
2080
Id.
2081
Id. at 64.
2082
“About 60% of the U.S. Electric Power Supply is Managed by RTOs,” U.S. Energy Information Administration,
(4/4/2011),http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=790.
2083
3/9/2012 presentation, “The Evolution of the CME Group Electricity Complex,” CME Group, at 6,http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Leach_Brad.pdf.
2084
See contract specifications for the “PJ M Western Hub Real-Time Peak Calendar-Month 2.5 MW Futures,” CME
website,
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/electricity/pjm-peak-calendar-month-lmp-swap-
futures_contract_specifications.html.
2085
See, e.g., electricity listings on the Intercontinental Exchange website,https://www.theice.com/products/Futures-
Options/Energy/Electricity
2086
See electricity listings on the Nodal Exchange website,http://www.nodalexchange.com/.
2087
See, e.g., “Utilities Turn to Global Markets to Hedge Commodity Risks,” Black & Veatch, Samuel Glasser
(2014),http://bv.com/Home/news/solutions/s...nt/utilities-turn-to-global-markets-to-hedge-
commodity-risks.
2088
See, e.g., 9/13/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-07-000001 -
021, attachment at J PM-COMM-PSI-000019.
2089
See, e.g., “Big bets on power cleared by regulator,” Financial Times, Gregory Meyer (1/21/2014),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a3d69d2-81f8-11e3-87d5-00144feab7de.html#axzz3FwLSMWhx (“Electricity is
typically the most volatile commodity market because it cannot be easily stored, forcing huge price swings to
balance supply and demand. Peak prices more than doubled overnight when extreme cold gripped the northern US
in early J anuary.”).
323
price and supply manipulation, such as cases involving Enron
2090
and, more recently, major
financial institutions.
2091
The following graph,
2092
prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, illustrates the volatility and overall increase in electricity prices from 1999 to 2013:
U.S. City Average Electricity Prices per Kilowatt
Power Plants. The United States currently has about 5,800 major power plants across
the country as well as smaller generation facilities that produce electricity.
2093
Many sell their
electricity output directly to distributors or end-users. Alternatively, many power plants sell their
electricity output to third parties via “tolling agreements,” who market the electricity to others.
A tolling agreement typically requires the “toller” to make periodic payments to the
power plant owner to cover the plant’s operating costs plus a fixed profit margin.
2094
In
exchange, the power plant gives the toller the right to all or part of the plant’s power output. As
part of the agreement, the toller typically supplies or pays for the fuel used to run the plant.
Since the toller has the right to the electricity output, it also determines the price at which to sell
it.
2090
See, e.g., United States v. Belden, Criminal Case No. No. CR 02-0313 MJ J (USDC ND Calif. 2002), Plea
Agreement, file:///C:/Users/eb45550/Downloads/usbelden101702plea.pdf; “Enron Forced Up California Prices,
Documents Show,” New York Times, Richard A. Oppel, J r. and J eff Gerth (5/7/2002),http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/business/enron-forced-up-california-prices-documents-show.html.
2091
See discussion, below.
2092
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Data, “Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject,” Series Id. No.
APU000072610, U.S. city average, Electricity per kilowatt (10/14/2014).
2093
“Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure,” American
Society of Civil Engineers (2011), at 15,http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Failure_to_Act/SCE41 report_Final-lores.pdf.
2094
See 2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60, C64
(2008) (hereinafter “RBS Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf. The
order authorized both the Royal Bank of Scotland and a joint venture called RBS Sempra Commodities that the
Royal Bank of Scotland had formed with Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company, to enter into tolling agreements.
324
Some power plants have also entered into Volumetric Production Payment (VPP)
agreements with financial holding companies. VPP agreements typically require the financial
holding company to provide upfront financing to the power plant for the purchase of fuel, in
exchange for a designated share of the electricity produced when production
occurs.
2095
According to J PMorgan, VPP agreements are usually between three and seven years
in length, and typically give the financial holding company the right to receive title to the
fuel.
2096
VPP transactions can be viewed as short term loans using electricity production as
security for the loan.
Financial holding companies involved with power plants typically use tolling agreements
or VPP agreements to obtain and sell electricity on the physical markets.
Power Plant Incidents. Power plants, like other industrial worksites, are subject to a
variety of operational and catastrophic event risks. They include mechanical and electrical
failure of equipment, fires associated with lack of maintenance, insufficient training of key
individuals, and the use of substandard material.
2097
Since power plants vary in size, location,
fuel source, age, and design, their risks are particular to the specific plant involved.
One of the worst power plant incidents in recent years involved the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) Kingston Fossil Plant in Tennessee. The coal-fueled Kingston Plant was built
in the 1950s, to supply the nearby Oak Ridge atomic energy installations with electricity.
2098
On
December 22, 2008, the walls of a containment dike holding coal ash gave way, suddenly
releasing 5.4 million cubic yards of material into the surrounding area,
2099
enough to fill three
football stadiums.
2100
Within an hour, approximately 300 acres were affected, as the fast moving
ash destroyed homes and altered the natural landscape.
2101
Fortunately, no fatalities resulted.
TVA has reportedly spent approximately $1.1 billion on cleanup costs, fines, and legal fees
associated with the spill, with cleanup work scheduled to continue well into 2015.
2102
To cover
2095
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan Chase legal counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase
Application for Complementary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 221, at 037.
2096
Id.
2097
See, e.g., “Keeping power plants online with risk management,” Utility Week, Paul Newton (3/2/2011),http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/K...ine-with-risk-management/795972#.VBb9_2ORKUw.
2098
See “Executive Summary for Root Cause Analysis of Kingston Dredge Cell Failure,” TVA website (6/26/2009) ,
at 1,http://www.tva.gov/kingston/rca/FINAL-062609_Executive_Summary-REV3.pdf.
2099
Id.
2100
“The Spill: What happened and why?” educational video on TVA website,http://www.tva.gov/kingston/education/index.htm.
2101
See “Executive Summary for Root Cause Analysis of Kingston Dredge Cell Failure,” TVA website (6/26/2009),
at 1,http://www.tva.gov/kingston/rca/FINAL-062609_Executive_Summary-REV3.pdf; “Ash Slide at TVA
Kingston Fossil Plant,” Tennessee Department of Environment & Conservation,http://tn.gov/environment/kingston/.
2102
“TVA deserves credit for coal-ash spill cleanup efforts,” Knoxville News Sentinel, editorial, (7/2/2013),http://www.knoxnews.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-tva-deserves-credit-for-coal-ash-spill. See also “Coal Ash
Spill Cleanup Could Cost $825 Million,” NBC News, (2/12/2009),http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29166267/ns/us_news-environment/t/coal-ash-spill-cleanup-could-cost-
million/#.VDRTTaPD9aQ.
325
the costs, TVA imposed a surcharge on customer electricity bills, projected to continue until
2024.
2103
Another major power plant incident occurred at the Kleen Energy Systems power station
in Middletown, Connecticut, which experienced a major explosion during the construction of the
plant in February 2010. The blast killed five and injured dozens, and tremors with earthquake
force could be felt across much of the state.
2104
Early estimates from property damage and
business interruption alone put the losses at $150 million, which did not include liabilities
resulting from death and injuries due to the accident.
2105
Other events, such as power plant fires, are more common. Earlier this year, for example,
a four-alarm fire at a power plant in Colorado Springs, Colorado substantially damaged the plant,
injured one worker, caused a brief power loss for 22,000 customers, and closed the plant.
2106
The
fire chief predicted that the plant would be “inoperable for some time,” and utilities officials
indicated that the plant would have to purchase replacement power from other sources at a higher
cost.
2107
The plant had previously experienced another fire in 2002.
Regulatory Framework. Electrical power plants are subject to regulation by multiple
agencies at the federal, regional, and state levels. The primary federal regulator is the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which oversees interstate wholesale electricity rates,
the reliability of the electrical grid, and the stability of energy markets in the United States.
2108
Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs), formed at
the regional or state level, also have key oversight responsibility for power plant facilities and
electricity rates.
2109
Their responsibilities include tariff administration, monitoring of wholesale
electricity markets, and management of the transmission system.
2110
(2) JPMorgan Involvement with Power Plants
Over the course of three years, from 2008 to 2010, J PMorgan acquired 31 power plants
across the country. J PMorgan has valued its power plant tolling agreements at more than $2
billion,
2111
with related capacity payments worth $1.2 billion.
2112
At the time of acquisition,
2103
“TVA deserves credit for coal-ash spill cleanup efforts,” Knoxville News Sentinel editorial, (7/2/2013),http://www.knoxnews.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-tva-deserves-credit-for-coal-ash-spill.
2104
See, e.g., “5 Dead, Dozens Hurt in Connecticut Power Plant Blast,” New York Times, Robert D. McFadden
(2/7/2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/nyregion/08explode.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2105 “Munich Re leads coverage on Kleen Energy Explosion” Business Insurance, Michael Bradford And Zack
Phillips (2/14/2010),http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100214/ISSUE01/302149988.
2106
“Drake Power Plant fire will be costly; hard to say how much,” The Gazette (5/6/2014),http://gazette.com/drake-power-plant-fire-will-be-costly-hard-to-say-how-much/article/1519474.
2107
Id.
2108
Subcommittee briefing by FERC (7/30/2013); 7/29/2014 testimony of FERC Acting Chairman Cheryl A.
LaFleur before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, “FERC
Perspective: Questions Concerning EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan and other Grid Reliability Challenges,”http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20140729091732-LaFleur-07-29-2014.pdf.
2109
“Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 60 - 62,http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
2110
Id. at 63 - 65.
2111
See, e.g., 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301383 -396, at
387.
326
J PMorgan did not have authority to enter into a tolling agreement with a power plant, much less
own one, and petitioned the Federal Reserve for broad authority to conduct power plant
activities. The Federal Reserve eventually authorized J PMorgan to enter into tolling agreements,
energy management contracts, and long-term supply contracts with power plants, but declined to
authorize J PMorgan to take direct ownership of a commercial power plant, as an impermissible
mixing of banking and commerce. J PMorgan responded by asserting that it would retain its
direct ownership of three power plants through its merchant banking authority. J PMorgan also
entered into a number of regulatory battles with state and federal regulators over its power plant
activities. Among other penalties, J PMorgan was barred from bidding in the California
wholesale electricity market for six months in 2013, and, in J uly 2013, paid $410 million to settle
charges that it had manipulated wholesale electricity prices in California and Michigan. That
same year, J PMorgan was ordered by FERC to stop blocking plant modifications to improve grid
reliability. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee it has now determined to exit the power plant
business, but will need four more years to do so.
(a) Acquiring Power Plants
J PMorgan acquired control of 31 power plants over a two-year period from 2008 to 2010.
In most instances, it acquired a tolling agreement to purchase the plant’s electricity output; in
some cases, it acquired a direct ownership interest in the power plant. It acquired the power
plants in three phases, in transactions involving Bear Stearns, AES, and RBS Sempra.
2008 Bear Stearns Acquisition. J PMorgan first entered the power plant business in
2008, when at the request of the Federal Reserve, it purchased The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.
which was then under financial distress.
2113
As part of that acquisition, J PMorgan acquired Bear
Energy LP which owned or held tolling agreements with 27 power plants across the country.
2114
Bear Energy, formed in 2006, was located in Houston.
2115
By 2008, it was engaged in a
wide range of physical and financial energy-related commodity activities. They included energy
and electricity trading, power plant management, and power plant restructuring services. It held
ownership interests in or tolling agreements with over two dozen power plants.
2116
The
acquisition of Bear Energy gave J PMorgan a significant presence in the power plant business.
Of the 27 power plants that Bear Energy transferred to J PMorgan in May 2008, 16 were
located in California.
2117
Three were located in Colorado, and one each in Alabama, Florida,
2112
See 9/30/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, chart at J PM-COMM-PSI-000048.
2113
See 11/4/2009 memorandum, “Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by J PMC Ventures Energy
Corporation, FRB-PSI-200611 - 632, at 627; 8/2/2013 Federal Reserve press release, “Bear Stearns, J PMorgan
Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,”http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm.
2114
See undated 2014 J PMorgan chart, “Power Plants Owned or Controlled via Tolling Agreements, 2008 to
present,” (hereinafter, “J PMorgan Power Plants Chart”), J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
2115
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (2/11/2014). See also “Bear Stearns's Trading Unit Draws Interest,” Wall
Street J ournal, Ann Davis (4/5/2008),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB120735754695191559.
2116
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (2/11/2014); 7/17/2008 “Quarterly review of risk, performance and
significant developments,” prepared by OCC regarding J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-303773 - 780, at 777 (listing Bear
power plant assets acquired by J PMorgan) [sealed exhibit].
2117
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
327
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New J ersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
2118
One was a coal-fired
plant; the rest were fueled by natural gas.
2119
According to the head of Bear Energy, Paul Posoli,
who was hired by J PMorgan to continue to run the Houston operation: “At the time of the
merger, Bear Energy was managing over 9,000MW [megawatts] of generation … and [had] a
very established national presence.”
2120
J PMorgan usedits key commodities subsidiary, J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy
Corporation (J PMVEC), to conduct its power plant business.
2121
Of the 27 power plants
transferred from Bear Energy, J PMVEC assumed tolling agreements for 17. J PMVEC also took
a direct ownership interest in eight power plants. Of those eight, it took a 100% ownership
interest in two power plants in Colorado; a 50% ownership share in another Colorado power
plant; a 30% ownership share in three power plants in California; a 14% ownership share in one
power plant in Texas; and a 1% ownership share in a power plant in Maine.
2122
In addition, in
one instance involving a power plant in California, rather than take an ownership interest or
tolling agreement, J PMorgan simply assumed a lease for the plant.
2123
Finally, through its Global
Commodities Group Principal Investments unit, J PMorgan took a 100% ownership stake in one
power plant in Florida, Central Power & Lime.
2124
Ownership was held through a subsidiary of
J PMVEC.
2125
To conduct its new power plant activities, J PMorgan retained the head of Bear
Energy and many of its employees in a new J PMorgan “Houston Energy” office.
2126
2010 Huntington Acquisitions. Almost two years later, J PMorgan acquired short-term
tolling agreements on the electricity output of two more Southern California power plants,
Huntington Beach 3 and 4.
2127
J PMorgan entered into the new tolling agreements with AES
Corporation, the owner of the plants.
2128
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it entered into the
tolling agreements, in part, because it had already acquired tolling agreements with the two sister
power plants on the same site, Huntington Beach 1 and 2, through the 2008 Bear Stearns
2118
Id.
2119
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2120
“J P Morgan's integration of Bear Energy,” Risk.net (1/13/2009),http://www.risk.net/energy-
risk/feature/1523435/jp-morgan-integration-bear-energy.
2121
See, e.g., 12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase &
Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” (hereinafter “J PM Notice
Requesting Tolling Agreements”), prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033, at 014, footnote 2;
9/10/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001- 013, at 008.
2122
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
2123
Id. at 025; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014). The lease expired in J une 2010, and J PMorgan
terminated its relationship with the power plant at that time.
2124
See J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000025; 10/2009 “Global Commodities Deep Dive Risk
Review,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200634 - 655, at 644 (identifying Central Power as a 100% owned
equity asset in a list of assets in the “Global Commodities Principal Investments Portfolio”); Subcommittee briefing
by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2125
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 -008, at 002.
2126
See, e.g., 7/17/2008 “Quarterly review of risk, performance and significant developments,” prepared by OCC
regarding J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-303773 - 780, at 777.
2127
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000022; In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding
Strategies, Docket Nos. IN11-8-000 and IN13-5-000, FERC “Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement
(7/30/2013), at 4, ¶19, and “Stipulation and Consent Agreement” (7/30/2014) at 3, ¶8, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068;
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2128
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan legal counsel (10/29/2014).
328
acquisition.
2129
J PMorgan stipulated in legal pleadings with FERC that it entered into the tolling
agreements for the two plants “to develop experience with the California market before the AES
4000 plants [the California power plants J PMorgan had previously acquired from Bear Stearns]
began returning to J PMVEC’s control in J anuary 2011.”
2130
J PMVEC assumed control of the
Huntington Beach 3 and 4 tolling agreements in J anuary 2010. Those tolling agreements
increased J PMorgan’s portfolio to 29 power plants.
2010 RBS/Sempra Acquisition. Six months later, in J uly 2010, J PMorgan expanded its
power plant activities yet again when it purchased energy-related commodity assets from RBS
Sempra, a joint venture between the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS) and Sempra Energy,
for $1.7 billion.
2131
Along with other assets, it acquired two more power plants, one in
Washington state and one in Maryland.
2132
Both were fueled with natural gas.
2133
J PMVEC
assumed a tolling agreement with the plant in Washington.
2134
In contrast, through its Global
Commodities Group Principal Investments unit, J PMorgan took direct ownership of the Panda
Brandywine plant in Maryland, acquiring a 100% ownership stake. J PMorgan held ownership
through its subsidiary, J PMVEC.
2135
J PMorgan then leased the plant back to the owners who
agreed to run it, and entered into a tolling agreement to acquire 100% of the plant’s electricity
output.
2136
This complex arrangement raised a number of issues over time.
Two months later, in September 2010, separate from the RBS Sempra transaction,
J PMorgan acquired 100% of the shares of the Kinder J ackson power plant in J ackson, Michigan,
becoming a direct owner of the plant.
2137
J PMorgan already had a tolling agreement with the
plant, which it acquired in 2008, as part of the Bear Stearns acquisition. In 2010, when the plant
was put up for sale, J PMorgan’s Global Commodities Group Principal Investments unit arranged
for the outright purchase of the power plant from Kinder Morgan Power Company and others for
about $143 million.
2138
Ownership of the plant was held through a subsidiary of J PMVEC.
2139
Generally, when J PMorgan entered into a tolling agreement with a power plant, it
promised, not just to buy the electricity produced, but also to supply natural gas to the plant for
the duration of the tolling agreement.
2140
In addition, J PMorgan entered into specific long-term
fuel supply agreements with three power plants acquired from Bear Stearns.
2141
2129
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014). See also J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-
000024.
2130
In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, Docket Nos. IN11-8-000 and IN13-5-000,
“Stipulation and Consent Agreement” (7/30/2013), at 3, ¶8, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068.
2131
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (2/11/2014).
2132
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022, 025; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2133
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2134
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000022.
2135
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 -008, at 002.
2136
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2137
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000025.
2138
See 8/13/2010 memorandum, “KJ Toll Disposition Plan,” prepared by J PMorgan Commodity Principal
Investment Team for the Commodities Principal Investment Committee, FRB-PSI-300066 - 093, at 066.
2139
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 -008, at 002.
2140
Id.
2141
Id.
329
Inadequate Oversight. About a year after J PMorgan assumed control of the Houston
office that formerly belonged to Bear Energy and which J PMorgan was using to oversee its
power plant assets, the Federal Reserve conducted an examination to “gain a better
understanding of the firm’s physical energy trading activities and the processes in place to
control and manage risks.”
2142
The examination tested, in part, whether J PMorgan had
adequately extended its “corporate compliance program” to include the new Houston office.
2143
The Federal Reserve concluded it had not.
2144
A 2010 internal Federal Reserve examination
document also noted that J PMorgan’s own internal audit team had found that J PMVEC did not
have the technical capability to evaluate its power plants’ compliance with “technical,
operational and engineering suitability standards”:
“For power plants in which J PMVEC has an equity interests, internal audit indicated that
it does not have the technical, operations or engineering capability to review the
compliance programs of such power plants.”
2145
In response to the Federal Reserve’s supervisory letter raising the issue, J PMorgan formulated a
plan to strengthen its compliance oversight of the Houston office and its supervision of
J PMVEC’s power plants.
2146
31 Power Plants. The following chart summarizes J PMorgan’s two-year acquisition
effort which, by 2010, produced its portfolio of 31 power plants.
2142
1/5/2010 report, “Combined Scope/Product Memo[:] J PMC Energy Ventures Corporation Corporate
Compliance,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300210 - 220, at 212 [sealed exhibit].
2143
Id.
2144
See 1/28/2010 supervisory letter from Federal Reserve Bank of New York to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300332 - 334
[sealed exhibit].
2145
1/5/2010 report, “Combined Scope/Product Memo[:] J PMC Energy Ventures Corporation Corporate
Compliance,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300210 - 220, at 217 [sealed exhibit].
2146
3/15/2010 letter from J PMorgan to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PMorgan Chase & Co. Houston
Energy,” FRB-PSI-301163 - 168.
330
Power Plant
Location
MW
Capacity
Fuel
Date JPM
Assumed
Control JPM Entity
Owned or
Tolled by
JPM
Percentage
of JPM
ownership Current Status
OLS Camarillo Camarillo, California 29 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 30% Sold
OLS Chino Chino, California 29 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 30% Sold
Carson
Cogeneration
Carson, California 49 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition} J PMVEC Owned 33% Sold
Grays Harbor Satsop, Washington
480 (Summer)
520 (Winter)
Gas
12/1/2010
(RBS/Sempra
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Terminated
Greeley Cogen Greeley, Colorado 32 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 100% Sold
Thermo Cogen Ft. Lupton, Colorado 272 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 100% Sold
Brush
Cogeneration
Brush, Colorado 70 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisit10n) J PMVEC Owned 50% Sold
Gregory Power
Partners
Gregory, Texas 345 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 14% Sold
Evangeline (Cleco)
Evangeline,
Louisiana
758 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Terminated
Ironwood
South Lebanon,
Pennsylvania
664 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Sold
Red Oak
Sayreville, New
J ersey
764 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Sold
Rumford Cogen Rumford, Maine 85 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 1% Sold
Mojave
Cogeneration
Boron, California 55 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Leased 100%
Lease Not
Renewed
Alamitos 1
Long Beach,
California
184 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 2
Long Beach,
California
184 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 3
Long Beach,
California
336 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Power Plants Owned or Controlled Via Tolling
Agreements by JPMorgan Since 2008
331
Alamitos 4
Long Beach,
California
336 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 5
Long Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 6
Long Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Huntington Beach
1
Huntington Beach,
California
225.8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Huntington Beach
2
Huntington Beach,
California
225 .8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Huntington Beach
3
Huntington Beach,
California
225
Gas
l/1/2010
(AES Contract)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A Taken Offline
Huntington Beach
4
Huntington Beach.
California
227
Gas
l/1/2010
(AES Contract)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A Taken Offline
Redondo Beach 5
Redondo Beach,
California
183.8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Redondo Beach 6
Redondo Beach,
California
183.8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Redondo Beach 7
Redondo Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Redondo Beach 8
Redondo Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Lindsay Hill
(Tennaska)
Billingsley, Alabama 844 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Sold to Mercuria
Kinder J ackson J ackson, Michigan 545 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 100%
Expected sale in
2016
Central Power &
Lime
Brooksville, Florida 60 Biomass
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Owned 100%
Operated by
Florida Power &
Development
Panda Brandywine
Brandywine,
Maryland
230
Gas
Oil
12/1/2010
(RBS/Sempra
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Owned 100%
J PM energy
mngmt contract;
3d party operator
Source: J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022-025
332
(b) Requesting Broad Authority for Power Plant Activities
J PMorgan got into the power plant business as a result of the larger Bear Stearns acquisition
during the financial crisis. At that time, J PMorgan did not have authority to conduct power plant
activities, but the Federal Reserve Bank of New York gave J PMorgan a two-year grace period to
decide how to handle the Bear Stearns assets. A little over a year after it acquired the power plants,
J PMorgan asked the Federal Reserve for broad complementary authority to own and manage them.
While the Federal Reserve agreed to provide J PMorgan with complementary authority to enter into
tolling agreements, energy management, and long-term supply contracts with the power plants, the
Federal Reserve declined to allow J PMorgan simply to buy power plants outright or engage in so-
called “financial restructuring” of power plants it owned. J PMorgan responded in part by asserting
that it would nevertheless retain direct ownership of three power plants by treating them as merchant
banking investments. After the Federal Reserve expressed increasing concern about its power plant
activities and J PMorgan entered into multiple regulatory disputes over how it was conducting those
activities, J PMorgan decided to exit the business over the next four years.
Two-Year Grace Period. Prior to acquiring the Bear Energy power plants in 2008,
J PMorgan had never engaged in power plant activities, and never sought complementary authority to
enter into a tolling agreement or other contract with a power plant. J PMorgan’s 2005 complementary
order did not explicitly address either power plants or electricity. As part of the Bear Stearns
transaction, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York gave J PMorgan a letter stating that “any assets or
activities acquired from Bear Stearns that J PMorgan is not currently permitted to own or engage in
shall be treated as permissible assets or activities for a period of two years.”
2147
That two-year grace
period applied to the 27 power plants acquired from Bear Stearns, deeming them “permissible”
assets. J PMorgan conducted power plant activities involving the Bear Stearns power plants
throughout the two-year grace period, which extended from March 2008 to March 2010, while it
sought an official grant of complementary authority to cover its power plant assets.
About two weeks after the Bear Stearns transaction in March 2008, the Federal Reserve
issued the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) a complementary order that provided broader authority for
physical commodity activities than prior complementary orders and, for the first time, explicitly
authorized activities involving power plants and electricity.
2148
Specifically, the RBS order allowed
RBS to enter into tolling agreements with power plant owners, energy management contracts with
power generation facilities, and long-term electricity supply contracts with large industrial and
commercial customers.
2149
Request for Tolling and Energy Management Authority. On December 30, 2009,
J PMorgan submitted two separate applications to the Federal Reserve to expand its 2005
complementary authority to match the authority provided to RBS for power plants and electricity.
2147
3/16/2008 letter from FRBNY to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-17-000003-05 at 04. See also 10/21/2014 letter from
J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003. During that two-year grace period,
J PMorgan sometimes referred to the power plants and related activities as “grandfathered activities,” but that was a
reference to their being allowed under the grace period; the assets were never held under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
grandfather clause since J PMorgan was ineligible to rely on that statutory authority for its physical commodity activities.
2148
See RBS Order, at C60. The order applied to both the Royal Bank of Scotland and a joint venture called RBS Sempra
Commodities that the Royal Bank of Scotland had formed with Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company.
2149
Id.
333
The first application requested complementary authority to enter into tolling agreements with
power plant owners.
2150
In its application, J PMorgan provided the following expansive definition of
the authority it was seeking, explaining that tolling agreements:
“may involve, among other things, purchasing fuel used to produce electricity, entering into
agreements for the transportation of fuel, entering into options to purchase electricity, taking
title to electricity and entering into agreements for the transmission and sale of electricity.”
2151
J PMorgan wrote that one reason the Federal Reserve should grant the authority was that it would
provide J PMorgan with access to “important market information”:
“The Complementary Activities will further complement the Existing Business by providing
J PMVEC [J PMorgan’s subsidiary] with important market information. The ability to be
involved in the supply end of the commodities markets through tolling agreements provides
access to information regarding the full array of actual producer and end-user activity in those
markets. The information gathered through this increased participation will help improve
J PMVEC’s understanding of market conditions and trends while supplying vital price and risk
management information that J PMVEC can use to improve its financial commodities
derivative offerings. …
y participating in the widest possible variety of commodities markets and transactions,
J PMVEC will gain access to price and related market information and acquire more
experience in the markets for physical commodities that it can use to better serve its
customers and manage its own risks, which will lead to increased revenues and lower costs,
all of which will improve J PMVEC’s and J PM Chase’s profits and enhance their
soundness.”
2152
J PMorgan offered to accept the same limitations on the new authority as appeared in the RBS
order. The key limitation was that J PMorgan would continue to limit the aggregate market value of
all of its physical commodities resulting from physical commodity trading to no more than 5% of its
Tier 1 capital, and that when calculating that aggregate value, it would include the present value of all
capacity payments made in connection with any energy tolling agreement.
2153
The second application requested complementary authority to enter into “energy
management” agreements with power generators.
2154
In its application, J PMorgan provided a broader
definition of energy management contracts than appeared in the RBS order.
2155
J PMorgan wrote:
2150
J PM Notice Requesting Tolling Agreements,
PSI-FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033. See also In Re Make-Whole
Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, FERC Docket Nos. IN11-8-000 and IN13-5-000, FERC “Order Approving
Stipulation and Consent Agreement (7/30/2013), 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, (hereinafter “Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement”) at 2,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130730080931-IN11-8-000.pdf.
2151
J PM Notice of Tolling Agreements, at 013.
2152
Id. at 019 - 020, 032.
2153
Id. at 032 - 033.
2154
12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to
Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000561 -
567.
2155
The RBS order described the approved energy management contracts as follows:
334
“Under an EMA [energy management agreement], energy traders, schedulers, and related
support personnel provide asset optimization services and accounting services to a power
plant owner. The energy trader will provide market information and recommend hedging
strategies, including capacity and transmission management services and advice regarding
switching between fuel inputs. Energy traders and schedulers assist the plant owner with the
acquisition and delivery of fuel inputs to the plant. In addition, the energy trader will provide
interface services for the power plant owners with independent system operators
(‘ISOs’)/regional transmission organizations (‘RTOs’) and will schedule plant output to
ISOs/RTOs and other power purchasers based on energy prices in the open market. … An
energy trader may also provide credit intermediation services to the power plant owner with
respect to the owner’s counterparties. For example, in connection with such credit services,
the energy trader might post collateral to an ISO or RTO on behalf of a plant owner as part of
a credit arrangement to ensure delivery …. The energy trader, in turn, will collect money
from the ISO or RTO and those funds will be available to the energy trader as a part of the
plant owner’s collateral arrangement with the energy trader.”
2156
J PMorgan offered to accept several limitations on the new energy management authority, modeled
after the RBS order. The first was to ensure that “revenues attributable to J PMVEC’s Energy
Management Services will not exceed 5 percent of J PM Chase’s total consolidated operating
revenues.”
2157
That 5% limit is substantially higher than the cap normally included in complementary
orders limiting the market value of physical commodity holdings to no more than 5% of tier 1 capital,
but it was the same limit as provided to RBS.
Request for One-Year Extension. About a month later, on February 5, 2010, in the absence
of a Federal Reserve ruling on its December 2009 applications, J PMorgan sent a letter to the Federal
Reserve asking for a one-year extension of the Bear Stearns grace period so that it could continue to
engage in “energy tolling, energy management and the purchase and financial restructuring of power
plants,” that would otherwise be impermissible activities.
2158
The request, which was eventually
granted, enabled J PMorgan to continue its power plant activities until March 2011. In the meantime,
it acquired additional power plant assets in J anuary and J uly 2010, as described above.
Request for Abrogation of Volume Limits. In addition to requesting a one-year extension
of the grace period, the February 2010 letter made several other requests to expand J PMorgan’s
power plant activities as well as its other physical commodity activities as a whole. First, the letter
asked the Federal Reserve essentially to eliminate any limit on J PMorgan’s complementary physical
“[T]he energy manager provides transactional and advisory services to power plant owners. The transactional
services consist of SET [Sempra Energy Trading Corporation] acting as a financial intermediary, substituting its
credit and liquidity for those of the owner to facilitate the owner’s purchase of fuel and sale of power. SET’s
advisory services include providing market information to assist the owner in developing and refining a risk-
management plan for the plant. SET also provides a variety of administrative services to support these
transactions.”
RBS Order, at 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C65.
2156
12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to
Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” (hereinafter “J PM Notice to Provide Energy
Management”), prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000559 - 567, at 564 - 565.
2157
Id. at 566.
2158
2/5/2010 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300286 - 290, at 286.
335
commodity activities, including the cap linked to 5% of its tier 1 capital.
2159
The letter asserted that
the 5% cap might “curtail not only its tolling activities but also its other physical trading activities
going forward,” putting J PMorgan at a competitive disadvantage.
2160
The letter also objected to the
much higher limit on its energy management services of 5% of its total consolidated operating
revenues, contending “such limitations are not necessary from a safety and soundness perspective
since the main components of this activity involve activities similar to those already conducted by
J PMC.”
2161
The letter proposed allowing its physical commodity activities to proceed without any
volume limit, “pursuant to robust risk management processes subject to regulatory examination.”
2162
Request for Restructuring Authority. In addition to requesting elimination of all volume
limits, the February 5 letter asked the Federal Reserve to allow it to continue to engage in another
power plant activity which it called “financial restructuring.”
2163
The letter described the activity as
“purchasing equity interests in power plants and subsequently restructuring and renegotiating the
power plant’s commodity purchase agreements and energy sale agreements with a view to making
the plant more efficient.”
2164
The letter explained that the new activity was “a natural outgrowth of
the energy management activities” and used the same expertise to restructure “the input and output
contracts entered into by power plants.”
2165
J PMorgan wrote:
“[T]his activity involves investing for a financial return in a way that allows J PMC to gain
valuable insight into the power market which can enhance J PMC’s overall commodities
business. … J PMC conducts this activity as a component of its overall commodities trading
and client business. J PMC’s goal is to augment its financial trading and not run the operation
of the plant as a commercial venture in a vacuum. As such, J PMC views this activity as
complementary to J PMC’s core commodities business.”
2166
The letter also indicated that J PMorgan might need to take ownership of power plants while
the restructuring was going on, with a view toward selling the plants one to two years later. It
explained that “ubjecting this activity to merchant banking restrictions may not be feasible unless
broad authority to renegotiate and act as counterparty to contracts with the plant is determined not to
constitute day to day management of the plant.”
2167
In response to the letter, the Federal Reserve granted the one year extension, allowing
J PMorgan to continue to treat its power plant activities as permissible activities, including
restructuring activities, until March 16, 2011, while it considered the other requests for expanded
authority to conduct power plant and other physical commodity activities.
2168
New Complementary Authority. On J une 30, 2010, 18 months after J PMorgan submitted
its applications and more than two years after it initiated its power plant activities, the Federal
2159
Id. at 287.
2160
Id.
2161
Id.
2162
Id.
2163
Id. at 288 – 289.
2164
Id. at 288.
2165
Id.
2166
Id.
2167
Id. at 289.
2168
See 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed
exhibit]; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
336
Reserve granted some, but not all, of the new authority J PMorgan had sought.
2169
By letter, the
Federal Reserve authorized J PMorgan to enter into tolling agreements and energy management
contracts with power plant owners.
2170
The letter also “confirmed” J PMorgan’s complementary
authority to enter into long-term electricity supply contracts, but “only with large commercial and
industrial end-users.”
2171
The Federal Reserve letter reasoned that the restriction to large customers
would ensure J PMorgan transacted with financially sophisticated purchasers and remained a
wholesale intermediary.
2172
The letter also imposed a number of restrictions on the authorities it
granted to ensure J PMorgan conducted its power plant activities in a safe and sound manner. The
restrictions included limiting its tolling payments to not more than 5% of J PMorgan’s tier 1 capital,
and limiting its energy management contract revenues to not more than 5% of J PMorgan’s total
consolidated operating revenues.
2173
By allowing J PMorgan to hold tolling agreements, energy management contracts, and long
term supply contracts with the power plants acquired from Bear Energy, the J une 30 letter made the
vast majority of its power plant activities permissible. In the case of three power plants that
J PMorgan owned outright, however, the Central Power & Lime plant in Florida, Panda Brandywine
plant in Maryland, and Kinder J ackson plant in Michigan, the new complementary order did not
authorize their direct ownership as either a financial or complementary activity. In addition, the
Federal Reserve did not provide any restructuring authority, because according to the Federal
Reserve, J PMorgan never submitted a formal application requesting it.
2174
According to J PMorgan,
the Federal Reserve did not want J PMorgan managing power plants, which the restructuring authority
would have necessitated, so it dropped the effort.
2175
Switch to Merchant Banking Authority. On February 23, 2011, J PMorgan notified the
Federal Reserve that, rather than rely on complementary authority for the three power plants it owned
outright, J PMorgan intended to assert merchant banking authority to continue owning them.
2176
A
March 2011 internal Federal Reserve examination document stated that J PMorgan had taken the new
stance, “because they believe [the Federal Reserve Board of Governors] staff is not inclined to
consider financial restructuring of power plants to be a complementary activity.”
2177
This document
suggests that J PMorgan’s assertion of merchant banking authority was a direct response to, as well as
an effort to circumvent, the Federal Reserve’s decision not to permit direct ownership of power plants
as a complementary activity. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that its assertion of merchant banking
2169
6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580.
2170
Id.
2171
Id. at 575. The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that J PMorgan did not formally request authority to enter into
long-term electricity supply contracts, because it viewed its 2005 complementary order as already providing it; the
Federal Reserve explained that the J une 30 letter clarified that J PMorgan did have that authority. Subcommittee briefing
by the Federal Reserve (10/16/2014).
2172
6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, at FRB-PSI-302574 - 575.
2173
Id. at 573.
2174
11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee,
PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002.
2175
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2176
See 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604 [sealed exhibit].
See also undated document, prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300352 - 353 (describing how
J PMorgan planned to move from engaging in plant restructuring to merchant banking with respect to the affected power
plants); Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/14).
2177
3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed
exhibit].
337
authority was permissible, because it was not running any of the three power plants directly, but was
relying on third parties to operate them.
2178
After noting J PMorgan’s revised justification for its ongoing direct ownership of the power
plants, the 2011 Federal Reserve examination document noted that J PMorgan had indicated that it
intended to divest itself of all three power plants.
2179
As of 2014, however, more than three years
after making that representation to the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan still retains possession of all three.
Of those three plants, J PMorgan acquired its ownership interest in the Central Power & Lime
plant in Florida in 2008, as part of the Bear Energy acquisition.
2180
In the case of the Panda
Brandywine plant in Maryland, J PMorgan acquired its shares as part of the RBS Sempra acquisition
in J uly 2010, leased the plant back to the same owners to run, and then entered into a tolling
agreement with the leaseholders.
2181
With respect to the Kinder J ackson plant in Michigan, J PMorgan
originally held a tolling agreement with the plant, but when it became available for sale in September
2010, J PMorgan purchased it outright from the owners.
2182
J PMorgan took each of these actions
without having authority to take direct ownership of a commercial enterprise like a power plant; it
bought the latter two plants while awaiting a response to its request for appropriate complementary
authority. Its ownership of the three power plants has now extended from four to six years.
A Federal Reserve examination document expressed frustration with J PMorgan’s stance. It
stated: “J PM has pressed on the boundaries of permissible activities including integrating merchant
banking investments into trading activities and pursuing activity that may appear ‘commercial in
nature,’ as well as pushed regulatory limits and their interpretation.”
2183
With respect to J PMorgan’s
power plant activities, it stated:
“J PMC holds power plants (Panda Brandywine and Kinder Morgan/J ackson) under a
combination of authorities. FRB has previously indicated to the firm this is impermissible
and is [in] discussion with the firm about conforming or divesting of these activities.”
2184
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee, and the Federal Reserve confirmed, that the Federal
Reserve has never explicitly determined that J PMorgan lacked merchant banking authority to own the
three power plants.
2185
J PMorgan explained that, prior to the Federal Reserve making that
determination, J PMorgan informed the Federal Reserve that it was planning on selling all of its
power plant holdings, which rendered the issue moot. As of October 2014, J PMorgan still has not
completely divested itself of its ownership interests in the three power plants.
2178
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014 and 10/10/2014).
2179
3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed
exhibit];
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2180
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000025.
2181
Id.
2182
8/13/2010 memorandum, “KJ Toll Disposition Plan,” prepared by J PMorgan Commodity Principal Investment Team
for the J PMorgan Commodities Principal Investment Committee , FRB-PSI-300066 - 093.
2183
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 examination document, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at
J PM,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 299 [sealed exhibit].
2184
Id. at 301.
2185
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014); email from the Federal Reserve to the Subcommittee (11/6/2014).
338
(c) Conducting Power Plant Activities
For six years, from 2008 to 2014, J PMorgan owned or controlled between 15 and 31 power
plants across the country. In most cases, it held a long-term tolling agreement with the power plants.
To carry out those tolling agreements, in most cases J PMorgan supplied the natural gas that fueled
the plants and then took control of the plants’ electricity output and sold it. J PMorgan used its wholly
owned subsidiary, J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC), to execute the vast majority
of its electricity and natural gas trades supporting its power plant activities.
2186
A large block of J PMorgan’s power plants, 18 in all, were located in California. J PMorgan
has sold some of those plants and currently holds a tolling agreement for 12, all of which are owned
by AES Corporation (AES). The tolling agreement between J PMorgan and AES runs through 2018
at which time it will terminate.
2187
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it has re-tolled all 12 power
plants to Southern California Edison,
2188
and has asked the plant owner, AES, to release it from the
tolling agreement, but AES has declined, preferring to rely on J PMorgan’s creditworthiness to ensure
the tolling payments are made.
2189
For that reason, J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it expects
the tolling agreement to continue for the next four years until the termination date in 2018.
2190
Regulatory Disputes. During the six years it has had control of the California power plants,
J PMorgan has entered into multiple regulatory disputes with the California Independent System
Operation Corporation (CAISO), California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) over its power plant activities.
In one set of disputes, it battled state and federal regulators over the regulators’ assertion that
J PMorgan had made inaccurate statements and failed to provide requested information in an
investigation into the pricing practices at some of its California plants during 2010 and 2011.
2191
To
punish and deter that misconduct, FERC suspended for six months, from April to October 2013,
J PMorgan’s ability to sell electricity at market rates in California and elsewhere in the United States,
costing it potentially millions of dollars.
2192
In a related regulatory dispute, described more fully
below, in J uly 2013, J PMorgan paid $410 million to settle charges by FERC that some of its plants
used improper bidding tactics that manipulated California and the Midwest's wholesale electricity
2186
See, e.g.,
J PM Notice Requesting Tolling Agreements, PSI-FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033, at 014, 018-019, 026.
2187
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2188
Id. See also 2/15/2013 Advice Letter No. 2853-E (U 338-E), filed by Southern California Edison with the Public
Utilities Commission of the State of California, Energy Division, “Bilateral Capacity Sale and Tolling Agreement
Between Southern California Edison Company and BE CA LLC” (seeking Commission approval of J PMorgan’s re-
tolling agreements with Southern California Edison).
2189
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2190
Id.
2191
See, e.g., FERC v. J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, Civil Case No. 1:2012-MC-00352-DAR (USDC DC),
“Memorandum in Support for Petition by [FERC] for an Order to Show Cause Why this Court Should Not Enforce
Subpoenas for Production of Documents” (7/2/2012).
2192
See In re J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, FERC Docket No. EL12-103-000, “Order Suspending Market-
Based Rate Authority,” (11/14/2012), 141 FERC ¶ 61,131. See also “J PMorgan's California energy dealings draw more
fire,” Los Angeles Times, Marc Lifsher (11/16/2012),http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/16/business/la-fi-
jpmorganchase-power-20121116.
339
markets.
2193
J PMorgan’s improper bidding tactics also caused CAISO and CPUC to make numerous
rule and tariff changes to prevent similar practices in the future.
A third dispute involved an effort by CAISO to modify two power plants near Los Angeles,
Huntington Beach 3 and 4, to increase electrical grid reliability.
2194
CAISO had entered into a
contract with the owner of the plants, AES, to convert both plants into “synchronous condensers” that
provide voltage support to move electricity through the grid and increase grid reliability.
2195
That
contract was to take effect in J anuary 2013, but J PMorgan claimed that, due to certain tolling and
supplemental agreements it had with AES, CAISO had to obtain J PMorgan’s consent to the plant
modifications, which it declined to provide, even though both plants had been taken out of
service.
2196
J PMorgan cited construction costs, harm to the economic value of its power plant
investments, alternative solutions, and the unlikeliness of grid problems as reasons for not
proceeding.
2197
CAISO eventually brought the dispute to FERC, which ruled that J PMorgan could
not use its tolling agreement with AES to continue to block the proposed modifications to improve
grid reliability.
2198
In each of those three regulatory disputes, J PMorgan incurred substantial legal expense as
well as ill will from regulators, utilities, wholesalers, and the California public.
2199
Current Status. In addition to the 12 California power plants with which it has tolling
agreements and re-tolled to Southern California Edison, J PMorgan still owns power plants in
Michigan, Maryland, and Florida. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it has arranged for the sale
of the Kinder J ackson plant in Michigan, but the transaction cannot take place for another year, until
early 2016.
2200
J PMorgan indicated that the second plant, located in Florida, was converted by
J PMorgan from a coal-fired plant to a biomass facility, is being run by an unrelated third party, and
has been up for sale, but not yet sold. According to J PMorgan, the third plant, Panda Brandywine, is
located in Maryland, is run by a J PMorgan subsidiary, KMC Thermo, and is also up for sale.
2201
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it intends to exit the power plant business.
2202
Despite
that intent, J PMorgan expects to continue in the tolling agreement for the 12 California power plants
for the next four years, plants to hold the Michigan plant for another year, and is uncertain when it
will be able to sell the Florida and Maryland plants.
2193
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement; “J P Morgan to pay $410m in penalties for manipulating
electricity prices,” Associated Press (7/30/2013),http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/30/jpmorgan-ferc-
penalty-energy-prices.
2194
See In Re California Independent System Operator Corporation, FERC Docket No. EL13-21-000, FERC “Order on
Petition for Declaratory Order” (1/4/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,016. See also “J PMorgan reduces presence in California
power market, Reuters, Scott DiSavino (5/10/2013),http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-10/news/sns-rt-utilities-
jpmorganedisoninternational-update-20130510_1_aes-corp-southern-california-edison-ferc.
2195
See In Re California Independent System Operator Corporation, FERC Docket No. EL13-21-000, FERC “Order on
Petition for Declaratory Order” (1/4/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,016, at 1-3.
2196
Id. at 3-4.
2197
Id. at 10, 12.
2198
Id. at 20. J PMorgan appealed FERC’s decision, but later re-tolled its California power plants to Southern California
Edison, including its consent rights for the Huntington Beach power plants. It then dropped the litigation.
2199
See, e.g., “State’s power-plant fight with J PMorgan Chase is a legacy of deregulation mess,” Sacramento Bee, Dale
Kasler (12/10/2012),http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/10/176938/californias-power-plant-fight.html.
2200
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2201
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025, at 025.
2202
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
340
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Electricity
J PMorgan’s power plant activities raise multiple concerns. First and foremost are concerns
that J PMorgan used some of its power plants to engage in a manipulative scheme to receive excessive
payments for electricity from Independent Systems Operators in California and Michigan. Additional
issues include J PMorgan’s allocating insufficient capital and insurance to protect against catastrophic
event risks, and the Federal Reserve’s failure to impose adequate safeguards to prevent misconduct
and protect taxpayers.
(a) Manipulating Electricity Prices
The most important issue illustrated by J PMorgan’s power plant activities is how physical
commodity activities can involve a financial holding company in price and market manipulation
misconduct, leading to consumers paying excessive electricity charges, violations of law, penalties,
legal expenses, and reputational damage.
Overview of Price Manipulation. In J uly 2013, J PMorgan paid $410 million to settle
charges brought by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that it used multiple pricing
schemes to manipulate electricity payments to the power plants it controlled in California and
Michigan.
2203
J PMorgan admitted to an agreed set of facts, did not admit to violations of law, but
agreed to disgorge “unjust profits” and pay a multi-million-dollar fine.
2204
The manipulative bidding
practices that were the focus of the case were employed by J PMorgan’s subsidiary, J PMorgan
Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC). The misconduct involved power plants in California and
Michigan, from 2010 through 2012, in the electricity markets overseen by the California Independent
System Operator (CAISO) and by the Midwest (now Midcontinent) Independent System Operator
(MISO). The Enforcement staff of FERC found that between September 2010 and November 2012,
J PMVEC engaged in 12 types of improper bidding strategies.
2205
In the process, FERC determined
that J PMVEC violated the Commission’s “Anti-Manipulation Rule” and employed fraudulent
schemes that resulted in “a fraud on electricity market participants in CAISO and MISO.”
2206
FERC Enforcement alleged that J PMVEC exploited loopholes in the electricity pricing
regulations in California and Michigan, and engaged in manipulative trading schemes “to make
profits from power plants that were usually out of the money [i.e., unprofitable] in the marketplace.”
2203
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement; 7/30/3013 FERC press release, “FERC, J P Morgan Unit
Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-
3/07-30-13.asp#.VEAgZ6PD9aR. The FERC Consent Agreement followed a filed claim in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. FERC v. J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, Civil Case No. 1:2012-MC-00352-DAR
(USDC DC 2012), “Memorandum in Support for Petition by [FERC] for an Order to Show Cause Why this Court Should
Not Enforce Subpoenas for Production of Documents” (7/2/2012). See also “J P Morgan to Pay $410 million in U.S.
settlement” Bloomberg, Brian Wingfield and Dawn Kopecki (7/30/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-
30/jpmorgan-to-pay-410-million-in-u-s-ferc-settlement.html.
2204
FERC Consent Agreement, at 15-19.
2205
. 7/30/2013 FERC news release, “FERC, J PMorgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to
Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VC8CUKPD9aQ.
2206
Id.; FERC Consent Agreement at 13-14. See also FERC Anti-Manipulation Rule, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2012) (stating it
is unlawful to fraudulently manipulate the energy market).
341
FERC also alleged that J PMVEC’s bidding strategies were “designed to create artificial conditions
that forced the regulators to pay J PMVEC above the market at premium rates.”
2207
To turn its usually unprofitable power plants into profitable ones, J PMVEC traders submitted
electronic bids that were calculated to falsely appear to be attractive to the bidding software used by
California and Michigan electricity authorities, but were designed to result in above-market rate
payments. To initiate the bidding scheme, J PMVEC’s traders submitted bids that offered to sell
electricity at rates well below J PMVEC’s cost in generating the electricity, which meant the offers
usually lost money, if accepted. J PMVEC was willing to make those artificially low offers, which
were really nothing more than loss leaders, so that it could then participate in CAISO’s and MISO’s
“make-whole” payment mechanisms.
2208
Those mechanisms allow CAISO and MISO to compensate
generators at above-market prices to provide an incentive for plant owners to participate in the
bidding auctions and ensure grid reliability. J PMVEC used the make-whole payments in connection
with its bidding strategies to more than make up for the money it lost at market rates, frequently
receiving, in the end, twice its costs plus the same market payments that other market participants
received, without adding any grid reliability benefits.
2209
J PMVEC’s bidding schemes caused California and Michigan electricity authorities to pay
approximately $124 million in “excessive” payments to J PMorgan.
2210
When CAISO and MISO
officials realized what J PMVEC was doing, they objected and asked J PMVEC to stop. According to
FERC, J PMVEC continued creating new bidding schemes more than a year after it had been notified
it was under investigation – even as CAISO and MISO were re-writing the bidding rules to address
the prior schemes.
2211
For example, after CAISO shut down one bidding scheme in April 2011,
J PMorgan began two new schemes that led to another CAISO intervention in J une 2011 to halt them
as well.
2212
Power Plants Involved with the Bidding. J PMVEC used several power plants in its bidding
schemes. Most prominent were a set of power plants, located in California, which were owned by the
AES Corporation (AES) and were part of the Bear Energy acquisition in 2008.
2213
J PMVEC also
used the Kinder J ackson power plant in Michigan, another plant acquired through the 2008 Bear
Energy acquisition. In each case, J PMorgan, through its subsidiary, J PMVEC, had acquired Bear
Stearns’ long-term tolling agreement with the plant.
2214
The tolling agreements gave J PMVEC the
right to sell the plants’ electricity output and keep the profits from the sales.
2215
2207
7/30/2012 FERC news release, “FERC, J PMorgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to
Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VC8CUKPD9aQ.
2208
In the CAISO system, make-whole payments are called “Bid Cost Recovery” or “BCR” payments. MISO has several
different types of make-whole payments.
2209
FERC Consent Agreement, at 11-13.
2210
Id. at 15.
2211
Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, at 2, 5 (indicating that the FERC investigation began in August
2011, but that J PMVEC continued implementing new bidding strategies until November 2012).
2212
FERC Consent Agreement, at 10.
2213
Id. at 1.
2214
Id.
2215
Id.
342
When J PMVEC first acquired the tolling agreement involving the AES power plants in
California, all of the tolling rights had been subleased to Southern California Edison.
2216
Starting in
2011, as the subleased tolling agreements began to expire, J PMVEC began to re-gain control of the
plants. On J anuary 1, 2011, J PMVEC re-gained control of four power plants. By J anuary 1, 2012,
J PMVEC had re-gained control of six more.
2217
In addition, in a separate transaction in J anuary 2010,
J PMVEC acquired from the plant owner, AES, short-term tolling rights with two additional
California power plants, Huntington Beach 3 and 4, which J PMorgan took on to gain experience in
the California market.
2218
Development of Bidding Strategies. According to FERC, the bidding strategies at issue
were developed by J PMVEC personnel based in a J PMorgan office in Houston.
2219
The Houston
office was run by Francis Dunleavy, who reported directly to Blythe Masters, the head of J PMorgan’s
Global Commodities Group.
2220
At the time the bidding schemes were developed, J PMVEC’s
California and Michigan plants could not compete profitably with other electricity plants in the
CAISO and MISO markets.
2221
According to FERC, “[Blythe] Masters kept close tabs on the
California and Michigan plants, in part, because she viewed the AES … plants as ‘our largest risk
position.’”
2222
J PMorgan’s senior management expected Mr. Dunleavy to find a way to make the
California and Michigan plants profitable and to generate an “‘appropriate return’ which meant a
17% return on equity.”
2223
In 2010, after J PMorgan took over the Huntington Beach 3 and 4 power
plants, it began pursing ways for them to become more profitable.
In 2010, J PMVEC hired a new employee who would become a key designer of its improper
bidding strategies. On April 29, 2010, the resume of J ohn Bartholomew made its way to the attention
of Mr. Dunleavy.
2224
Mr. Bartholomew was then employed at Southern California Edison and had
previously interned at FERC.
2225
On his resume, he stated that he had identified a “flaw in the market
mechanism … causing CAISO to misallocate millions of dollars.”
2226
Mr. Bartholomew indicated
that it was possible to profit by gaming the system, rather than selling electricity at a profit at market
rates.
2227
In a matter of hours after Mr. Bartholomew sent his resume to the Houston office, Mr.
2216
Id. at 2.
2217
Id.
2218
Id. at 3.
2219
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 117 [sealed exhibit].
2220
Id. See also 3/14/2011 email exchange between Francis Dunleavy, J PMorgan, and Blythe Masters, J PMorgan,
“Privileged and Confidential – CAISO update,” PSI-FERC-02-000067 (showing Mr. Dunleavy discussing the CAISO
matter with Ms. Masters).
2221
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 117-119 [sealed exhibit].
2222
Id. at 118.
2223
Id. at 019.
2224
See 4/29/2010 email exchange between Francis Dunleavy, J PMorgan, and Rob Cauthen, J PMorgan, “Resume for
Power,” PSI-FERC-02-000009 - 010, at 009.
2225
Id.
2226
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 120 [sealed exhibit]. The Bartholomew resume stated: “Identified flaw in the
market mechanism Bid Cost Recovery that is causing the CAISO to misallocate millions of dollars.” 4/29/2010 email
exchange between Francis Dunleavy and Rob Cauthen, “Resume for Power,” PSI-FERC-02-000009 - 010, at 009.
2227
See 4/29/2010 email exchange between Francis Dunleavy, J PMorgan, and Rob Cauthen, J PMorgan, “Resume for
Power,” PSI-FERC-02-000009 - 010, at 009.
343
Dunleavy instructed others to “get him in ASAP.”
2228
Mr. Bartholomew began working at J PMVEC
in J uly 2010.
2229
Shortly after starting, Mr. Bartholomew began to develop manipulative bidding strategies
focused on CAISO’s make-whole mechanism, called Bid Cost Recovery or BCR payments. The
strategies were designed to cause CAISO and MISO to make payments at premium prices above the
market rates, and produce millions of dollars in profits for J PMorgan.
2230
Regional Electricity Markets. To understand the bidding strategies, some background on
the CAISO and MISO electricity markets is necessary. CAISO and MISO are Independent System
Operators (ISOs) that operate regional wholesale markets for electricity, and are regulated by
FERC.
2231
In their wholesale electricity markets, the sellers – who are generally power plants or
parties like J PMVEC who control power plant output – and the buyers – who are generally
distributors that provide electricity to retail customers – submit bid and offer prices at which they are
willing to transact.
2232
CAISO and MISO both operate “Day Ahead” and Real Time” regional
markets for physical electricity.
2233
As explained earlier, the Day Ahead market is a forward market
that allows participants buy and sell one day ahead of the date on which the electricity is actually
delivered; the Real Time market operates on the day the electricity is transmitted.
2234
In general,
CAISO and MISO provide the power seller with an “award” if the ISO agrees to buy electricity from
the seller.
2235
Even if a seller receives an ISO Day Ahead “award,” it may not produce all of the
energy called for in the award.
2236
If the ISO does not, in the end, instruct the generator to produce all
of the energy specified in the award, the generator can “buy back” the unneeded portion of the award
in the Real Time market.
2237
Because of this system, in the Real Time market, some sellers/power generators become
potential buyers of electricity in the Day Ahead market.
2238
If a generator receives an award in the
Day Ahead market and then buys back a portion of the award in the Real Time market, the generator
is said to be receiving a ‘decremental’ or reduced energy award.
Payments to Generators. ISOs such as CAISO and MISO pay power generators for
electricity. When CAISO and MISO pay power generators, they ordinarily do so at market rates.
2239
As noted above, in certain circumstances, they also pay power generators “make-whole” payments
2228
Id.
2229
FERC Consent Agreement, at 2.
2230
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 120 [sealed exhibit].
2231
FERC Consent Agreement, at 3.
2232
Id.
2233
Id.
2234
Id. at 4 (explaining that due to the two different markets, the prices from each exchange for the same hour may differ).
See also “Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 65,http://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf (describing the markets generally).
2235
FERC Consent Agreement, at 4.
2236
Id.
2237
Id.
2238
Id. at 5.
2239
Id.
344
under applicable market rules designed to ensure grid reliability.
2240
Under CAISO’s BCR
mechanism, CAISO generally guarantees payments to cover a plant’s costs for starting up and
running its plants at the lowest level – called “minimum load” – if the plant gets a Day Ahead award,
even if the plant later buys back in the Real Time market the entire portion of the award above its
minimum load. The BCR payments, again, provide an incentive for power sellers to participate in
electricity markets and increase grid reliability. BCR payments “provide additional compensation to
generators when market revenues are insufficient to cover the ‘bid cost’ of a resource the ISO has
committed.”
2241
In the CAISO system, the BCR rules allow bidders to be paid up to twice their real
costs for running a minimum load, which can result in electricity customers paying excessive
electricity charges.
JPMVEC Manipulation. According to the stipulated facts, on September 8, 2010,
J PMVEC began to implement one of its bidding strategies in the CAISO market.
2242
The strategy had
been developed by Mr. Dunleavy, Mr. Bartholomew, and Andrew Kittell in J PMorgan’s Houston
office. The strategy was used in connection with the Huntington Beach 3 and 4 plants and,
eventually, other AES plants as J PMVEC regained control of them.
2243
As part of the strategy, in the
Day Ahead market, J PMVEC submitted the lowest bid allowed under CAISO rate schedules.
2244
The
bid was generally at the rate of -$30 per megawatt hour, which meant that J PMVEC was offering a
negative bid and was willing to pay the buyer to take the electricity, despite the costs involved in
producing it.
2245
Its bids were reviewed by electronic software, which did not grasp the intent behind
J PMVEC’s below-cost bids. J PMVEC’s -$30 bids were well below where the Day Ahead Market
actually settled, which was typically in the positive range of $30 - $35 per megawatt hour, so the bids
routinely secured Day Ahead awards from CAISO.
2246
J PMVEC was then given a Day Ahead award
at the prevailing market price regardless of its initial low bid price.
2247
In addition, its traders knew
that if J PMVEC won a Day Ahead award, J PMVEC could also qualify for a BCR payment on its
minimum load equal to twice its costs, resulting in a total payment well in excess of market prices.
2248
To obtain the BCR payment, the bidding strategy required J PMVEC to place a followup bid
in the Real Time market. On the days that it received Day Ahead awards, J PMVEC submitted
followup bids in the Real Time market, generally above the market price by only a small amount to
ensure its bids were taken.
2249
In each bid, J PMVEC sought to reduce its award in the Day Ahead
market to no more than its minimum load, which it knew would elicit a BCR payment. After the
close of bids in the Real Time market, CAISO’s electronic system generally provided a decremental
2240
Id.
2241
Id. “Bid cost” refers to the price the power generating unit has submitted to the ISO.
2242
Id. at 6.
2243
Id. at 5-6.
2244
Id. at 6. CAISO’s rate schedules are often referred to as the “tariff.” See “Help – Glossary,” FERC website
(8/20/2013),http://www.ferc.gov/help/glossary.asp#T (defining “tariff” as “[a] compilation of all effective rate schedules
of a particular company or utility. Tariffs include General Terms and Conditions along with a copy of each form of
service agreement”).
2245
FERC Consent Agreement, at 7. Sellers can havelegitimate reasons to make a negative bid, such as wind farms
which may be entitled to tax credits greater than their negative bid.
2246
Id.
2247
Id.
2248
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 123 [sealed exhibit].
2249
FERC Consent Agreement, at 7.
345
electricity award to J PMVEC, reducing the actual amount of energy it was required to produce to its
minimum load. For that minimum load amount, the software typically awarded J PMVEC a BCR
payment equal to twice its costs for producing the electricity. In essence, J P Morgan sold high priced
electricity to CAISO, received a BCR payment equal to twice its costs, and also received a payment
at the prevailing marketplace price for the electricity provided – in effect, it was paid three times for
the same electricity.
Unjust Profits. The result of the bidding strategy was an immediate increase in J PMVEC
power plant revenues, which totaled several million dollars in just the first month.
2250
By the second
month in October 2010, J PMVEC estimated that the bidding strategy could produce profits of
between $1.5 and $2 billion through 2018.
2251
According to the stipulated facts, in the six-month
period between September 8, 2010 and March 10, 2011, the two Huntington Beach power plants
produced market revenues of $21.9 million, while accruing costs of $29.5 million, producing a loss of
$7.6 million.
2252
During the same period, however, the two plants collected BCR payments totaling
$34.6 million, resulting in an overall six-month profit of $27 million – from inefficient plants that
usually could not compete successfully in the marketplace.
2253
As evidence of the success of this
strategy, in the midst of that stretch, a J PMVEC employee sent an email to several colleagues with an
image of Oliver Twist extending a bowl and the subject line: “Please sir! mor BCR!!!!”
2254
In addition to this scheme, which was its most profitable, FERC Enforcement found that
J PMVEC engaged in 11 other manipulative bidding strategies from September 2010 through
November 2012, in both the CAISO and MISO markets. FERC officials told the Subcommittee that
in the years since Congress gave FERC enhanced anti-manipulation authority in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, the CAISO and MISO regulators had never before witnessed the degree of blatant rule
manipulation and gaming strategies that J PMorgan used to win electricity awards and elicit make-
whole payments.
2255
Penalties. To settle the manipulation charges, J PMorganagreed to disgorge $124 million in
“unjust profits” to CAISO to be allocated for the benefit of current CAISO ratepayers; $1 million in
“unjust profits” to MISO for the benefit of current MISO ratepayers; and a civil penalty of $285
million to the United States Treasury.
2256
Other Financial Institutions. J PMorgan is not the only financial holding company that has
been charged with manipulating electricity prices. In J uly 2013, FERC issued an order assessing civil
penalties against Barclays and its traders for manipulating electricity prices in California from 2006
to 2008, directing it to pay compensatory damages, interest and penalties totaling $435
2250
Id. at 6.
2251
Id.
2252
Id. at 7-8.
2253
Id.
2254
11/22/2010 email from Luis Davila, J PMorgan, to J ohn Rasmussen and Ryan Martin, J PMorgan, “Please sir! mor
BCR!!!!,” PSI-FERC-02-000042. The image of Oliver Twist in the body of the email can be viewed at this website:
.
2255
Subcommittee briefing by FERC (7/11/2013).
2256
FERC Stipulation and Consent Agreement, at 15 - 19.
346
million.
2257
Specifically, FERC found that Barclays and its traders manipulated “prices on 655
product days over 35 product months in the … regulated physical markets at the four most liquid
trading points in the western United States.”
2258
According to FERC, Barclays and its traders carried
out this scheme “by building substantial monthly physical index positions in the opposite direction of
the financial swap positions they assembled at the same points ….”
2259
By building physical positions
in the index, Barclays was able to move the index price so that its financial swap positions would
benefit.
2260
FERC found that Barclays’ trading in physical index positions “was ‘not intended to get
the best price on those trades’ and was ‘not responding to supply and demand fundamentals,’ but
instead was intended to ‘benefit” Barclays’ related Financial Swap positions.”
2261
Barclays is
contesting both the charges and penalty.
In addition, in J anuary 2013, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $1.6 million to settle FERC
charges that it manipulated electricity markets in California in 2010.
2262
FERC alleged that that the
manipulation involved using physical positions to benefit derivative positions in financial markets.
2263
Together, the J PMorgan, Barclays and Deutsche Bank cases demonstrate a variety of ways in
which financial holding companies have taken advantage of their power plant activities to manipulate
electricity prices to their benefit. They also demonstrate the critical importance of regulatory
oversight and enforcement to stop unfair practices.
(b) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance to Cover Potential Losses
A completely different set of issues raised by J PMorgan’s power plant activities involves its
exposure to the catastrophic event risks associated with commercial industrial ventures. Power plants
are large industrial complexes subject to a wide range of catastrophic event risks. Many are powered
with natural gas, which is flammable and explosive. Over a two-year period, J PMorgan gained
exposure to 31 natural gas and coal-fueled power plants across the country, at a time when it knew
virtually nothing about the business. Federal Reserve examiners found that J PMorgan did not have
the technical, operations or engineering capability to review the power plants’ compliance with
2257
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041
(7/16/2013). The CFTC has also charged hedge funds with market manipulation, demonstrating that financial firms have
the means to manipulate commodity futures and swap prices. See, e.g., CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, Case No. 07-
CV-6682 (DC) (USDC SDNY)(7/25/2007); 8/12/2013 CFTC press release, “Amaranth Entities Ordered to Pay a $7.5
Million Civil Fine in CFTC Action Alleging Attempted Manipulation of Natural Gas Futures Prices,” (describing how, in
2009, the CFTC collected $7.5 million in fines from a hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors LLC, and its Canadian subsidiary
for attempted manipulation of natural gas futures prices in 2006); CFTC v. Moncada, Case No. 09-CV-8791 (USDC
SDNY)(12/4/2012)(describing how, in 2012, the CFTC charged two related hedge funds, BES Capital LLC and Serdika
LLC, with attempted manipulation of wheat futures prices in 2009; they are contesting the charges).
2258
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041, at 3
(716/2013).
2259
Id.
2260
Id.
2261
Id. at 4.
2262
See In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC, FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, “Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement,” (1/22/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-
IN12-4-000.pdf .
2262
1/22/2013 FERC news release, “FERC Approves Market Manipulation Settlement with Deutsche Bank,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-1/01-22-13.asp
2263
Id.
347
regulatory standards, and the Federal Reserve Commodities Team found that J PMorgan’s capital and
insurance levels were insufficient to protect it against potential losses from a catastrophic event.
Placing accurate values on power plants, tolling agreements, and related assets are critical to
financial holding companies allocating adequate capital and insurance to cover potential losses. The
2012 Summary Report prepared by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team warned, however, that
the valuation techniques being used by financial holding companies for their physical commodity
activities were not consistent, comprehensive, or reliable. The 2012 Summary Report looked in
particular at how financial holding companies were valuing power plants. It determined that most
held the plants on their books as an investment at cost, and used tolling agreements to capture the
ongoing economic value. Tolling agreements typically capture the value of the difference between a
plant’s fuel inputs (coal or gas) and its output (electricity). The 2012 Summary Report determined
that, while that approach provided a liquid derivative representation of an illiquid, hard-to-value
asset, it also had weaknesses that would not be reflected in stress tests.
2264
It pointed out, for example,
that depending upon how a tolling agreement was worded, a financial holding company might have
to make payments to buy output from a power plant that wasn’t producing any power, or have to buy
all of the production of a facility whose output is no longer valuable, expenses that might not be
disclosed in a typical stress test.
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report found that the insurance coverage at the financial
holding companies appeared to be insufficient. It noted that “[p]hysical commodities is a notoriously
fat-tailed business with [the] insurer only covering limited losses for some risks.”
2265
The 2012
Summary Report found that “n all cases … insurance for … catastrophic events is capped at a
certain level (typically US $1 billion) and firms cannot cover any amount beyond the cap through
insurance.”
2266
It also noted that the financial holding companies used “aggressive assumptions” to
minimize estimated losses from a catastrophic event.
2267
In the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill
case, BP had reportedly self-insured for up to $700 million,
2268
but projections now place its liability
at $42 billion, with another possible $18 billion in fines, almost 85 times greater than what BP had
self- insured for.
With respect to J PMorgan, the 2012 Summary Report stated that J PMorgan had determined
that the “operational and event risks of owning power facilities” were capped at the dollar value of
those facilities in the event of their total loss, with some insurance to cover “the death and disability
of workers” and some facility replacement costs, but leaving all other expenses, including a “failure
to deliver electricity under contract,” to be paid by the holding company.
2269
At another point, the
2012 Summary Report prepared a chart comparing the level of capital and insurance coverage at four
financial holding companies, including J PMorgan, against estimated costs associated with “extreme
2264
10/3/2012 report, “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 482 [sealed exhibit].
2265
Id. at 509. See also id. at 500 (noting that insurance companies “do not have comfortable ways to assess the rail risk
and thus avoid insuring the tails” for catastrophic events, such as multi-billion dollar oil spills).
2266
Id. at 491.
2267
Id. at 493 - 494.
2268
See “BP Oil Spill Damages to Stretch Insurance Coverage,” Oilprice.com, Gloria Gonzalez (8/2/2010),http://oilprice.com/The-Environment...l-Damages-To-Stretch-Insurance-Coverage.html.
2269
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200494 [sealed exhibit]. See also 5/18/2011 presentation, “Commodities
Operational Risk Capital,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300727 - 736, at 729.
348
loss scenarios.” It found that at each institution, including J PMorgan, “the potential loss exceed[ed]
capital and insurance” by $1 billion to $15 billion.
2270
Still another problem involves J PMorgan’s direct ownership of three power plants. Although
J PMorgan has contracted with third parties to operate those plants, it still owns 100% of their shares.
U.S. federal law attaches liability for catastrophic environmental events to both owners and operators.
By choosing to become the direct owner of the three power plants, instead of holding tolling
agreements with them as permitted under its complementary authority, J PMorgan has increased the
financial holding company’s liability for damages, should disaster strike.
Even well–run power plants carry catastrophic event risks. If the worst case scenario should
occur, J PMorgan should be prepared to cover the potential losses, without U.S. taxpayer assistance.
(c) Erecting Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of issues involves the absence of effective regulatory safeguards and enforcement
related to financial holding company involvement with power plants. One key regulatory gap is the
Federal Reserve’s lack of procedures to handle market manipulation problems. Because banks have a
limited history of involvement with physical commodities, and market manipulation violations are
typically detected and enforced by non-banking regulators such as the CFTC, SEC, or FERC, the
Federal Reserve has few mechanisms in place to educate or alert examiners to signs of market
manipulation. At the same time, the 2012 Summary Report warned that virtually every financial
holding company it examined had been “accused or charged” with “manipulating markets.”
2271
Those
charges can lead to violations of law, reimbursement of excessive consumer electricity bills, multi-
million-dollar fines, and reputational damage. Regulatory safeguards should be erected to ensure
bank examiners act against improper practices by establishing examination procedures, implementing
preventative measures, and strengthening coordination with enforcement agencies.
A second problem exposed by J PMorgan’s power plant activities is how financial holding
companies are permitted to retain and profit from the impermissible holding of physical commodity
assets for years at a time. J PMorgan had no legal authority to directly own a power plant, yet it
acquired one in 2008, and two more in 2010, and still has them years later. When J PMorgan’s
application for complementary authority to own those plants was turned down, it asserted its
merchant banking authority to keep them. At the same time, knowing of the Federal Reserve’s
concern about its direct ownership of a commercial enterprise like a power plant, J PMorgan promised
to exit the power plant business, but plans to take years to do so. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee
that its tolling agreement for 12 California power plants will take another four years to finish, its
planned sale of a Michigan plant is on hold for another year, and its attempts to locate buyers for two
other power plants are moving slowly. Despite the passage of years and multiple warnings about
directly owning the power plants, and the increased liability attached to direct ownership, the Federal
Reserve has yet to force J PMorgan to divest itself of those assets. More broadly, the Federal Reserve
appears to have a track record of repeatedly extending deadlines for the sale of impermissible assets,
2270
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509 [sealed exhibit]. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that
commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries
had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%. Id. at 499.
2271
Id. at 492.
349
in the end allowing banks to retain them for multiple years. Today, safeguards to ensure the sale of
impermissible physical commodity assets appear dysfunctional, with little certainty to protect U.S.
taxpayers at risk when financial holding companies ignore the restrictions on their activities.
(4) Analysis
When the Subcommittee investigation examined financial holding company involvement with
electricity, it found multiple levels of involvement affecting power generation in the United States
and around the world. All three financial holding companies examined by the Subcommitteetraded
electricity, had tolling agreements or ownership interests in power plants around the world, supplied
fuel to power plants, and engaged in some form of power plant energy management. Their power
plant activities ranged widely, from capturing the energy output of alternative energy plants using
wind, solar, hydropower, and other energy sources; to installing residential rooftop solar systems; to
building wind farms; to becoming the primary supplier of coal, natural gas, or uranium to multiple
utilities. Power plant activities are fraught with market manipulation issues, operational and
catastrophic event risks, and impermissible commercial activities. It is past time for the Federal
Reserve to impose needed safeguards to limit financial holding company involvement with this high
risk physical commodity activity.
350
C. JPMorgan Involvement with Copper
For many years, J PMorgan has engaged in a wide range of physical copper activities.
Because federal bank regulators currently treat copper as “bullion,” equivalent to gold or silver,
J PMorgan has been permitted to accumulate copper holdings without the normal size limits that
apply to other metals and has amassed, at times, copper inventories exceeding $2 billion.
J PMorgan has also participated in copper-related physical and financial trading, and proposed a
copper-backed exchange traded fund that some industrial copper users allege raises conflict of
interest and market manipulation concerns.
(1) Background on Copper
Copper is a naturally occurring metal which, due to its “high ductility, malleability, and
thermal and electrical conductivity, and its resistance to corrosion,” has become “a major
industrial metal, ranking third after iron and aluminum in terms of quantities consumed.”
2272
Copper is widely used in the electrical, construction, and electronics industries,
2273
which
together comprise approximately 56% of global industrial copper consumption.
2274
It is also
important to the defense industry, transportation, and industrial machinery.
2275
When mined, copper is produced as part of a mixture of materials that usually includes
iron and sulfur.
2276
Producing pure copper metal requires a multistage process which typically
includes concentrating the copper found in low-grade ore; smelting – heating and chemically
treating -- the ore to extract the copper; and then applying electrolytic refining to produce a
“copper cathode,” meaning copper material with a purity of 99.95%.
2277
Another way copper
can be purified is through the “acid leaching of oxidized ores.”
2278
Copper recycling contributes
a significant share of copper supply worldwide.
2279
Most of the world’s copper comes from Chile, whose mines produced 5.7 million metric
tons of copper in 2013.
2280
The next largest copper producers are China, with 1.7 million metric
tons in 2013; Peru with 1.3 million metric tons, and the United States with 1.2 million metric
2272
Undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/.
2273
See Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8 (4/5/2013), at 33,
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278680/000119312505011426/ds1a.txt.
2274
See 9/19/2014 “Production and Consumption,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/copper/http://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-ferrous/copper/production-and-consumption/.
2275
See undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/.
2276
See undated “What is a Copper Cathode?”http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-copper-cathode.htm.
2277
See undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/; undated “What is a Copper Cathode?”http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-copper-cathode.htm.
2278
Undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/.
2279
Id.
2280
See 2/2014 “U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries,” U.S. Geological Survey website, at 48-
49,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2014/mcs2014.pdf.
351
tons.
2281
In 2013, U.S. production accounted for about 7% of global annual copper
production.
2282
Despite rising copper prices, copper mines have increased production only
modestly, due in part to declining extractions from old mines and delays in new mining
projects.
2283
In the physical markets, according to copper manufacturers, about 85% of the copper
produced annually is sold via long-term supply contracts.
2284
Those contracts typically specify
the amount of copper to be delivered on specific dates, at prices linked to benchmark copper
prices that vary over time.
2285
The most common benchmark price is the copper futures price
established on the London Metal Exchange (LME), the largest financial market for metals.
Physical contracts also typically specify a “locational premium,” reflecting storage and
transportation expenses associated with providing copper at a specified location.
2286
Collectively, the benchmark price and locational premium typically comprise the “all-in” price
for copper.
Copper Prices. Over the last decade, copper prices have experienced significant
volatility, including “unpredictable” fluctuations,
2287
creating price risks for producers and end
users.
2288
As shown in the chart below, prices per metric ton fell from $8,500 in 2008, to under
$3,000 in 2009, and then spiked to over $10,000 in December 2010 and J anuary 2011, reaching
all-time highs. Over a three-month period from August through October 2014, copper prices
fluctuated between $7,100 and $6,600 per metric ton, a difference of nearly 10%.
2289
2281
See 2/2014 “U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries,” U.S. Geological Survey website, at 48-
49,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2014/mcs2014.pdf.
2282
See 2/2014 “Mineral Commodity Summaries,” U.S. Geological Survey website, at 48,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2014/mcs2014.pdf.
2283
See 4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8, at 38, SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010313002224/dp37414_s1a8.htm
2284
See 7/18/2012 letter from Copper Manufacturers to SEC, “Re: File Number SR-NYSEArca-2-12-66 PSI-
VandenbergFeliu_to_SEC(J uly2012)-000001-005, at 004-005.
2285
Id.
2286
See 4/16/2012 SEC “Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade Shares of the J PM XF Physical
Copper Trust,” Release No. 34-66816, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, at 13 (hereinafter “SEC Notice”), SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2012/34-66816.pdf.
2287
4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8, at 15, SEC
website,http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=8803483.
2288
See 7/18/2012 letter from Copper Manufacturers to SEC, “Re: File Number SR-NYSEArca-2-12-66 PSI-
VandenbergFeliu_to_SEC(J uly2012)-000001-005, at 004-005.
2289
See undated “Historical price graph for Copper,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-
ferrous/copper/ (showing copper futures prices from August 1 to October 21, 2014).
352
Source: “Historical Copper Prices and Price Chart,” InfoMine Inc. (10/14/2014),http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/copper/all/.
In the financial markets, copper can be traded through a variety of financial instruments,
including futures, swaps, options, and forwards. The most active copper trading takes place on
the LME.
2290
The LME identifies four categories of metals: “precious metals,” which include
gold and silver; “non-ferrous” or “base” metals, which include copper, aluminum, nickel, and
zinc, among others; “steel billet,” which includes steel, and “minor metals,” which include cobalt
and molybdenum.
2291
The LME provides multiple copper futures contracts for trading.
2292
The
standardized LME futures contracts involve 25 metric tons of “Grade A Copper,” and may be
settled financially or by delivery of physical copper.
2293
In 2013, copper was among the most
actively traded base metal futures on the LME.
2294
LME prices provide the global price
benchmarks used in contracts around the world for the physical purchase or sale of copper.
2295
2290
See LME website,https://www.lme.com/ (“More than 80% of global non-ferrous business is conducted here and
the prices discovered on our three trading platforms are used as the global benchmark.”).
2291
See undated “Metals,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/. The LME is planning to add
platinum, and palladium to its precious metals category by the end of 2014. See 10/16/2014 LME press release,
“LME wins bid for provision of London Platinum and Palladium Prices,”https://www.lme.com/news-and-
events/press-releases/press-releases/2014/10/lme-wins-bid-for-provision-of-london-platinum-and-palladium-prices/.
2292
See undated “Copper,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-ferrous/copper/.
2293
See undated “LME Copper physical specification,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/non-
ferrous/copper/contract-specifications/physical/, and “2013 Trading Volumes,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/reports/monthly-volumes/annual/2013/.
2294
See, e.g., “2013 Trading Volumes,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/reports/monthly-
volumes/annual/2013/.
2295
See LME website,https://www.lme.com/ (“More than 80% of global non-ferrous business is conducted here and
the prices discovered on our three trading platforms are used as the global benchmark.”); 1/17/2013 Form S-1
Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment, at 40.
353
Copper as Bullion. Although for more than 100 years, copper has been traded on world
markets and in the United States as a base metal with industrial uses,
2296
both the Federal
Reserve and the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) currently classify copper
as a type of “bullion,” a classification normally reserved for precious metals like gold and silver.
That regulatory decision affects how financial holding companies are allowed to trade copper.
The National Bank Act expressly authorizes U.S. national banks “to exercise … all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking,” including the
“buying and selling of exchange, coin, and bullion.”
2297
“Bullion” is not defined in the Act.
Instead, the OCC, which regulates national banks, has defined the term through interpretative
letters, and the Federal Reserve has defined it through regulation.
For many years, the OCC defined “bullion” as “uncoined gold or silver in bar or ingot
form.”
2298
In 1991, at the request of a bank, the OCC issued a letter which expanded the
definition to include platinum.
2299
Four years later, in 1995, again at the request of a bank, the
OCC expanded the definition to include palladium.
2300
While platinum and palladium – like
gold and silver – have industrial uses, all four have traditionally been traded internationally as
precious metals, held primarily for their exchange value rather than industrial use.
A few months after the palladium decision, however, once again at the request of a bank,
the OCC expanded the definition of “bullion” a third time to include – for the first and only time
– a base metal: copper.
2301
While copper has been used in coins, it has never been traded
internationally as a precious metal; it has always been classified and traded as a “base,” “non-
ferrous,” or “industrial” metal. Since adding copper to the definition in 1995, the OCC has not
added any other metal to the definition of “bullion.”
The OCC’s inclusion of copper in the definition of “bullion” materially altered its
regulatory treatment for commodity purposes. Prior to its inclusion, copper was subject to all of
the limitations imposed by the OCC on bank involvement with physical commodities, including
the 5% limit placed by the OCC on physical commodities acquired as hedges for derivative
transactions.
2302
Once defined as “bullion,” however, copper could be treated in the same way as
gold and silver, and exempted from a number of physical commodities restrictions, including
size limits.
2303
2296
See, e.g., undated “Production and consumption,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/non-
ferrous/copper/production-and-consumption/ (indicating copper began trading on the LME in 1877).
2297
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh).
2298
See, e.g., Banking Circular 58 (Rev.), OCC (11/3/1981),http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/bulletins/pre-
1994/banking-circulars/bc-1981-58.pdf.
2299
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 553 (5/2/1991), PSI-OCC-01-000112-113.
2300
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141, at 137 (citing OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 683 (7/28/1995) (approving palladium within the definition of “bullion”)).
2301
Id. at 135.
2302
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 - 374.
2303
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141, (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits, below.
354
The Federal Reserve has also designated copper as “bullion” in a regulation stating that
“uying, selling and storing” physical copper is a “permissible” nonbank activity.
2304
The
Federal Reserve explained to the Subcommittee that physical copper could be held and traded by
financial holding companies under that regulatory authority and thereby avoid any size limits
applicable to complementary, merchant banking, or grandfathering activities.
2305
The Federal
Reserve also indicated that financial holding companies would not have to include their copper
holdings when reporting the market value of their physical commodity assets to the Federal
Reserve.
2306
By treating copper as bullion, the OCC and Federal Reserve have enabled banks
and their holding companies to hold physical copper outside of the limits that apply to all other
base metals.
(2) JPMorgan’s Involvement with Copper
J PMorgan is an active trader of physical and financial copper. In recent years, it has
engaged in physical copper activities that included outsized transactions and massive copper
inventories. J PMorgan also designed and proposed a copper-backed exchange traded fund
(ETF), a controversial investment fund which was to be the first ETF backed by a physical
industrial metal in the United States. The ETF was designed to acquire copper, place it in
storage, and sell investment securities whose value would be tied to copper prices. Some
industrial users of copper opposed the proposed ETF, alleging it would artificially restrict copper
supplies and raise copper prices and price volatility, unconnected to fundamental forces of
supply and demand. J PMorgan has since placed its ETF proposal on hold, but has not withdrawn
its proposed registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
J PMorgan’s physical copper activities raise financial risk, conflict of interest, and market
manipulation concerns.
(a) Trading Copper
J PMorgan has been trading metals, including copper, for many years.
2307
J PMorgan
conducts its copper activities through its Global Metals Group which, according to J PMorgan, is
a “core component” of its Global Commodities Group.
2308
The Global Commodities Group, and
its Global Metals Group, are part of the financial holding company.
2309
For years, however, the
majority of J PMorgan’s metals trading has been booked, not through the financial holding
company, but through J PMorgan Chase Bank.
2310
The OCC told the Subcommittee that
2304
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii) (2/28/1997) (stating that permissible nonbank activities include: “Buying,
selling and storing bars, rounds, bullion, and coins of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, copper, and any other metal
approved by the Board, for the company's own account and the account of others, and providing incidental services
such as arranging for storage, safe custody, assaying, and shipment.”).
2305
10/28/2014 email from the Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-16-000001.
2306
Id.
2307
See, e.g., 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 838
(indicating the Global Metals Group has been transacting business with clients “over the past 30 years”).
2308
Id.
2309
Id.
2310
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014); 10/23/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-16-000001.
355
J PMorgan Chase Bank is the only national bank that, in recent years, has engaged in extensive
physical metals trading and maintained a large physical metals inventory.
2311
Two legal entities actually execute metal trades for the bank. The first is a U.K. bank
subsidiary, J .P. Morgan Securities PLC, which is a market maker for metals on the LME as well
as an LME “Category 1 ring dealer” which gives it special trading status on the exchange.
2312
The second is J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC), a U.S. subsidiary of the
financial holding company.
2313
J PMVEC has employees who work for both the holding
company and the bank, and handle both financial and physical commodity activities, in an
arrangement that has been disclosed to and permitted by the Federal Reserve.
2314
The Global Metals Group operates a metals trading desk that conducts both financial and
physical copper activities.
2315
Its financial activities include trading copper futures, swaps,
options, and forwards, as well as financing arrangements, structured transactions, and hedging
transactions for clients. Physical activities include buying and selling physical copper on the
spot market and through LME warrants.
2316
Although the Global Metals Group is located within
the financial holding company, the traders on its metals trading desk are employed by the bank
or J .P. Morgan Securities PLC, the bank’s subsidiary.
2317
The metals desk traders are also
“empowered to act for other legal entities within the J PM group through service agreements that
are in place between entities and through ‘dual-hatting’ arrangements, whereby individuals can
be officers of more than one legal entity in the group.”
2318
In other words, the same traders on
the metals trading desk can book metals trades for both the bank and the financial holding
company.
J PMorgan’s physical metal holdings increased after its acquisition of Bear Stearns in
2008
2319
and RBS Sempra in 2010.
2320
As part of the RBS Sempra acquisition, J PMorgan
2311
Subcommittee briefing by OCC (9/22/2014).
2312
10/23/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-16-000001.
2313
Id.
2314
See 7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co.
Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan (requesting a
complementary order to conduct physical commodity activities), PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 012 - 013
(discussing J PMVEC).
2315
See, e.g., excerpts from undated J P Morgan presentation, “Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel
Hedging/J P Morgan Global Commodities Group,” FRB-PSI-301592; 1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM
Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 838.
2316
See, e.g., undated J PM presentation, “Introduction to J PM Commodities and Steel Hedging,” at FRB-PSI-
301592; 1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865.
2317
10/23/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-16-000001.
2318
Id. See also 7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase &
Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 012 - 013 (indicating J PMVEC employees can work for both the bank and
holding company).
2319
See, e.g., 7/31/2008 “Supervisory Plan, Risk Assessment Program & Institutional Overview of J PMorgan Chase
& Co.” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-305013-030 (identifying Bear Stearns assets being integrated
into J PMorgan) [sealed exhibit].
2320
See, e.g., “2010 CA Quarterly Summary Global Commodities Group,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300645
- 649, at 645; 1/ 2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 836;
7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”
356
gained ownership of the Henry Bath & Sons global network of warehouses, most of which were
certified by the London Metal Exchange to store LME metals, including copper.
2321
J PMorgan
began marketing Henry Bath warehousing services along with its other financial and physical
activities involving metals, including copper.
2322
J PMorgan is also, through J .P. Morgan
Securities PLC, a “ring dealing” member of the LME, meaning that its traders can trade copper
and other metals on the floor of the LME, and a member of the LME Copper Committee.
2323
In 2011, J PMorgan described its “base metals” trading activities as “[c]lient-focused
trading of aluminium, copper, zinc, lead, nickel and tin in Asia, Europe and the Americas.”
2324
It
noted that, during 2010, it had executed transactions involving more than 1 million metric tons of
metal with a value of $4 billion; and, in 2011, held “1.2 million metric tonnes of [metals]
inventory in various global locations with a value of $4.2 [billion].”
2325
In 2012, in a
presentation prepared for clients, J PMorgan stated that it was “a member of all the world’s
leading metals exchanges,” traded “metal forwards and options including long dated contracts,”
had experience with “larger transactions,” and was a “leading trader in physical metal.”
2326
J PMorgan also noted that, in 2013, its metals business had 650 “[f]inancial” and 166 ‘[p]hysical”
clients.
2327
J PMorgan’s physical metal activities resulted in its holding multi-billion-dollar
inventories of various metals, including inventories that experienced significant volatility. For
example, in 2010, J PMorgan’s inventory of nickel peaked at nearly $2.2 billion, only to fall
nearly 85% soon after.
2328
Similarly, in 2011, J PMorgan’s platinum holdings peaked at nearly
$1.5 billion, only to fall sharply after its peak.
2329
In the largest single base metals holding seen
by the Subcommittee, in J anuary 2012, J PMorgan held a nearly $7.5 billion inventory of
aluminum, consisting of a whopping 3.5 million metric tons of aluminum,
2330
an amount
exceeding over half of the entire North American annual consumption of aluminum that year.
2331
https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
2321
See, e.g., 4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at
101.
2322
See, e.g., 1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 838, 841.
2323
See undated “LME Membership,” list of “Ring Dealing” members, LME website,http://www.lme.com/en-
gb/trading/membership/category-1-ring-dealing/j_p_morgan-securities-plc/; LME Copper Committee, LME
website,https://www.lme.com/about-us/corporate-structure/committees/copper-committee/.
2324
4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 101.
See also “Commodities[:] Metals,” J PMorgan website (listing copper as a “base metal”),https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities/metals
2325
4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 101.
2326
1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 840. See also
9/2013 “Global Commodities Compliance Self Assessment,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301370 - 378, at
372.
2327
6/24/2013 “Global Commodities BCC,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301397 - 442, at 411.
2328
See 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015.
2329
Id.
2330
11/10/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-23-000001.
2331
See undated “Primary Aluminum Consumption, 2011-2013,” European Aluminum Association website,http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-consumption-in-world-regions/ (indicating that North
American primary aluminum consumption in 2012 was 5.3 million metric tons).
357
JPMorgan Copper Inventories. In recent years, as part of its copper activities,
J PMorgan has held substantial inventories of physical copper and sometimes conducted outsized
transactions to build or reduce its holdings. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that virtually all of
its physical copper, like its other base metals, has been held in the name of J PMorgan Chase
Bank.
2332
J PMorgan provided the Subcommittee with information on the market value of its
physical copper holdings each year between 2008 and 2013.
2333
The following chart shows how
its copper inventories increased tenfold in value over that time period, and how the size of its
copper holdings varied significantly during the year:
JPMorgan Physical Copper Inventories by Market Value
2008-2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013**
Year-End
Totals*
$148 million $304 million $660 million $1.26 billion $1.13 billion $1.7 billion
Maximum
During Year
$242 million $551 million $1.65 billion $2.72 billion $1.22 billion N/A
* Amounts as of the end of the fiscal year. ** As of J une 28, 2013.
Data provided by J PMorgan uses monthly inventory values.
Source: Attachment to 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015;
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as of
J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” at FRB-PSI-301388.
In December 2010, several media reports named J PMorgan as the undisclosed trader
behind a $1.5 billion copper transaction that allegedly led to a single trader holding, as indicated
in an LME daily report on warrants, between 50% and 80% of the existing LME warrants for
copper, then representing about 350,000 metric tons of copper.
2334
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that, while it did purchase substantial amounts of copper in November and
December 2010, it did so through multiple transactions on behalf of more than 50 clients, and the
“trade data does not appear to support the theory that J .P.Morgan’s copper warrant position was
the result of a single large trade.”
2335
J PMorgan also told the Subcommittee that its copper
trading decisions were completely unrelated to its proposal for a copper-based exchange traded
fund (ETF), described below, noting that the copper trading decisions were made by the metals
2332
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2333
See 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015; 9/26/2013
“Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as of
J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” at FRB-PSI-301388.
2334
See, e.g., “J P Morgan revealed as mystery trader that bought £1bn-worth of copper on LME,” The Telegraph,
Louise Armitstead and Rowena Mason (12/4/2010),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
industry/8180304/J P-Morgan-revealed-as-mystery-trader-that-bought-1bn-worth-of-copper-on-LME.html; “A
Single Trader, J P Morgan, Holds 90% Of LME Copper,” Zero Hedge, Tyler Durden (12/21/2010),http://www.zerohedge.com/article/single-trader-jp-morgan-holds-90-lme-copper. See also 12/15/2010 LME daily
“Warrant Banding Report,” PSI-LME-06-000001 (showing a single trader holding between 50% and 80% of total
LME warrants for copper at that time); 10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 002 (indicating LME copper warrants totaled 350,000 metric tons at the time).
2335
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 002. See
also Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan legal counsel (10/29/2014).
358
trading desk, which was completely separate from the “Commodity Investor Products” group
that was designing the ETF.
2336
J PMorgan indicated that according to its records, in December 2010, its copper
inventory, which included both LME warrants and a small amount of non-LME warranted
copper, “ranged from approximately 198,000 metric tonnes to 213,000 metric tonnes” of copper
during the month, which was “approximately 57% to 61%” of all LME copper warrants available
at the time.
2337
The market value of its inventory, shown in the above chart, peaked at about
$1.65 billion. The increases in J PMorgan’s copper inventory took place at the same time copper
prices were reaching all-time highs, and as the copper market was anticipating J PMorgan’s
proposed copper-backed ETF.
2338
An April 2011 internal analysis by J PMorgan of the operating risks facing its Global
Commodities group took particular note of the size of its copper holdings during November
2010, which it described as representing “approx[imately] 52% of the published LME stock,”
observing that the large position had triggered LME scrutiny of the trading desk.
2339
Federal
Reserve records indicate that J PMorgan may have had even more copper than its trading data
shows for December 2010. A 2011 Federal Reserve document that was part of the preparation
for its special physical commodities review noted that, in December 2010, J PMorgan had
reported holding about “332,000 tons of copper (over 50% of available physical inventory) in
their own storage facilities.”
2340
Regardless of the exact amount of J PMorgan’s copper holdings in late 2010, the facts
indicate that J PMorgan held a significant portion of the physical copper available for trading in
the United States. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that, due to its large position in copper, it
received LME guidance instructing it to lend some of its holdings to the market.
2341
On
December 15, 2010, J PMorgan used the bulk of its copper warrants to settle other obligations,
and substantially reduced its inventory to 56,000 tons which represented “roughly 16% of LME
copper warrants at that time.”
2342
At the time of the December transactions, copper prices were
near all-time highs.
2343
2336
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan legal counsel (10/29/2014); 10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel
to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 005; 11/13/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-24-000001. Both the metals trading desk and the Commodity Investor Products
group are, however, located within the Global Commodities Group at J PMorgan.
2337
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan - 18-000001 - 005, at 002.
2338
See, e.g., “J P Morgan revealed as mystery trader that bought £1bn-worth of copper on LME,” The Telegraph,
Louise Armitstead and Rowena Mason (12/4/2010),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/8180304/J P-Morgan-revealed-as-mystery-trader-that-
bought-1bn-worth-of-copper-on-LME.html (“Traders said J P Morgan's name had been circulating the market all day
as the most likely buyer, especially since it is about to launch a physically-backed ‘exchange-traded fund’ (ETF) in
copper imminently. One metals broker dealing on the LME said: ‘The story is that they're positioning themselves
in front of the ETF. There's been a lot of speculation it’s them.’).
2339
4/2011 “Global Commodities – Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 120.
2340
2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200455 - 476,
at 464 [sealed exhibit]; Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
2341
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 003.
2342
Id.
2343
See, e.g., “Historical Copper Prices and Price Chart,” prepared by InfoMine Inc.,http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/copper/all/.
359
After reducing its copper holdings in December, in the first three months of the next year,
2011, J PMorgan re-built its physical copper inventory, attaining a market value even larger than
before.
2344
At one point during 2011, as indicated in the chart above, its copper inventory
peaked with a market value of $2.7 billion. J PMorgan then sold a large amount of copper,
reducing its inventory by about half so that, by the end of the fiscal year, the market value of its
remaining copper holdings was about $1.26 billion.
2345
In September 2012, according to
J PMorgan, the dollar value of its copper holdings had dropped slightly to about $1.1 billion.
2346
As of J une 2013, J PMorgan reported to its regulators that its physical copper inventory had
increased once more, to about $1.7 billion, which J PMorgan described as a “key risk position” in
the bank.
2347
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that, since then, it had substantially reduced its
copper inventory so that, in September 2014, it had a market value of about $368 million.
2348
J PMorgan’s records show that, in recent years, the bank regularly engaged in massive
copper trades that built and reduced its billion-dollar copper inventories. Due to the regulators’
classification of copper as bullion, those activities operated outside of the OCC and Federal
Reserve size limits on physical commodity activities to reduce risk.
(b) Proposing Copper ETF
In addition to trading copper in the physical and financial markets, in October 2010,
J PMorgan filed a registration statement seeking to establish a copper-backed Exchange Traded
Fund (ETF) which would have been the first ETF in the United States backed by a physical
industrial metal.
2349
The proposed ETF was designed to purchase physical copper, store it in the
Henry Bath warehouses owned by J PMorgan, and issue securities linked to the value of that
copper. The securities could then be sold and traded on U.S. securities exchanges. The proposed
ETF stirred controversy among industrial end-users of copper who viewed it as likely to cause
artificial supply shortages and higher and more volatile copper prices by removing large amounts
of copper from the marketplace for indeterminate amounts of time.
2350
While J PMorgan
characterized the ETF as providing “a simple and cost-effective means of making an investment
similar to an investment in copper,”
2351
others compared it to the Hunt Brothers’ silver scandal
and characterized it as an attempt to legally corner and squeeze the copper market to raise
2344
Id.; “J PMorgan Physical Copper Inventories by Market Value chart,” above.
2345
3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015. See also
10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049.
2346
Attachment to 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049.
2347
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as
of J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at 388.
2348
Attachment to 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049.
2349
See 10/22/2010 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J .P. Morgan Physical Copper Trust, filed by J PMorgan, SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000119312510234452/ds1.htm.
2350
See, e.g., 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC on behalf of
copper end-users and a copper merchant, File Number SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
2351
4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8, at 3, SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010313002224/dp37414_s1a8.htm.
360
prices.
2352
The proposal went through a lengthy review process at the SEC which, in 2012,
approved a rule change to allow the ETF to be listed on an exchange for trading, but J PMorgan
then placed the project on hold.
2353
Commodity-based ETFs. Exchange traded funds enable investors to buy and sell
interests in a fund on a stock exchange in the same way that investors can use the stock exchange
to buy and sell shares in a corporation.
2354
The first ETF issuing securities linked to commodity
prices appeared on a U.S. stock exchange in 2004, when interests in an ETF linked to gold prices
began trading.
2355
Commodity-related ETFs can attract smaller investors more easily than
commodity exchanges which use standardized futures and swaps contracts requiring relatively
large investments; for example, LME copper futures currently require an initial investment of
about $6,500 to purchase a single contract.
2356
Interests in commodity-related ETFs typically
trade for much less. Currently, retail investors and market participants can buy and sell interests
in a wide variety of commodity-related ETFs, some of which reference a single commodity
2357
and others of which track broad commodity indexes.
2358
Commodity-related ETFs use several different methods to establish their value. Some
track one or more commodity indexes; some acquire commodity-related futures or other
financial instruments; others acquire an inventory of actual physical commodities; while still
others may offer a combination of those techniques, in each case linking the ETF’s value to the
value of the specified commodities. By investing in commodity-related ETFs, investors gain or
lose value according to the rise or fall in the relevant commodity prices.
2359
JPMorgan Copper ETF. In October 2010, J PMorgan filed an S-1 registration statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposing to create an ETF called the “J .P.
Morgan Physical Copper Trust.”
2360
In 2011, the name was changed to “J PM XF Physical
Copper Trust” (J PMorgan Copper ETF).
2361
The ETF was structured as a Cayman Island trust
whose assets were limited to a single physical commodity, copper. Its investment objective was
2352
See, e.g., “Who Cornered the Copper Market? (J PM, J J C, COPX, SCCO, FCX),” 247WallStreet (12/23/2010),http://247wallst.com/commodities-me...ered-the-copper-market-jpm-jjc-copx-scco-fcx/;
“Copper: Part 2, The Next ETF,” J ack H. Barnes website (12/4/2010),http://jackhbarnes.wordpress.com/2010/12/04/copper-part-2-the-next-etf/.
2353
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2354
3/11/2013 letter from Senator Carl Levin to SEC, “J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Form S-1 Registration
Statement,” (hereinafter, 2013 Levin letter”), PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000001 - 015, at 002.
2355
Id; “How gold ETFs have transformed the market in 10 years,” Market Watch, Myra P. Saefong (3/29/2013),http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-gold-etfs-have-transformed-market-in-10-years-2013-03-29.
2356
See “Copper,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-ferrous/copper/.
2357
See, e.g., “SPDR Gold Shares: An Exchange Traded Gold Security,”http://www.spdrgoldshares.com/.
2358
See, e.g., “iShares S&P GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust,”http://www.ishares.com/us/products/239757/ishares-
sp-gsci-commodityindexed-trust-fund.
2359
See 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000001 - 015, at 002.
2360
10/22/2010 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J .P. Morgan Physical Copper Trust, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000119312510234452/ds1.htm.
2361
6/10/2011 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 4, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010311002278/dp23025_s1a4.htm.
361
to reflect the spot price of copper, less trust expenses and fees.
2362
J PMorgan affiliates were to
serve as the fund’s investment adviser, administer the trust, acquire the copper, store it at
J PMorgan-owned Henry Bath warehouses, and help sell securities to investors, among other
services, all of whose costs would be borne by the investors in the fund.
2363
J PMorgan also
disclosed in the proposed registration statement that it planned to have the ETF indemnify
J PMorgan and its affiliates from any lawsuit filed by an aggrieved investor.
2364
According to the proposed registration statement, the J PMorgan Copper ETF would not
sell individual securities in the investment fund; instead, it would sell large blocks, or “Creation
Units,” of 2,500 securities each to “Authorized Participants” (APs) who were authorized to sell
them to individual investors.
2365
To obtain a block of securities, the AP would be required to
deliver to the ETF a specified amount of physical copper whose dollar value would support the
fund.
2366
After delivering the copper, the AP could begin selling the ETF securities to investors
who could, in turn, trade them on a U.S. stock exchange.
2367
J PMorgan indicated in the
registration statement that it planned to act as one of the Authorized Participants.
J PMorgan’s registration statement explained that, if copper prices increased, the value of
the ETF securities would increase, and investors would gain; conversely, if prices dropped, the
securities’ values would fall, and investors would lose.
2368
If the fund attracted sufficient
investment, the ETF could sell more blocks of securities to Authorized Participants in exchange
for additional copper deliveries.
2369
If investors left the fund, the ETF could reduce its copper
holdings, selling the copper on the spot market or through other arrangements.
2370
After several years of debate and controversy, on December 14, 2012, the SEC approved
a proposed rule change by NYSE Arca Inc. to list the copper ETF for trading.
2371
A copper
merchant and four industrial copper end-users sent a joint request for the SEC to reconsider its
decision, warning that the ETF’s removal of physical copper from the market would disrupt
supply and demand fundamentals, cause damaging price increases, and lead to commercial
supply shortages.
2372
But in March 2013, the SEC reaffirmed its decision.
2373
2362
See 4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8 (hereinafter,
“J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8”), at 1, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010313002224/dp37414_s1a8.htm.
2363
Id. at 83 - 84.
2364
Id. at 87. See also 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000014.
2365
Id. at 85 - 86.
2366
See 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000003.
2367
Id.
2368
See J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8, at 15.
2369
Id. at 78 - 79.
2370
See 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000002.
2371
See 12/14/2012 SEC Release No. 34-68440, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, “Self-Regulatory Organizations;
NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed
Rule Change as Modified by Amendment No. 1 to List and Trade Shares of the J PM XF Physical Copper Trust
Pursuant to NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.201,” filed by the SEC,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2012/34-
68440.pdf.
2372
See 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC, File Number SR-
NYSEArca-2012-28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
2373
See 3/28/2013 SEC Release No. 34-69256, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, “Self-Regulatory Organizations;
NYSE Arca, Inc.; Response to Comments Submitted After the Issuance on December 14, 2012, of a Notice of Filing
362
Challenges were also filed to J PMorgan’s proposed registration statement, contending
that it failed to provide sufficient information to investors about, among other matters, how
J PMorgan’s copper activities could affect the fund; what roles would be played by J PM affiliates
in administering the fund, and how those affiliates would be compensated; whether J PMorgan’s
interests were aligned with or could adversely affect the fund’s clients; and how the fund would
handle conflict of interest and market manipulation issues.
2374
Over the course of two years,
J PMorgan amended its proposed registration statement eight times to address numerous
concerns,
2375
but the statement has yet to be deemed effective by the SEC.
2376
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that it has placed its copper ETF proposal on indefinite hold.
2377
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan Involvement with Copper
J PMorgan’s copper activities raise two sets of concerns. The first focuses on the
loophole in the regulatory rules for physical commodities that exempts copper from size limits
and other safeguards to ensure physical commodity activities are carried out in a financially safe
and sound manner. The second focuses on the conflict of interest and market manipulation
concerns related to the proposed J PMorgan Copper ETF.
(a) Unrestricted Copper Activities
Over the past five years, J PMorgan has conducted massive copper trades, including some
in late 2010 involving billions of dollars and over 50% of the LME’s total copper warrants. In
2011, its physical copper inventory peaked at more than $2.7 billion. To the Subcommittee’s
knowledge, J PMorgan is the only large U.S. financial holding company that conducts copper
trading primarily through its federally insured national bank.
of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change as Modified by
Amendment No. 1 to List and Trade Shares of the J PM XF Physical Copper Trust Pursuant to NYSE Arca Equities
Rule 8.201,” filed by the SEC, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2013/34-69256.pdf/.
2374
See, e.g., 2013 Levin letter, PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000001 - 015.
2375
See 4/5/2013 J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8.
2376
Subcommittee briefing by the SEC (10/8/2014).
2377
Error! Main Document Only.Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014). The J PMorgan registration
statement represents the largest proposed copper ETF to date, but it is not the only proposal. A second is the
BlackRock iShares Copper Trust, which was proposed in 2011, and approved by the SEC in 2013, but still not
finalized. See 9/2/2011 Form S-1 Registration Statement, iShares Copper Trust, Amendment No. 4, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ edgar/data/1504251/000119312511240231/ds1a.htm; 2/22/2013 SEC Release No. 34-
68973, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-66, "Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of
Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change as Modified by
Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 to List and Trade Shares of the iShares Copper Trust Pursuant to NYSE Arca Equities
Rule 8.201," filed by SEC,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2013/34-68973.pdf. Additionally, a London-
based investment firm called ETF Securities introduced a physical copper ETF in Europe that is similar to, but much
smaller than, the J PMorgan and BlackRock proposals. It holds only about 3,400 metric tons of copper, while the
J PMorgan and BlackRock proposals collectively seek to place in storage about 70% of the current copper stocks in
LME warehouses. See "SEC Approves J PMorgan's Plan For Copper ETF, First in US," Reuters (12/17/2012),http://www.moneynews.com/Markets/SEC-J PMorgan-Copper-ETF/2012/12/17/id/467985/.
363
As discussed in the following section, both the OCC and the Federal Reserve impose size
limits on physical commodity activities to ensure they do not threaten the safety and soundness
of the financial institutions conducting those activities.
2378
The OCC limits banks to settling no
more than 5% of their derivative transactions by taking physical delivery of commodities. The
Federal Reserve limits financial holding companies to conducting complementary physical
commodity activities at no more than 5% of their Tier 1 capital. Activities involving “bullion,”
however, are exempted, not only from those limits, but also from any monitoring and reporting
requirements related to the size of physical commodity activities.
J PMorgan informed the Subcommittee that it did not include any of its copper holdings
when calculating the market value of its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying
with the OCC and Federal Reserve size limits.
2379
J PMorgan indicated, for example, that when it
added up the dollar value of its physical commodity holdings to gauge compliance with the
OCC’s derivatives limit, it omitted its copper holdings, which often exceeded $1 billion.
2380
J PMorgan explained that it also did not include copper – or any of the metal holdings at its bank
– when calculating compliance with the Federal Reserve’s complementary limit, because they
were not held pursuant to its complementary authority from the Federal Reserve.
2381
When the
Subcommittee asked the Federal Reserve about J PMorgan’s exempting its copper holdings from
the regulatory size limits, the Federal Reserve confirmed that copper trading activities are, in
fact, conducted under a separate Federal Reserve grant of regulatory authority for “bullion,”
2382
and so were not conducted under J PMorgan’s complementary authority and were not subject to
the 5% limit.
2383
Exempting “bullion” from physical commodity limits and reporting requirements rests on
the traditional role of banks using gold and silver as mediums of exchange; while anachronistic,
that exception has been viewed as a limited one.
2384
Extending the definition of “bullion” to
copper dramatically stretched the exception. In its 1995 interpretative letter deciding that copper
could be treated as “bullion,” the OCC ignored copper’s longstanding, worldwide trading status
as a base metal, and instead highlighted other characteristics:
“Copper, like platinum and palladium, has been used to mint legal-tender coins. …
Additionally, copper, like platinum and palladium, is bought and sold as a metal in a
mass standardized as to weight and purity.”
2385
Focusing on the use of copper in coins and the use of standardized weight and purity
requirements in copper trading does not explain, however, why copper merits special status.
Other base metals, such as zinc, nickel, and even steel, have been used to make coins in the
2378
See discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits, below.
2379
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2380
Id.
2381
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014). For more information about exempting its bank’s holdings
from the Federal Reserve’s size limit, see discussion in the next section, below.
2382
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii).
2383
10/30/2014 email from the Federal Reserve to the Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 002-003.
2384
The Subcommittee did not examine the gold, silver, platinum, and palladium trading undertaken by the financial
institutions that are the subject of this Report, and has no data on the actual size of that trading activity.
2385
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135, 138.
364
United States. In fact, the penny – the U.S. coin most closely associated with copper – has been
composed of 97.5% zinc since 1984.
2386
Moreover, a broad swath of base metals, including
aluminum, lead, steel, and uranium, are traded using standardized weight and purity
requirements.
2387
Even today, more than 15 years after the OCC’s determination, banks –
including J PMorgan Chase Bank,
2388
trading firms,
2389
analysts,
2390
and exchanges
2391
continue
to treat copper for trading and risk management purposes as a base metal, not a precious metal.
U.S. bank regulators’ contrary stance is out of alignment with worldwide trading norms.
Given copper’s widely-accepted trading status as a base metal, the impact of copper price
volatility on end-users, and financial holding company involvement with massive copper
inventories and transactions, the Federal Reserve and OCC should treat copper as subject to all
the same size limits and reporting requirements that apply to other base metals. Otherwise,
copper will continue to provide a loophole that can be used to circumvent otherwise applicable
2386
See undated “The Composition of the Cent,” United States Mint,http://www.usmint.gov/about_the_mint/fun_facts/?action=fun_facts2.
2387
See “Metals Used in Coins and Medals,” Coins of the UK, Tony Clayton (3/9/2014),http://www.coins-of-the-
uk.co.uk/pics/metal.html.
2388
See e.g., undated “Commodities,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities/metals (listing copper as a “base metal”
on its Products & Solutions webpage); 9/26/2013 “FED/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan,
FRB-PSI-301383-396, at 388 (including copper, along with aluminum, nickel, and zinc, under the heading “Base
Metal” and identifying a copper holding as one of the bank’s “Key Risk Positions”); 7/24/2013 “Mining
commodities: The focus shifts to the supply side,” prepared by Goldman,http://ucore.com/Commodities_Supply_Side.pdf (explaining in a 2013 report on investment strategies that, because
copper was expected to underperform zinc and lead: “Copper has shifted to [their] least preferred base metal on a 6-
18 month view”); 12/10/2010 “2011 Outlook: A Commodity Bull Market,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, at 1,7,
file:///C:/Users/am44209/Downloads/COMMODITIES_2011_OUTLOOK.pdf (describing copper as Morgan
Stanley’s “favorite base metal,” with “copper fundamentals” that “remain the strongest in the base metal complex”).
2389
See, e.g., undated “Base Metals,” Mercuria Energy Trading,http://www.mercuria.com/trading/base-metals
(listing copper, along with aluminum, lead, zinc, nickel and tin, on its “base metals” information page); undated
“Trading: Refined metals: Products,” Trafigura website,http://www.trafigura.com/trading/non-ferrous-and-
bulk/refined-metals/ (describing its metals business as dealing “mainly in London Metal Exchange (LME)
deliverable grades for the major base metal markets, including copper, lead, zinc, nickel and aluminium”); undated,
“Base metals[:] Copper,” Metal Bulletin website,http://www.metalbulletin.com/Base-
metals/Copper.html#axzz3GEGCyEkl.
2390
See, e.g., 4/9/2012 “CPM Group: Commodities Views-Apr 9,” prepared by CPM Group,http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/14-CPM_Commodities_Views_8-14_2012-04-09.pdf; undated, “Base
Metals,” CPM Group,http://www.cpmgroup.com/our-commodities-coverage/base-metals (listing copper as a base
metal on the website and in the weekly commodities view report of CPM Group, a commodities research firm).
2391
See, e.g., 9/4/2014, “New Products Briefing - LME and HKEx: Base Metals Seminar,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/news-and-events/...-products-briefing-_-lme-and-hkex--singapore/
(announcing a new base metals seminar to launch London Metal mini contracts “in base metals such as copper,
aluminum and zinc”); 9/5/2014, “Precious Metals Price Data and Matching and Clearing Services,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2014/2014_09/14%20269%20A261%20Precious%20Metals%20Price%
20Data%20and%20Matching%20and%20Clearing%20Services.pdf (omitting copper from its precious metals price
data and clearing services); undated, “Metals Product Slate,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/ (listing copper and aluminum in its “base metal” subgroup and not under
its “precious metals” subgroup.); undated “Commodity Market Commentary: Energy, Metals and the Soft
Commodities,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/education/featured-reports/cpm-group-
commodities-views.html (listing copper in the base metals subgroup).
365
physical commodity safeguards important to protecting U.S. taxpayers from risks related to
physical commodity activities.
(b) ETF Conflicts of Interest
A second set of concerns involves J PMorgan’s proposal to construct an Exchange Traded
Fund (ETF) backed by physical copper. While this proposal is currently on hold, the relevant
registration statement has not been withdrawn from the SEC by J PMorgan, and the registration
process could be easily re-started.
2392
For that reason, the J PMorgan Copper ETF continues to
raise conflict of interest and market manipulation concerns that need to be addressed.
One area of potential conflicts of interest involves J PMorgan’s ownership of a significant
copper inventory and its active copper trading activities at the same time it has been working to
create a copper-backed ETF. As indicated earlier, J PMorgan’s copper inventory fluctuated from
2010 to 2013, peaking at $2.7 billion but rarely falling below $1 billion in market value.
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that its massive copper acquisitions were unrelated to its
ETF.
2393
Nevertheless, its copper-backed ETF was designed to acquire a large physical copper
inventory, and its registration statement indicated that J PMorgan planned to be one of the
Authorized Participants that would deposit physical copper with the fund in exchange for ETF
securities. In late 2010, in the two months after the ETF registration was first filed with the SEC,
J PMorgan initiated trades that led to its amassing an enormous copper inventory. Analysts at the
time predicted copper prices would rise as a result of J PMorgan’s large copper purchases.
2394
Soon after, J PMorgan sold the bulk of its copper holdings over a short period of time, suddenly
increasing the marginal amount of copper available for trading, while contributing to volatility
and downward pressure on copper prices. Those large trades demonstrate how J PMorgan could
impact the value of the copper placed in its copper-backed ETF and do so through trades that
could be beneficial or adverse to potential ETF investors.
By forming and administering the ETF, J PMorgan would also have positioned itself to
gain access to commercially valuable, non-public ETF information that could have been used to
benefit its trading activities, again, at times, in ways that could have been adverse to ETF
investors. J PMorgan had arranged for its affiliates to advise and administer the ETF, necessarily
giving them access to the ETF’s internal records on copper investments and physical copper
movements. Those J PMorgan affiliates would have gained access, for example, to information
about plans by an Authorized Participant to buy physical copper to place in the ETF, an action
which, if known beforehand, could have provided J PMorgan traders with an opportunity to profit
from marginal supply shortages and rising copper prices. Alternatively, information that ETF
investors were leaving the fund and might trigger a release of copper into the marketplace could
have provided J PMorgan traders with an opportunity to short copper futures and benefit from
lower prices. In that instance, J PMorgan could have initiated trades against the interests of ETF
investors seeking higher copper prices. The J PMorgan registration statement recognized that
2392
Subcommittee briefing by the SEC (10/8/2014).
2393
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 005.
2394
See, e.g., “Copper price set to rise further after J P Morgan bet,” The Telegraph, Rowena Mason (12/6/2010),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...82493/Copper-price-set-to-rise-further-after-
J P-Morgan-bet.html.
366
possibility, stating that it had “not established formal procedures to resolve potential conflicts of
interest,” which would protect investors in the event that J PMorgan affiliates traded against the
interests of the ETF investors.
2395
Still another set of issues involves potential manipulation of copper prices. By amassing
large amounts of physical copper, the J PMorgan Copper ETF would have made the copper
market more susceptible to being squeezed by speculators. In 1996, a major scandal over copper
prices involved the purchase of massive amounts of copper by the Sumitomo Corporation’s chief
copper trader who used those copper holdings to corner and squeeze the market and artificially
inflate copper prices.
2396
Additional squeezes in the copper market by unnamed traders amassing
large copper holdings have generated media reports over the last few years.
2397
The J PMorgan
Copper ETF could have made the market even more susceptible to squeezes, because it would
have been used by market participants to remove copper from the available market supply which,
in turn, could have inflated copper prices. J PMorgan’s own registration statement acknowledged
that the ETF, “as it grows, may have an impact on supply and demand for copper that ultimately
may affect the price of the shares in a manner unrelated to other factors affecting the global
markets for copper.”
2398
In other words, the ETF, by removing copper from the marketplace,
could affect copper prices in a way unrelated to fundamental supply and demand forces and
which could act effectively as a manipulation of the price.
The market manipulation problem would have been magnified by the fact that the ETF’s
activities would have taken place without oversight from commodities regulators, because ETFs
operate in securities markets and are not currently subject to commodities regulation. Instead,
because ETFs issue securities to their investors, ETFs are currently regulated solely by securities
regulators like the SEC, and not by commodities regulators, like the LME or Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). By holding physical copper that is not subject to LME warrants,
the J PMorgan Copper ETF could have positioned itself to control a substantial portion of the
available supply of physical copper without triggering LME or CFTC surveillance, rules, or
reporting requirements.
How the ETF planned to detect and prevent its misuse as a means of market manipulation
was not addressed in the J PMorgan Copper ETF registration statement. As Subcommittee
Chairman Levin put it in a letter challenging the registration:
2395
J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8, at 23.
2396
See, e.g., Global Derivative Debacles: From Theory to Malpractice, Laurent L. J acque (World Scientific 2010),
Chapter 7, at 97–101; “The Copper King: An Empire Built On Manipulation,” Investopedia, Andrew Beattie
(undated),http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/mr-copper-commodities.asp.
2397
See, e.g., “Copper market expects squeeze, big holding appears,” Reuters, Eric Onstad, (7/2/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-copper-tightness-idUSBRE8610XK20120702; “The Big Squeeze -
mystery hand scoops up copper,” Reuters (12/20/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/copper-squeeze-
idUSL6N0J X2FG20131220 (“Someone has made a near billion-dollar bet on copper this week, virtually cornering
the world's key stocks of the metal. That has stoked worries of a supply squeeze, as warehouses run low on a raw
material vital to global industry, and has raised questions about commodity exchanges' efforts to curb attempts to
manipulate prices by aggressively heavy trading.”); “Single Firm Holds More Than 50% of Copper in LME
Warehouses,” Wall Street J ournal, Sarah Kent, Ese Erheriene, Ira Iosebashvili (10/26/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/single-firm-holds-more-than-50-of-copper-in-lme-warehouses-
1414361984?cb=logged0.02992292078844988.
2398
J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8, at 21.
367
“The S-1 [registration statement] does not identify, discuss, or present actions that could
be taken to address the legal issues that might arise if the ETF itself is seen as fostering
price distortions, squeezes, corners, or other price manipulations in the copper market.
Nor does the S-1 detail what policies and procedures J PMorgan would follow to ensure
that its other trading and business interests are not impermissibly conflicted with those
invested in [the J PMorgan Copper ETF]. …
As currently configured, the [J PMorgan Copper ETF] Trust contains no provisions to
prevent high investor demand from causing an increase in copper prices or, alternatively,
a quick drop in demand from driving down copper prices. The risk of a bubble in the
copper market creates a corresponding risk that the bubble will eventually burst. If that
happens, investors may dump thousands of metric tons of copper back onto the market,
swamping the market and depressing the price, impacting not only copper-reliant
industries around the world, but also possibly producing large gains for any parties
shorting the copper market.”
2399
The many conflict of interest and market manipulation concerns raised by an ETF backed
by physical commodities are not fully addressed or resolved in the J PMorgan Copper ETF
registration statement or the existing regulatory framework. If a financial holding company
were to be found to have engaged in market manipulation through an ETF, it could lead to
copper price distortions, civil and criminal actions by law enforcement agencies, lawsuits by
ETF investors, legal expenses, penalties, and other consequences.
(c) Potential Economic Impacts of a Copper ETF
Aside from conflict of interest and market manipulation concerns, a copper-backed ETF
may have significant impacts on the broader economy, by increasing commodity costs and price
volatility for consumers and producers. Some commentators have said the financialization of
base metals would “wreak havoc on the US and global economy.”
2400
Those commentators note
that the intent of a commodity-based ETF is to provide speculators with a way to bet on the price
of the underlying commodity. Two supply and demand curves result – one for the physical
commodity such as metal, and another for the financial product related to that metal. Although
the two are integrally related, they are distinct. For example, investors in a copper ETF may not
be interested in using the copper; their goal may simply be to profit from changes in copper
prices. Their investments are likely to drive up prices for consumers who actually use physical
copper by reducing the supply of copper available on the market.
The market impact of a copper ETF may be exacerbated by the fact that copper has not
historically been held for investment purposes.
2401
Copper is expensive to store and difficult to
2399
2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000008.
2400
“Copper ETF Plan Would ‘Wreak Havoc,’” Financial Times, J ack Farchy (3/23/2012),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7d32d4c-a4fb-11e1-b421-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DOphziCJ .
2401
See, e.g., 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC, File Number
SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, at 26 – 28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-
28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
368
transport.
2402
Its supply and demand functions have traditionally been set according to
commercial and personal uses, and not as a store of value.
2403
That means, if a copper ETF were
to be established, manufacturers, fabricators, and other industrial businesses that use copper
would be forced to compete with speculators holding copper as a passive asset, changing the
market dynamics of copper’s supply and demand functions and introducing greater volatility.
2404
For those reasons, the acquisition and holding of copper for investment purposes may
have a greater impact on physical markets
2405
and the broader economy
2406
than ETFs holding
palladium, platinum, silver, or gold. At the same time, a commodity-backed ETF can have a
significant impact on the price and volatility of the underlying commodity, even when a precious
metal is involved. For example, gold-related ETFs first surfaced in 2004,
2407
with dozens of
similar ETFs springing up over time.
2408
Today, it has become clear that significant movements
in the gold-related ETFs have had direct impacts on the price of physical gold.
2409
As one
analyst in the field noted: “You watch the flow of money …. No matter what the supply-and-
demand fundamentals [for physical gold] may suggest, if that money’s flowing, those prices are
going to move.”
2410
The Wall Street J ournal cited as a possible explanation for the impact of
gold ETFs on physical gold prices, the relatively small size of the gold market, estimated at $236
billion in annual sales in 2012, and the ETFs’ significant share of those sales.
2411
A copper-based ETF could create a similar dynamic with copper prices, with potentially
even more dramatic effects on copper producers and consumers around the world, because of the
larger size of the copper market.
(d) Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of concerns involves the lack of regulatory safeguards applicable to both
copper and copper-backed ETFs. The regulatory decision to treat copper as “bullion” has
already exempted copper as a class from OCC and Federal Reserve size limits intended to reduce
risk. Similar regulatory gaps apply to copper-backed ETFs. Because commodity-related ETFs
issue securities to investors, they operate outside of all commodity regulation and oversight, even
2402
See, e.g., J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 1, at 40-41.
2403
See, e.g., 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC, File Number
SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, at 26 – 28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-
28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
2404
Id. See also 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000003.
2405
See “Speculative Influences on Commodity Futures Prices,” Christopher Gilbert (2010),http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20101_en.pdf, at 8.
2406
See “The Growing Financialisation of Commodity Markets: Divergences between Index Investors and Money
Managers,” J ournal of Developmental Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 6, (2012), J örg Mayer (UNCTAD), at 752 - 753.
2407
2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000002.
2408
See, e.g., Form S-1 Registration Statement, streetTRACKS Gold Trust, Amendment No. 5 (11/16/2004),
Securities and Exchange Commission website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1222333/000095013604004007/file001.htm; Form S-1 Registration
Statement, iShares COMEX Gold Trust, Amendment No. 4 (1/25/2005), Securities and Exchange Commission
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278680/000119312505011426/ds1a.txt.
2409
“Does a Big ETF Drive Gold’s Price?” Wall Street J ournal, Rob Curran (5/5/2013),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324030704578426613352725022.
2410
Id.
2411
Id.
369
though they directly impact both commodity prices and commodity trading. In addition,
physical metals like copper generally fall outside of federal regulation, which currently focuses
on the financial market for metals rather than the physical market, even though contracts to buy
metals like copper in the physical market may reference prices set in the LME futures market.
Federal banking regulators should treat ETFs backed by physical commodities as within
the category of physical commodity activities subject to their oversight. ETFs backed by
physical commodities carry conflict of interest and market manipulation risks that can threaten
the safety and soundness of affiliated banks and their holding companies. Federal bank
regulators should make it clear that those ETFs are physical commodity activities subject to
review, and impose regulatory constraints to reduce their risks, including size limits and
safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest and market manipulation. Commodity regulators like
the CFTC should also work with the SEC to apply position limits or other restrictions to ETF
owners, organizers, and authorized participants to prevent the misuse of ETFs backed by
physical commodities to manipulate commodity prices.
(4) Analysis
J PMorgan has a long history as an active trader in copper markets. At times, it has
amassed copper holdings worth billions of dollars, carrying financial risks due to volatile copper
prices. It is not the only financial holding company with large copper holdings; for example, in
J anuary 2011, according to the Federal Reserve, Goldman held copper worth $2.3 billion.
2412
Those copper holdings should be subject to the same size limits as all other physical
commodities, but currently are not. Federal bank regulators should ensure that copper’s status as
“bullion” does not lead to federally insured banks and their holding companies engaging in
copper activities on an unrestricted basis, but instead ensure they operate within limits that
reduce the risks associated with investing in such a volatile commodity.
In addition, while J PMorgan has placed its plan to offer a copper-backed ETF on hold, it
could revive that proposal at any time. If it were to obtain approval of its registration statement,
the resulting copper-backed ETF could distort copper markets worldwide with artificial supply
shortages and price swings, create conflicts of interest between J PMorgan and the ETF investors,
and expose J PMorgan to possible legal actions to prevent or halt market manipulation. If
allowed to proceed, J PMorgan could also set an ill-advised precedent for other bank-sponsored
commodity-backed ETFs that could raise similar concerns and have similar negative impacts on
commodity markets. Regulators should act now to make clear that ETFs backed by physical
commodities will be treated as a physical commodity activity subject to oversight, and develop
safeguards to detect and prevent conflicts of interest and market manipulation.
2412
2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200455 - 476,
at 464 [sealed exhibit].
370
D. JPMorgan Involvement with Size Limits
This final part of the J PMorgan case study examines, not a particular commodity, but
issues related to financial holding company compliance with regulatory limits on the size of their
physical commodity holdings. Those size limits were established to reduce the risks associated
with those activities, protect the safety and soundness of the banks and their holding companies,
and ensure that the banks and their holding companies remain engaged primarily in the business
of banking and conduct only a limited amount of physical commodity activities.
The Federal Reserve, which is the primary regulator for financial holding companies,
imposes several distinct limits on physical commodity activities. Depending on which authority
is being relied upon, the activity may be: (i) limited to not more than 5% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital; (ii) limited to not more than 5% of the financial holding company’s
total consolidated assets (a much larger number); or (iii) subject to no limit at all. In addition,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which is the primary regulator for national
banks, has its own size limit on physical commodity activities. It requires that physical
commodities transactions be conducted in only a “nominal” amount, comprising “no more than
5%” of the bank’s commodity derivative transactions. Neither regulator has issued formal
guidance on how to implement their limits or, until recently, required regular reports tracking
compliance. Nor are their limits coordinated in any comprehensive or coherent way.
The Federal Reserve and OCC size limits applicable to J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase
Bank respectively were the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit on complementary activities, and the
OCC 5% limit on commodity derivative transactions that are physically settled. For years,
J PMorgan and its bank employed aggressive interpretations on how to interpret and apply those
two limits, at times without alerting regulators to their actions. In some cases, J PMorgan and
J PMorgan Chase Bank implemented their respective size limits in ways that were later – after the
regulators learned of them – rejected by the Federal Reserve or OCC. In other circumstances, its
aggressive interpretations and implementation methodologies were allowed to continue, even
after regulators learned of them.
The end result was that J PMorgan maintained physical commodity holdings far larger
than the limits would suggest. In September 2012, for example, J PMorgan held physical
commodity assets – excluding gold, silver, and commodity-related merchant banking assets –
that had a combined market value of $17.4 billion, which at the time equaled nearly 12% of its
Tier 1 capital of $148 billion. J PMorgan asserted, however, that due to various exclusions
allowing it to omit certain categories of assets when calculating compliance, the market value of
its physical commodity assets for purposes of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit was only $6.6
billion or 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it had not
yet objected to the exclusions J PMorgan was using to claim compliance with the 5% limit. That
J PMorgan could claim to be in compliance with a 5% limit when its physical commodities were,
in fact, more than double that size demonstrates how the current regulatory limits are riddled
with exclusions, poorly coordinated, and currently ineffective to protect taxpayers from financial
holding companies engaging in excessive amounts of high risk physical commodity activities.
371
(1) Background on Size Limits
Financial holding companies and their banks, when engaged in physical commodity
activities, are subject to several sets of prudential limits on size enforced by the Federal Reserve
and OCC.
Federal Reserve Limits. As explained earlier, the Federal Reserve historically
permitted very little involvement by bank holding companies in physical commodities
markets.
2413
Then in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created a new category of “financial
holding companies” and authorized them to engage in complementary, grandfathered, and
merchant banking activities that could include physical commodities. The Federal Reserve
responded by broadening the physical commodity activities that bank holding companies could
conduct.
2414
For a financial holding company to engage in complementary activities, it must first
obtain permission from the Federal Reserve. Beginning in 2000, the Federal Reserve authorized
over a dozen financial holding companies to engage in “complementary” activities involving
physical commodities.
2415
In the orders and letters granting that complementary authority, the
Federal Reserve typically noted that the intent of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley complementary
provision was “to allow the [Federal Reserve] Board to permit FHCs [financial holding
companies]” to engage in the specified commercial activities “on a limited basis.”
2416
The Federal Reserve also imposed a number of limitations on the financial holding
companies receiving complementary authority. One key limitation stated that, “to limit the
potential safety and soundness risks of Commodity Trading Activities,” the “market value of
commodities held” by the financial holding company “must not exceed 5 percent” of the
financial holding company’s “consolidated tier 1 capital.”
2417
In addition, the financial holding
company was required to notify the Federal Reserve if the market value of its physical
commodities “exceeds 4 percent of its tier 1 capital.”
2418
The Federal Reserve imposed that
same volume limit and reporting requirement on all of the financial holding companies given
complementary authority to engage in physical commodity activities.
2419
A later internal Federal Reserve memorandum described the twin objectives of the 5%
limit as:
2413
See discussion in Chapter 2, above, on the history of bank involvement with physical commodities.
2414
See discussion in Chapter 3, above, describing Federal Reserve actions after the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
2415
See discussion in Chapter 3 above, describing the Federal Reserve grants of complementary authority to
financial holding companies from 2000 to 2009.
2416
See, e.g., 11/18/2005 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by J P Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 - C59, at C57
(2006) (hereinafter, “2005 J PMorgan Complementary Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
2417
Id. at C58.
2418
Id.
2419
See citations to the individual orders in Chapter 3. Neither Goldman nor Morgan Stanley has ever requested or
received a complementary order; they rely instead on other authorities, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
grandfather and merchant banking authorities, to conduct their physical commodity activities.
372
“intended to both limit the level of activity that ‘appears commercial in nature’ and to
address safety and soundness concerns related to non-traditional risk from industrial
commodities activities.”
2420
Physical commodity activities undertaken as complementary activities were not the only
activities subject to limits. In addition, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act imposed a limit on the
physical commodity activities that could be undertaken by firms that converted to bank holding
companies under the so-called “grandfather clause.”
2421
The statute specified that physical
commodity activities undertaken through the grandfather clause had to be limited to “not more
than 5 percent of the total consolidated assets of the bank holding company.”
2422
In addition, the
statute authorized financial holding companies to engage in “merchant banking” activities which,
among other types of business, could include physical commodity activities.
2423
Initially, the
Federal Reserve imposed a limit on the overall size of merchant banking activities, generally
capping them at no more than 30% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital, but that cap
was removed more than a decade ago.
2424
Since then, physical commodity activities undertaken
pursuant to the merchant banking provision have operated with no size limit at all.
Each of the size limits imposed on financial holding company involvement with physical
commodities was intended, in part, to reduce the safety and soundness risks associated with those
activities. The Federal Reserve, however, has not issued any written guidance on how each of
the limits should be applied, or how they should be integrated so that they work together
efficiently and effectively. Nor, until recently, did the Federal Reserve impose routine reporting
requirements to determine whether financial holding companies were appropriately valuing their
physical commodity assets and accurately reporting compliance with the 5% limit.
2425
Instead,
the Federal Reserve essentially relied on its examiners and the financial holding companies
themselves to ensure the complementary, merchant banking, and grandfathering limits were
implemented in appropriate ways.
OCC Limits. A second set of limits on physical commodity activities was imposed by
the OCC, which regulates federally-insured national banks, in contrast to the bank holding
companies regulated by the Federal Reserve.
Like bank holding companies, federally-chartered banks have historically held
inventories of precious metals, such as gold or silver, but not other types of physical
commodities in any significant quantities. In 1993, the OCC significantly altered this landscape
2420
Undated but likely the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 301 [sealed exhibit].
2421
See discussion in Chapter 3, above, regarding the grandfather clause.
2422
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, §103(a).
2423
See discussion in Chapter 3, above, regarding merchant banking authority.
2424
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds); Capital; Leverage and
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy, Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity
Investments, 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (1/25/2002) (adopting a final rule that ended the size limit while imposing specific
capital requirements for merchant banking investments).
2425
While the Federal Reserve has long had access to, and general reporting regarding, financial holding companies’
commodities activities, the specifics regarding compliance with applicable size limits, were not, until recently,
regularly provided to the regulators.
373
when it issued an Interpretive Letter that deemed it permissible for national banks to hedge their
commodity-linked derivative transactions by taking or making delivery of physical commodities,
subject to certain limitations.
2426
Two years later, in 1995, the OCC broadened and clarified this
new physical commodity hedging authority with another Interpretive Letter.
2427
The OCC
explicitly limited this hedging authority by imposing a number of requirements and restrictions,
including that the authorized transactions needed to be:
• “nominal,” and that “no more than 5% of its total transactions involving Eligible
Commodities would involve actual physical delivery;”
• “Hedge Transactions” used to “manage risk” arising out of permissible commodity-
linked financial transactions;
• made only with “Eligible Commodities,” meaning physical metals that were not
deemed to be bullion and coin, including aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc,
cobalt, platinum, iridium, palladium, and rhodium;
2428
• “customer-driven;” and not “entered into for speculative purposes.”
2429
The Interpretive Letter did not detail how the specified limitations and safeguards were to
be implemented. For example, the letter did not detail how the 5% limit should be calculated or
applied. In addition, since 1995, the OCC has not issued any formal guidance on its 5% limit,
nor, until recently, required regular reporting on compliance with it. Instead, similar to the
Federal Reserve, until very recently, the OCC essentially relied on its examiners and the
financial holding companies themselves to implement the limit in an appropriate way.
(2) JPMorgan’s Aggressive Interpretations
J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank have both, over the years, employed aggressive
interpretations and practices when complying with the regulatory size limits.
2430
J PMorgan,
which exercised a wide range of complementary activities involving physical commodities, was
subject to the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. J PMorgan Chase Bank, which conducted a large
amount of physical commodities activities involving primarily physical metals like aluminum
and copper, was subject to the OCC’s separate 5% limit. From 2005 to 2012, despite those
purported size limits, J PMorgan accumulated massive physical commodity holdings far in excess
of 5% of its Tier 1 capital.
2426
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358 - 366.
2427
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 - 374.
2428
Id. Three months later, the OCC issued another Interpretive Letter allowing banks to treat copper as “bullion,”
which effectively excluded copper from the 5% limit imposed by the OCC. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693
(11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141.
2429
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 - 374. The OCC also prohibited the bank
from being a “dealer or market-maker” in the physical commodity transactions; required the bank to “take delivery
by accepting warehouse receipts or simultaneous ‘pass-through’ delivery to another party;” and precluded the bank
from taking “a net position” in the commodities. Id.
2430
In this section, unless otherwise indicated, “J PMorgan” refers to the holding company, J PMorgan Chase & Co.,
while “J PMorgan Chase Bank” refers to its primary national bank subsidiary.
374
J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank claimed to be in compliance with the Federal
Reserve and OCC size limits, despite the actual size of their physical commodity holdings, by
excluding and minimizing the value of various assets when calculating the market value of their
respective holdings. Until 2012, both regulators had largely relied on J PMorgan and J PMorgan
Chase Bank to track their own compliance and report any breaches of the regulatory limits.
When the regulators learned of their aggressive interpretations and practices in connection with
the limits, they disallowed some, while allowing others to continue.
J PMorgan’s compliance practices came into the spotlight in late December 2011, when
J PMorgan Chase Bank engaged in a massive physical commodities transaction, involving $1.6
billion in aluminum, and breached the OCC’s limit. To bring the bank back into compliance
with the OCC limit, the bank “sold” about $1.1 billion in aluminum to a nonbank affiliate of the
J PMorgan holding company, J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC). J PMorgan
informed the Federal Reserve that it had exceeded the 4% reporting threshold for physical
commodities, but would not exceed the 5% limit. That transaction led to both Federal Reserve
and OCC examiners asking questions about the compliance of both J PMorgan and J PMorgan
Chase Bank with their respective size limits. The Federal Reserve examiners learned for the first
time that the financial holding company had not been including the value of its bank’s physical
commodity assets when reporting the market value of it physical commodity holdings to the
Federal Reserve. The OCC examiners learned that the bank had earlier exceeded the OCC limit
without disclosing the breach to OCC examiners, and then remained in breach of the limit,
ultimately for about a month.
The Federal Reserve and OCC examiners also learned that, when the physical commodity
assets of the financial holding company and bank were combined, they far exceeded 5% of the
financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital, and had exceeded that level in every month of 2011.
J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank nevertheless asserted they were in full compliance with
both the Federal Reserve and OCC 5% limits, except for the one-month period, because they
could use exclusions and other valuation techniques that brought down the value of their
respective assets to below the regulatory limits. Despite concerns expressed by Federal Reserve
and OCC examiners about J PMorgan’s excluding its bank’s assets when calculating the financial
holding company’s physical commodity holdings, the Federal Reserve legal department has so
far declined to object to J PMorgan’s approach.
(a) Making Commitments
In 2004 and 2005, J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank sought expanded
authority to engage in physical commodity activities from their respective regulators. To
obtain that authority, both made commitments to comply with the size limits designed to
reduce the associated risks.
2004 JPMorgan Chase Bank Commitments to the OCC. In 2004, as its merger with
Bank One was being finalized, J PMorgan Chase Bank sent a letter to the OCC essentially
alerting it to the physical commodity activities then taking place within the bank, and seeking
confirmation that those activities were permissible. The J PMorgan Chase Bank letter stated:
375
“The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information regarding the Bank's
current commodity derivative activities and to request the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency's (the "OCC") concurrence with our view that entering into (1) cash-settled
derivative transactions in natural gas, crude oil, power, coal, emissions and weather, (2)
physically-settled transactions in the form of transitory title transfers in natural gas, crude
oil, power, emissions and coal, including volumetric production payment transactions,
and (3) physical commodity transactions in natural gas, crude oil, coal and emissions, all
as described more fully below, is permissible for a national bank.”
2431
To persuade the OCC to support continuation of its physical commodity activities, in its
letter J PMorgan Chase Bank made a number of commitments, including that: (1) all of its
commodity related transactions would be to assist customers, and not for purposes of
speculation; (2) it would establish comprehensive risk management practices and policies; and
(3) when the bank took delivery of physical commodities, it would act as a financial intermediary
and that “taking delivery of a physical commodity should be incidental to such financial
intermediation.”
2432
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that the bank never received a specific
written response from the OCC, but its understanding was that the activities described in its letter
were, in fact, permissible.
2433
2005 JPMorgan Commitments to the Federal Reserve. Nine months after J PMorgan
Chase Bank sent the letter to the OCC, its holding company, J PMorgan, sent one to the Federal
Reserve applying for complementary authority to engage in physical commodity activities
through the financial holding company.
2434
The letter asked that J PMorgan be allowed to
“expand its commodities derivatives activities to include physical transactions in the natural gas,
crude oil and emissions allowance markets” through an affiliate, J PMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation (J PMVEC).
2435
The letter indicated that J PMVEC’s “front office” employees would
also be employees of J PMorgan Chase Bank, and the bank would also supply administrative and
operational support for J PMVEC.
2436
J PMVEC would then execute commodity trades for both
the bank and the holding company.
The letter requested complementary authority that would allow J PMorgan, through
J PMVEC, to trade as a principal using commodity-related futures, swaps, options, forwards, and
similar contracts.
2437
The letter indicated that, if given the authority, in many cases, J PMorgan
would either settle the contracts on a financial basis (without making or taking physical delivery
of the commodities) or use paperwork to take legal title to the physical commodities and transfer
that title “instantaneously” to a third party.
2438
The letter also stated that, in other cases,
2431
10/26/2004 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to OCC, “Commodity Derivative Activities of J PMorgan Chase
Bank,” OCC-PSI-00000266 - 298, at 266.
2432
Id. at 267.
2433
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014). However, the OCC subsequently engaged
the bank in extended discussions, some of which resulted in the OCC providing numerous Interpretive Letters to the
bank during 2005 and 2006. Subcommittee briefing by OCC (11/14/2014).
2434
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 000028.
2435
Id. at 007 (internal citations omitted).
2436
Id. at 012.
2437
Id. at 009.
2438
Id.
376
J PMorgan would take legal title to physical commodities for “a relatively short period of
time.”
2439
In addition, the letter stated that J PMorgan “d[id] not expect to own, control or
operate entities in the Unites States that are involved in the production, distribution, storage or
processing of physical commodities for the purposes of engaging in those activities.”
2440
J PMorgan’s 2005 letter to the Federal Reserve also made a number of specific
commitments if it were granted expanded authority to conduct physical commodity activities.
They included commitments that J PMorgan would:
• “limit the amount of physical commodities that it holds at any one time to 5% of its
consolidated Tier 1 Capital,” a limit which, for reference purposes, it estimated was
about $3.5 billion on December 31, 2004, based on J PM Chase Tier 1 capital at that
time of $69.4 billion;
2441
• “assure proper risk management and controls over the [physical commodity
activities]”;
2442
• “make and take physical delivery of, or store, only commodities, such as natural gas,
crude oil, and emissions allowances, that have been approved by the CFTC for
trading on U.S. futures exchanges”;
2443
• “not acquire or operate facilities in the Unites States for the extraction, transportation,
storage or distribution of commodities. … [but if J PMorgan nevertheless ended up
owning such a facility] J PMorgan will not hold any such interest as a means to
engage in the underlying commercial activity”;
2444
• “not process, refine, store or otherwise alter commodities in the United States”;
2445
• “contract with a third party for any services that it needs in connection with the
handling of any commodity”;
2446
and
• “only use storage and transportation facilities owned and operated by third parties”
and “enter into service agreements only with accredited, reputable independent third
party facilities.”
2447
2439
Id.
2440
Id. at 020. Five years later, as part of its RBS Sempra acquisition, J PMorgan acquired the Henry Bath
warehouses, which were plainly engaged in the storage of physical commodities. While the Federal Reserve gave
J PMorgan an initial grace period to operate the warehouse company, it did not provide complementary authority or
agree that J PMorgan could use merchant banking authority to retain ownership of the company. In 2014, J PMorgan
sold Henry Bath to a third party. For more information, see discussion of Henry Bath in Chapter 3, above.
2441
Id. at 026. Tier 1 capital is generally comprised of “equity capital and published reserves from post-tax retained
earnings” and is a “principal form of eligible capital to cover market risks.” 6/2006 “International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version,” prepared by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1 - 333, at 14 and 16,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
2442
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” at PSI-FederalReserve-01-
000001 - 028, at 026.
2443
Id.
2444
Id. at 027.
2445
Id. Four years later, in response to its request, J PMorgan obtained complementary authority to engage a third
party to conduct those activities on its behalf. See 4/20/2009 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan,
PSI-
FRB-11-000001 - 002, at 001 (allowing it to “engage a third party to alter or refine commodities after J PM takes
delivery in connection with its Physical Commodity Trading”) [sealed exhibit].
2446
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” at PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 027.
377
J PMorgan was one of the first financial holding companies to apply for complementary
authority to engage in physical commodity activities.
2448
The Federal Reserve granted its request
on November 18, 2005.
2449
In the order granting the new authority, the Federal Reserve wrote
that it was authorizing J PMorgan to engage in the new activities “on a limited basis.”
2450
The
order also stated:
“As a condition of this order, to limit the potential safety and soundness risks of
Commodity Trading Activities, the market value of commodities held by J PM Chase as a
result of Commodity Trading Activities must not exceed 5 percent of J PM Chase’s
consolidated tier 1 capital. J PM Chase also must notify the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York if the market value of commodities held by J PM Chase as a result of its
Commodity Trading Activities exceeds 4 percent of its tier 1 capital.”
2451
The order was also “specifically conditioned on compliance with all the commitments”
J PMorgan had made in its application.
2452
(b) Expanding Its Physical Commodity Activities
As described earlier, J PMorgan used its new complementary authority to engage in a
wide range of physical commodity activities. J PMorgan’s expansion into physical commodities
was fueled, in part, by a handful of major acquisitions as well as an agreement with a major
refinery. In 2008, through its Bear Stearns acquisition, J PMorgan gained rights to, or ownership
interests in, 27 power plants and a host of energy-related assets, including pipeline and storage
leases.
2453
In 2009, through a UBS acquisition, J PMorgan obtained crude oil, natural gas, power,
and agricultural assets in Canada.
2454
In 2010, as part of a $1.6 billion RBS Sempra acquisition,
J PMorgan obtained global oil, natural gas, coal, and metal assets; European power and gas
assets; and the Henry Bath network of warehouses.
2455
In 2012, J PMorgan entered into a long-
term agreement with a large oil refinery in Philadelphia, in which it agreed to supply crude oil
and feedstocks to the refinery and purchase 100% of its refined oil products.
2456
According to internal OCC and Federal Reserve analyses, in September 2012,
J PMorgan’s physical commodity assets reached an all-time high.
2457
J PMorgan’s own records
show that, in 2012, its physical commodity inventories were substantial. By 2013, J PMorgan
had begun to prepare quarterly charts for its regulators that tracked its physical commodity
2447
Id.
2448
Only Citibank preceded it, receiving the first grant of complementary authority from the Federal Reserve in
2003. See 10/2/2003 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Citigroup, Inc., 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 508 - 511 (12/2003),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdf.
2449
See 2005 J PMorgan Complementary Order, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 - C59.
2450
Id. at C57.
2451
Id. at C58.
2452
Id. at C59.
2453
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding the Bear Stearns acquisition.
2454
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding the UBS acquisition.
2455
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding the RBS Sempra acquisition.
2456
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding Project Liberty.
2457
See email from OCC staff to FRBNY staff, “Meeting?,” OCC-PSI-0000077 - 079; 2012 Summary Report, at
FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506 [sealed exhibit].
378
holdings and compared their market value to its Federal Reserve and OCC size limits. In
September 2013, J PMorgan prepared a chart for its regulators that included information about its
physical commodity holdings as of September 28, 2012, and compared those holdings to its Tier
1 capital as of that date, which was about $148 billion.
2458
The chart first provided data on the physical commodity holdings of J PMorgan, the
financial holding company. It showed that, as of September 28, 2012, the market value of the
“Physical Inventory” held by the financial holding company – referred to as “J PMVEC & Non
Bank Subs” – was about $6.6 billion, or about 4.5% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1
capital of $148 billion.
2459
That $6.6 billion total excluded, however, several major categories of
physical commodity holdings at the financial holding company, including all of the physical
commodities held by its national bank, all of the financial holding company’s gold, silver,
platinum, palladium, and copper assets, and all of the financial holding company’s physical
commodities held through an exercise of its merchant banking authority.
2460
The result was that
the $6.6 billion total reflected only a portion of the physical commodity assets actually held by
the financial holding company.
The chart also provided data on the physical commodity holdings of J PMorgan Chase
Bank. It showed that, on the same date, September 28, 2012, the market value of the “Base
Metals” inventory held by J PMorgan Chase Bank was approximately $8.1 billion.
2461
That total
suggested that the bank held a larger inventory of physical commodities than the entire financial
holding company. At the same time, that $8.1 billion total also excluded certain categories of
assets at the bank, including its gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper holdings. In
response to a Subcommittee request, J PMorgan also provided separately, as of September 28,
2012, the total market value of the bank’s copper, platinum, and palladium inventories, which
together totaled about $2.7 billion.
2462
When the financial holding company’s physical commodities inventory of $6.6 billion is
added to the bank’s metals inventory of approximately $8.1 billion – still excluding gold, silver,
and all merchant banking commodity assets – and the bank’s copper, platinum, and palladium
inventories of $2.7 billion are added in as well, the total market value of J PMorgan’s combined
physical commodity inventories on September 28, 2012, was $17.4 billion. That $17.4 billion
was about 11.75% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital of $148 billion, which
meant that it was more than twice the size allowed by the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit, were it to
apply.
2458
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators, FRB-
PSI-301383 - 396, at 387. See also 2012 excel spread sheet, “Physical Inventory Limit Monitor-
9.17.12_Final.xlsx,” prepared by the OCC, OCC-PSI-0000080 (stating that, in 2012, J PMorgan had Tier 1 capital of
$148 billion).
2459
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators, FRB-
PSI-301383 - 396, at 387; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2460
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014).
2461
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators, FRB-
PSI-301383 - 396, at 387.
2462
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, at attachment, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049
(indicating that, on September 28, 2012, J PMorgan Chase Bank held $1.13 billion worth of physical copper, $872
million worth of physical platinum, and $656 million worth of physical palladium for a total market value of $2.7
billion).
379
The information provided by J PMorgan indicates that the size of its physical commodity
holdings were actually far in excess of the 5% regulatory limits that were created to reduce the
risks associated with those assets. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee, however, that it was in full
compliance with all of its regulatory limits, because it was allowed to exclude whole categories
of assets, including its bank’s assets, under its interpretation of those limits.
2463
The Federal
Reserve told the Subcommittee that, after researching the issue, it had not yet objected to
J PMorgan’s interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit on complementary activities,
because it was a possible interpretation that would, in fact, allow the financial holding company
to exclude many of its physical commodity assets.
2464
That J PMorgan could be found to be in
compliance with a 5% limit at the same time the actual market value of its physical commodity
assets totaled nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital demonstrates how the Federal Reserve’s regulatory
limit, as currently enforced, has become riddled with exclusions and ineffective in capping the
size of a financial holding company’s physical commodity holdings.
(c) Stretching the Limits
For years, J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank have applied aggressive interpretations
to stretch the size limits imposed by the Federal Reserve and OCC on the amount of physical
commodities they are allowed to hold. To stay under the limits, they have routinely excluded
assets and minimized the value of others. Some of these interpretations were known to the
regulators; others were not. As a result of these efforts, J PMorgan often held physical
commodities assets whose combined market value far exceeded 5% of its Tier 1 capital.
From 2005, when it received its first complementary order, until early 2012, Federal
Reserve examiners appear to have been largely unaware of how J PMorgan was calculating its
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. It was not until 2012 that Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) examiners learned that, for over six years, J PMorgan had been
excluding all of the commodities held in J PMorgan Chase Bank when calculating the market
value of its commodity holdings for purposes of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2465
J PMorgan
had excluded its bank’s holdings despite the financial holding company’s having committed to
“limit the amount of physical commodities that it holds at any one time to 5% of its consolidated
Tier 1 Capital,” with no express caveat for bank assets.
2466
After learning of J PMorgan’s
exclusion, despite concerns expressed by its examiners, the Federal Reserve has yet to require
J PMorgan to include its bank’s assets when valuing the physical commodities held by the
financial holding company.
Similarly, from 1995 until early 2012, the OCC appears to have been unaware of how
J PMorgan Chase Bank calculated its compliance with the OCC’s 5% limit. Beginning in 2012,
2463
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2464
Subcommittee briefings by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014) and OCC (9/22/2014).
2465
Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013) and (10/8/2014).
2466
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 026. Again, the complementary order
was “specifically conditioned on compliance with all the commitments made to the Board.” 11/18/2005 “J PMorgan
Chase & Co. New York, New York Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial
Activity,” Federal Reserve website, at 7,http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20051118/attachment.pdf.
380
as the OCC examined the bank’s practices more closely, it issued a series of supervisory letters
criticizing and disallowing some of those practices, as explained below. In response, J PMorgan
Chase Bank agreed to change those practices and also recently sold much of the physical metals
inventory that had been held in the bank’s name. Today, J PMorgan asserts that both the bank
and holding company continue to be in full compliance with the Federal Reserve and OCC size
limits.
Excluding Bank Assets. Perhaps the most striking aspect of J PMorgan’s approach to the
size limits is its assertion that it can exclude all of its bank’s extensive physical commodity
holdings when reporting to the Federal Reserve on the total market value of the financial holding
company’s physical commodity assets. Since 2005, when it was first granted complementary
authority by the Federal Reserve to conduct physical commodity activities, J PMorgan has been
under an obligation to keep the market value of its physical commodity assets below 5% of its
Tier 1 capital and to report to the Federal Reserve any instance in which those assets exceeded
4% of its Tier 1 capital. Normally, a financial holding company’s assets include the assets of its
bank subsidiaries, since they are typically the largest, and may be the only, subsidiaries of the
holding company. Yet since 2005, J PMorgan has apparently never included the physical
commodities held by J PMorgan Chase Bank when calculating the market value of the financial
holding company’s physical commodity assets for purposes of complying with the Federal
Reserve’s 5% limit.
2467
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it first learned of J PMorgan’s practice in
early 2012.
2468
Internal documents from the Federal Reserve, OCC, and J PMorgan chronicle
what happened. The precipitating event came in J anuary 2012, when J PMorgan reported to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) that its physical commodity assets had recently
exceeded 4% of its Tier 1 capital, the reporting threshold established in its 2005 complementary
order.
2469
According to the Federal Reserve and contemporaneous documents, when the FRBNY
examiners asked J PMorgan what caused the increase in the market value of its physical
commodity assets, J PMorgan indicated that, on or around December 21, 2011, J PMorgan Chase
Bank purchased about $1.9 billion of physical aluminum on behalf of a client.
2470
J PMorgan
told the Subcommittee that, as a result, the bank’s total physical aluminum holdings on that date
rose to $6.5 billion.
2471
A few weeks later, on J anuary 10, 2012, J PMorgan Chase Bank’s
2467
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
2468
Id.
2469
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY Staff to OCC staff, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049.
2470
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013);
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY Staff to OCC staff,
“J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049. J PMorgan legal counsel described the transaction to the
Subcommittee as a swap in which J PMorgan “(1) delivered contracts for approximately 860,000 tons of aluminum
to [its customer], (2) paid [the customer] a locational premium of ten million dollars, and (3) received from [the
customer] warrants for approximately 860,000 tons of aluminum in Vlissingen.” 10/30/2014 letter from J PMorgan
legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-17-000001 - 003, at 002. J PMorgan legal counsel also indicated that
the correct total for the transaction was $1.68 billion, rather than $1.9 billion reported at the time; the discrepancy
between the two numbers is not explained. 11/5/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
J PMorgan-22-000001 - 004, at 001.
2471
11/10/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-23-000001 - 004, at 001.
381
aluminum inventory peaked at “3,501,365 metric tonnes,” which J PMorgan estimated had “a
total value of approximately $7.48 billion.”
2472
Those enormous holdings put the bank over the OCC’s size limit, so to get back under
the limit, the bank decided to sell a large amount of the aluminum to J PMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation (J PMVEC), an affiliate of the financial holding company.
2473
Emails between
regulators indicate that, a month later, as of J anuary 24, 2012, the bank’s physical aluminum
holdings had decreased in value to $4.9 billion.
2474
According to an internal Federal Reserve
email at the time, J PMorgan told FRBNY examiners that nearly 80% of the aluminum at issue –
purportedly worth $3.8 billion – would continue to be held by J PMorgan Chase Bank, while
about $1.1 billion in aluminum would be sold to J PMVEC a subsidiary of the financial holding
company, which meant J PMorgan would have to add it to the physical commodity assets subject
to the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2475
According to J PMorgan, the additional aluminum put the
financial holding company’s assets over the 4% reporting threshold, which was why J PMorgan
had notified the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
2476
According to Federal Reserve emails, when J PMorgan informed its FRBNY examiners
about the details of the aluminum trade, it marked the first time that the FRBNY examiners
discovered that J PMorgan was not “reporting the full balance of its aluminum inventory for
compliance with the 5% of Tier 1 capital rule, but rather only the portion that is held in non-bank
affiliates.”
2477
Upon further inquiry, the FRBNY examiners learned that, during 2011,
J PMorgan’s physical commodities holdings, when the bank’s assets were included (but
excluding bullion), had ranged from $8.9 billion to $14.4 billion, and exceeded 5% of
J PMorgan’s Tier 1 capital in every month of the year.
2478
The FRBNY examiners were told that,
as of February 2012, J PMorgan’s total physical inventory (excluding bullion) was “$12.4 billion,
2472
Id. at 001. At 3.5 million metric tons, J PMorgan Chase Bank’s aluminum holdings were so large that they
exceeded more half of the physical aluminum consumed in North America that year. See undated “Primary
Aluminum Consumption, 2011-2013,” European Aluminum Association website,http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-consumption-in-world-regions/ (indicating North
American primary aluminum consumption in 2012 was 5.3 million metric tons).
2473
Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013) and J PMorgan (10/10/2014); 2/15/2012 email from
FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049, at 049.
2474
2/1/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-
200827 - 831, at 831. It is unclear how the value of the bank’s aluminum holdings dropped from $7.48 billion to
$4.9 billion, a difference of $2.58 billion, over the course of that month.
2475
2/1/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-
200827 - 831, at 831. J PMorgan legal counsel has indicated that the correct value of the aluminum sold to J PMVEC
was $921 million rather than $1.1 billion, writing that, on J anuary 19, 2012, J PMorgan Chase Bank sold, “in an
arms-length, at-market transaction, 419,400 metric tonnes of aluminum to J PMVEC at $2,196.75 per metric tonne,
or approximately $921 million.” 11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-
19-000001 - 004, at 001 - 002. The discrepancy between the $921 million reported to the Subcommittee in the
November 2014 letter and the $1.1 billion reported to the Federal Reserve in 2012, is not explained.
2476
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2477
Id. See also Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013) and (10/8/2014) (confirming Federal
Reserve examiners first learned of the exclusion in 2012).
2478
2/17/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-
PSI-200827 - 831, at 827.
382
which would exceed their 5% of Tier 1 capital limit (~$7.5 bn) by about $5 billion if the limit
were applicable.”
2479
The discovery that J PMorgan was excluding its bank’s holdings when calculating its
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit raised concerns among the FRBNY examiners
that J PMorgan was either bypassing the limit or the limit itself was ineffective in ensuring safety
and soundness. As one FRBNY examiner wrote in an email: “It strikes me that the 5% Tier 1
capital limit should apply to all activity (whether its conducted in a bank or non-bank) given that
the limit is relative to the consolidated organization’s [T]ier 1 capital.”
2480
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it discussed the aluminum trade in a meeting with
the OCC on J anuary 17, 2012.
2481
It was two days later, on J anuary 19, 2012, that J PMorgan
Chase Bank actually sold the 419,400 metric tons of aluminum to J PMVEC.
2482
On February
15, 2012, the FRBNY examiners raised the matter with their OCC counterparts who were
already aware of J PMorgan’s large aluminum trade
2483
and already analyzing how the new
aluminum holdings in the bank affected the OCC’s separate 5% limit.
2484
The OCC limit
focused, not on Tier 1 capital, but on the percentage of derivative trades that resulted in the
physical delivery of commodities to the bank. The FRBNY examiners learned that the OCC
examiners had determined that the aluminum trade had caused J PMorgan Chase Bank to breach
the OCC’s 5% limit by a large margin over the course of a month, from December 21, 2011
through J anuary 20, 2012, the day on which the aluminum transfer by the bank to J PMVEC
settled.
2485
When asked about these developments, J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it reduced
its holdings as quickly as it could, came back under the OCC’s limit within 30 days, and never
breached the Federal Reserve’s separate 5% limit at all.
2486
J PMorgan explained to the
Subcommittee that the bank’s efforts to quickly reduce its aluminum holdings had been stymied,
not only by the holidays, but also by a decline in the notional amount of outstanding derivatives
held by the bank, which is the denominator for the OCC 5% calculation.
2487
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that it had hedged nearly all of its aluminum position by selling forward contracts,
2479
Id. It is unclear whether these figures included the entire amount of aluminum then held by the bank and its
holding company.
2480
Id. at 829.
2481
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2482
11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-19-000001- 004, at 001 - 002.
2483
Subcommittee briefing by the OCC (9/22/2014); 2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J P
Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049; 2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum
inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-200827 - 831, at 829.
2484
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049, 048.
2485
8/1/2012 email from J PMorgan to OCC staff, “5% limit calculation method,” OCC-PSI-00000324 (indicating
the sustained breach of the OCC limit);
11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
J PMorgan-19-000001 - 004, at 002 (reflecting that the “transaction settled on J anuary 20, 2012”). J PMorgan Chase
Bank later attempted to change how it calculated compliance with the OCC limit, by using average holdings over a
three or twelve month period, which would have minimized the impact of large trades like the aluminum trade in
late 2011. That methodology was disallowed by the OCC. See discussion, below.
2486
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2487
10/30/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-17-000001 - 003, at 002.
383
and thus had relatively small “net” aluminum positions that it could dispose of to reduce its
overall holdings.
2488
When asked about excluding the bank’s assets when reporting the market value of the
financial holding company’s physical commodity assets to the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan
explained that the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit applied only to physical commodity holdings
acquired as a result of complementary activities; that the bank did not and could not act under
“complementary” authority since only financial holding companies could employ that authority;
that the bank’s activities took place under a separate grant of authority from the OCC to accept
physical deliveries of commodities in a small percentage of derivatives trading transactions; and
that the bank’s physical commodity holdings were, therefore, separate from and not subject to
the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2489
J PMorgan also expressed surprise that the Federal Reserve had been unaware of its
ongoing exclusion of the bank assets.
2490
A J PMorgan representative told the Subcommittee
that, at some point in early 2010, she had a conversation with Federal Reserve personnel in
Washington, D.C. that she thought indicated they “must have known there were metals in the
bank.”
2491
Federal Reserve representatives told the Subcommittee, however, that they were
unaware of that earlier conversation, had been unaware of the financial holding company’s
practice, and it was clear that the examiners in New York first learned of the practice in
connection with the aluminum transaction in 2012.
2492
The internal emails exchanged between
the FRBNY and OCC examiners in early 2012 also indicate that J PMorgan’s FRBNY examiners
had been unaware of the exclusion prior to that time.
In early February 2012, the FRBNY examiners consulted with the Federal Reserve’s
legal department to determine whether J PMorgan was permitted to exclude its bank’s physical
commodity holdings when calculating the market value of its physical commodity assets for
purposes of the 5% limit, on the theory that the bank’s assets were held under “separate authority
granted by the OCC … rather than under FRB compl[e]mentary authority.”
2493
The Federal
Reserve legal department concluded that J PMorgan’s interpretation was a possible interpretation
of the limit and that it would not object to that interpretation.
2494
Despite that legal analysis, the
FRBNY examination team remained “very concerned … [with] not looking at the activity across
the consolidated organization [because] f we don’t do that the limit strikes us as not very
meaningful.”
2495
J PMorgan and the Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that J PMorgan continues to
exclude physical commodities held by J PMorgan Chase Bank when calculating the market value
of the physical commodity assets held by the financial holding company.
2496
The Federal
2488
11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-19-000001 - 004, at 002.
2489
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2490
Id.
2491
Id.
2492
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
2493
2/1/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-
200827 - 831, at 831.
2494
Id. at 828.
2495
Id.
2496
Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014) and J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
384
Reserve acknowledged to the Subcommittee that it typically looks at a bank holding company
holistically, and includes all bank assets when evaluating the holding company’s assets. The
Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it was unable to identify any other instance in which,
when calculating the assets held by the financial holding company, it excluded the assets of a
subsidiary bank.
2497
Excluding Other Assets. Bank assets were not the only assets J PMorgan excluded when
calculating the market value of the financial holding company’s physical commodity assets for
purposes of complying with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
A second exclusion was its copper holdings. As indicated in the prior section, J PMorgan
is an active trader of copper and, from 2008 to 2012, maintained physical copper inventories
whose value ranged from $148 million to $2.7 billion, with holdings frequently in excess of $1
billion.
2498
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it did not include any of its copper holdings
when calculating compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2499
J PMorgan explained to
the Subcommittee that its physical copper was not only held by its bank, but it was also
categorized as “bullion,” and for both reasons could be excluded from its physical commodity
holdings for purposes of complying with both the Federal Reserve and OCC limits.
2500
As
indicated earlier, the OCC has treated copper as bullion for years.
2501
The Federal Reserve told
the Subcommittee that it explicitly authorizes banks to deal in bullion, including copper, and as a
result, a financial holding company could hold copper under that separate authority rather than
under its complementary authority, and so exclude its copper holdings when calculating
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s complementary 5% limit.
2502
While excluding copper is
permissible according to regulators, excluding billion-dollar copper inventories from regulatory
size limits, despite copper’s trading status as a base metal, and the risk that even small price
decreases could dramatically lower the value of large holdings, seems to have little economic
rationale from a safety and soundness perspective.
Still another exclusion that J PMorgan employed for two years involved the power plants
it obtained through its Bear Stearns acquisition in 2008. At that time, among other physical
commodity assets, J PMorgan acquired tolling agreements and ownership interests in 27 power
plants.
2503
J PMorgan later put a market value on the tolling agreements with those and a few
2497
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
2498
See discussion above;
attachment to 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-
COMM-PSI-000015 - 018, at 015; 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page
entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as of J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” at FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at
388.
2499
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2500
Id.
2501
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141 (defining copper as bullion). See
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii) (stating that a permissible nonbank activity includes: “Buying, selling and storing bars,
rounds, bullion, and coins of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, copper, and any other metal approved by the Board,
for the company's own account and the account of others, and providing incidental services such as arranging for
storage, safe custody, assaying, and shipment.”).
2502
10/29/2014 email from the Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, “Outstanding requests,” PSI-FRB-16-000001 -
002.
2503
See discussion above; undated 2014 J PMorgan chart, “Power Plants Owned or Controlled via Tolling
Agreements, 2008 to present,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
385
other power plants in the range of $2 billion to $2.3 billion.
2504
In addition to the sheer size of
those holdings, the normal practice at the time was for financial holding companies to include the
market value of those types of power plant assets in their physical commodity holdings subject to
the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. Despite those factors, J PMorgan excluded its power plant assets
when calculating its compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit for over two years.
Prior to the Bear Stearns acquisition in 2008, J PMorgan had never engaged in power
plant activities or sought complementary authority to do so. As part of the Bear Stearns
transaction, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) gave J PMorgan a two-year grace
period during which “any assets or activities acquired from Bear Stearns that J PMorgan is not
currently permitted to own or engage in shall be treated as permissible assets or activities for a
period of two years.”
2505
That grace period applied to the 27 power plants, as part of the Bear
Stearns acquisition. J PMorgan took the position that, for the next two years, it held the power
plants under the authority of the FRBNY two-year grace period, and not under its
complementary authority, and so could exclude them when calculating the market value of its
physical commodity holdings subject to the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2506
J PMorgan took that
position even though the FRBNY letter contained no language related to excluding the value of
permissible assets from J PMorgan’s physical commodity holdings.
J PMorgan held the Bear Stearns power plants from March 2008 to March 2010, without
including their market value in its calculations of the total market value of its commodity
holdings for purposes of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. There is no indication that J PMorgan
informed the Federal Reserve of its practice, or that the Federal Reserve inquired about the
matter. On February 5, 2010, J PMorgan asked the Federal Reserve to extend the grace period
for another year, and also explicitly requested permission to conduct its energy tolling and other
power plant activities outside of the 5% limit.
2507
The Federal Reserve extended the grace period
for one more year, until March 2011.
On J une 30, 2010, the Federal Reserve issued a complementary order authorizing
J PMorgan to conduct its power plant activities as complementary activities.
2508
At the same time,
the Federal Reserve denied J PMorgan’s request to exclude the value of its power plant assets
when calculating compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit, instead explicitly directing
inclusion of the market value of its various power plant assets.
2509
It was only after the new
complementary order was issued that J PMorgan began to include the value of its power plant
2504
See, e.g., 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its
regulators, FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at 387.
2505
3/16/2008 letter from FRBNY to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-17-000001 - 005, at 004 [sealed exhibit].
2506
10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003.
2507
2/5/2010 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300286 - 290, at 286, 287
(stating: “[T]he Board has indicated that it has in the past subjected tolling activities of [financial holding
companies] to the [5%] limit because tolling contracts expose the toller to the risk that the plant proves to be
uneconomical to operate, which can occur when the cost of producing power is greater than the power’s market
price. However, given the competitive disadvantages that J PMC would suffer from having to manage its entire
physical commodity and tolling activity under the [5%] limit, J PMC respect[fully] submits that the risks involved in
tolling can be managed pursuant to robust risk management processes subject to regulatory examination.”).
2508
6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580.
2509
Id. at 578 - 579.
386
assets when calculating its compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2510
The end result
was that, for more than two years after acquiring the 27 Bear Stearns power plant interests, from
March 2008 to J uly 2010, J PMorgan excluded their $2 billion value from its calculation of
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. Because the Federal Reserve never decided the
issue, it is unclear whether J PMorgan’s exclusion was permissible, and whether the same
approach may be applied by J PMorgan or other financial holding companies when acquiring
physical commodity assets that enjoy a two-year grace period before being required to conform
with Federal Reserve requirements.
A third exclusion involved leases on oil and gas storage facilities. The FRBNY
Commodities Team found that, while leases on power plants were included in the calculation of
the market value of a financial holding company’s physical commodity assets, some financial
holding companies excluded “leases on infrastructure such as oil and gas storage facilities.”
2511
A different Federal Reserve examination document noted that J PMorgan was “leasing oil and
natural gas storage” as well as “oil tankers and pipeline capacity.”
2512
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that it normally excluded those types of infrastructure leases from its market value
calculations for purposes of the 5% Federal Reserve limit.
2513
The Commodities Team stated in
its 2012 Summary Report that it was “investigating [the] interpretation of the rule.”
2514
The
Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that, currently, such leases are normally not included in
the calculation of a financial holding company’s physical commodity assets for purposes of the
5% limit.
2515
The Federal Reserve also noted that its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
raised questions about whether such leasing arrangements should be approved as complementary
activities at all and solicited public comment on how to reduce the safety and soundness risks
they present.
2516
Reducing Asset Values. In addition to excluding assets, J PMorgan also used techniques
to minimize the value of its assets when calculating the overall market value of its physical
commodity holdings for purposes of complying with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. In
particular, it used two techniques to try to reduce the market value of its power plant assets, once
it was required to include them in its overall physical commodity holdings. After the Federal
Reserve learned that J PMorgan was using those techniques on its power plant assets, it
disallowed them.
The first involved a netting practice. When J PMorgan began including power plant
tolling agreements in its Federal Reserve calculation for the first time in 2010, it initially
calculated the values on a “net” basis, which reduced their market value.
2517
According to
2510
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014).
2511
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506 [sealed exhibit].
2512
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 299 [sealed exhibit].
2513
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2514
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506 [sealed exhibit].
2515
11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002, at 002.
2516
Id. See also Federal Reserve advance notice of proposed rulemaking, “Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.
Reg. 3329 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-21/pdf/FR-2014-01-21.pdf.
2517
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014).
387
J PMorgan, once the Federal Reserve learned of this practice, the regulator disallowed it.
2518
On
J uly 5, 2011, J PMorgan raised the issue again, formally asking the Federal Reserve for
permission to “exclude from its calculation of the 5% Limit the value of its rights under Energy
Tolling agreements to the extent that J PM Chase has effectively assigned its rights … to an
unaffiliated third party.”
2519
In other words, J PMorgan proposed that if it had a tolling
agreement with a power plant, but then assigned or “re-tolled” that agreement to an independent
third party, then J PMorgan could calculate the agreement’s market value according to the netted
revenues it would receive from the re-tolled agreement.
2520
J PMorgan noted that payments
under a re-tolling agreement would “not necessarily offset dollar for dollar” the payments owed
by J PMorgan under the original tolling agreement, and so proposed that it be allowed to net out
the “present value of future committed receivables” from third parties against the payments owed
by J PMorgan under the original tolling agreement.
2521
J PMorgan calculated that the netting
technique would reduce the market value of its tolling agreements by about $300 million, from
$2.3 billion to $2.0 billion.
2522
The Federal Reserve denied J PMorgan’s request to use netting when valuing its tolling
agreements.
2523
An internal Federal Reserve memorandum reviewing J PMorgan examination
issues explained: “FRB [Federal Reserve Board] denied this request for several reasons,
including that permitting netting would have allowed the firm to enter into unlimited tolling
agreements, which would have been inconsistent with the spirit of the 5% limit on physical
activity.”
2524
In other words, the Federal Reserve viewed the 5% limit as a way of limiting the
amount of physical commodity activities that a financial holding company may conduct, and so
opposed a netting arrangement that, in effect, would have removed the limit with respect to
tolling agreements.
A second technique J PMorgan used involved reducing the market value of the “capacity
payments” paid in connection with its power plants. The Federal Reserve has defined a
“capacity payment” as a “fixed periodic payment that compensates the power plant owner for its
fixed costs.”
2525
When it received complementary authority to enter into tolling agreements in
J une 2010, J PMorgan committed to including “the present value of all capacity payments to be
made by it in connection with energy tolling agreements in calculating its compliance with” the
5% limit.
2526
On J uly 5, 2011, J PMorgan asked to modify that commitment by excluding certain
portions of the capacity payments, including “debt and equity payments associated with the
power plant” and variable “operating” and “maintenance” expenses, so that a much smaller
2518
Id.
2519
7/5/2011 “Request to modify a commitment made by J PMorgan Chase & Co. in connection with its notice to,
and approval by, the Federal Reserve to engage in energy tolling,” prepared by J PMorgan and submitted to the
Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300258 – 263, at 260.
2520
Id.
2521
Id. at 261.
2522
Id.
2523
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 302 [sealed exhibit].
2524
Id.
2525
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 345.
2526
Id. See also 6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580, at 578.
388
portion of the capacity payments – reflecting only “fixed costs” – would count towards the 5%
limit.
2527
An internal J PMorgan document indicates that J PMorgan actually made that change in its
valuation methodology in November 2010, without getting prior approval from regulators.
2528
According to projections by J PMorgan, the change potentially reduced the capacity payments
that would count towards the cap from about $2.1 billion to about $560 million, a reduction of
nearly 75%.
2529
In 2011, the Federal Reserve rejected the change in methodology, reasoning that
capacity payments include the “total fixed periodic payments as specified in a tolling contract,”
not just the “fixed operating costs.”
2530
The Federal Reserve’s rejection of J PMorgan’s two techniques to lower the reported
market value of its power plant assets represent rare occasions in which the Federal Reserve did
not go along with J PMorgan’s efforts to reduce the impact of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
Stretching the OCC Limit. Since 1995, the OCC has expressly prohibited a national
bank from accepting or delivering physical commodities in more than 5% of its derivative
transactions. Yet, from 1995 until 2012, it appears as though J PMorgan Chase Bank was largely
unaware of the OCC’s 5% limit, and may have even believed that it was 20%.
2531
J PMorgan
Chase Bank also used aggressive interpretations and loopholes to reduce the impact of the OCC
limit.
Among other measures, J PMorgan Chase Bank’s actions included calculating the value
of its metals inventory: (1) on a physical volume basis, meaning tracking metric tons, instead of
tracking the dollar value of those tons; (2) on an aggregated basis, meaning applying the limit to
the overall amount of its metals holdings instead of applying the limit on a metal-by-metal
basis;
2532
and (3) on a total notional amount basis, meaning measuring the amount of the bank’s
derivatives holdings on a notional rather than net basis, which inflated the base against which the
2527
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 345. See also 3/3/2011
Federal Reserve document, “Resolved Issues,” FRB-PSI-304601 - 604, at 604 (discussing “Tolling Calculation –
Capacity Payment”) [sealed exhibit].
2528
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 345. See also Subcommittee
briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2529
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 347; Subcommittee briefing
by J PMorgan (4/23/2014). See also 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 505 [sealed exhibit].
2530
3/3/2011 Federal Reserve document, “Resolved Issues,” FRB-PSI-304601 - 604, at 604 (discussing “Tolling
Calculation – Capacity Payment”) [sealed exhibit]. See also 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at
505 [sealed exhibit].
2531
See 1/25/2012 email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Guidance on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000343-345 (“The bank
used to believe it was 20% and I asked them to show me where they got that interpretation.”).
2532
See, e.g., 1/11/2012 email from Mark Lenczowski, J PMorgan, to OCC staff, “Consolidated OCC Summary 10
J an 2012,” OCC-PSI-00000336; 1/25/2012 email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Guidance on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-
00000343 - 345 (allowing aggregating) [sealed exhibit].
389
5% limit was applied.
2533
Taken together, these three interpretations rendered the OCC’s 5%
limit effectively meaningless as a risk management or prudential safeguard.
2534
Additionally, J PMorgan Chase Bank attempted to replace the OCC’s requirement to
calculate the tonnage of physical assets held by the bank on a specific day, with using the
average tonnage over a 12-month or 3-month rolling period, which would have allowed the bank
to take delivery of more physical commodities overall.
2535
In addition to those calculation
strategies, J PMorgan Chase Bank also omitted data on the bank’s holdings of “base metals,
investor products, and agricultural and soft commodities” from a report to the OCC on its
physical commodity assets;
2536
and employed anticipatory and portfolio hedging tactics that
stretched the permissible relationship between its physical commodity transactions and the
derivative transactions they were supposedly hedging.
2537
The OCC has objected to some of
those tactics, but has not registered objections to others.
In December 2011, J PMorgan Chase Bank made a transfer of approximately $1 billion in
physical aluminum
2538
to J PMVEC, which was outside the bank, but run by many of the same
employees. This transaction moved physical metal to the financial holding company, but did not
act as a derivative hedge for the bank. As a result, it triggered more intensive reviews of the
bank’s conduct by the OCC.
Over the next three years, the OCC cited a number of concerns with how J PMorgan was
complying with the agency’s 5% limit. In March 2012, the OCC sent a Supervisory Letter to
J PMorgan Chase Bank identifying significant control weaknesses and regulatory non-
compliance in how the bank was conducting its commodity activities, including with respect to
its implementation of the 5% limit.
2539
The OCC sent a followup Supervisory Letter in J une
2013.
2540
In April 2014, after concluding an extensive analysis of J PMorgan Chase Bank’s
activities, the OCC found that the bank was “making or taking physical delivery of metal in
connection with spot and forward transactions in a manner that [was] beyond the scope of metals
2533
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 006.
2534
For example, a bank could still be in compliance with the OCC 5% limit if it held a long derivatives position for
1 million tons of aluminum that was offset by a short derivatives position for 999,999 tons of aluminum, but then
had 99,000 physical tons of nickel, representing 5% of the total notional tonnage of derivatives. The net derivatives
exposure in aluminum is just 1 ton, and yet it could be “hedged” with 99,000 tons of physical nickel. The OCC
confirmed for the Subcommittee that this extreme example would be consistent with the 5% limit as currently
applied. However, the OCC noted that the facts in this example may run afoul of other requirements set forth in the
OCC’s Interpretive Letters, such as the hedging requirement. Subcommittee briefing by the OCC (9/22/2014).
2535
See, e.g., 1/10/2012 email from Michael Kirk, OCC, to Fred Crumlish, OCC, “GCG Exam, Bank seeks guidance
on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000342; 2/15/2012 email from Mark Lenczowski, J PMorgan, to Michael Kirk, OCC, “5%
Limit Calculation,”OCC-PSI-00000324; 10/4/2012 email from Michael Kirk, OCC, to Fred Crumlish, OCC, “Mark
Lenszowki Call on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000346(disallowing averaging) [sealed exhibit].
2536
See 6/27/2013 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2013-36, OCC-PSI-00000312 - 314 (citing 3/28/2012 OCC
Supervisory Letter J PM-2012-13 (requiring corrected report) [sealed exhibit].
2537
See 4/15/2014 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2014-23, OCC-PSI-00000315 - 320 [sealed exhibit].
2538
While contemporaneous documents reflected the transaction as valued at $1.1 billion, J PMorgan legal counsel
told the Subcommittee that the transaction was an “arms-length, at-market transaction” for “approximately $921
million.” 11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-19-000001 - 004, at 002.
2539
See 3/28/2012 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2012-13, OCC-PSI-00000303 [sealed exhibit].
2540
See 6/27/2013 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2013-36, OCC-PSI-00000312 [sealed exhibit].
390
activities authorized in OCC interpretive letters.”
2541
In other words, the bank was engaging in
physical spot market transactions, forward contracts, and swaps that were not clearly customer-
driven or linked to hedging transactions, as required by OCC rules.
In May 2014, J PMorgan Chase Bank informed the OCC that it would cease the
impermissible activities by J uly 1, 2015, and thereafter conduct them “in a subsidiary or affiliate
of the Bank for which such activities are permissible” under Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
2542
The bank further committed that, prior to J uly
1, 2015, it would keep its base metals “within the quantitative limits established by the
OCC.”
2543
On J une 27, 2014, the OCC essentially accepted J PMorgan Chase Bank’s proposal,
giving J PMorgan more time to reconfigure its currently impermissible derivative and physical
commodity activities.
2544
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Size Limits
J PMorgan’s actions raise a number of concerns about the effectiveness of the existing
Federal Reserve and OCC limits to assess and limit the size of physical commodity activities at
banks and their holding companies. Those size limits were developed to promote the safety and
soundness of banks and their holding companies, and protect U.S. taxpayers from physical
commodity activities posing outsized financial, operational, and catastrophic event risks. The
facts show that J PMorgan was able to reduce the impact of both sets of limits by using
aggressive interpretations that, in some cases, took years for regulators to uncover and, in other
cases, identified loopholes that the regulators have so far failed to close. Key issues include the
ongoing exclusion of key assets when applying the limits, valuation methodologies that
minimize the value of some assets, the absence of comprehensive, standardized reports to track
compliance with the limits, and a current lack of coordination that, together, allow financial
holding companies to amass billions of dollars in physical commodity holdings far in excess of
5% of its Tier 1 capital.
(a) Excluding Bank Assets
The 2005 order granting J PMorgan’s complementary authority was explicitly conditioned
upon J PMorgan’s commitment to “limit the amount of physical commodities that it holds at any
one time to 5% of its consolidated Tier 1 Capital.”
2545
The order contains no caveat exempting
J PMorgan’s bank which, even in 2005, held billions of dollars in physical commodities. As far
as the Subcommittee has been able to determine, J PMorgan is alone among financial holding
companies in claiming that its obligation to limit the size of its physical commodity holdings
excludes the physical commodities held by its bank. The Federal Reserve itself has been unable
2541
4/15/2014 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2014-23, OCC-PSI-00000315 – 320, at 315[sealed exhibit]. The OCC
took exception, in particular, to J PMorgan Chase Bank’s extensive activities in the spot markets for base metals.
2542
5/15/2014 letter from J PMorgan Chase Bank to OCC, “Supervisory Letter J PM-2014-23 (the “Letter”),” OCC-
PSI-00000321, at 321 [sealed exhibit].
2543
Id. This pledge did not, however, include copper which remains exempt from the OCC’s size limit.
2544
6/27/2014 letter from OCC to J PMorgan Chase Bank, “Management Response to SL J PM-2014-23, MRA
Follow-Up,” OCC-PSI-00000323 [sealed exhibit].
2545
7/21/2005, letter from J PMorgan counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority”, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 221, at 026.
391
to identify for the Subcommittee any other instance in which it disregards a financial holding
company’s subsidiary bank when evaluating the size of the financial holding company’s assets or
when evaluating the financial holding company’s compliance with a safety and soundness
limitation on its holdings.
Disregarding the bank’s physical commodity holdings is particularly inappropriate in the
case of J PMorgan, since the same employees, working for J PMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation, execute physical commodity transactions on behalf of both the holding company
and the bank.
2546
That arrangement has meant, on a practical level, that the holding company
and its bank have long conducted their physical commodity activities in an integrated fashion,
sharing personnel, support functions, and infrastructure. J PMorgan disclosed that arrangement
when it sought complementary authority in 2005; there was no indicating then, nor was the
Federal Reserve aware for the next seven years, that J PMorgan planned to exclude its bank’s
holdings when reporting the market value of its physical commodity assets for purposes of
complying with the 5% limit.
The Federal Reserve and OCC’s own examiners have expressed concern that excluding
the bank’s assets has rendered the 5% limit ineffective. One Federal Reserve examiner wrote
that the examination staff was “very concerned … [with] not looking at the activity across the
consolidated organization [because] f we don’t do that the limit strikes us as not very
meaningful.”
2547
Another Federal Reserve examiner, in a communication with the OCC, noted
the “mismatch” between allowing a financial holding company to use the Tier 1 capital amount
for the entire “consolidated” group, but then exclude consideration of the substantial assets at the
bank:
“The FRS [Federal Reserve System] limit maintains that the firm cannot hold a market
value of physical commodities and certain assets (e.g. tolling agreements) exceeding 5%
of the consolidated organization's Tier 1 capital; the firm supplies a file each month
showing physical commodity balances in relation to Tier 1 capital. Our lawyers [at the
Federal Reserve] have told us that this limit only applies to the subsidiaries and not the
national bank, which is under separate authority granted by the OCC. This creates
something of a mismatch between numerator and denominator in the FRS limit as the
numerator is only for the subsidiaries while the denominator is the entire firm. We
realized this was more of an issue than previously known when the firm moved
approx[imately] $1.8B[illion] of physical aluminum from the bank into the subsidiary
(J PMVEC) for the stated reason of avoiding breaching the OCC limit of 5% of total
transactions going to physical delivery, and thus saw that physical balances in the bank
were more substantial than previously known. Thus, we thought it would be important to
2546
Id. at 012.
2547
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-
PSI-200827 - 831, at 828. See also 10/25/2012 email from OCC staff to Federal Reserve Staff, “Regulatory limit
framework around physical commodities,” FRB-PSI-624379 - 382, 380 (“one partial solution to address fully
consolidated concerns would be to have FRB clarify to include holdings on a consolidated basis.”).
392
understand how you implement IL [Interpretive Letter] 684 and jointly explore how we
can ensure commodities are limited to the levels intended.”
2548
Emails from OCC examiners express similar concerns with excluding the bank’s commodity
holdings from the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2549
The Federal Reserve’s failure to object to J PMorgan’s unusual interpretation of the 5%
limit has allowed J PMorgan to exclude billions of dollars in physical commodities held at its
bank when reporting the market value of its physical commodity assets to the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve’s inaction may also act as an incentive for other financial holding
companies to follow suit and locate physical commodities within their federally insured banks to
avoid triggering the Federal Reserve limit, a development that would create more, rather than
less, risk for U.S. taxpayers.
2550
Excluding billions of dollars in bank assets when calculating the physical commodity
holdings of the bank’s holding company is contrary to the Federal Reserve’s normal practice and
creates an unbridgeable gap between its 5% limit and the actual physical commodity assets held
by financial holding companies. In 2012, J PMorgan had $17.4 billion in physical assets
representing nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital, but was allowed to report to the Federal Reserve
that it had only $6.6 billion in physical assets representing 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. The
reported figures were about one-third of the actual physical assets (excluding gold, silver, and
commodity-related merchant banking assets) held by the financial holding company. The
Federal Reserve should not permit or support that type of pretense. Instead, the Federal Reserve
should employ its normal practice of viewing a financial holding company’s assets holistically,
and apply its limit accordingly.
(b) Excluding and Undervaluing Other Assets
J PMorgan’s practice of excluding other assets from its physical commodities reporting,
including the 27 Bear Stearns power plants, and oil and gas leases, as well as its methodology
changes to lower the reported value of its tolling agreements and capacity payments, is evidence
of a relationship in which the financial holding company was continually trying to find loopholes
to reduce the impact of the safety and soundness limit on size put in place by the Federal
Reserve. Federal Reserve examiners recognized the problem in a memorandum providing an
overall analysis of J PMorgan’s physical commodity activities:
“Since 2006 the firm [J PMorgan] has significantly grown its physical activities, largely
through acquisition, and joined the top tier (along with MS [Morgan Stanley] and GS
[Goldman Sachs]) among banks in commodities. … Amid this growth, J PM has pressed
on the boundaries of permissible activities including integrating merchant banking
investments into trading activities and pursuing activity that may appear ‘commercial in
nature,’ as well as pushed regulatory limits and their interpretation. …
2548
5/30/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J PMC Physical Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000033 - 035, at
033.
2549
See, e.g., 2/15/2012 internal OCC email, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000040 - 043.
2550
It is possible that implementation of Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act would restrict the ability of a bank to take this course of action.
393
In 2012 the SSO team [examination team for J PMorgan] identified a weakness in the
FRS [Federal Reserve System] limit which caps commodity inventory and certain
activities to 5% of the consolidated organization’s Tier 1 capital. … [T]he FRS limit
was only partially effective in constraining the firm’s commercial commodities activities.
J PM’s expansion in physical commodities – both in the bank and nonbank – has brought
the market value of its commercial commodity activity well above 5% of consolidated
Tier 1 capital.”
2551
Despite this finding, the Federal Reserve appears to have taken no action to date to make its 5%
limit more effective, such as by requiring the inclusion of bank assets, copper inventories, oil and
gas leases, and assets acquired through acquisitions. The Federal Reserve’s possible rulemaking
offers an opportunity to address those issues and strengthen its size limits.
OCC examiners experienced a similar set of tactics used by J PMorgan to avoid safety and
soundness limitations, and issued three supervisory letters in three years to eliminate
impermissible physical commodity transactions at J PMorgan’s federally-insured bank. Recently,
J PMorgan has taken action to sell major components of its physical commodity activities,
including much of the metals inventory held at its bank, which may reduce its overall physical
commodity holdings and the risks those holdings represent.
(c) Operating Without Written Guidance or Standardized Periodic
Reports
Although size limits are among their most powerful safety and soundness tools to reduce
the risks associated with physical commodity activities, neither the Federal Reserve nor the OCC
has issued formal written guidance on how their respective size limits are to be implemented. In
the absence of written guidance, J PMorgan employed aggressive interpretations that attempted to
maximize the amount of physical commodities it would be permitted to hold under both limits.
While it has recently reduced its physical commodity holdings, the issues J PMorgan raised,
including how to value certain assets, what assets can be excluded, and whether derivative
holdings can be calculated on a notional rather than net basis, have not been publicly addressed
or even disclosed. The lack of written guidance also invites financial institutions to develop their
own implementation strategies that require time and resources from regulators to detect and
analyze. Standardized rules in formal guidance would help clear up ambiguities in the regulatory
limits and enable both financial institutions and regulators to implement the limits in a more
efficient and effective manner.
A related problem has been the lack of standardized periodic reports tracking compliance
with the regulatory size limits. For years, the Federal Reserve and OCC relied on information
provided by J PMorgan on an ad hoc basis to enforce their respective regulatory limits. It was
only after the 2011 aluminum trade raised questions about J PMorgan’s actions that the Federal
Reserve began receiving from J PMorgan periodic information in a standardized format regarding
its compliance with the size limits.
2552
It was also at that point that the OCC learned J PMorgan
2551
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 299, 301 [sealed exhibit].
2552
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001-000008, at 002.
394
Chase Bank had breached its 5% limit
2553
– and that bank personnel had inaccurately thought the
limit was 20%, not 5%.
2554
The documents produced to the Subcommittee indicate that it was not until early 2013,
that the Federal Reserve and OCC began receiving, on at least a quarterly basis, information in a
standardized format related to both the holding company and bank’s compliance with the Federal
Reserve and OCC size limits.
2555
That reporting aligns with a recommendation made by the
FRBNY Commodities Team that the Federal Reserve should require “formal reporting of
physical commodity exposures” including with respect to the “5% tier 1 capital limit.”
2556
The
Federal Reserve and OCC should take the next step and make those reports public so that
policymakers, analysts, and market participants can develop a better understanding of the
physical commodities held by large banks and their holding companies.
(d) Rationalizing Patchwork Limits
A final issue involves the failure of the Federal Reserve to rationalize the existing
patchwork of limits that now apply to financial holding companies engaged in physical
commodity activities. As explained earlier, a financial holding company’s physical commodity
activities are currently subject to a limit of 5% of Tier 1 capital when conducted under its
complementary authority; and a limit of 5% of its consolidated assets when conducted as a
grandfathered activity. Physical commodities held by a financial holding company’s bank are
subject to a separate OCC 5% limit on physical delivery of commodities in connection with
derivative transactions. Physical commodities acquired under the merchant banking authority
have no size limit at all. Neither do activities involving copper, platinum, or palladium.
Collectively, these limits create a complex Venn diagram with spotty coverage and significant
gaps. The complementary limit is also riddled with exclusions.
One Federal Reserve Bank of New York examiner took particular issue with the lack of
coordination between the Federal Reserve and OCC 5% limits.
“In part because the two regulatory limits reference separate metrics (Tier 1 capital and
percentage of physical delivery) and legal entities (the Bank and BHC subsidiaries), the
resultant dual-limit framework is less effective and vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage.
The Firm may increase physical commodity holdings in the booking entity where it
perceives the most regulatory leeway and both regulators may be challenged to limit
overall physical holdings to intended levels.”
2557
2553
See, e.g., 2/28/2013 email from Mark Lenczowski, J PMorgan, to Michael Kirk and others, OCC, “MRA
Review,” OCC-PSI-00000389 - 390; 1/20/2012 email from Blythe Masters, J PMorgan, to Michael Kirk, OCC,
“Consolidated OCC Summary 19 J an 2012,” OCC-PSI-00000340 (apologizing for the OCC’s learning about a limit
breach “after the fact”).
2554
1/25/2012 email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Guidance on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000343 - 345, at 343 [sealed
exhibit].
2555
See, e.g., 2/12/2013 “Fed/OCC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301443 - 451, at 447.
2556
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 484 [sealed exhibit].
2557
10/25/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff and FRBNY staff, “Re: Regulatory limit framework around
physical commodities,” FRB-PSI-4000179 - 181, at 181 [sealed exhibit].
395
The examiner further noted: “The current regulatory limit framework is thus siloed to some
extent without an overall limit.”
2558
Nothing in the law necessitates this lack of coordination and consistency across
regulatory authorities. Nothing in the statutory text or legislative history of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act suggests that the Federal Reserve’s broad authority to protect the safety and
soundness of financial institutions and the U.S. financial system was intended to be limited in
any way, such as by precluding the establishment of an integrated, comprehensive, coherent limit
on physical commodity activities.
To the contrary, Section 5(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act gives the Federal
Reserve broad authority “to issue such regulations and orders … as may be necessary to enable it
to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter and prevent evasions thereof.”
2559
That
broad grant of authority provides the legal foundation for the Federal Reserve to issue
regulations or orders establishing limits on physical commodity activities authorized under the
Bank Holding Company Act.
2560
In fact, pursuant to its broad authority under the Bank Holding Company Act and its
responsibility to ensure the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system, the Federal
Reserve has already imposed size limits on physical commodity activities undertaken with
respect to both the merchant banking and complementary authorities. With respect to merchant
banking, the Federal Reserve initially limited the size of those activities to no more than 30% of
a financial holding company’s consolidated Tier 1 capital.
2561
Later, the Federal Reserve
repealed that limit after adopting rules imposing additional capital charges on those activities.
2562
The imposition and subsequent removal of the merchant banking limit was not provided for in
the statute, but was instead grounded on the Federal Reserve’s authority to administer the Bank
Holding Company Act and safeguard the U.S. banking system. Similarly, the existing 5% limit
imposed by the Federal Reserve on complementary physical commodity activities is not
expressly required or authorized by the statute authorizing complementary activities. Rather, the
statute is silent on the amount of activity allowable under the complementary authority,
2563
and
yet the Federal Reserve has imposed, not only a size limit, but also other conditions on each
financial holding company given that authority to ensure complementary activities are carried
out in a safe and sound manner.
2564
2558
Id.
2559
12 U.S. Code § 1844.
2560
As discussed in Chapter 3, above, it is the Bank Holding Company Act that authorizes financial holding
companies to engage in physical commodity activities that are financial in nature or incidental thereto under Section
4(k)(1)(B);
complementary to financial activities under Section 4(k)(1)(B);
merchant banking investments under
Section 4(k)(4)(H); or grandfathered under Section 4(o).
2561
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds).
2562
“Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy, Guidelines; Capital Maintenance:
Nonfinancial Equity Investments,” 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (1/25/2002) (adopting a final rule that ended the size limit
while imposing specific capital requirements for merchant banking investments).
2563
See 12 U.S.C. §1843(j).
2564
See e.g., 2005 J PMorgan Complementary Order, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 - C59 (imposing numerous restrictions
on the complementary powers authorized).
396
Using its broad authority to administer the Bank Holding Company Act and ensure the
safe and sound operation of financial holding companies, the Federal Reserve can remedy the
current ineffective and incoherent set of size limits on physical commodity activities. One
solution would be for the Federal Reserve to impose a single limit on all of the physical
commodity activities conducted by a financial holding company and its affiliates – no matter
how authorized – to no more than 5% of the financial holding company’s consolidated Tier 1
capital. That approach would simplify, rationalize, and strengthen the most important safeguard
ensuring that financial holding companies conduct physical commodity activities on a limited
basis, in a safe and sound manner, with minimal risk that U.S. taxpayers would one day be called
upon for another multi-billion-dollar bailout.
In addition, the Federal Reserve could provide better guidance on how to calculate the
market value of physical commodities for purposes of complying with the size limit. In its 2012
Summary Report, the FRBNY Commodities Team stated that it was already “formulating
specific guidance on the appropriate calculation methodology to be used by J PMC [J PMorgan]
as well as peer firms.” Two years later, however, that guidance has yet to be circulated or made
public. In addition, the various limits remain compartmentalized. The Federal Reserve’s current
rulemaking offers an opportunity to correct the many problems with the size limits on physical
commodity activities.
(4) Analysis
The Federal Reserve and OCC have each imposed limits on the physical commodity
activities that may be undertaken by a bank or financial holding company. Those size limits are
intended to reduce risks that, in a worst case scenario, could lead to taxpayer bailouts. As
currently configured and implemented, however, the limits do not impose a meaningful overall
cap on the amount of physical commodity activities that may be conducted by a financial holding
company and its federally insured bank. They are riddled with multi-billion-dollar exclusions
and are compartmentalized in ways that reduce their effectiveness. The current problems are
brought home by J PMorgan’s ability to amass physical commodities valued at $17.4 billion,
representing nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital, at the same time it was allowed by regulators to
calculate that its holdings totaled just $6.6 billion, representing 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. The
differences between those two sets of figures are startling, troubling, and need to be resolved.
On J anuary 21, 2014, the Federal Reserve issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on financial holding company involvement with physical commodities.
2565
That
rulemaking effort addresses, in part, the question of differing authorities and limits, and offers a
way to remedy the faults of the current system. The OCC should also revise its physical
commodities limit to prevent it from being undermined or gamed. To promote the safety and
soundness of the banks and their holding companies, and to prevent potential abuses, the current
patchwork of limits on physical commodities activities using different measures should be
reconciled across authorities and regulators.
2565
See Federal Reserve advance notice of proposed rulemaking, “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking
Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg.
3329 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-21/pdf/FR-2014-01-21.pdf.
doc_624560699.pdf
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Carl Levin, Chairman
John McCain, Ranking Minority Member
WALL STREET BANK
INVOLVEMENT WITH
PHYSICAL COMMODITIES
MAJORITY AND MINORITY
STAFF REPORT
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INVESTIGATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
RELEASED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
NOVEMBER 20 AND 21, 2014 HEARING
SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Chairman
SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Ranking Minority Member
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
ELISE J. BEAN
Staff Director and Chief Counsel
TYLER GELLASCH
Senior Counsel
JOSEPH M. BRYAN
Professional Staff Member
Armed Services Committee
DAVID KATZ
Senior Counsel
AHMAD SARSOUR
Detailee
ANGELA MESSENGER
Detailee
JOEL CHURCHES
Detailee
MARY D. ROBERTSON
Chief Clerk
ADAM HENDERSON
Professional Staff Member
HENRY J. KERNER
Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Minority
MICHAEL LUEPTOW
Counsel to the Minority
ELISE MULLEN
Research Assistant to the Minority
TOM McDONALD
Law Clerk
TIFFANY EISENBISE
Law Clerk
CHRISTINA BORTZ
Law Clerk to the Minority
ANDREW BROWN
Law Clerk to the Minority
DANICA HAMES
Law Clerk to the Minority
JENNIFER JUNGER
Law Clerk to the Minority
TIFFANY GREAVES
Law Clerk
KYLE BROSNAN
Law Clerk to the Minority
CHAPIN GREGOR
Law Clerk to the Minority
PATRICK HARTOBEY
Law Clerk to the Minority
FERDINAND KRAMER
Law Clerk to the Minority
11/18/14
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
199 Russell Senate Office Building – Washington, D.C. 20510
Majority: 202/224-9505 – Minority: 202/224-3721
Web Address:http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations
WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH
PHYSICAL COMMODITIES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Subcommittee Investigation. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Investigation Overview. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
C. Findings of Fact and Recommendations. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Findings of Fact:
(1) Engaging in Risky Activities. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(2) Mixing Banking and Commerce. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(3) Affecting Prices. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(4) Gaining Trading Advantages . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(5) Incurring New Bank Risks. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(6) Incurring New Systemic Risk . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(7) Using Ineffective Size Limits . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.
(8) Lacking Key Information. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Recommendations:
(1) Reaffirm Separation of Banking and Commerce. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(2) Clarify Size Limits. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(3) Strengthen Disclosures. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(4) Narrow Scope of Complementary Activity . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(5) Clarify Scope of Grandfathering Clause. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(6) Narrow Scope of Merchant Banking Authority. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(7) Establish Capital and Insurance Minimums. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(8) Prevent Unfair Trading. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(9) Utilize Section 620 Study. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(10) Reclassify Commodity-Backed ETFs. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
(11) Study Misuse of Physical Commodities to Manipulate Prices . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
II. BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Short History of Banking Involvement in Physical Commodities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(1) Historical Limits on Bank Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(2) U.S. Banks and Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Risks Associated with Bank Involvement in Physical Commodities.. . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C. Role of Regulators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
(1) Federal Reserve Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
(2) Other Federal Bank Regulators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
(3) Dodd-Frank Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
(4) Other Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
i
III. OVERSEEING PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A. Expanding Physical Commodity Activities, 2000-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
(1) Expanding Permissible “Financial” Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
(2) Authorizing Commodity-Related “Complementary” Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
(3) Delaying Interpretation of the Grandfather Clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
(4) Allowing Expansive Interpretations of Merchant Banking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
(5) Narrowly Enforcing Prudential Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B. Reviewing Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities, 2009-2013.. . . . . . . . . . 75
(1) Initiating the Special Physical Commodities Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
(2) Conducting the Special Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
(3) Documenting Extensive, High Risk Commodity Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
(a) Summarizing Banks’ Physical Commodities Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
(b) Identifying Multiple Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
(c) Evaluating Risk Management and Mitigation Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
(d) Recommendations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C. Taking Steps to Limit Physical Commodity Activities, 2009-Present. . . . . . . . . . . . 94
(1) Denying Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
(2) Using Other Means to Reconsider Physical Commodity Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . 97
(3) Changing the Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
D. Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
IV. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A. Overview of Goldman Sachs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
(1) Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
(3) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B. Goldman Involvement with Uranium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
(1) Background on Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
(2) Background on Nufcor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
(3) Goldman Involvement with Physical Uranium.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
(a) Proposing Physical Uranium Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
(b) Operating a Physical Uranium Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
(4) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Physical Uranium Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
(a) Catastrophic Event Liability Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
(i) Denying Liability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
(ii) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
(b) Unfair Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
(c) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
(d) Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
(5) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C. Goldman Involvement with Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
(1) Background on Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
(2) Goldman Involvement with Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
ii
(a) Trading Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
(b) Acquiring the First Colombian Coal Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
(c) Operating the Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
(d) Acquiring the Second Colombian Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
(e) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Coal Mining Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
(a) Catastrophic Event Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
(b) Merchant Banking Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
(c) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
D. Goldman Involvement with Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
(1) Background on Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
(2) Goldman Involvement with Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
(a) Building an Aluminum Inventory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
(b) Acquiring a Warehousing Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
(c) Paying Incentives to Attract Outside Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
(d) Paying Incentives to Retain Existing Aluminum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
(i) Deutsche Bank Merry-Go-Round Deal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
(ii) Four Red Kite Merry-Go-Round Deals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
(iii) Glencore Merry-Go-Round Deal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
(e) Benefiting from Proprietary Cancellations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
(f) Benefiting from Fees Tied to Higher Midwest Premium Prices.. . . . . . . . . . . 212
(g) Sharing Non-Public Information.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
(h) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman Involvement with Aluminum.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
(a) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
(b) Aluminum Market Impact.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
(c) Non-Public Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
V. MORGAN STANLEY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
A. Overview of Morgan Stanley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
(1) Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
(3) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
B. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
(1) Background on Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
(a) Trading Natural Gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
(b) Planning to Construct a Compressed Natural Gas Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
(c) Investing in a Natural Gas Pipeline Company. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
(d) Investing in Other Natural Gas Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
iii
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Natural Gas Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
(a) Shell Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
(b) Unfair Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
(c) Catastrophic Event Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
(d) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
(e) Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
C. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Crude Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
(1) Background on Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
(a) Building a Physical Oil Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
(b) Conducting Physical Oil Activities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
(c) Exiting the Physical Oil Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Crude Oil Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
(a) Mixing Banking with Commerce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
(b) Multiple Risks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
(c) Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
D. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
(1) Background on Jet Fuel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
(a) Storing, Supplying, and Transporting Jet Fuel Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
(b) Supplying Jet Fuel to United Airlines.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
(c) Hedging Jet Fuel Prices with Emirates.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Involvement with Jet Fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
(a) Thin Benefits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
(b) Operational and Catastrophic Event Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
VI. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
A. JPMorgan Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
(1) Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
(2) Historical Overview of Commodities Activities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
(3) Current Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
B. JPMorgan Involvement with Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
(1) Background on Electricity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
(2) JPMorgan Involvement with Power Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
(a) Acquiring Power Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
(b) Requesting Broad Authority for Power Plant Activities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
(c) Conducting Power Plant Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
(a) Manipulating Electricity Prices.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
(b) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance to Cover Potential Losses.. . . . 346
iv
(c) Erecting Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
(4) Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
C. JPMorgan Involvement with Copper.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
(1) Background on Copper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
(2) JPMorgan’s Involvement with Copper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
(a) Trading Copper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
(b) Proposing Copper ETF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan Involvement with Copper.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
(a) Unrestricted Copper Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
(b) ETF Conflicts of Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
(c) Potential Economic Impacts of a Copper ETF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
(d) Inadequate Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
D. JPMorgan Involvement with Size Limits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
(1) Background on Size Limits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
(2) JPMorgan’s Aggressive Interpretations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
(a) Making Commitments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
(b) Expanding Its Physical Commodity Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
(c) Stretching the Limits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Size Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
(a) Excluding Bank Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
(b) Excluding and Undervaluing Other Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
(c) Operating Without Written Guidance or Standardized Periodic Reports. . . . . 393
(d) Rationalizing Patchwork Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
(4) Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
h h h
v
WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH
PHYSICAL COMMODITIES
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For more than a decade, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has
investigated and presented case histories on the workings of the commodities markets, with the
objective of ensuring well-functioning markets with market-based prices, effective hedging tools,
and safeguards against market manipulation, conflicts of interest, and excessive speculation.
Past investigations have presented case studies on pricing gasoline; exposing a $6 billion
manipulation of natural gas prices by a hedge fund called Amaranth; closing the Enron loophole
impeding energy market oversight; tracing excessive speculation in the crude oil and wheat
markets; exposing the increased role of mutual funds, exchange traded funds, and other financial
firms in commodity speculation; and revitalizing position limits as tools to combat market
manipulation and excessive speculation.
1
This investigation focuses on the recent rise of banks and bank holding companies as
major players in the physical markets for commodities and related businesses. It presents case
studies of three major U.S. bank holding companies, Goldman Sachs,
2
J PMorgan Chase,
3
and
Morgan Stanley that over the last ten years were the largest bank holding company participants
in physical commodity activities. Those activities included trading uranium, operating coal
mines, running warehouses that store metal, stockpiling aluminum and copper, operating oil and
gas pipelines, planning to build a compressed natural gas facility, acquiring a natural gas pipeline
company, selling jet fuel to airlines, and operating power plants.
The United States has a long tradition of separating banks from commerce. The
Subcommittee’s case studies show how that tradition is eroding, and along with it, protections
from a long list of risks and potentially abusive conduct, including significant financial loss,
catastrophic event risks, unfair trading, market manipulation, credit distortions, unfair business
competition, and conflicts of interest. The investigation also highlights how the Federal Reserve
has identified financial holding company involvement with physical commodities as a significant
risk, but has taken insufficient steps to address it. More is needed to safeguard the U.S. financial
system and protect U.S. taxpayers from being forced to bailout large financial institutions
involved with physical commodities.
1
See, e.g., U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations reports and hearings, “Gas Prices: How Are
They Really Set?” S. Hrg. 107-509 (April 30 and May 2, 2002); “U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Recent Policy
has Increased Costs to Consumers But Not Overall U.S. Energy Security,” S. Prt. 108-18 (March 5, 2003); “The
Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat,” S. Prt. 109-65
(J une 27, 2006); “Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,” S. Hrg. 110-235 (J une 25 and J uly 9, 2007);
“Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market,” S. Hrg. 110-235 (J une 25 and J uly 9, 2007); “Excessive Speculation
and Compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act,” S. Hrg. 112-313 (November 3, 2011); and “Compliance with Tax
Limits on Mutual Fund Commodity Speculation,” S. Hrg. 112-343 (J anuary 26, 2012).
2
The terms “Goldman Sachs” and “Goldman” are intended to refer to The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., the financial
holding company, unless otherwise indicated.
3
The terms “J PMorgan Chase” or “J PMorgan” are intended to refer to J PMorgan Chase & Co., the financial holding
company, unless otherwise indicated.
2
A. Subcommittee Investigation
The Subcommittee initiated this investigation in 2012. As part of the investigation, the
Subcommittee gathered and reviewed over 90,000 pages of documents from Goldman Sachs,
J PMorgan, Morgan Stanley, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), as well as from a number of other financial firms and agencies. The
Subcommittee obtained information from them through information requests, briefings,
interviews, and reviews of publicly available information. The Subcommittee participated in 78
interviews and briefings involving the financial institutions, regulators, and other businesses and
agencies. In addition, the Subcommittee spoke with academic and industry analysts, as well as
experts in a variety of fields, including banking law, commodities trading, environmental and
catastrophic risk management, and the aluminum, copper, coal, uranium, natural gas, oil, jet fuel,
and power markets. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and J PMorgan, as well as U.S. federal
banking regulators, other U.S. agencies, and the LME all cooperated with Subcommittee requests
for information.
B. Investigation Overview
The Subcommittee investigation developed case studies involving the three U.S. financial
holding companies with the largest levels of involvement with physical commodities, Goldman
Sachs, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley. Within each case study, the Subcommittee looked at
three specific commodities issues in detail to illustrate the wide variety of physical commodity
activities underway and the particular concerns they raise.
The Goldman case study looks at Goldman’s acquisition of a company called Nufcor
which bought and sold physical uranium and supplied it to nuclear power plants. The case study
also examines Goldman’s ownership of two open-pit coal mines in Colombia and its use of
Colombian subsidiaries to produce, market, and export that coal. In addition, it scrutinizes
Goldman’s involvement with aluminum, including its acquisition of Metro International Trade
Services LLC, a warehouse company with nearly 30 Detroit warehouses containing the largest
London Metal Exchange (LME)-certified aluminum stocks in the United States.
The Morgan Stanley case study focuses on Morgan Stanley’s involvement with natural
gas, in particular its effort to construct a new compressed natural gas facility in Texas and its
involvement with a natural gas pipeline company in the Midwest named Southern Star. It also
examines Morgan Stanley’s involvement with oil storage and transport activities, and its role as a
supplier of jet fuel to United Airlines and as a jet fuel hedging counterparty to Emirates airline.
The J PMorgan case study features J PMorgan’s acquisition of over 30 power plants across
the United States, and subsequent involvement with manipulating electricity payments and
blocking plant modifications to improve grid reliability. The case study also examines
J PMorgan’s involvement with physical copper activities, including massive copper trades, a
multi-billion-dollar copper inventory that operates free of regulatory size limits, and a proposal
to establish a copper-backed exchange traded fund that some industrial copper users view as
potentially creating artificial copper shortages and price increases. In addition, the case study
examines how J PMorgan used loopholes, exclusions, and valuation minimization techniques to
stay under regulatory limits on the size of its physical commodity holdings.
3
In addition to analyzing financial company involvement with physical commodity
activities, the investigation examined the level of oversight exerted by the Federal Reserve,
which has sole authority over bank holding companies in the United States, including bank
holding companies that have elected to operate as “financial holding companies” authorized to
engage in physical commodity activities. In 2009, as part of its effort to analyze risks in the U.S.
financial system after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve identified bank involvement with
physical commodities as an area of concern and initiated a multi-year review of the issue. In an
October 2012 report, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Commodities Team that conducted
the special review issued an internal, staff-level report concluding bank involvement with
physical commodities raised significant concerns that required action. A year ago, the Federal
Reserve signaled that it was considering initiating a rulemaking to reduce the risks associated
with physical commodities, but has yet to issue a proposed rule.
Risky Activities. All three of the financial holding companies examined by the
Subcommittee were engaged in a wide range of risky physical commodity activities which
included, at times, producing, transporting, storing, processing, supplying, or trading energy,
industrial metals, or agricultural commodities. Many of the attendant risks were new to the
banking industry, and could result in significant financial losses to the financial institutions.
One set of risks arose from the sheer size of each financial institution’s physical
commodity activities. Until recently, Morgan Stanley controlled over 55 million barrels of oil
storage capacity, 100 oil tankers, and 6,000 miles of pipeline. J PMorgan built a copper
inventory that peaked at $2.7 billion, and, at one point, included at least 213,000 metric tons of
copper, comprising nearly 60% of the available physical copper on the world’s premier copper
trading exchange, the London Metal Exchange (LME). In 2012, Goldman owned 1.5 million
metric tons of aluminum worth $3 billion, about 25% of the entire U.S. annual consumption.
Goldman also owned warehouses which, in 2014, controlled 85% of the LME aluminum storage
business in the United States. Those large holdings illustrate the significant increase in
participation and power of the financial holding companies active in physical commodity
markets.
In addition to accumulating large inventories, the three financial holding companies
engaged in transactions involving massive amounts of physical commodities. J PMorgan
executed a series of copper trades in 2010 involving more than $1.5 billion, and a series of
aluminum trades in 2011 involving $1.9 billion. In 2012, Goldman twice made purchases of
LME warrants providing title to physical aluminum worth more than $1 billion. In 2012,
Morgan Stanley bought 950,000 barrels of heating oil. These transactions represented outsized
physical commodity trades within their respective markets. Since most physical commodity
transactions are not subject to regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Securities Exchange Commission, or bank regulators, those transactions also represent an area in
which risky conduct may escape federal oversight.
In addition to compiling huge commodity inventories and participating in outsized
transactions, the three financial holding companies chose to engage in commodity-related
businesses that carried potential catastrophic event risks. While the likelihood of an actual
catastrophe remained remote, those activities carried risks that banks normally avoided
altogether. Goldman, for example, bought a uranium business that carried the risk of a nuclear
incident, as well as open pit coal mines that carried potential risks of methane explosions, mining
4
mishaps, and air and water pollution. Its coal mines also experienced extended labor unrest,
which at one point led to requests for police and military assistance to remove a human blockade
preventing entry to the mines, risking injuries, an international incident, or worse. Morgan
Stanley owned and invested in extensive oil storage and transport facilities and a natural gas
pipeline company which, together, carried risks of fire, pipeline ruptures, natural gas explosions,
and oil spills. J PMorgan bought dozens of power plants whose risks included fire, explosions,
and air and water pollution. Throughout most of their history, U.S. banks have not incurred
those types of catastrophic event risks.
In some cases, the financial holding companies intensified their liability risks. Morgan
Stanley formed shell companies to launch construction of a compressed natural gas facility, and
ran the venture entirely with Morgan Stanley employees and resources, opening up the financial
holding company to direct liability if a worst case scenario should occur. Goldman bought two
Colombian coal mines, took control of 100% of the coal sales, and provided other essential
services to its subsidiaries running the business, putting itself at significant financial risk if
potential mining-related accidents were to occur. Goldman also purchased an existing uranium
business and, after its employees left, used Goldman personnel to buy and sell uranium and
supply it to nuclear power plants. J PMorgan took 100% ownership of several power plants,
exposing the financial holding company, as the direct owner, to financial liability should any of
those plants experience a catastrophic event.
At the same time, none of the three financial holding companies was adequately prepared
for potential losses from a catastrophic event related to its physical commodity activities, having
allocated insufficient capital and insurance to cover losses compared to other market participants.
In its recent public filing seeking comment on whether it should impose new regulatory
constraints on financial holding companies conducting physical commodity activities, the
Federal Reserve described a litany of past industrial disasters, including massive oil spills,
railway crashes, nuclear power plant meltdowns, and natural gas explosions.
4
The Federal
Reserve wrote:
“Recent disasters involving physical commodities demonstrate that the risks associated
with these activities are unique in type, scope and size. In particular, catastrophes
involving environmentally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic
damages well in excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the
committed capital and insurance policies of market participants.”
5
When the Federal Reserve Commodities Team, in 2012, analyzed the extent to which a
group of four financial holding companies, including the three examined here, had allocated
capital and insurance to cover “extreme loss scenarios,” it determined that all four had
insufficient coverage, and that each had a shortfall of $1 billion to $15 billion.
6
In other words,
4
See “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding
Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.Reg. 3329 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014)(hereinafter “ANPR”),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-21/pdf/2014-00996.pdf.
5
Id. at 3331.
6
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 498, 509 [sealed exhibit].
See also ANPR, at 3332-3333.
5
if a catastrophic event were to subject a financial holding company to multi-billion-dollar costs
to the same extent as, for example, BP Petroleum in the Deep Water Horizon oil spill disaster,
the financial holding company would not have the capital and insurance needed to cover its
losses which, in turn, might lead to its business partners and creditors reducing their business
activities or lending to the financial holding company, exacerbating its financial difficulties. In a
worst case scenario, the Federal Reserve and ultimately U.S. taxpayers could be forced to step in
with financial support to avoid the financial institution’s collapse and consequential damage to
the U.S. financial system and economy.
Unfair Trading Advantages. A second set of issues involves unfair trading advantages.
When financial holding companies seek permission from the Federal Reserve to engage in
physical commodity activities, a common reason given for approving the activities is that
exposure to the physical market would improve the company’s trading in the corresponding
financial market. For example, in its 2005 application to the Federal Reserve for complementary
authority to participate in physical commodity activities, J PMorgan explained that engaging in
such activities would:
“position J PM Chase in the supply end of the commodities markets, which in turn will
provide access to information regarding the full array of actual produce and end-user
activity in those markets. The information gathered through this increased market
participation will help improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply
vital price and risk management information that J PM Chase can use to improve its
financial commodities derivative offerings.”
7
In the activities reviewed by the Subcommittee, the financial companies often traded in
both the physical and financial markets at the same time, with respect to the same commodities,
frequently using the same traders on the same trading desk. In some cases, after purchasing a
physical commodity business, the financial holding company ramped up its financial trading.
For example, after Goldman bought Nufcor, the uranium company, it increased Nufcor’s trading
activity tenfold, going in four years from an annualized rate of 1.3 million pounds of uranium to
trades involving 13 million pounds. In all of the commodities examined by the Subcommittee,
however, the trades executed by the financial holding companies in a commodity’s physical
markets remained a small percentage of the trades they executed in the corresponding financial
markets, reflecting the greater focus of the financial holding companies on earning substantial
revenues from trading in those financial markets.
In some cases, financial holding companies used their physical commodity activities to
influence or even manipulate commodity prices. J PMorgan, for example, paid $410 million to
settle charges by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that it used manipulative bidding
practices to obtain excessive electricity payments in California and the Midwest. Goldman was
sued by over a dozen industrial users of aluminum claiming that Goldman’s warehouses were
artificially delaying the release of aluminum from storage to boost prices and restrict supplies.
As discussed below, in connection with its warehouses in Detroit, Goldman approved “merry-go-
7
7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000004, at 016.
6
round” transactions in which warehouse clients were paid cash incentives to load aluminum from
one Metro warehouse into another, essentially blocking the warehouse exits while they moved
their metal. Those merry-go-round transactions lengthened the queue for other metal owners
seeking to exit the Detroit warehouses, accompanied by increases in the Midwest Premium for
aluminum. In another troubling development, J PMorgan proposed an exchange traded fund
(ETF) to be backed with physical copper, described below. In filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, some industrial copper users charged that the proposed ETF would
create artificial copper shortages as copper was stockpiled to back the fund, leading to price
hikes and, potentially, manipulation of market prices.
In addition, in each of the three case studies, evidence showed that the financial holding
companies used their physical commodity activities to gain access to commercially valuable non-
public information that could be used to benefit their financial trading activities. For example,
Morgan Stanley’s oil storage and transport activities gave it access to information about oil
shipments, storage fill rates, and pipeline breakdowns. That information was available not only
with respect to its own activities, but also for clients using its storage and pipeline facilities.
Goldman’s warehouse business gave over 50 Goldman employees access to confidential
warehouse information about aluminum shipments, storage volumes, and warrant cancellations.
Its coal mines in Colombia, the number one exporter of coal to the United States, provided
Goldman with non-public information about coal prices, export levels, and environmental
regulatory developments that could affect coal exports. J PMorgan’s power plants gave it
insights into electricity costs, congestion areas, and power plant capabilities and shutdowns, all
of which could be used to advantage in trading activities. In each instance, non-public market
intelligence about physical commodity activities provided an opportunity for the financial
holding company to use the information to benefit its financial trading activities.
U.S. commodities laws traditionally have not barred the use of non-public information by
commodity traders in the same way as securities laws have barred its use in securities trades.
But when large financial holding companies begin to take control of physical commodity
businesses, gain access to large amounts of commercially valuable market intelligence
unavailable to most market participants, and use that information to make large profitable trades
in financial markets, concerns deepen about unfair trading advantages. Those types of concerns
have been magnified by the financial holding companies’ increased involvement with physical
commodities.
Commodity markets used to be dominated by commodity producers and end-users, like
farmers, manufacturers, airlines, and municipalities who relied on the commodity markets to
determine fair prices for critical materials, and to hedge their future price risks. They typically
held 70% of the open interest in the futures markets, while commodity speculators held about
30%. But by 2011, those percentages were reversed, with commodity speculators dominating
U.S. commodity markets, including financial holding companies like the three Wall Street banks
examined by the Subcommittee. Under those changed circumstances, if commodity markets are
to be fair, it is particularly important that large traders like financial holding companies not gain
unfair trading advantages.
Mixing Banking and Commerce. For over 150 years, the United States has generally
restricted banks to the business of banking and discouraged the mixing of banking and
7
commerce. Multiple concerns, discussed in more detail below, have been articulated over the
years to support the separation of banking from commerce, but the case studies discussed in this
Report show how that principle is being eroded.
The case studies show how financial holding companies have taken control of numerous
commercial businesses that have never before been run by a bank or bank holding company.
Morgan Stanley’s effort to construct a compressed natural gas facility, for example, is
unprecedented for a bank or bank holding company, and in direct competition with a similar
project by a private company. Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel supply services also compete directly
with oil and refining companies providing the same services. Goldman’s coal operations are in
direct competition with those of an American company that is the second largest coal producer in
Colombia. In running its power plants, J PMorgan competes with utilities and other energy
companies that specialize in that business. Until recently, banks and their holding companies
focused on financing private sector businesses, rather than acquiring and using subsidiaries to
compete against them.
One key concern when financial holding companies compete against non-bank
companies is that their borrowing costs will nearly always undercut those of their non-bank
competitors. Another advantage is their relatively low capital requirements. The Federal
Reserve Commodities Team determined that, in 2012, corporations engaged in oil and gas
businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover potential losses, while bank holding
company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%, making it much easier for
them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.
8
In addition to those fundamental
economic advantages over non-bank companies, a financial holding company could, in theory,
help its rise in a particular business simply by not providing financing to its rivals. Some experts
have identified less expensive financing, lower capital, and control over credit decisions as key
factors that give financial holding companies an unfair advantage over non-bank competitors and
represent some of the concerns motivating the traditional U.S. ban on mixing banking with
commerce. Avoiding the catastrophic risks described above is another.
Still another set of concerns involves the transitory nature of a financial holding
company’s involvement in any particular physical commodity operation. In most cases, financial
holding companies are looking for short-term financial returns rather than making long-term
commitments to run a business like a power plant or natural gas facility. In addition, financial
holding companies that make so-called merchant banking investments in a commercial company
are constrained by law to sell those investments generally within ten years.
Those relatively short-term investment horizons mean that financial holding companies
are not or may not be willing to develop or dedicate the resources, time, and expertise needed to
make complex infrastructure investments and meet regulatory requirements. For example, in the
case studies, Goldman chose not to upgrade its port in Colombia with new coal loading
equipment, while J PMorgan stalled upgrades to two power plants in California to support grid
reliability, making decisions contrary to the companies participating in those business sectors for
the long haul. Without those investments, however, a financial holding company may place
itself at greater risk of violating regulations or experiencing a catastrophic event. A related
8
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200499.
8
concern is whether decisions by financial holding companies to delay or avoid infrastructure
investments disadvantage competitors who do make those investments and may, in fact, pressure
those competitors to delay or skimp on needed infrastructure as well.
Many physical commodity businesses today rely on a small cadre of experienced
corporations with long term investment horizons to transport oil and gas, mine coal, process
uranium, or generate electricity. Those corporations make expensive infrastructure investments.
The prospect of financial holding companies changing those markets by buying particular
companies, capturing profits, and then pulling out, is a troubling scenario.
Inadequate Safeguards. A final set of issues involves a current lack of effective
regulatory safeguards related to financial holding company involvement with risky physical
commodities. As explained in the following chapters, financial holding companies currently
conduct physical commodity activities under one of three authorities provided in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the so-called complementary, merchant banking, and grandfather
authorities. Despite enactment of that law 15 years ago, the Federal Reserve has yet to address a
host of pressing questions related to how that law should be implemented.
For example, the Federal Reserve has never issued guidance on the scope of the
grandfather authority that allows financial firms that convert to bank holding companies to
continue to engage in certain physical commodity activities. That failure has allowed Goldman
and Morgan Stanley to use expansive readings of the grandfather authority to justify otherwise
impermissible physical commodity activities. The Federal Reserve has also failed to specify
capital and insurance minimums to protect against losses related to catastrophic events. Nor has
it clarified whether financial holding companies can use shell companies to conduct physical
commodity businesses as Morgan Stanley and Goldman have done in their compressed natural
gas and uranium trading businesses. Procedures to force divestment of impermissible physical
commodity activities are also opaque and slow.
One key problem is that the Federal Reserve currently relies upon an uncoordinated,
incoherent patchwork of limits on the size of the physical commodity activities conducted under
various legal authorities, permitting major exclusions, gaps, and ambiguities. In September
2012, for example, according to its own records, J PMorgan held physical commodity assets with
a combined market value of at least $17.4 billion, which was then equal to nearly 12% of its Tier
1 capital of $148 billion, while at the same time calculating its physical commodity assets for
regulatory purposes at $6.6 billion or just 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. J PMorgan was able to report
that lower amount by excluding and minimizing the market value of many of its physical
commodity assets, including billions of dollars in industrial metal held by its subsidiary national
bank. The Federal Reserve has not, to date, objected to J PMorgan’s key exclusions. The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has its own size limit, which applies to its banks, but
those are also ineffective in calculating the actual size of a bank’s commodity holdings. Size
limits subject to massive exclusions provide an illusion of risk management. The existing size
limits on physical commodities need to be reworked to ensure they effectively achieve the
intended limit on financial holding companies’ and banks’ commodities holdings.
9
A final set of problems arise from the lack of essential data. The Federal Reserve only
recently began requiring regular reports from financial holding companies tracking their
compliance with size limits, and has yet to clarify how the market value of commodity holdings
should be calculated for compliance purposes. Commodity-related merchant banking
investments are made by multiple components within a financial holding company – in the
commodities division, proprietary investment units, infrastructure funds, and other capital funds
– but the Federal Reserve does not require a listing of all of those physical commodity
investments on a single report. Instead, the Federal Reserve requires an annual merchant
banking report with such high level aggregate data that it cannot be used to analyze the extent to
which those investments involve physical commodities or the extent to which the data includes
all of the commodity-related investments taking place throughout the financial holding company.
The Federal Reserve does even less with respect to grandfathered physical commodity activities,
not requiring any regular reports at all. Moreover, the availability of public information on
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities is almost non-existent.
Ensuring physical commodity activities are conducted in a safe and secure manner will require
more comprehensive, regular, and publicly available reports from financial holding companies.
In early 2014, the Federal Reserve indicated that it was considering issuing a new
rulemaking to address the risks to the financial system caused by bank involvement with physical
commodities. That announcement was based upon several years of work examining the physical
commodity activities being conducted by financial holding companies. The Federal Reserve’s
focus on the issue has also led all three of the financial holding companies examined by the
Subcommittee to reduce the level and breadth of their physical commodity activities. However,
none of the three has yet exited the area completely, and other financial institutions are
considering entering the field or increasing their physical commodity activities. In addition,
Goldman has said that it considers physical commodities to be a core business it is not leaving.
C. Findings and Recommendations
Findings of Fact
(1) Engaging in Risky Activities. Since 2008, Goldman Sachs, J PMorgan Chase,
and Morgan Stanley have engaged in many billions of dollars of risky physical
commodity activities, owning or controlling, not only vast inventories of physical
commodities like crude oil, jet fuel, heating oil, natural gas, copper, aluminum, and
uranium, but also related businesses, including power plants, coal mines, natural gas
facilities, and oil and gas pipelines.
(2) Mixing Banking and Commerce. From 2008 to 2014, Goldman, J PMorgan,
and Morgan Stanley engaged in physical commodity activities that mixed banking
and commerce, benefiting from lower borrowing costs and lower capital to debt
ratios compared to nonbank companies.
(3) Affecting Prices. At times, some of the financial holding companies used or
contemplated using physical commodity activities, such as electricity bidding
strategies, merry-go-round trades, or a proposed exchange traded fund backed by
10
physical copper, that had the effect or potential effect of manipulating or
influencing commodity prices.
(4) Gaining Trading Advantages. Exercising control over vast physical
commodity activities gave Goldman, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley access to
commercially valuable, non-public information that could have provided
advantages in their trading activities.
(5) Incurring New Bank Risks. Due to their physical commodity activities,
Goldman, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley incurred multiple risks normally absent
from banking, including operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks,
made worse by the transitory nature of their investments.
(6) Incurring New Systemic Risks. Due to their physical commodity activities,
Goldman, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley incurred increased financial, operational,
and catastrophic event risks, faced accusations of unfair trading advantages,
conflicts of interest, and market manipulation, and intensified problems with being
too big to manage or regulate, introducing new systemic risks into the U.S. financial
system.
(7) Using Ineffective Size Limits. Prudential safeguards limiting the size of
physical commodity activities are riddled with exclusions and applied in an
uncoordinated, incoherent, and ineffective fashion, allowing J PMorgan, for
example, to hold physical commodities with a market value of $17.4 billion –
nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital – while at the same time calculating the market
value of its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying with the
Federal Reserve limit at just $6.6 billion.
(8) Lacking Key Information. Federal regulators and the public currently lack key
information about financial holding companies’ physical commodities activities to
form an accurate understanding of the nature and extent of those activities and to
protect the markets.
Recommendations
(1) Reaffirm Separation of Banking and Commerce as it Relates to Physical
Commodity Activities. Federal bank regulators should reaffirm the separation of
banking from commerce, and reconsider all of the rules and practices related to
physical commodity activities in light of that principle.
(2) Clarify Size Limits. The Federal Reserve should issue a clear limit on a financial
holding company’s physical commodity activities; clarify how to calculate the
market value of physical commodity holdings; eliminate major exclusions; and
limit all physical commodity activities to no more than 5% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital. The OCC should revise its 5% limit to protect banks
11
from speculative or other risky positions, including by calculating it based on asset
values on a commodity-by-commodity basis.
(3) Strengthen Disclosures. The Federal Reserve should strengthen financial
holding company disclosure requirements for physical commodities and related
businesses in internal and public filings to support effective regulatory oversight,
public disclosure, and investor protections, including with respect to commodity-
related merchant banking and grandfathered activities.
(4) Narrow Scope of Complementary Activity. The Federal Reserve should
narrow the scope of “complementary” activities by requiring financial holding
companies to demonstrate how a proposed physical commodity activity would be
directly linked to and support the settlement of other financial transactions
conducted by the company.
(5) Clarify Scope of Grandfathering Clause. The Federal Reserve should clarify
the scope of the “grandfather” clause as originally intended, which was only to
prevent disinvestment of physical commodity activities that were underway in
September 1997, and continued to be underway at the time of a company’s
conversion to a financial holding company.
(6) Narrow Scope of Merchant Banking Authority. The Federal Reserve should
tighten controls over merchant banking activities involving physical commodities
by shortening and equalizing the 10-year and 15-year investment time periods,
clarifying the actions that qualify as “routine operation and management” of a
business, and including those activities under an overall physical commodities size
limit.
(7) Establish Capital and Insurance Minimums. The Federal Reserve should
establish capital and insurance minimums based on market-prevailing standards to
protect against potential losses from catastrophic events in physical commodity
activities, and specify the catastrophic event models used by financial holding
companies.
(8) Prevent Unfair Trading. Financial regulators should ensure that large traders,
including financial holding companies, are legally precluded from using material
non-public information gained from physical commodities activities to benefit their
trading activities in the financial markets.
(9) Utilize Section 620 Study. Federal regulators should use the ongoing Section
620 study requiring regulators to identify permissible bank activities to restrict
banks and their holding companies from owning or controlling physical
commodities in excess of 5% of their Tier 1 capital and consider other appropriate
modifications to current practice involving physical commodities.
12
(10) Reclassify Commodity-Backed ETFs. The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and Securities Exchange Commission should treat exchange
traded funds (ETFs) backed by physical commodities as hybrid security-commodity
instruments subject to regulation by both agencies. The CFTC should apply
position limits to ETF organizers and promoters, and consider banning such
instruments due to their potential use in commodity market corners or squeezes.
(11) Study Misuse of Physical Commodities to Manipulate Prices. The Office
of Financial Research should study and produce recommendations on the broader
issue of how to detect, prevent, and take enforcement action against all entities that
use physical commodities or related businesses to manipulate commodity prices in
the physical and financial markets.
13
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on the history of U.S. bank involvement
with physical commodities, including how federal statutes governing permissible bank activities
have changed over time. It also provides background information on the concerns motivating
U.S. efforts to restrict federal banks to the “business of banking” and discourage the mixing of
banking with commerce; the roles played by federal regulators charged with overseeing
commodity-related activities; and the key physical commodity regulatory issues now facing
federal bank regulators.
A. Short History of Banking Involvement in Physical Commodities
For the first 150 years of banks operating in the United States, commodities played a very
limited role in bank activities, in part because federal laws discouraged the mixing of banking
and commerce. More recently, however, in response to bank pressure, federal regulators began
to weaken the separation of banking and commerce. In the 1980s, with the invention of energy-
based commodities that could be traded in futures and swaps markets, U.S. banks began to
increase their commodities activities. In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
which explicitly allowed banks to engage in commercial activities, including activities involving
commodities. Over the next decade, a handful of major U.S. banks not only began to expand
their trading in commodity-based financial instruments, but also to take ownership interests in, or
exert control over, businesses handling physical commodities. The 2008 financial crisis further
boosted bank involvement, when one major bank acquired a securities firm with commodity
investments, and two securities firms with extensive commodity holdings converted to bank
holding companies. Today, a handful of large U.S. banks and their holding companies are major
players in U.S. commodities markets. Those banks not only dominate commodities trading on
financial markets, but also own or exercise control over businesses that produce, store, transport,
refine, supply, and utilize physical commodities, including oil products, natural gas, coal, metals,
and electricity. The current level of bank involvement with critical raw materials, power
generation, and the food supply appears to be unprecedented in U.S. history.
(1) Historical Limits on Bank Activities
In the United States, banks have traditionally operated under laws that restrict them to
engaging in the “business of banking.”
9
The key federal statutory provision authorizes national
banks to engage in:
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating
notes ….”
10
9
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh).
10
Id., originating as the “bank powers clause” of the National Bank Act of 1863, and attaining its current wording in
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), §16. See also “Permissible Securities
Activities of Commercial Banks Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),”
14
Since 1956, bank holding companies have operated under a similar set of restrictions.
11
The
Bank Holding Company Act generally limits companies that own or control a bank to engaging
in banking activities or activities determined by the Federal Reserve “to be so closely related to
banking as to be a proper incident thereto.”
12
According to one expert, the Bank Holding
Company Act was designed to “prevent[ ] a holding company from being used by banking
organizations to acquire commercial firms and to enter activities prohibited to banks
themselves.”
13
The basis for these statutory restrictions is a longstanding U.S. principle that banking
should not mix with other types of commerce.
14
This principle was first manifested in the
charters issued to early banks operating within the United States; those charters typically
prohibited banks from dealing in “merchandise.”
15
New York bank charters, and later New York
banking statutes, also expressly prohibited banks from “dealing or trading in … goods, wares,
merchandise, [or] commodities.”
16
Early U.S. courts generally interpreted the charter and legal
restrictions narrowly, ruling that banks were prohibited from issuing mortgages, investing in real
estate, purchasing stocks as an investment, or operating any non-bank, commercial business.
17
The purpose behind those prohibitions was generally to prevent banks from competing with
Congressional Research Service, No. R41181 (4/12/2010) (hereinafter “2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA”), at
3 (“Banks are institutions of limited power; they may only engage in the activities permissible pursuant to their
charter, which generally limits them to the ‘business of banking’ and all powers incidental to the business of
banking.”).
11
See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, 70 Stat. 134 (1956). See also 1970 amendments, P.L. 91-
607 (12/31/1970).
12
Id.; 12 U.S.C. §1843(a) and (c)(8).
13
“The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United States: an Examination of Principal Issues,” OCC
Economics Working Paper 1999-1, Bernard Shull (hereinafter “Shull”), at 57-58, see also 19,http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/economics-working-papers/1999-1993/wp99-1.pdf.
14
See, e.g., “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities,” Professor Saule Omarova, 98
Minnesota Law Review 265, 268 (2012) (hereinafter “The Merchants of Wall Street”); Shull at 12. The separation
between banking and commerce in the United States has never, however, been absolute. Federal law has, for
example, allowed commercial firms to own industrial banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H), and unitary thrift holding
companies, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D), and has long permitted bank holding companies to retain small equity
ownership stakes in non-financial corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) and (7). A banking expert at a2013 Senate
hearing put it this way:
“The principle of keeping banking separate from commerce can be a useful way to simplify the otherwise
complex U.S. banking laws. Certainly, the basic structure of the National Bank Act and the [Banking
Holding Company] Act reflects this general principle. But this general principle is not a binding legal rule
and does not create an impermeable wall, and reasonable people can disagree as to where the line is and
should be drawn.”
Prepared testimony of Randall Guynn, counsel with Davis Polk & Wardell LLP, before U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, hearing on “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control
Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil Refineries,” (7/23/2013)(hereinafter “Guynn Testimony”), at 20.
15
Shull, at 12.
16
Shull, at 13, footnote 29; see also id. at 15.
17
Id. at 15-16. See also Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (analyzing “hazards” that
arise when bank affiliates become involved with investment banking).
15
other types of businesses and from engaging in risky investments, limiting them instead to
conducting a narrow range of banking activities.
18
Bank Circumvention of Restrictions. U.S. banks have traditionally chafed under the
legal limitations on their activities, and U.S. history is replete with examples of banks willfully
circumventing them. One notorious example, in the early 1900s, involved Wall Street banks that
established affiliates that dealt in securities, insurance, and real estate, and acquired ownership
interests in a wide range of commercial businesses.
19
A few major banks formed so-called
“trusts” that acted as holding companies for massive commercial enterprises, including
businesses that handled physical commodities, such as railroads, oil companies, steel
manufacturers, and shipping and mining ventures.
20
In 1901 and 1907, bank actions to acquire
or trade stocks in commercial corporations contributed to chaotic stock prices and financial
panics, triggering Congressional hearings and legislative reforms.
21
Pujo Hearings. In 1912 and 1913, hearings held by a subcommittee of the U.S. House
Committee on Banking and Currency, known as the “Pujo Committee” after Committee
Chairman Arsene Pujo of Louisiana, confirmed allegations that some Wall Street banks had
acquired control over major commercial enterprises critical to the U.S. economy, while also
asserting control over “the money, exchange, security and commodity markets.”
22
Among other
matters, the hearings disclosed to the public that a handful of major Wall Street banks controlled
hundreds of businesses in the areas of insurance, finance, transportation, and commodities; had
set up interlocking directors with their fellow banks and trusts; had restrained competition; and
had contributed to financial panics through massive stock trading, inadequate capital reserves,
and bad loans.
23
In response to the Pujo or “money trust” hearings as well as pressure from President
Theodore Roosevelt, Congress enacted several laws to break up the banks’ influence over the
economy and increase bank regulation. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which strengthened
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, provided new tools to prevent monopolistic, anti-competitive
18
See Shull, at 10-12, 55. Professor Shull noted that the principle against mixing banking and commerce had roots
as far back as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, writing that, in 1374, “the Venetian senate prohibited bankers
from dealing in copper, tin, iron, lead, saffron, and honey … probably to keep banks from undertaking risky
activities and monopolizing the specified commodities.” Id. at 6.
19
See, e.g., id. at 16; Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630 (“n 1908 banks began the practice
of establishing security affiliates that engaged in, inter alia, the business of floating bond issues and, less frequently,
underwriting stock issues.”).
20
See, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 67-68 (railroad trusts), 81-86 (U.S. Steel
trust), 100-103 (shipping trust), 109 (farm equipment trust), and 123 (copper trust).
21
Id. at 91-93 (describing massive stock trades by J PMorgan’s predecessor bank to acquire control of the Northern
Pacific railroad in 1901, leading to dramatic price volatility in the railroad’s stock price, financial panic by
speculators who had shorted the stock, and the largest stock market crash in a century), and 122-128 (describing the
1907 financial panic which began with a collapse in copper prices and a corresponding plunge in United Copper
stock prices which, in turn, undermined the financial stability of certain trust companies and banks, and threatened
widespread economic damage).
22
See “Money Trust Investigation: Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States,” hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Currency (5/16/1912), HRG-1912-BCU-0017,
Y4.B22/1:M74/2-1,http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1912-bcu-
0017?accountid=45340 (first of multiple days of hearings continuing into 1913), at 4.
23
Id. See also, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 150-156.
16
conduct.
24
The landmark Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Federal Reserve System
to act as a central bank for the United States, required national banks to become members of the
system, imposed capital and reserve requirements on them, and mandated OCC and Federal
Reserve examinations to stop unsafe and unsound banking practices.
25
The Federal Reserve Act
also modestly expanded bank activities by permitting foreign branches and certain loans secured
by farmland, while leaving in place the general prohibition against banks engaging in
commerce.
26
Stock Market Crash of 1929. A dozen years later, the pendulum swung the other way,
and banks gained new statutory authority, under the McFadden Act of 1927, to buy and sell
marketable debt obligations and issue more types of real estate loans.
27
The OCC followed with
regulations permitting federally chartered banks, through affiliates, to underwrite, buy, and sell
both debt and equity instruments.
28
Those expansions in banking powers led to a rapid increase
in bank participation in the securities markets, with banks acting on behalf of both clients and
themselves.
Two years later came the stock market crash of 1929. The ensuing depression and
economic turmoil led to the closure of thousands of banks. A subsequent investigation by a U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency subcommittee, led in part by subcommittee counsel
Ferdinand Pecora, pointed to bank involvement in non-banking activities as a key contributor to
the market’s collapse, including the underwriting and trading of questionable securities, the
repackaging of poorly performing foreign loans into bonds sold to the public, and in the case of
one bank, providing new stocks at below market prices to Administration officials, Members of
Congress, and businessmen considered to be friends of the bank.
29
The Pecora hearings
examined a wide range of banking activities, but did not highlight problems with commodities.
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. In response to the bank closures and Great Depression that
followed the stock market crash, Congress enacted several laws that reinstated restrictions on
bank activities. The most prominent was the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-
Steagall Act after the Congressmen who championed key provisions.
30
The Glass-Steagall Act
explicitly prohibited U.S. banks from dealing in securities or establishing subsidiaries or
24
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, P.L. 63–212.
25
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, P.L. 63-43.
26
Id. See also Shull, at 17.
27
McFadden Act of 1927, P.L. 69-639, §§2(b) and 16.
28
See Shull, at 17.
29
See, e.g., “Stock Exchange Practices,” report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S.Hrg. 73-
1455, (6/6/1934),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/sensep/issue/3912/download/59691/sensep_report.pdf, and
associated hearings from J anuary 1933 to May 1934 (known as the Pecora hearings); The House of Morgan, Ron
Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 352-373; Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-631 (“Congress
was concerned that commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal Reserve System in particular had
both aggravated and been damaged by [the] stock market decline partly because of their direct and indirect
involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative securities.”). The Pecora hearings also disclosed other
problematic bank conduct, including substantial bank loans given to bank officers and later forgiven; interlocking
directors with other banks and trust companies; and nonpayment of taxes by wealthy bankers.
30
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). Senator Carter Glass (D-Virginia) was then a
member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency as well as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee;
Congressman Henry B. Steagall (D-Alabama) was chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency.
17
affiliates that dealt in securities.
31
It also prohibited banks from engaging in securities
transactions undertaken “for its own account” rather than on behalf of a client.
32
In addition, the
law established the federal deposit insurance system to safeguard bank deposits.
33
The new Glass-Steagall prohibitions compelled major U.S. banks to terminate or divest
themselves of their securities trading operations as well as other prohibited activities.
34
Two
prominent banks that spun off their securities operations were J .P. Morgan & Co. and First
Boston.
35
The result was that the banking community essentially split into two groups,
commercial banks which offered deposits, checking services, mortgages, and loans; and
investment banks which traded securities and invested in new businesses.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. In 1956, Congress enacted the Banking Holding
Company Act (BHCA). According to a 2012 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
“A key original goal of the BHCA was to limit the comingling of banking and
commerce, that is, to restrict the extent to which BHCs or their subsidiaries could
engage in nonfinancial activities (more details and historical background are found in
Omarova and Tahyar, forthcoming; Santos 1998; Aharony and Swary 1981; and
Klebaner 1958). This separation is intended to prevent self-dealing and monopoly power
through lending to nonfinancial affiliates and to prevent situations where risk-taking by
nonbanking affiliates erodes the stability of the bank’s core financial activities, such as
lending and deposit-taking (Kroszner and Rajan 1994; Klebaner 1958). To further
enhance stability, BHCs are also required to maintain minimum capital ratios and to act
as a ‘source of strength’ to their banking subsidiaries, that is, to provide financial
assistance to banking subsidiaries in distress.”
36
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Banks and bank regulators respected the Bank Holding
Company Act and Glass-Steagall prohibitions for more than 40 years, and U.S. banking
flourished. By the 1970s, however, some banks began pressing regulators and Congress to allow
them once more to engage in a wider array of commercial and financial activities, including
dealing in securities, insurance, and, for the first time, the growing field of derivatives.
37
In
response to bank pressure, the OCC and Federal Reserve began weakening the Glass-Steagall
restrictions, in particular by expanding the securities and derivatives activities considered to be
within the “business of banking” or “incidental” to banking.
38
In 1998, in direct defiance of
Glass-Steagall prohibitions, Citibank announced that it intended to merge with the Travelers
31
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), §§16, 20, 21, and 32.
32
Id. at §16.
33
Id. at §8.
34
See, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 384-386; Shull at 18.
35
See, Shull at 18; The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 384-386.
36
“A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (7/2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [footnotes omitted].
37
See 2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA, at 8, 28.
38
See id. at 8-15; The Merchants of Wall Street, at 279; Shull at 20, 24. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has published a comprehensive listing of the various activities related to derivatives that national banks are
authorized to engage in. See Comptroller of the Currency, “Activities Permissible for a National Bank, Cumulative”
(April 2012) , at 57-64 .
18
insurance group, and pressed bank regulators and Congress to allow it to create what it described
as the largest financial services company in the world.
39
In 1999, faced with Citibank’s planned merger, regulatory actions that undercut the
Glass-Steagall prohibitions, and a rapidly changing banking landscape in which banks were
conducting an expanding variety of financial activities, Congress enacted the Financial
Modernization Act of 1999. This law is commonly referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
after the Congressmen who championed its enactment.
40
The new law repealed key Glass-
Steagall restrictions on banks and widened the activities authorized for bank holding
companies.
41
In particular, the law explicitly authorized commercial banks to affiliate with other
types of financial companies using a new “financial holding company” structure.
Under the new structure, a bank holding company could elect to also become a “financial
holding company” and own, not only one or more banks, but also any other type of company that
the Federal Reserve determined was “financial in nature,” “incidental” to a financial activity, or
“complementary” to a financial activity, if certain conditions were met.
42
In addition, the law
explicitly authorized bank holding companies to engage in “merchant banking,” meaning they
could buy ownership interests in any company as a private equity investment, so long as the bank
did not try to operate the business itself and held it as a passive investment for a limited period of
time.
43
Together, these provisions significantly weakened the longstanding separation of
banking and commerce.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorized all existing bank holding companies that met
certain capital and operating requirements to elect to become financial holding companies.
44
In
39
See, e.g., “Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion Deal: A New No. 1: Financial Giants
Unite,” Mitchell Martin, New York Times (4/7/1998),http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/07/news/07iht-citi.t.html;
“Citicorp-Travelers Merger Shakes Up Wall Street Rivals,” Patrick McGeehan and Matt Murray, Wall Street
J ournal (4/7/1998),http://online.wsj.com/article/SB891903040436602000.html.
40
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, P.L. 106-102 (1999). Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas) was then
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development. Congressman J im Leach (R-
Iowa) was Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. Congressman Tom Bliley (R-
Virginia) was Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce.
41
See “A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames
Vickery of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (J uly 2012), at 3’http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf .
42
See Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, as amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which states
that a financial holding company:
“may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares of any company engaged in any
activity, that the [Federal Reserve] Board […] determines (by regulation or order) --
(A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or
(B) is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.”
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also authorized banks, subject to certain conditions, to own or
control their own “financial subsidiaries” when established to engage in “’activities that are financial in nature or
incidental to financial activity,’ as well as ‘activities that are permitted for national banks to engage in directly.’”
2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA, at 20-21; 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(A).
43
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
44
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1). To become a financial holding company, a bank holding company had to meet a list
of statutory criteria, including that it and its subsidiary banks were well capitalized and well managed. 12 C.F.R. §
19
addition, the law allowed bank holding companies or other firms that, after enactment of the law,
sought to become a financial holding company, to “grandfather” in certain prior holdings and
businesses rather than divest them.
45
Today, “virtually all” large bank holding companies are
also registered as financial holding companies.
46
In 2000, Congress enacted another law, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act,
which prohibited all federal regulation of the leading type of derivative known as a “swap.”
47
Derivatives are financial instruments that derive their value from another asset.
48
Swaps are
generally bilateral contracts in which two parties essentially make a bet on the future value of a
specified financial instrument, interest rate, or currency exchange rate. By prohibiting federal
regulation of swaps, among other consequences, the law effectively authorized banks to engage
in an unrestricted array of swap activities, including swaps linked to commodities. That law, like
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, further undermined the separation of banking from commerce.
Together, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act
authorized U.S. banks to engage in many financial activities that had been denied to them under
the Glass-Steagall Act, including activities that essentially mixed banking with commercial
activities. Major U.S. bank holding companies soon attained financial holding company status
and began to affiliate with securities and insurance firms. The resulting financial conglomerates
expanded into multiple financial activities, including many that were high risk. Less than ten
years later, major U.S. banks triggered the financial crisis that devastated the U.S. economy and
from which the country is still recovering.
49
(2) U.S. Banks and Commodities
For the first 150 years banks operated in the United States, commodities played a very
limited role in bank activities. It was not until the 1980s, with the invention of energy-based
commodities that could be traded in futures and swaps markets, that U.S. banks began dealing in
U.S. commodities in a substantial way. Over time, with the acquiescence of federal bank
225.82(a) (2013). For a current list of all bank holding companies that have elected to become financial holding
companies, seehttp://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
45
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1843
and (o).46
“A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (J uly 2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf .
47
The 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act was enacted as a title of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2001, P.L. 106-554.
48
See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website,http://www.sec.gov/answers/derivative.htm
49
For more information on key causes of the financial crisis, see “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis,” hearings
before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-671 to 111-674, Volumes 1-5 (April
2010); “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” a bipartisan report by the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 112-675, Volume 5, (April 13, 2011). See also prepared
testimony of J oshua Rosner, managing director of Graham Fisher & Co., before U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, hearing on “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power
Plants, Warehouses, and Oil Refineries,” (7/23/2013)(hereinafter “Rosner Testimony”), at 3 (“While the actions of
many parties … led us to [the financial] crisis the fact remains that structured products innovated and sold as a result
of the combination of commercial and investment banking, devastated Main Street USA and ravaged consumers and
businesses alike. Banks, which had previously been prevented from investment banking activities, had stimulated
demand for faulty mortgage products.”).
20
regulators, a handful of major U.S. banks began, not only to develop and trade in commodity-
based financial instruments, but also to take ownership interests in, or exert control over,
businesses handling physical commodities. Today, banks are major players in U.S. commodities
markets, not only dominating the trading of commodity-related futures, options, swaps, and
securities, but also owning or exercising control over businesses that produce, store, transport,
refine, supply, and utilize physical commodities. Those commodities include oil products,
natural gas, coal, metals, agricultural products, and electricity.
Early History of Limited Bank Involvement in Commodities. Some experts contend
that, because banks handle money, they have a long history of dealing with commodities,
highlighting commodities that represent “an efficient medium of exchange and store of value,”
such as gold and silver bullion.
50
While that exception to the rule is true, for most of U.S.
history, U.S. banks were not major players in commodity markets.
The first commodities exchange established in the United States was the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT) which opened in 1848, as a central marketplace for the buying and selling of
grain.
51
Almost twenty years later, in 1865, CBOT developed the first standardized futures
contracts that could be traded on the exchange.
52
Over the next 100 years, the commodities
traded on U.S. exchanges grew to encompass a variety of agricultural products. The resulting
trade in futures and options was viewed as a specialized business generally handled by large
agricultural companies and commodity brokers, not banks.
53
At times, especially during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade
of the twentieth century, a handful of major banks acquired ownership interests in businesses that
handled physical commodities, including railroads, oil companies, and shipping and mining
ventures. But bank ownership of those businesses largely halted after the Pujo money trust
hearings and the enactment of restrictions on bank activities. During the 1920s, many banks
began trading stocks and bonds, but largely ignored the agriculturally-based commodity
exchanges. When Congress enacted the first major federal commodities law, the Grain Futures
Act of 1922, banks were not even mentioned in the statute.
54
When banking reforms were put into place after the stock market crash of 1929,
commodities were, again, hardly mentioned in the new statutes, given the paucity of bank
involvement with commodities. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, for example, mentioned
commodities only once, in a section that established a Federal Reserve oversight responsibility to
prevent banks from facilitating undue speculative activity through the issuance of bank credit.
That section directed each regional Federal Reserve Bank to:
50
See, e.g., Guynn Testimony, at 15-16.
51
See CME Group “Timeline of Achievements,”http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-
achievements.html.
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., Merchants of Grain by Dan Morgan (Viking Press 1979)(tracing grain trading and commodities markets
in the United States from the 1800s to the 1970s, and describing the roles played by five major grain merchants, but
making no mention of U.S. banks as market participants).
54
See Grain Futures Act of 1922, P.L. 67-331.
21
“keep itself informed of the general character and amount of the loans and investments of
its member banks with a view to ascertaining whether undue use is being made of bank
credit for the speculative carrying of or trading in securities, real estate, or commodities,
or for any other purpose inconsistent with the maintenance of sound credit conditions.”
55
The Glass-Steagall Act also directed each Federal Reserve Bank to report “any such undue use
of bank credit by any member bank” to the Federal Reserve Board.
56
No provision addressed
any other aspect of bank trading in commodities. Similarly, the landmark Commodities
Exchange Act of 1936, which revamped federal law on commodities markets, mentioned banks
only in passing in a single provision allowing commodity brokers to commingle customer funds
in their corporate bank accounts.
57
Further evidence of bank noninvolvement with commodities comes from extensive bank
statistics compiled by the Federal Reserve over a 60-year period, from 1896 to 1955.
58
The
report published by the Federal Reserve includes a four-page list of banking activities that
occurred during those years, but nowhere mentions commodities.
59
Banks Begin Trading Financial Commodities. It was not until decades later, when
U.S. commodity exchanges began to undergo fundamental change, that banks and other financial
firms began to participate in them. The primary change was an expansion of the concept of
commodities to encompass more than agricultural products. The first expansion occurred during
the 1970s, when commodity exchanges developed standardized foreign currency and interest rate
futures and options contracts that could be traded on the exchanges.
60
In 1979, Goldman Sachs, then a securities firm and not a bank, registered with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), regulator of U.S. futures markets, as a
“Futures Commission Merchant” (FCM) and received authorization to buy and sell futures and
options on regulated exchanges.
61
Three years later, in 1982, Goldman expanded its commodity
operations by purchasing J . Aron & Co., a commodities trading firm that has since become
55
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), § 3.
56
Id.
57
See Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, P.L. 74-674, §5.
58
See “All-Bank Statistics United States 1896 - 1955,” prepared by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, (April 1959), Federal Reserve Archives,http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/allbkstat/1896-
1955/us.pdf (containing historical banking data).
59
Id. at Appendix E, “Composition of Asset and Liability Items,” pages 85-89.
60
See, e.g., CME Group “Timeline of Achievements,”http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-
achievements.html (CME introduced the first foreign currency contracts in 1972, and the first interest rate future in
1975); Fool’s Gold, Gillian Tett (Free Press 2009), at 10-11.
61
See Goldman Sachs & Co. FCM information, National Futures Association (NFA) Background Affiliation Status
Information Center (BASIC) website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uZSsBZcBKLE=&rn=Y. For more information on
Futures Commission Merchants, see NFA “Glossary,”http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx?term=futures+commission+merchant (defining FCM as “[a]n
individual or organization which solicits or accepts orders to buy or sell futures or options contracts and accepts
money or other assets from customers in connection with such orders. Must be registered with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.”). The OCC authorized banks to become commodity exchange members as early as
1975, according to an unpublished letter cited in OCC Interpretative Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986), reprinted in
Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85, 604. See also 2010 CRS Report on GSA and GLBA, at 10-11, footnote 54.
22
Goldman’s principal commodities trading subsidiary.
62
Goldman initially directed J . Aron &
Co. to expand into the trading of interest rate and currency futures.
63
In 1982, the OCC explicitly authorized national banks to execute and clear trades in
futures contracts.
64
Both J PMorgan
65
and Morgan Stanley,
66
which were not then national banks
or regulated by the OCC, registered as FCMs that year. In 1983, the OCC took the next step and
authorized banks to execute and clear exchange-traded options.
67
That same year, the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), a leading U.S.
commodities exchange, introduced the first standardized futures contracts for crude oil and
heating oil.
68
They were the first energy-related futures traded on a regulated exchange.
Additional standardized futures contracts for natural gas and electricity products followed, and
futures and options trading expanded rapidly.
69
In 1986, the OCC issued a series of letters
interpreting the “business of banking” clause of the National Bank Act to permit national banks
to engage in a widening range of commodity-related trading activities.
70
Also in 1986, Chase Manhattan Bank and Koch Industries reportedly entered into the first
oil-related swap, introducing the concept of swaps linked to the price of a physical commodity.
71
62
See Goldman Sachs’ response to the Subcommittee questionnaire (8/8/2014); PSI-Goldman-11-000001, at 002.
63
See The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, Charles D. Ellis (Penguin Books 2008), at 252-254.
64
OCC Interpretive Letter (7/23/1982), unpublished.
65
See J P Morgan Futures Inc. FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=jSzQxZANWxY=&rn=Y. That FCM license was
withdrawn in 2011. Id. J P Morgan Securities LLC also holds the FCM license that Bear Stearns obtained in 1982.
See J P Morgan Securities LLC FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/Details.aspx?entityid=7YD6PX+m0vo=.
66
See Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=UpygXzt3Ct4=&rn=N.
67
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 260 (6/27/1983). See also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 896 (8/21/2000)(national
bank may purchase options on futures contracts on commodities to hedge the credit risk in its agricultural loan
portfolio).
68
See “NYMEX Energy Complex,” prepared by NYMEX, at 7,http://www.kisfutures.com/NYMEX-energy-
complex.pdf. See also, e.g., Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21
st
Century, Tom Bower (Grand Central
Publishing 2009), at 47.
69
See, e.g., David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, “The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem
of Market Power,” 53 B.C. L. Rev. 131, 152 (2012).
70
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 356 (1/7/1986) (authorizing a bank subsidiary to trade agricultural and
metal futures for clients seeking to hedge bank loans); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 372 (11/7/1986) (authorizing a
bank subsidiary to act as a broker-dealer and market maker for exchange-traded options for itself, its affiliated bank,
and clients); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986), reprinted in Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85,604
(authorizing a bank to provide margin financing to its clients to trade commodities; execute and clear client
transactions involving futures and options in gold, silver, or foreign currencies on exchanges and over the counter;
and direct a subsidiary to become a commodities exchange member). See also “Activities Permissible for a National
Bank, Cumulative,” prepared by the OCC (April 2012), at 57-64 (listing permissible derivative-based activities for
national banks).
71
See “Oil Derivatives: In the Beginning,” EnergyRisk magazine (J uly 2009), at 31,http://db.riskwaters.com/data/energyrisk/EnergyRisk/Energyrisk_0709/markets.pdf. The swap was a bilateral
contract in which, for a four-month period, one party agreed to make payments to the other for 25,000 barrels of oil
per month using a fixed price per barrel, while the other party agreed to make payments using the average monthly
spot price for oil.
23
Other commodity swaps followed, creating a rapidly expanding over-the-counter commodities
market in derivatives, separate and apart from the regulated commodity exchanges.
In 1987, in response to a request, the OCC authorized national banks to engage in
transactions involving commodity price index swaps.
72
The OCC authorized the activity even
though banks were still prohibited from directly investing in physical commodities.
73
A later
OCC Handbook explained:
“A national bank may also enter into derivative transactions as principal or agent when
the bank is acting as a financial intermediary for its customers and whether or not the
bank has the legal authority to purchase or sell the underlying instrument for its own
account. Accordingly, a national bank may enter into derivative transactions based on
commodities or equity securities, even though the bank may not purchase (or may be
restricted in purchasing) the underlying commodity or equity security for its own
account.”
74
At first, the OCC allowed banks to enter into commodity index swaps only on a “matched” basis
to offset risk,
75
but over time relaxed that as well as other, earlier restrictions.
76
In 1991, Goldman Sachs, again operating solely as an investment bank, launched the
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index whose value reflected price changes in a broad basket of
commodity futures.
77
Over the next few years, commodity index trading exploded, accompanied
by a sharp increase in futures trading used to hedge the index transactions.
78
Expansion into Physically-Settled Transactions. At the same time some commercial
and investment banks deepened their involvement with commodity-linked financial instruments,
some began increasing their involvement with physical commodities. One reason was that some
commodity futures contracts, including those involving crude oil, natural gas, and electricity,
allowed transactions to be settled financially or through physical delivery of the specified
72
See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987).
73
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 (9/13/1994), at 5.
74
“Risk Management of Financial Derivatives,” Comptroller’s Handbook (1997), at 68,http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/deriv.pdf.
75
See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987)(authorizing the bank to act as a principal in commodity price
index swaps with clients only on a “matched basis” in which the bank’s commodity price index contract with a
commodity “user” was offset by an index contract with a commodity “producer,” so that “the Bank would be
matched as to index, amount and maturity on each side of the transaction”).
76
See, e.g., OCC No-Objection Letter No. 90-1 (2/16/1990) , reprinted in Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 83,095
(authorizing the bank to engage as a principal in unmatched commodity index swaps with its clients so long as the
swaps were cash settled); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 507 (5/5/1990)(authorizing a bank subsidiary to execute all
types of commodity futures and options for all types of customers, whether or not hedging a bank loan); OCC
Interpretive Letter (3/2/1992)(authorizing bank to engage in unmatched commodity index swaps, warehouse the
swap contracts, and hedge them on a portfolio basis).
77
See “S&P GSCI Commodity Index,” prepared by Goldman Sachs,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-
do/securities/products-and-business-groups/products/gsci/. In 2007, Goldman Sachs transferred the index to
Standard & Poor’s. In 2012, the index was acquired by S&P Dow J ones Indices LLC, a subsidiary of The McGraw-
Hill Companies. See “Our History,” prepared by S&P Dow J ones Indices,http://us.spindices.com/about-sp-
indices/our-history/.
78
See, e.g., “Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market,” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-
155, report at 168-171.
24
commodity. Some banks wanted to be able to settle futures contracts through physical delivery,
contending that physical settlements would give them more flexibility, enable them to engage in
more effective hedging with lower risks and costs, and enable them to compete more effectively
in commodities markets.
79
In response, in 1993, the OCC issued an interpretive letter which greatly expanded the
ability of banks to engage in physical commodity transactions. The letter interpreted the banking
powers clause to allow national banks to hedge permissible banking activities by making or
taking “physical delivery of commodities,” including by taking or delivering documents
providing title to the commodities, such as warehouse receipts or warrants.
80
In addition, the
OCC explicitly authorized banks to engage in related physical commodity activities such as
“storing, transporting, and disposing of the commodities.”
81
The 1993 OCC letter stated that banks could use physically-settled transactions only to
“reduce risk” and only when they would “provide a more accurate hedge than available
exchange-traded or over-the counter transactions.”
82
The OCC required the physically-settled
transactions to be “customer-driven,” prohibited their use for “speculative purposes,” and stated
that they should constitute “only a nominal percentage of a bank’s hedging activities.”
83
To limit
the associated risks, the OCC required the bank to develop management expertise and internal
controls to ensure safe and sound banking practices, submit a “detailed plan” to the OCC, and
obtain “prior written authorization” by the OCC’s supervisory staff before going forward.
84
In 1995, the OCC issued another interpretive letter giving banks broad authority to
engage in physically-settled transactions involving metals, as well as to engage in “ancillary
activities” such as storing, transporting, and disposing of the physical commodities.
85
The OCC
expressed approval of banks taking delivery of the physical commodities through warehouse
receipts or transitory title transactions, noting that “n no case would the Bank take delivery by
receipt of physical quantities … on Bank premises.”
86
The OCC letter directed the bank to
establish risk management procedures in accordance with Banking Circular 277, which had been
issued earlier that year, and also required the bank to implement the additional safeguards first
identified in the 1993 letter.
87
At the time, the Federal Reserve chose not to follow the OCC’s lead in expanding bank
involvement with physical commodities. Instead, in 1997, while the Federal Reserve amended
79
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358, at 359-361; OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368,,at 372.
80
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358 at 358, 359.
81
Id. at 361. See also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 935 (5/14/2002), PSI-OCC-01-000170, at 173 (warning about
additional storage, transportation, environmental, and insurance risks posed by physical commodity transactions).
82
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358, at 358, 365.
83
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 at 368-369.
84
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358, at 358, 366.
85
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368,at 372-374. See also OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 1073 (10/19/2006), PSI-OCC-01-000425 (allowing banks and their foreign branches to engage in
“customer-driven, metal derivative transactions that settle in cash or by transitory title transfer”); OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 693(11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 (allowing banks to buy and sell physical copper).
86
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368, at 369.
87
Id. at 370, 373 - 374.
25
its Regulation Y to broaden the list of permissible bank holding company activities, it declined at
that point to grant bank holding companies broad authority to participate in physically-settled
commodity transactions.
88
Instead, the Federal Reserve continued to generally limit bank
holding companies to trading in cash-settled commodity transactions. Despite that setback,
banks continued to lobby for broader authority to conduct physical commodity transactions.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Expansion. More fundamental change came two years later, in
1999, when Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. That Act created the financial
holding company structure described earlier and authorized banks to affiliate with subsidiaries
engaged in a wider array of financial activities, including trading in commodities.
The law contained four provisions which dramatically increased the ability of banks,
through their financial holding companies, to engage in physical commodities transactions and
related businesses. First, the law allowed financial holding companies to engage in any activity
which the Federal Reserve determined was “financial in nature” or “incidental to a financial
activity.”
89
Second, the law enabled a financial holding company to engage directly in any
nonfinancial, commercial activity which the Federal Reserve determined to be “complementary”
to a financial activity.
90
The Federal Reserve later interpreted that provision to allow financial
holding companies to engage in activities involving physical commodities.
91
Third, the law
allowed financial holding companies to exercise so-called “merchant banking” authority to make
a temporary, passive equity investment in any type of commercial company, including firms
involved with physical commodities.
92
Finally, the law included a special grandfathering
provision that allowed certain financial firms that later became financial holding companies to
continue any commodities activities they had undertaken, directly or indirectly, in the United
States on or before September 30, 1997.
93
According to one analysis, “
the largest U.S. [financial holding companies] began using their new powers to build physical
commodity trading businesses.”
94
By the time the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999, banks and bank holding
companies had already become interested in expanding their commodity activities for a number
of reasons. Earlier in the decade, Enron Corporation, then a leading U.S. energy company, had
popularized the concept of energy “commodities” that could be traded like stocks and futures.
From 1992 until its collapse in 2001, Enron convinced a number of large U.S. banks to finance
or participate in its energy commodity trades, including entering into over $8 billion in energy
trades with Citigroup and J PMorgan Chase Bank in transactions later exposed as hidden loans.
95
In 1999, Enron also launched an energy commodities electronic trading platform known as
88
62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9311 (Feb. 28, 1997).
89
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
90
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B). The law also defined “financial activity” by referencing the activities that the Federal
Reserve determined were “closely related to banking,” in Regulation Y. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(a).
91
See descriptions of Federal Reserve orders, below.
92
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
93
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act, adding § 4(o).
94
The Merchants of Wall Street, at 26.
95
See “The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse-Volume 1,” Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S.Hrg. 107-618, (J uly 23 and 30, 2002), at 231, 264.
26
EnronOnline to trade energy commodities involving natural gas and electricity.
96
By 2001,
EnronOnline was the leading U.S. energy trading platform.
97
After Enron’s collapse, the
platform was sold and later closed,
98
and some Enron traders were convicted of using the
platform and other schemes to manipulate electricity prices in the western United States.
99
Prior
to that ignoble end, however, Enron’s activities had hastened the development of energy
commodities and bank involvement with them.
Further Expansion. In 2000, Congress enacted the Commodities Futures Modernization
Act (CFMA) which, as explained earlier, barred all federal regulation of swaps, making it
difficult for federal bank regulators to restrict trading of commodity swaps by banks and their
holding companies.
100
The CFMA also barred CFTC oversight of energy and metal commodity
trades executed on electronic exchanges used by large traders.
101
That same year, several
investment banks, including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, joined with major oil
companies to establish the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), an electronic exchange specializing
in commodity-related swaps.
102
Over the next decade, ICE would grow into a leading
commodities exchange.
Around the same time, some banks and financial holding companies began to deepen
their involvement with electricity markets. Beginning in 2002, the OCC issued a series of
interpretive letters expanding bank authority to participate in electricity derivatives and related
businesses. Among other measures, the OCC allowed banks to hedge their transactions by
taking title to electricity commodities,
103
acquire royalty interests in energy reserves, and use
96
For more information about Enron Online, see “Asleep At the Switch: FERC’s Oversight of Enron Corporation,”
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S.Hrg. 107-854, (November 12, 2002), Volumes I-IV, at 238-245.
97
Id. at 238.
98
In 2002, Enron’s trading business was purchased by UBS Warburg, which closed it less than a year later. See,
e.g., “UBS Closing Trading Floor It Acquired From Enron,” New York Times, David Barboza (11/21/2002),http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/21/business/ubs-closing-trading-floor-it-acquired-from-
enron.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.
99
For more information about Enron’s manipulation of electricity prices, see “Asleep At the Switch: FERC’s
Oversight of Enron Corporation,” U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S.Hrg. 107-854, (November 12,
2002), Volumes I-IV, 251-260.
100
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Title I, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, P.L. 106-554.
101
See Section 2(h)(3) of the Commodity Exchange Act, added by CFMA, codified at 7 U.S.C. §2(h)(3). This
exemption was known as the “Enron loophole,” because it was included in CFMA at the request of Enron and
others, and once in place, exempted from federal oversight the energy and metals contracts traded on Enron Online.
See “Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 110-
235 (6/24 and 7/9/2007), at 204, 246-247. The Enron Loophole was later closed. See CFTC Reauthorization Act of
2008, Title XIII of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246 (2008); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
102
See “U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Recent Policy Has Increased Costs to Consumers but Not Overall U.S.
Energy Security,” Minority Staff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Prt. 108-18 (3/5/2003), at
42-43; information provided by Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee (9/29/2014). The firms who
formed ICE were BP Petroleum, Dean Witter, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Royal Dutch/Shell
Group, SG Investment Bank, and Totalfina Elf Group. The OCC also issued several interpretive letters allowing
banks to become members of ICE, ICE Europe, and ICE Trust. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No.1113
(3/4/2009); OCC Interpretive Letter No.1116 (5/6/2009); OCC Interpretive Letter No.1122 (7/30/2009).
103
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 937 (6/27/2002)(allowing banks to engage in customer-driven, cash-settled
derivatives based on electricity prices and in related hedging activities); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 962
(4/21/2003) (allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven, electricity derivative transactions that involve transfer
27
reserve royalty payments to repay loans extended to the reserve owner.
104
The OCC also
authorized national banks to make merchant banking investments in energy-related
businesses.
105
Along the way, the OCC continued to approve bank requests to deal in additional
types of commodities.
106
Still another change came as commercial and investment banks began to devise new
types of securities whose values were linked to commodities. Those securities could then be
traded on U.S. stock exchanges rather than on the less well known and more expensive
commodity exchanges. In some cases, the security explicitly referenced a specific commodity
future; in other cases, it referenced a broad-based index. In still other cases, the value of the
security was supported by an inventory of commodity futures or an inventory of physical
commodities. For example, the first commodity-based Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) in the
United States,
107
backed by gold futures, was traded on the New York Stock Exchange in
November 2004.
108
Since then, multiple ETFs backed by commodity futures or physical
commodities have been approved.
109
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also
approved the trading of futures and options referencing commodity-based ETFs.
110
Designing,
selling, and trading commodity-based securities further deepened bank involvement with
commodities.
of title to electricity”); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1025 (4/6/2005) (allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven
electricity derivative transactions and hedges, settled in cash and by transitory title transfer”).
104
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1117 (5/19/2009) (allowing banks to issue credit to an electricity producer in
return for receiving a limited royalty interest in the producer’s hydrocarbon reserves and receiving payments from
the energy produced from those reserves over a stated term, so-called “Volumetric Production Payment” loans). See
also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1071 (9/6/2006) (allowing banks to become members of Independent Systems
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations that oversee electricity transactions).
105
See, e.g., OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2005-3 (7/20/2005)(construction and operation
of ethanol plant); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2008-1 (7/31/2008)(development of solar
energy facilities); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2009-6 (12/16/2009)(installation of
photovoltaic systems in low-income housing); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2011-2
(12/15/2011)(construction of wind turbines).
106
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1040 (9/15/2005)(allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven
physically settled derivative transactions in emission allowances”); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1060
(4/26/2006)(allowing banks to engage in “customer-driven coal derivative transactions that settle in cash or by
transitory title transfer and that are hedged on a portfolio basis with derivative and spot transactions that settle in
cash or by transitory title transfer”)(emphasis in original); OCC Interpretive Letter No.1065 (7/24/2006)(allowing
banks to engage in cash-settled derivative transactions referencing “petroleum products, agricultural oils, grains and
grain derivatives, seeds, fibers, foodstuffs, livestock/meat products, metals, wood products, plastics and fertilizer”).
107
For more information on exchange traded funds, see NYSE Explanation of ETFs,http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ETFs7109.pdf, or SEC statement regarding ETFs,http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm.
108
See NYSE Information Memo Number 04–59 (November 18, 2004) (trading of streetTRACKS Gold
Shares: Rules 1300 and 1301); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50603 (October 28, 2004),
69 FR 64614 (November 5, 2004) (approval of the listing and trading of streetTRACKS Gold Shares). See also
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1013 (1/7/2005)(authorizing banks to buy and sell ETF shares); 9/30/2010 CFTC
“Request for Comment on Options for a Proposed Exemptive Order Relating to the Trading and Clearing of
Precious Metal Commodity-Based ETFs; Concept Release,” 75 FR 189, at 60412.
109
See “Excessive Speculation and Compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act,” Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S Hrg. 112-313 (11/3/2011), at 176-178.
110
See, e.g., 9/30/2010 CFTC “Request for Comment on Options for a Proposed Exemptive Order Relating to the
Trading and Clearing of Precious Metal Commodity-Based ETFs; Concept Release,” 75 FR 189, at 60412.
28
Commodity Price Rise. Still another factor motivating bank involvement with
commodities was that, beginning in 2000, commodity prices began a sharp and sustained
increase, which continued to accelerate for years.
111
According to the World Bank, between
2003 and 2008, “[a]verage commodity prices doubled in U.S. dollar terms (in part boosted by
dollar depreciation), making this boom longer and stronger than any boom in the 20th
century.”
112
While some have attributed that price rise to market forces of supply and demand,
others have attributed a portion of it to increased commodity speculation fueled by banks and
securities firms trading in U.S. commodities markets. In addition, commodity price volatility
increased over the same period,
113
inviting commodity speculators like the banks to profit from
the price changes.
114
Federal Reserve Expansion. As banks continued to trade financial instruments linked
to commodities, they also continued to lobby the Federal Reserve to loosen its restrictions on
bank holding companies, in particular with respect to physical commodities. In 2003, the
Federal Reserve amended Regulation Y to give bank holding companies more leeway in
physically settled transactions. The amended rule allowed the holding companies to participate
in commodity trades which required them to take or make delivery of documents giving title to
physical commodities on an “instantaneous pass-through basis,” so long as the underlying assets
were approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
115
The Federal Reserve also eliminated
a requirement that holding companies enter into only those commodity contracts that explicitly
permitted financial settlements or terminations. At the same time, like the OCC, the Federal
Reserve continued to discourage holding companies from actually taking possession of the
physical commodities involved in the trades.
116
In addition, beginning in 2003, in response to individual applications, the Federal
Reserve issued a series of orders granting major financial holding companies permission under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to deal in a much wider array of physical commodity activities. In
those orders, the Federal Reserve determined that the activities requested by the financial holding
companies were “complementary” to their trading in commodity derivatives.
117
The earliest order explicitly allowed financial holding companies to buy and sell oil,
natural gas, agricultural products, and other commodities in the physical spot market, and to take
and make delivery of physical commodities to settle commodity-linked derivative
111
See The Merchants of Wall Street, at 300.
112
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads,
113
See “Speculators and Commodity Prices - Redux”, CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton (February 24, 2012),http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement022412; see also “Global Commodity Markets
– Price Volatility and Financialisation”, Alexandra Dwyer, George Gardner and Thomas Williams (J une, 2011),http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/jun/pdf/bu-0611-7.pdf.
114
See “Derivatives, Innovation in the Era of Financial Deregulation”, Wallace Turbeville (J une, 2013), at 18,
115
68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (7/3/2003); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B).
116
Id. The amended Regulation Y explicitly required holding companies to make “every reasonable effort to avoid
taking or making delivery of the asset underlying the contract.” Alternatively, it allowed financial companies to
participate in instantaneous title transfers to the underlying assets only “by operation of contract and without taking
or making physical delivery of the asset.” 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B)(3) and (4).
117
For more information on the individual orders, see below.
29
transactions.
118
A later order allowed a financial holding company to contract with a third party
to “refine, blend, or otherwise alter” its physical commodities, essentially authorizing it to sell
crude oil to an oil refinery and buy back the refined oil products.
119
The order also allowed the
financial holding company to enter into long-term electricity supply contracts with large
industrial and commercial customers, and to enter into “tolling agreements” and “energy
management” agreements with power generators.
120
Together, these orders explicitly permitted
banks, through their financial holding companies, to engage in a broader set of physical
commodity activities than ever before in U.S. banking history.
To minimize the accompanying risks, the orders also required the relevant financial
holding company to make a number of commitments to limit the size and scope of its physical
commodities activities. For example, each financial holding company had to commit that the
market value of its commodities holdings resulting from trading activities would not exceed 5%
of its consolidated Tier I capital, and that the company would alert the Federal Reserve if and
when the market value exceeded 4%.
121
Despite those and other commitments, the financial
holding companies given complementary authority were able to use that authority to dramatically
increase their physical commodity operations over time.
Financial Crisis Expansion. In 2008, as the financial crisis deepened in the United
States and several large U.S. financial institutions declared bankruptcy or teetered on the edge of
insolvency, U.S. bank acquisitions of weaker financial institutions as well as the sudden
conversion of investment banks into bank holding companies led to even greater U.S. bank
involvement with physical commodities.
In March 2008, for example, essentially at the request of the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan
acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (Bear Stearns), a large investment bank that was then
nearly insolvent.
122
At the time, Bear Stearns had extensive physical commodity holdings,
including commodities that it traded in the spot markets, oil refineries, and power plants.
123
Through its acquisition of Bear Stearns, J PMorgan gained control of all of those physical
commodity activities.
118
2003 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Citigroup, Inc., 89 Fed. Res. Bull., at 508 (12/2003) (hereinafter
“Citigroup Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdf.
119
2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60 (2008)
(hereinafter “RBS Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf.
120
Id. A tolling agreement typically allows the “toller” to make periodic payments to a power plant owner to cover
the plant’s operating costs plus a fixed profit margin in exchange for the right to all or part of the plant’s power
output. As part of the agreement, the toller typically supplies or pays for the fuel used to run the plant. Id. at C64.
An energy management agreement typically requires the “energy manager” to act as a financial intermediary for the
power plant, substituting its own credit and liquidity for the power plant to facilitate the power plant’s business
activities. The energy manager also typically supplies market information and advice to support the power plant’s
efforts. Id. at C65.
121
See, e.g., Citigroup Order,http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdf.
122
See “Bear Stearns, J PMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,” press release issued by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm.
123
See, e.g., 7/2008 Federal Reserve Supervisory Plan, Risk Assessment Program & Institutional Overview of
J PMorgan Chase & Co., FRB-PSI-305013 (identifying Bear Stearns assets being integrated into J PMorgan).
30
Six months later, in September 2008, after Lehman Brothers failed, the Federal Reserve
gave immediate approval to applications from both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to
become bank holding companies with access to Federal Reserve lending programs.
124
Both
firms also elected to become financial holding companies authorized to engage in a broad array
of financial activities. At the time of their conversions, both were heavily invested in a wide
array of physical commodities and related businesses.
125
Four months after that, in J anuary 2009, again in response to the turmoil created by the
financial crisis, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, a troubled investment bank with $650
billion in assets.
126
The acquisition gave Bank of America control over Merrill Lynch’s
extensive commodity holdings, which the bank estimated at “roughly ten times the size” of its
own commodity operations.
127
The new assets included Merrill Lynch’s substantial holdings in
North American physical natural gas and electrical power markets.
128
In 2010, Goldman and J PMorgan participated in additional acquisitions that further
deepened their involvement with physical commodities. In February 2010, Goldman acquired
Metro International, a company with a worldwide network of commodity storage warehouses.
129
Later that year, in two separate transactions, J PMorgan acquired the Royal Bank of Scotland’s
51% ownership stake in RBS Sempra, a joint venture with extensive North American and
European energy and commodity operations involving oil, natural gas, metals, and power
plants.
130
As part of that acquisition, J PMorgan also took ownership of Henry Bath Inc. which,
like Metro International, owned a worldwide network of commodity storage warehouses.
131
From 2009 to 2011, Goldman and J PMorgan extended their reach again, acquiring
ownership stakes in the London Metals Exchange (LME), the leading futures market in metals.
124
See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies, 94 FED. RES. BULL.
C101, C102 (2008), 2008 WL 7861871, at *4 (order approving Goldman Sachs Group’s request to become a BHC
upon conversion of Goldman Bank to a state chartered bank); Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding
Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 94 FED. RES. BULL. C103, C105 (2008),
2008 WL 7861872, at *5 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Sept. 21, 2008) (order approving Morgan Stanley’s request to become a
BHC upon conversion of Morgan Stanley Bank to a bank).
125
See histories of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, below.
126
See 5/4/2010 letter from Bank of America’s legal counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, to the Federal
Reserve providing notice of the bank’s intent to engage in an expanded set of physical commodity activities as a
result of its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, FRB-PSI-500001 - 218, at 013 [sealed exhibit].
127
Id. at 020-021.
128
Id. at 020.
129
See 9/12/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-06-000001 - 021, at 017 (Exhibit C); “Goldman and J PMorgan Enter Metal Warehousing,” Financial
Times, By J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kXv0R8iX. Compare Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2010, at Exhibit 21.1 (including “Metro International Trade Services LLC” as a subsidiary of GS
Power Holdings LLC), with Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009, at
Exhibit 21.1 (not listing GS Power Holdings LLC or Metro International as significant subsidiaries of Goldman
Sachs).
130
J PMorgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, at 184,http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000163/corp10k2011.htm#s50873
1DA912EFDF440782294EA306391.
131
See 7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completed commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/detail/1277505237241.
31
Together, the two banks, through their financial holding companies, became the LME’s largest
shareholders until, in 2012, the shareholders sold the LME to a Hong Kong exchange.
132
Bank Commodities Involvement Today. Today, a handful of large U.S. banks, directly
and through their financial holding companies, are major participants in global commodity
markets. In recent years, J PMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley were the three largest
U.S. participants in physical commodities.
133
Bank of America, Barclays, and Citi were the next
largest participants.
134
Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, and BNP followed them.
135
The largest of those banks, through their financial holding companies, were among the
largest commodity traders in the world and dominated the U.S. commodities futures, options and
swaps markets. OCC data shows that, in 2013, of the commercial banks it tracked, four U.S.
banks – J PMorgan, Bank of America, Citi, and Goldman Sachs – accounted for more than 90%
of commodities derivatives trading and holdings within the U.S. commercial banking system.
136
OCC data also shows that, for all U.S. insured banks over the last five years, the total notional
dollar value of their outstanding commodity contracts, including futures, exchange traded
options, over-the-counter options, forwards, and swaps, has centered around $1 trillion:
NOTIONAL VALUE OF COMMODITY CONTRACTS
137
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Notional value
of commodity
contracts
$979 billion
$1.195 trillion
$1.501 trillion
$1.402 trillion
$1.241 trillion
Source: OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013, Graph 3
132
See, e.g., 6/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMC-11-000001 - 002, at 001;
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001 -
011, at 003, 004; “HKEx and LME announce completion of transaction,” prepared by Hong Kong Exchanges and
Clearing Limited (HKEx) and LME Holdings Limited (12/6/2012),http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-
events/press-releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-announce-completion-of-transaction/.
133
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). Royal Bank of Scotland, which sold its major
commodity holdings to J PMorgan, is no longer active in physical commodity activities in the United States. Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. According to the Federal Reserve, Deutsche Bank has indicated that it is planning to exit its U.S. physical
commodities activities. Id. In August 2014, Deutsche Bank sold certain commodity-related assets to Morgan
Stanley. 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 002. Wells
Fargo acquired its physical commodity activities through its acquisition of Wachovia Bank, which had a Federal
Reserve order to engage in them; Wells Fargo has indicated it plans to continue to engage in physical commodity
activities to a limited extent. Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). According to the Federal
Reserve, Royal Bank of Scotland, which sold its major commodity holdings to J PMorgan in 2010, is no longer
conducting physical commodity activities in the United States. In contrast, BNP engages in physical commodity
activities to a limited extent in the United States. Id. Fortis, which had a Federal Reserve order allowing it to
engage in physical commodity activities, was acquired by ABN Amro Bank which, according to the Federal
Reserve, no longer operates in the United States. Id. UBS and Societe General, each of which had a Federal
Reserve order to engage in physical commodities, no longer engage in those activities, again according to the
Federal Reserve. Id.
136
See OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013, at 1, Graph 4 and 5A,
Tables 1, 2, 9 and 10,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
137
Data is taken from OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013, at
Graph 3,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
32
The data indicates that the dollar value of the banks’ commodity contracts peaked in 2011 at $1.5
trillion, and while it has since declined, the value still exceeds $1.2 trillion.
The physical commodity activities of the four key banks and their financial holding
companies comprise a relatively small percentage of their total commodities activities, which
remain dominated by financial instruments traded on exchanges or over the counter. Public data
depicting the actual size and value of their physical commodities holdings is, however, limited.
One of the few sources of public data is the FR Y-9C report, a quarterly report which bank
holding companies with consolidated assets of $500 million or more are required to file with the
Federal Reserve, providing specified financial information. One of the required information
items is the gross market value of any physical commodities held by the bank holding company
in its trading inventory.
138
The data provided on the FR Y-9C report offers a limited but useful measure of bank
holding company involvement with physical commodities. As one analyst explained:
“The gross market value of FHCs’ physical commodity trading inventory … measures
solely their current exposure to commodity price risk. It does not provide a full picture of
these organizations’ actual involvement in the business of producing, extracting,
processing, transporting, or storing physical commodities.”
139
Despite this limitation, the FR Y-9C reports filed by the holding companies featured in this
Report indicate that, in each of the last five years, the physical commodity holdings in their
trading inventories had a total dollar value of $3 to $26 billion:
GROSS FAIR VALUE OF PHYSICAL COMMODITY TRADING INVENTORIES
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Goldman
Sachs
$3.7 billion $13.1 billion $5.8 billion $11.7 billion $4.6 billion
J PMorgan $10.0 billion
$21.0 billion $26.0 billion $16.2 billion $10.2 billion
Morgan
Stanley
$5.3 billion $6.8 billion $9.7 billion $7.3 billion $3.3 billion
Source: Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, FR Y-9C Reports, Schedule HC-D, Item
M.9.a.(2).
140
138
See “Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies - FR Y-9C,” Schedule HC-D (“Trading
Assets and Liabilities”), Item M.9.a.(2) (“the “Gross Fair Value of Physical Commodities held in Inventory”) for
each bank.
Publicly traded companies provide the same information in their quarterly 10-Q filings with the SEC.
139
The Merchants of Wall Street, at 30 [citations omitted].
140
See National Information Center website –http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20091231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20101231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20111231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20121231.PDF, at 24;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20131231.PDF, at 25;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20091231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20101231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20111231.PDF, at 23;
33
This FR Y-9C data also shows that the value of the physical commodity trading
inventories at the three institutions has fluctuated from year to year, and that their trading
inventories comprised only a small part of the financial holding companies’ overall commodity
activities. That the data provides only a partial picture can be seen by comparing the reported
figures against estimated values used by the Federal Reserve during its special review of bank
involvement with physical commodities. In 2011, for example, a Federal Reserve examination
team estimated that the physical commodity activities at Goldman Sachs had a total value of $26
billion, a total four times greater the $5.8 billion reported by the company on the FR Y-9C report
for 2011.
141
Whether the individual financial holding companies’ physical commodities activities are
valued at billions or tens of billions of dollars, the bottom line is that they are substantial. They
include involvement with metals warehouses, oil storage facilities, oil tankers, oil and gas
pipelines, natural gas facilities, electrical power plants, gold and coal mines, and uranium. Bank
holding companies are supplying crude oil to refineries, jet fuel to airlines, natural gas to
manufacturers, coal to power plants, and electricity to regional power authorities.
The evidence indicates that this substantial level of bank involvement with physical
commodities is a relatively recent phenomenon that has grown significantly in only the last ten
years. The posture of the financial holding companies stands in sharp contrast to the
longstanding U.S. principle against mixing banking with commerce. The current level of bank
involvement with critical raw materials, power generation, and the food supply appears to be
unprecedented in U.S. history.
In the last year, some financial holding companies have taken steps to reduce their
involvement with physical commodities. In 2013, J PMorgan, Morgan Stanley, and Deutsche
Bank announced plans to sell the bulk of their physical commodities businesses; in 2014, all
three sold major holdings.
142
Those actions may have been in response to declining profits in the
commodities field, as well as Federal Reserve pressure to reduce some activities. In contrast,
although Goldman Sachs announced plans to sell a certain portion of its physical commodity
activities, it also informed the Federal Reserve that it planned to continue to pursue physicalhttp://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20121231.PDF, at 24;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20131231.PDF, at 25;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20091231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20101231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20111231.PDF, at 23;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20121231.PDF, at 24;http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20131231.PDF, at 25
141
2011 Work Plan, at FRB-PSI-200455, at 465.
142
See, e.g., 9/9/2014 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to Sell TransMontaigne Ownership Stake to
NGL Energy Partners,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/fc833211-9eeb-4616-87ff-
3024b89db7b1.html; 3/19/2014 Mercuria press release, “Mercuria Announces Acquisition of J .P. Morgan Physical
Commodities Business,”http://www.mercuria.com/media-room/business-news/mercuria-announces-acquisition-jp-
morgan-physical-commodities-business; 12/5/2013 Deutsche Bank press release, “Deutsche Bank refocuses its
commodities business,”https://www.db.com/ir/en/content/ir_releases_2013_4413.htm.
34
commodities as a core business line.
143
In addition, other banks, such as Bank of America, have
pending requests to increase their physical commodity activities.
144
B. Risks Associated with Bank Involvement in Physical Commodities
Increased U.S. bank involvement with physical commodities has evolved despite a
longstanding U.S. principle discouraging national banks from operating commercial enterprises.
Multiple concerns have been articulated over the years in support of separating banking from
commerce. In the case of physical commodities, at least seven different concerns have been
identified when banks own or control substantial physical commodities and related businesses:
(1) it provides banks with unfair economic and informational advantages; (2) it distorts credit
decisionmaking; (3) it creates conflicts of interest between banks and their clients; (4) it invites
market manipulation and excessive commodity speculation; (5) it creates inappropriate bank and
systemic risks; (6) it creates undue concentrations of economic power; and (7) it intensifies the
too-big-to-fail problem by creating financial conglomerates that are too big to manage or
regulate.
Unfair Economic Advantages. One key concern with mixing banking and commerce is
that it may provide banks, through their financial holding companies and subsidiaries, with
unfair economic or informational advantages compared to other commercial competitors.
Most banks have access to low cost financing through either the Federal Reserve’s
lending programs or interbank loans bearing low interest rates. National banks have federally
insured deposits, and some are also perceived as too big to fail, factors that generally lower their
lending costs. Nonbank businesses typically do not have the same access to low cost financing,
giving banks a competitive advantage when they operate commercial enterprises.
One expert described the problem this way:
“The growth of big banks is a case of too much of a good thing metastasizing into a bad
thing. What started out with a limited safety net designed to protect the payments system
and to provide a safe place for small, unsophisticated depositors to place their savings has
morphed into an anticompetitive system where government subsidized banks can use
unfair advantage to enter and dominate any market or business, financial or nonfinancial,
that they choose.”
145
143
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). See also, e.g., “Goldman Sachs Stands Firm as
Banks Exit Commodity Trading,” Bloomberg, Ambereen Choudhury (4/23/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...ds-firm-as-banks-exit-commodity-trading.html.
144
See 5/4/2010 letter from Bank of America legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-500001 - 218 (requesting
complementary authority to engage in an expanded set of physical commodity activities as a result of its acquisition
of Merrill Lynch). In addition, in 2012, Toronto Dominion Bank requested complementary authority to engage in
certain physical commodity activities involving natural gas, but has since withdrawn that request. 10/2/2012 letter
from Toronto Dominion Bank legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-500219 – 681; 11/17/2014 email from the
Federal Reserve to the Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002, at 002. Despite the passage of four years, the
Bank of America request remains pending at the Federal Reserve.
145
Rosner Testimony, at 15.
35
In a 2013 editorial opposing bank involvement in commodity speculation, a business
publication wrote:
“The largest U.S. banks are accused of causing problems in markets ranging from energy
to aluminum. … Why are the banks in these businesses in the first place?
Part of the answer is that they’re among the country’s most subsidized enterprises. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Federal Reserve, both backed by taxpayers,
provide an explicit subsidy by ensuring that banks can borrow money in times of market
turmoil. Banks that are big and connected enough to bring down the economy enjoy an
added implicit subsidy: Creditors will lend to them at low rates on the assumption that
the government won’t let them fail. …
Congress could … strictly limit all federally insured banks to the business of taking
deposits, lending, and processing payments.”
146
Unfair Informational Advantages. In addition to low cost financing, major banks that,
through subsidiaries or financial holding company affiliates, own pipelines, warehouses,
shipping operations, or refineries are likely to acquire commercially useful, non-public
information that could benefit their trading activities and perhaps lead to unfair trading
advantages.
Useful non-public information could come from the bank’s own operations or from
observing or assisting actions taken by clients, and include a wide variety of types of data,
including information about commodity price trends, upcoming large transactions, supply
disruptions, transport flows, or regulatory actions. That physical commodity activities can
provide access to commercially valuable non-public information has long been recognized by
both market participants and regulators. In a 2005 application seeking authority to engage in
physical commodity activities, for example, J PMorgan stated that the activities would:
“position J PM Chase in the supply end of the commodities markets, which in turn will
provide access to information regarding the full array of actual produce and end-user
activity in those markets. The information gathered through this increased market
participation will help improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply
vital price and risk management information that J PM Chase can use to improve its
financial commodities derivative offerings.”
147
146
“The Wrong Business for Big Banks,” Bloomberg Businessweek (8/1/2013),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-01/bloomberg-view-the-wrong-business-for-big-banks.
147
7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000004, at 016. See also 12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” PSI-
FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033, at 019 - 020, 032 (“The Complementary Activities will further complement the
Existing Business by providing J PMVEC [J PMorgan’s subsidiary] with important market information. The ability
to be involved in the supply end of the commodities markets through tolling agreements provides access to
information regarding the full array of actual producer and end-user activity in those markets.”).
36
A Federal Reserve analysis of the physical commodity activities conducted by Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs also noted the informational advantage those activities produced:
“In addition to the financial return, these direct investments provide MS [Morgan
Stanley] and GS [Goldman Sachs] with important asymmetrical information on
conditions in the physical markets such as production and supply/demand information,
etc., which a market participant without physical global infrastructure would not
necessarily be privy to.”
148
Since U.S. commodities laws do not currently prohibit using non-public information in
commodities trading in the same way that U.S. securities laws restrict the use of non-public
information in securities transactions, banks can legally obtain and use nonpublic information to
trade in the commodity futures, swaps, and options markets. For example, a bank whose affiliate
has a controlling interest in a refinery could quickly learn of a pending shutdown due to technical
problems and use that inside information to profit from a short position in the commodity
markets. A bank with an affiliate that controls a shipping operation could find out when bad
weather has delayed deliveries and, again, use that information legally to profit in the
commodities markets from shorting prices. Concerns about unfair trading advantages deepen
when the commodities trader is a large financial institution drawing on client data and its own
commodity activities to profit from counterparties.
Those types of unfair informational advantages would not apply to banks whose affiliates
do not own or control physical commodities or related businesses.
Credit Distortions. A second problem with mixing banking and commerce is the
concern that it may distort bank decisions about extending credit to businesses.
The concern is that, if a bank’s affiliate owns or controls a business that handles physical
commodities, the bank may not only extend credit to that business on favorable terms, but also
deny credit to its competitors. A bank that owns or profits from a solar power plant, for
example, may view any request for financing made by that firm in a favorable light. In contrast,
the bank may be reluctant to provide financing to a rival solar power generator or may agree to
lend funds only on more expensive terms. Because of its commercial involvement, the bank’s
credit decisions may no longer utilize objective lending criteria, but may be distorted by the
bank’s desire to see a particular business succeed.
One expert has warned that distorted credit decisions create a number of risks:
“A bank may extend credit to a company in which it has an ownership interest,
independent of the company’s creditworthiness, to assist the company and increase the
value of its stock. Such an extension would conflict with the interest of its depositors, its
safety and soundness, and the integrity of the deposit insurance fund. Further, rival
148
Undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 439 [sealed exhibit].
37
companies, unaffiliated with the banking organization, might be subject to unfair credit
terms.”
149
A related concern is that distorted credit determinations will not be limited to the
enterprises owned or controlled by the bank’s affiliates, but may extend to other businesses as
well. In one scenario, if a bank has an ownership interest in a particular commodity-related
business, it may seek to guide related business opportunities to other clients in which the bank
has invested or provided financing. For example, if the bank’s solar power plant needed
manufacturing equipment, the bank might recommend a manufacturer that has an outstanding
loan with the bank.
The Supreme Court recognized similar problems in a 1971 decision which overturned an
OCC interpretive letter allowing bank subsidiaries to form and sell shares in mutual funds. The
Court identified a litany of “hazards” that could unfold from that business, including credit
problems:
“
natural temptation [by the bank] to shore up the affiliate through unsound loans or other
aid. Moreover, the pressure to sell a particular investment and to make the affiliate
successful might create a risk that the bank would make its credit facilities more freely
available to those companies in whose stock or securities the affiliate has invested or
become otherwise involved. … The bank might exploit its confidential relationship with
its commercial and industrial creditors for the benefit of the [mutual] fund. ... The bank
might make loans to facilitate the purchase of interests in the fund.”
150
The Supreme Court summarized this set of concerns by warning that a bank’s ownership interest
in its affiliate “might impair its ability to function as an impartial source of credit.”
151
Conflicts of Interest. A third problem with mixing banking and commerce is that it
invites conflicts of interest between a bank and its clients. In the case of physical commodities,
those conflicts can arise in multiple settings. If the bank’s affiliate owns a solar power plant, for
example, it may put that plant’s financing interests before those of a client with a rival power
plant. If the bank’s affiliate owns a metals warehouse and the bank trades metals in the futures
market, the bank may time the release of the warehoused metal in ways that benefit the bank’s
own commodities positions and contrary to the interests of its clients. If a bank’s affiliate
supplies crude oil to a refinery while the bank trades oil futures, the bank may delay its oil
deliveries to restrict the supply and boost oil prices in the futures market, increasing the value of
its long positions while decreasing the value of the short positions held by its counterparties.
149
Shull, at 40. See also id. at 58 (“Will [small and new businesses] have less access to credit than rivals who are
affiliated with banks, and, when they obtain credit, will their rates be higher? … Will higher rates compel most
businesses to affiliate with banks if they can?”); Rosner Testimony at 12 (describing a “risk that a bank may choose
to deny lending or underwriting to a competitor of their commercial affiliate … [or] may choose to lend, at
preferential rates, to a commercial affiliate … [or] may, legally or illegally, tie loans to the purchase of a commercial
affiliate’s products”).
150
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631-632 (1971).
151
Id. at 631.
38
Possible conflicts of interest permeate virtually every type of commodity activity. If the
bank’s affiliate leases an electrical power plant, the bank may attempt to use regional pricing
conventions to boost its profits, even at the expense of clients that pay the higher electricity
costs. If the bank’s affiliate mines coal while the bank trades coal swaps, the bank may ask its
affiliate to store the coal rather than sell it to help restrict supplies, and benefit from long swap
positions, while causing its counterparties to incur losses. If the bank’s affiliate operates a
commodity-based exchange traded fund backed by gold, the bank may ask the affiliate to release
some of the gold into the marketplace and lower gold prices, so that the bank can profit from a
short position in gold futures or swaps, even if some clients hold long positions.
Market Manipulation. A fourth problem with mixing banking and commerce is that, in
the context of physical commodities, it invites market manipulation and excessive speculation in
commodity prices. If a bank’s affiliate owns or controls a metals warehouse, oil pipeline, a coal
shipping operation, refinery, grain elevator, or exchange traded fund backed by physical
commodities, the bank has the means to affect the marginal supply of a commodity and can use
those means to benefit the bank’s physical or financial commodities trading positions. If a
bank’s affiliate controls a power plant, the bank can “manipulate the availability of energy for
advantage” or to obtain higher profits.
152
In recent years, banks and their holding companies have settled allegations of price
manipulation by paying substantial fines and legal fees. In J uly 2013, for example, J PMorgan
paid $410 million to settle FERC charges that it used multiple pricing schemes to manipulate the
price of electricity produced by power plants it controlled in California and Michigan, in a matter
explained in more detail below.
153
That same month, FERC charged Barclays Bank with
manipulating electricity prices in California from 2006 to 2008, in order to benefit its swap
positions in other markets, directing it to disgorge $35 million plus interest and pay a penalty
totaling $435 million.
154
Specifically, FERC alleged that Barclays and its traders “engaged in a
coordinated scheme to manipulate trading at four electricity trading points in the Western United
States … by engaging in loss-generating trading of next-day fixed-price physical electricity on
the IntercontinentalExchange … to benefit Barclays’ financial swap positions in those
markets.”
155
Barclays is contesting both the charges and penalty.
152
Rosner Testimony, at 12.
153
See “FERC, J P Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,” FERC News
Release (7/30/2013).
154
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041
(7/16/2013). The CFTC has also charged hedge funds with market manipulation, demonstrating that financial firms
have the means to manipulate commodity futures and swap prices. See, e.g., CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC,
Case No. 07-CV-6682 (DC) (S.D.N.Y.)(7/25/2007); “Amaranth Entities Ordered to Pay a $7.5 Million Civil Fine in
CFTC Action Alleging Attempted Manipulation of Natural Gas Futures Prices,” CFTC Press Release No. 5692-09
(8/12/2013)( describing how, in 2009, the CFTC collected $7.5 million in fines from a hedge fund, Amaranth
Advisors LLC, and its Canadian subsidiary, for attempted manipulation of natural gas futures prices in 2006); CFTC
v. Moncada, Case No. 09-CV-8791 (S.D.N.Y.)(12/4/2012)(describing how, in 2012, the CFTC charged two related
hedge funds, BES Capital LLC and Serdika LLC, with attempted manipulation of wheat futures prices in 2009; they
are contesting the charges).
155
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order To Show Cause and Notice of Proposed Penalty,
141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (10/31/2012). For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with
electricity, below.
39
In another case the prior year, in J anuary 2013, Deutsche Bank settled FERC charges that
it, too, had manipulated electricity prices.
156
FERC alleged that Deutsche Bank had “engag[ed]
in a scheme in which [it] entered into physical transactions to benefit its financial position,”
identifying occasions in 2010 in which the bank made physical electricity trades to offset losses
in electricity-related financial instruments held by the bank.
157
Deutsche Bank admitted the
facts, but neither admitted or denied the violations of law, while paying disgorged profits and a
civil penalty totaling over $1.6 million. In still another case, involving agricultural commodities
rather than electricity, the CFTC reached a settlement, in 2014, with FirstRand Bank, Ltd. of
South Africa on charges of “executing unlawful prearranged, noncompetitive trades involving
corn and soybean futures contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).”
158
The CFTC
found:
“[O]n several occasions, from J une 2009 to August 2011, FirstRand and another foreign-
based company entered into prearranged noncompetitive trades involving CBOT corn
and soybean futures contracts. Before these trades were entered on the CBOT,
employees for FirstRand and the other company had telephonic conferences with each
other during which they agreed upon the contract, quantity, price, direction, and timing of
those trades. These prearranged trades negated market risk and price competition and
constituted fictitious sales, in violation of the [Commodities Exchange Act].”
159
To settle the charges, FirstRand agreed, without admitting or denying the facts or violations of
law, to pay a $150,000 civil penalty and revamp its procedures to prevent future fictitious
trades.
160
These cases are consistent with prior investigations by this Subcommittee which included
evidence of bank participation in commodity trading strategies that, collectively, constituted
excessive speculation in such energy and agricultural commodities as crude oil, natural gas, and
wheat.
161
Banks suspected of engaging in manipulation or excessive speculation in commodity
markets risk civil and criminal investigations, legal expenses, reputational damage, and penalties.
156
See In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC, FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, “Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement,” (1/22/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-
IN12-4-000.pdf.
157
1/22/2013 FERC press release, “FERC Approves Market Manipulation Settlement with Deutsche Bank,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-1/01-22-13.asp;
158
8/27/2014 CFTC press release, “CFTC Orders FirstRand Bank, Ltd. to Pay $150,000 Civil Monetary Penalty for
Unlawfully Executing Prearranged, Noncompetitive Trades on the CBOT,”http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6985-14.
159
Id.
160
See In re FirstRand Bank, Ltd., CFTC Case No. 14-23 (CFTC Administrative Proceedings), “Order Instituting
Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing
Remedial Sanctions,” at 1,http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enffirstrandorder082714.p
df.
161
See, e.g., “The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the
Beat,” report by Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Prt. 109-65 (6/27/2006); “Excessive Speculation in
the Wheat Market,” hearing before Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-155 (7/21/2009).
40
Increased Bank and Systemic Risks. A fifth problem with mixing banking and
commerce in the context of physical commodities is that it imposes a wide range of new and
increased risks on both individual banks and the broader U.S. financial system and economy.
Banks that own or control businesses with physical commodities, either directly or
through their financial holding companies, incur risks that are common in those businesses, but
uncommon in banking. For example, if the BP oil rig that caused a major oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico had instead been owned, leased, or controlled by a bank, that bank would have
confronted multi-billion-dollar liabilities that otherwise would never have threatened its balance
sheet. Similar low-probability but high-risk operational risks affect a wide range of
commodities, including coal, natural gas, and uranium, as well as a wide range of commodity
activities, such as mining, transporting, storing, or refining commodities with toxic properties.
Another set of risks include the expenses and disruptions that may be caused by the sudden
destruction of a major asset such as a power plant, warehouse, or pipeline; major thefts of
physical inventory; or industrial accidents that injure individuals or property. Still another type
of unusual risk is undergoing investigation for possible manipulation of physical commodity
prices, with the attendant legal expenses, reputational damage, and, in some cases, large fines.
Each of those risks does not normally apply to a bank, and would not apply if the bank’s
affiliates did not handle physical commodities.
In addition to the risks imposed on individual banks, physical commodities create
systemic risks. Currently, substantial physical commodity activities have been undertaken by a
handful of the country’s largest banks, each of which qualifies as a systemically important
financial institution. If one of those banks were to suffer an environmental or operational
disaster involving its physical commodities or sudden massive commodity trading losses, the
resulting financial consequences might be difficult to confine to that one bank. For example, if
the bank were to lose market confidence, it might find itself unable to obtain short term
financing, derivatives counterparties, or business partners, or might have to accept higher
expenses to continue to operate. Deposit runs or restricted liquidity could worsen the situation.
If the bank held substantial interests in non-banking commercial enterprises, its troubles could
taint those nonbanking enterprises as well. Regulatory action, and ultimately a U.S. taxpayer
bailout, might be required to prevent contagion spreading from one major bank to other financial
institutions or other sectors of the U.S. economy.
One business publication framed the problem this way in an editorial opposing bank
involvement in physical commodity businesses:
“Subsidized financing – made particularly cheap by the Fed’s efforts to stimulate the
economy with near-zero interest rates – [have] encouraged banks and their clients to
build bigger stockpiles [of commodities] than they otherwise would have, tying up
supplies. If the bets were to go wrong and lead to distress at a big bank, the Fed would
have to provide emergency financing for an activity that taxpayers never intended to
support.”
162
162
“The Wrong Business for Big Banks,” Bloomberg Businessweek (8/1/2013),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-01/bloomberg-view-the-wrong-business-for-big-banks.
41
A related risk, identified by another expert, is that banks, for legal or reputational reasons,
may take on the debts of affiliated commercial companies, creating unanticipated risks not only
to the bank itself, but also possibly systemic risks:
“Unfortunately, reputational risk within a systemically important financial institution can
result in requirements that the firm backstop assets, even those that were legally isolated.
In 2008 Citi was obligated to guarantee and then repurchase $17.4 billion of structured
investment vehicles (SIVs). As a result, the failure of the federal government to backstop
a firm’s reputation against such losses during a time of crisis could exacerbate panics and
lead to contagion and the creation of larger systemic problems.”
163
A second set of systemic risks involves the physical commodities themselves. Banks
whose affiliates horde key industrial metals such as copper, aluminum, or uranium in a
warehouse or an ETF could impose higher costs or a scarcity of raw materials on manufacturers,
technology companies, the automobile sector, nuclear power plants, or other industries. Banks
that manipulate electricity prices could impose higher costs on whole regions of the country.
Banks that supply jet fuel to airlines, coal to power plants, or natural gas to manufacturers could,
if they faltered, affect industries far afield from the banking sector. Ultimately, they could
negatively impact the U.S. economy.
Undue Concentrations of Economic Power. A sixth problem with mixing banking and
commerce in the context of physical commodities involves undue concentrations of economic
power.
164
Banks already occupy a critical role in the U.S. economy, as custodians of the country’s
wealth, facilitators of funding transfers worldwide, and arbiters of credit. Well aware of their
special status, banks have used their access to inexpensive financing and excess deposits to
expand into multiple business sectors. According to Federal Reserve data, at the end of 2011,
the top five U.S. banks alone held assets equal to 56% of the U.S. economy.
165
Enabling major banks to straddle, not only the financial sector, but also key raw material
and energy markets, would further extend their economic power. Industrial metals such as
copper and aluminum are essential in countless U.S. industries, including computers,
automobiles, and manufacturing equipment. Uranium is a critical contributor to nuclear power
plants, as well as certain defense and medical industries. Low cost natural gas is rejuvenating
U.S. manufacturing, as well as heating homes and producing low cost electricity. Economical
electricity generation is fundamental to the entire country, as is reasonably priced crude oil.
Refined oil products such as diesel fuel, heating oil, and jet fuel play critical roles in the U.S.
163
Rosner Testimony, at 7-8.
164
A 2012 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted that separating banking from commerce was, in
part, “intended to prevent self-dealing and monopoly power” by bank holding companies. “A Structural View of
U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (J uly 2012), at 3,http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf .
165
See “Big Banks: Now Even Too Bigger to Fail,” Bloomberg Businessweek, David J . Lynch (4/19/2012),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-19/big-banks-now-even-too-bigger-to-fail (stating: “Five banks –
J PMorgan Chase (J PM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Wells Fargo (WFC), and Goldman Sachs (GS) –
held more than $8.5 trillion in assets at the end of 2011, equal to 56 percent of the U.S. economy, according to the
Federal Reserve. That’s up from 43 percent five years earlier”).
42
economy. Agricultural products, including wheat, corn, and soybeans, not only help feed the
world, but produce biofuels that reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. If banks were to
dominate, not only the financial sector, but also key energy, metals, and agricultural sectors, they
would have even more influence over the economy.
One expert observed that if major banks:
“are allowed to control vast networks of nonfinancial assets, either as principal or agent,
they will have the power to pick winners and losers in the commercial world, not based
on the productivity or competitive advantages of those firms’ operations but as a result of
their own profit motives.”
166
The same expert quoted a warning by the Independent Community Bankers Association:
“Over time, the individual, the small business owner, small towns, and rural countryside
will suffer economically. More power will devolve to fewer and fewer hands, and
economic diversity will wither, and with it, choices.”
167
In the first decade of the twentieth century, a handful of U.S. banks dominated major U.S.
industries, including railroads, oil, mining, and the nascent electrical industry. The Pujo or
money trust hearings concluded that those banks had abused the public trust.
168
Too Big to Manage or Regulate. A final problem with mixing banking and commerce
in the context of physical commodities is that it intensifies the problem of too-big-to-fail banks
by producing complex financial conglomerates that are too big to manage or regulate.
Businesses that conduct commodities-related activities involving the producing, storing,
transporting, and refining of commodities are, in themselves, complex enterprises with multiple
regulatory and practical difficulties. Adding those complexities to the complexities already
attendant to global banks conducting hundreds of billions of dollars of complicated financial
transactions around the world raises regulatory and management problems it would be foolhardy
to ignore or discount.
C. Role of Regulators
Increased bank involvement with physical commodities could not have taken place in the
United States without the acquiescence of federal bank regulators that set the parameters on
permissible bank activities. Because most bank involvement with physical commodities takes
place through the bank’s financial holding company, actions by the Federal Reserve, the
exclusive regulator of bank holding companies, take center stage. Because a few banks also
participate directly in physical commodity activities, actions taken by the OCC, the primary
regulator of national banks, also come into play. In addition, other federal agencies exercise
oversight of certain aspects of physical commodity activities, including agencies that oversee
166
Rosner Testimony at 13.
167
Id., citing Cam Fine of the Independent Community Bankers Association, Chicago Fed Letter, “The Mixing of
Banking and Commerce: A conference summary,” Nisreen H. Darwish, Douglas D. Evanoff, Essays on Issues, The
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 244a (Nov. 2007),http://qa/chicagofed.org/digital_as...ago_fed_letter/2007/cflnovember2007_244a.pdf.
168
Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream, (J ohn Wiley & Sons, 2010), at 106.
43
U.S. commodities markets; electricity markets and energy production; commodity-related
securities; and commodity-related environmental and safety issues.
(1) Federal Reserve Board
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors has exclusive responsibility under the Bank
Company Holding Act of 1956 to regulate holding companies that own or control banks,
including overseeing their involvement with physical commodities.
The Federal Reserve currently oversees nearly 5,000 domestic and foreign-owned bank
holding companies.
169
Less than 150 of those holding companies are major global institutions
with $50 billion or more in assets. In 2011, 26 domestic bank holding companies and 106
foreign-owned bank holding companies reported $50 billion or more in total consolidated
assets.
170
Together, those holding companies reported a combined global value in excess of $70
trillion.
171
Within the Federal Reserve, the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation
(BS&R) oversees bank holding companies. Within BS&R, the Large Institution Supervision
Coordinating Committee (LISCC) coordinates the efforts of the Federal Reserve System to
oversee the largest and most complex bank holding companies and other systemically important
financial institutions.
172
Created in response to the financial crisis of 2008, LISCC was designed
to centralize supervision of those firms and to apply a cross-firm, interdisciplinary approach to
identify and reduce material risks to the U.S. and global banking system.
173
Additional supervisory duties are held by two BS&R subgroups known as the Large
Banking Organizations (LBO) Section and the International Banking Organizations (IBO)
Section. The LBO Section helps oversee domestic bank holding companies that have $50 billion
or more in consolidated assets but are not overseen by LISCC.
174
It works with the examination
and supervisory efforts of the district Reserve Banks; reviews examination and other reports on
bank holding companies and state member banks; and helps develop informal and formal
enforcement actions.
175
The IBO Section helps oversee foreign banking organization that have
$50 billion or more in consolidated U.S. assets but are not overseen by LISCC.
176
It monitors
169
5/23/2012 letter from Federal Reserve System’s Office of Inspector General to the Federal Reserve’s Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation (BS&R) regarding an audit of BS&R efforts to develop enhanced prudential
standards under Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereinafter “5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Inspector General
Letter”), at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf
(stating that, as of March 31, 2011, the Federal Reserve oversaw 4,770 domestic and 179 foreign-owned bank
holding companies).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
See Federal Reserve SR Letter 12-17, “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,”
(12/17/2013), at 2,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
173
See, e.g., testimony of Federal Reserve Governor Daniel K. Tarullo before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, hearing on Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, (6/6/2012),http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20120606a.htm.
174
See Federal Reserve SR Letter 12-17, “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,”
(12/17/2013), at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
175
5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Inspector General Letter, at 4.
176
See Federal Reserve SR Letter 12-17, “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,”
(12/17/2013), at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
44
foreign country developments that could affect supervision of foreign banks operating in the
United States; works with foreign regulators of U.S. banks operating abroad; and provides
Federal Reserve views on supervisory issues and banking trends of international interest.
177
To oversee large bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve assigns a team of
examiners to each institution. In New York, the head of the team is called the Senior
Supervisory Officer (SSO); outside of New York, the team leader is generally called the Central
Point of Contact (CPC).
178
Depending upon the size and complexity of the holding company,
the SSO or CPC examination team has between 10 and 40 members with various areas of
expertise.
179
At larger holding companies, the examination team typically spends four days per
week on site at the assigned institution and one day per week at Federal Reserve offices.
180
The examination team typically develops an annual supervisory plan and conducts
routine and special examinations on a wide range of holding company issues, including capital
and liquidity adequacy, management of core business lines, internal controls, stress testing, and
risk management. Risk specialists may assist or conduct certain examinations. The team
provides written materials summarizing examination results, identifying problems, and requiring
or encouraging corrective actions. Team members also conduct ongoing meetings with the
holding company to monitor developments and communicate concerns. In addition, the
examination team helps prepare the Federal Reserve’s annual rating assessment of the bank
holding company.
According to the Federal Reserve, the BS&R division does not maintain a group of
examiners who specialize in physical commodity issues, nor do SSO and CPC teams typically
include physical commodities specialists.
181
Instead, SSO and CPC teams typically assign
physical commodity related concerns to examiners who also handle other issues.
182
Key Federal Reserve regulatory issues related to physical commodities include
application of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley authorities for permissible financial activities,
nonfinancial complementary activities, merchant banking investments, and grandfathered
commodity activities, as well as enforcement of prudential limits on physical commodity
activities.
(2) Other Federal Bank Regulators
While the Federal Reserve has exclusively responsibility for regulating financial holding
companies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) are charged with overseeing individual national banks and their subsidiaries.
The OCC has primary regulatory authority over national banks, and is charged with, among other
tasks, ensuring those banks comply with the law restricting them to the “business of banking”
and operate in a safe and sound manner. The FDIC exercises secondary authority over national
177
Id. at 4-5.
178
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
45
banks, with its responsibilities centered around protecting the federal deposit insurance system
from losses.
Over the years, the OCC has played a key role in the physical commodities area by
expansively interpreting the scope of the bank powers clause of the National Bank Act to permit
commodity-related activities. As explained earlier, the bank powers clause sets out the
boundaries of permissible activities by national banks. It states that a national bank may
exercise:
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating
notes ….”
183
Both the OCC and the courts have determined that the banking powers granted by this
clause should be interpreted broadly.
184
During the 1980s, when commodity issues first arose,
the OCC reasoned that, since commodities were not expressly mentioned in the bank powers
clause, the key issue was whether they were permissible “incidental powers.” Over the years, the
OCC has used several tests to make that determination. In some interpretive letters, the OCC
used a judicial standard which required only that the commodity-related activity “be ‘convenient
and useful’ in the performance of the bank’s expressly permitted activities.”
185
That non-
demanding standard made it easy for the OCC to find that a variety of commodity-related
activities were permissible.
In another letter, the OCC used a more detailed, four-part test, citing multiple court
decisions as the basis for the standards:
“(1) whether the activity is similar to the types of activities permitted by the Act and not
expressly prohibited … or is not ‘so disconnected with the banking business as to make it
in violation of’ section 24 …
(2) whether the activity is a ‘generally adopted method’ of banks or one in which banks
have traditionally engaged …
(3) whether the activity in question ‘has grown out of the business needs of the country’
… or would ‘promote the convenience of [the bank’s] business for itself or for its
customers” … and
(4) whether the activity is usual and useful to the bank, or is expected of the bank, in
performing its functions in the current competitive climate.”
186
While this test is not explicitly cited in other OCC interpretive letters, its standards seem to
underlie much of the OCC’s analysis. For example, a number of OCC interpretive letters
183
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh).
184
See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257-59, 115 S. Ct.
810 (1995); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), at 5.
185
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 260 (6/27/1983), at 4, citing Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1
st
Cir. 1972); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 356 (1/7/1986), at 2; OCC Interpretive Letter (6/19/1986), at 2; OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 1025 (4/6/2005), at 6.
186
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 494 (12/20/1989), at 11-12 (citations omitted).
46
analogized the bank’s authority to execute commodity-related transactions to its longstanding
authority to act as a financial intermediary, broker, or lender for its clients, and concluded that
the similarity justified finding that the commodity-related activities were permissible under the
bank powers clause.
187
Beginning in the 1990s, OCC interpretive letters often used another approach which
analyzed whether the commodity-related activity:
“(1) [was] functionally equivalent to or a logical outgrowth of a traditional banking
activity; (2) would respond to customer needs or otherwise benefit the bank or its
customers; and (3) involve[d] risks similar to those already assumed by banks.”
188
In 1993, the OCC used that three-part test in its key interpretive letter approving national
banks taking delivery of physical commodities and conducting related activities such as storing,
transporting, and disposing of the commodities.
189
The OCC letter found that taking physical
delivery of commodities was a logical outgrowth of a bank’s other permissible activities and
served as a means to manage the risks arising from those permissible activities.
190
The letter
determined that the bank’s clients would benefit from the bank’s accepting physical commodities
by providing the bank with “more accurate and economical hedges” and by increasing the bank’s
ability to compete in the commodities markets, both of which could lead to reduced prices for
clients.
191
The letter also determined that the bank itself would benefit from using more accurate
hedges that reduced risk.
192
Finally, the OCC letter found that the risks associated with taking
physical delivery of commodities were similar to those in other permissible banking activities.
193
The OCC used the same three-part test in several other interpretive letters allowing banks to
engage in physically-settled commodity transactions.
194
Even after finding that taking physical delivery of commodities was within the business
of banking, however, the OCC routinely placed prudential conditions on the exercise of that
activity, requiring the bank to put into place risk management, documentation, and audit controls
to ensure safe and sound banking practices. As part of that effort, the OCC required a bank,
prior to engaging in any physically-settled commodity transactions, to submit a detailed plan to
the OCC and obtain prior written authorization from its OCC supervisory staff.
195
Another letter
placed limits on the volume of permissible commodities trading.
196
Still others required the
implementation of a bank circular on risk management.
197
187
See, e.g., id. at 16-25; OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987), at 4-6; OCC Interpretive Letter
(3/2/1992), at 3-4; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 (9/13/1994), at 4; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 929 (2/11/2002),
at 4-5.
188
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), at 4.
189
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993).
190
Id. at 5.
191
Id. at 4.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), at 4 (metals); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 937
(6/27/2002), at 7-10 (electricity); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1060 (4/26/2006), at 6-7 (coal).
195
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), at 6.
196
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 507 (5/5/1990), at 3.
197
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 937 (6/27/2002), at 10-11.
47
Another line of OCC interpretive letters extended bank involvement with physical
commodities by approving proposed merchant banking investments in energy-related
businesses.
198
Still another line of OCC letters approved credit arrangements in which energy
producers agreed to repay bank loans by assigning the bank a royalty interest in the producer’s
physical energy reserves.
199
Through its interpretation of the bank powers clause, the OCC continually extended the
scope of national bank involvement with commodities, including physical commodities. Its
decisions allowed national banks and their subsidiaries to execute and clear futures, options and
swaps; become members of commodity exchanges and clearinghouses; engage in physically-
settled transactions involving the delivery of physical commodities; store, transport, and dispose
of physical commodities; invest in commodity-related businesses; and deal with a wide range of
commodities with unique and toxic properties, from oil products to natural gas, metals, uranium,
agricultural products, emissions, electricity, and more. Since bank holding companies are also
restricted to engaging in banking or closely related activities, the OCC’s interpretations
expanded their ability to engage in physical commodity activities as well.
(3) Dodd-Frank Provisions
One set of regulatory issues that is outside the scope of this Report, but may have a
significant future impact, is how implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) will affect bank involvement with physical
commodities.
200
At least five Dodd-Frank provisions have the potential to restrict or reshape bank
involvement with physical commodities. Section 171 requires minimum, risk-based capital and
leverage standards for federally insured banks, their holding companies, and affiliates. If bank
regulators were to determine that physical commodity activities constitute high risk activities,
they could impose minimum capital or leverage standards to mitigate the risk associated with
conducting such activities and discourage, reshape, or reduce bank involvement.
Section 165 authorizes enhanced supervision and prudential standards for large bank
holding companies with assets in excess of $50 billion. It explicitly permits more stringent rules
based on a company’s “capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities (including the
financial activities of their subsidiaries), size” or other factors.
201
If bank regulators were to
determine that physical commodity activities created sufficient risk, they could impose
contingent capital, credit exposure, or leverage standards, concentration limits, stress testing, or
other measures to minimize risk and discourage, reshape, or reduce bank involvement with
physical commodities.
198
See, e.g., OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2005-3 (7/20/2005)(construction and operation
of ethanol plant); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2008-1 (7/31/2008)(development of solar
energy facilities); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2009-6 (12/16/2009)(installation of
photovoltaic systems in low-income housing); OCC Community Development Investment Letter No. 2011-2
(12/15/2011)(construction of wind turbines).
199
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1117 (5/19/2009)(volumetric production payment loans).
200
P.L. 111-208 (7/21/2010).
201
Section 165(a)(2)(A).
48
Section 619, which is part of the Merkley-Levin provisions and includes the so-called
Volcker Rule, prohibits banks and their subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading as well
as hedging or market-making activities that create client conflicts of interest or high risk
exposures. Depending upon implementation of the Volcker Rule’s provisions, this section could
also restrict and reshape some of the physical commodity activities now undertaken by banks,
their holding companies, and affiliates.
Section 111 of the law created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) whose
mission is to identify and address systemic risks to the U.S. financial system. Section 152
created the Office of Financial Research which the FSOC could task with gathering and
analyzing data on possible systemic risks caused by bank involvement with physical
commodities. If the FSOC were to determine that bank involvement in physical commodities
imposed systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it could recommend or take measures to
restrict or restructure those activities.
Finally, Section 620 of the law requires federal bank regulatory agencies to conduct a
study of appropriate banking activities. Work on that study is underway. If the study were to
conclude that conducting physical commodity activities, in whole or in part, is inappropriate for
federally insured banks, their holding companies, or affiliates, the study could recommend
measures to reduce, restructure, or even eliminate some of those activities.
Most of the Dodd-Frank provisions are not fully in effect, and the required Section 620
study is not yet complete. Multiple agencies are in charge of their implementation, and multiple
outcomes are possible. Depending upon agency implementation, each of these Dodd-Frank
provisions offers tools that could be used to discourage, reshape, or reduce bank involvement
with physical commodities.
(4) Other Agencies
In addition to federal banking regulators, other federal agencies also exercise oversight of
various aspects of bank involvement with physical commodities. They include agencies that
oversee U.S. commodities markets; electricity markets and energy production; commodity-
related securities; and a wide range of commodity-related environmental and safety issues.
Commodity Markets. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is charged
with overseeing the fair and orderly operation of commodity futures, swaps, and options markets,
whether trading takes place on an exchange, swap execution facility, or over-the counter. The
CFTC is also charged with preventing, detecting, and punishing commodity price manipulation
and excessive speculation. While the CFTC does not have direct authority over physical
commodity markets, those markets can and do affect prices on the financial markets, and can
lead to misconduct within the CFTC’s jurisdiction. The lack of transparency in many of the
physical markets, as well as the ability of prices or actions in one market to affect prices in
another market, further complicate CFTC oversight. Since major U.S. banks now dominate
commodity swaps and are major traders of commodity futures and options, CFTC oversight
responsibilities include monitoring and reviewing their conduct.
Energy Regulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is charged
with ensuring U.S. electricity prices are just and reasonable. In addition, FERC is charged with
49
ensuring energy reliability, which includes overseeing energy production facilities, distribution
networks, and electrical grids, among other tasks. Its work includes oversight of power plants
run on oil, natural gas, solar, wind, geothermal, biofuel, and other energy sources, as well as
refineries that produce a wide variety of oil-based products, such as jet fuel, heating oil, and
bunker fuel. FERC’s mission also includes preventing price and market manipulation in
electricity markets. Since major U.S. banks have now become participants in many U.S.
electricity markets, FERC oversight responsibilities include reviewing their conduct.
Commodity-Related Securities. While commodity prices used to be the product of
transactions in the physical or financial commodity markets, today they are also affected by
transactions in the securities markets. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
charged with ensuring the fair and orderly operation of U.S. capital markets, including multiple
stock exchanges and security-based swaps markets. The SEC also oversees the issuance and sale
of a wide variety of commodity-related securities, including securities linked to commodity
index swaps and commodity-based exchange traded funds (ETFs). The agency is also charged
with detecting and punishing misconduct, including insider trading, price manipulation, and
securities fraud. Since major U.S. banks often design, administer, and trade commodity-related
securities, SEC oversight responsibilities now include examining their conduct.
Environmental and Safety Oversight. A fourth category of federal agencies with
commodity-related oversight encompasses agencies responsible for overseeing a wide range of
environmental and safety issues. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is
primarily charged with preventing pollution, has oversight responsibilities that affect a broad
range of commodity-related activities, from refineries to smelting facilities, mining operations,
and power plant emissions. The Coast Guard, which is charged with ensuring marine safety and
dealing with water-based oil spills, oversees oil tankers, ships that transport other types of
commodities such as coal, grain, or iron ore, and port facilities used to load and unload
commodity cargos. The responsibilities of the Department of Transportation (DOT) include
oversight of land-based oil storage tanks, oil and gas pipelines, trucks, and railroads, all of which
are used by commodity-related businesses. The Department of Energy issues energy export
licenses and oversees a vast range of energy-related issues. The Mine Safety Administration is
charged with ensuring that U.S. mines operate in a safe manner. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) oversees grain elevators and food safety. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is charged with ensuring safe workplace operations.
This federal agency list is far from exhaustive and does not even begin to address
regional, state, local, or international authorities that may have oversight or regulatory
responsibilities related to physical commodities. As noted earlier, when banks, through their
financial holding companies, initiate activities involving crude and refined oil products, natural
gas, coal, uranium, solar and wind energy, metals, agricultural products, pipelines, shipping,
railroads, refineries, mining, smelting, uranium enrichment, and electricity generation and
distribution, among others, a massive network of complex regulations and overlapping
regulatory authorities follow.
While this Report does not focus on the oversight efforts of non-banking federal
agencies, they, too, play a critical role in the physical commodity activities undertaken by banks
and their holding companies.
50
III. OVERSEEING PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors has exclusive responsibility for regulating
holding companies that own or control banks, and has played a central role in delineating the
extent of their allowable involvement with physical commodities. Prior to enactment of the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the Federal Reserve permitted very little physical commodity
activities. That stance changed after the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act authorized banks and their
holding companies to engage in a broader array of activities, including those involving physical
commodities.
Since then, drawing on authority from either the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or the Bank
Holding Company Act, financial holding companies have engaged in physical commodity
activities which they assert are:
(1) “financial in nature” or “incidental” to financial activities,
(2) non-financial, but found by the Federal Reserve to be “complementary” to financial
activities,
(3) “grandfathered” under the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, or
(4) qualified “merchant banking” investments.
The Federal Reserve’s oversight of the resulting physical commodity activities can be
seen as falling generally into two phases. In the first phase, from 2000 to 2008, the Federal
Reserve generally permitted financial holding companies to expand and deepen their physical
commodity activities. In the second phase, from 2009 to the present, after the financial crisis
raised concerns about hidden risks to the U.S. financial system, the Federal Reserve began to
reconsider bank involvement with physical commodities. A newly created Federal Reserve Risk
Secretariat identified bank involvement with physical commodities as a major emerging risk and
dedicated resources for a multi-year special review of the issue. The special review surveyed ten
financial holding companies’ physical commodity activities, marked the growth in the variety
and dollar value of those activities, and identified multiple concerns including operational,
catastrophic event, and reputational risks, inadequate risk management, insufficient capital and
insurance, and ineffective regulatory safeguards.
While the review was underway, the Federal Reserve began taking some steps to curb
high risk physical commodity activities at bank holding companies, including by halting
previously permitted activities, delaying or denying requests for expanded activities, and
adopting changes to capital rules that increased protections against commodity-related risks. At
the same time, the Federal Reserve left unresolved major issues about what physical
commodities activities were permissible under the law, permitted a wide range of risky activities,
and failed to close loopholes exploited by some financial holding companies to weaken the
impact of limits on the size of their physical commodity holdings. In early 2014, the Federal
Reserve solicited public comment on whether it should propose new regulatory limits on banks
with physical commodities, but has yet to propose a rulemaking.
51
A. Expanding Physical Commodity Activities, 2000-2008
From 2000 to 2008, the Federal Reserve steadily expanded the range of allowable
physical commodity activities by financial holding companies, enabling them to become major
participants in markets for a wide array of commodities, from uranium
202
to natural gas
203
to
electricity.
204
During this phase, among other measures, the Federal Reserve issued orders
explicitly authorizing expanded commodity activities, provided relaxed interpretations of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley provisions on permissible financial, complementary, grandfathered, and
merchant banking activities, and failed to resolve key issues that would limit those activities.
(1) Expanding Permissible “Financial” Activities
Historically, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 has restricted holding companies
that own or control banks to engaging in “banking” activities or activities determined by the
Federal Reserve “to be so closely related to banking … as to be a proper incident thereto.”
205
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 gave financial holding companies greater leeway,
allowing them to engage in any activity, or retain the shares of any company engaged in any
activity, that the Federal Reserve determined was “financial in nature or incidental to such
financial activity.”
206
The Federal Reserve was given sole authority to define which holding
company activities were “financial in nature” or “incidental” to a financial activity.
207
From 2000 to 2008, the Federal Reserve used its new authority to expand the physical
commodity activities that financial holding companies were allowed to conduct. In Regulation
Y, the Federal Reserve had created a non-exclusive list of “permissible nonbanking activities”
for bank holding companies.
208
That lengthy list was revised to include the following
commodity-related activities:
• providing “advice with respect to any transaction in foreign exchange, swaps, and
similar transactions, commodities, and any forward contract, option, future, option on
a future, and similar instruments;”
209
202
See discussion below involving Goldman Sachs.
203
See discussion below involving Morgan Stanley.
204
See discussion below involving J PMorgan.
205
See Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, codified at 12 U.S.C. §1843(a) and
(c)(8).
206
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
207
Under the bank powers clause of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh), the OCC has sole authority to
determine what activities constitute the “business of banking” and so qualify as a “banking” activity, as explained in
Chapter II. Because the OCC is charged with defining banking activities, its determinations necessarily affect the
determinations made by the Federal Reserve regarding what activities are incidental to banking.
208
12 C.F.R. § 225.28. Regulation Y contains the key rules for bank holding companies. It lists permissible
activities for financial holding companies in 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (listing activities that are “financial in nature or
incidental to a financial activity”) and permissible nonbanking activities for all bank holding companies in 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.28 (listing activities that are “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto”). Section 225.86 explicitly incorporates all of the activities listed in Section 225.28.
209
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(6)(iv) (1997).
52
• allowing a subsidiary to register with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant,
execute and clear futures and options on regulated exchanges, and act as an agent to
trade commodities for clients;
210
and
• engaging as principal, subject to some limitations, in “forward contracts, options,
futures, options on futures, swaps, and similar contracts, whether traded on exchanges
or not, based on any rate, price, financial asset (including gold, silver, platinum,
palladium, copper, or any other metal approved by the Board), nonfinancial asset, or
group of assets, other than a bank-ineligible security.”
211
The Federal Reserve also amended Regulation Y to give bank holding companies more
authority to make or take delivery of physical commodities. Originally, Regulation Y limited
bank holding companies to commodity transactions that provided for cash settlement of the
transaction or for the assignment, termination, or offset of any physical commodities, so that a
bank holding company could not be required to take actual delivery of any physical commodity.
In 2003, the Federal Reserve amended the rule to also allow bank holding companies to enter
into commodity contracts that provided for the delivery of physical commodities, so long as the
holding company made “every reasonable effort to avoid taking or making delivery of the asset
underlying the contract” and, if it did take delivery, did so by taking paper title to the
commodities or arranging for their delivery to another party on an “instantaneous, pass-through
basis.”
212
The regulation also limited bank holding companies to trading commodities that had
been approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
213
Over time, the expansion of permissible activities under Regulation Y enabled bank
holding companies to engage in a wider range of commodity-related financial transactions,
including, for the first time beginning in 2003, transactions that could result in their taking or
making delivery of physical commodities.
(2) Authorizing Commodity-Related “Complementary” Activities
The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act also gave the Federal Reserve sole authority to permit
financial holding companies to engage in any activity, or retain the shares of any company
engaged in any activity that the Federal Reserve first determined was “complementary to a
financial activity.”
214
The Federal Reserve has interpreted this statutory provision as allowing it
to permit an activity that “appears to be commercial rather than financial in nature but that is
meaningfully connected to a financial activity such that it complements the financial activity.”
215
210
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(7)(iv) and (v) (1997).
211
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B) (2003); See also See, e.g., 2003 Federal Reserve "Order Approving Notice to
Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity," in response to a request by Citigroup, Inc., 89 Fed.
Res. Bull. 508, 509 (12/2003) (hereinafter "Citigroup Order"),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdfCitibank Order (containing the Federal
Reserve’s summary of commodity related activities authorized by Regulation Y as of 2003).
212
68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (7/3/2003); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B)(3).
213
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B)(4).
214
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
215
See, e.g., Citigroup Order, at 508, 509.
53
During the legislative process leading to enactment of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, this
complementary provision was presented as a way to allow financial holding companies to
engage in a limited amount of low risk activities that would support their banking operations,
such as selling data processing services that took advantage of excess capacity in bank
technology systems.
216
The legislative record contains little or no mention of commodities. In
addition, complementary activities were generally expected to be insignificant relative to the
overall financial activities of the financial holding company and its affiliates.
217
Since
enactment, however, the complementary provision has been used almost exclusively to approve
greater bank involvement with physical commodities,
218
and revenues related to physical
commodities activities have grown into billions of dollars.
Prior Notice and Approval. What constitutes a “complementary” activity is not defined
by the statute. Rather, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act established a process through which such
activities could be authorized by the Federal Reserve on a case-by-case basis.
219
A financial
holding company seeking to rely on the Act’s complementary authority must first notify and
obtain approval from the Federal Reserve of the proposed activities.
220
Under implementing
regulations issued by the Federal Reserve, the financial holding company must file an application
describing each proposed activity, its proposed size and scope, the financial activity to which it
would be complementary, how the proposed activity would complement the financial activity,
the attendant risks, and the “public benefits” that would be produced.
221
In their applications requesting permission to engage in “complementary” commodity
activities, the financial holding companies gave several reasons. One commonly cited reason
was that increased access to information about physical commodity activities would help the
financial holding company in its commodity trading activities, such as in the futures and swaps
markets. For example, in its 2005 application for complementary authority, J PMorgan explained
that engaging in physical commodities activities would:
“position J PM Chase in the supply end of the commodities markets, which in turn will
provide access to information regarding the full array of actual produce and end-user
activity in those markets. The information gathered through this increased market
participation will help improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply
216
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. Hrg. 113-67
(7/23/2013), at 5, written testimony of Saule T. Omarova, Professor of Law, (hereinafter “Omarova Testimony”)http://www.banking.senate.gov/publi...es.View&FileStore_id=6d49a599-f7dc-4c1f-9455-
fa8d891f04c6; “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities,” Professor Saule Omarova,
98 Minnesota Law Review 265, 288 (2012) (hereinafter “The Merchants of Wall Street”); See also 145 Cong. Rec.
H11529 (11/4/1999) (House Banking Chairman Leach: “It is expected that complementary activities would not be
significant relative to the overall financial activities of the organization.”).
217
See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. H11529 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (Statement of Chairman Leach) (“It is expected that
complementary activities would not be significant relative to the overall financial activities of the organization.”).
218
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that all of the complementary orders it has issued, save one,
approved commodities activities. 12/13/2013 Federal Reserve briefing of the Subcommittee. See also Omarova
Testimony, at 5.
219
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j).
220
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a).
221
12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a).
54
vital price and risk management information that J PM Chase can use to improve its
financial commodities derivative offerings.”
222
J PMorgan also stated that it “must have the ability to enter into physically settled transactions” in
order to “compete effectively” in offering commodity-linked products to its customers,
223
and
that the authority would allow them to “hedge … commodities derivatives positions more
effectively and cheaply.”
224
All three reasons indicate that the primary motivating factor for
entering into physical commodity activities was to complement the financial holding company’s
financial activities, including its participation in the commodity-related futures and swaps
markets.
Before approving a request for complementary authority, the Federal Reserve is legally
required to make an explicit finding that the proposed activity meets the statutory requirements
that it would “not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depositary institutions or
the financial system generally,”
225
and that it “can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to
the public … that outweigh possible adverse effects.”
226
The statutory list of possible public
benefits includes “greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency,” while the
list of possible adverse effects includes “undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices, or risk to the stability of the
United States banking or financial system.”
227
Complementary Orders. From 2003 to 2008, the Federal Reserve used its case-by-case
approval process to issue a series of orders and letters authorizing financial holding companies to
engage in a variety of physical commodity activities found to be “complementary” to their
trading in commodity-related financial instruments.
228
Ultimately, thirteen financial holding
companies were approved to engage in various categories of complementary activities, including
purchasing and selling physical commodities in the spot markets,
229
making and taking delivery
of physical commodities to settle derivatives transactions,
230
entering into energy tolling
agreements,
231
and providing energy management services.
232
The first such order, granted in 2003, permitted Citigroup, through its then commodity
trading subsidiary, Phibro, to buy and sell oil, natural gas, agricultural products, and other
commodities in the physical spot markets, and to take and make delivery of physical
222
7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000004 - 028, at 016.
223
Id. at 015.
224
Id.
225
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
226
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(b)(3).
227
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A).
228
See, e.g., Citigroup Order, at 508.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
See 2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” presentation prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (hereinafter, “2011 Work Plan”), FRB-PSI-200455 - 476, at 458.
232
Id.
55
commodities to settle commodity-linked derivative transactions.
233
This was the first time the
Federal Reserve had allowed a bank holding company to buy and sell physical commodities in
the physical spot markets.
To reduce the risks associated with these new activities, the order required Citigroup to
make a number of commitments to limit the size and scope of its physical commodity activities.
Among other measures, the order stated:
• That as a condition of the order, Citigroup must cap the market value of its
commodities holdings resulting from trading activities at 5% of its consolidated Tier I
capital;
• Citigroup must also alert the Federal Reserve if the market value exceeded 4% of its
Tier I capital;
• Citigroup may make or take physical delivery of only those commodities which have
been approved by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for trading
on U.S. futures exchanges, unless it separately obtained permission from the Federal
Reserve;
• Citigroup was not authorized to own, operate, or invest in facilities for the extraction,
transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities; and
• Citigroup was not authorized to process, refine, or otherwise alter commodities.
234
Over the next five years, the Federal Reserve issued similar complementary orders or
letters to eleven other major financial holding companies. Those orders or letters were issued to
UBS
235
and Barclays
236
in 2004; J PMorgan in 2005;
237
Deutsche Bank,
238
Societe Generale,
239
Wachovia,
240
and Fortis
241
in 2006; Bank of America,
242
Credit Suisse,
243
and BNP Paribas
244
in
233
See Citigroup Order. In 2009, Citigroup sold Phibro to Occidental Petroleum Corporation. 10/9/2009 Citigroup
Inc. press release, “Citi to Sell Phibro LLC,”http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/091009a.htm.
234
Id.
235
2004 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity,”
in response to a request by UBS AG, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 (Spring 2004),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_q22004.pdf .
236
2004 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Barclays Bank PLC, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 511 (Autumn 2004),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_q42004.pdf .
237
2006 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by J P Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 (2006)(hereinafter
“J PMorgan Order”)(effective as of November 18, 2005),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf. J PMorgan has subsequently sought
and received additional complementary authority.
238
2006 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Deutsche Bank AG, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C54 (2006),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
239
2006 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Societe Generale, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C113 (2006),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
240
4/13/2006 Federal Reserve letter regarding Wachovia Corporation. PSI-FRB-20-000012-014.
241
9/29/2006 Federal Reserve letter regarding Fortis S.A./N.A., PSI-FRB-19-000027-030; and later 94 Fed. Res.
Bull. C20 (2008),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf.
242
4/24/2007 Federal Reserve letter regarding Bank of America Corporation, PSI-FRB-20-000001-005.
56
2007; and Wells Fargo in 2008.
245
Each permitted the named financial holding company, either
directly or through one or more affiliates, to engage in the same types of physical commodity
activities as Citigroup. In addition, each required the financial holding company to comply with
specified safeguards such as size restrictions, risk management controls, and prohibitions against
owning, operating or investing in “facilities for the extraction, transportation, storage, or
distribution” of commodities, and against processing, refining or altering commodities.
246
In 2008, the Federal Reserve issued a complementary order for the Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS) in which it authorized the firm to engage in an even greater range of physical
commodities activities.
247
First, the RBS Order omitted a limitation in the prior orders that had
restricted the banks to trading commodities that had been approved for trading by the CFTC on
U.S. exchanges. Instead, after describing the relevant over-the-counter (OTC) markets as
“sufficiently liquid,” the order authorized RBS to trade in nickel, butane, asphalt, kerosene,
marine diesel, and other oil products that had not received CFTC approval for trading on U.S.
exchanges.
248
Second, the order allowed RBS to contract with a third party to “refine, blend, or
otherwise alter” its physical commodities, essentially authorizing RBS to sell crude oil to a
refinery and buy back the refined oil products.
249
In still another major expansion, the order
allowed RBS to enter into long-term electricity supply contracts with large industrial and
commercial customers, and to enter into “tolling agreements” and “energy management”
agreements with power generators.
250
Collectively, these authorities gave RBS permission to
243
3/27/2007 Federal Reserve letter regarding Credit Suisse Group, PSI-FRB-20-000006-011.
244
8/31/2007 Federal Reserve letter regarding BNP Paribas, PSI-FRB-19-000012-017.
245
4/10/2008 Federal Reserve letter regarding Wells Fargo & Company, PSI-FRB-19-000018-023.
246
See 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 459.
247
2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60 (2008)
(hereinafter “RBS Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf. The order
applied to both the Royal Bank of Scotland and a joint venture called RBS Sempra Commodities that the Royal
Bank of Scotland had formed with Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company.
248
Id.
249
Id. See also The Merchants of Wall Street, at 304-05. Prior Federal Reserve complementary orders had
prohibited holding companies from engaging in such activities. A few months later, the Federal Reserve provided
the same authority to J PMorgan. See 11/25/2008 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended,
and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000553, at 555 (requesting authority to refine, blend, or alter
physical commodities); 4/20/2009 letter from Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 (granting
J PMorgan’s request). J PMorgan used that authority to set up an arrangement in which it sold crude oil to a refinery
in Philadelphia and bought 100% of the refined oil products. See, e.g., 1/24/2013 “Commodities Physical Operating
Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301379, at 381 (Chart entitled, “Physical Operating Risk Review of Project
Liberty”).
250
RBS Order, at C64. A tolling agreement typically allows the “toller” to make periodic payments to a power plant
owner to cover the plant’s operating costs plus a fixed profit margin in exchange for the right to all or part of the
plant’s power output. As part of the agreement, the toller typically supplies or pays for the fuel used to run the plant.
Id. at C64. An energy management agreement typically requires the “energy manager” to act as a financial
intermediary for the power plant, substituting its own credit and liquidity for the power plant to facilitate the power
plant’s business activities. The energy manager also typically supplies market information and advice to support the
power plant’s efforts. Id. at C65.
57
engage in an unprecedented range of physical commodity activities.
251
At the same time, as in
prior orders, the Federal Reserve conditioned its approval of the new commodity activities on
RBS’ meeting certain prudential requirements, such as adequate risk controls and size
restrictions. After issuing the RBS order, the Federal Reserve granted similar authority to other
financial holdings companies as well.
252
In sum, since the first complementary order was issued less than a dozen years ago, the
Federal Reserve has granted complementary authority for financial holding companies to:
• buy and sell physical commodities like oil, natural gas, metal, and agricultural
products in the physical spot markets;
• take and make delivery of physical commodities to satisfy derivative trades without
Regulation Y’s requirement of taking all reasonable steps to avoid physical delivery;
• enter into tolling agreements and energy management contracts with power plants;
• sell crude oil to refineries and buy back the refined oil products; and
• enter into long term commodity supply contracts.
Without the complementary orders and letters issued by the Federal Reserve, many of
those physical commodity activities would not otherwise have been permissible “financial”
activities under federal banking law.
253
By issuing those complementary orders, the Federal
Reserve directly facilitated the expansion of financial holding companies into new physical
commodity activities.
(3) Delaying Interpretation of the Grandfather Clause
A third legal basis for financial holding companies engaging in physical commodity
activities involves the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s “grandfather” clause. This clause was enacted
over fourteen years ago in 1999, yet its contours have yet to be delineated by the Federal Reserve
in regulation, guidance, or order. Resolving questions about its scope and meaning gained
urgency six years ago, in 2008, after Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank
holding companies and became the first financial institutions to invoke the clause as the legal
basis for engaging in a wide range of physical commodity activities that would not otherwise be
permitted under law.
254
Despite Goldman’s and Morgan Stanley’s increasing reliance on the
251
See also 4/10/2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Wells Fargo & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 (2008),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_q22004.pdf .
252
For example, the Federal Reserve later granted J PMorgan similar complementary authority to engage in refining
and power plant activities. See 4/20/2009 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 - 002
(on refining authority); 6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580 (on power
plant activities).
253
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). It is important to note, however, that neither
Goldman nor Morgan Stanley has requested or received a complementary order; each relies instead on the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley grandfather and merchant banking authorities to conduct much of their physical commodity activities,
as explained in the following sections.
254
Goldman cited the clause in its original application to convert to a bank holding company as justification for
continuing all of its then existing commodity activities. See 9/21/2008 Goldman application to the Board of
Governors to the Federal Reserve System, FRB-PSI-303638, at 648 - 649.
58
grandfather clause to conduct otherwise impermissible commodity activities, in six years, the
Federal Reserve has taken no action to clarify its scope and proper interpretation.
As explained earlier, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause, which appears in
Section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act, provides that any company that becomes a
financial holding company after November 12, 1999, may “continue to engage in … activities
related to the trading, sale, or investment in commodities and underlying physical properties,”
provided that several conditions are met.
255
Those conditions include that:
• the company “lawfully was engaged, directly or indirectly, in any of such activities as
of September 30, 1997, in the United States”;
• the company’s non-authorized commodity assets do not exceed 5% of the company’s
total consolidated assets or any higher threshold set by the Federal Reserve; and
• the company does not permit a subsidiary that is engaged in grandfathered
commodities activities to cross-market its products and services to an affiliated
bank.
256
Differing Interpretations. The grandfather clause states that a firm can “continue” its
commodities activities provided that it was lawfully engaged in “any” of such activities in the
United States as of September 30, 1997. This statutory language has resulted in at least two very
different interpretations of the law, neither of which has been validated to date by the Federal
Reserve.
The first interpretation contends that the grandfather clause should be read narrowly,
reasoning that its sole purpose was to protect firms from having to discontinue or disinvest their
commodity activities or assets upon becoming a financial holding company. It views the
grandfather clause as preserving only those specific commodity activities that originated prior to
the trigger date in 1997, and that were still ongoing in the United States on the date that the firm
converted to a financial holding company. In contrast, the second interpretation contends that
the grandfather clause should be read expansively, so that if a financial holding company’s
subsidiaries, affiliates, or predecessor companies conducted any type of physical commodity
activities in the United States to any degree prior to the trigger date in 1997, then the financial
holding company is entitled to engage in all types of physical commodity activities at any time
into the future, subject only to the 5% cap imposed by the law.
257
The first reading essentially focuses on the word, “continue,” while the second
emphasizes the word, “any.” The Federal Reserve, which, again, has sole authority to interpret
the grandfather clause, has yet to issue any guidance on the correct interpretation.
255
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o).
256
Id.
257
See, e.g., 3/25/2009 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-706298, at 299-300;
Guynn Testimony, at 11.
59
Legislative History. Grandfather clauses, by their nature, typically safeguard existing
activities, rather than authorize new or expanded activities.
258
The legislative history indicates
that, in keeping with that approach, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause was presented
as a way to avoid forcing a firm to discontinue or divest itself of existing commodity activities or
assets in order to become a financial holding company. The Senate Banking Committee
Chairman at the time, Senator Phil Gramm, who offered the amendment that formed the basis for
Section 4(o), entitled it: “Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities
Activities.” The amendment also contained this short explanation of its purpose:
“The above amendment assures that a securities firm currently engaged in a broad range
of commodities activities as part of its traditional investment banking activities, is not
required to divest certain aspects of its business in order to participate in the new
authorities granted under the Financial Services Modernization Act. This provision
‘grandfathers’ existing commodities activities.”
259
The author’s explanation of his amendment indicates it was intended to prevent
divestitures of “existing” commodities activities. It makes no mention of any intent to authorize
new commodities activities or “any” and all commodities activities. Accordingly, the
explanation of the Gramm amendment suggests that the grandfather clause should be read as a
preservation of activities then-existing when a company converted to a financial holding
company status, and not as an authorization to conduct additional or new activities. This reading
is also consistent with the use of the word “continue” in the statutory text.
A second issue is what “existing commodities activities” were intended to be covered by
the clause. With respect to this question, the Committee Report on the bill stated:
“[A]ctivities relating to the trading, sale or investment in commodities and underlying
physical properties shall be construed broadly and shall include owning and operating
properties and facilities required to extract, process, store and transport commodities.”
260
This Committee Report language focuses on protecting from divestment any existing activity
that fits within a broad interpretation of the terms “commodities” and “underlying physical
properties.” Consistent with the explanation of the Gramm amendment, it does not express any
intention to authorize new commodities activities not already underway as of the trigger date and
the date of conversion to a financial holding company.
258
See, e.g., Pac. N.W. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
grandfather clause in a Washington State Department of Wildlife regulation banning import of exotic animals
applied to new sales and imports but allowed the continued possession of animals legally held within the state prior
to the passage of the regulation); see also “definition of ‘grandfather clause,’” Farlex Financial Dictionary
(10/8/2014),http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Grandfather+Clause (defining the term grandfather
clause as “[a] provision included in a new rule or regulation that exempts a business that is already conducting
business in the area addressed by the regulation from penalty or restriction”).
259
Committee Amendment No. 9, “Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities Activities,”
offered by Senator Phil Gramm during committee markup of the Financial Modernization Act, (3/4/1999),http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm.
260
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, H.R. Committee Report No. 104-127, pt. 1, at 97 (5/18/1995).
60
Goldman and Morgan Stanley. From 2000 until 2008, no financial holding company
relied on the grandfather clause to authorize its physical commodity activities.
261
That changed
when Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies during the
depths of the financial crisis in 2008.
In its September 2008 application to become a bank holding company, Goldman
explicitly cited the grandfather clause as authorizing it to continue to conduct its physical
commodity activities.
262
Since then, both Goldman and Morgan Stanley have asserted that the
grandfather clause provides legal authority for them to, not only continue physical commodity
activities underway in 2008, but also renew past activities and engage in entirely new
commodities activities.
In its 2008 application to become a bank holding company, Goldman’s legal counsel
wrote:
“The Section 4(o) exemption does not require that a company have been engaged prior
to September 30, 1997 in all the activities that it seeks to grandfather under Section 4(o)
at the time the company becomes a BHC [Bank Holding Company], rather it only
requires that the company have been engaged prior to that date in commodity-related
activities that were not permissible for a BHC in the United States on that date.”
263
Similarly, in a 2009 letter to the Federal Reserve, Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel wrote:
“[T]he plain language of Section 4(o) authorizes a qualifying financial holding company
to continue to engage in any activities related to trading, selling, and investing in any type
of commodities and related physical properties or facilities, if certain conditions are
satisfied. Section 4(o) does not merely authorize the retention of investments in
commodities or related physical properties or facilities made or held on a certain date.
Instead, it expressly extends to the continuation of any activities related to the trading,
selling, and investing in any type of commodities and related properties or facilities, if
certain conditions are satisfied.”
264
In internal documents, the Federal Reserve has taken note of the Goldman and Morgan
Stanley interpretations of the grandfather clause, observing that the firms have asserted an
expansive reading that allows them to engage in “trading, selling, and investing in any type of
261
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that, to
date, only two financial holding companies, Goldman and Morgan Stanley, have cited the grandfather clause as the
legal basis for engaging in otherwise impermissible physical commodity activities.
262
9/21/2008 “Confidential Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-303638 - 662, at
648 - 649, 661.
263
Id. at 649.
264
3/25/2009 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-706298 - 505, at 298 - 300
(emphasis in original).
61
commodity and its related physical properties or facilities, including mining, processing, storage,
transport, generation and refining, and any related activities.”
265
To better understand the issues related to the grandfather clause, from 2009 to 2011, a
Federal Reserve team of examiners undertook an in-depth review of the two financial holding
companies’ physical commodity activities, including comparing their activities prior to the 1997
trigger date and in 2010.
266
During that review, a detailed status report was prepared indicating
that both financial holding companies had greatly expanded their commodity activities and
incurred numerous new risks, while claiming their new activities were permitted under the
grandfather clause.
267
That internal Federal Reserve report’s findings included the following:
“The scope and size of commodity based industrial activities and trading in physical and
financial commodity markets at MS [Morgan Stanley] and GS [Goldman Sachs] has
increased substantially since 1997.
There are a large number of new commodities traded by these firms today which they did
not trade in 1997 … The new commodities traded today by MS number 37 and GS 35
(this is a representative sampling and represents a lower bound). Several of these
commodity related activities involve substantially new types of risks emanating from
newer deal and investment structures, expansion in new markets (e.g. uranium by GS,
emission credits), and geographic regions ….
Much of the new business conducted by MS and GS is in the form of industrial processes
involving commodities. The expansion of these firms into power generation, shipping,
storage, pipelines, mining and other industrial activities has created new and increased
potential liability due to the catastrophic and environmental risks associated with the
broader set of industrial activities.
Below are examples of industrial processes which are new or greatly expanded today
from 1997:
• Leasing of ships and ownership of shipping companies at MS and GS
• New ownership, and expanded leasing of oil storage facilities at MS
• Ownership of companies owning oil refineries at MS
• Ownership of coal mines and distribution at GS
• New ownership of power plants at GS and expanded ownership at MS
• Leasing of power generation at MS and GS
• Ownership of retail gasoline outlets at MS
• Ownership of royalty interests from gold mining at MS
• Ownership and development of solar panels at GS ….
265
2011 Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 461 [sealed exhibit].
266
See undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 [sealed exhibit].
267
Undated but likely 2010 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
between 1997 and Present,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454 [sealed exhibit].
62
These types of industrial activities are of greater concern as they are held over longer
holding periods than more purely financial activities and are more difficult to value and
risk manage due to the absence of market liquidity. …
More recently, these firms have expanded their investment activity in emerging markets
… [which] are more subject to liquidity risks and price shocks ….
The expansion of these firms into power generation, shipping, storage, pipelines, mining
and other industrial activities has created new and increased potential liability for firms
with access to the federal safety net supporting the banking system for catastrophic event
risk arising from industrial control failures – including environmental liability in
particular – of a type that is difficult for bank supervisors to dimension.
The severity of this risk is in proportion to the potential damage and associated liability
of industrial accidents in handling different commodities. Some, like uranium, may be
more severe than others. …
Furthermore, the scale of bank involvement in industrial commodity processes is not
widely understood – even within the bank regulatory community. As a result, it is
possible that losses within the banking sector arising from these activities will be
surprising and further lead to questions regarding the integration of this industry within
banking.
Lastly, there appears to be differences between banks and industrial energy firms in
income recognition practices, capitalization methods and risk management practices. It is
possible that bank incentives to expand in this industry are affected by their use of mark-
to-market valuation for activities that are otherwise accounted for as accrual income at
energy firms – and rates of capitalization for these activities that are much less than those
used by energy firms. …
The commodities businesses at MS and GS are material drivers of firm profitability,
capitalizing on economics in a wide breadth of commodity markets and activities. Risk
exposures run the gamut from exchange traded futures to leases on power plants and oil
storage facilities to equity investments in coal mines and oil shipping operations.”
268
The report also included the following chart comparing the banks’ commodity activities
in 1997 versus 2010.
269
268
Id. at 428 - 430.
269
Id. at 433.
63
The chart below is a comparison of the range of activities from 1997 to 2010, related to financial contract for the physical settlement and delivery of various
commodity products.
Chart 1
Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley
Sept 97 Dec 10 Sept 97 Dec 10
Agricultural Products Agricultural Products
Barley
Cattle
Cocoa Cocoa Cocoa
Coffee Coffee
Corn Corn Corn
Cotton Cotton
European Rapseed European Rapseed
Foreign Products – Pulp
Hogs Hogs
Rice
Rubber
Soybean Soybean Meal
Soybean Meal Soybean Oil
Soybean Oil Soybeans
Sugar Sugar
Wheat Wheat
Metals Metals
Aluminum Aluminum Aluminum
Cooper Cooper
Bank Eligible* Gold Bank Eligible*** Gold
Lead Lead Lead
Nickel Nickel Nickel
Bank Eligible* Palladium Bank Eligible*** Palladium
Bank Eligible* Platinum Bank Eligible*** Platinum
Rhodium Unknown Rhodium Unknown
Bank Eligible* Silver Bank Eligible*** Silver
Steel Steel
Tin Tin
Zinc Zinc Zinc
“Base Metals”****
Emissions/Renewable Emissions/Renewable
Blue Source Emission Credits Carbon Credits
Ercot Renewable Certificate CER (Certified Emission Reductions)
EU Scheme Emission Certificates ERU (Emission Reduction Units)
Kyoto Emission Credit EUA (European Union Allowances)
PJM Renewable Energy Cert LEC (Levy Exemption Certificates)
Rgnl Greenhouse Gas Init Emissns Nox (Nitrogen Oxide)
VER (Voluntary Emission Reductions) ROCS (Renewable Obligation Cert)
Sox (Sulfer Dioxide)
VER (Voluntary Emission Reductions)
Energies Energies
Butane Bunker Fuel
Coal Coal Coal
Condensate Condensate Crude Oil Crude Oil
Crude Oil Crude Oil Diesel Diesel
Diesel Electricity Electricity
Electricity** Electricity Ethanol
Freight Freight Freight
Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Fuel Oil
Gasoil Gasoil Heating Oil Heating Oil
Heating Oil Heating Oil Jet Fuel Jet Fuel
Jet Fuel Jet Fuel LNG
LNG MTBE
Naptha Naptha Naphtha
Natural Gas Natural Gas Natural Gas Natural Gas
Palm Oil Natural Gas Liquids
Propane RBOB
Temperature Residual Fuel
Unleaded Gasoline Unleaded Gasoline Unleaded Gasoline Unleaded Gasoline
Uranium
Total: 18 Total: 52 Total: 11 Total: 48
Difference: 35 Difference: 37
* The status of trading in these commodities as of 1997 was not reported by the firm, however they
are bank eligible commodities.
** Pursuant to the PBSA with Constellation Energy.
*** The status of trading in these commodities as of 1997 was not reported by the firm,
however they are bank eligible commodities.
**** The firm’s submission only stated “base metals.”
SOURCE: Chart Prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428, at 433.
64
Goldman has cited the grandfather clause as its authority to own and trade uranium
270
and
own coal mines,
271
two activities that it initiated for the first time after converting to a bank
holding company. Similarly, Morgan Stanley has cited the grandfather clause as authority for its
ownership of a global network of oil and natural gas storage facilities and pipelines; leasing over
100 oil tankers, LNG transport barges, and other ships; and recent plans to construct and operate
compressed natural gas facilities in Texas and Georgia.
272
Both cite the grandfather clause as
legal authority for engaging in physical commodity activities which are significantly broader
than otherwise permitted for financial holding companies.
273
Federal Reserve analyses have noted that the banks’ expansive interpretation of the
grandfather clause has not only enabled them to conduct new, high risk physical commodity
activities not otherwise permitted by law,
274
but also created a competitive disparity between
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, one the one hand, and financial holding companies on the
other hand that cannot invoke the grandfather clause.
275
In a 2012 internal analysis, the Federal
Reserve staff wrote:
“[Goldman] continues to engage in commodities-related activities and hold commodities-
related investments that are generally not permissible under section 4 of the BHC [Bank
Holding Company] Act, such as owning and managing power plants and owning storage
facilities. GS has requested that the Board determine certain of these activities and
270
See 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 201043, at 1000 (listing Nufcor as an asset acquired under
Section 4(o)).
271
See Report of Changes in Organizational Structure, FR-Y-10, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (4/14/2010),
GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303 (indicating its coal mine investment was “permissible under [Bank Holding
Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant Banking regulations”); 5/26/2011 Response
from Goldman Sachs to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200600, at 602. But see 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-
PSI-200984 - 201043, at 1000 (indicating CNR, owner of one coal mine, as a merchant banking investment, rather
than grandfathered asset).
272
See, e.g., 9/18/2012 “Morgan Stanley request for a third extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking
activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-
PSI-304905, at 910 (Morgan Stanley “continues to engage in commodities-related activities and hold commodities-
related investments that are generally not permissible under section 4 of the BHC Act, such as owning and managing
power plants and owning storage facilities. MS has requested that the Board determine certain of these activities
and investments are permissible under section 4(o)’s permanent grandfather authority. This request remains under
consideration by the Legal Division.”)[footnote omitted][sealed exhibit]; 9/19/2011 “Morgan Stanley request for a
second extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,”
internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, at 7, FRB-PSI-304896 [sealed exhibit]; 9/12/2014 letter
from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-11-000001 - 008, at 004, 006.
273
See, e.g., 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 459 (stating that the
complementary orders given to the banks would not have allowed them to “own, operate, or invest in facilities for
the extraction, transportation, storage, or distribution” of commodities, nor could a financial holding company
“process, refine, or otherwise alter” commodities) [sealed exhibit].
274
See undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 [sealed exhibit].
275
See 6/21/2011 “Section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act - Commodity-related Activities of Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200936, at 940 [sealed exhibit].
65
investments are permissible under section 4(o)’s permanent grandfather authority. This
request remains under consideration by the Legal Division.”
276
At the time the Federal Reserve wrote that analysis, questions about the proper scope of the
grandfather clause with respect to Goldman and Morgan Stanley had already been pending for
four years, without resolution.
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 gives the Federal Reserve general authority to
interpret and administer the Act, including Sec. 4(o). In particular, Section 5(b) of the Banking
Holding Company Act grants the Federal Reserve broad authority to issue orders and regulations
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act and prevent evasions of it.
277
That broad grant of
authority provides ample legal foundation for the Federal Reserve to issue regulations or orders
delineating the scope of the grandfather clause, including narrowing its interpretation to support
the purposes of Act, which have been described as seeking to “limit the comingling of banking
and commerce,” and “prevent situations where risk-taking by nonbanking affiliates erodes the
stability of the bank’s core financial activities.”
278
Financial holding companies that disagreed
with the Federal Reserve’s interpretation would have an opportunity to challenge it in court
under the Chevron standard requiring deference to administrative determinations.
279
Despite the two banks’ growing investment in otherwise impermissible commodity
activities and the growing disparity between them and other banks from 2008 to 2014, the
Federal Reserve has repeatedly indicated that the permissibility of their activities under the
grandfather clause remains an open and pending issue, while also permitting both financial
institutions to continue and even expand the commodity activities in question.
280
By failing to
276
9/19/2012 “Goldman Sachs’ request for a third extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking activities
pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-
304868 - 875, at 872 [footnote omitted][sealed exhibit]. See also 9/20/2011 “Goldman Sachs’ request for a second
extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal
memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-304860 - 867, at 866 [sealed exhibit]; 7/25/2012
“Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee: Global Commodities,” (hereinafter “2012
Firmwide Presentation”), prepared by Goldman Commodities group, FRB-PSI-200984, at 1000 (listing Cogentrix
and Nufcor as assets acquired under Section 4(o)).
277
Section 5(b) states: “The Board is authorized to issue such regulations and orders … as may be necessary to
enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this Act and prevent evasions thereof.” Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, codified at 12 U.S. Code § 1844.
278
“A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (7/2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [footnotes omitted].
279
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 - 843 (1984) (creating a
two-part analysis for reviewing an agency interpretation of a statue: “First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. …
If, however, the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction of the statute. … Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the issue for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
280
See, e.g., 9/19/2012 “Goldman Sachs’ request for a third extension of time to divest or conform nonbanking
activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, at 5,
FRB-PSI-304868 [sealed exhibit]; 9/18/2012 “Morgan Stanley request for a third extension of time to divest or
66
provide a timely interpretation delineating how the grandfather clause should be applied, the
Federal Reserve effectively enabled both bank holding companies to deepen their involvement in
otherwise unallowable physical commodity activities for more than six years.
In addition, unlike the actions it took to implement the Gramm-Leach-Bliley provision on
complementary authority, the Federal Reserve has failed to impose any regulatory safety and
soundness-based limitations on the volume of activities that may be conducted under the
grandfathering clause.
281
Currently, the only limit on the amount of grandfathered activities is
the statutory requirement that they not exceed 5% of the financial holding company’s “total
consolidated assets.”
282
Given the size of Goldman and Morgan Stanley’s assets, that limit is set
so high as to not function as a restriction at all. In contrast, activities authorized under the
complementary authority may not exceed 5% of the firm’s Tier 1 capital, while the Volcker Rule
limits investments to not more than 3% of a firm’s Tier 1 capital, restrictions which result in
much lower dollar limits on the activities. Under the Federal Reserve’s current practice, a
financial holding company could engage in physical commodity activities under the grandfather
clause that could be orders of magnitude larger than those authorized under the complementary
authority and could even exceed its total Tier 1 capital.
In J anuary 2014, the Federal Reserve solicited public comment on whether it should issue
a rulemaking to impose “additional prudential requirements” on financial holding companies to
ensure commodity activities conducted under the grandfather clause “do not pose undue risks” to
the holding company, an insured bank, or U.S. financial stability.
283
The Federal Reserve asked,
in particular, for suggestions on appropriate “safety and soundness, capital, liquidity, reporting,
or disclosure requirements” for grandfathered activities.
284
Despite passage of nearly a year,
however, the Federal Reserve has taken no further action on this rulemaking effort to curb risks
associated with grandfathered commodity activities not otherwise permitted by law.
(4) Allowing Expansive Interpretations of Merchant Banking
A fourth legal basis for financial holding companies engaging in physical commodity
activities involves the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s merchant banking authority. As with the
grandfather authority, the Federal Reserve has allowed financial holding companies to engage in
an increasing array of commodity-related merchant banking investments.
As explained earlier, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act permitted financial holding companies
to purchase up to a 100% ownership interest in non-financial commercial enterprises for a
limited period of time, subject to certain limitations.
285
In 2001, the Federal Reserve and
conform nonbanking activities pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act,” internal memorandum prepared by the
Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-304905, at 910 [sealed exhibit].
281
For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits, below.
282
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(2).
283
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329, 3336 and Question 23, (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
284
Id.
285
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Section 4(k)(4)(H); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H). See also “Merchant Banking: Mixing
Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” Congressional Research Service, No. RS21134
(10/22/2004), at 1 (“Before [the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act], banking companies could use equity-investing authority
67
Treasury adopted the “Merchant Banking Rule” to spell out some of the parameters of this
authority.
286
To limit the risks associated with merchant banking investments, the Federal
Reserve initially imposed a size limit on those investments, generally prohibiting merchant
banking assets from exceeding 30% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital,
287
but that
size limit was removed in 2002.
288
Qualifying Investments. Neither the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act nor the Merchant
Banking Rule explicitly defines the term “merchant banking.”
289
Instead, both focus on
“qualifying investments.” To qualify as a merchant banking investment under the law and the
Merchant Banking Rule, an investment must meet a number of requirements, including the
following:
• the investment must not be made or held, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. depository
institution;
290
• the investment must be “part of a bona fide … merchant or investment banking
activity,” including investments made for the “purpose of appreciation and ultimate
resale”;
291
• the financial holding company must use a securities affiliate or an insurance affiliate
with a registered investment adviser affiliate to make the investment;
292
• the investment must be held on a temporary basis, “only for a period of time to enable
the sale or disposition thereof on a reasonable basis”
293
and generally for no longer
than ten years;
294
and
only through Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) and other limited powers. Bank holding companies
could own [only] noncontrolling interests in nonfinancial companies: not more than 5% to 10% of voting securities.
[The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] allows [financial holding companies] into the high-risk, high-reward private equity
market.”).
286
See Merchant Banking Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466 (1/31/2001), codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 225, Subpart J , 225.170
et seq.
287
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds); “Capital; Leverage and
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy, Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity
Investments,” 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (1/25/2002) (adopting a final rule that ended the size limit while imposing specific
capital requirements for merchant banking investments).
288
See 67 Federal Register 3786 (2002). The Federal Reserve terminated the size limit after imposing specific
capital requirements for merchant banking investments.
289
The Merchant Banking Rule simply stated that merchant banking activities were “those not otherwise
authorized” under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 C.F.R. § 225.170. See also “Merchant
Banking: Mixing Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” Congressional Research Service,
No. RS21134 (10/22/2004), at 1 (“Merchant banking mixes banking with commerce. The term comes from
European practices, in which bankers financed foreign trade and other high risk ventures undertaken by merchants
such as ship owners and importers for a share of the profits, rather than receiving interest returns from lending.
Taking a stake in a venture made it merchant banking.”)(emphasis in original).
290
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(i); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(d).
291
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(b).
292
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f). A bank can also use a private equity fund that meets
certain requirements to make the merchant banking investment. 12 C.F.R. § 225.173.
293
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(a).
294
12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(1).
68
• the financial holding company generally must not “routinely manage or operate” the
company in which it has made the investment.
295
Financial holding companies can make qualifying investments as the principal or on
behalf of clients.
296
And, in contrast to the complementary powers provision, financial holding
companies generally do not have to obtain prior approval by the Federal Reserve before making
a merchant banking investment.
297
Investment Gains Versus Operational Revenues. The Merchant Banking Rule does
not expressly limit the scope of investments that meet the above criteria. The preamble to the
Rule took the position, however, that the merchant banking authority was not intended to mix
banking and commerce, but to allow financial holding companies to make purely financial
investments. It states that, to “preserv[e] the financial nature” of the merchant banking
investment and “maintai[n] the separation of banking and commerce,” the principal purpose of
the investment must be to make a profit for the financial holding company from the resale or
disposition of its ownership stake and not from the operational revenues derived from running
the nonfinancial business.
298
According to the Congressional Research Service, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
effectively “allows [financial holding companies] into the high-risk, high-reward private equity
market.”
299
Another expert has described the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority
as intended to enable banks to compete with securities firms and venture capital funds in
investing in start-up companies.
300
Routine Management. One key set of issues affecting merchant banking activities
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act involves the extent to which a financial holding company
may exercise control over a business acquired as a merchant banking investment. Those
acquired businesses are referred to in the Merchant Banking Rule as “portfolio companies,” since
they reside within the investment portfolio of the financial holding company.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act states that a financial holding company may not “routinely
manage or operate” a portfolio company. Nevertheless, financial holding companies have long
sought to exercise varied degrees of control over their portfolio companies. Examples include
requiring the portfolio company to first seek the financial holding company’s approval before
295
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(a) and (b)(e).
296
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a).
297
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174(a). However, prior approval may be needed if the proposed investment would cause the
aggregate carrying value of all of its merchant banking investments to exceed the 5% cap.
298
Merchant Banking Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8469 (1/31/2001).
299
“Merchant Banking: Mixing Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” Congressional
Research Service, No. RS21134 (10/22/2004), at 1.
300
See, e.g., Omarova Testimony, at 3; The Merchants of Wall Street, at 281.
69
issuing securities, declaring dividends, or taking other actions deemed “outside the ordinary
course of business.”
301
The extent of control that can be appropriately exercised by a financial holding company
over a portfolio company remains unclear. Generally speaking, from 1999 to 2009, the Federal
Reserve permitted financial holding companies to place a significant number of controls over a
portfolio company related to the governance and funding of the company, without running afoul
of the limitation that the financial holding company may not “routinely manage or operate” that
company.
302
More recently, as explained below, the Federal Reserve has begun to take a more
restrictive approach.
Currently, the extent of control that a financial holding company may appropriately
exercise over a portfolio company is not spelled out in a rule, but is instead set forth largely in a
2001 letter from the Federal Reserve’s then-General Counsel to Credit Suisse First Boston.
303
Some of guidance provided in that letter relates to the overall structure and funding of the
portfolio company. For example, the letter indicated that a bank engaged in merchant banking
may restrict the ability of a portfolio company to issue debt or equity securities,
304
redeem
securities,
305
or amend the terms of securities.
306
The letter also indicated the bank could require
the portfolio company to obtain prior approval by the financial holding company before
declaring dividends “outside the ordinary course of business.”
307
Other types of control delve
more deeply into the portfolio company’s business operations. For example, the Federal Reserve
letter indicated that a bank may place restrictions on a portfolio company’s ability to hire or fire
executives,
308
“[e]nte[r] into a contractual arrangement (including a property lease or consulting
agreement) that imposes significant financial obligations on the portfolio company,”
309
sell
significant assets,
310
adopt or modify a budget for compensation,
311
“[c]reate, incur, assume,
guarantee, refinance or prepay any indebtedness” outside the ordinary course of business,
312
or
“[m]ake, or commit to make, any capital expenditure” outside the ordinary course of business.
313
By allowing financial holding companies engaged in merchant banking to impose those
types of restrictions on their portfolio companies, the Federal Reserve signaled that the financial
holding companies could exercise significant control over their portfolio companies, so long as
the controls related to activities “outside of the ordinary course of business.” More recently, the
301
See, e.g., 12/21/2001 letter from Federal Reserve to Credit Suisse First Boston, FRB-PSI-301593 - 601, at 599
[sealed exhibit] (outlining several types of covenants imposed by a financial holding company that restrict the
financing or operations of a portfolio company).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 596.
305
Id.
306
Id. at 597.
307
Id. at 595.
308
Id. at 598.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
12/21/2001 letter from Federal Reserve to Credit Suisse First Boston, FRB-PSI-301593 - 601, at 597 [sealed
exhibit].
313
Id.
70
Federal Reserve has begun to reject financial holding company reliance on merchant banking
authority to justify certain commodity activities when confronted by evidence that the activities
were conducted by portfolio companies whose day-to-day operations were subject to the control
of the financial holding company.
One example involves J PMorgan which, as part of a larger acquisition in 2010, acquired
ownership of Henry Bath & Sons, a company that owns a global network of metals warehouses.
J PMorgan applied to operate the business as a complementary activity.
314
The Federal Reserve
denied the application.
315
J PMorgan then sought to hold the asset under its merchant banking
authority.
316
In 2013, the Federal Reserve informed the bank that its merchant banking authority
did not cover the Henry Bath acquisition, and that the bank would have to divest the holding,
317
which J PMorgan has since done.
318
Although it did not provide a written explanation of its
reasoning for rejecting J PMorgan’s reliance on its merchant banking authority, the Federal
Reserve told the Subcommittee
319
that it had based its decision on two factors: (1) J PMorgan’s
active integration of the warehouse services into its other commodity activities and routine
advertisement of the warehouse services to its clients; and (2) J PMorgan’s dominant use of the
warehouses, citing information provided by J PMorgan that about 75% of the commodities stored
in the Henry Bath warehouses belonged to J PMorgan or a J PMorgan client.
320
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that in addition to those reasons, the Federal Reserve had communicated its view
that the warehouses were “not a passive investment” being held by J PMorgan.
321
In another instance, the Federal Reserve has pressed J PMorgan to sell three power plants
in which it owns 100% of the shares and is currently holding under its merchant banking
authority.
322
J PMorgan originally acquired the power plants as part of larger acquisitions
related to Bear Stearns in 2008 and RBS Sempra in 2010.
323
J PMorgan first approached the
Federal Reserve about holding all three power plants under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
314
See 6/8/2011 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co.
Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” (hereinafter “2011 Notice to the
Board”) FRB-PSI-300977 - 1052, at 1001 (J PMorgan application to hold Henry Bath metals storage facility as
complementary activity).
315
See 10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 505 [sealed exhibit];
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014)(stating that the Federal Reserve rejected the complementary
request related to Henry Bath during a telephone call and never provided a written explanation).
316
See undated “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry Bath,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve,
FRB-PSI-301532 - 534; Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
317
2012 Summary Report, at 505; undated but likely 2013 “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 300 [sealed exhibits].
318
J PMorgan sold Henry Bath and its warehouses to the Mercuria Group, a commodities and energy company based
in Switzerland in 2014. Subcommittee briefing by Mercuria (9/12/2014).
319
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
320
See 2011 Notice to the Board, FRB-PSI-300977 - 1052, at 1001.
321
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
322
For more information about the power plants, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with electricity, below.
323
See 5/26/2011 “Summary of outstanding legal/commodities issues as of March 2011,” prepared by J P Morgan,
FRB-PSI-304601 - 604, at 602. For more information about these power plants, see discussion of J PMorgan’s
involvement with electricity, below.
71
complementary authority.
324
After the Federal Reserve staff indicated that complementary
authority did not include direct ownership of power plants, the bank invoked its merchant
banking authority to continue its ownership stake in the power plants.
325
While the Federal
Reserve continued to press the bank to sell the power plants, it did not explicitly disallow
J PMorgan’s reliance on its merchant banking authority to own them. As of October 2014,
J PMorgan was attempting to sell all three.
326
These and other examples of commodity-related merchant banking activities discussed
below indicate that financial holding companies still do not have clear guidance on when it is
appropriate to rely on merchant banking authority to own commodity-related businesses, nor are
they clear about what controls may be asserted over their portfolio companies.
Still another issue raised in an internal Federal Reserve report is “the extent to which
banks can engage in commercial/physical commodity activities breaches the separation of
banking and commerce and places industrial activities within the federal safety net.”
327
In other
words, merchant banking losses incurred by banks and their holding companies are effectively
being subsidized by the government and could end up being subsidized by taxpayers through
Federal Reserve loans, FDIC insurance, or other types of federally-financed assistance. Despite
identifying this problem, it is unclear what steps the Federal Reserve has taken to address it.
Growth in Merchant Banking Activities. Since 2001, under the auspices of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the volume and nature of “merchant banking” activities at financial
holding companies, including physical commodity activities, have continued to expand.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), from 2000 to 2013, financial
holding companies have increased their merchant banking holdings from $9.5 billion to $46.2
billion, a fivefold increase.
328
The following charts, prepared with data gathered by CRS at the
Subcommittee’s request, show a steady growth in merchant banking activities over the last ten
years, with twice as many foreign banks as domestic banks participating in merchant banking
activity.
329
324
See 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602
[sealed exhibit].
325
Id. Three months later, energy traders at J PMorgan initiated a scheme to manipulate energy prices in California
and the Midwest, using some of the power plants acquired from Bear Stearns. The bank ultimately paid $410
million to settle charges by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that it had gained $125 million in
unjust profits at the expense of businesses and families who used power in those regions. 7/30/2013 FERC press
release, “J P Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VFlUkvnF9u0.
326
For more information about the current status of these power plants, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement
with electricity, below.
327
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 482.
328
12/20/2013 “Merchant Banking Assets of Financial Holding Companies,” memorandum by CRS, at 5, Tables 1
and 2 (using data provided by the Federal Reserve).
329
Id.
72
Number and Dollar Value of Merchant Banking Assets
of Financial Holding Companies, 2000-2013
Number of Financial Holding Companies
Domestic Foreign
Year Assets Reported
( in U.S. billions)
2000 11 9 $9.5
2001 19 10 $8.3
2002 12 14 $9.1
2003 14 15 $10.7
2004 15 18 $12.0
2005 13 20 $15.50
2006 14 23 $19.90
2007 13 24 $27.10
2008 10 27 $22.60
2009 11 25 $34.00
2010 10 25 $54.00
2011 10 24 $48.50
2012 12 23 $49.40
2013 10 23 $46.20
Source: Congressional Research Service
Because the Federal Reserve does not require financial holding companies to report with
specificity on their merchant banking activities, neither the Federal Reserve nor CRS was able to
indicate what portion of the financial holding companies’ growing merchant banking assets was
tied to commodities versus other types of businesses. It is also unclear the extent to which the
reported data includes all merchant banking activities undertaken by financial holding
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
i
n
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.
S
.
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
Source: Congressional Research Service
Merchant Bank Holdings From 2000-2013
Domestic FHCs
Foreign FHCs
73
companies. When the Subcommittee reviewed the annual reports that the Federal Reserve
requires financial holding companies to file on their merchant banking activities, the reports
contained only aggregate data on such matters as the acquisition costs, unrealized gains, carrying
values, and publicly quoted values of the merchant banking investments, but no list of individual
projects.
330
The lack of specific information meant the Subcommittee could not determine
whether the data included all of an institution’s commodities-related merchant banking activities.
The lack of data also makes it difficult for regulators or others to monitor the extent to which
financial holding companies are accurately disclosing their merchant banking investments and
complying with the requirements for those activities.
Case Studies. Each of the banks examined by the Subcommittee relied on their
merchant banking authority to conduct at least some commodity activities that might otherwise
be unallowable under the law. Goldman Sachs, for example, cited merchant banking authority as
the legal basis for its ownership of Metro International’s global network of warehouses, as well
as its acquisition of companies that own multiple coal mines and related infrastructure in
Colombia.
331
As explained above, J PMorgan cited merchant banking authority for its ownership
of three power plants and attempted to use that authority for the Henry Bath network of
warehouses.
332
Morgan Stanley cited reliance on merchant banking authority for its acquisition
of Southern Star, a natural gas pipeline company, discussed further below.
333
Each of the banks conducted their commodity-related merchant banking activities both
within and outside of their commodities divisions. Morgan Stanley, for example, engaged in
merchant banking investments involving natural gas, not only through its commodities division,
but also through the Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partnership and Morgan Stanley Global
Private Equity Partnership, both of which operate through its Investment Division.
334
Goldman
made merchant banking investments through its commodities group as well as a “Merchant
Banking Division” that was completely outside of the commodities group.
335
Similarly,
J PMorgan made merchant banking investments through a “Global Real Assets” section of its
330
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies – FR
Y-12,” submitted to the Federal Reserve by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-800005 - 008; Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-800009 -
012; and Goldman, FRB-PSI-800013 - 016.
331
See 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1000 (listing Metro and CNR as merchant banking
investments). For more information about these merchant banking activities, see below. Goldman has also asserted
that its investment in Colombian mines was authorized pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “grandfather”
authority. See Report of Changes in Organizational Structure, FR-Y-10, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (4/14/2010),
GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303 (indicating its coal mine investment was “permissible under [Bank Holding
Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant Banking regulations”).
332
See 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477-510, at 505; 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal
Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed exhibit].
333
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014); Morgan Stanley Investment Management portfolio list,
Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html (including Triana
Energy, a natural gas exploration and production company; Trinity, a carbon dioxide pipeline company; and Sterling
Energy, a natural gas gathering, processing and marketing company).
334
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014); discussion of Morgan Stanley’s merchant banking
activities in that financial holding company’s overview, below.
335
See, e.g., undated organizational chart prepared by Goldman for the Subcommittee, PSI-Goldman-10-000002.
74
Asset Management business segment.
336
The evidence indicated that commodities-related
merchant banking investments were being made by multiple, unrelated units throughout each
financial holding company.
Ongoing merchant banking issues at the financial holding companies include whether
their physical commodity activities qualify as merchant banking investments or improperly mix
banking with commerce; and ensuring that financial holding companies’ merchant banking
activities do not undermine the safety and soundness of the firms.
(5) Narrowly Enforcing Prudential Limits
Still another key regulatory issue has to do with enforcing the statutory, regulatory, and
company-specific prudential limits created to restrict the overall size of a bank’s physical
commodity activities and reduce the related risks. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, its
implementing regulations, and the grants of complementary authority issued by the Federal
Reserve all contain prudential limits on the volume of a holding company’s physical commodity
activities. However, those prudential limits, which generally seek to place a cap on the
investments as a percentage of the firm’s assets or capital, have implementation and enforcement
issues that have not been resolved.
The only statutory limit is in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s grandfather clause which
provides that the dollar value of the physical commodity activities engaged in by the financial
holding company’s subsidiaries under the clause cannot exceed 5% of the subsidiaries’
“aggregate consolidated assets” or 5% of the financial holding company parent’s “total
consolidated assets,” unless the Federal Reserve increases the cap.
337
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not place any statutory limit on activities that may be
conducted under its complementary authority. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve has
conditioned its approval of complementary activities on a commitment by the relevant financial
holding company that the dollar value of its physical commodity holdings will not exceed 5% of
the financial holding company’s consolidated Tier I capital.
338
The Federal Reserve also initially
restricted merchant banking investments to generally no more than 30% of financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, but removed that cap in 2002.
339
The two 5% limits on grandfathered and complementary activities apply to different
attributes (assets versus capital) and are applied and enforced separately.
340
Both limits raise
336
See, e.g., 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at
003 - 004.
337
See Section 103(a) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, P.L. 106-102, codified at 12 U.S.C. §1811.
338
See, e.g., 11/18/2005 “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity,”
prepared by Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20051118/attachment.pdf.
339
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds);10/22/2004 “Merchant
Banking: Mixing Banking and Commerce Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,” prepared by the Congressional
Research Service, at 4; 67 Federal Register 3786 (2002). The Federal Reserve terminated the size limit after
imposing specific capital requirements for merchant banking investments.
340
Federal Reserve briefing of the Subcommittee (12/13/2013).
75
multiple enforcement concerns. One issue is whether financial holding companies are excluding
major categories of assets.
341
For example, a report prepared by the Federal Reserve staff found
that financial holding companies included the dollar value of leases on power plants when
calculating covered assets for purposes of the 5% Tier I capital cap, but excluded leases on
infrastructure, such as oil and gas storage facilities.
342
Another tactic used by one financial
holding company was to exclude the physical commodities held by its bank when calculating the
financial holding company’s physical commodity assets subject to the Federal Reserve’s 5%
complementary limit.
343
A second concern involves how the financial holding companies are valuing their
physical commodity assets for purposes of calculating the limits. During its recent review of
bank involvement with physical commodities, the Federal Reserve uncovered and disallowed
several valuation practices, such as a dubious netting of income from tolling agreements.
344
Still another issue is whether, given the enormous size of the financial holding companies
involved with physical commodities, the 5% limits provide sufficient protection from financial
risk for both the firms and the commodities markets.
345
As of March 2014, the six largest bank
holding companies reported aggregated assets of nearly $10 trillion.
346
The enormous value of
their assets means that even a rigorous 5% Tier 1 capital limit – as opposed to the current porous
one – would permit multi-billion-dollar physical commodity activities which, in the event of
losses, could impact both the financial institutions and the markets. In addition, those limits fail
to prevent massive inflows of capital into the relatively small commodities markets, under the
control of a relatively small number of financial holding companies, raising concerns about
undue economic concentration and market manipulation.
347
Since enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, a handful of financial holding
companies have significantly expanded their involvement with physical commodities. They
have done so despite prudential limits designed to constrain that growth and the attendant risks.
Loopholes and inappropriate interpretations have rendered the limits largely ineffective and in
need of clarification and renewal.
B. Reviewing Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities, 2009-2013
After the financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve, as well as other U.S. bank
regulators, undertook new efforts to identify hidden or under-appreciated risks in the U.S.
banking system. As part of that effort, the Federal Reserve identified financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities as creating risks requiring a special review. The
341
See discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
342
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506.
343
Id. For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
344
For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
345
See, e.g., Rosner Testimony, at 6.
346
See “Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion,” (as of 6/30/2014), Federal Reserve System,
National Information Center,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (reflecting the aggregated
assets of the six largest U.S. banks at $9.8 trillion).
347
In evaluating requests for complementary authority, the Federal Reserve is statutorily required to consider “undue
concentration of resources.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A).
76
resulting special review, which spanned three years, not only surveyed the financial holding
companies’ physical commodity activities, but also identified numerous risks associated with
those activities, including operational risks, inadequate risk management, insufficient capital, and
ineffective regulatory safeguards. It offered multiple recommendations to reduce financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities and ameliorate the associated risks.
(1) Initiating the Special Physical Commodities Review
After the 2008 financial crisis disclosed vulnerabilities in federal oversight of the largest
banks, the Federal Reserve revamped its risk governance system. In 2009, the Federal Reserve
replaced its Large Financial Institutions section with the Large Institution Supervision
Coordinating Committee (LISCC), headed by senior Federal Reserve personnel.
348
The Inspector General for the Federal Reserve System has explained that LISCC was
created to:
“provide strategic and policy direction for supervisory activities across the Federal
Reserve System, improve the consistency and quality of supervision, incorporate
systemic risk considerations, and monitor the execution of the resulting supervisory
program.”
349
In addition to supervisory personnel, LISCC was staffed with economists, quantitative analysts,
payment system specialists, and other experts to enable it to take a multidisciplinary approach to
identifying and analyzing risks affecting systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and
the global banking system.
350
In 2009, LISCC established an Operating Committee composed of senior regulatory
officials to develop prudential standards for and oversee the largest SIFIs within its jurisdiction,
generally those whose assets exceeded $50 billion.
351
To carry out its oversight obligations, the
Operating Committee established several subgroups, including a Risk Secretariat charged with
identifying key risks affecting the SIFIs, setting priorities for investigating those risks, and
providing the resources needed to conduct the risk investigations.
352
In 2009, after weighing investigative priorities and its limited resources, the Risk
Secretariat identified bank involvement with physical commodities as a major emerging risk and
348
5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General letter, at 3,http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf.
349
Id. at 4.
350
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
351
5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General letter, at 3,http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf. In 2012, those
SIFIs included eight domestic and four foreign-owned firms, the majority of which were financial holding
companies of major banks. Id.
352
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).. Other subgroups created by the Operating
Committee include the Capital Performance Secretariat, the Data Team, Products and Processes, the Tactical Action
Group, and Vetting. 5/23/2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General letter, at 4,http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/BOG_enhanced_prudential_standards_progress_May2012.pdf.
77
approved a special review of those activities.
353
Dan Sullivan, then Assistant Vice President and
Department Head of Market Risk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY),
submitted the proposal for a comprehensive review of physical commodity activities, explained
why it should be approved on a priority basis, and agreed to “sponsor” the investigative effort, if
approved.
354
In early 2010, the Risk Secretariat agreed to provide sufficient resources for an in-depth,
multi-firm, multi-year review of the physical commodity activities at financial holding
companies. The special review was designed to accomplish the following objectives:
• “Deepen our understanding of the scope of commodity trading at SIFIs and assess the
inherent risks, the quality of risk reporting and controls, and capital methodologies
with an emphasis on the physical industrial commodity activities. Lead efforts to
develop a complete assessment of risk in commodity related industrial activities
across risk disciplines.
• Assess the broader implications of SIFIs in the commodity markets along with non-
financial traditional firms and the impact on markets.
• Provide product knowledge expertise and analysis in support for NY Banking
Applications and the Legal divisions in NY and the Board on physical commodity
applications (under complementary authority).”
355
(2) Conducting the Special Review
After approving the special review, LISCC’s Risk Secretariat directed formation of a
Commodities Team to perform the work. To gather and analyze information, the Commodities
Team drew from past and ongoing commodities examinations, and conducted its own
investigative work. In October 2012, the team concluded the special review with a private
presentation to Federal Reserve supervisors summarizing its overall findings and
recommendations.
356
The Commodities Team then ceased its active investigation but continued
in existence for nearly a year, assisting Federal Reserve personnel with a variety of physical
commodity issues until dissolving in 2013.
357
Creating the Commodities Team. In the first quarter of 2010, the Risk Secretariat
directed formation of the Commodities Team to conduct the special review.
358
To ensure that
the team had the necessary expertise in physical commodities, risk management, capital
353
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). The Risk Secretariat has also approved other
horizontal, multi-firm investigations including those related to capital stress testing and capital adequacy. See, e.g.,
“Implementing Wall Street Reform: Enhancing Bank Supervision and Reducing Systemic Risk,” hearing before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. Hrg. 112-714 (6/6/2012), at 47, prepared
statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Federal Reserve Governor,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg78813/html/CHRG-112shrg78813.htm.
354
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013). See also 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work
Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 467 [sealed exhibit].
355
See 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 468.
356
See 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510 [sealed exhibit].
357
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
358
Id.
78
planning, insurance, and related issues, personnel for the Commodities Team were drawn from
Federal Reserve supervisory ranks and new hires from industry. The Commodities Team had
about a half dozen members at any one time.
359
From the team’s inception, the Project Manager
was Wai Wong, a senior Federal Reserve regulator with expertise in capital markets risk.
360
The team was based in New York, and was housed and supported by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY). It also worked closely with and received assistance from the
Federal Reserve examination teams assigned to the institutions being examined, as well as
Federal Reserve personnel in Washington, D.C., Richmond, and New York.
361
From 2010 to
2012, the Commodities Team members spent the bulk of their time conducting the commodities
review.
362
Developing a Work Plan. To accomplish their work, the Commodities Team drew on a
“discovery review” that had been conducted prior to the team’s formation to justify the larger
investigation,
363
as well as earlier targeted examinations.
364
Those past efforts helped the team
gain a greater understanding of the commodities, products, operations, and risks involved in the
banks’ physical commodity activities.
In 2011, the Commodities Team drew up its own work plan.
365
One part of the 2011
Work Plan, entitled: “Why is this a priority,” gave five key reasons for the special review of
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities:
• “Key business targeted for expansion and growth
359
Id. In addition to Mssrs. Sullivan and Wong, over time other team members and persons associated with the
Commodities Team included Xiaobin Cai, Eric Caban, Philip Etherton, Nathan Fujiki, Irina Gvozd, David Gross,
Lyon Hardgrave, Sarah J ackson, and Michael Nelson. See, e.g., 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 [sealed
exhibit].
360
Id. See also 2011 FRBNY Commodities Team Work Plan, at FRB-PSI-200467. In May 2013, shortly before the
team’s dissolution, he was replaced by Nathan Fujiki, another Commodities Team member. Subcommittee briefing
by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
361
Id.
362
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
363
See undated, but likely 2009 “Scope Discovery Review Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Group Commodities,” prepared
by Federal Reserve Bank New York examiners, FRB-PSI-200511 - 515 [sealed exhibit]; 4/8/2010 “Discovery
Review Product Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Global Commodities,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Commodities
Team, FRB-PSI-303698 - 767 [sealed exhibit]; 5/11/2010 “Goldman Sachs Commodities[:] Discovery Review
Product Memo Vetting Presentation,” prepared by Federal Reserve Commodities Team, FRB-PSI-200586-599)
[sealed exhibit].
364
See, e.g., 5/11/2009 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Product Memo Goldman Sachs Group (GS) Market
Risk Amendment,” prepared by FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-304941 - 959, at 942 (identifying concerns with VAR
modeling used for commodities)[sealed exhibit]; 3/20/2009 letter from Federal Reserve to Morgan Stanley, FRB-
PSI-304613 - 619, at 613 (announcing “target review of Morgan Stanley’s commodities business for six weeks” at
its offices in New York); 10/5/2009 letter from Federal Reserve to Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-304620 - 626, at 620
(announcing “target review of Morgan Stanley’s commodities business for approximately four weeks” at its offices
in London); 10/19/2009 “Scope Memorandum[:] Morgan Stanley Euro Commodities, Control Validation Target
Exam,” prepared by FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-304665 - 672 [sealed exhibit]; 5/24/2010 letter from Federal
Reserve to Morgan Stanley, “Global Oil Trading Review beginning J une 22, 2010,” FRB-PSI-304673 - 677, at 673
(announcing “a control validation review of Morgan Stanley’s global oil trading desks for approximately six weeks”
at its offices in New York).
365
See 2011 Work Plan, FRB-PSI-200455, at 472; and 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477, at 480.
79
• Size and complexity of the business
• Weaknesses in Risk Management and Valuation
• Raises issues regarding Commerce vs. Banking
• Capital measures low relative to non-banking players”
366
On the first two points, the 2011 Work Plan noted that “SIFIs exposures are growing and
cover a broad range of commodity physical industrial activities.”
367
It also
observed that several
large financial institutions:
“continue to expand in the physical commodities markets, with an emphasis on leasing
and owning assets such as power plants, oil and natural gas storage facilities, and
transportation assets (e.g. oil tankers or product pipelines). MS has $13.1 billion in
commodity assets, and Goldman Sachs as $26 billion.”
368
On the third point, the 2011 Work Plan noted that “the Management framework used by
banks for physical assets is the same framework used for financial derivatives products,”
369
and
that “most risk measures such as [Value-at-Risk] do not capture many risk components to
physical commodities.”
370
These concerns about risk management weaknesses built upon an
earlier Federal Reserve memorandum finding significant “limitations with VaR calculations due
to the large number of proxies used, unstable correlations and issues with seasonality and manual
processes.”
371
On the fourth point, the Commodities Team was concerned that, by buying, selling and
maintaining ownership interests in physical commodities, banks appeared to be engaging in
commercial activities in direct competition with non-banking firms, contrary to longstanding
principles against mixing banking with commerce.
372
As to the fifth and final point, the Commodities Team was concerned that financial firms
were inadequately prepared for possible losses associated with their physical commodity
activities. In particular, preliminary research had shown that commercial firms engaged in the
same activities retained capital in amounts several times greater than those of banks engaged in
them, raising concerns that banks were not fully protected from financial loss in the case of an
operational failure or catastrophic event.
373
Conducting Examinations. Over the next two years, the Commodities Team conducted
an extensive review of physical commodity activities at ten SIFIs.
374
Goldman Sachs,
J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley received the most attention due to their having the most
366
2011 Work Plan, at FRB-PSI-200471.
367
Id. at 464.
368
Id. at 465 (emphasis omitted).
369
Id. at 466.
370
Id. at 465.
371
Undated “Update on Trading in Commodities,” memorandum prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-
200419 - 423, at 419 [sealed exhibit].
372
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
373
Id.
374
Id.; 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200480 [sealed exhibit].
80
extensive commodity holdings and activities. The other seven firms, Bank of America, Barclays
Capital, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and GE Capital, received relatively
less scrutiny because they had less extensive physical commodity activities.
To conduct the review, the Commodities Team used a mix of targeted and routine
examinations and continuous monitoring reviews to collect and analyze needed information.
375
The Team eventually conducted targeted examinations exploring specific commodities issues at
four financial holding companies, J PMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, and
Barclays.
376
It collected additional information about physical commodity activities at Goldman
Sachs, Citigroup, GE Capital, and Deutsche Bank using routine examinations and ongoing,
continuous monitoring reviews.
377
Issuing Reports. In connection with its work, the Commodities Team produced
numerous interim examination reports, memoranda, and analyses documenting various aspects of
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities. These internal reports were
made available to Federal Reserve personnel, but not to the public.
A number of the reports examined the banks selected as case studies for this Report. For
example, a Commodities Team analysis of J PMorgan reported that its “Global Commodities
Group is a strategic priority for the firm, and includes financial and physical capabilities across
oil, gas, power, metals, agriculturals, plastics, environmental markets, and weather.”
378
The
Commodities Team wrote: “Since 2006 the firm [J PMorgan] has significantly grown its physical
activities, largely through acquisition, and has joined the top tier (along with [Morgan Stanley]
and [Goldman Sachs]) among banks in commodities.” A 2009 analysis found that:
“[Goldman Sachs] is one of the largest players in the commodities market and the
business has been a material driver of revenue for the firm. … Goldman’s commodities
business is active in the physical markets, in terms of trading, transporting, and storing
physical commodities as well as owning power generation and other physical assets.”
379
A 2011 targeted examination of Morgan Stanley focused on its power plant activities in
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), and provided in-depth reviews of its insurance
arrangements, operational risk management, regulatory compliance procedures, vendor
management, and internal audit coverage.
380
Among other problems, the examination found that
Morgan Stanley’s operational risk capital calculations improperly excluded key activities, and
that Morgan Stanley had valuation issues, an incomplete database of operational and
environmental incidents, poor vendor management, and insufficient insurance.
375
Id.
376
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200480.
377
Id.
378
Undated but likely 2013 “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,” prepared by FRBNY Commodities
Team, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 300 [sealed exhibit].
379
Undated but likely 2009 “Scope Discovery Review Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Group Commodities,” prepared by
FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-200511 - 515 [sealed exhibit].
380
See 10/30/2011 “Supervisory Assessment – Multiple Exams Product Memo[:] Morgan Stanley Commodities,”
prepared by FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-304747 - 797 [sealed exhibit].
81
Still another set of reports, prepared by the Commodities Team in connection with an
analysis of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause, provided detailed information about the
commodity activities at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley prior to 1997 and more recently.
381
Ultimately, in October 2012, the Commodities Team produced a Summary Report
highlighting key supervisory concerns and offering recommendations to reduce the attendant
risks.
382
This report was presented to Federal Reserve senior management, but not to any
Federal Reserve Governors or the public.
383
(3) Documenting Extensive, High Risk Commodity Activities
The written materials produced by the Commodities Team painted a detailed picture of
the rapidly expanding, complex physical commodity activities underway at major bank holding
companies from the mid-2000s to 2012. The special review documented an unprecedented level
of bank involvement in the energy, metal, and agricultural commodity markets, as well as a wide
range of troubling risks and inadequate risk management practices.
(a) Summarizing Banks’ Physical Commodities Activities
In its 2012 report summarizing the special review, the Commodities Team concluded that
the ten financial holding companies it had examined had “significant footprints in physical
commodity activities.”
384
To provide an overview of the physical commodity activities
involved, the report provided a two-page list of representative bank activities in oil and gas
storage and transport, electrical power generation, shipping, metal warehousing, and coal and
uranium mining.
Oil and Gas. The 2012 Summary Report found that Morgan Stanley then held
“operating leases on over 100 oil storage tank field
globally and 18 natural gas storage facilities in US and Europe.”
385
It reported that J PMorgan
had a “significant global oil storage portfolio (25 [million barrel] capacity) … along with 19
Natural Gas storage facilities on lease.”
386
And it noted that Bank of America had “23 oil
storage facilities and 54 natural gas facilities … leased for storage.”
387
Power Generation. The 2012 Summary Report found that J PMorgan had “14 tolling
agreements (operating lease
6% of the maximum total output of the California Electricity grid, and potentially up to 12% of
381
See, e.g., undated but likely 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by FRBNY, FRB-PSI-200428-454 [sealed exhibit]; 4/19/2011
“Commodities Activities at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley[:] 4(o) permissibility analysis overlaid on GS and
MS activities,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200944 - 959 [sealed exhibit].
382
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510. [sealed exhibit]
383
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
384
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200485 [sealed exhibit].
385
Id.
386
Id.
387
Id.
82
average electricity demand.”
388
It indicated that J PMorgan had also bought and sold over $1
billion worth of power plants over the prior three years. In addition, the 2012 Summary Report
found that Morgan Stanley owned 6 domestic and international power plants; Bank of America
could make contingent power purchases from several nuclear power plants; and Goldman Sachs
had four tolling agreements and a wholly-owned subsidiary, Cogentrix, withownership interests
in over 30 power plants.
389
Shipping. The 2012 Summary Report found that Morgan Stanley had “over 100 ships
under time charters or voyages for movement of oil product, and was ranked 9
th
globally in
shipping oil distillates in 2009.”
390
It also noted that Morgan Stanley was “[c]urrently growing
its ability to ship Liquefied Natural Gas.” In addition, the Summary Report observed that
J PMorgan and Goldman Sachs had a “total of 20-25 ships under time charters or voyages
transporting oil [and] Liquefied Natural Gas.”
391
Metals. The 2012 Summary Report found that Goldman Sachs owned “Metro
Warehouse which controls 84 metal warehouse/storage facilities globally” and qualified as a
London Metals Exchange storage provider.
392
It also reported that J PMorgan had acquired
“Henry ath metals warehouse (LME certified base metals warehousing/storage worldwide),”
and that J PMorgan’s “total base metal inventory was as high as $8 [billion]” during the first
quarter of 2012.
393
Coal. The 2012 Summary Report found that all of the financial holding companies
reviewed conducted “physical coal trading involv[ing the] shipment of coals.”
394
It also noted
that Goldman Sachs had acquired a Colombian coal mine valued at $204 million, which had also
included associated rail transportation for the coal.
395
Uranium. The 2012 Summary Report also found that Goldman Sachs had conducted “a
uranium trading business that engages in the trading of the underlying commodity.”
396
Altogether, the 2012 Summary Report showed how, in the space of one decade, large
U.S. bank holding companies had developed and expanded multi-billion-dollar commodity
activities involving energy, critical metals, and associated storage and transport functions vital to
U.S. commerce and defense.
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
Id. at 486.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
Id.
395
Id.
396
Id. While the assessment referred to trading “fully enriched uranium,” Goldman told the Subcommittee that it
has not traded any enriched uranium. Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
83
(b) Identifying Multiple Risks
In addition to describing the physical commodity activities underway at ten large
financial holding companies, the special review conducted by the Commodities Team
catalogued, investigated, and analyzed numerous risks and related issues of concern associated
with those activities. Problems included multiple operational risks, weaknesses in risk
management, weak valuation practices, market manipulation concerns, reputational risks,
insufficient capital, and ineffective limits.
The Commodities Team observed that one of the central challenges facing financial
holding companies engaging in physical commodities activities is that the risk management
techniques applicable to the financial world may not translate well to the physical world. Mining
coal, producing electric power, transporting and storing oil and gas, storing uranium, operating a
natural gas compression facility, and owning gasoline stations are all complex businesses with
multiple risks varying from the commonplace to unexpected disasters. Customers can dry up.
Labor can go on strike. Equipment can break down. Inventories can be too high or too low.
Vendors can cause problems. Prices may spike or fall. Regulations can change. Transportation
can become difficult. There can be an environmental, health, or safety event. Some of these
commercial operational risks may be small, while others may be catastrophic.
Rather than survey all of these types of operational risks, the Federal Reserve’s review
focused on the direct risks associated with the storage, transport, production, and supply of
physical commodities. They included the risks associated with a catastrophic event, including
costs not covered by insurance; market and valuation risks including valuation problems leading
to insufficient capital or insurance; and reputational risks such as allegations of price
manipulation or pressures to pay unanticipated costs associated with an affiliate.
Catastrophic Event Risks. One of the greatest challenges in the commodities business
is dealing with the risk of a catastrophic event, such as an oil spill or gas explosion. Identifying
and quantifying those event risks are difficult tasks.
397
In particular, a lack of data on infrequent
events makes it extraordinarily difficult to predict with any accuracy whether, when, and to what
degree they may occur.
398
The 2012 Summary Report found that building risk models for “very infrequent, but high
impact events is very much an art,”
399
and that financial holding companies had very different
approaches to quantifying those risks.
400
According to the special review, for example, both
397
See “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding
Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” prepared by Federal Reserve, 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329 (daily ed. J an.
21, 2014).
398
These prediction challenges are not isolated to the financial world. For example, in the aftermath of the
Challenger shuttle disaster, Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman famously challenged NASA’s probability of total
failure of a space shuttle mission, which was purportedly 1 in 100,000. While challenging the mathematical rigor of
that determination, he noted that some engineers had numbers suggesting failure rates more along the lines of 1 in
200. “Personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle,” Richard Feynman, (6/6/1986),http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt.
399
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 [sealed exhibit].
400
Id.
84
Morgan Stanley and J PMorgan assumed that the maximum dollar loss for a power plant that
experienced a catastrophic event was simply the value of the facility itself, without adding in
costs reflecting such factors as loss of life, property damage, or legal expenses.
401
The special
review determined that Goldman Sachs had developed a power plant destruction loss model, but
it, too, had an upper bound limited to the current value of its most valuable power plant. The
special review noted that Bank of America had no total loss model for its commodity activities at
all.
402
In addition to upper bounds that were set too low, the special review found that financial
holding company model assumptions tended to be “aggressive” and resulted in “lower capital
levels than would be for a stand alone entity.”
403
For example, the review found that J PMorgan
had determined that an oil spill into water would cause the largest potential single loss to the firm
of all of its physical commodities businesses, and estimated that the maximum oil spill loss
would be $497 million.
404
According to the special review, J PMorgan then applied
“diversification benefits” and other assumptions to reduce its estimated capital exposure from
$497 million to about $50 million.
405
The final capital calculation was, thus, one tenth of the
original loss estimate. In another case involving Bank of America, the special review found that
its stand alone capital for its commodity activities was approximately $208 million, with no
capital at all allocated for a catastrophic loss.
406
The 2012 Summary Report summarized the problems with managing catastrophic risks
as follows:
“Modeling for the tail risk or maximum loss for a broad range of physical commodities
activities such as power generation, transportation and refining are difficult to measure
and potentially inadequately capitalized under current framework. Practices for
measuring stress loss are highly disparate [a]cross firms. Use of traditional BHC [Bank
Holding Company] financial risk measure processes and techniques do not appear to be
appropriate for Physical Commodity Activities.”
407
In short, the report found that financial holding companies were not identifying or quantifying
catastrophic event risks in a standard or appropriate way, and most were clearly
underappreciating such risks.
Market and Valuation Risks. The Commodities Team found similar problems with
how financial holding companies valued their physical commodities and associated facilities for
purposes of calculating their market risk. Market risk is the “risk due to factors that affect the
401
Id.
402
Id.
403
Id..
404
Id. at 494.
405
Id. at 493. This $50 million figure stands in sharp contrast to the over $40 billion in losses suffered by BP as a
result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See 2013 “Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013,” prepared by BP, BP
website,http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2013.pdf .
406
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 [sealed exhibit].
407
Id. at 481.
85
overall performance of the financial markets.”
408
It depends upon accurate asset valuations, which
are central to calculating appropriate levels of insurance and capital. The 2012 Summary Report
determined that the financial holding companies were using a variety of valuation methods,
many of which contained significant flaws.
The 2012 Summary Report found, for example, that the financial holding companies
were using different valuation methods in different settings for the same physical commodity
assets, leading to the use of one valuation method for the company’s internal metrics, another for
their capital calculations, and perhaps another for their public reporting. The report determined
that the different valuation methods could lead to profit and loss figures that varied significantly
from revenues reported to the public under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP).
409
The 2012 Summary Report found that, in some cases, this variance exceeded $1
billion.
410
The 2012 Summary Report provided an example involving oil cargoes. It found that, for
its internal performance metrics, Morgan Stanley valued its oil cargos at the highest price
available at any port in the world minus the transportation cost of getting it to its final
destination.
411
By contrast, the report found that, under GAAP, the bank was required to value
its oil cargos using spot market prices.
412
The Summary Report noted that J PMorgan took a
more conservative approach, valuing its oil cargos at the lowest observed destination price for its
internal performance metrics, and using the lower of cost or market prices for its financial
reporting under GAAP.
413
These different approaches led to very different cargo values for
purposes of calculating capital and market risk, with lower cargo values resulting in less capital.
Similarly, when looking at how the banks valued oil when held in storage, the 2012
Summary Report found very different approaches. It determined that Morgan Stanley used a
basket of calendar spread options to calculate the value of its stored oil; J PMorgan used a model
based on the intrinsic value of the highest calendar spread for the oil; and Bank of America used
a Monte Carlo simulation of an option.
414
Again, the three approaches produced different dollar
values, with different consequences for capital and market risk management calculations.
In a third analysis, the 2012 Summary Report found that the financial holding companies
varied somewhat in how they valued physical equipment, such as power plants. It determined
that most held the plants on their books as an investment at cost, and used tolling agreements to
capture the ongoing economic value. Tolling agreements typically capture the value of the
spread between a plant’s output (electricity) and its fuel inputs (coal or gas). The 2012 Summary
Report determined that, while this approach provided a liquid derivative representation of an
illiquid, hard-to-value asset, this method of valuation also had weaknesses that would not be
reflected in stress tests.
415
For example, depending upon how a tolling agreement is worded, a
408
2014 “Market Risk,” Investopedia website,http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketrisk.asp.
409
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200501 - 502 [sealed exhibit].
410
Id. at 495.
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
Id.
414
Id. at 496.
415
Id. at 493, 496.
86
bank may have to make payments to buy output from a power plant that isn’t producing any
power, or have to buy all of the production of a facility whose output is no longer valuable. In
addition, the derivatives-based valuation models might not accurately reflect the nature of the
market risks and price variability associated with specific physical commodity activities.
Placing accurate values on power plants, tolling agreements, and lease arrangements are
critical to financial holding companies setting adequate insurance and capital levels. The 2012
Summary Report warned, however, that the valuation techniques being used by financial holding
companies for their physical commodity activities were not consistent, comprehensive, or
reliable.
Reputational Risk. In addition to catastrophic, market, and valuation risks, the
Commodities Team examined reputational risks associated with physical commodity activities.
The 2012 Summary Report identified two types of reputational risks associated with physical
commodities activities, those associated with allegations of price manipulation and those
associated with being pressured to pay for an affiliate’s losses.
The first type of reputation risk involved the risk of being accused of misusing physical
commodity activities to engage in price manipulation:
“Having access to physical markets gives the firms access to supply/demand information
that is reportedly vital to running a profitable global commodities business. Many of
these physical activities involve warehousing and storing commodity products, and
therefore the control of the supply of certain commodities in specific geographic regions,
which raises the potential for price manipulation issues.”
416
The report stated: “In the past few years, all the banks involved in these markets have been
accused and/or charged of manipulating markets.”
417
The report’s analysis indicated that financial holding companies conducting physical
commodity activities opened themselves up to charges of being engaged in market or price
manipulation. Banks that avoided physical commodity activities were less vulnerable to those
types of allegations. The analysis also identified two different aspects of price manipulation
allegations, accusations regarding misusing inside information to make profitable trades, and
accusations regarding the improper manipulation of supplies to affect commodity prices.
Suspicions related to misuse of non-public information arise from the fact that financial
holding companies conducting commodity trades are simultaneously privy to commodity
decisions being made by numerous clients, some of which may be important market participants.
In addition, financial holding companies operating warehouses, pipelines, or shipping businesses
gain access to non-public information that can be used to make profitable trading decisions.
While commodity laws traditionally have not barred the use of non-public information in the
same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading advantages deepen when the trader is
416
Id. at 492.
417
Id.
87
a large financial institution with access to non-public information about numerous clients as well
as its own extensive commodity activities.
A related concern is when financial holding companies operate businesses that can
directly affect market supplies at the same time they are trading commodity-related financial
instruments on exchanges or over the counter. Cancelling warrants that lengthen a warehouse
queue, causing congestion in electricity markets, or supplying copper to an exchange traded fund
are actions that can and have elicited charges of market manipulation.
418
In recent years, banks and their holding companies have settled allegations of price
manipulation by paying substantial fines and legal fees. For example, in J uly 2013, J PMorgan
paid $410 million to settle charges by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that
the bank had manipulated electricity markets in California and the Midwest, as further described
below.
419
In J anuary 2013, Deutsche Bank paid $1.6 million to settle FERC price manipulation
charges that, in 2010, it had “engag[ed] in a scheme in which [the bank] entered into physical
transactions to benefit its financial position,” including by making physical electricity trades to
offset losses in electricity-related financial instruments held by the bank.
420
Also in 2013,
Barclays Bank contested charges by FERC imposing a $453 million civil penalty on the bank for
“manipulating electric energy prices in California and other western markets between November
2006 and December 2008.”
421
Banks have also been accused by regulators
422
and plaintiffs
423
of
rigging metals markets as well.
The 2012 Summary Report warned: “Reputational risks can be significant with frequent
occurrences and accusations of pricing manipulation.”
424
What the Summary Report failed also
to acknowledge is that price manipulation is not just a matter of reputational risk, but an
increasing area of actual misconduct by bank holding companies leading to civil and criminal
proceedings, violations of law, substantial fines, and enormous legal fees. The Summary Report
contained little analysis and no recommendations on how regulators should oversee or manage
the conflicts of interest inherent in a financial holding company that engages simultaneously in
commodities trading and physical commodity activities like storing, transporting, or supplying
commodities.
418
See, e.g., In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC, FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, Order Approving Stipulation
and Consent Agreement, (1/22/2013 ), 142 FERC at ¶ 61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-IN12-4-000.pdf ; Superior Extrusion v. Goldman Sachs,
(USDC ED Mich.), Complaint, (8/1/2013), at ¶¶ 3, 6, 11.
419
7/30/2013 FERC press release, “J P Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to
Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VDVXWKPD9aQ.
420
1/22/2013 FERC press release, “FERC Approves Market Manipulation Settlement with Deutsche Bank,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-1/01-22-13.asp; In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC,
FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, (1/22/2013 ), 142 FERC at ¶
61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-IN12-4-000.pdf .
421
7/16/2013 FERC press release, “FERC Orders $453 Million in Penalties for Western Power Market
Manipulation,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-16-13.asp#.VDFvefldVu0.
422
See, e.g., “Metals, Currency Rigging Is Worse Than Libor, Bafin Says,” Bloomberg, Karin Matussek and Oliver
Suess, (1/17/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-16/metals-currency-rigging-worse-than-libor-bafin-s-
koenig-says.html. (quoting Elke Koenig, the top financial regulator in Germany).
423
See, e.g., Nicholson v. The Bank of Nova Scotia et al, Case No. 14cv05682 (USDC SD NY), (7/25/2014).
424
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477-510, at 482 [sealed exhibit].
88
The 2012 Summary Report identified a second, very different type of reputational risk
that arises when a financial holding company comes under pressure, for reputational reasons, to
provide financial support for an affiliate or other party that has suffered significant losses or is
suspected of misconduct. The 2012 Summary Report highlighted as an example BP’s decision
to pay damages associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
425
The same risk was evident in
the financial crisis when, for reputational reasons, firms like Bear Stearns and State Street Bank
assumed significant financial obligations incurred by hedge funds with which they were
associated but had no direct legal responsibility.
426
The 2012 Summary Report expressed the opinion that financial holding companies did
not adequately appreciate the reputational risks arising from their involvement with physical
commodity activities.
427
(c) Evaluating Risk Management and Mitigation Practices
After identifying multiple risks associated with physical commodity activities, the 2012
Summary Report discussed ways in which some financial holding companies attempted to
manage and mitigate those risks. The analysis focused in particular on legal structures, use of
third-party vendors, insurance, and capital buffers.
Legal Structures. The 2012 Summary Report found that one of the primary ways that
financial holding companies sought to limit their risk for physical commodity activities was by
creating separate legal structures to conduct the activities.
428
For example, the report found that
Goldman Sachs typically purchased companies that engaged in power generation, rather than
purchased the physical power generation assets directly, in part to shield itself from liability for
activities at the power plant.
429
Similarly, the report found that Goldman Sachs avoided “overt
control of its coal mine business,” by using a subsidiary as the direct owner and by not hedging
its underlying coal exposures, in an attempt to demonstrate the legal distinction between the
financial holding company and its affiliate.
430
The 2012 Summary Report raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of this
approach. It stated:
425
Id. at 482, 492.
426
See 1/2011 “Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in the United States,” prepared by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, at 286,http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173545/http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/fci
c_final_report_full.pdf (explaining how the failure of two Bear Stearns funds led to the government bailout of the
firm itself). See also “Test Case on the Charles,” Raj Date, Cambridge Winter Center for Finantial Institutions
Policy (6/12/2010),http://www.cambridgewinter.org/Cambridge_Winter/Archives/Ent
ries/2010/6/12_TEST_CASE_ON_THE_CHARLES_files/state%20street%20volcker%20061
210.pdf (explaining how State Street bailed out funds that it managed, but then itself needed aid via several
taxpayer-backed programs).
427
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200492.
428
Id. at 488.
429
Id. at 489.
430
Id.
89
“There is no available historical precedent to support … the effectiveness of the ‘legal
structure’ mitigation strategy, rather there have been cases where a company using third
part[y] vendors was itself held liable for environmental damage.
“There have been cases where firms, due for example to action of their employees which
damaged legal protections, have been held legally liable for fines and damages (e.g. the
firm Total was held responsible for the spill of oil on a ship it did not own due to not
following internal policies). …
“The integrity of legal structures cannot be guaranteed as firms could be compelled for
reputational or other reasons to cover damages from an event such as in the Deepwater
Horizon incident when BP incurred losses even though they were not the operator.”
431
In addition, financial holding companies using subsidiaries to conduct physical
commodity activities are exposed to a “Catch-22” legal problem.
432
On the one hand, if the firm
seeks to actively mitigate the risks associated with the physical commodity activities by exerting
control over the subsidiary’s management or operations, its actions will increase the connections
between the parent and the subsidiary and increase the likelihood that any future liability
incurred by the subsidiary will be imputed to the parent, facilitating the piercing of the legal
distinctions between the two corporate entities. On the other hand, if the firm does not exert
control over the subsidiary’s management or operations, then its subsidiary may incur greater
risk, which may or may not ultimately flow back as liabilities to the parent.
433
This tension may be further exacerbated if the subsidiary is held as a merchant banking
investment, which bars the financial company from routinely managing the portfolio
company.
434
While creating separate legal structures may help minimize some of the risks that could
flow back to a financial holding company or its other affiliates, the 2012 Summary Report found
that strategy did not ensure financial holding companies would be protected from risk.
435
Third Party Operators. A related mitigation strategy used by some financial holding
companies to avoid potential liabilities involved outsourcing key functions in physical
431
Id.
432
“Catch -22,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catch-22,
(defines “catch-22” as “a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in
the problem or by a rule”). The term was first introduced in a book entitled, Catch-22, written by J oseph Heller.
433
As the Federal Reserve’s recent rulemaking action examining bank involvement with physical commodity
activities put it: “[C]urrent management techniques designed to mitigate risks, such as frequent monitoring of risk,
requirements to restrict the age of transport vessels, and review of disaster plans of third-party transporters, may
have the unintended effect of increasing the potential that the [financial holding company] may become enmeshed in
or liable to some degree from a catastrophic event.” “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and
Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329, 3332,
prepared by the Federal Reserve, (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
434
Merchant Banking Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466 (1/31/2001), codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 225, Subpart J .
435
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489 [sealed exhibit]. See also “Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
90
commodities activities to unrelated third parties. This strategy included, for example, hiring a
third party contractor to run a power plant or operate an oil tanker. The 2012 Summary Report
raised questions about the efficacy of this strategy, noting that “there have been cases where a
company using third part[y] vendors was itself held liable for environmental damage.”
436
The
report also observed that BP was found responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill despite
the fact that BP was not the legal operator of the oil rig and had hired a third party to run it.
437
The report further noted that some financial holding companies exercised ongoing oversight of
their third party vendors, raising the same concerns associated with a subsidiary – that extensive
oversight could also lead to greater liability in the event of a disaster or misconduct.
The 2012 Summary Report concluded: “Vendor Management practices for physical
commodities need[] to be improved.”
438
After describing several problems, the Summary Report
noted: “Current corporate policies do not readily address the unique relationship and dependency
of physical commodities activities with vendors.”
439
Insurance. Another mitigation strategy examined by the 2012 Summary Report was the
use of different types and levels of insurance by the financial holding companies. The 2012
Summary Report questioned the usefulness of this mitigation strategy, after its research
determined that “nsurance companies reportedly will not insure the full event loss due to their
inability to measure the maximum potential loss.”
440
The 2012 Summary Report found that all financial companies retained some form of
insurance for their physical commodity activities and that “nsurance practices [we]re generally
similar among firms.”
441
At the same time, of the institutions whose insurance was reviewed,
Bank of America, Barclays, Goldman Sachs, J PMorgan, and Morgan Stanley, the Summary
Report found significant variations in the levels of insurance coverage obtained for commodity-
related activities.
442
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report found that the insurance coverage at the financial
holding companies examined appeared to be insufficient. It noted that “[p]hysical commodities
is a notoriously fat-tailed business with [the] insurer only covering limited losses for some
risks.”
443
The 2012 Summary Report found that “n all cases … insurance for … catastrophic
events is capped at a certain level (typically US $1 billion) and firms cannot cover any amount
beyond the cap through insurance.”
444
It also noted that the financial holding companies used
“aggressive assumptions” to minimize estimated losses from a catastrophic event,
445
and found
that, when comparing capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with
436
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489 [sealed exhibit].
437
Id.
438
Id. at 490.
439
Id.
440
Id. at 481.
441
Id. at 491.
442
Id.
443
Id. at 509. See also id. at 500 (noting that insurance companies “do not have comfortable ways to assess the rail
risk and thus avoid insuring the tails” for catastrophic events, such as multi-billion dollar oil spills).
444
Id. at 491.
445
Id. at 493 - 494.
91
“extreme loss scenarios,” “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by billions of
dollars.
446
The 2012 Summary Report concluded that, in the event of a multi-billion-dollar
catastrophe such as a major oil spill, insurance would not protect a financial holding company
from significant costs.
Capital. A final mitigation strategy examined by the 2012 Summary Report was the
extent to which financial holding companies conducting physical commodity activities held
additional capital to cover potential losses stemming from those activities. The Summary Report
noted that capital can provide significant loss absorption capacity and is a critical component in
risk mitigation and bank regulation, but also concluded that “current levels of capital appear
insufficient to protect against a maximum loss potential.”
447
Federal regulations establish several methods for financial holding companies to calculate
the amount of capital they need, with the amount based in part on the value and riskiness of the
activities it undertakes.
448
The 2012 Summary Report raised concerns about how assets were
being valued for capital calculation purposes, whether some assets were being excluded, and
how the capital rules were being applied. The report noted, for example, that “applying capital
allocation methods that are based on financial mark-to-market methodologies to physical
activities leads to considerably lower capital rations than methods used by non-financial firms
engaged in the same businesses.”
449
The Commodities Team also noted that non-financial firms
engaged in similar physical commodity activities were funded with a capital ratio of about 42%,
whereas the subsidiaries of financial holding companies engaged in those activities had a capital
ratio of roughly 8 – 10%.
450
This wide disparity was found to exist across multiple physical
commodity activities including liquid pipelines, natural gas facilities, and electrical power
operations.
451
The 2012 Summary Report also highlighted weaknesses in the capital allocations for
certain physical commodities activities. After examining how oil and gas were valued during
storage and transportation, as well as how transportation, storage, and power generation facilities
themselves were valued, the Commodities Team found inappropriate valuation methods and
significant gaps in capital charges. For example, the report noted that, while commodity-related
hedges may show up in Value-at-Risk measures, underlying leases or tolling agreements may
incur no capital charge at all.
452
446
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
447
Id. at 481.
448
See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 53059 (2012).
449
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200499.
450
Id. at 499, 507.
451
Id. at 499.
452
Id. at 501 - 502.
92
The 2012 Summary Report concluded: “Current levels of capital appear insufficient to
protect against a maximum loss potential – on a stand alone basis.”
453
In addition, it found that
four major financial holding companies, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, J PMorgan, and
Morgan Stanley, had insufficient capital, even when enhanced with insurance, to cover losses
associated with an extreme loss scenario, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Oil Spill Loss Model, or the Deepwater Horizon oil spill event.
454
Put
another way, the report determined that the financial holding companies could incur significant
net losses far in excess of their insurance and capital loss absorption capabilities in the event of a
catastrophic event.
Prudential Limits. One mitigation strategy discussed in the Summary Report involves
financial holding company compliance with the prudential limits put in place by regulators to
restrict the size of their physical commodity activities. As discussed earlier, the Federal Reserve
granted complementary authority to financial holding companies conditioned upon their limiting
the resulting physical commodity activities to less than 5% of their Tier 1 capital. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act imposed a cap on grandfathered activities, using a much higher limit equal to
5% of the financial holding company’s consolidated assets. Separately, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency imposed caps on the amount of certain physical commodities that
can be held in a national bank.
As more fully explained below, those limits have been subject to various interpretations
that have undermined their collective ability to ensure the safety and soundness of the banks and
holding companies engaged in the physical commodity activities. One key problem is that the
limits have not been considered, applied, or enforced in an integrated fashion.
455
In addition,
some financial holding companies have excluded major categories of commodity-related assets
or used dubious valuation methods when calculating compliance with some of the limits.
456
The
2012 Summary Report noted, for example, that J PMorgan had booked “significant amounts of
base metals in the national bank entity,” and did not include those holdings when calculating the
financial holding company’s compliance with the 5% limit on its complementary activities,
noting that, in September 2012, the financial holding company hit “an all time high in physical
holdings.”
457
In response, the 2012 Summary Report indicated that work was being done to develop a
standard approach for valuing assets and called for better disclosures by financial holding
companies to track compliance with the size limits.
458
At the same time, the Summary Report
failed to discuss better integration or enforcement of existing size limits, or whether the limits
themselves needed to be improved.
453
Id. at 481.
454
Id. at 498.
455
See 4/16/2014 comment letter from Subcommittee Chairman Carl Levin to Federal Reserve, “Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking Related to Physical Commodities Docket No. 1479 and RIN 7100 AE-10,” (hereinafter
“Senator Levin Comment Letter”) ,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124566_481901422162_1.pdf.
456
See discussion of J PMorgan involvement with size limits, below.
457
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200506.
458
Id. at 484.
93
(d) Recommendations
In addition to identifying key risks and evaluating mitigation strategies, the 2012
Summary Report offered a number of recommendations to strengthen Federal Reserve oversight
of financial holding company involvement with physical commodities. Those recommendations
were as follows:
“–While action on the 4o authority is still open, BHCs [bank holding companies] will be
able to conduct physical commodity activities under the 4k permissibility/authority and
Merchant Banking.
–Action points include closer monitoring, strengthen the 4k through the applications
process, higher capital.
–Commodity businesses should be looked at in a stand-alone capacity, capital levels
should be aligned to cover maximum potential loss with a buffer.
–If it was not part of the BHC what amount of capital would be needed as a viable
entity. …
–Firms are utilizing operating leases to extract economic value with minimal capital
charge – propose a way to capitalize these leasing arrangement
under capital leasing[.]
–Increase capital requirement for physical commodities activity – which could include[:]
o Eliminate the diversification benefit for ops risk capital and assign a loss
probability equal to the term of the lease and not a one year period or longer.
o Add a specific risk charge – account for the unique nature of these assets[.]
o Treat operating leases as capital lease
–Improve corporate risk governance on physical commodities activities and strengthen
stress testing practices[.]
–Require formal reporting of physical commodities exposures such as 9YC, !$A and 14Q
and 5% tier 1 capital limit[.]
–Greater definition of regulatory permissibility.”
459
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittees that these recommendations were reviewed
by senior Federal Reserve managers, but were not submitted directly to any member of the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
460
According to Federal Reserve representatives, the
recommendations were “integral” to the Federal Reserve Board’s decision to reconsider its
position on financial holding company involvement with physical commodities and one of many
factors that led to its decision to request public comment on whether new regulations should be
459
Id. at 483 - 484.
460
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
94
issued.
461
Two years after the recommendations were made, however, the Federal Reserve
declined to identify for the Subcommittee any that had actually been implemented.
462
C. Taking Steps to Limit Physical Commodity Activities, 2009-Present
Since 2008, instead of allowing financial holding companies to continue to expand their
involvement with physical commodities, the Federal Reserve has begun to take steps to curb
high risk physical commodity activities at financial holding companies, including by halting
previously permitted activities, denying or delaying requests for expanded activities, and
adopting changes to capital rules that increase protections against commodities-related risks. In
addition, earlier this year, the Federal Reserve sought public comment on whether it should
propose new regulatory limits on banks’ physical commodities activities.
463
(1) Denying Applications
After ten years of granting financial holding company applications to engage in an
increasingly broad range of physical commodity activities, beginning in 2010, the Federal
Reserve began to deny some requests for expanded commodity activities.
Illiquid Oil Products. One of the first examples of this shift involved the Federal
Reserve’s denial of a request by J PMorgan to trade certain oil-based products known as asphalt,
Canadian or CAD condensate, cutter stock, straight run fuel oil, and marine diesel.
464
These oil
products, which are distillated from crude oil at refineries, are traded in relatively small volumes
in less liquid markets, compared to crude oil.
465
J PMorgan had acquired small stocks of them
when, in 2010, it acquired physical commodity assets from RBS Sempra, a joint venture between
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and a U.S. company known as Sempra Energy.
466
At the
request of RBS, the Federal Reserve had issued a 2008 complementary order allowing RBS and
RBS Sempra Commodities to buy and sell those oil products, even though they were not
approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
467
In August 2010, J PMorgan filed an application with the Federal Reserve for permission
to trade the same oil products as RBS Sempra Commodities.
468
To support its request,
J PMorgan stated in its filing that it “incorporate[d] herein by reference the considerations that the
461
Id.
462
Id.
463
See “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding
Companies Related to Physical Commodities,” prepared by Federal Reserve, 79 Fed. Reg. 13, 3329 (daily ed. J an.
21, 2014).
464
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505.
465
See 4/18/2011 memorandum by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team, “J PMC Asphalt, Cutter Stock, Fuel
[O]il, Marine Diesel and CAD Condensate Trading Approval Application,” FRB-PSI-300323 - 325, at 324.
466
See 7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
467
RBS Order, at C60.
468
8/18/2010 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. §225.89,” FRB-PSI-
301639 - 647, at 641.
95
Board cited in the RBS Order with respect to the Proposed Commodities.”
469
In October 2010,
the Federal Reserve asked J PMorgan to provide additional information demonstrating that the oil
products retained the “attributes of price transparency, fungibility, and liquidity” that they
possessed in 2008, including information about where and how the commodities were traded.
470
J PMorgan responded ten days later.
471
In April 2011, the Federal Reserve Commodities Team
conducting the special review of financial holding company involvement with physical
commodities provided an analysis indicating that only one of the oil products, CAD condensate,
had “all of the necessary characteristics for permissibility.”
472
It recommended against
approving the trading of the other oil products, due to their illiquidity and lack of a futures
market, and recommended maintaining the same limit on CAD condensate trading that already
applied to J PMorgan’s affiliate J PMC Energy Ventures.
473
After that analysis, the Federal
Reserve sought and received additional information from J PMorgan regarding each of the oil
products.
474
In August 2012, after it had become clear that the Federal Reserve would deny the
request, J PMorgan withdrew its application to trade the oil products.
475
The decision of the Federal Reserve not to approve J PMorgan’s trading request, which
took two years to finalize, is one of the first instances of the Federal Reserve reversing an earlier
grant of authority to engage in an otherwise impermissible commodity activity.
Warehouse Business. A second example of the Federal Reserve’s shift to a more
restrictive interpretation of permissible commodities activities involves the Federal Reserve’s
review of J PMorgan’s request to own and operate Henry Bath & Son Ltd. Henry Bath is a U.K.
company that operates a global network of warehouses that store commodities traded on the
London Metal Exchange (LME), including copper, aluminum, nickel, tin, lead, zinc and steel
billet.
476
Its operations include warehouse services for commodities traded on the LME, NYSE
Liffe or ICE Futures US,
477
as well as off-warrant stocks.
478
As explained earlier, on J uly 1, 2010, as part of a larger acquisition from RBS Sempra,
J PMorgan acquired Henry Bath. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, J PMorgan then had a
two-year grace period to: (1) divest its ownership, (2) obtain a “complementary” order, or (3)
469
Id. at 643.
470
10/18/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301650 - 651 [sealed
exhibit].
471
10/28/2010 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve Ban k of New York, “J PM Chase Request for
Additional Information,” FRB-PSI-301653 - 663.
472
4/18/2011 memorandum by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team, “J PMC Asphalt, Cutter Stock, Fuel [O]il,
Marine Diesel and CAD Condensate Trading Approval Application,” FRB-PSI-300323 - 325.
473
Id. at 325.
474
See, e.g., 12/2/2011 email from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve, with attachment, “Additional Commodities,”
FRB-PSI-301666 - 670; undated submission from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve, “Responses to Requests for
Additional Information,” FRB-PSI-300311 - 313.
475
8/7/2012 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Notice Regarding Application for
Relief in Connection with Complementary Authority,” FRB-PSI-301056; 8/9/2012 letter from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301676; Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013).
476
9/10/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co's Sixth Response to
J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001 - 013, at 005.
477
Id.
478
Id.
96
conform the investment to comply with merchant banking restrictions.
479
At first, J PMorgan
sought a complementary order to own and operate the Henry Bath warehouses,
480
but in 2011,
the Federal Reserve indicated it would deny the request,
481
and J PMorgan withdrew it.
482
On
J une 29, 2012, the day before its grace period lapsed, the bank sought a one-year extension from
the Federal Reserve so that it could bring the investment into compliance with its merchant
banking authority.
483
Several months later, the Federal Reserve indicated that J PMorgan could
not hold Henry Bath as a merchant banking investment,
484
and gave J PMorgan a one-year
extension to J uly 2013, on the understanding that J PMorgan would use the time to sell the
company.
485
In May 2013, J PMorgan made a request for yet another year, and based upon its
good faith efforts to sell the company, the Federal Reserve gave J PMorgan another year to divest
the holding.
486
In March 2014, J PMorgan reached an agreement to sell certain physical
commodities assets, including Henry Bath, to the Swiss-based commodities and energy firm,
Mercuria.
487
That acquisition was finalized in October 2014.
488
Other Requests. The Federal Reserve’s new reluctance to approve expanded physical
commodities activities was not confined to J PMorgan. It also rejected applications by Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley to trade physical iron ore.
489
It also denied an application by
Goldman Sachs for a joint venture sugar plant in Brazil.
490
In addition, the Federal Reserve delayed making a decision on applications requesting
approval of new physical commodity activities as complementary activities. Bank of America,
for example, has had a complementary application pending since 2010.
491
In 2012, Toronto
479
See undated “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry Bath,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve,
FRB-PSI-301532 - 534, at 532.
480
6/8/2011 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300977 - 1052.
481
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505 (stating the Federal Reserve “[r]ejected” the J PMorgan
application “to hold Henry Bath metals storage facility as 4(k) complimentary activity”); Subcommittee briefing by
J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
482
10/26/2011 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Notice Regarding LME
Metals Warehousing,” FRB-PSI-301636 -637 (withdrawing request).
483
6/29/2012 letter from J PMorgan to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-301061-062. In August,
J PMorgan replaced that request with one for a three-year extension. 8/16/2012 letter from J PMorgan to Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300358 - 359. See also undated “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry
Bath,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-301532 - 534.
484
See 10/3/2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505 (stating the Federal Reserve had “[r]ejected” the J PMorgan
application to hold Henry Bath metals storage facility “under Merchant Banking Authority”); Subcommittee briefing
by Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
485
11/16/2012 letter from Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300338 -340 (granting extension to 7/1/2013);
10/31/2012 Federal Reserve memorandum, “Request by J PMorgan Chase & Company for an extension of time to
divest or conform nonbanking activities,” FRB-PSI-301525 -531.
486
7/11/2013 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301069 - 071.
487
Subcommittee briefing by Mercuria (9/12/2014). See also “J PMorgan sells physical commodities unit to
Mercuria for $3.5 billion,” Reuters, Dmitry Zhdannikov and Chris Peters (3/19/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-jpmorgan-mercuria-idUSBREA2I0LG20140319.
488
See 10/3/2014 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan Completes Sales of Physical Commodities Assets,”http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=874514.
489
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200505.
490
Id.
491
5/4/2010 letter from Bank of America legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “Section 4(k)(l)(B) Notification by Bank
of America Corporation of Its Intention to Continue to Engage in Certain Physically-Settled Commodity Trading
97
Dominion Bank submitted an application for complementary authority to engage in certain
physical commodity activities involving natural gas, but withdrew it in 2014.
492
More broadly, in J uly 2013, the Federal Reserve issued a public statement that it was
reconsidering its previously permissive view of “complementary” orders: “The Federal Reserve
regularly monitors the commodity activities of supervised firms and is reviewing the 2003
determination that certain commodity activities are complementary to financial activities and
thus permissible for bank holding companies.”
493
That announcement, now over a year old, has
not yet resulted in a broader policy statement or regulatory proposals on how the Federal Reserve
intends to interpret the Gramm-Leach-Bliley complementary authority.
(2) Using Other Means to Reconsider Physical Commodity Activities
In addition to taking a more restrictive approach to applications for expanded physical
commodity activities, the Federal Reserve has signaled its intention to reconsider financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities using other mechanisms to restrain
physical commodity activities or reduce their attendant risks to the financial system, including
through an ongoing study and regulatory actions.
Section 620 Study. In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. Section 620 of that Act, which was added to the legislation in an
amendment sponsored by Senators J eff Merkley and Carl Levin, requires federal banking
regulators to conduct a review and prepare a report on “the activities that a banking entity may
engage in under Federal and State law, including activities authorized by statute and by order,
interpretation and guidance.”
494
That study, which is ongoing, offers another mechanism to
reconsider financial holding company involvement with physical commodities.
The sponsors of the Section 620 study have explained that it was intended to “address the
risks to the banking system arising from … longer-term instruments and related trading.”
495
Specifically, Section 620:
“directs Federal banking regulators to sift through the assets, trading strategies, and other
investments of banking entities to identify assets or activities that pose unacceptable risks
to banks, even when held in longer-term accounts. Regulators are expected to apply the
Activities and Related Activities, Engage in Energy Tolling Activities and Continue to Provide Certain Asset and
Energy Management Services, through Certain Affiliates,” FRB-PSI-500001 - 218 (providing notice of the bank’s
intent to engage in an expanded set of physical commodity activities as a result of its acquisition of Merrill Lynch);
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (12/13/2013); 11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee,
PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002, at 001.
492
10/2/2012 letter from Toronto Dominion Bank legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “Notice by The Toronto-
Dominion Bank to Engage in Commodity Trading Activities,” FRB-PSI-500219 – 681; Subcommittee briefing by
Federal Reserve (12/13/2013); 11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-21-000001 -
002, at 001.
493
Federal Reserve statement to the New York Times (7/19/20013), copy provided by the Federal Reserve to the
Subcommittee.
494
Section 620(a), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, codified at 12
U.S.C. §5301.
495
156 Cong. Rec. S5870, S5895 (daily ed. J uly 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley).
98
lessons of that analysis to tighten the range of investments and activities permissible for
banking entities, whether they are at the insured depository institution or at an affiliate or
subsidiary, and whether they are short or long term in nature.”
496
It also directs the banking regulators to focus on “any financial, operational, managerial, or
reputation risks associated with or presented as a result of the banking entity engaged in the
activity or making the investment.”
497
The 2012 Summary Report explicitly points to the Section 620 report as a possible
mechanism for clarifying appropriate commodity-related activities for banks and financial
holding companies.
498
Other federal banking regulators have also indicated that physical
commodities activities would be an appropriate topic for the Section 620 study and report. The
report could be used by the Federal Reserve and OCC, for example, to coordinate their
interpretations of permissible physical commodity activities, as well as appropriate safeguards to
reduce risks, including their respective 5% limits on the size of physical commodity holdings.
However, the report is nearly 3 years overdue,
499
and there is no sign of when it may be
completed.
(3) Changing the Rules
In addition to reconsidering financial holding company involvement with physical
commodities by reconsidering its complementary orders and using the ongoing Section 620
study, the Federal Reserve is also making use of its regulatory authority. Recently, together with
other federal regulators, the Federal Reserve issued new capital rules that, in part, addressed
commodity-related concerns. In early 2014, the Federal Reserve also issued an advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking soliciting public comment on whether it should take regulatory action to
address a number of commodity-related issues.
Revising the Capital Rules. In December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision proposed significant revisions to the international framework for regulating bank
capital, often referred to as the Basel III proposal.
500
The Basel III framework revised many of
the mechanisms and criteria used to determine appropriate levels of capital for financial holding
companies, including their commodities activities.
501
On J uly 2, 2013, the Federal Reserve
adopted rules to implement the Basel III framework, and on J uly 9, 2013, the Office of the
496
Id.
497
Section 620(a)(2)(B), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, codified
at 12 U.S.C. §5301.
498
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200506.
499
See Section 620(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
codified at 12 U.S.C. 5301 (indicating study was to be finished in December 2011).
500
See 12/2010 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report “Basel III: International framework for liquidity
risk measurement, standards and monitoring”,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf.
501
See 12/2010 (revised 6/2011) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report “Basel III: A global regulatory
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”, at 15,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
99
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) followed
suit.
502
The new capital rules directly affect how financial holding companies must account for
their physical commodity activities. First, the Basel III framework made a number of changes to
the risk weightings and capital calculations for assets held in a trading book. These changes,
which were implemented in the new federal capital rules, generally can be viewed as marginally
increasing capital requirements for both financial and physical commodity positions held as
trading assets.
503
The Basel III framework, and the corresponding U.S. implementing regulations, also
require financial holding companies to maintain added capital to absorb the risk of counterparty
defaults on a portfolio of OTC derivatives by requiring financial holding companies to make a
credit valuation adjustment on a portfolio basis when calculating their capital requirements.
504
This additional capital requirement may reduce the extent to which financial holding companies
use OTC derivatives in their commodity activities.
In addition, the Basel III framework increased the risk weights for merchant banking
equity exposures, imposing risk weights of 300%, 400%, or 600% on those holdings, depending
in part upon whether the acquired equity was publicly traded and whether the portfolio company
qualifies as an “investment firm.”
505
The capital charges focus on the fact that the financial
holding company’s direct investment is an equity; it does not take into account any risks related
to the portfolio company’s underlying activities. The result is that the merchant banking capital
charge for acquiring a company engaged in trading uranium versus a company operating a small
grocery may be the same, despite the likely significant variance in the risks between those two
investments. In the view of the capital rule, it is the equity holding of the bank that counts, not
the activities of the portfolio company. While the new merchant banking capital rules do not
reflect the risks associated with the underlying portfolio companies, the increased capital charge
for equity investments may lead to reduced merchant banking positions held by financial holding
companies, including merchant banking investments involving physical commodity activities.
Collectively, these changes in how banks calculate capital to insulate against financial
risks have put some downward pressure on banks’ commodity-related activities,
506
including
their physical commodity activities. Although the new capital rules have yet to fully take effect,
some banks have already initiated compliance, resulting in increased capital. Critics note that,
502
“Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition
Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and
Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule; Final
Rule”, 78 Fed. Reg.,62018, 62021-62022 (daily ed. Oct. 11,2013,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-
11/pdf/2013-21653.pdf.
503
See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 53059 (2012).
504
Id.
505
1/1/2014 “Summary of Capital Requirements Applicable to Merchant Banking Investments, Commodities, and
Related Items under the Federal Reserve’s Regulations as of J anuary 1, 2014,” memorandum prepared by the
Federal Reserve FRB-PSI-708382-385, at 384 [sealed exhibit].
506
See, e.g., “Basel III part of 'double whammy' hitting bank commodity trade,” Independent Chemical Information
Service, Seth Freedman, (1/1/2012),http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2012/01/10/9522349/basel-iii-part-of-
double-whammy-hitting-bank-commodity-trade/.
100
while the new rules have increased capital requirements for commodity-related assets and
merchant banking investments, the new rules still fail to fully protect against the potential
monetary risks associated with physical commodity activities, including the risks associated with
catastrophic events, market valuation problems, and other operational and reputational issues.
507
Proposing New Rules for Physical Commodity Activities. On J anuary 21, 2014, the
Federal Reserve issued a notice which outlined the current regulatory landscape governing
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities activities, identified potential
risks and regulatory weaknesses, and requested public comment on whether new regulatory
limits were needed. The notice requested public comment:
“on all aspects of physical commodities activities of BHCs [Bank Holding Companies]
and banks and invites comments on the risks and benefits of allowing … these activities
as well as ways in which risks to the safety and soundness of a FHC [Financial Holding
Company] and … to the financial system can be contained or limited.”
508
In its wide-ranging advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the Federal Reserve noted
the significant increase in physical commodity activities by financial holding companies since
2007, and suggested a fundamental re-thinking of the Federal Reserve’s previously expansive
interpretations of the laws allowing those activities. The notice invited public comment on
twenty-four separate questions.
509
Assessing Risks and Risk Mitigation. In the notice, the Federal Reserve highlighted the
potential danger posed to banks by “tail risks,” such as environmental disasters or other
catastrophic events that affect physical commodity activities. The notice discussed, for example,
such recent catastrophic events as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (which
killed 11 people and has cost BP over $42 billion in losses); a natural gas pipeline rupture in San
Bruno, California (which killed 8 people and will likely cost billions of dollars in damages); a
natural gas power plant explosion in Middletown, Connecticut (which killed 6 people); the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant meltdown in Tohuku, J apan; and the crash and explosion
of a crude oil-laden railway train in Quebec, Canada (which killed 47 people), as evidence that
the “risks of catastrophic events continue.”
510
The notice stated that these “recent catastrophes
suggest that the cost of preventing accidents are high and the costs and liability related to
physical commodity activities can be difficult to limit and higher than expected.”
511
The notice connected these catastrophic event risks to the recent financial crisis, which
exposed the negative consequences of underappreciated tail risks combined with contagion.
512
It
explained that if a financial holding company owned “physical commodities that are part of a
catastrophic event[,] it could suddenly and severely undermine public confidence in the
[financial holding company] or its insured depository institution and undermine their access to
507
Subcommittee briefing by the FDIC (9/3/2014).
508
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 3329 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014).
509
Id.
510
Id. at 3331
511
Id. at 3329, 3331.
512
Id.
101
funding markets.”
513
The notice raised the concern that, in the case of a large financial
institution denied access to funding markets, the resulting financial problems, if severe enough,
could spread beyond the institution to damage its counterparties and even the broader U.S.
financial system.
The Federal Reserve also observed that “current risk management techniques designed to
mitigate risks, such as frequent monitoring of risk, requirements to restrict the age of transport
vessels, and review of disaster plans of third-party transporters, may [have] the unintended effect
of increasing the potential that the [financial holding company] may become enmeshed in or
liable to some degree from a catastrophic event.”
514
While the notice focused on risks associated with catastrophic environmental disasters, it
did not discuss in detail other risks that also affect many physical commodity businesses. For
example, it did not address the risk of changing regulations or technologies which may render a
physical commodity operation significantly more or less valuable over a short period of time. In
the United States, for example, a combination of market forces and emissions rules has
dramatically altered the fuel source for power generation. While coal used to provide more than
half of U.S. power generation, it is now down to just over one-third, with natural gas largely
filling the void.
515
This dramatic shift has altered world-wide demand for coal and the value of
coal-related commodity activities. Similarly, the Fukushima Diachii nuclear disaster in J apan
had a dramatic chilling effect on the nuclear power industry, lowering the value of uranium-
related commodity activities.
516
The notice similarly did not examine other types of risks that
may materially impact a commodity-related business, such as labor unrest or political
upheaval.
517
Instead, the notice solicited public comment on the nature and types of risks posed
by physical commodity activities, how they were addressed by financial holding companies, and
how the Federal Reserve could enhance protections by further mitigating such risks or limiting
activities.
Assessing Authority. The notice also posed questions regarding the appropriate
application of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley complementary, merchant banking, and grandfather
authorities in the context of physical commodities. The proposal sought comment on whether
complementary commodities activities should be subjected to: (i) increased insurance
requirements, (ii) enhanced capital requirements; or (iii) “absolute dollar limits and caps based
on a percentage of the [financial holding company’s] regulatory capital or revenue.”
518
With
respect to merchant banking authority, it questioned whether merchant banking investments
513
Id. at 3329, 3332.
514
Id.
515
See, e.g., “Natural Gas Dethrones King Coal As Power Companies Look To Future,” National Public Radio,
Christopher J oyce (3/1/2013),http://www.npr.org/2013/03/01/173258342/natural-gas-dethrones-king-coal-as-
power-companies-look-to-future.
516
See, e.g., “Fukushima, 3 Years Later: Disaster Still Lingers,” Mashable, Andrew Freedman (3/11/2014),http://mashable.com/2014/03/11/three-years-after-fukushima/ ; “The Impact of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident
on People's Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy Policy: Silent Movement,” XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology,
Noriko Iwai and Kuniaki Shishido (7/19/2014),
517
See, e.g., discussion of how these issues affected Goldman’s involvement with coal, below.
518
79 Fed. Reg. at 3333 - 334.
102
should be subject to: (i) increased capital requirements; (ii) caps on the total dollar amount of
such investments; or (iii) enhanced restrictions on the routine management of merchant banking
portfolio companies.
519
With respect to the grandfather clause, the notice asked about its
necessity 15 years after enactment of the law, as well as whether any additional requirements or
limits should be imposed, and how it might be reconciled with the other authorities for
competitiveness reasons, since most financial holding companies cannot invoke the grandfather
clause to authorize additional physical commodity activities.
520
Current Status. The initial comment period for the notice ended April 16, 2014, with
over 17,000 comments having been filed with the Federal Reserve.
521
Comments came from
small business owners, commodity markets participants, public interest groups, financial holding
companies, members of Congress, legal experts, and concerned members of the public.
522
The
vast majority were letters submitted by members of the public expressing support for increased
restrictions on financial holding company involvement with commodity activities. Other letters
generally supported some or all of the activities of financial holding companies in the commodity
markets, including their roles as financiers of physical inventories for producers or consumers.
523
Still others expressed concerns with the risks posed by physical commodity activities to the
financial holding companies, U.S. markets, and U.S. economy, and urged additional restrictions
on the financial holding companies conducting those activities.
524
While the Federal Reserve has
not yet taken further action based on the notice, its issuance of the notice indicates the regulator
is considering taking regulatory action to restrict financial company involvement with physical
commodities and reduce the attendant risks.
D. Analysis
Federal law gives the Federal Reserve key authority to determine financial holding
company involvement with physical commodities. For nine years, from 2000 to 2008, the
Federal Reserve used that authority generally to facilitate financial holding company expansion
into physical commodity activities. In response, large financial holding companies like
Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and J PMorgan expanded their commodity activities and asserted
519
Id. at 3334 - 335.
520
Id. at 3335 - 336.
521
See 2/24/2012 “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial
Holding Companies related to Physical Commodities [R-1479],” Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewAllComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1479&doc_ver=1.
522
Id.
523
Id., see, e.g., 4/16/2014 letter from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, American Bankers
Association, et al to the Federal Reserve, “Comment Letter on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities (Docket No. R-1479; RIN 7100 AE-10),” Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140424/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124557_481903450084_1.pdf.
524
Id. See also, e.g., 4/16/2014 comment letter from Subcommittee Chairman Levin, Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124566_481901422162_1.pdf; 4/16/2014 comment letter from Senators Sherrod Brown and
Elizabeth Warren, Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-
1479/R-1479_041614_124552_376253020070_1.pdf; 4/16/2014 comment letter from Americans for Financial
Reform, Federal Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140417/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124629_505856748926_1.pdf .
103
control over vast physical commodity holdings and operations involving the storage, transport,
production, refinement, and trading of oil, natural gas, aluminum, copper, coal, electricity, and
other commodities.
After the financial crisis and a special review conducted by the Federal Reserve raised
concerns about the operational, catastrophic event, valuation, reputational, and systemic risks
posed by physical commodity activities, the Federal Reserve began to reconsider its role.
Beginning in 2010, the Federal Reserve took some initial steps to restrict and reduce financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities. At the same time, the Federal
Reserve failed to resolve ongoing, basic questions about the scope of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
complementary, grandfather, and merchant banking authorities, thereby enabling large financial
holding companies to continue to deepen their involvement with physical commodities. In early
2014, the Federal Reserve announced it was considering issuing new regulations on financial
holding company involvement with physical commodity activities, but nearly a year later has yet
to propose new rules. The Federal Reserve’s failure to resolve key issues related to bank
involvement with physical commodities has weakened longstanding American barriers against
the mixing of banking and commerce as well as longstanding safeguards protecting the U.S.
financial system and economy against undue risk. The following chapters illustrate some of the
consequences.
104
IV. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., a financial holding company since 2008, has described
commodities as one of its core businesses. It currently conducts billions of dollars in physical
commodity activities involving energy, metals, and related businesses, and has expressed a
commitment to continuing in the physical commodities field. This case study examines just
three examples of its physical commodities activities, involving the trading of physical uranium,
the operation of coal mines in Colombia, and possession of a global metals warehousing
business.
A. Overview of Goldman Sachs
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is a global financial services firm incorporated under
Delaware law and headquartered in New York City.
525
It is listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) under the ticker symbol “GS.”
526
In addition to being one of the largest
financial holding companies in the United States, Goldman Sachs conducts operations in more
than 30 countries, has over 32,000 employees, has a market capitalization of $77 billion, and
manages assets of more than $938 billion.
527
In 2013, it reported total consolidated assets of
$912 billion,
528
net revenues of $34.2 billion, and net earnings of $8 billion.
529
Goldman Leadership. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is Lloyd Blankfein, who has held that post since 2006.
530
The
President and Chief Operating Officer is Gary Cohn, and the Chief Financial Officer is Harvey
Schwartz. All three executives started their careers in the firm at its J . Aron & Co. commodities
subsidiary, described below.
531
The Global Head of Commodities, from 2007 to 2012, was
525
7/16/2013 Form 8-K, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.., at cover page [hereinafter 7/16/2013 Goldman Form 8-
K],http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/8k/pdf-attachments/8k-7-16-13.pdf ; see
also “Top Fifty Holding Companies (HC) as of 6/30/2013,” Federal Reserve System, National Information Center,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
526
Undated “Stock Chart,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/stock-
chart/index.html.
527
See undated “Governance at Goldman Sachs[:]Key Facts,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investo...overnance/corporate-governance-documents/key-
facts.pdf; 9/27/2013 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20131001.pdf; 2/28/2013 Form 10-
K, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., at 70 (hereinafter, “2/28/2013 Goldman Form 10-K”),http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/10k/docs/2012-10-K.pdf;“Top Fifty Holding
Companies (HC) as of 6/30/2013,” Federal Reserve System, National Information Center,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
528
See 12/31/2013 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Goldman
Sachs with the Federal Reserve.
529
Undated “Governance at Goldman Sachs: Key Facts,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investo...overnance/corporate-governance-documents/key-
facts.pdf.
530
Undated Goldman biography of Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-
are/leadership/executive-officers/lloyd-c-blankfein.html.
531
See, e.g., “The J . Aron Takeover of Goldman Sachs,” New York Times, Susanne Craig (10/1/2012),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10...of-goldman-sachs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
105
Isabelle Ealet.
532
The current Global Co-Heads of Commodities are Greg Agran and Guy
Saidenberg.
533
The head of Global Commodities Principal Investments is J acques Gabillon.
534
The head of J . Aron & Co. is Ashok Varadhan.
535
(1) Background
Goldman Sachs was formed by Marcus Goldman in 1869, as a small commercial paper
company.
536
It eventually turned to investment banking, specializing in underwriting Initial
Public Offerings for corporations offering stock to the public.
537
After the company lost heavily
in the stock market crash of 1929, it slowly rebuilt its business as a securities firm, providing
investment advice to corporate clients, arranging and executing mergers and acquisitions, and
arranging financing for clients through stock and bond offerings.
538
In 1979, Goldman obtained
a license to trade commodities and, in 1981, launched a major expansion of its commodity
activities.
539
In 1999, Goldman converted from a private partnership to a publicly traded
corporation.
540
Bank Holding Company. In September 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis,
Goldman submitted,
541
and the Federal Reserve approved on the same day,
542
an application for
it to become a bank holding company with access to Federal Reserve lending programs. At the
same time, Goldman converted an industrial bank it held in Utah into a state-chartered bank.
543
532
Undated Goldman biography of Isabelle Ealet, Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-
are/leadership/management-committee/isabelle-ealet.html; “Commodities trading loses its Goldman queen,”
Financial Times, J avier Blas (1/12/2012),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ec8af7f0-3d02-11e1-ae07-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FUdL9Mxe. In 2012, Ms. Ealet was appointed Co-Head of the Securities Division at
Goldman.
533
Subcommittee interview of Greg Agran (10/10/2014).
534
Id.
535
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008.
536
“A Brief History of Goldman Sachs,” WSJ .com,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704671904575193780425970078.html.
537
Id.
538
Id.
539
See Goldman Sachs & Co. FCM information, National Futures Association (NFA) Background Affiliation Status
Information Center (BASIC) website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uZSsBZcBKLE=&rn=Y.
540
“Undated “Governance at Goldman Sachs[:] Key Facts,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/investo...overnance/corporate-governance-documents/key-
facts.pdf.
541
See 9/21/2008 “Confidential Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” FRB-PSI-303638 - 662 (applying to
become banking holding companies).
542
See 9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a1.pdf; 9/21/2008 Goldman Sachs press
release, “Goldman Sachs to Become Fourth Largest Bank Holding Company,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archived/2008/bank-holding-co.html. See also “Shift
for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of an Era,” New York Times, Andrew Ross Sorkin and Vikas Bajaj
(9/21/2008),http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank.html.
543
See 9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a1.pdf. The name of the Utah bank was
Goldman Sachs Bank USA. Id.
106
Goldman also elected to become a financial holding company.
544
Goldman has one U.S.
depository and lending bank, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, which is chartered in New York and
insured by the FDIC.
545
One business unit of the bank is called “GS Private Bank,” which serves
high-net worth individuals and families.
546
The bank is also a registered swap dealer.
547
Goldman also owns several banks outside of the United States, including Goldman Sachs
International Bank of the United Kingdom.
548
As of December 31, 2013, Goldman Sachs Bank
USA and Goldman Sachs International Bank reported a total of about $70 billion in savings,
demand, and time deposits.
549
Key Subsidiaries. In addition to its banks, other key U.S. subsidiaries of The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. include Goldman Sachs & Co., which is registered as a U.S. broker-dealer,
futures commission merchant, and swap dealer; Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP, a U.S.
investment advisor; and J . Aron & Co., a swap dealer, and authorized electrical power
marketer.
550
Two key U.K. subsidiaries are Goldman Sachs International, a U.K. broker-dealer
and swaps dealer; and Goldman Sachs Asset Management International, a U.K. investment
advisor.
551
Major Business Lines. According to Goldman, it has four key business segments: (1)
Investment Banking, which includes work related to mergers and acquisitions, restructurings and
spin-offs, debt and equity underwriting, and derivatives transactions; (2) Institutional Client
Services, which facilitates client transactions primarily for corporations, financial institutions,
investment funds, and governments in fixed income, equity, currency and commodity products;
provides financing, securities lending, and other prime brokerage services; and makes markets
and clears client transactions on major stock, options and futures exchanges worldwide; (3)
Investing & Lending, which invests in and originates loans to clients; and (4) Investment
544
See undated “Financial Holding Companies,” Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
545
See undated “Banking,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-
lending/banking/. Goldman also has a U.K. bank, Goldman Sachs International Bank, and an Irish bank, GS Bank
Europe. See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 2,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
546
See undated “Private Wealth Management Services—United States,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we...nt/private-wealth-management/services/united-
states.html.
547
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 22,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf; undated “Banking,”
Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/banking/.
548
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 2,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
549
Id. at 15; undated “Banking,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-
lending/banking/; undated “Private Wealth Management Services—United States,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we...nt/private-wealth-management/services/united-
states.html.
550
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 2, 22,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
551
Id.
107
Management, which provides investment management and brokerage services, investment
products, and wealth advisory services to high net worth individuals.
552
Commodities. The Institutional Client Services business segment includes Global
Commodities, also referred to by Goldman as “GS Commodities,” which is Goldman’s leading
commodities-related business unit. In 2013, GS Commodities had a total of about 235
employees.
553
According to Goldman, GS Commodities “provides financial and physical risk
management solutions to a wide range of global clients, including utilities, producers, industrial
users, sovereigns, state owned entities, and financial institutions.”
554
In addition, “GS
Commodities invests in commodity-related businesses to generate returns and to create synergies
within the franchise.”
555
The following chart shows how GS Commodities fits within the
holding company’s organizational structure and its own three main subdivisions:
Source: Organizational chart prepared by Goldman Sachs, PSI-Goldman-10-000002.
One of the subdivisions within GS Commodities is Global Commodities Principal
Investing (GCPI) which “invests as principal in companies/assets linked to the global
commodities trade.”
556
Goldman has described GCPI to its Board of Directors as an entity that
552
Undated “At a Glance,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/at-a-glance/index.html;
6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,” at 3,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
553
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of the
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077 - 098, at 078.
554
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011-30, at 015.
555
Id.
556
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 246. See also 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global
108
“seeks attractive risk-adjusted returns … [and] focuse
then held under the Merchant Banking Exemption.”
557
GCPI has sponsored a number of
investment funds which appear to be financed solely by Goldman, with no inclusion of funds
from third party investors. According to Goldman, GCPI investment professionals “do not
operate the businesses in the Group’s portfolio but rather employ experienced management
teams for portfolio companies and supervis[e] investments at [the] board level.”
558
In 2010,
GCPI’s portfolio of investments included 16 projects.
559
According to Goldman, GCPI’s key investments over the years have included an
Australian coal mine, an oil and gas exploration company, a natural gas production company in
the former Soviet Union, a sugar-based ethanol production company in Brazil, and two bulk
carrier shipping joint ventures.
560
Additional key GCPI investments include the Colombian coal
mines and Metro warehousing business, discussed below.
561
GCPI also contributed analysis to
Goldman’s purchase of Nufcor’s uranium trading business, also discussed below.
The key legal entity executing the majority of Goldman’s commodity activities is J . Aron
& Co., a commodities trading firm purchased by Goldman in 1981.
562
GS Commodities books,
for example, the majority of its commodity-related trades, including futures, swaps, options, and
forward transactions, through J . Aron & Co.
563
J . Aron & Co. also acts as “the primary, but not
exclusive, legal entity that engages in market making in commodities and commodity derivative
products” for GS Commodities.
564
In addition, J . Aron & Co. performs some physical
Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by
Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087.
557
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087. In addition, at times, Goldman
also asserted grandfather authority, discussed below, as another potential basis for holding some of the GCPI
investments. See, e.g., 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10 filed by The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303, at 303 (stating that the
investment was “permissible under ][Bank Holding Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the
Merchant Banking regulations.”).
558
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 246.
559
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 265 - 272.
560
Id. at 247; 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of
Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087. See also
3/31/2013 “Commodity, Energy, E&P, Renewable Energy Equity Investments,” chart prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-400065 - 070.
561
See 3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the
Federal Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602243 - 274, at 265; 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global
Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by
Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087.
562
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008; 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011- 030, at 013.
563
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008.
564
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001-
011, at 002.
109
commodity activities, such as selling coal produced by Goldman’s coal mines.
565
J . Aron & Co.
is authorized to act as a swap dealer and electrical power marketer.
566
It currently has about 33
employees who work out of various Goldman offices; J . Aron & Co. has no separate offices of
its own.
567
Commodities-Related Merchant Banking. Goldman also engages in commodity-
related activities through certain investment funds maintained by its Merchant Banking Division,
depicted on the chart above. Goldman describes the Merchant Banking Division as “the primary
center for Goldman Sachs’ long term principal investing activity … across corporate, real estate
and infrastructure strategies.”
568
The Merchant Banking Division houses, for example, GS
Infrastructure Partners, a subsidiary which Goldman established in 2006, to sponsor a private
equity fund focused on infrastructure projects, including ventures involving electricity, natural
gas, and power generation.
569
GS Infrastructure Partners sponsored a $6.5 billion fund in 2006;
and a second $3.1 billion fund in 2010.
570
Its projects have included, for example, a 2014
investment of more than $1 billion to acquire an 18% stake in Dong Energy, the largest utility in
Denmark, which explores for energy and constructs and operates power plants;
571
an investment
in an electricity distribution network in Finland, Elenia Oy;
572
solar and wind generation projects
in J apan;
573
and 100% ownership of a natural gas transmission and distribution company in
Spain, Endesa Gas.
574
The Merchant Banking Division also houses GS Capital Partners, a much
larger private equity fund used by Goldman to invest in such commodity-related ventures as the
$22 billion buyout of Kinder Morgan Inc., a pipeline company.
575
Still another business unit with commodity-related merchant banking investments, also
depicted in the above chart, is the Special Situations Group. Goldman described this group to its
565
See discussion, below, on Goldman’s involvement with coal.
566
See 6/27/2014 “The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Resolution Plan,”at 2, 22,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/goldman-sachs-1g-20140701.pdf.
567
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman legal counsel (10/7/2014).
568
Undated “Direct Private Investing,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-
and-lending/direct-private-investing/index.html.
569
See “Direct Private Investing Equity - GS Infrastructure Partners,” Goldman website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we...ng/direct-private-investing/equity-folder/gs-
infrastructure-partners.html.
570
Id.
571
Goldman’s investment in the largely state-owned utility, when announced to the public, sparked widespread
opposition in Denmark, but was nevertheless completed. See, e.g., “A closer look at a Goldman Sachs deal many in
Denmark find rotten,” Financial Times, Richard Milne (1/31/2014),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/92816e68-8a6e-
11e3-9c29-00144feab7de.html#axzz3EdqIlSm5; “Goldman Deal Threatens Danish Government,” New York Times,
Danny Hakim (1/30/2014),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/goldman-deal-threatens-danish-government/.
572
See, e.g., 3/31/2013 “Commodity, Energy, E&P, Renewable Energy Equity Investments,” chart prepared by
Goldman, FRB-PSI-400065 - 070, at 065.
573
Id. at 066.
574
See, e.g., “Goldman Sachs Infrastructure funds acquire remaining 20 % stake in Endesa Gas,”
InfraPPP (11/8/2013),http://infrapppworld.com/2013/11/goldman-sachs-infrastructure-funds-acquire-remaining-20-
stake-in-endesa-gas.html.
575
See “Direct Private Investing Equity-GS Capital Partners,” Goldman
website,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/direct-private-investing/equity-
folder/gs-capital-partners.html. See also “Kinder Morgan Accepts $15 Billion Buyout Offer,” New York Times, J ad
Mouawad (8/28/2006),http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/28/business/29kindercnd.html?_r=1&.
110
Board of Directors as “specializ[ing] in lending to and investing in middle market companies on
a risk-adjusted return basis. Equity investments are held under the merchant banking
exemption.”
576
As of September 2013, the Global Special Situations Group held “19
investments in commodities assets totaling a current book value of $683 [million] vs. a $13
[billion] total portfolio.”
577
They included a U.S. geothermal energy provider, a wind power
company, a solar power plant, a company involved with residential rooftop solar systems, oil and
gas exploration and drilling companies, and coal facilities.
578
In J une 2014, Goldman reported to the Federal Reserve that it held merchant banking
investments with a total value of about $15 billion, but it is unclear how many of those were
commodity related. It is also unclear whether the total included all of Goldman’s various
commodity-related merchant banking investments, including those made through the Global
Commodities Principal Investing unit, Merchant Banking Division, and Special Situations
Group.
579
Commodities Trading. At the same time it conducts a wide range of physical
commodity activities, Goldman trades commodities-related financial instruments, including
futures, swaps, and options, involving billions of dollars each day. Goldman is among the ten
largest financial institutions in the United States trading financial commodity instruments,
according to Coalition Ltd., a company that collects commodity trading statistics.
580
Data
compiled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which applies to national
banks and does not include their holding companies, indicates Goldman is one of the four largest
banks trading commodity-related derivatives.
581
Commodity Revenues. In a 2011 presentation prepared for its Board of Directors,
Goldman stated: “Over the last 5 years, GS Commodities has generated more than $10 [billion]
of pre-tax earnings, with an average margin of ~60%.”
582
The presentation also noted: “In the
last 2 years, margins and market share have declined dramatically as a result of increased
competition from both financial and non financial institutions.”
583
A 2013 presentation to the
Board of Directors included a chart tracing Goldman’s commodity-related revenues over 30
years. The chart showed that commodity revenues were generally under $500 million from 1981
until 2000, and then began to climb, producing four years of relatively high revenues, from 2006
until 2009, before they once more began to decline. The chart included the following figures:
576
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077 - 098, at 093.
577
Id.
578
Id. at 093 - 094.
579
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies – FR
Y-12,” filed by Goldman, FRB-PSI-800013 - 016.
580
See 3/2014 “Global & Regional Investment Bank League Tables – FY2013”, Coalition, Ltd., PSI-Coalition-01-
000013, at 14, 16.
581
2013 “OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013,” at Tables 1 and 2,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
582
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 013.
583
Id. Goldman identified its key financial competitors as Morgan Stanley, J PMorgan, Barclays, and Deutsche
Bank, while its non-financial competitors were Glencore, Vitol, Mercuria, BP, certain large utilities, and certain
private equity funds. Id. at 016.
111
Global Commodities Revenues
Including Franchise and Principal Investments
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
Revenues $1.4
billion
$3.1
billion
$2.9
billion
$3.3
billion
$3.4
billion
$2.2
billion
$2.0
billion
$1.0
billion
$1.3
billion*
*Partial year amount.
Source: 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors
of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 – 098, at 078.
The 2011 presentation stated that as of October 28, 2011: “Physical business now
accounts for approximately 15-20% of total Franchise Revenues and is expected to increase.”
584
The 2013 presentation stated: “Physical activity represents 6 - 17% of our 2012 global franchise
revenues.”
585
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities
Goldman first became involved with commodities when, in 1979, it registered with the
CFTC as a “Futures Commission Merchant” (FCM) and received authorization to buy and sell
futures and options on regulated exchanges.
586
Two years later, in 1981, it purchased J . Aron &
Co., a commodities trading company that then specialized in precious metals and coffee, but
soon began trading interest rate, foreign currency, and crude oil futures and options.
587
In 1991,
Goldman Sachs launched the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), a mathematical
construct that reflects the dollar value of a diversified basket of commodity futures, and allows
investors to invest in commodities by buying and selling financial instruments whose values are
584
09/2013 presentation, “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group,” prepared by Goldman Sachs,
FRB-PSI-624274 - 295, at 279.
585
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 082.
586
See Goldman Sachs & Co. FCM information, National Futures Association (NFA) Background Affiliation Status
Information Center (BASIC) website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=uZSsBZcBKLE=&rn=Y. For more information on
Futures Commission Merchants, see NFA “Glossary,”http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx?term=futures+commission+merchant (defining FCM as “[a]n
individual or organization which solicits or accepts orders to buy or sell futures or options contracts and accepts
money or other assets from customers in connection with such orders. Must be registered with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.”). The OCC authorized banks to become commodity exchange members as early as
1975, according to an unpublished letter cited in OCC Interpretative Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986), reprinted in
Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85, 604, PSI-OCC-01-000046-061. See also 4/12/2010 Permissible Securities Activities of
Commercial Banks Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),” prepared by
Congressional Research Service,http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41181_20100412.pdf , at 10-11, footnote 54.
587
See also10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 013. See also 6/18/2009 “Goldman Sachs Permissibility
Study Follow-Up-Commodities,” FRB-PSI-200961-979, at 962 (explaining that J . Aron & Co. is registered with
FERC to sell power at market based rates).
112
linked to the index.
588
The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index led to an explosion in commodity
index trading as well as increased futures trading.
589
According to Goldman, by 1997, operating as a securities and commodities firm and not
as a bank, it was trading in physically settled contracts in base metals, such as aluminum, lead,
nickel, and zinc.
590
Goldman reported to the Federal Reserve that it was doing the same for
contracts involving energy commodities, including crude oil, natural gas, gasoline, heating oil,
and jet fuel;
591
and for agricultural products, including wheat, corn, coffee, cocoa, soybeans, and
sugar.
592
In addition, Goldman indicated that it was engaging in physically settled trades in
“power” through a “joint venture with Constellation Energy.”
593
Goldman also told the Federal
Reserve that, by 1997, it had owned or operated an oil refinery with related pipeline and storage
infrastructure, an oil and gas marketing and distribution company, an upstream oil and gas
producer, and a fertilizer producer.
594
Cogentrix Acquisition. In 2003, Goldman purchased Cogentrix Energy, a company
which developed and operated power plants and had ownership interests in 24 different power
related facilities.
595
That acquisition represented one of Goldman’s earliest forays into electrical
power generation.
596
By 2011, Goldman had sold 80% of the Cogentrix portfolio for a gain of
more than $1.6 billion.
597
But it still retained two coal fired power plants in Florida and
Virginia; and a natural gas burning plant in San Diego.
598
In addition, it had diversified into
renewable energy, taking ownership interests in eight hydroelectric and two wind generation
facilities in Turkey, a solar power plant in California, and a photovoltaic solar power facility
under construction in Colorado.
599
By 2008, Goldman had expanded its commodities activities still further. In a list
prepared for the Federal Reserve, Goldman indicated that, in 2008, it owned or operated a carbon
aggregator, bio-diesel refinery, ethanol producer, and liquefied natural gas developer.
600
It had
588
See, e.g., “A Brief History Of Commodities Indexes,” ETF.com, Adam Dunsby and Kurt Nelson (4/12/2010),http://www.etf.com/publications/jou...-a-brief-history-of-commodities-indexes.html.
589
In 2007, Goldman sold the index to Standard & Poors, and it is now known as the S&P GSCI. See, e.g.,
“Goldman Sachs selling popular commodity index,” Market Watch, (2/6/2007),http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-sachs-selling-popular-commodity-index-to-sp.
590
5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, at FRB-
PSI-200600 - 610.
591
Id. at 600.
592
Id. at 601.
593
Id.
594
Id.
595
10/20/2003 Goldman Sachs press release, “Goldman Sachs to Purchase 100% of Cogentrix,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archived/2003/2003-10-20.html.
596
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014).
597
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 029.
598
Id.
599
Id.
600
5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, at FRB-
PSI-200600 – 610, at 601.
113
also become engaged in shipping vessels and mining coal.
601
In addition, Goldman began
trading aluminum alloy, steel, coal, and liquefied natural gas.
602
Bank Holding Company Status. As indicated earlier, in September 2008, in the midst
of the financial crisis, Goldman became a bank holding company. In its expedited application
filed with the Federal Reserve, Goldman explicitly invoked Section 4(o) of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act as legal authority to “grandfather” its existing commodities activities, that otherwise
would not be permitted for a financial holding company.
603
Constellation Energy Acquisition. After its conversion to a bank holding company,
Goldman continued to expand its physical commodity activities.
604
In 2009, according to the
Federal Reserve, Goldman purchased over 3,000 trading assets involving U.K., French, and
German power and U.K. natural gas; as well as about 60 coal contracts, 20 time and voyage
freight agreements, and 900,000 pounds of uranium ore from Constellation Energy, a U.S. utility
and trading business.
605
Included in that acquisition was Nufcor International, a uranium trading
company which stored and traded uranium ore in various stages of enrichment, as further
described below. A later Federal Reserve examination report noted that, by the end of 2009,
Goldman’s physical commodity inventories included $258 million in oil products, $207 million
in natural gas, $140 million in coal, and $3 billion in metals.
606
As the Federal Reserve began to consider whether it should take a closer look at financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities, an initial analysis contained this
depiction of Goldman:
“[Goldman Sachs] is one of the largest players in the commodities market and the
business has been a material driver of revenue for the firm. … Goldman’s commodities
business is active in the physical markets, in terms of trading, transporting, and storing
physical commodities as well as owning power generation and other physical assets.”
607
601
Id.
602
Id. at 600.
603
9/21/2008 “Confidential Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” FRB-PSI-303638 - 662, at 649, 661. Goldman
wrote: “[A]fter becoming an FHC [financial holding company], Goldman will continue to operate its existing
commodity trading business pursuant to the grandfather exception in Section 4(o) …. Goldman Sachs understands
Section 4(o) to permit it to retain all its existing commodity-related businesses and activities because Goldman
Sachs was engaged, prior to September 30, 1997, in the trading, sale, and investment in commodities and underlying
physical properties that were not permissible for BHCs [bank holding companies] on that date. The Section 4(o)
exemption does not require that a company have been engaged prior to September 30, 1997 in all the activities that it
seeks to grandfather under Section 4(o) at the time the company becomes an FHC; rather, it only requires that the
company have been engaged prior to that date in commodity-related activities that were not permissible for a BHC
in the United States on that date. Goldman meets this test, as well as the 5% of total consolidated assets test in
Section 4(o)(2).” Id. at 648- 649.
604
See 3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Principal Investments,” FRB-PSI-
602243 - 274.
605
See 2/2010 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discovery Review: Global Commodities” prepared by
Goldman,FRB-PSI-601685 - 713, at 698.
606
4/8/2010 “Global Commodities Discovery Review,” FRB-PSI-200516-585, at 523.
607
Undated but likely 2010 “Scope Discovery Review Memo[:] Goldman Sachs Group Commodities,” prepared by
FRBNY examiners, FRB-PSI-200511 - 515, at 511 [sealed exhibit].
114
Additional Acquisitions. Goldman continued to expand its physical commodity
activities throughout 2010. One of its acquisitions was Metro International Trade Services, the
global metals warehousing business discussed further below.
608
Another was its purchase of a
natural gas trading book from Nexen Inc., a Canadian natural gas business that reportedly bought
and sold about 6 billion cubic feet of gas per day and managed more than 50 billion cubic feet of
gas storage capacity.
609
A third acquisition was taking ownership of a coal mine and related
assets in Colombia, as discussed in more detail below.
610
The Federal Reserve determined that, by 2010, Goldman’s holdings included crude oil
and natural gas exploration and production efforts in the North Sea, Central Asia, and North
Africa; bulk carrier shipping through a joint-venture headquartered in Europe and another in
J apan; and a coal mine in Australia.
611
According to Goldman, by then it was also trading
physical palm oil, rubber, and asphalt.
612
A 2011 presentation by Goldman to its Board of Directors provided these “[e]xamples of
physical client activity”: supplying jet fuel to Delta and Qatar airlines; supplying crude oil
feedstock to Independent Refiner Alon and then purchasing the refined products; and supplying
coal to Utility Drax.
613
It also stated: “We expect a larger increase in Physical activity in
Growth Markets relative to Developed Markets.”
614
The last page of the presentation stated that
Goldman would be able to attribute a high valuation to GS Commodities “if the business was
able to grow physical activities, unconstrained by regulation and integrated with the financial
activities.”
615
In 2011, Goldman also reported to the Federal Reserve that it provided risk management
services to clients involving various types of commodities, including crude oil and refined
products, power and natural gas, coal, freight, emissions and iron ore, base and precious metals,
index products, and agricultural products.
616
Goldman indicated that, in November 2011, it had
608
See 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 014, 027.
609
Id. at 014, 022. See also, e.g., “Goldman expands in commods with Nexen unit buy,” Reuters, J oe Silha and J eff
J ones (5/14/2010),http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/14/us-goldman-nexen-naturalgas-
idUSTRE64D53120100514.
610
See 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 028.
611
3/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments[:] Commodities Private Equity Presentation to the Federal
Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-606243 - 274, at 247. See also “A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks,
Pure Gold,” New York Times, David Kocieniewski (7/20/2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-
shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-gold.html?ref=business; 07/23/2013 Goldman Sachs press release,
“Goldman Sachs on Aluminum and Physical Commodities,”http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/in-the-
news/archive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-23-13.html.
612
5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” FRB-PSI-200600 – 610, at
600.
613
10/28/2011 “Global Commodities[:] Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700011 - 030, at 019.
614
Id.. at 021.
615
Id. at 030.
616
11/2011 “Global Commodities Business Overview,” FRB-PSI-000857 - 872, at 858.
115
over 1,000 active clients in its commodities business.
617
Those clients included producers,
consumers, industrial users, central banks, pension funds, wealth managers, and other financial
institutions,
618
with corporate clients accounting for about 45% of its global commodities
clients.
619
In 2011, the Federal Reserve estimated that Goldman had physical commodity assets
worth $26 billion.
620
(3) Current Status
When the Federal Reserve initiated its special review of financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities in 2010, Goldman was one of the ten banks it examined
in detail. Goldman was also featured in the internal Summary Report prepared by the Federal
Reserve’s Commodities Team summarizing the findings of the special review.
621
The nonpublic 2012 Summary Report described Goldman’s wide-ranging physical
commodity activities. They included Goldman’s acquisition of Cogentrix, with its ownership
interests in over 30 power plants;
622
direct ownership of four tolling agreements with other
power plants;
623
direct ownership of Metro, with 84 metal warehouses around the world;
624
the
Colombian coal mines and related assets;
625
as well as the uranium trading business.
626
The
2012 Summary Report also noted that Goldman and J PMorgan together had a “total of 20-25
ships under time charters or voyages transporting oil [and] Liquefied Natural Gas.”
627
In addition to surveying the extent of Goldman’s physical commodity activities, the 2012
Summary Report by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team identified multiple concerns with
those activities. One concern was that Goldman had insufficient capital and insurance to cover
potential losses from a catastrophic event. The report noted at one point that Goldman’s
catastrophic risk valuation methodology for its power plants was to use “simply the current value
of its most valuable power plant,” with no provision for potential expenses stemming from loss
of life, worker disability, facility replacement, or a “failure to deliver electricity under
contract.”
628
At another point, the 2012 Summary Report compared the level of Goldman’s
capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with “extreme loss scenarios,”
and found that “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by $1 to $15 billion.
629
If
617
Id.
618
Id.
619
Id. at 862.
620
2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by FRBNY Commodities Team, FRB-PSI-
200465 - 476, at 465 [sealed exhibit].
621
See 10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by FRBNY Commodities Team, (hereinafter,
“2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 – 510 [sealed exhibit].
622
Id. at 485.
623
Id.
624
Id. at 486.
625
Id.
626
Id.
627
Id. at 486.
628
Id. at 494.
629
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
116
Goldman were to incur losses from its physical commodity activities while maintaining
insufficient capital and insurance protections, the Federal Reserve, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers,
could be asked to rescue the firm.
In 2013, when the Subcommittee asked Goldman about its physical commodity activities,
the financial holding company provided information that, consistent with the Summary Report,
illustrated its far-reaching commodity operations. Goldman reported trading in the physical
commodities of aluminum, copper, gold, lead, nickel, palladium, platinum, silver, tin, zinc, coal,
crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, jet kerosene, and natural gas.
630
Goldman also reported
maintaining substantial inventories of many physical commodities. At the end of 2011 (the latest
year in which complete data was provided to the Subcommittee), those inventories included
approximately 231,000 metric tons of aluminum, 37,000 metric tons of copper, 3,000 metric tons
of nickel, 2.2 million barrels of crude oil, 245,000 barrels of heating oil, 2 million barrels of jet
kerosene, and 106.5 million BTUs of natural gas.
631
In addition, Goldman has continued to own
and operate coal mines in Colombia, supply uranium to power plants, and operate a global
metals warehouse business.
632
Continuing Physical Commodities. Although several other bank holding companies
have begun to exit their physical commodity activities, Goldman executives have indicated that
Goldman remains committed to commodities as a core business.
633
In September 2013, Goldman
CEO Lloyd Blankfein described commodities as a “core, strategic business” for the bank.
634
In
an October 2013 earnings conference call, in response to questions from analysts, Goldman’s
Chief Financial Officer Harvey Schwartz described commodities as an “essential business for
our clients,” and stated: “We have no intention of selling our [commodities] business.”
635
Despite those public statements, in the last two years, Goldman has sold or attempted to
sell certain commodity assets. In 2012, it sold Cogentrix Energy and essentially exited the
business of operating power plants.
636
In 2013, it signaled that Metro International and its
630
2/12/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,”PSI-
GoldmanSachs-01-000001 - 008, at 002 - 004; 2/12/2013 Goldman Response to Subcommittee Questionnaire,
GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R - 003-R.
631
See 2/12/2013 Goldman Response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R - 003-R, at
003-R.
632
See discussion below.
633
See “Goldman Sachs Stands Firm as Banks Exit Commodity Trading,” Bloomberg , Ambereen Choudhury
(4/22/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-22/goldman-sachs-stands-firm-as-banks-exit-
commodity-trading.html.
634
“As rivals fade, Goldman Sachs stands firm on commodities,” Reuters, J onathan Leff and Dmitry Zhdannikov,
(12/6/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/06/us-banks-commodities-idUSBRE9B50S720131206. See
also “Goldman Serves Crucial Physical Commodities Role, Blankfein Says,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore
(9/18/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-18/goldman-serves-crucial-physical-commodities-role-
blankfein-says.html.
635
“Goldman Q3 commodity revenue down ‘significantly’ on Q2” (10/17/2013), Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/goldman-results-commodities-idUSL1N0I70OD20131017.
636
9/6/2012 Carlyle Group press release, “The Carlyle Group to Acquire Cogentrix Energy Assets and Power
Project Development and Acquisition Platform,”http://www.carlyle.com/news-room/news-release-archive/carlyle-
group-acquire-cogentrix-energy-assets-and-power-project-devel.
117
warehouses were up for sale, although it has yet to conclude a transaction.
637
In 2014, Goldman
announced that Nufcor and its uranium trading business were for sale.
638
Goldman told the
Subcommittee that it has yet to receive an acceptable bid for Nufcor and has decided instead to
wind down the business which, due to long-term uranium supply contracts, will require Goldman
to continue supplying uranium to one power plant until 2018.
639
Goldman told the
Subcommittee it is also considering selling its Colombian coal mines.
640
Despite those
statements and actions to sell or shut down certain aspects of its physical commodity activities,
Goldman informed the Subcommittee that it intended to remain active in the commodities
business and will seek to continue its physical commodity activities.
641
637
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/17/2014); “Goldman explores sale of Metro metals warehouse business,”
Reuters, J osephine Mason and David Sheppard (4/11/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/11/us-goldman-
metro-idUSBRE93A0IO20130411.
638
“Goldman puts 'for sale' sign on Iran's old uranium supplier”, Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211.
639
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014).
640
Id.
641
Id.
118
B. Goldman Involvement with Uranium
For the past five years, Goldman Sachs has owned, marketed, and traded physical
uranium and related financial instruments. Goldman initiated its physical and financial trading
of uranium in 2009, a year after it became a bank holding company, by acquiring a longtime
industry leader in the uranium markets, Nufcor International Ltd. Goldman claimed that it had
legal authority to engage in uranium trading under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “grandfather”
clause. Since no Nufcor employees came to Goldman as part of the sale, Goldman employees
ran the business. Within three years of purchase, Goldman increased the volume of Nufcor’s
uranium trading tenfold, from an annualized amount of about 1.3 million pounds to 13 million
pounds, and increased its long-term uranium supply contracts from two to nine utilities with
nuclear power plants. Goldman stored its physical uranium in at least six storage facilities in the
United States and abroad, owned by unrelated parties.
Goldman’s uranium-related activities, which are expected to continue until at least 2018,
raise multiple concerns, including insufficient capital and insurance to protect against a
catastrophic event, unfair competition, and conflicts of interest arising from controlling physical
uranium supplies while trading uranium financial instruments.
(1) Background on Uranium
Uranium (U) is a dense, weakly radioactive, naturally occurring metal
642
that is most
commonly used for power generation and nuclear weapons. It is found in rocks and ores that
make up approximately three percent of the earth’s crust, and so is not considered a rare metal.
643
In its natural form, uranium is found in three different isotopes: Uranium-238, Uranium-
235, and Uranium-234, with U-235, the isotope used for nuclear enrichment, comprising only
about 0.7 percent of natural uranium.
644
To be useful for power generation or military purposes,
the percentage of U-235 in a given sample needs to be increased significantly. Power plants
need uranium to contain about 5% U-235,
645
while military weapons require uranium to contain
at least 90%.
646
642
10/1/2012 “Radiation Protection[:] Uranium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website,http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.html.
643
12/2008 “New Product Memorandum [:] Uranium Trading,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at
049 (hereinafter “12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading”); Being Nuclear: Africans
and the Global Uranium Trade, (The MIT Press, 2012) (hereinafter, “Being Nuclear”), Gabrielle Hecht, at 51
(“ranium wasn’t confined to particular geological formations or geographical locations. The stuff was
everywhere.”).
644
10/1/2012 “Radiation Protection[:] Uranium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website,http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.html.
645
See 10/1/2014 “Uranium Enrichment,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission website,http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html; See also 3/2014 “What is Uranium? How Does it
Work?,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-
cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/.
646
See 3/2014 “What is Uranium? How Does it Work?,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/.
119
To increase the concentration of U-235, uranium must go through a fuel processing cycle.
The process begins when the uranium ore is refined and processed to generate triuranium
octaoxide (U
3
O
8
or U3O8), otherwise known as “yellowcake.”
647
U3O8 is “an inert, stable,
insoluble oxide.”
648
In the next step of the fuel processing cycle, by removing impurities and
combining it with fluorine, the U3O8 is converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF
6
or UF6). The
only conversion plant currently operating in the United States is located in Metropolis,
Illinois.
649
In the next step in the process, the UF6 is enriched to increase the level of U-235.
650
The
enriched UF6 is then solidified and processed into uranium oxide (UO
2
), which can be used to
manufacture nuclear fuel rods for power plants.
651
This multi-step enrichment process was
depicted in the following chart included in a Goldman internal memorandum advocating the
financial holding company’s involvement with uranium trading:
Figure 1. The Uranium Fuel Processing Cycle.
652
Health Risks. The health-related risks of uranium itself as well as from the fuel
processing cycle can be significant. While uranium in its natural form is not considered a
harmfully radioactive substance, it is toxic after processing.
653
Exposure to too much uranium
has been found to increase cancer risk and cause liver damage.
654
Further, various stages of
uranium processing involve strong acids and produce extremely corrosive chemicals that could
cause fires or explosions.
655
647
12/2008 “New Product Memorandum,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 049.
648
Id.
649
Id. (noting other conversion plants in Canada, France, United Kingdom, China, and Russia).
650
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 049.
651
Id.
652
Id.
653
Id. at 50.
654
10/1/2012 “Radiation Protection[:] Uranium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website,http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.html.
655
5/21/2014 “Uranium Conversion,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission website,http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-conversion.html.
120
Regulatory Framework. The regulatory landscape for owning and processing uranium
varies as uranium is enriched and moves closer to useable form for fuel or weapons. In the
United States, a person may not take title to or possession of, or import or export uranium,
without obtaining a general or specific license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).
656
In 1980, the NRC issued a regulation which automatically grants a “general” license,
without any application requirement, to any U3O8 or un-enriched UF6 title holder who does not
physically possess, move, or process the uranium.
657
That regulation effectively allows uranium
owners to buy and sell the uranium without having to obtain a specific U.S. license, so long as
they do not take physical possession of the metal. At the same time, the NRC has imposed
significant licensing requirements on parties involved with the physical transport, handling, and
processing of uranium.
658
Other countries have different regulatory requirements regarding the storage, transport,
enrichment, and trading of uranium. An ongoing regulatory issue is whether uranium should be
treated as nuclear material requiring careful monitoring and trading restrictions, or a profit-
generating commodity freely transferable among parties interested in buying and selling it.
659
Uranium Markets. According to the World Nuclear Association, over 400 nuclear
power plants scattered over 30 countries use uranium to generate about 12% of the world’s
power supply.
660
Those nuclear power plants have created a market for about 160-170 million
pounds of uranium oxide concentrate per year.
661
To meet that demand, uranium is usually
purchased by utilities or power plants directly from the producers using long term supply
contracts.
662
The prices for those contracted deliveries are usually linked to the spot prices of
uranium at the time of delivery.
663
Uranium-related trading can occur in a number of ways, including trading in: (1)
physical uranium at various stages of its life cycle; (2) uranium financial instruments, including
futures, forwards, options, or swaps; (3) certain rights related to uranium, such as “Conversion
656
See Section 62 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 83-703, codified at 42 U.S.C. §2011 (“Unless authorized
by a general or specific license issued by the Commission, which the Commission is hereby authorized to issue, no
person may transfer or receive in interstate commerce, transfer, deliver, receive possession of or title to, or import
into or export from the United States any source material after removal from its place of deposit in nature … ”).
657
10 C.F.R. § 40.21, 45 Fed. Reg. 65531, (Oct. 3, 1980) (“A general license is hereby issued authorizing the receipt
of title to source or byproduct material, as defined in this part, without regard to quantity. This general license does
not authorize any person to receive, possess, deliver, use, or transfer source or byproduct material.”).
658
Subcommittee briefing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (9/23/2014).
659
See, e.g., Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade, (The MIT Press, 2012) (hereinafter, “Being
Nuclear”), Gabrielle Hecht, at 31-36, 56-57.
660
3/2014 “What is Uranium? How Does it Work?,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/.
661
4/2014 “Uranium Markets,” World Nuclear Association website,http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-
cycle/uranium-resources/uranium-markets/ (stating 170 million pounds).
662
Id.
663
Id. Because of the extensive amount of processing required to make uranium useful, only about one third of the
cost of nuclear fuel for a power plant is the cost of the original uranium. Id. Further, the “spot” prices for uranium
are not based on actual transactions, but are instead published by survey services that are integrally involved in these
markets. See 12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 052.
121
Service Certificates” or “Separative Work Units”; and (4) shares of uranium-related companies
or an index that tracks uranium-related companies’ stock prices.
664
Uranium is commonly traded as a physical commodity at two stages in its life cycle:
U3O8 (triuranium octoxide) and as UF6 (uranium hexafluoride).
665
The total volume of those
two physical markets is relatively small.
With respect to uranium financial instruments, CME Group Inc. lists a standardized
uranium-related futures contract for 250 pounds of U3O8.
666
This financially settled contract is
traded on the CME Globex and CME ClearPort trading platforms, and is linked to prices
provided by Ux Consulting Company, LLC.
667
It was established and began trading for the first
time on May 6, 2007.
668
In recent years, the uranium futures market has had relatively few
participants, the U3O8 contract has rarely traded, and open interest has generally remained
relatively low.
669
Uranium can also be traded through two unique financial instruments tied to its
processing cycle. The right to “convert” U3O8 into UF6, represented by a U3O8 “Conversion
Services Certificate,” can be traded on an over-the-counter basis.
670
These certificates grant the
holder a place in line to convert U3O8 to UF6 at a conversion facility.
671
Similarly, a
“Separative Work Unit,” representing the “right” to enrich uranium at a particular enrichment
facility by a particular amount, can also be traded over the counter.
672
Finally, although more removed, investors seeking to profit from changes in uranium
prices may invest in a company engaged in the uranium business or in one or more exchange
traded funds that track stocks of companies involved in uranium.
673
In recent years, the uranium market has experienced significant price fluctuations, based
on massive swings in market sentiment towards nuclear power and technology changes for
alternative sources of energy. Price swings in the U3O8 spot market illustrate the price variance
and increased volatility in recent years.
664
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 030 - 040.
665
Id.
666
See “UxC Uranium U3O8 Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/other/uranium_contract_specifications.html.
667
Id.
668
When it first began trading, the futures contract was on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) Clear
Port and CME Globex platforms. See “CME/NYMEX Uranium Futures (UX) Contract[:]
CME/NYMEX Partners with Ux Consulting to Offer Uranium Futures Contracts,” Ux Consulting Company, LLC
website,http://www.uxc.com/data/nymex/NymexOverview.aspx.
669
There are frequently zero reported trades per day. For example, for the week of September 9-September 16,
2014, only one trade was reported, involving 50 contracts. See “UxC Uranium U3O8 Volume,” CME Group
website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/other/uranium_quotes_volume_voi.html.
670
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
671
Id.
671
Id.
672
Id.
673
For example, an investor could invest in the Global X Uranium ETF, which tracks the Solactive Global Uranium
Index and is traded on NYSE Arca under symbol URA. See “Global X Uranium ETF,” Global X Funds website,http://www.globalxfunds.com/URA.
122
Ux U3O8 Price - Full History (Spot U3O8-Full)
*Chart prepared by Ux Consulting Company, LLC
674
This price history reflects fundamental changes in the uranium market. In particular, in
the mid-2000s, a renewed focus on global warming
675
led to widespread speculation that nuclear
power would expand, leading to an increase in uranium prices. U3O8 spot market prices peaked
at about $135 per pound, at nearly the same time as the U3O8 futures product began trading for
the first time in May 2007.
676
Demand for nuclear power sources then waned, as huge stores of
relatively inexpensive natural gas became available as an alternative energy source. J ust as
prices began to recover amid a renewed push for low carbon dioxideemission energy sources to
counter global warning, the nuclear disaster occurred at the Fukushima Diachii nuclear power
plant in J apan in March 2011. “The accident … called nuclear power’s prospects into question
and the spot price [of U3O8] has declined dramatically since that time.”
677
Governments shut
down nuclear power plants,
678
postponed plans for new ones, and began to shift to other power
sources.
679
From a peak of about $135 per pound in 2007, U3O8 spot market prices have since
fallen to about $40 today.
674
Ux Consulting Company, LLC,http://www.uxc.com/review/UxCPriceChart.aspx?chart=spot-u3o8-full.
675
In May 2006, the movie, “An Inconvenient Truth” was released, for example, which significantly raised
awareness of global warming. See “ 'An Inconvenient Truth': Al Gore's Fight Against Global Warming,” New York
Times, Andrew Revkin (5/22/2006),http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/movies/22gore.html?pagewanted=all.
676
See, e.g., “Uranium stocks rally in advance of NYMEX futures trading,” U3O8.biz, Robert Simpson (5/3/2007),http://www.u3o8.biz/s/MarketComment...97&_Title=Uranium-stocks-rally-in-advance-of-
NYMEX-futures-trading (“The NYMEX will list a uranium futures contract on Monday, May 7, as the energy and
metals exchange looks to capitalize on surging interest in the nuclear fuel.”); Being Nuclear, at 329.
677
2014 Review, prepared by Energy Resources International, Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of
Nuclear Energy, at 5,http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f15/ERI Market Analysis.pdf.
678
Id. at 4 (noting J apan temporarily shut down some nuclear facilities while Germany permanently shut facilities).
679
See, e.g., “Uranium Market,” Uranium Participation Corporation website,http://www.uraniumparticipation.com/s/Uranium_Market.asp (explaining current lower uranium prices).
123
Because the uranium market is volatile and has relatively few participants, it poses
significant risks for those who trade in it. As one website discussing uranium investments
warned: “Uranium futures carry a double whammy of being thinly traded and very volatile.”
680
(2) Background on Nufcor
The Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa (Nufcor), the predecessor to Nufcor
International Ltd., was formed by South African gold mining companies in the 1960s, to process
and market uranium to the nascent nuclear power industry.
681
The companies had previously
sold the bulk of the uranium obtained as a byproduct of their gold mining to the United States
and United Kingdom for military purposes.
682
The creation of Nufcor marked a significant shift in market focus away from military
sales towards commercial power plants, and Nufcor became a supplier of uranium products used
to produce nuclear fuel rods for nuclear power plants around the world.
683
Among other
countries, in the 1970s, Nufcor sold enriched uranium to Iran.
684
In 1999, Nufcor incorporated a new subsidiary in London, Nufcor International Ltd., to
undertake trading in nuclear fuel cycle products and services. Nufcor also created an investment
adviser, Nufcor Capital Ltd., which managed an investment fund, Nufcor Uranium Ltd., for
uranium-related investments.
685
By the mid-2000s, Nufcor and its related affiliates were actively
engaged in owning physical uranium, trading financial products related to uranium, and advising
investors’ on uranium-related investments.
686
On J une 26, 2008, Nufcor was bought by the Constellation Energy Group, a U.S. firm that
operated several nuclear power plants, for about $103 million.
687
680
10/2/2014 “How to Invest in Uranium,” Demand Media, Karen Rogers,http://finance.zacks.com/invest-
uranium-5543.html.
681
“Goldman puts ‘for sale’ sign on Iran’s old uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211.
682
See Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade, (The MIT Press, 2012) (hereinafter, “Being
Nuclear”), Gabrielle Hecht, at 68, 89.
683
See Being Nuclear, at 68 - 69, 72.
684
11/16/2014 email from Professor Gabrielle Hecht to Subcommittee; “Goldman puts 'for sale' sign on Iran's old
uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/goldman-
uranium-idUSL2N0LC0ZV20140211.
685
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 06, Exhibit A, at GSPSICOMMODS00046240.
686
See 2008 Form 10-K for Constellation Energy Group, Inc., filed with the SEC on 2/27/09, at 152 - 153,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9466/000104746909002000/a2190570z10-k.htm.
687
Id. at 1, 152. The two owners of Nufcor at the time were AngloGold Ashanti and FirstRand International.
Constellation Energy’s purchase of Nufcor led to speculation in the press that it “could trigger a trend where utilities
start to trade uranium as a commodity.” “Constellation poised to buy Nufcor Intl,” Mineweb, Anna Stablum
(5/7/2008),http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/content/en/mineweb-fast-news?oid=52522&sn=Detail.
124
(3) Goldman Involvement with Physical Uranium
Goldman’s involvement with physical uranium began with a 2008 proposal by GS
Commodities to get into the business of trading physical and financial uranium products and
processing rights.
688
In 2009, Goldman purchased Nufcor, and expanded its business over the
next five years, resulting in Goldman’s buying millions of pounds of uranium, controlling
inventories of physical uranium at storage facilities in the United States and Europe, and
becoming a long term supplier of physical uranium to nine utilities with nuclear power plants.
Because no employees who conducted Nufcor’s business joined Goldman after the sale,
Goldman employees ran the business. In 2014, for a variety of reasons, Goldman decided it
would sell Nufcor or wind it down. It currently has contractual obligations to supply physical
uranium to one nuclear power plant until 2018.
(a) Proposing Physical Uranium Activities
In December 2008, three months after Goldman became a bank holding company,
Goldman’s commodities group, GS Commodities, sought approval from senior Goldman
management to expand its physical commodity activities to include “trading physical and
financial Uranium products and processing rights.”
689
As a way of initiating this activity, GS
Commodities advocated acquiring Nufcor International Ltd., which was “a recognized name in
the uranium industry,”
690
and which was then owned by Constellation Energy Group.
691
The proposal, which was sponsored by Goldman’s Global Head of Commodities, Isabelle
Ealet, was memorialized in a 2008 “New Product Memorandum.”
692
The memorandum was
submitted to Goldman’s European Federation New Products Committee for approval.
693
The
New Products Committee, which included approximately a dozen Goldman executives, focused
on ensuring that Goldman had the ability to support the proposed new activities from
compliance, legal, tax, and operational perspectives.
694
The New Product Memorandum detailed
Goldman’s understanding of Nufcor’s business activities, highlighted some of the associated
risks, and ultimately recommended purchasing the company.
695
Describing Nufcor’s Business. According to the Goldman analysis in the New Product
Memorandum, Nufcor’s business model was focused around four distinct activities involving the
trading of physical and financial uranium products, the marketing of uranium ore supplied by
688
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
689
Id. Goldman told the Subcommittee that while it may have previously traded in uranium to a minimal degree,
creating a dedicated business line to conduct uranium transactions in the financial and physical markets was a major
change in the nature, scope, and volume of its uranium activities, and necessitated a new product presentation and
approval. Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
690
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
691
Constellation Energy is a longtime operator of nuclear power plants in the United States. See 2008 Form 10-K
for Constellation Energy Group, Inc., filed with the SEC on 2/27/09,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9466/000104746909002000/a2190570z10-k.htm.
692
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
693
Id.
694
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
695
See 12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052.
125
two mining companies, and advising on uranium-related investments.
696
Goldman described the
four business activities as follows:
(1) “Arbitrage across elements and processes in the uranium fuel cycle including time-
spreads and inventory carry trades to capture contango differentials”;
697
(2) “Speculation on individual elements and processes in the fuel cycle”;
698
(3) “Fulfilment of Agency Agreements with two mining companies for the marketing and
sale of U3O8”;
699
and
(4) “Provision of Advisory and Custodian services to Nufcor Capital Ltd, a closed-ended
investment fund that buys and holds UF6 & U3O8.”
700
The Goldman analysis found that Nufcor International Ltd. traded a significant volume of
physical and financial uranium-related products. Its trading activity included:
• 3.6 million pounds of physical U3O8 during 2008;
• 460,000 kilograms of physical UF6 during 2008;
• 1.3 million pounds of U3O8, using exchange based products and bilateral swap
agreements during 2008;
• 760,000 kilograms of uranium in Conversion Service Credits (rights to convert U3O8
to UF6) during 2007; and
• 500,000 kilograms of uranium in Separative Work Units (rights to enrich UF6).
701
In addition, the December 2008 Goldman analysis noted that Nufcor possessed a large inventory
of physical uranium products which, in 2008, included:
• 1.15 million pounds of U3O8;
702
• 200,000 kilograms of UF6; and
• Conversion Service Credits representing 770,000 kilograms of uranium.
703
The Goldman analysis valued the entire portfolio at $47 million dollars, which included a
physical uranium inventory worth $90 million, but also certain uranium forward positions that
were then out of the money by $55 million.
704
696
Id.
697
Id. at 040. See also “Arbitrage,” Investopedia.com,http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp (“The
simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset in order to profit from a difference in the price.”).
698
Id. According to the Goldman analysis, Nufcor then held inventories of U3O8 and UF
6
, as well as uranium
Conversion Service Credits which had been loaned to Honeywell, but were due to return to Nufcor in 2009. Id.
699
Id. According to the Goldman analysis, Nufcor then had annual retainer and sales commission arrangements
with Uranium One and with AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., the South African gold mining consortium. Id.
700
Id.
701
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 040.
702
Id. This figure of 1.15 million pounds of U3O8 was contradicted a few pages later, at FRB-PSI-400046, where
Goldman indicated that Nufcor had only about 623,000 pounds of U3O8, nearly 500,000 fewer pounds than first
indicated at FRB-PSI-400040 in the same memorandum.
703
Id.
704
Id. A few pages later, however, the memorandum indicated that Nufcor had only about 623,000 pounds of
U3O8, and its total physical uranium portfolio had an estimated value of only about $64 million. Id. at 046.
126
Identifying Key Nufcor Risks. In addition to describing Nufcor’s business activities
and current uranium holdings, the New Product Memorandum identified and analyzed a number
of risks associated with taking on Nufcor’s uranium-related activities.
705
They included
valuation and market risks, liquidity risks, catastrophic event liability issues, compliance issues,
regulatory risks, credit risks, inventory management concerns, trade reporting issues, and tax
considerations.
706
The description of those risks informed senior Goldman management that the
proposed uranium-related activities were high-risk. The key risks included the following.
Valuation Risks and Market Risks. A significant portion of the analysis in the New
Product Memorandum focused on trade-related risks, including valuation risks, market risks, and
the consequences of declining uranium prices.
The Goldman analysis warned that obtaining accurate valuations for uranium had a
number of challenges. It stated that there was “no spot market or spot price marker” that an
owner of uranium could use to determine daily uranium prices.
707
Instead, it found that weekly
“spot” prices were published by two consulting firms based on “market sentiment and qualifying
bids,” rather than completed transactions.
708
The Goldman analysis stated that Goldman had not
yet tested the “rigor/robustness” of those weekly price markers.
709
The Goldman analysis also
found that there was “no exchange-traded commodity market for physical uranium products.”
710
The absence of an active physical exchange market, again, made valuing uranium products more
difficult than for other commodities, adding to the risk of holding the assets.
With respect to market risks, the Goldman analysis highlighted uranium’s volatile prices.
It stated that the “disconnect between [fair value] of physical inventory and the lack of [mark-to-
market] on the forward positions may result in [profit and loss] volatility for the Uranium
portfolio.”
711
The Goldman analysis also highlighted Nufcor’s then out-of-the-money net short
position in uranium forwards, concluding that it could give rise to further losses if uranium prices
declined.
712
Those financial instrument losses would be in addition to losses from the declining
value of the physical uranium Nufcor also held.
Operational Risks. In addition to price volatility and valuation issues, the Goldman
analysis identified a number of operational concerns related to physical uranium. One key issue
was whether Goldman’s existing systems could accurately track physical and financial uranium
705
Id. at 042.
706
Id. at 043 - 048.
707
Id. at 042.
708
Id. Reliance on bids rather than completed transactions can result in inaccurate pricing and even abusive
practices. For example, widespread manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR), benchmarks
underpinning trillions of dollars in derivatives, was achieved in part through submissions of inaccurate and
misleading bids, as opposed to actual transactions. See, e.g., 2/6/2013 U.S. Department of J ustice press release,
“RBS Securities J apan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR
Benchmark Interest Rates,”http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/292421.htm.
709
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, at FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 042.
710
Id.
711
Id. at 047.
712
Id. at 045.
127
transactions, given the absence of standardized uranium trade documentation.
713
The
memorandum indicated that trade capturing and reporting mechanisms would need to be
developed so that uranium transactions could utilize Goldman’s existing confirmation,
settlement, and operations systems.
714
The Goldman analysis also noted that personnel would be
needed to manage Nufcor’s physical inventories.
715
Another key issue raised in the memorandum was ensuring that Goldman could manage
its positions through effective hedging. The Goldman analysis indicated that it might be difficult
to hedge particular uranium positions due to the lack of robust trading in the futures market. For
example, the analysis noted that uranium futures were so thinly-traded that Nufcor’s 2008 open
interest of 139,000 pounds of U3O8 futures was about 20% of the overall open interest in the
product.
716
The memorandum warned that hedging significant exposures would be difficult due
to the lack of many counterparties in the market, adding to the risk of holding uranium assets.
The New Product Memorandum also noted that the market was characterized by “long-
term physical participants trading with each other,” which could lead to significant informational
disadvantages for new entrants, like Goldman.
717
Put another way, the memorandum indicated
that it might be difficult for Goldman to fully understand the market at a given time, and that it
could be more readily taken advantage of by other market participants with more experience
trading uranium.
Credit Risks. In contrast to the operational risks, Goldman found that the counterparty
credit risks arising from a Nufcor acquisition were not significant.
718
The Goldman analysis
noted that many of the counterparties in the uranium market were large multinational
corporations or government-related entities, and tended to have strong credit.
719
Goldman also evaluated the credit risks of the third party facilities where Nufcor stored
its uranium.
720
The memorandum examined five companies with storage facilities: Cameco
Corp.;
721
Comurhex;
722
ConverDyn;
723
EURODIF S.A.;
724
and USEC, Inc.
725
The memorandum
713
Id.
714
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 047 - 048.
715
Id. at 047. The memorandum observed that Goldman already had “experience of managing physical unallocated
products for metals and coal,” as well as products with different quality levels, such as coal with different sulfur
content, suggesting that Goldman should also be able to manage the physical uranium inventory. Id.
716
Id. at 042.
717
Id.
718
Id. at 045.
719
Id.
720
Id. at 046.
721
Cameco Corp. is the largest U.S. uranium producer with mines in Wyoming and Nebraska. See “About,”
Cameco Corp. website,http://www.cameco.com/usa/.
722
Comurhex is a subsidiary of AREVA, a French multinational group that specializes in nuclear power plants and
owns a uranium conversion facility in France. See “The History of Comurhex Pierrelatte,” AREVA website,http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-...hex-pierrelatte-from-1959-to-the-comurhex-ii-
project.html.
723
ConverDyn is a partnership between affiliates of Honeywell and General Atomics, and has uranium storage
facilities in Illinois. See “Our Business,” ConverDyn website,http://www.converdyn.com/business/index.html;
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” at PSI-
GoldmanSachs-21-000010 - 004.
128
expressed concern about USEC’s credit profile,
726
and noted that Goldman would not want to
add to that credit exposure if it were to acquire Nufcor.
727
Regulatory Risks. Goldman next assessed the regulatory risks associated with an
acquisition of Nufcor. The memorandum framed the issue as whether Nufcor’s uranium
activities: (1) were consistent with the laws governing all persons regarding uranium, and (2)
would be permitted by its banking regulators.
The New Product Memorandum noted that “ranium processing and storage (in all
forms) is heavily regulated.”
728
It briefly analyzed regulatory issues in the primary jurisdictions
where Nufcor operated: the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, while also
recognizing a need to analyze regulatory requirements in Germany and Sweden.
729
With respect
to the United States, the memorandum stated that “holders of legal title to uranium ore
concentrates and UF6 are required to be licensed,”
730
while also noting that, if Goldman were to
conduct the business so that Goldman would not come into physical possession of uranium, own
any storage facility, or transport any uranium, licensing would likely not be a problem.
731
On the issue of whether Goldman would be permitted by its U.S. and U.K. banking
regulators to engage in uranium-related trading, the memorandum concluded that, in the United
States, the acquisition of Nufcor was “consistent” with the activities in which the firm was
engaged at the time it became a bank holding company, and thus would be eligible for
grandfathering under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
732
Goldman determined that it could treat
physical uranium activities as a “grandfathered” activity despite having never before engaged in
it. With respect to the United Kingdom, the Goldman analysis stated that the proposed uranium
activities gave rise to no additional registration requirements with the U.K. Financial Services
Authority.
733
724
EURODIF S.A. is another AREVA subsidiary and owns a uranium enrichment facility in France. See AREVA
website, “EURODIF S.A.: Uranium Enrichment,”http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-792/eurodif-s-a-georges-
besse-plant-uranium-enrichment.html. The United States government and the United States Enrichment Corporation
previously brought actions against EURODIF S.A. for “dumping” Separative Work Units in the United States. See
United States v. EURODIF S.A., Case No. 07-1059 (U.S.), Opinion (1/26/2009),http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1059.pdf .
725
USEC, Inc. was created by the U.S. Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, later became a publicly-traded
corporation. See “History,” USEC website,http://www.centrusenergy.com/company/history.
726
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 046.
727
Id. Goldman’s assessment of USEC’s credit risk proved accurate, as USEC ultimately declared a Chapter 11
bankruptcy in early 2014. It is expected to emerge from that bankruptcy as a reorganized company under the name
Centrus Energy Corp. in September 2014. See 9/5/2014 USEC press release, “Court Confirms USEC Inc. Plan of
Reorganization,”http://www.usec.com/news/court-confirms-usec-inc-plan-reorganization.
728
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 042.
729
Id. at 043 - 044.
730
Id. at 043.
731
Id. at 045. Goldman told the Subcommittee that it has not been required to obtain any specific license to engage
in uranium trading or take ownership of physical uranium. Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
732
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 044. The
Goldman analysis also noted that uranium trading was “of a type” authorized by the Federal Reserve, since U3O8
futures contract had been approved by the CFTC for trading on exchanges. Id.
733
Id. at 045.
129
Catastrophic Event Liability Risks. Still another set of key risks identified and
discussed in the New Product Memorandum involved potential liability risks for Goldman in
connection with a health, safety, or environmental disaster arising from the proposed uranium
activities. The New Product Memorandum included a lengthy legal analysis focused on the
potential liability of facility owners, facility operators, and the title holders of uranium.
734
It
discussed the applicability of the Price Andersen Act which is triggered by the occurrence of a
“nuclear incident,” meaning nuclear material is released from a facility’s boundaries.
735
It also
discussed the possibility of lawsuits being brought in federal versus state courts. After
enumerating a number of potential liability risks, the New Product Memorandum expressed
confidence that Goldman would not be held liable in the event of a uranium-related event, so
long as it was not the operator of any storage or transport facility involved and did not dictate
how the facility should be operated.
736
The New Product Memorandum’s long list of the risks involved with buying and selling
physical uranium – including valuation, market, operational, credit, regulatory, and catastrophic
event risks – showed it was a high risk business. Despite the risks, a lack of prior uranium
activities, its status as a bank holding company, and public pressure for banks to reduce risks to
avoid taxpayer bailouts, Goldman made the decision to expand into physical uranium activities.
(b) Operating a Physical Uranium Business
On J une 30, 2009, as part of a larger commodities acquisition from the Constellation
Energy Group, Goldman purchased 100% of the shares of Nufcor International Ltd. and Nufcor
Capital Ltd., as well as an 8% ownership stake in the Nufcor Uranium Ltd. investment fund.
737
Goldman relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause as its legal authority to purchase
Nufcor.
738
Nufcor is a U.K. corporation, and its immediate owner is Goldman Sachs Group UK
Limited, a London-based affiliate of the Goldman holding company.
739
Goldman explained to
734
Id. at 043 - 044.
735
Id.
736
Id.
737
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at 002-003.
738
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 7/25/2012 “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business
Standards Committee: Global Commodities,” (hereinafter “2012 Firmwide Presentation”), prepared by Goldman,
FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1000 (indicating Nufcor was “owned under 4(o),” the grandfather clause). Although
Goldman ultimately relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority, several facts suggest that Goldman
may have considered holding Nufcor under its merchant banking authority. For example, Goldman placed J acques
Gabillon on the Nufcor Board of Directors; he was from the Goldman Commodities Principal Investments group,
which oversaw Goldman’s commodities-related merchant banking activities. In addition, Goldman’s New Products
Memorandum stated that Nufcor’s uranium-related “positions will not be [m]arked to market and hence will sit out
of VaR,” a comment which implies that the plan was to hold Nufcor as a merchant banking portfolio company
whose assets would not be valued on a daily basis in Goldman’s trading books, but would instead be held by
Goldman as a separate merchant banking investment. See 12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on
Uranium Trading, at FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 048. In the end, however, Goldman relied on the grandfathering
authority as the legal basis for its physical uranium activities and completely integrated Nufcor’s assets and trading
into its own trading operations.
739
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046240.
130
the Subcommittee that no employees conducting Nufcor’s business stayed on after Goldman
acquired it, and as a result, Goldman employees in the GS Commodities group took on
management of Nufcor’s operations.
740
As a result, Nufcor International Ltd. became a shell
company whose business activities were conducted exclusively by Goldman employees.
741
As
one Goldman document put it, Nufcor’s uranium activities were “treated as [the] firm’s own
activities.”
742
Goldman explained that it also shuttered Nufcor Capital Ltd., which was already
in the course of being wound down at the time of its sale to Goldman.
743
In addition, Goldman
stated that Nufcor Uranium, Ltd., the investment fund which had been organized as a Guernsey
investment company, was later merged into the Uranium Participation Corporation, which is
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
744
Since acquiring Nufcor in 2009, Goldman has used Nufcor International Ltd. to engage in
a wide array of uranium-related activities.
745
The activities included buying and selling physical
U3O8 and physical UF6 on the spot markets; forward contracts to buy and sell physical U3O8
and UF6; options on U3O8 and UF6; uranium futures contracts; and Conversion Service
Credits.
746
Goldman also took ownership of hundreds of thousands of pounds of physical
uranium, and became a supplier of uranium to utilities with nuclear power plants.
747
740
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
741
Id.
742
2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1000 (“Portfolio companies owned under 4(o) include
Cogentrix and Nufcor – treated as firm’s own activities.”).
743
Id. See also 12/31/2011 “Director’s Report and Financial Statements,” prepared by Nufcor International Ltd.,
GSPSICOMMODS00046281 - 290 at 282 (noting that the company had not traded in 2010 or 2011, had terminated
its advisory agreement with its key client, and had also deregistered with the U.K. FSA).
744
Id. On its website, the Uranium Participation Corporation describes itself as “focused solely on investing in
uranium concentrates,” such as U3O8 and UF
6
, “with the primary investment objective of achieving appreciation in
the value of its uranium holdings through increases in the uranium price.” Uranium Participation Corporation
website,http://www.uraniumparticipation.com/s/Home.asp.
745
5/17/2013 “Physical Commodity Review Committee: Meeting Minutes,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-
400053 - 055.
746
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). Although Nufcor also previously traded Separative Work
Units, Goldman has not traded them since the acquisition. 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 002.
747
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at Exhibit B, GSPSICOMMODS00046532.
131
After acquiring Nufcor, Goldman quickly increased the volume of its uranium trading,
eventually surpassing Nufcor’s 2009 benchmark by tenfold, going from an annualized 1.3
million pounds to nearly 13 million pounds in uranium trading per year from 2009 through 2013:
Goldman’s Uranium Trading
2009 – 2013
Year U3O8 Traded (Pounds)
2009 (annualized) 1.3 million
2010 4.7 million
2011 8.2 million
2012 13.7 million
2013 12.8 million
Source: 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee,
“Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 004.
The value of Goldman’s physical uranium inventory also grew steadily, from an estimated $90
million in 2008 to more than $240 million in 2013, even as uranium prices fell:
Goldman’s Physical Uranium Inventory
2010 – 2013
Date Dollar Value
December 31, 2010 $112.8 million
December 31, 2011 $157.8 million
December 31, 2012 $230.3 million
December 31, 2013 $241.8 million
Source: Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2011, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046251; Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial
Statements, for 12/31/2012, at GSPSICOMMODS00046264; Nufcor International Ltd.
Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2013, at GSPSICOMMODS00046278.
In addition, Goldman significantly expanded Nufcor’s uranium supply contracts with
utilities. At the time of acquisition in 2009, through Nufcor International, Ltd., Goldman became
a supplier of uranium to two utilities with nuclear power plants.
748
As of J une 30, 2014, it had
supply contracts with nine utilities located in Florida, New Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina,
Washington state, Wisconsin, and elsewhere.
749
The longest of those supply contracts required
Goldman to deliver uranium to the utility through 2018.
750
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it is also holding a substantial inventory of forward
contracts to buy or deliver over 3 million pounds of uranium over the next four years.
751
In
addition, it is holding U3O8 future positions that mature in each of the next several years,
748
Id. at Exhibit B, GSPSICOMMODS00046532, 533.
749
Id.
750
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 002.
751
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
132
involving hundreds of thousands of pounds of uranium.
752
Most of Nufcor’s positions are held
on a mark-to-market basis, pursuant to Goldman’s valuation policy, and so are subject to daily
price fluctuations.
753
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, in connection with its physical uranium activities
through Nufcor, it has stored U3O8 at three locations: ConverDyn facility in Illinois; Cameco
facility in Canada; and Comurhex facility in France.
754
Each of those facilities converts U3O8
into UF6. In addition, Goldman has stored UF6 at three other locations: Louisiana Energy
Services facility in New Mexico;
755
EURODIF S.A. facility in France; and URENCO facility in
the Netherlands.
756
Each of those facilities enrich UF6.
When asked to summarize its physical uranium activities, Goldman described them as
buying uranium from mining companies, storing it, and providing the uranium to utilities when
they wanted to process more fuel for their nuclear power plants.
757
Goldman indicated that it
was, essentially, financing the storage of the uranium until its buyers were ready to purchase it.
Goldman said that it hedged its physical positions primarily by selling the physical supply
through forward contracts.
758
At the same time Goldman acted as a supplier for the utilities, it
was also speculating on uranium prices by trading uranium futures and other financial products.
Goldman documentation indicates that, in 2012, Goldman briefly considered expanding
its physical uranium activities still further, by getting involved with transporting uranium, but
decided not to go forward.
759
In 2013, GS Commodities personnel proposed expanding
Goldman’s physical uranium trading activities by including enriched uranium products. In May
2013, Goldman’s Physical Commodity Review Committee met to consider the proposal, which
involved buying and selling physical UF6 with enrichment levels up to five percent.
760
The
proposal stated that the enriched uranium would be stored at a Global Nuclear Fuel facility in
North Carolina.
761
Ultimately, Goldman decided against the proposal. Goldman explained to
the Subcommittee that the decision was due, in part, to the departure of a key Goldman employee
who had been a strong proponent of the physical uranium trading business.
762
752
Id.
753
See 10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
19-000001 - 009, at 008 (noting that “all physical uranium futures, forwards, swaps and options are fair valued,”
other than UF6 forwards contracts which are treated as executory contracts and conversion credits are treated as
intangibles); Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014).
754
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
755
The facility is run by URENCO USA, Inc., a subsidiary of URENCO LTD. See “Company Structure,”
URENCO website,http://www.urenco.com/about-us/company-structure/.
756
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
757
Id.
758
Id.
759
See 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200984 - 1043, at 1006 (indicating that, on 5/31/2012, a presentation
was made to start a new activity, “Physical vessel transportation of Uranium (U3O8),” that review of that proposal
was then underway); Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
760
See 5/17/2013 “Physical Commodity Review Committee: Meeting Minutes,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-
400053 - 055.
761
Id.
762
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
133
In 2014, Goldman put Nufcor up for sale.
763
Goldman told the Subcommittee that
because it did not receive an acceptable bid for the business, Goldman was in the process of
winding down Nufcor over the next several years.
764
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, as
part of the wind down, it has stopped building its inventory of physical uranium and expects its
physical and financial uranium positions to steadily decrease over the next few years.
765
Goldman explained that it currently has one uranium supply contract that continues until 2018,
766
and expects to complete that contract.
767
When asked why Goldman is exiting the uranium
trading business, a Goldman representative replied that it was because the physical uranium
business was “easy to misunderstand.”
768
Additional possible reasons include lower uranium
prices since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event in J apan, and pressure from the Federal
Reserve regarding the risks of its physical commodity activities.
(4) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Physical Uranium Activities
Goldman’s uranium-related activities, which are expected to continue until at least 2018,
raise multiple concerns, including insufficient capital and insurance to protect against a
catastrophic event, unfair competition, conflicts of interest arising from controlling uranium
supplies while trading uranium financial instruments, and inadequate safeguards.
(a) Catastrophic Event Liability Risks
One of the troublesome aspects of Goldman’s involvement with physical uranium trading
is the risk that if a catastrophic event were to occur involving the release of uranium from a
storage facility, it could cause such severe financial damage to the financial holding company
that the Federal Reserve, and ultimately taxpayers, might be called upon to rescue it. While such
an event is highly unlikely, history has shown that nuclear accidents do occur, and the nature and
extent of liabilities in connection with such an accident are uncertain.
769
(i) Denying Liability
Goldman strenuously denies that its physical uranium activities create a substantial risk
of additional liability for the financial holding company. Goldman recently discussed the
liability issue generally in a publicly-available memorandum that it submitted to the Federal
763
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also “Goldman puts ‘for sale’ sign on Iran’s old
uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-
uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211.
764
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
765
Id.
766
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-
000001 - 006, at 002.
767
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at 005.
768
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
769
The Fukushima Diachii nuclear power plant disaster is a recent example of a nuclear disaster that was highly
unlikely but did occur. Improbable events involving low level nuclear materials have also taken place. See, e.g.,
“Mexico’s Stolen Radiation Source: It Could Happen Here,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Tom Bielefeld
(1/23/2014),http://thebulletin.org/mexico’s-stolen-radiation-source-it-could-happen-here (discussing
instances in which low level nuclear materials were stolen while in transit).
134
Reserve in response to a Federal Reserve request for public comment on whether it should
impose new regulatory constraints on financial holding companies conducting physical
commodity activities.
770
In its public comment, Goldman took the position that its liability for a
commodities-related catastrophic event was limited, making three arguments:
• Most of its commodities pose no risk to the environment;
• Even the commodities that do pose a risk to the environment will not impose liability
on Goldman, because Goldman does not operate the facilities used to store, ship, or
process them; and
• Even if Goldman were assessed “some liability” for an environmental event, it would
not be in an amount large enough to hurt the financial holding company.
771
This generalized analysis differs from an internal analysis contained in Goldman’s 2008
New Products Memorandum on trading uranium, which identified several ways in which
Goldman might, in fact, incur liability as a result of a nuclear-related event. Also omitted from
the public comment letter is Goldman’s decision, in late 2011, to implement an additional layer
of insurance for “contingent, third-party environmental/pollution liability coverage for risks that
could emanate from either our physical trading activities or our investing activities.”
772
While
most insurance policies contain an exclusion for nuclear-related events,
773
Goldman’s insurance
policy included a specific amount of coverage that was not subject to an exclusion for a nuclear
incident involving unenriched uranium.
774
Despite purchasing insurance to help protect it against liability arising from a nuclear
incident or other uranium-related environmental event, Goldman has continued to take the
position that the possibility of incurring that liability is “rare” and that any such liability would
not be “on a scale that could threaten the viability” of the financial holding company.
775
Goldman has publicly pointed out that the “general approach” of most federal
environmental law is to place liability for environmental damages on the owners and operators of
the facilities responsible for the damages.
776
Goldman has publicly argued that it “will not be
subject to liability under well-settled law” for its physical commodity activities, because it avoids
being an “owner” or “operator” of facilities that store or transport commodities.
777
Goldman
770
See 4/16/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. to the Federal Reserve, “Comment Letter on the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of
Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities (Docket No. R-1479: RIN 7100 AE-10),” Federal
Reserve website,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf (hereinafter “2014 Goldman Comment Letter”).
771
Id. at 4, 13-19.
772
7/9/2013 memorandum from Goldman to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-201245 - 268, at 252.
773
Id. at 253.
774
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-
000001 - 010, at 005.
775
2014 Goldman Comment Letter,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf , at 4.
776
Id. at 14.
777
Id. at 4; 14-16.
135
appears to have taken explicit steps to “avoid[] operator status” and instead “selec[t] qualified
operators,”
778
such as third party vendors to own and operate the storage facilities for its
uranium. Goldman’s legal position appears to rely, in particular, on Bestfoods, a Supreme Court
case delineating when a parent corporation can be held liable for pollution damages caused by a
subsidiary.
779
The legal liability of owners and operators of facilities does not, in and of itself, however,
preclude others from also being found to have liability for environmental damages. In the recent
Deepwater Horizon oil spill case, BP “neither owned the rigs … nor ‘operated’ them in the
normal sense of the word.”
780
Nevertheless, by the end of 2013, BP had recognized over $42
billion in losses from the event.
781
In addition, in September 2014, after a bench trial, a U.S.
court found BP to be “grossly negligent” for its role in the disaster, opening the door to as much
as $18 billion in additional damages.
782
Federal environmental laws do not preclude lawsuits being filed against the holders of
legal title to a commodity like uranium if that uranium were to be involved in a catastrophic
event. As the Federal Reserve has pointed out: “liability may attach to [financial holding
companies] that own physical commodities involved in catastrophic events even if the [financial
holding companies] hire third parties to store and transport the commodities.”
783
There is no
dispute that Nufcor, a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman, is the direct owner of its uranium.
In addition, since Nufcor has no employees of its own, having become a shell entity, Goldman
employees directly manage its business, including dealing directly with Nufcor’s vendors. The
level of Goldman’s direct involvement in Nufcor’s daily operations increases Goldman’s
potential liability for Nufcor’s actions. As a result, if a catastrophic event were to occur
involving uranium owned by Nfcor, at a minimum, Goldman could have to defend itself against
claims in courts here or abroad, under the distinct laws in each jurisdiction.
In addition, as Goldman has recognized, under U.S. law, “a party that knowingly entrusts
a hazardous material to an incompetent operator may be held liable.”
784
A joint memorandum of
law submitted in support of Goldman’s submission to the Federal Reserve explicitly
acknowledged that an owner of environmentally hazardous commodities could be held liable for
778
Id. at 15-16; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
779
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
780
“National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Chief Counsel’s Report,”
at 30,http://www.eoearth.org/files/164401_164500/164423/full.pdf. (noting that BP personnel did, however, specify
how the well was to be drilled).
781
2013 - 14 Annual Report, BP plc, at 9,http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2013.pdf.
782
“BP May Be Fined Up to $18 Billion for Spill in Gulf,” Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, New York
Times, (Sept, 4, 2014),http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/bp-negligent-in-2010-oil-spill-us-judge-
rules.html?_r=1.
783
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.Reg. 3329, at 3332 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-01-21/pdf/2014-00996.pdf.
784
2014 Goldman Comment Letter,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf , at 15.
136
negligently entrusting those commodities to an incompetent transportation or storage operator.
785
Case law includes a number of instances in which, in some jurisdictions, an owner may incur
liability if it entrusts “a dangerous instrumentality” to a party that the owner knew or should have
known was incompetent.
786
To help address those risks, Goldman “maintain
program of policies, procedures, diligence practices, governance arrangements, approval
processes and insurance coverage.”
787
Goldman also “maintain
response’ policies and procedures that are designed to address a situation in which a commodity
that [it] own
788
In addition, Goldman has a sophisticated
vendor oversight system to evaluate, among other factors, a vendor’s financial condition,
insurance, and safety record.
789
As Goldman explained to the Federal Reserve in its public
comment letter, it performs those basic checks to gain “confidence that the operator has the
requisite expertise and capabilities to safely handle, store or transport [its] commodities” and
provide a “basis to defeat claims that [it] knowingly entrusted [its] commodities to an
incompetent operator.”
790
Of course, a failure to follow those policies, procedures, and practices
could increase the liability risk for Goldman.
785
See undated, but likely 4/2014 “J oint Memorandum of Law Prepared for SIFMA In Response to the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of
Financial Holding Company Groups Related to Physical Commodities (DOCKET NO. R-1479; RIN 7100AE-10),”
at 30, submitted on behalf of SIFMA by Covington & Burling LLP, Davis Polk &
Wardwell LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Vinson & Elkins LLP,http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589948617 (click on download to access J oint Memorandum of Law).
786
See, e.g., Zokas v. Friend, 134 Mich. App. 437, 443 (Mich. App. Mar. 9, 1984) (noting that, “an owner or lender
who entrusts a person with a dangerous instrumentality may be held liable to a third party who is injured by the
negligent act of the entrustee, where the owner or lender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know,
that the person entrusted was incompetent”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 160 Mich. App. 349, 357 (Mich. App.
May 19, 1987) (recognizing negligent entrustment where (1) the entrustor negligently entrusts the instrumentality to
the entrustee, and (2) the entrustee negligently or recklessly misuses the instrumentality); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); Shaffer v. Maier, Nos. C-900573, C-900600, 1991 WL 256493, at *8 (Ct.
App. Ohio Dec. 4, 1991) (finding that liability can attach when there is entrustment of a chattel, inexperience or
incompetence on the part of the entrustee, and actual or implied knowledge of that inexperience or incompetence on
the part of the entrustor).
787
2014 Goldman Comment Letter, at 13,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf . 3.
788
Id. at 15.
789
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 2014 Goldman Comment Letter, at 16,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf . See also 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations
Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI400077 - 098, at 085 (“Business Intelligence Group (“BIG”) & GS Logistics team in Commodities Operations
conduct diligence and vendor suitability checks on all providers, such as pipeline operators, in line with the firm’s
wider Vendor Management Policy. … Instituted best-in-class shipping, rail and pipeline transportation policies,
enforced by GS Logistics team, include Critical Event Management Policy[.] Periodic review and enhancement of
policies based on industry related ‘events’ e.g.: Quebec rail[.] … Engagement of Internal Audit and third parties to
audit storage, transportation and delivery practices[.] Vendor management review of service providers including
health & safety, environmental and OFAC.”).
790
2014 Goldman Comment Letter, at 16,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/20140506/R-1479/R-
1479_041614_124563_481901890144_1.pdf .
137
The extent to which Goldman exercises oversight of the third party vendors for its
uranium activities and requires them to meet Goldman’s standards for reliability and competence
is unclear. Rather than evaluating third parties to assess the competency of its uranium vendors,
as it does with other commodity vendors, Goldman appears to have relied exclusively on the
licenses obtained by the uranium storage and processing facilities it used.
791
Goldman’s vendor
oversight activities, if found insufficient, might cause a state, U.S. federal, or foreign court to
attach some degree of liability to Goldman. For that reason, Goldman could find itself litigating,
on a case-by-case basis, whether it took adequate steps to prevent its commodities from being
given to an incompetent vendor.
Still another set of concerns involves the potential financial impact that a catastrophic
event could have on Goldman even if it were eventually proved correct in court that it had no
legal liability for damages. As the financial crisis demonstrated, parties viewed by the public as
being potentially liable for damages may be shunned by customers as well as potential
counterparties. In the aftermath of a catastrophic event linked to a financial holding company,
market participants could react by withdrawing funds from the holding company or its banks,
refraining from doing business with them, or demanding increased compensation to continue
being exposed to their credit risk. It is not inconceivable that the ability of a financial holding
company to conduct its day-to-day businesses could be threatened as business partners seek to
lessen their financial exposure to the potentially risky party. That type of reaction could worsen
over time if the publicity and magnitude of an event increase.
This aspect of catastrophic event risk means that, even if as a legal matter, Goldman were
found not to be liable for damages arising from a nuclear incident or other uranium-related event,
market participants’ fears that Goldman might incur liability might nevertheless lead to financial
difficulties and even losses for the financial institution.
The likelihood of a nuclear-related event is, of course, remote. However, while Goldman
has publicly dismissed the risk of such an event, that risk may be much greater than Goldman
has, to date, planned for.
(ii) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance
A related issue involves the amount of capital and insurance coverage Goldman has
allocated to protect against potential losses associated with a catastrophic event arising from its
physical uranium activities. Adequate capital and insurance are the key financial safeguards to
prevent a Federal Reserve or taxpayer bailout in the event of substantial losses arising from a
catastrophic event. In part because Goldman has concluded that it has essentially no potential
liability for losses arising from a catastrophic event, and in part due to lax regulatory
requirements, Goldman’s allocations for capital and insurance coverage appear to be inadequate.
In its recent public filing seeking comment on whether it should impose new regulatory
constraints on financial holding companies conducting physical commodity activities, the
Federal Reserve made the following observation:
791
See 10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
19-000001 - 009, at 002 - 003.
138
“Recent disasters involving physical commodities demonstrate that the risks associated
with these activities are unique in type, scope and size. In particular, catastrophes
involving environmentally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic
damages well in excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the
committed capital and insurance policies of market participants.”
792
Consistent with that observation, the facts suggest that financial losses arising from a uranium-
related catastrophe could far exceed all of the capital allocated by Goldman for its entire
commodities business plus any applicable insurance.
Goldman’s capital for its entire commodities portfolio, as of March 2013, was about $3.4
billion, of which the “operational risk” component was about $400 million.
793
In a 2013
memorandum sent by Goldman to the Federal Reserve, Goldman admitted that its capital
allocations included “no explicit scenario for environmental/catastrophic damage for any
business line.”
794
In other words, Goldman apparently holds no added capital to cover the risk to
its commodities business arising from any environmental disaster or catastrophic event,
including one related to its uranium holdings.
In addition, Goldman has apparently calculated its “operational” risk of loss related to the
storage and transportation of all of its physical commodities by selecting a figure equal to the
dollar value of those assets alone, and nothing more.
795
In particular, Goldman has calculated its
operational risk capital so that it corresponds to the “highest dollar value of inventory at a single
location.”
796
That means, for example, if a catastrophic event were to take place involving oil or
uranium, Goldman has calculated that its maximum loss would equal the lost value of the oil or
uranium itself. It did not include additional costs arising from, for example, loss of life, property
damage, pollution cleanup, legal expenses, or the failure to honor any existing contracts to
deliver oil or uranium.
797
In its 2012 Summary Report, the Federal Reserve Commodity Team
noted that Goldman’s catastrophic risk valuation methodology for its power plants was to use
“simply the current value of its most valuable power plant,” with no provision for potential
expenses stemming from loss of life, worker disability, facility replacement, or a “failure to
deliver electricity under contract.”
798
In light of the financial consequences of recent disasters ranging from oil spills to nuclear
meltdowns to power plant explosions, that approach appears highly unrealistic, and produces
capital allocations far below what is needed to safeguard taxpayers. The latest example is BP,
792
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg. 3329, at 3331 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-01-21/pdf/2014-00996.pdf.
793
7/9/2013 memorandum from Goldman Sachs to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-201245 - 268, at 248.
794
Id. at 250.
795
Id.
796
Id. at 251.
797
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by FRBNY Commodity Team, (hereinafter,
“2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 498.
798
Id. at 494.
139
which has already recognized losses over $42 billion as a result of Deepwater Horizon — an
amount well in excess of the dollar value of the physical oil that was lost.
799
Additionally, many environmental laws, which are intended to protect clean air and
water, for example, are intended to have significant deterrent effects, and thus provide for treble
or even greater penalties for violations. In the event that Goldman were to find itself with
liability under U.S. or foreign environmental laws, Goldman’s liabilities could end up being
many multiples of the damages suffered, as may happen in the BP oil spill case where the court’s
finding of “gross negligence” and “reckless” conduct may produce a fine equal to as much as
$4,300 per barrel for the spill, exceeding the cost of both the spilled oil and the cleanup.
800
Such
findings could also trigger exclusions under established insurance policies, making the insurance
payments unavailable.
801
When the Federal Reserve’s Commodities Team concluded its special review of financial
holding company involvement with physical commodities, it expressed concern that all of the
financial holding companies it examined, including Goldman, had insufficient capital and
insurance coverage to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event.
802
The 2012 Summary
Report prepared a chart comparing the level of capital and insurance coverage at four financial
holding companies against estimated costs associated with “extreme loss scenarios.” It found
that at each institution, including Goldman, “the potential loss exceed[ed] capital and insurance”
by $1 billion to $15 billion.
803
Insufficient capital and insurance coverage increases the risk of a
Federal Reserve or taxpayer bailout were a catastrophic event to occur.
(b) Unfair Competition
A completely different set of concerns raised by Goldman’s physical uranium activities
involves issues related to unfair competition. When Goldman acquired Nufcor in 2008, it was a
leading uranium company that had been in business for 40 years.
804
Goldman’s analysis
indicated Nufcor then had a portfolio of physical and financial uranium holdings worth about
$47 million and an annualized trading volume involving about 1.3 million pounds of uranium.
805
799
2013 “Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013,” prepared by BP p.l.c., BP p.l.c website, at 9,http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2013.pdf.
800
See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2014 WL 4375933 (E.D.
La. Sept. 4, 2014); see also “BP’s ‘gross negligence’ caused Gulf oil spill, federal judge rules,” The Washington
Post, Steve Mufson (9/4/2014),http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bps-gross-negligence-caused-
gulf-oil-spill-federal-judge-rules/2014/09/04/3e2b9452-3445-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html.
801
Subcommittee briefing by Chiara Trabucchi, an expert in financial economics and environmental risk
management (10/7/2014).
802
See 2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 498.
803
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499. The recent decision in the BP oil spill case suggests that the “extreme loss” scenarios may entail
expenses beyond those contemplated as recently as 2012.
804
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 039.
805
Id. at 040.
140
Within one year, Goldman more than tripled Nufcor’s trading volume and increased the
value of its inventory by about 40%.
806
Within five years, Goldman had increased Nufcor’s
trading volume by tenfold, increased its physical uranium inventory so that its dollar value more
than doubled despite falling uranium prices, and increased the number of its supply contracts
from two to nine major utilities.
807
By 2013, Goldman controlled millions of pounds of uranium
in storage facilities in the United States and Europe.
This rapid expansion of Nufcor’s uranium activities is attributable, not just to Goldman’s
business acumen, but possibly also to inherent advantages that financial holding companies have
when competing against businesses that are not affiliated with banks. First, a holding company
has access to inexpensive credit from its subsidiary bank, enabling its borrowing costs to nearly
always undercut those of a nonbank corporation. Another advantage is the financial holding
company’s relatively low capital requirements. The Federal Reserve determined that
corporations engaged in oil and gas businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover
potential losses, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8%
to 10%, making it much easier for them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.
808
Less expensive financing and lower capital requirements are the types of inherent bank
advantages that contribute to the traditional U.S. ban on mixing banking with commerce.
(c) Conflicts of Interest
Still another set of issues raised by Goldman’s uranium activities involves conflicts of
interest. The conflicts arise from the fact that the Goldman was trading uranium-related financial
products at the same time it was intimately involved with an array of physical uranium activities.
Goldman’s conduct raises two sets of conflict of interest concerns, one involving non-public
information and the other involving physical uranium supplies.
Because Nufcor had no employees of its own, Goldman employees conducted all of its
business activities and were necessarily privy to all of its non-public information. While
commodities laws traditionally have not barred the use of non-public information by traders in
the same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading advantages deepen when the
commodities trader is a major financial institution that can influence a small and volatile market
like uranium. Goldman’s acquisition of Nufcor gave it access to a substantial amount of
commercially valuable, non-public information about the uranium market. First, Goldman
gained insight into Nufcor’s own physical and financial uranium inventories and trading patterns.
According to Goldman’s analysis, for example, in 2008, Nufcor had 20% of the open interest for
uranium futures,
809
a sizeable market position. Second, by acquiring Nufcor, Goldman gained
information about the mining companies that supplied it with physical uranium as well as the
uranium needs of major utilities. Goldman also gained information about the timing, locations,
806
See 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
21-000001 - 010, at 004; see also Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2011, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046251; Nufcor International Ltd. Notes to the Financial Statements, for 12/31/2012, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046264 (reflecting an increase in uranium inventory holdings from $112.8 million to $157.8
million.
807
See discussion, above.
808
2012 Summary Report, FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 499.
809
12/2008 Goldman New Product Memorandum on Uranium Trading, FRB-PSI-400039 - 052, at 042.
141
and nature of the transport of millions of pounds of uranium, as well as the scheduling and
operations of six major uranium storage facilities and processing centers.
Goldman’s access to that non-public data about physical uranium would have provided
useful market intelligence that Goldman employees could have used to benefit Goldman’s
trading in the physical and financial uranium markets. Non-public information about a uranium
transport delay, processing schedules, or utility shutdowns could have been used to short futures
or make profitable trades on forwards. As shown earlier, after acquiring Nufcor, Goldman
expanded its uranium trading volume tenfold, becoming a more significant market participant. A
major concern is whether Goldman used any non-public information to gain a trading advantage
over other market participants.
A second conflict of interest issue is whether Goldman’s increasing control over uranium
supplies created opportunities for unfair trading advantagesor price manipulation. Goldman
expanded Nufcor’s physical uranium inventory over time until, by 2013, Goldman controlled
millions of pounds of uranium in storage facilities in the United States and Europe. Goldman
also increased the number of its supply contracts from two to nine major utilities across the
United States, Canada, and Europe. Its increased ability to make decisions over the amount and
timing of physical uranium deliveries created market manipulation opportunities that could have
been used to benefit Goldman’s trading activities in the small and volatile uranium market or in
affected electricity markets. Historically, banks and bank holding companies have not exerted
that extent of control over a physical market and have not raised the same type of market
manipulation concerns.
(d) Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of issues involves a lack of regulatory safeguards related to financial holding
company involvement with a high risk physical commodity activity like uranium. Physical
uranium becomes increasingly toxic as it is enriched, is subject to complex regulatory regimes
related to its storage, handling, and transit, and trades in a small, volatile market. It imposes, not
only the catastrophic event risks discussed above, but also financial risks due to volatile prices
and limited counterparties.
Although Goldman had not engaged in physical uranium activities prior to becoming a
bank holding company, it claimed it could do so under the grandfather clause in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act for authority. The Federal Reserve has never ruled on whether Goldman’s
entry into the physical uranium market was an appropriate exercise of the grandfather clause, nor
has it issued general guidance on the proper scope of the grandfather authority.
810
Additionally,
810
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 gives the Federal Reserve broad authority to issue orders and
regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act and prevent evasions of it. See, e.g., Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, P.L. 84-511, § 5(b), codified at 12 U.S. Code § 1844. That broad grant of authority provides
the legal foundation for the Federal Reserve to issue regulations or orders interpreting the scope of the grandfather
clause and setting limits on the size of grandfathered activities to support the purposes of Act, which have been
described as seeking to “limit the comingling of banking and commerce,” and “prevent situations where risk-taking
by nonbanking affiliates erodes the stability of the bank’s core financial activities.” “A Structural View of U.S.
Bank Holding Companies,” Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and J ames Vickery of the Federal Reserve Bank of
142
because Goldman relied on the grandfather clause to authorize its uranium activities, those
activities were not subject to the prudential size limit imposed by the Federal Reserve on
complementary activities which, were it to apply, would prohibit physical commodity activities
from exceeding 5% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital. The only cap on the size
of Goldman’s uranium activities was the statutory prohibition that its grandfathering activities
not exceed 5% of Goldman’s consolidated assets of $912 billion,
811
a limit set so high as to be no
meaningful restriction at all.
A final consideration is whether financial holding companies should be allowed to trade
in such a limited and volatile market as that represented by uranium. The Federal Reserve has
generally allowed financial holding companies to trade in any commodity that the CFTC has
approved for trading on an exchange. It has not required that the commodities reach a particular
volume of trading or other measure of liquidity. While U3O8 futures are traded on a CFTC-
regulated exchange, uranium is not a robust market, and often has zero contracts traded in a day.
The illiquid state of the uranium market illustrates the dangers of relying solely on the exchange-
trading requirement to approve financial holding company trading in a particular commodity.
(5) Analysis
Since acquiring Nufcor in 2009, Goldman has owned and traded millions of pounds of
uranium and millions of dollars of uranium-related financial products. The risks attached to
those activities continue to be significant, and Goldman’s efforts to address and mitigate them
have fallen short of what the Federal Reserve has indicated is necessary.
Goldman is not the only financial holding company to have engaged in physical uranium
activities. Deutsche Bank has been another key player in uranium,
812
and J PMorgan has
considered initiating physical uranium activities.
813
It is past time for the Federal Reserve to
enforce needed safeguards on this high risk physical commodity activity.
New York, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (7/2012), at 3;http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [footnotes omitted].
811
See 12/31/2013 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Goldman
with the Federal Reserve, at 13,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2380443_20121231.PDF.
812
See, e.g., “Goldman puts ‘for sale’ sign on Iran’s old uranium supplier,” Reuters, David Sheppard (2/11/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-goldman-uranium-insight-idUSBREA1A0RX20140211 (discussing
Deutsche Bank’s involvement in uranium activities).
813
See, e.g., 9/28/2009 “[Global Commodities] BCC Agenda,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-304494-520, at
Appendix 5, FRB-PSI-304520; 2/11/2011 Global Commodities Group Operating Risk Committee Meeting Agenda,
including attachment entitled, “Marketing of Physical Uranium NBIA: Overview of Transaction,” FRB-PSI-302581
- 587, at 584 - 585.
143
C. Goldman Involvement with Coal
For many years, including prior to its 2008 conversion to a bank holding company,
Goldman traded coal futures and other coal-related financial products, as well as arranged for the
shipping and storage of coal for customers such as coal producers, coal traders, and coal-fired
power plants. In 2010, Goldman dramatically expanded its physical coal activities by purchasing
an open pit coal mine in Colombia with related railroad and port assets. In 2012, Goldman
purchased a second coal mine next to the first. Today, in addition to its longstanding coal
trading operations, Goldman is involved with producing, storing, transporting, selling, and
supplying physical coal.
Tracing Goldman’s four-year Colombian coal venture illustrates the many risks involved
with getting into a complex area like coal mining, including operational problems, regulatory
challenges, and environmental and catastrophic event risks. It also demonstrates how the mines’
merchant banking status – an investment that must be sold within ten years – creates a
disincentive for Goldman to make the necessary investments to operate the mines in a safe and
environmentally sound manner, exacerbating its operational and catastrophic event risks.
Additional concerns involve Goldman’s legal authority to get into the coal mining business in the
first place, and the conflicts of interest that arise when a Goldman subsidiary conducts coal
supplies and transport activities, while also trading coal-related financial instruments.
(1) Background on Coal
Coal is a naturally occurring fossil fuel formed from compressed and pressurized plant
matter, found mainly in deposits beneath the earth’s crust.
814
It has been used across the world
as a source of energy for hundreds of years.
815
Today, coal is predominantly used to generate
electricity, produce iron and steel, manufacture cement, and provide a liquid fuel.
816
In 2013, for
example, about 39% of the electricity generated in the United States came from coal-fueled
power plants.
817
The world’s supply of coal is finite, and expert opinions differ as to how much
longer global coal reserves will last.
818
Coal Production. Coal “production” refers to the process by which coal is extracted
from the earth and prepared for commercial use. It typically involves mining the coal from the
ground and treating it to achieve a consistent level of quality for end users.
819
Depending upon
the geology of the coal deposit, extraction of the coal may be accomplished through surface
814
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 2,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
815
Id. at 19.
816
Id. at 20-24.
817
“Electricity in the United States,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/12/2014),http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states.
818
“How Much Coal is Left,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (7/3/2014),http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_reserves.
819
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 7-8,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
144
mining (also called “open pit” mining), underground mining, strip mining, or mountain top
removal.
820
The United States is currently the world’s second-largest coal producer, following
China.
821
In 2012, 1.02 billion tons of coal were produced in the United States, making up
nearly 12% of the coal produced worldwide.
822
Other major coal producers include India,
Indonesia, and Australia.
823
In 2012, Colombia was the world’s eleventh largest producer of
coal,
824
but exported more coal to the United States than any other country, providing about 74%
of total U.S. coal imports in 2013.
825
The majority of the time, coal is used in the country in
which it was produced; only about 18% of the world’s hard coal production reaches the
international market.
826
Coal Infrastructure. Moving coal from a production site to a end-user requires a
complex infrastructure. Coal transport may be via truck, rail, or shipping vessel. Within the
United States, for short distances, coal is typically transferred via conveyor or truck; for longer
distances, rail or barge transport is common.
827
Although less common, coal can also be mixed
with water and transported by pipeline.
828
In addition to transportation infrastructure, after being
mined, coal requires treatment at a coal preparation plant, where impurities are removed to
improve the coal’s quality and value.
829
The level of treatment varies depending upon the coal’s
content and intended use. Coal storage facilities are also often needed and can be found, for
example, at mining sites, ports, and end-users such as utilities. Coal-fired power plants may also
construct containment facilities for spent coal ash, including coal slurry ponds.
830
Coal Markets. Coal trades in both physical and financial markets. In the physical
market, coal prices are typically determined through bilateral contracts, including “direct
supplier-consumer transactions and third-party transactions, and on bids and offers, whether via
820
See 2012 memorandum, “Metals & Mining: Background to Environmental and Social Due Diligence,” prepared
by Goldman, FRB-PSI-300221 - 230, at 223.
821
“International Energy Statistics: Total Primary Coal Production (Thousand Short Tons),” U.S. Energy
Information Administration,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=1&pid=7&aid=1.
822
Id.
823
Id.
824
Id.
825
See “Frequently Asked Questions: From what country does the U.S. import the most coal?,” U.S. Energy
Information Administration (6/13/2014),http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=67&t=2. Colombian coal
imports can outcompete coal produced domestically in the United States. See, e.g., “Coal imports add stress to U.S.
glut,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Anya Litvak (11/9/2014),http://powersource.post-
gazette.com/powersource/companies-powersource/2014/11/09/Coal-imports-add-stress-to-U-S-
glut/stories/201411090069.
826
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 13,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
827
Id. at 9.
828
Id.
829
Id. at 8.
830
“Preventing Breakthroughs of Impounded-Coal-Waste-Slurry Into Underground Mines,” Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Peter R. Michael, Michael W. Richmond, David L. Lane, & Michael J .
Superfesky (2013), at 2,http://wvmdtaskforce.com/proceedings/13/Michael-Paper.pdf.
145
traders, brokers, the over-the-counter market, or secondary deals among consumers.”
831
As
indicated in the following chart, over the last ten years, coal prices have been volatile:
Source: “Historical Coal Prices and Price Chart,” InfoMine Inc.,http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-
prices/coal/all/.
In 2008, coal prices spiked, in particular for “thermal coal” used to fuel electrical power
plants. This price spike took place around the same time that oil prices unexpectedly jumped
and then declined. Since then, coal prices have not returned to their 2008 peak, but have
remained somewhat volatile. While U.S. power generation is shifting away from reliance on
coal as a fuel source, worldwide demand for coal has nevertheless risen due in part to increasing
energy demand from developing countries.
832
Key market participants include coal mines and
distributors, as well as commercial and industrial users such as power plants.
In addition to the physical market, coal is traded in the financial markets using a variety
of financial products, including futures, options, and swaps. The New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX), for example, began offering futures in North American coal in 2001.
833
One of the more commonly traded coal contracts, the Central Appalachian Futures Contract,
tracks prices for 1,550 tons of coal and is available for trading on CME Globex, CME ClearPort,
831
See “Methodology and Specifications Guide: Coal,” Platts (9/2014), at 3,http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/methodologyreferences/methodologyspecs/coalmethodology.pdf.
832
“The Coal Resource: A Comprehensive Overview of Coal,” World Coal Institute (3/6/2009), at 39,http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coal_resource_overview_of_coal_report(03_06_2009).pdf.
833
See “NYMEX Coal Futures Near-Month Contract Final Settlement Price 2014,” Energy Information
Administration (10/14/2014),http://www.eia.gov/coal/nymex/.
146
and by open outcry.
834
A number of coal-related financial products are also available on the
Intercontinental Exchange.
835
Coal Mining Incidents. Coal mining is an inherently dangerous process with significant
occupational hazards. For example, in the week ending October 31, 2014, a coal mining
accident in China claimed at least 16 lives,
836
and at least 18 people were still trapped in a
flooding coal mine in Turkey.
837
Colombia, in particular, has experienced several deadly mining incidents in recent years.
In 2010, for example, an explosion at a coal mine in Amaga, Colombia, trapped scores of miners
underground,
838
reportedly killing 73 people.
839
A flood in that same mine a few years earlier
killed five miners.
840
On J anuary 26, 2011, a gas explosion at the La Preciosa mine in Sardinata,
Colombia, killed 21 miners and seriously injured six others.
841
Investigators found that the
explosion was likely due to a buildup of methane gas ignited during a shift change in the mine.
842
A similar incident took the lives of 32 employees in that same mine in 2007.
843
In addition to mining disasters, coal mining has produced air and water pollution in the
surrounding communities. In Colombia, the government recently ordered several towns in the
Cesar region to be relocated due to mining-related air pollution.
844
(2) Goldman Involvement with Coal
While Goldman has traded coal in financial and physical markets for years, Goldman
fundamentally expanded its physical coal activities by purchasing an open pit coal mine in
Colombia in 2010, and a neighboring open pit coal mine in 2012. Goldman formed a number of
Colombian entities to function as the mine owners, including CNR, while its primary
commodities trading arm, J . Aron & Co., became the mines’ exclusive coal marketing and sales
834
See contract specifications for the “Central Appalachian Coal Futures Contract,” CME website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/coal/central-appalachian-coal_contract_specifications.html.
835
See coal listings on the IntercontinentalExchange website,https://www.theice.com/products/Futures-
Options/Energy/Coal.
836
“Coal mine accident in far west China kills 16: Xinhua”, Reuters, Kazunori Takada (10/25/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/25/us-china-coal-accident-idUSKCN0IE03320141025.
837
“18 miners trapped in coal mine accident in Turkey,” Associated Press (10/28/2014),http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/18-miners-trapped-coal-accident-turkey-article-1.1989940.
838
“Colombian Coal Mine Blast Kills at Least 18,” New York Times, Simon Romero (6/17/2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/world/americas/18colombia.html.
839
“73 Killed in Coal Mine Blast, Colombian Authorities Say,” Latin American Herald Tribune,http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=359210&CategoryId=12393.
840
“Colombian Coal Mine Blast Kills at Least 18,” New York Times, Simon Romero (6/17/2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/world/americas/18colombia.html.
841
“Colombia Searches for Answers in Mine Blast,” Wall Street J ournal, Dan Molinski (1/28/2011),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704680604576110044086058786.
842
Id. Methane buildup is not a problem specific to mines in Colombia; coal mine methane has been identified as a
serious issue in the United States, China, and India as well. 2012 memorandum, “Metals & Mining: Background to
Environmental and Social Due Diligence,” prepared by Goldman Sachs, FRB-PSI-300221 - 230, at 223.
843
“Colombia Searches for Answers in Mine Blast,” Wall Street J ournal, Dan Molinski (1/28/2011),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704680604576110044086058786.
844
See 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translation provided by Goldman).
147
agent.
845
From 2010 to 2012, Goldman increased the mines’ coal exports, while J . Aron & Co.
purchased about 20% of the output for Goldman’s own activities and sold the remaining 80% to
third parties.
Beginning in 2012, a litany of operational and environmental problems reduced the
mines’ coal exports and revenues. They included mine and railway closures, contractor disputes,
labor unrest, pollution concerns, regulatory limits on mining activities, port access problems,
flooding, and declining coal prices. Despite those problems, Goldman was able to offset losses
through a short coal hedge that, in 2013, produced a nearly $250 million gain.
846
In 2014, due to
ongoing port access problems, the mines did not export any coal.
(a) Trading Coal
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it has traded coal-related financial instruments as
well as physical coal for many years.
847
Its financial trading has included coal-related futures,
swaps, options, forwards and other instruments, both on-exchange and over-the-counter. Its
physical coal activities have included storing, transporting, and supplying physical coal to
various customers, including coal-fired power plants.
Coal trading at Goldman is conducted within the GS Commodities group, by the “U.S.
Natural Gas & Power” unit which, among other activities, operates a coal trading desk.
848
Most
of the trades are booked through J . Aron & Co., Goldman’s leading commodities trading arm.
849
According to Goldman, in its 2009 fiscal year, it bought financially settled coal financial
instruments representing 159 million metric tons of coal and sold 121 million metric tons, of
which Goldman took physical delivery in about 4% of the trades, resulting in deliveries of about
5.2 million metric tons of coal.
850
With respect to its physical coal activities, Goldman informed the Subcommittee that,
during the five year period from 2008 to 2012, it bought and sold millions of metric tons of
coal.
851
For example, in 2008, it purchased about 2 million metric tons and sold about 300,000
metric tons. In 2011, it purchased about 16 million metric tons and sold nearly 18 million metric
tons.
852
It also stored and transported millions of metric tons of coal.
853
For example, in 2008, it
transported about 2 million metric tons, while in 2011 it transported nearly 9 million metric tons
845
11/4/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001 - 003 at 001.
846
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Goldman Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077, at 91.
847
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (9/5/2014). In materials submitted to the Federal Reserve, Goldman
indicated that it began trading coal sometime after 1997. See 5/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on
4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-200600 - 610, at 600.
848
See 3/2010 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discovery Review: Global Commodities – US Natural Gas &
Power,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400006 - 015, at 007.
849
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-
000001 - 009, at 008.
850
3/2010 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discovery Review: Global Commodities – US Natural Gas &
Power,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400006 - 015, at 008.
851
4/30/12 Goldman response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, GSPSICOMMODS00000005.
852
Id.
853
Id. at 006.
148
of coal.
854
Goldman indicated that, in 2012, it stored coal at facilities in Alabama, Florida,
Illinois, Louisiana, and Virginia within the United States, as well as at locations in Colombia,
Europe, and Australia.
855
One reason Goldman deepened its involvement with physical coal was its increasing
involvement with coal-fired power plants. From 1997 to 2001, Goldman entered into a joint
venture with Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Inc. (Constellation Energy) to “create an
arrangement for [the] trading of physically-settled power transactions.”
856
In 1998, as part of
that effort, they jointly formed Orion Energy, a company which purchased power plants across
the country, including plants fueled with coal.
857
In 2002, Orion Energy went public.
858
In 2003, Goldman purchased 100% of Cogentrix Energy LLC, a U.S. company that
developed, owned, and operated power plants.
859
At the time of the acquisition, Cogentrix
owned 24 power plants, 14 of which were coal-fired; over the next ten years, it bought and sold
those and other plants.
860
Cogentrix managed some of the plants’ fuel procurement needs,
including by arranging long term coal supply contracts.
861
According to Goldman, Cogentrix
sold 80% of its ownership interests in a portfolio of power plants to funds managed by Energy
Investors Funds in 2007, and sold the remaining 20% interest in that portfolio in 2011.
862
Even
after that sale, in October 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Commodities Team
wrote that Goldman had tolling agreements with four power plants, while its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Cogentrix, owned 30 power plants in the United States and abroad.
863
According to
Goldman, in December 2012, Cogentrix sold its ownership interests in all of its remaining power
plants to funds managed by the Carlyle Group.
864
Goldman records also show that, in 2007, its Global Commodities Principal Investments
(GCPI) group purchased an ownership interest in an Australian coal mine owned by Syntech
Resources for about $195 million.
865
Goldman held the mine as a merchant banking investment
until it sold the mine four years later in 2011.
866
Goldman also purchased from Constellation
854
Id.
855
4/30/12 Goldman response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, GSPSICOMMODS00000008 - 014.
856
3/26/2011 “Questions from the Federal Reserve on 4(o) Commodities Activities,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-200600 - 610, at 608 (discussing Goldman’s joint venture with Constellation Energy).
857
Id. at 010.
858
Id. See also, e.g., “Nice work[:] How to make a fortune from a utility,” The Economist (11/22/2001),http://www.economist.com/node/877192.
859
See 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at
003.
860
Id.
861
Id.
862
Id.
863
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200485.
864
Id.
865
See 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 087; 1/29/2010 “Global
Commodities Principal Investments: Portfolio Snapshot,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-201213.
866
Id. See also 8/2/2011 “Yancoal Acquires 100% of Syntech Resources,” Yancoal press release,http://www.yancoal.com.au/icms_docs/122173_Yancoal_Acquires_100_of_Syntech_Resources.pdf; “China's
Yanzhou Coal buys Aussie mine for $202m,” The Australian, Matt Chambers (8/3/2011),
149
Energy, in 2009, a book of commodities assets which included a number of coal-related
assets.
867
(b) Acquiring the First Colombian Coal Mine
Goldman’s foray into Colombian coal mining had its roots in Goldman’s 2009
acquisition from Constellation Energy.
868
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, as part of that
Constellation Energy transaction, it acquired an array of coal-related assets, including nearly 700
coal swaps, 58 contracts to buy or sell physical coal, inventories of physical coal, port access
agreements related to coal, and four ship charters related to the shipment of coal.
869
Goldman
told the Subcommittee that one of the coal-related assets was a coal supply contract that
Constellation Energy had with Coalcorp Mining, Inc., a Canadian company that owned a
Colombian coal mine.
870
That contract required Coalcorp to supply Constellation Energy with
2.4 million metric tons of coal over a five-year period from 2009 to 2012, with an option for
another year.
871
According to Goldman, as the successor to that contract, it became an unsecured
creditor of Coalcorp, a company then in financial distress.
872
According to information supplied by Coalcorp to its shareholders, Coalcorp discussed
refinancing its debt with Goldman in September 2009, but the two were unable to reach
agreement on terms.
873
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, to protect itself from the
counterparty credit risk, it began to explore buying Coalcorp’s key asset, the Colombian coal
mine, as part of the consideration for restructuring the coal supply contract.
874
Goldman
indicated that its Global Commodities Principal Investments Group took the lead in examining
the coal mine as a potential merchant banking investment.
875
In J anuary 2010, Goldman and Coalcorp publicly announced that Goldman would
acquire Coalcorp’s La Francia mine.
876
The transaction was comprised of several parts.
877
First,http://www.theaustralian.com.au/bus...oal-buys-aussie-mine-for-202m/story-e6frg906-
1226106981679.
867
See 1/20/2009 Constellation Energy press release , “Constellation Energy Enters into Definitive Agreement to
Divest the Majority of its International Commodities Business,”http://www.constellation.com/
documents/news/264949.pdf.
868
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). Constellation Energy, a U.S. utility and trading business,
sold Goldman “trading positions in gas, power, coal & freight.” 11/2011 “Global Commodities Business
Overview[:] Presentation to the Federal Reserve,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-201176 - 188, at 184.
869
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 10/2/2014 chart on coal transactions associated with
Constellation Energy, GSPSICOMMODS00046535.
870
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
871
Id; 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 006.
872
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also, e.g., “Coalcorp fights to avoid forced
bankruptcy,” National Post (1/22/2010),http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=5bd85dd8-112f-4af4-883a-
803594922cf3&sponsor=.
873
1/19/2010 “Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders to be Held on February 22, 2010 and Management
Information Circular,” prepared by Coalcorp Mining Inc. (hereinafter, “2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice”), PSI-
CI-000001 - 030, at 026. See also, e.g., “Coalcorp fights to avoid forced bankruptcy,” National Post (1/22/2010),http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=5bd85dd8-112f-4af4-883a-803594922cf3&sponsor=.
874
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice, at PSI-CI-000020.
875
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
876
See, e.g., 1/21/2010 “Coalcorp announces filing of Management Information Circular for the Special Meeting to
vote on proposed transaction,” Coalcorp press release,http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/703837/coalcorp-
announces-filing-of-management-information-circular-for-the-special-meeting-to-vote-on-proposed-transaction;
150
Goldman would acquire the open-pit mine as well as related mining concessions, infrastructure
assets, and contractual rights. Second, Goldman would acquire a nearby undeveloped mine site
that also had mining concessions. Third, Goldman would acquire Coalcorp’s 8.43% ownership
interest in Ferrocarriles Del Norte de Colombia (Fenoco), a company that operated a 226 km
railway that transported coal from the Cesar mining region to the seaports over 100 miles
away.
878
Railway access was critical to exporting the coal. In addition, as part of the
transaction, Coalcorp would assign to a new Goldman subsidiary the supply contract to deliver
coal to Constellation Energy.
879
On March 19, 2010, Coalcorp and Goldman completed the acquisition for about $200
million.
880
Goldman established several legal entities to own and operate the mines and related
infrastructure.
881
The key Goldman entity was a Colombian corporation, Colombian Natural
Resources I S.A.S. (CNR). CNR and other entities were set up as wholly owned subsidiaries that
were ultimately owned by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc and Goldman, Sachs & Co LLC.
882
The Boards of Directors of the new entities were comprised exclusively of Goldman
employees.
883
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the coal mine was purchased as a merchant
banking investment, and the vast majority of its internal documents also characterize the
transactions in that manner, although forms filed with the Federal Reserve indicate that Goldman
also asserted that its ownership of the Colombian mining operations was permissible under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority.
884
“Coalcorp agrees to sell La Francia coal mine to Goldman Sachs,” Proactiveinvestors.com (1/7/2010),http://www.proactiveinvestors.com/c...rees-to-sell-la-francia-coal-mine-to-goldman-
sachs-3506.html.
877
See 2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice, at PSI-CI-000019 - 020, 026.
878
See “Management and Discussion Analysis, 2010,” prepared by Coalcorp Mining Inc. (hereinafter, “2010
Coalcorp MDA”), at 4,http://www.meliorresources.com/uploads/documents/annualreports/2010 Annual MD&A.pdf (stating
Coalcorp sold its 8.43% stake in Fenoco to Goldman as part of the La Francia transaction in March 2010).
879
See 2010 Coalcorp Shareholder Notice, at PSI-CI-000020; 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 006. See also 10/28/2011 “Global Commodities Review of
Acquisitions: Colombian Natural Resources,” part of a presentation by Goldman for the Goldman Board of
Directors, FRB-PSI-201063 (valuing the contract at about $50 million); “Coalcorp agrees to sell La Francia coal
mine to Goldman Sachs,” Proactiveinvestors.com (1/7/2010),http://www.proactiveinvestors.com/c...rees-to-sell-la-francia-coal-mine-to-goldman-
sachs-3506.html.
880
“Management and Discussion Analysis, 2011,” prepared by Melior Resources Inc. (formerly Coalcorp Mining
Inc.) (hereinafter, “2011 Melior MDA”), at 3-4,http://www.meliorresources.com/uploads/documents/annualreports/Melior-MDA-2011.pdf; 1/29/2010 “Global
Commodities Principal Investments: Portfolio Snapshot,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-602254 - 55.
881
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also undated “CNR Structure Chart,” prepared by
Goldman at the Subcommittee’s request, GSPSICOMMODS00046318.
882
See undated “CNR Structure Chart,” prepared by Goldman at the Subcommittee’s request,
GSPSICOMMODS00046318.
883
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
884
See, e.g., 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10, submitted to the Federal
Reserve by Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303, at 303 (reflecting that the investment
was “permissible under [Bank Holding Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant
Banking regulations.”).
151
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, at the time of the acquisition, Goldman intended to
make minor changes to the mining operations and, within a short period of time, sell the entire
project to Vale S.A., a Brazilian mining company that owned the neighboring El Hatillo mine.
885
That planned sale did not take place.
(c) Operating the Mine
To operate the La Francia mine, CNR retained the same consortium of three companies,
known as Consorcio Minero del Cesar S.A.S. (CMC), that Coalcorp had used.
886
CMC was
responsible for conducting the mining operations, including hiring the miners and other
employees who worked on the site. Goldman also acquired rights to ship the coal out of a
Colombian port known as Santa Marta.
887
During its first two years of operation, the coal mine’s exports and revenues increased
rapidly. At year-end in 2010, CNR, the Goldman subsidiary that owned the La Francia mine,
reported operational revenues from selling the coal at about $66 million.
888
By the end of the
next year, 2011, CNR reported that the mine’s operating revenues from selling coal had tripled to
about $200 million.
889
CNR reported higher revenues even though it had lost its second and
third-largest customers, Glencore and Electroandina S.A., which had collectively accounted for
about one third of CNR’s net operational revenues in 2010.
890
CNR’s financial statement
showed that the lost revenues had been more than made up by its new and largest customer,
Goldman’s commodities subsidiary, J . Aron & Company, which accounted for about $74 million
of its operating revenues.
891
Exclusive Marketing Agreement. Once it acquired the mine, Goldman installed CNR
as “the exclusive marketing and sales agent,” although the terms of the agreement were not
formalized until 2011.
892
In September 2011, CNR entered into a formal Marketing Agreement
with J . Aron & Co., designating it as CNR’s “exclusive agent”
893
to perform the following
services:
885
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
886
See 12/31/11 and 12/31/2010, C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I S.A.S., Financial Statements (hereinafter
“2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements”), GSPSICOMMODS00046319 - 365, at 343.
887
Goldman acquired those port access rights from Vitol in 2010. See “Vitol buys export space at Colombia Santa
Marta port,” Reuters, J ackie Cowhig (1/25/2010),http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/01/25/ac-coal-vitol-colombia-
idUKLDE60O17F20100125.
888
See 12/31/11 and 12/31/2010, C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I S.A.S., Financial Statements (hereinafter
“2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements”), GSPSICOMMODS00046319 - 365, at 324 (applying 2010 US dollar
exchange rate of .000522 as listed on X-rates.com,http://www.x-
rates.com/historical/?from=COP&amount=1&date=2010-12-31).
889
Id. (applying 2011 U.S. dollar exchange rate of .000516 as listed on X-rates.com,http://www.x-
rates.com/historical/?from=COP&amount=1&date=2011-12-31).
890
Id. at 345.
891
Id. (applying 2011 U.S. dollar exchange rate of .000516 as listed on X-rates.com,http://www.x-
rates.com/historical/?from=COP&amount=1&date=2011-12-31).
892
11/4/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001- 003, at 001.
893
9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron & Company,
GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 498.
152
• “Marketing coal to prospective customers,”
• “negotiating the terms of sale and delivery of coal with prospective customers;”
• “procurement of port services;” and
• “procurement of blending coal.”
894
In other words, under the agreement, Goldman’s key commodities trader became the coal mine’s
sole sales agent.
The next month, October 2011, in a presentation to the Goldman Board of Directors,
Goldman’s Global Commodities Group reported that, overall, CNR had “[r]amped up production
/ sales from 1 mt [million metric tons] in 2009 to 2.5 mt in 2011.”
895
The presentation stated that
CNR had also “nstalled J .Aron Coal Desk as marketing agent, increasing customer base from
15 in 2011.”
896
The Global Commodities Group presentation also stated: “2011
projected to be the most profitable year since the assets went into production (2005), with
revenues forecasted to be >$65 [million].”
897
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, after the acquisition, J . Aron & Co. purchased
about 20% of CNR’s coal for itself and sold the other 80% to unrelated third parties.
898
Specifically, Goldman indicated that in 2011, J . Aron & Co. purchased about 710,000 metric
tons from CNR for itself and sold about 1.6 million metric tons of CNR coal to third parties, for
a total of about 2.3 million metric tons.
899
In 2012, J . Aron & Co. purchased about 775,000
metric tons for itself and sold about 3.5 million metric tons of CNR coal to third parties, for a
total of about 4.2 million metric tons.
900
In 2013, the figures were 324,000 metric tons
purchased by J . Aron & Co. and 3.4 million metric tons sold to third parties, for a total of about
3.7 million metric tons.
901
The Colombian coal mine gave Goldman control over a vertically integrated coal
operation. Goldman entities mined the coal, transported it by a railway partly owned by
Goldman, and delivered it to a port facility controlled by Goldman. Another Goldman entity, J .
Aron & Co., negotiated and arranged for 100% of the coal sales. It either bought the coal itself
and arranged for its shipment, or sold it to third parties. The coal purchased by J . Aron & Co.
was transported on Goldman-chartered ships to either the United States or Europe.
894
Id. at 528.
895
10/28/2011“Global Commodities Review of Acquisitions: Colombian Natural Resources,” part of a presentation
prepared by Goldman for the Goldman Board of Directors, FRB-PSI-201063.
896
Id.
897
Id.
898
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008;
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). CNR’s financial statements indicate that, during 2012, J .
Aron & Co. was slated to purchase closer to one-third of its coal. See 2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements, at
Note 16, at GSPSICOMMODS00046342. In 2014, the amount of coal committed to J . Aron & Co. dropped
dramatically to about 275,000 metric tons, likely due to the extended closure of the La Francia mine during 2013,
and CNR’s reduced production. See 12/31/2013 and 12/31/2012 C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I S.A.S.,
Financial Statements (hereinafter “2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements”), at Note 16,
GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 391.
899
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008.
900
Id.
901
Id.
153
Setbacks. Despite its increased coal production, customer base, and revenues,
Goldman’s coal mining operations during 2010 and 2011 also experienced some difficulties.
902
In November 2010, CNR sent Coalcorp a Notice of Claim for indemnification for an alleged
$37.4 million in losses from locomotives not being in working condition and from unpaid import
value-added taxes.
903
In December, CNR sent Coalcorp a second Notice of Claim for
indemnification from $1.1 million in alleged losses due to Coalcorp’s failure to provide title to
one third of the real property intended to be used for a rail spur.
904
In March 2011, Coalcorp –
renamed Melior Resources Inc. in 2011 – settled both claims by paying Goldman-related entities
$6.2 million.
905
In May and August 2010, the Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and
Territorial Development issued resolutions recognizing coal-induced air pollution problems in
the Cesar region and calling for the relocation of families living in certain areas contaminated by
coal dust.
906
Both resolutions explicitly named CNR, among other companies, as needing to
reduce air pollution from its mining operations,
907
and identifying it as one of four companies
that would have to pay relocation expenses.
908
In December 2011, the Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable
Development adopted a resolution that suspended new coal mining activities in “high” pollution
areas, including the Cesar region where Goldman’s coal mine was located, making expansion or
sale of those mining operations more difficult.
909
902
Goldman has confirmed that it “does not operate, possess or own on its balance sheet a major investment in any
coal mine other than [its Colombian mining operations].” 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 005.
903
See “Coalcorp Receives Notice of Claim,” Canada Newswire (11/3/2010),http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=CCJ :CN&sid=azvtX.MEk4LY.
904
See “Coalcorp Receives Notice of Claim,” Bloomberg (12/3/2010),http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0M6GkXe6jhc.
905
See 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 003
(“Coalcorp paid Goldman Sachs about $6.2 million to settle certain claim relating to the La Francia mine
purchase.”); Melior Resources Inc, FY 2012 Management and Discussion Analysis, Consolidated Financial
Statements, at 5-6,http://www.meliorresources.com/uploads/documents/annualreports/MLR-MDA-Oct16-2012-
FINAL.pdf.
906
See 5/20/2010 Resolution No. 0970, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047330 - 334; and 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the
Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translations provided by
Goldman); Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also “Colombia: Coal producers feel out of
favour,” Mining J ournal (5/3/2013),http://www.mining-journal.com/reports/colombia-coal-producers-feel-out-of-
favour?SQ_DESIGN_NAME=print_friendly (noting that the issue of “the re-location of three towns in Cesar away
from the mining site – Plan Bonito, El Hatillo and El Boqueron” remains “unresolved”).
907
See 5/20/2010 Resolution No. 0970, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, at GSPSICOMMODS00047334.
908
See 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, at GSPSICOMMODS00047335.
909
See 12/22/2011 Resolution No. 0335, Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development,
Official Gazette No. 48.294 of 2011, GSPSICOMMODS00047310 - 329 (translation provided by Goldman).
154
(d) Acquiring the Second Colombian Mine
Despite those difficulties, in 2012, rather than sell its Colombian coal mining operation as
planned, Goldman expanded its physical coal activities by purchasing a second coal mine.
Goldman told the Subcommittee that before it could sell its mine to Vale S.A. as it had intended,
Vale announced plans to sell its coal mine and exit Colombia altogether.
910
Goldman told the
Subcommittee that because Vale’s mine was so close to the La Francia mine, it decided to
purchase it and combine the operations, with a view towards selling the integrated mining
operations to a third party in the future.
911
In May 2012, Vale announced the sales agreement, indicating it would sell Goldman an
open-pit working mine, an undeveloped mine site, additional shares in the Fenoco railway, and a
port terminal.
912
The second coal mine was known as El Hatillo, and the new port was called
Río Córdoba. Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments Group again took the lead
on the transaction, forming new subsidiaries for the holdings, which were again set up as
ultimately wholly owned by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and The Goldman, Sachs & Co
LLC.
913
Goldman closed on the approximately $400 million acquisition on J une 22, 2012.
914
In 2013, Goldman’s Global Commodities group reported to the Goldman Board of
Directors that, together, the La Francia and El Hatillo holdings had total coal reserves of about
160 million metric tons and a total production capacity of about six million metric tons per
annum.
915
It also informed the Board that CNR had “significant expansion plans,” including
plans to double the annual output of coal and expanding the site from “2 to 5 open pit operations
over the next 4 years.”
916
In the same presentation to the Board, however, the Global Commodities group also
stated: “Certain operational issues have arisen.”
917
Operational Issues. The September 2013 presentation identified two operational issues.
The first was that, since the acquisition of the first mine, coal prices had declined from about
910
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
911
Id.
912
See, e.g., “Vale Sells Colombia Coal Mines to GS-led Group,” Reuters, Reese Ewing (5/28/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/us-vale-coal-idUSBRE84S00N20120529; “Goldman front-runner for
Vale's Colombian coal ops,” Reuters, J ack Kimball and J acqueline Cowhig (2/14/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/us-colombia-vale-coal-idUSTRE81D19620120214.
913
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014); 3/31/2013 “Commodity, Energy, E&P, Renewable Energy
Equity Investments,” chart prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400065 - 070, at 068.
914
See undated report, “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR-Y-10 filed by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046304 - 306 (reflecting the J une 22, 2012
acquisition of Colombia Purchase Co., S.A.S. by GS Power Holdings LLC and Goldman Sachs Global Holdings
L.L.C.); 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at
008 (indicating the transaction was settled for “cash consideration of approximately $400 million, subject to certain
adjustments”).
915
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090.
916
Id.
917
Id.
155
$113 per metric ton to $90 per metric ton, a drop of 20%.
918
The presentation stated that an
additional drop of $5 to $7 per metric ton “may trigger a permanent impairment” of the value of
the investment, which was then being carried on Goldman’s books at about $590 million.
919
A second problem identified in the Board presentation involved a J anuary 2013 shipping
incident in which a barge owned by another, unaffiliated company released a large amount of
coal into Colombian waters.
920
As a result, the Colombian government announced that it would
no longer delay compliance with a 2007 law requiring all Colombian ports to install equipment
enabling coal to be loaded directly onto ocean-going vessels, without using a barge.
921
The
procedure used at most Colombian ports was for coal to be loaded from a port terminal onto a
barge, transported farther out to sea, and then transferred from the barge to a larger ship using
cranes and open conveyor systems that produced coal dust and coal spills into the water during
transfers. The Colombian government imposed a J anuary 2014 deadline for all ports to install
direct-loading equipment and stop using barges.
922
Goldman’s Commodities group reported to
the Goldman Board of Directors that CNR currently “barges coal out to sea in order for it to be
loaded onto vessels via floating cranes,” and that upgrading its port facilities with direct loading
equipment would cost about $220 million.
923
The presentation indicated that CNR was
“evaluating alternatives.”
924
While the cost and port equipment issues were serious, additional operational problems
affecting the Colombian mines were not mentioned in the Board presentation. For example, in
2010 and 2011, the Colombian government denied requests by CNR and other companies to
increase coal mining in the Cesar region, limiting Goldman’s expansion plans.
925
Similarly, in
August 2012, the Fenoco railway, which transports the coal from Goldman’s mines to the ports
over 100 miles away, had been shut down for a month due to a pay dispute, slowing coal
delivery.
926
In addition, Goldman, through its subsidiary CNR, became embroiled in an ongoing
dispute with the consortium that operated the mines, Consorcio Minero del Cesar (CMC).
918
Id. at 091.
919
Id.
920
Id.
921
See 8/15/2007 Decree No. 3083, Colombian Transport Ministry, Official Gazette No. 46.721,
GSPSICOMMODS00046536 - 537 (requiring compliance by 6/1/2010); 11/4/2009 Decree No. 4286, President of
the Republic of Colombia, GSPSICOMMODS00046538 - 539 (requiring ports to file monthly progress reports);
3/5/2010 Decree No. 0700, Colombian Transport Ministry, GSPSICOMMODS00046540 - 541 (allowing delayed
filing of progress reports) (translations provided by Goldman).
922
See 2011 Law No. 1450, GSPSICOMMODS00046542 (translation provided by Goldman).
923
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090.
924
Id.
925
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-000001 - 009, at
004; see also12/22/2011 Resolution No. 0335, Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable
Development, Official Gazette No. 48.294 of 2011, GSPSICOMMODS00047310 - 329 (translation provided by
Goldman); 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translation provided by Goldman).
926
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-000001 - 009, at 004.
See also “Colombia’s Fenoco, Coal Railway Workers Agree on Pay Raise,” Reuters (9/18/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/colombia-fenoco-pay-idUSL2N0HE2BB20130918.
156
According to CNR, in November 2012, CMC “informed CNR” that it had assigned the operating
contract to a related company, but CNR refused to “recognize the legality of that assignment,”
rejected invoices from the new company, and essentially stopped paying for work under the
contract.
927
In addition, Goldman told the Subcommittee that CNR had become concerned about
whether CMC was conducting the mining at the sites in accordance with approved plans or was
mining them in a way that could significantly reduce the value of the mines.
928
In J anuary 2013, the consortium sent a letter declaring CNR in breach of the contract and
suspended work at the mine.
929
That same day, miners and other employees who worked for the
consortium walked off the job, abandoning the mine and extensive mining equipment.
930
CNR
described the situation in its certified financial statement as follows:
“On the 21
st
of J anuary of 2013, in a sudden manner, Consorcio Minero del Cesar S. A. S
sent a letter announcing the unilateral termination of the La Francia Mine’s operation
Contract, based on the alleged breach of the Company. In parallel, the mine’s activities
were suspended on the same day and all the machinery of the consortium and of its
members was abandoned on the field. During the next two weeks, the inventory of coal
on the yards was shipped to the port, and from then onwards the mine’s activity was
completely halted. On the 15
th
of April a group of women and children who [were] said
to be relatives of the CMD’S employees blocked the access to the camp of the El Hatillo
mine. In this way, the conflict at the La Francia mine irradiated also to that mine ….
CNR I started several legal actions for the unblocking of the mine, including protection
petitions and police proceedings filed with the mayor of El Paso, as well as a request of
administrative protection before the National Mining Agency ANM. Likewise, a large
number of letters was sent to request the intervention of police and military authorities,
the Governor of Cesar, the office of the Attorney General and the People’s Defender
Office, as well as to the Mines and Interior Ministries, among others.”
931
CNR stated that the blockade of the mine continued, and the mine remained closed for
the next nine months, until September 22, 2013:
“The total blockade of the La Francia mine lasted for 244 days, until the 22
nd
of
September of 2013, and it was lifted thanks to a private agreement in which CNR I paid a
cash bonus of $20,000 to each one of the persons that were still protesting. Once CNR I
resumed the control of the mine, the activities to recover the productive areas were
started, particularly the pumping of water from the pit.”
932
927
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 394.
928
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
929
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 374.
930
Id.
931
Id.
932
Id.
157
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the payments made by CNR to end the blockade were by
check rather than in cash.
933
Goldman further told the Subcommittee that 120 current or former
employees received the USD $10,000 checks.
934
Shortly thereafter, CNR hired a new mine
operator, Excavaciones y Proyectos de Colombia S.A.S. (EPSA).
935
All told, as a result of the dispute with CMC, the La Francia mine produced no coal from
J anuary 21 through September 22, 2013.
936
During the shutdown, Goldman used coal from an
affiliate to meet CNR’s coal supply contracts.
937
When those supplies ran out, some supply
contracts were cancelled or postponed.
938
Still another supply contract required CNR to make a
$237,000 payment to settle the contract breach.
939
Many of the operational problems with the mines were not identified in the 2013
presentation made by the GS Commodities Group to the Goldman Board of Directors, including
the nine-month closure of one mine, the legal dispute with the mine operator, the mine blockade
by women and children, the attempts to obtain police and military assistance, the payments to
protestors, the cancellation, postponement, and settlement of coal supply contracts, and the
associated legal expenses.
940
At the same time, those developments increased the financial,
operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks associated with the mining venture,
presenting issues that do not normally confront a bank or bank holding company.
(e) Current Status
Operational and environmental problems at the Colombian mines have continued
throughout 2014. Coal prices have remained volatile. Even after the La Francia mine reopened,
the labor dispute at the El Hatillo mine continued with a labor union representing about 40% of
the employees.
941
After years of negotiations, “CNR has requested the Ministry of Labor of
Colombia to convene an arbitration panel to decide the dispute.”
942
In J anuary 2014, the
Colombian environmental law precluding the use of barges to load coal onto ships took effect.
Since then, Goldman has been precluded from using its port, which has no direct-loading
equipment.
943
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, as a result, “since J anuary 1, 2014, CNR
has not exported any coal it produced in Colombia.”
944
933
10/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-24-000001 - 003, at 001
(explaining that the amount was in U.S. dollars, whereas the amount reflected in the certified financial statement
was in thousands of Colombian pesos).
934
Id.
935
2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 375.
936
Id..
937
Id. at Note 1.
938
Id.
939
Id.
940
See 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090 - 091.
941
10/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-19-000001 - 000009, at 004.
942
Id.
943
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
944
9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 004.
158
According to CNR’s financial statement, during 2013, Goldman considered several
alternatives to gain access to a port with a direct-loading system.
945
CNR considered “the
possibility to load its coal at Puerto Nuevo which, being a public port, had to offer access to third
parties.”
946
J ust days before the law was to go into effect, however, the Puerto Nuevo port
announced that it had established an application process which CNR would have to complete to
use the port facilities.
947
According to CNR, the new application process was inconsistent with
Colombian law and effectively precluded CNR from being approved.
948
CNR has not yet been
permitted to use the public port. Goldman also entered into negotiations with Drummond Corp.,
a U.S. company with major coal operations in Colombia, over using its port for CNR coal
exports, but no agreement has yet been reached.
949
In addition, Goldman obtained government
permission to upgrade its Río Córdoba port with direct-loading equipment,
950
but Goldman told
the Subcommittee that the cost was too high to go forward.
951
Because CNR cannot currently export any coal, it has reduced its coal production to
levels well below amounts established in CNR’s agreement with the Colombian National Mining
Agency.
952
While CNR has requested relief from its production obligation due to lack of port
access, as of March 2014, the National Mining Agency had not yet agreed.
953
If the Colombian
government were to take action against CNR for underproduction of coal, Goldman could lose
some or all of its mining rights. In the meantime, while Goldman continues to seek port access,
its mines have been operating at reduced rates, and the coal has been accumulating on site.
954
Goldman told the Subcommittee that CNR is storing the coal in the mine’s yards.
955
In 2013, CNR incurred losses due, in part, to the mine shutdown, reduced sales, and
declining coal prices,
956
but Goldman may not have lost money on its investment. In a
September 2013 presentation to the Goldman Board of Directors, the Global Commodities
Group reported that to offset declining coal prices and CNR’s declining market value, it had
entered into a “short coal hedge” which had to date produced “accounting gains” of $246
945
2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 375.
946
Id.
947
Id.
948
Id.
949
Id.; 9/19/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 004.
950
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also “Colombia Oks Goldman Sachs’ Direct Loading
Coal Port Upgrade Works,” Platts Coal Trader International, J aime Concha (8/13/2013), PSI-
PlattsGoldmanCoalStory(8-13-13)-000001.
951
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008;
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
952
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 376.
953
Id.
954
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
955
Id.; 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 376. See also
“Goldman Sachs miner halts coal exports from Colombia,” Reuters, Peter Murphy (1/9/2014),http://finance.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-goldman-sachs-miner-halts-210300373.html.
956
See, e.g., 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, Income Statement, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at
369.
159
million.
957
Those gains may have more than offset the CNR losses. Goldman is also considering
selling the mines.
958
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman’s Coal Mining Activities
Goldman’s coal mining activities illustrate a number of concerns related to financial
holding company involvement with complex physical commodity businesses. In just three years,
Goldman’s coal mines experienced contractor disputes, labor unrest, equipment issues, mine and
railway shutdowns, and flooding, events in addition to the many operational, environmental, and
catastrophic event risks inherent in coal mining. Had those developments combined into a worst
case scenario, they could have imposed severe financial consequences on Goldman – one that in
an extreme case could have necessitated a Federal Reserve, or even U.S. taxpayer, rescue.
The Colombian coal venture also disclosed how the coal mines’ merchant banking status
– as a short-term investment that must be sold within ten years – created a disincentive for
Goldman to pay for long-term infrastructure investments – such as direct-loading port facilities –
needed to operate the mines in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Choosing not to make
those infrastructure investments, in turn, deepened Goldman’s risk of incurring an operational or
environmental disaster in Colombia. Additional concerns illustrated by Goldman’s coal mining
venture involve its legal authority to enter the coal mining business to begin with, and the
conflicts of interest that arise when a financial holding company controls coal supplies and
transport, while trading coal-related financial instruments.
(a) Catastrophic Event Risks
Since acquiring its first Colombian coal mine in 2010, Goldman has incurred multiple
operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks that rarely confront traditional banks or
financial holding companies. When asked by the Subcommittee to describe the types of risks
that can affect coal operations, one Goldman representative summed it up by saying:
“Everything that’s happened to us.”
959
Operational, Environmental, and Catastrophic Event Risks. Colombia’s history is
marked with mining collapses, mining fatalities, and a variety of coal-related incidents and
accidents. In three years, Goldman’s Colombian coal mining operations experienced operational
problems that raised the risk of a similar mining mishap affecting the La Francia or El Hatillo
mines, including disagreements with the mine operator over how to mine the coal, abandonment
of mining equipment on site, an extended mine shutdown, water flooding the mines, and women
and children blocking mine access. Dangerous conditions and contractor and labor disputes, by
their nature, intensify the risk of a catastrophic event, although none has resulted to date.
957
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-400077 - 098, at 091.
958
See “Mick the Miner in talks to buy Goldman’s Colombian coal,” The Sunday Times, Danny Fortson
(8/17/2014),http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Industry/article1447559.ece.
959
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
160
Goldman’s operational problems were in addition to ongoing environmental problems.
Colombia has a long history of coal-related environmental problems, including air and water
pollution. Goldman had already recognized that mining-related environmental issues require
special attention, as indicated in an internal, non-public Goldman memorandum entitled, “Metals
and Mining: Background to Environmental and Social Due Diligence.”
960
The Goldman
memorandum warned that, as a result of mining operations, “[l]egal claims against the company
might include fines, penalties, prison sentences for staff (arising from pollution, compensation
from communities that have lost land or assets), significant delays in construction/development
of projects/ infrastructure, [and] impaired ability to access new assets based on previous
performance.”
961
The La Francia and El Hatillo mines had already been identified as producing coal-
related environmental problems before Goldman took ownership of them. As a result, a 2010
Colombian resolution explicitly named CNR, among other corporations, as having a
responsibility to reduce the air pollution associated with its mining operations and to contribute
to an ongoing effort to relocate three communities to a less polluted area.
962
In December 2011,
the Colombian government identified the Cesar region, which is the region where the Goldman
mines are located, as a “high pollution area,” and limited the expansion of coal mining
operations there.
963
Those actions by the Colombian government imposed additional costs and
constraints on Goldman’s coal mining activities.
Another environmental development, involving water pollution, also dramatically
impacted Goldman’s coal operations. In J anuary 2013, an affiliate of Drummond Company Inc.
was involved in a coal spill. Due to rough seas, a Drummond barge containing more than 1,800
tons of coal became partially submerged outside of the Drummond Port, and was towed to
shallow water.
964
In connection with its efforts to salvage the ship and its cargo, the crew
released a large amount of coal into Colombian waters, an event that was caught on film.
965
In
response, the Colombian government suspended Drummond’s ship-loading license until it
submitted an improved spill contingency plan.
966
As a result, Drummond lost significant
960
See undated memorandum, “Metals and Mining: Background to Environmental and Social Due Diligence,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-300221 - 230.
961
Id. at 225.
962
See 5/20/2010 Resolution No. 0970, Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047330 - 334; and 8/5/2010 Resolution No. 1525, Colombian Ministry of the
Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, GSPSICOMMODS00047335 - 341 (translations provided by
Goldman).
963
See 12/22/2011 Resolution No. 0335, Colombian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development,
Official Gazette No. 48.294 of 2011, GSPSICOMMODS00047310 - 329 (translation provided by Goldman).
964
See 2012 “Statement by Drummond Ltd. – Barge Accident Internal Investigation Results,” prepared by
Drummond Company Inc.,http://www.drummondco.com/barge-accident-internal-investigation-results/.
965
See “Colombia Suspends Drummond’s Coal Ship-Loading License,” Bloomberg, Alex Emery & Oscar Medina
(2/6/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/colombia-suspends-drummond-ship-loading-license-
agency-says.html.
966
Subcommittee briefing by Drummond Company, Inc. (9/16/2014). See also “Colombia Lifts Drummond Coal
Export Ban,” Colombia Reports, J oey O’Gorman (3/1/2013),http://colombiareports.co/colombia-lifts-drummond-
coal-export-ban/; “The Colombian Mining Locomotive Has Halted,” Environmental J ustice Organisations,
Liabilities and Trade, J oan Martínez-Alier (2/14/2013),http://www.ejolt.org/2013/02/the-colombian-mining-
locomotive-has-halted/.
161
revenues while also being required to pay at least $3.6 million in fines.
967
In addition, the
Colombian government imposed the J anuary 2014 deadline on port compliance with the 2007
direct-loading law that had not been enforced on a mandatory basis until then. In response,
Drummond paid $360 million to upgrade its port with direct-loading equipment.
968
The 2013
Drummond shipping accident graphically demonstrated how environmental disasters can lead to
regulatory actions, fines, legal expenses, lost profits, and reputational damage. The same types
of environmental disasters create catastrophic event risks for Goldman’s coal mining operations.
Still another category of catastrophic event risk confronting Goldman’s mining
operations involves the labor unrest at its mines. Labor relations in Colombia have long been
volatile and politically sensitive, especially with respect to coal mining. In 2013, the months-
long human blockade by women and children at the Goldman mines created a potentially
explosive situation. During the dispute, CNR asked the mayor, police, military, and other
Colombian authorities for assistance.
969
Had those requests been granted, actions to end the
blockade could have produced a worst case scenario involving arrests, injuries, and a political
backlash that, potentially, could have led to condemnation of Goldman, not only in Colombia,
but in other parts of the world.
Insufficient Capital and Insurance. While the risk that a catastrophic event will cause
severe damages to Goldman’s coal mines is remote, it must be addressed to protect U.S.
taxpayers from being asked to step in after a disaster strikes. The primary tool used by financial
holding companies to address catastrophic event risk is to allocate sufficient capital and
insurance to cover potential losses. According to a 2012 Federal Reserve analysis, however,
Goldman has failed to allocate sufficient capital or insurance to cover those potential losses.
970
As indicated in the prior section, Goldman has strenuously denied any liability for costs
associated with a catastrophic event involving its physical commodity activities, which may have
contributed to its failure to allocate sufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses.
971
As explained earlier, Goldman has attempted to limit its liability by structuring its physical
commodity activities to take place through subsidiaries, but Goldman’s reliance on legal
structures provides no guaranteed shield from liability, lawsuits, or legal expense.
972
Moreover,
967
“Colombia Bans Coal Loading by 2nd-Biggest Producer Drummond,” Bloomberg, Andrew Willis and Oscar
Medina (1/14/2009),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-08/drummond-s-coal-loading-halted-as-colombia-
pulls-port-license.html.
968
See 3/31/2014 Drummond press release, “Drummond Restarts Port Operations with an Investment of US$360
Million in a Modern Direct Ship Loading System,”http://www.drummondco.com/drummond-restarts-port-
operations-with-an-investment-of-us360-million-in-a-modern-direct-ship-loading-system/.
969
See 2013 and 2012 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 1, GSPSICOMMODS00046366 - 397, at 374.
970
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509.
971
See discussion in section on uranium, above.
972
See id., as well as the Federal Reserve’s analysis in its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
“Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies
Related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.Reg. 3329, at 3331 (daily ed. J an. 21, 2014) (“Recent disasters involving
physical commodities demonstrate that the risks associated with these activities are unique in type, scope, and size.
In particular, catastrophes involving environmentally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic
damages well in excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the committed capital and insurance
policies of market participants.”); 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489 (FRBNY Commodities Team wrote:
“There is no available historical precedent to support .. the effectiveness of the ‘legal structure’ mitigation strategy,
162
Goldman has opened itself up to potential liability under a Bestfoods analysis
973
by the extent of
its involvement with CNR operations. Its key commodities subsidiary, J . Aron & Co., controls
100% of CNR’s coal marketing and sales, manages its port procurements and coal blending
operations, and is one of CNR’s largest purchasers of coal.
974
Goldman indicated to the
Subcommittee that its dispute with CNR’s mine operator, CMC, stemmed in part from its
concern that CMC was not following a Goldman-approved plan regarding how the CNR mining
operations should be conducted.
975
Goldman also appears to have made the decision not to pay
for direct-loading equipment at the primary port used to export the coal. Those and other actions
suggest that Goldman personnel were involved with the day-to-day operations and management
of the Colombian coal mining operations, increasing Goldman’s potential liability in the event of
a catastrophic event.
Because a court in the United States, Colombia, or another jurisdiction might hold
Goldman liable for the actions of its mining-related entities and any disaster involving them,
Goldman should, but has not, allocated sufficient capital and insurance to cover potential
losses.
976
According to a Federal Reserve analysis in 2012, as explained in the earlier section,
the potential losses associated with an “extreme loss scenario” affecting Goldman or its peer
institutions would exceed the capital and insurance coverage at each financial holding company
by $1 billion to $15 billion.
977
That shortfall leaves the Federal Reserve, and U.S. taxpayers, at
risk of having to provide financial support to Goldman should a catastrophic event occur.
Short Term Disincentive. Still another issue raised by Goldman’s coal mining
operations is the effect of its relatively short-term investment horizon. Goldman holds CNR and
its other Colombian subsidiaries as a merchant banking investment that must be sold within ten
years, which for the La Francia mine means by 2020. Currently, that is a six-year investment
horizon. When the Colombian government required its ports to install direct-loading equipment
to reduce coal-related pollution by J anuary 2014, Drummond Inc., a U.S. company with a long
history of coal mining in Colombia, spent $360 million to upgrade its port.
978
CNR did not,
because as Goldman explained to the Subcommittee: “CNR evaluated the prospect of upgrading
the Rio Cordoba port facilities to make them compliant with the direct-loading regulations but
determined that it was not economically feasible to pursue such an initiative.”
979
Goldman
calculated the cost of upgrading the port at about $220 million.
980
It decided spending that
amount of money to upgrade the port in Colombia did not make economic sense.
rathe[r] there have been cases where a company using third part[y] vendors was itself held liable for environmental
damage.”).
973
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
974
See 9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron &
Company, GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 498.
975
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
976
See prior analysis; 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509.
977
See prior analysis; 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509.
978
See 3/31/2014 Drummond press release, “Drummond Restarts Port Operations with an Investment of US$360
Million in a Modern Direct Ship Loading System,”http://www.drummondco.com/drummond-restarts-port-
operations-with-an-investment-of-us360-million-in-a-modern-direct-ship-loading-system/.
979
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008.
980
See 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 091.
163
According to an environmental risk management expert consulted by the Subcommittee,
that type of financial calculus is representative of a broader phenomenon taking place across the
United States and around the world.
981
A number of large financial holding companies have
made merchant banking investments in industrial facilities, such as power plants, pipelines,
natural gas facilities, and refineries, that may require expensive investments to operate in a safe
and environmentally sound manner. To the degree the financial holding companies plan to hold
those facilities for relatively short periods of time, they may be less inclined to dedicate the
financial resources, time, and expertise needed for operational and environmental
improvements. According to the expert, in general, the payback period for such improvements
tends to be long term, which can be in direct tension with the financial holding company’s goal
of realizing short term profit targets and maximizing immediate investment returns.
982
The
reluctance to make improvements places the financial holding companies at potentially greater
risk of environmental and financial consequences should a mishap arise when compared to peers
that upgrade their infrastructure.
In the expert’s view, the transitory nature of merchant banking investments suggests that
the financial holding companies are betting on the probability that a facility in which they are
invested will not face a financially material catastrophic event during the years in which that
physical asset forms part of their portfolio.
983
Of particular concern is whether, in so doing, the
financial holding companies are actively limiting disclosure of the potential long-tailed
environmental risk associated with their investments, and also failing to adequately hedge their
financial responsibilities should an environmental event arise.
984
The expert pointed out the existence of established case law that presumes a legal shield
between a parent or holding company and its subsidiary facility. However, she also cautioned
that recent events suggested a potentially shifting landscape with respect to the standards and
conditions under which a corporate parent may be held financially responsible for the actions of
its subsidiary following a catastrophic environmental event. This increased uncertainty calls into
question reliance by the financial holding companies on a legal shield as a reasonable risk
management strategy to hedge the consequences from a catastrophic environmental event. To
the degree such a shield fails, and insufficient resources exist for the financial holding companies
to meet their financial responsibilities, then the burden for responding to an environmental
incident may well rest with U.S. taxpayers and the general public.
985
Still another concern is whether financial holding companies that delay or avoid
infrastructure investments may gain an unfair, short-term competitive advantage over market
participants who do make long-term investments in infrastructure. Equally troubling is whether
decisions by financial holding companies to delay or avoid infrastructure investments may
pressure its competitors to delay or skimp on needed infrastructure as well.
981
Subcommittee briefing by Chiara Trabucchi, Principal at Industrial Economics, Inc. an expert in financial
economics and environmental risk management (10/6/2014).
982
Id.
983
Id.
984
Id.
985
Id.
164
If the bet by a financial holding company is lost and a catastrophic event were to take
place, the affected financial holding company could be confronted with billions of dollars in
damages. It could also start to lose customers and counterparties due to perceptions regarding its
liability for those damages, or it could be forced to accept higher costs to convince third parties
to bear the added credit risk of doing business with the financial holding company, its
subsidiaries, and its bank. As the financial crisis demonstrated, even a large, well-capitalized
financial institution can experience liquidity problems that it cannot overcome without financial
assistance from the Federal Reserve or, ultimately, U.S. taxpayers.
In September 2013, Goldman’s Global Commodities Group told the Goldman Board of
Directors that CNR had “significant expansion plans” for Colombia, including plans to double
the annual output of coal at the mines and expand from “2 to 5 open pit operations over the next
4 years.”
986
To protect U.S. taxpayers, the Federal Reserve should ensure Goldman allocates
sufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event affecting those
coal mines in Colombia.
(b) Merchant Banking Authority
A second set of completely different issues goes to Goldman’s legal authority to be in the
coal mining business at all. Goldman has indicated that the legal foundation for its Colombian
mine operations is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority.
987
Goldman’s
extensive relationships with its Colombian coal mining operations raise questions, however,
about the extent to which they qualify as merchant banking investments.
The law does not require a financial holding company to notify or obtain prior approval
from the Federal Reserve for a merchant banking investment.
988
Rather, a company simply
makes the investment, and asserts its authority to do so after the investment is made. If the
Federal Reserve determines that the investment does not meet the qualifications for merchant
banking authority, then the financial holding company may assert other authority for the
investment.
989
If the investment is viewed as not qualifying for any authority, then the Federal
Reserve may force divestiture.
990
In this case, Goldman told the Subcommittee that it did not notify or obtain prior
permission from the Federal Reserve before buying the Coalcorp and Vale coal mining
986
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 090.
987
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014). See also , e.g., 7/25/2012 “Presentation to Firmwide
Client and Business Standards Committee,” (hereinafter 2012 Firmwide Presentation”), by Goldman Global
Commodities group, FRB-PSI-200986 - 1007, at 1000 (indicating CNR investment was a merchant banking asset).
Compare with 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10 filed by The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046301 - 303, at 303 (stating that the investment
was “permissible under ][Bank Holding Company Act Section] 4(o), but investment complies with the Merchant
Banking regulations.”).
988
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
989
Id.
990
Id. See also earlier discussion in Chapter 3, for example, regarding J PMorgan’s assertion of legal authority to
retain Henry Bath & Sons, Inc.
165
operations.
991
After making each of the two acquisitions, Goldman filed FR Y-10 forms with the
Federal Reserve, which are used to alert the agency to changes in the financial holding
company’s organizational structure and, in this case, provided notice that Goldman had
established new subsidiaries in Colombia.
992
Through the filing of the forms, Goldman alerted
the Federal Reserve to its investments shortly after they were made. It appears, however, that the
Federal Reserve examiners were likely unaware of the extent of Goldman’s involvement with the
day-to-day operations with its Colombian subsidiaries.
To qualify as a merchant banking investment, the investment must meet a number of
criteria, including that the financial holding company must not “routinely manage or operate” the
company in which it has made the investment.
993
Goldman has acknowledged this limitation in
internal materials.
994
In this case, Goldman installed its own employees as the directors of the
boards of its Colombian subsidiaries; no non-Goldman directors were selected. Goldman also
ensured that it had a formal right to approve important decisions.
995
In addition, Goldman’s key commodities subsidiary, J . Aron & Co., became CNR’s
“exclusive” agent to market, negotiate the terms of sale, and arrange for the delivery of all of the
coal produced in Colombia.
996
Goldman reported to its Board of Directors in 2011, that J . Aron
& Co. had increased CNR’s customer base from less than five to more than fifteen customers.
997
J . Aron & Co. was also given exclusive authority to procure “port services” for CNR – services
critical to the export of CNR coal – as well as exclusive authority to procure “coal blending”
services for CNR, which are critical to ensuring the quality of the coal to be sold.
998
From at
least 2011 to 2013, before CNR’s exports stopped, J . Aron & Co. used its authority to exercise
complete control over CNR’s mining output, buying about 20% of the coal for itself and
negotiating and effectively controlling the sale of the other 80% as well.
999
In addition, J . Aron
991
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
992
See 4/14/2010 “Report of Changes in Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10, filed by The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve, GSPSICOMMODS00046301-303 (reflecting the March 19, 2010 acquisition
of Colombian Nautural Resources I, S.A.S. by GS Power Holdings LLC); undated “Report of Changes in
Organizational Structure,” Form FR Y-10, filed by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. with the Federal Reserve,
GSPSICOMMODS00046304 - 307 (reflecting the J une 22, 2012 acquisition of Colombia Purchase Co., S.A.S. by
GS Power Holdings LLC and Goldman Sachs Global Holdings LLC.).
993
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (a)-(b), (e).
994
See, e.g., 2012 Firmwide Presentation, FRB-PSI-200986 - 1007, at 1000 (identifying CNR as a merchant banking
asset and noting that “Firm personnel not permitted to engage in ‘routine management’ absent extraordinary
circumstances” and “Merchant Banking authority not available for investments that are extension of firm’s own
activities”).
995
See 1/29/2010 “Global Commodities Principal Investments: Portfolio Snapshot,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-201213 - 232, at 215.
996
See 9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron &
Company, GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 498; see also 11/4/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001 - 003 at 001. Goldman has told the Subcommittee that it did not
discuss with the Federal Reserve its “intention to at as CNR’s agent/broker to market coal.” 9/19/2014 letter from
Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-16-000001 - 006, at 005.
997
See 10/28/2011“Global Commodities Review of Acquisitions: Colombian Natural Resources,” part of a
presentation prepared by Goldman for the Goldman Board of Directors, FRB-PSI-700011-030, at 028.
998
9/26/2011 “Marketing Agreement” between C.I. Colombian Natural Resources I SAS and J . Aron & Company,
GSPSICOMMODS00046496 - 530, at 500.
999
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 010, at 008.
166
& Co. appears to have arranged to buy coal at prices that were, at times, materially lower than
the prices charged to unaffiliated customers.
1000
Another sign of Goldman’s extensive involvement with CNR was the representation to
the Subcommittee that part of CNR’s dispute with its mining contractor, CMC, stemmed from a
concern about whether CMC was implementing plans approved by Goldman on how the mining
should be conducted to preserve the value of the sites.
1001
Depending upon the extent to which
Goldman’s involved itself in the details of CNR’s mining activities via Goldman-approved plans
and CNR implementation of those plans, Goldman may have been exercising a level of control
beyond what is permitted for a merchant banking portfolio company. Still another sign of
Goldman’s control over CNR was its role in deciding against spending $220 million to upgrade
CNR’s port with direct-loading equipment. While that decision is not a routine management
matter, its dramatic impact on CNR’s day-to-day operations and the reality that Goldman was the
only possible source of financing for that investment suggest Goldman was exercising significant
influence over CNR’s operations.
Still another piece of evidence of the close relationship between Goldman and CNR
involves Goldman’s hedging decisions. In its 2012 Summary Report, the FRBNY Commodities
Team wrote: “Goldman avoids the appearance of overt control of its coal mine business by not
hedging its underlying coal exposure to maintain legal protection.”
1002
In other words, Goldman
had indicated to the Federal Reserve that it used a subsidiary as the direct owner of its coal
mining operations and didn’t hedge its coal exposures, as a way of demonstrating the legal
distinction between the financial holding company and its affiliate.
1003
Internal Goldman
documents indicate, however, that Goldman did, in fact, use hedging to offset its coal exposure
and the reduced value of its CNR holdings.
1004
In a 2013 presentation to the Goldman Board of
Directors, the Goldman Global Commodities Group reported that it held a “short coal hedge” to
offset declining coal prices and CNR’s declining market value, and that the hedge had produced
“accounting gains” of $246 million.
1005
Goldman’s coal-related hedge is one more sign of the
close links between Goldman and CNR.
Goldman personnel appear to have been involved with CNR’s day-to-day marketing,
sales negotiation, procurement of coal blending and port services, and export decisions, activities
that appear to involve Goldman in the routine management of the company in the “ordinary
course of business.” Drummond, Inc., a U.S. company that is Colombia’s second-largest
1000
See discussion above; See 2011 and 2010 CNR Financial Statements, at Note 16, at
GSPSICOMMODS00046342.
1001
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (9/5/2014).
1002
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200489.
1003
Id.
1004
Goldman legal counsel told the Subcommittee that the hedge was consistent with “the shareholder of a portfolio
company … implement[ing] hedges to protect it against the possibility that the value of its investment may decline
as a result of changes in the prices of commodities produced by the portfolio company.” 11/4/2014 letter from
Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-25-000001 - 03 at 02. That said, the Goldman-
prepared presentation noted that “[g]ains in coal prices would result in hedge losses but would not result in a mark
up of the coal mine asset value.” 9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to
the Board of Directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 091.
1005
9/2013 “Global Commodities & Global Special Situations Group Presentation to the Board of Directors of The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI400077 - 098, at 091.
167
producer of coal, told the Subcommittee that Drummond conducts its own marketing, sales, and
shipping arrangements.
1006
When asked whether it ever outsourced those functions, Drummond
representatives responded that producing, marketing, and selling coal was its business. Yet,
Goldman’s wholly-owned portfolio companies in Colombia have “outsourced” 100% of those
day-to-day functions to Goldman’s primary commodities trading subsidiary. Goldman further
entwined itself with CNR by approving mining plans, controlling major investment decisions,
and hedging its exposure to CNR’s declining market value.
The Federal Reserve has authorized financial holding companies, in connection with their
merchant banking activities, to impose a limited set of restrictions on the portfolio companies in
which they have invested, so long as the restrictions address matters that are outside the scope of
ordinary business, such as restricting the portfolio company’s authority to fundamentally change
its capital or debt structure, or fundamentally alter its business without the approval of the
holding company.
1007
The Subcommittee is unaware of any Federal Reserve guidance, however,
that would permit a financial holding company to control 100% of a portfolio company’s
marketing and sales. To the contrary, when the Federal Reserve discovered that J PMorgan was
marketing Henry Bath warehousing services to clients as an integral part of its overall
commodity-related services, the Federal Reserve disallowed J PMorgan’s treatment of Henry
Bath as a separate merchant banking investment and required J PMorgan to divest itself of the
holding.
1008
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2010 – more than a year before the formal
marketing contract was signed between J . Aron & Co. and CNR – Goldman assured its
examiners that it was taking care not to become involved in the daily management and operation
of its portfolio companies, in connection with its efforts to use legal structures to shield the
holding company from legal liability.
1009
Goldman’s statements, however, appear inconsistent
with the actual level of involvement of Goldman personnel in the day-to-day activities of CNR.
To clarify the scope of the merchant banking authority, the Federal Reserve should analyze and
determine whether Goldman’s level of involvement with CNR, like J PMorgan’s level of
involvement with Henry Bath, disqualifies CNR as a merchant banking investment.
Should the Federal Reserve disallow CNR as a merchant banking investment, Goldman
might try to assert that its coal mining activities are still permissible under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley grandfathering authority. But Goldman has already admitted that, prior to the statutory
trigger date in 1997, it did not trade coal, either physically or financially. In light of that
admission, and the fact that Goldman purchased the Colombian coal mines after it became a
bank holding company, there should be no reason for the Federal Reserve to treat CNR as a
grandfathered activity protected from divestment.
1006
Subcommittee briefing by Drummond Company, Inc. (9/16/2014).
1007
See earlier discussion in Chapter 3; 12/21/2001 letter from Federal Reserve to Credit Suisse First Boston, FRB-
PSI-301593 - 601, at 596 - 597.
1008
See discussion of Henry Bath warehouses in Chapter 3, above. See also 2012 Summary Report, at 505; undated
but likely 2013 “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 -
302, at 300 [sealed exhibits].
1009
See 3/17/2010 “Minutes of GS Commodities Review Legal Meeting,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, FRB-PSI-602360 - 370, at 361 [sealed exhibit].
168
(c) Conflicts of Interest
A final set of issues involves potential conflicts of interest. Goldman trades coal in both
the physical and financial markets at the same time, using the same traders sitting at the same
coal trading desk, generally executing those trades through J . Aron & Co. CNR’s activities
provide those traders with access to commercially valuable, non-public information about coal
operations in Colombia, the largest exporter of coal to the United States, including information
about coal production, labor disputes, regulatory actions, port facilities, and coal shipments. The
J . Aron traders handling CNR’s marketing, sales, and shipments are also active in physical and
financial coal markets. The fact that Goldman shorted coal in 2013, explained its actions
internally as a response to declining coal prices and CNR’s declining market value, and, by
September 2013, booked accounting profits from that short position of nearly $250 million,
suggests a close connection between its financial trading and physical coal activities. That
Goldman’s coal traders may be in the position to use the non-public information obtained from
CNR to inform their financial trades with counterparties lacking the same access is troubling.
(4) Analysis
All of the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee were heavily
involved with coal trading, although not with coal mining. Goldman’s four-year experience with
investing in open-pit coal mines in Colombia exposed a litany of operational, environmental, and
catastrophic event risks to the holding company, exacerbated by a mine shutdown, contractor
disputes, abandoned mining equipment, flooded mines, labor unrest, environmental regulatory
actions, port access problems, and declining coal prices. Goldman’s control, through J . Aron &
Co., over 100% of CNR’s coal marketing, sales and deliveries, among other activities, increases
the potential for Goldman to be held legally liable in the event of a catastrophic event and
underscores the need for it to allocate increased capital and insurance to cover potential losses.
The same activities raise questions about whether Goldman is inappropriately relying on
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority to justify Goldman’s entry into the coal
mining business. Potential conflict of interest issues also call out for additional oversight and
preventative safeguards. It is past time for the Federal Reserve to enforce needed safeguards on
this high risk physical commodity activity.
169
D. Goldman Involvement with Aluminum
After it became a bank holding company in 2008, in addition to expanding its physical
commodity activities involving uranium and coal, Goldman substantially increased its
involvement with aluminum. In 2010, it purchased Metro International Trade Services LLC
(Metro), owner of a global network of warehouses that store actual metal, including aluminum.
Metro’s warehouses are approved by the London Metal Exchange (LME) to store metals traded
on its exchange. Under Goldman’s ownership, Metro implemented practices to aggressively
attract and retain aluminum in its Detroit warehouses.
Over the next few years, Metro loaded aluminum into its Detroit warehouses at an
historic rate, building a virtual monopoly of the U.S. LME aluminum storage market. Metro
attracted the aluminum in part by paying “freight incentives” to metal owners to store their metal
in the Detroit warehouses. In addition, Metro entered into “merry-go-round” transactions with
existing warehouse clients in which it paid them millions of dollars in incentives to join or stay
in the exit line, known as the “queue,” to load out metal, move the metal from one Metro
warehouse into another, and then place it back on warrant. Those merry-go-round transactions
lengthened the metal load out queue to exit the Metro warehouse system, blocked the exits for
other metal owners seeking to leave the system, and helped ensure Metro maintained its
aluminum stockpiles while earning a steady income. Metro’s queue grew to an unprecedented
length, forcing metal owners to wait, at times, up to nearly two years to get their metal out of
storage in Detroit.
As the Detroit warehouse queue grew, so did the Midwest aluminum premium, a
component of the aluminum price. Higher Midwest Premium prices increased aluminum costs
for U.S. aluminum buyers and weakened their ability to hedge their price risks, affecting
aluminum users in the defense, transportation, beverage, and construction sectors. Some
industrial users of aluminum charged that the dysfunctional aluminum market inflated overall
aluminum costs by $3 billion. While long queues and increasing Midwest Premium prices were
hurting aluminum users, the LME has said that the emergence of increasing premiums
“convey[ed] an advantage to the expertise of merchants and brokers, who have built-up strong
modelling capabilities around premiums and queues.”
1010
Goldman, through its control of the Metro Board of Directors, approved Metro practices
that lengthened Metro’s queue, at the same time Goldman was ramping up its own aluminum
trading operations. Between 2010 and 2013, Goldman built up its physical aluminum stockpile
from less than $100 million in 2009, to more than $3 billion in aluminum in 2012. At one point
in 2012, Goldman owned about 1.5 million metric tons of aluminum, worth $3.2 billion, more
than 25% of annual North American aluminum consumption at the time. Goldman also engaged
in massive aluminum transactions, acquiring hundreds of thousands of metric tons of metal in
one series of transactions in 2012, and more than 1 million metric tons in another series of
transactions later in the year. That same year, Goldman made large cancellations of warrants
1010
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 29,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
170
totaling about 300,000 metric tons of aluminum stored at Metro in Detroit, contributing to the
lengthening of the queue.
The fact that Goldman engaged in extensive aluminum trading at the same time it was
approving practices leading to a long warehouse queue has given rise to serious questions about
the integrity of the aluminum market. Those doubts have been fueled, in part, by a perception
that Goldman is benefiting financially from the longer queue and using non-public information
gained through its ownership of Metro to benefit its trading activities. Metro and Goldman
information barrier policies prohibit the sharing of confidential warehouse information with
those engaged in aluminum trading.
(1) Background on Aluminum
Aluminum is one of the most actively traded base metals in the world, with complex
physical and financial markets, and volatile prices that, at times, appear disconnected to
fundamental forces of supply and demand.
Using Aluminum. Aluminum is a durable, versatile, light-weight base metal made by
extracting aluminum oxide, commonly known as alumina, from bauxite ore. It is used in a wide
variety of applications including in the transportation, construction, and consumer goods
markets.
1011
General Motors Corp., for example, indicated that its 2012 U.S.-sold vehicles
would contain an average of 370 pounds of aluminum, providing, among other applications, 90%
of the engine block and all cylinder heads.
1012
Aluminum also plays an important role in the
defense and aerospace industry and is a critical raw material for the production of military
aircraft
1013
and ships.
1014
As of 2009, the most recent year for which figures were available, the
U.S. Department of Defense consumed about 3% of annual U.S. aluminum production.
1015
The United States is the world’s fourth largest aluminum producer behind China, Russia,
and Canada.
1016
In 2013, U.S. primary aluminum production (as opposed to production from
1011
See undated “Aluminum Consumption by Regions in 2013 and 2025” Rusal website,http://www.rusal.ru/en/aluminium/consumers.aspx; “Ford’s Epic Gamble: The Inside Story,” Fortune, Alex Taylor
III (7/24/2014),http://fortune.com/2014/07/24/f-150-fords-epic-gamble/ (Ford’s new all-aluminum truck).
1012
U.S. Geological Survey 2011 Yearbook on Aluminum,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/aluminum/myb1-2011-alumi.pdf, citing “GM sees 2011 sales at
12–13 mil units,” Platts Metals Week, v. 82, no. 38,(9/19/2011), at 15. See also “The Changing Demand for
Aluminum in North America,” Open Markets, a CME publication, Samantha Azzarello (3/18/2014),http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/7855/the-changing-demand-for-aluminum-in-north-america (discussing rising
aluminum demand in cars).
1013
See, e.g., undated “Defense[:] Military Aircraft,” Kaiser Aluminum website,http://www.kaiseraluminum.com/markets-we-serve/aerospace/defense/military-aircraft/.
1014
One shipbuilding company, Austal USA, told the Subcommittee that it uses 2.5 million pounds of aluminum in
each J oint High Speed Vessel it produces for the U.S. Navy and 3.5 million pounds in each Littoral Combat Ship.
Subcommittee briefing by Austal USA. (10/30/2014).
1015
See 12/2005 “China’s Impact on Metals Prices in Defense Aerospace,” prepared by U.S. Department of
Defense, at 1-2,http://www.acq.osd.mil/mibp/docs/china_impact_metal_study_12-2005.pdf; 1/25/2014 email from
Office of the Secretary of Defense to Senate Armed Services Committee staff, “Aluminum,” PSI-OSD-01-000001.
1016
2/2014 “Aluminum Production,” prepared by Mineral Resources Program, U.S. Geological Survey,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/aluminum/mcs-2014-alumi.pdf.
171
scrap aluminum) was more than 1.9 million metric tons.
1017
North American aluminum
consumption is expected to be about 6.4 million metric tons in 2014.
1018
Aluminum Infrastructure. A complex infrastructure is required to produce useable
aluminum. Bauxite mines produce bauxite ore, which must be ground, mixed with chemicals,
and subjected to heat and pressure to extract the alumina.
1019
The extracted alumina is then
transformed into liquid aluminum through a smelting process.
1020
The liquid aluminum is mixed
with other metals to form aluminum alloys which are molded or cast into ingots. Depending on
the intended use, aluminum ingots can be fabricated into rolls or other shapes.
1021
Aluminum is
non-toxic and can be stored for years without problems.
1022
Aluminum recycling provides
another important source of the metal.
1023
Aluminum Markets. Aluminum is bought and sold in both physical and financial
markets. Physical aluminum is typically sold directly from producers to industrial end users.
Most aluminum produced by smelters is sold directly to companies that use the metal to make
their products. Physical aluminum can be sold through long or short term supply contracts or
through ad hoc purchases made on “spot” markets. Physical aluminum prices are typically
established, in part, by referencing aluminum prices in the financial markets.
In the financial markets, aluminum can be sold using a variety of financial instruments,
including futures, options, swaps, and forwards. Those financial instruments can be bought or
sold on public commodities exchanges, like the London Metal Exchange (LME) or the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME), or through over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. Published
aluminum prices on the exchanges, most commonly the LME’s “Official Price” for aluminum,
play an important role as the reference price in contracts for physical aluminum.
Physical aluminum contracts typically establish the aluminum price using several pricing
components which, when combined, produce an “all-in” aluminum price. One key component is
the LME Official Price for aluminum as of a specific date or as an average over a specified
period. That price is established through trading on the LME exchange and is generally
recognized for aluminum as the “global reference for physical contracts.”
1024
The second key
pricing component is a regional “premium,” which is intended to reflect the availability of
1017
A metric ton is equal to 1000 kilograms or about 2,200 pounds. See 9/10/2014 “ U.S. Primary Aluminum
Production,” prepared by The Aluminum Association,http://www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/USPrimaryProduction082014.pdf.
1018
See undated “Capitalizing on Opportunities, Minimizing Risks,” Alcoa website,http://www.alcoa.com/sustainability/en/info_page/vision_risks.asp.
1019
See undated “Adding Value From the Ground Up,” Alcoa website (interactive webpage teaching the stages of
making aluminum),http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/about_alcoa/dirt/addingvalue_2.htm. See also undated “How
it’s Made,” Hydro website,http://www.hydro.com/en/About-aluminium/How-its-made/ (webpage showing how
aluminum is made from “bauxite, through production, use and recycling”).
1020
Id.
1021
Id.
1022
“Aluminum 101,” The Aluminum Association website,http://www.aluminum.org/aluminum-
advantage/aluminum-101.
1023
Id.
1024
Undated “LME Official Price,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/pricing-and-data/pricing/official-price/.
172
aluminum in a particular geographic area and the cost of delivering aluminum there.
1025
The
relevant premium for aluminum sold in the United States is the “Midwest Aluminum Premium”
(Midwest Premium). Midwest Premium prices are published by a company called Platts, which
derives it by conducting surveys of the contract prices between physical spot market aluminum
buyers and sellers for delivery of the metal.
1026
Large aluminum users typically closely monitor
the LME and Midwest Premium prices, since both prices will largely determine the all-in price
they will pay for aluminum in contracts with aluminum producers.
1027
Aluminum Prices. Over the past five years, aluminum prices have been volatile, with
all-in prices sometimes swinging by as much as $400 per metric ton within a month.
1028
The
following graph depicts the aluminum all-in price, LME futures price, and Midwest Premium
price from 2008 to 2014. The Midwest Premium price has climbed dramatically, both in dollar
terms and as a percentage of the all-in price.
1025
A third pricing component in physical aluminum contracts may be the cost of producing for delivery a particular
shape or aluminum alloy. So-called “product premiums” are not a focus of the Subcommittee’s Report. See
3/31/2014 Alcoa, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2014, at 45,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4281/000119312514157120/d701633d10q.htm.
1026
See 6/2014 “Methodology and Specifications Guide,” prepared by Platts, at 2,https://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/methodologyreferences/methodologyspecs/metals.pdf.
1027
See, e.g., Subcommittee briefing by Austal USA (10/30/2014). Austal told the Subcommittee that it purchases
millions of pounds of aluminum each year to build ships for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Austal
explained that, under its DOD contract, any increase in the purchase price of physical aluminum was shared 50% by
the company and 50% by DOD, which meant that increased aluminum costs required additional U.S. taxpayer
dollars. Austal indicated that it continually monitors both the LME and Midwest Premium prices.
1028
Subcommittee briefing by Austal USA (10/30/2014).
173
Source: Prepared by Subcommittee using data provided by Novelis.
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
For many years, the Midwest Premium was a relatively small portion of the all-in price
for physical aluminum. In recent years, however, it has grown more volatile and has
dramatically increased in both real dollar terms and as a proportion of the all-in price. That
development has had an adverse impact on many industrial aluminum users who believe that
higher Midwest Premium prices decrease their ability to hedge price swings and lead to higher
all-in prices for aluminum.
1029
Aluminum Trading on the London Metal Exchange. The London Metal Exchange
(LME) is the dominant market in the world for trading aluminum, copper, and other base metals.
The exchange is physically located in London and falls within the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The LME is empowered by the FCA to act as
the primary regulator for its market.
1030
1029
See, e.g., Subcommittee briefing by Novelis, (11/3/2014).
1030
See undated “Regulation,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/regulation/.
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
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$450
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$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
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4
Aluminum Prices, 2008 to 2014
All-in Price LME Price Midwest Premium (Right-Axis)
174
The LME is owned by London Metals Exchange, which is owned by LME Holdings
Limited.
1031
For many years, the LME was a member-owned organization, and several large
banks, including Goldman, J PMorgan, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup, held its
shares.
1032
In late 2012, the LME shareholders sold 100% of their shares to Hong Kong
Exchanges and Clearing Ltd., which is now the sole owner of the LME.
1033
The LME offers many types of financial products for trading on the exchange, including:
• Futures – contracts that obligate parties to buy or sell a specified amount and type of
metal at a specified price on a specified future date; and
• Options – similar to futures contracts except that parties have the option rather than
an obligation to buy or sell the metal at the specified date and price.
1034
Those financial products can be used to trade a variety of base metals on the LME, such as
aluminum and copper.
Every day, the LME publishes official prices for each metal traded on the exchange. For
aluminum, those include the “cash” price and a “three month” futures price. LME prices,
especially the daily LME Official Price, have become benchmarks for aluminum physical
contracts.
1035
Aluminum market participants also use LME futures to hedge their exposure to
changes in aluminum prices,
1036
although, as shown in the chart above, over the last two years,
there has been an increasing gap between the LME price and the all-in price consumers actually
pay for aluminum. That growing difference between the LME price and the all-in aluminum
price has made the LME price a less effective hedging tool.
LME Warrants. Parties trading LME futures contracts can generally settle those
contracts in one of two ways. The first and most common method is called offsetting. Under
that settlement method, a party’s obligation to deliver or take delivery of metal under an LME
futures contract can be negated by their entering into an equivalent but opposite transaction, such
1031
See 12/6/2012 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) and LME Holdings Ltd. press release,
“HKEx and LME Announce Completion of Transaction,”http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-events/press-
releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-announce-completion-of-transaction/.
1032
Id.; “LME Shareholders OK HKEx Takeover Pact,” Resource Investor, Philip Burgert (7/25/2012),http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2012/07/25/lme-shareholders-ok-hkex-takeover-pact.
1033
See 12/6/2012 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) and LME Holdings Limited press release,
“HKEx and LME Announce Completion of Transaction,”http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-events/press-
releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-announce-completion-of-transaction/.
1034
See undated “Trading[:] Contract Types,” London Metal Exchange website,https://www.lme.com/trading/contract-types/.
1035
In many U.S. physical aluminum contracts, for example, the parties agree to deliver a specified amount of
aluminum on a specified date at the then-prevailing LME Official Price, plus the Midwest Premium, plus other
specified amounts such as a product premium or additional delivery charge.
1036
While some aluminum users hedge their price risk using the LME futures market, several others told the
Subcommittee that they typically do not hedge their positions on the LME itself, but instead engage in bilateral swap
transactions with banks or other market participants to hedge aluminum prices. Even in those instances, however,
the Subcommittee was told that the LME price is often the reference price in those swap agreements. See, e.g.,
Subcommittee briefing by Anheuser Busch (10/9/2014).
175
as buying a short to match a long position. This settlement method offers a purely financial
option, since funds can be used to purchase the necessary offsetting positions.
The other way to settle an LME contract is to deliver or take delivery of LME “warrants,”
documents that convey actual legal title to specific lots of metal stored in LME-approved
warehouses.
1037
This settlement option results in ownership of physical metal. In order for
physical metal to be used to settle an LME trade, it must be “warranted” by the LME as meeting
certain quality and quantity requirements and being maintained in a warehouse approved by the
LME. In the case of aluminum, the LME warrant conveys title to a specific lot of 25 metric tons
of “high grade primary aluminum” stored in an LME-approved warehouse.
1038
While physical settlement is relatively rare, the LME has emphasized its importance:
“This presence, or threat, of delivery has the result of constantly ensuring that the LME
price is in line with the physical market price. It also enables industry to sell material via
the Exchange delivery system in times of over supply, and use the LME as a source of
material in times of extreme shortage.”
1039
The LME warranting system has, for much of its history, enabled the LME to function as a
market of last resort for market participants seeking to buy metal. Put simply, the owner of a
future, through the warrant settlement system, could expect to receive title to metal on a specific
date at a specific price. In addition, the LME explained, the ownership of warrants could be
utilized as a “backstop” for negotiations in a financial transaction.
1040
If an owner of metal under LME warrant decided to remove its aluminum from the LME
warehouse, the owner would have to take steps to have its warrants “cancelled.”
1041
To cancel
the warrants, the owner must notify the warehouse holding the metal, and the warehouse must
complete the necessary paperwork and notify the LME, which monitors the amounts of metal
stored in each LME-approved warehouse. It is only after the warrants are cancelled, the owner
of the metal has settled outstanding rent and other warehouse charges, and the owner has
1037
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by London Metal
Exchange, at 7,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf (One LME aluminum warrant equals 25 metric tons of the metal).
1038
See “Futures Contract Specifications[:] LME Aluminum Futures,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/aluminium/contract-specifications/futures/ (reflecting a number of
specifications regarding the appropriate volume and characteristics of the aluminum). The LME also has warrants
for certain aluminum alloys that can be traded on the exchange; they convey title to a specific lot of 20 tons of
A380.1, 226 or AD12.1 aluminum alloy. See “Futures Contract Specifications[:] LME Aluminum Alloy Futures,”
LME website,http://www.lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/aluminium-alloy/contract-specifications/futures/ .
1039
See undated “FAQ: Why is the physical delivery important for minor metals futures?” LME website,http://www.lme.com/about-us/faqs/#.
1040
See 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by London Metal
Exchange, at 68,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1041
See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York),
Complaint (4/11/14), at ¶ 147.
176
provided the warehouse with shipping instructions that the metal is placed in a queue for load-
out from the LME warehouse.
1042
For most of LME’s history and at most warehouses, metal owners could load out metal
stored in an LME warehouse within a few days or weeks. Over the past several years, however,
long lines or “queues” to load out metal from some LME-approved warehouses have developed,
in particular with respect to aluminum. In some cases, warrant owners have had to wait months,
a year, or even longer to take possession of warranted aluminum. As discussed more fully
below, in the United States, as the queue has grown, the difference between the LME official
price and the all-in market price for physical aluminum has widened, reducing the effectiveness
of the LME price as a hedge for aluminum prices.
LME Warehouses. While the LME does not own or operate the warehouses where
aluminum and other exchange-traded metals are stored, it enters into a standard, non-negotiable
Warehouse Agreement with the warehouse owners, allowing them to store LME-warranted metal
in exchange for compliance with the terms and conditions of the Warehouse Agreement.
1043
Currently, more than 700 LME-approved warehouses are in operation.
1044
LME-
approved warehouses are located in many countries around the globe and store a vast volume of
metals. For many years, LME warehouses were owned by independent warehousing companies
that did not engage in commodities trading. Beginning in 2010, however, many of those
warehouse companies were bought by bank holding companies or trading houses with extensive
commodity trading operations.
1045
Some of the key global networks of LME-approved warehouses are operated by Metro,
which is owned by Goldman;
1046
Henry Bath & Sons, which was recently sold by J PMorgan to
Mercuria Energy Trading;
1047
Pacorini Metals, which is owned by Glencore, a commodities
trading house; NEMS Ltd. (recently renamed Impala Terminals) which was acquired by
Trafigura, a commodities trading and logistics company; and C. Steinweg Handelsveem, an
independent warehousing firm unaffiliated with a trading company.
1048
1042
See 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-
000001 - 011, at 008.
1043
See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York),
Complaint (4/11/2014), at ¶ 156; Opinion and Order (8/25/2014) (ECF No. 564), at 9.
1044
See undated “Approved Warehouses,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/trading/warehousing-and-
brands/warehousing/approved-warehouses/.
1045
See, e.g., “Metals Warehousing: The Perfect Hedge & The Perfect Storm?,” Hard Assets Investor, Tom Vulcan
(3/23/2012),http://www.hardassetsinvestor.com/features/3567-metals-warehousing-the-perfect-hedge-a-the-perfect-
storm.html.
1046
See “Goldman and J PMorgan enter metal warehousing,” Financial Times, J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CkHqTn7n .
1047
See 10/3/2014 Mercuria press release, “Mercuria Closes Acquisition of J .P. Morgan Chase Physical
Commodities Business,”http://www.mercuria.com/media-room/business-news/mercuria-closes-acquisition-jp-
morgan-chase-physical-commodities-business.
1048
See “Metals Warehousing: The Perfect Hedge & The Perfect Storm?,” Hard Assets Investor, Tom Vulcan
(3/23/2012),http://www.hardassetsinvestor.com/features/3567-metals-warehousing-the-perfect-hedge-a-the-perfect-
storm.html.
177
Aluminum Trading on the CME. The CME Group Inc. owns four exchanges on which
commodity-related financial products are traded, including futures, options, and swaps linked to
aluminum.
1049
The CME Group is primarily regulated by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In 2012, the CME Group began offering a new financial product related to aluminum
called the “Aluminum MW U.S. Transaction Premium Futures” contract. That futures contract
was made available for trading on COMEX, one of the CME Group’s commodity exchanges. It
represented the first exchange-traded product allowing aluminum market participants to manage
price risks associated with the Midwest Premium for aluminum.
1050
In May 2014, the CME
Group launched a second new aluminum-related product for trading on COMEX, a futures
contract for delivery of physical aluminum in North America. CME described the new contract,
which is intended to be an all-in price, as designed to increase price transparency for aluminum
and enable market participants to better manage price risks than is currently possible using LME
futures.
1051
To date, however, both of the new CME aluminum products have been thinly
traded.
1052
Aluminum Trading in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market. Aluminum and
aluminum-related derivatives are also traded over-the-counter (OTC), which means they are
traded outside official exchanges like the LME and COMEX.
Aluminum-related swaps executed in the OTC market are often customized to address
specific issues. They include, for example, swaps designed to permit aluminum market
participants to hedge their price exposure to the all-in price of aluminum, the LME price, or the
Midwest Premium, which has been steadily increasing in price and volatility over the last few
years.
1053
The Subcommittee has been told that large financial institutions, including Goldman,
and major aluminum consumers have traded those aluminum swaps in the OTC market.
1054
Another type of aluminum trading that takes place in the OTC market, outside of the
exchanges, involves trading LME warrants for aluminum lots held in different warehouse
locations.
1055
That trading takes place, because the value of aluminum is affected by where it is
1049
See undated “Driving Global Growth and Commerce,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/. The four exchanges are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME),
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and the Commodity Exchange
(COMEX) which is a division of the NYMEX.
1050
See 8/9/2013 CME Group press release, “CME Group Announces the First Aluminum Midwest Premium
Contracts Traded,”http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=784335. At the
time of its introduction, the CME said it was offering the product, because “n the past three years, the premium
increased from $0.04/lb to close to $0.09/lb and it is now a larger component of the aluminum consumer’s cost and
risk. This contract enables market participants in North America to better manage their price risk.” Undated “FAQ:
Aluminum MW US Transaction Premium Platts (25MT) Swap Futures,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/files/faq_aluminum_mw_us_transaction_premium_swap.pdf.
1051
See 3/18/2014 CME Group press release, “CME Group to Launch North American Physically Delivered
Aluminum Futures,”http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20140318-907146.html.
1052
Subcommittee briefing by CFTC (9/2/2014).
1053
See 9/17/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
15-000001, at 03.
1054
See, e.g., Subcommittee briefing by Anheuser-Busch (10/9/2014).
1055
Subcommittee briefing by London Metal Exchange (8/1/2014).
178
located and how long it may take to remove the aluminum from the warehouse. For example,
warrants for aluminum held in a warehouse with a long queue may be worth less than warrants
for aluminum held in a warehouse with no queue. Relative values of warrants for aluminum held
in different locations may change by the day as warehouse queues lengthen or shorten.
Because OTC trades are not subject to the same reporting as those that occur on regulated
exchanges, it is difficult to determine the overall size of the OTC aluminum market and the types
of financial instruments that are most common.
Relationship Between Warehouse Queues and Aluminum Prices. A critical factor
affecting aluminum trading in recent years has been an unprecedented growth in the size of
physical aluminum inventories at LME-approved warehouses, as industrial demand for the metal
plummeted during the financial crisis and metal owners sought to sell or store their excess
stocks.
1056
The increase in aluminum inventory was particularly dramatic at Metro’s Detroit
warehouses. At the same time the physical aluminum inventories increased, warrant holders
with metal in the Metro Detroit warehouses experienced increasingly long queues before they
could remove their aluminum from the warehouses. Those queues, over time, have been highly
correlated with the increases in the Midwest Premium prices.
At the end of February 2010, just after Goldman acquired Metro, the Midwest Premium
was approximately $134 per metric ton.
1057
It has since steadily climbed to over $400.
1058
In
dollar terms, the Midwest premium climbed over 300% in just a few years. Over the same
period, the queue went from about 40 days to over 600 days.
1059
As depicted in the chart below, the increase in the Midwest Premium has been highly
correlated with the growth of the queue at Metro’s Detroit warehouses.
1056
See 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 20,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1057
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
1058
Id.
1059
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
179
Source: Prepared by the Subcommittee using information provided by Harbor Aluminum. See undated
“HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs HARBOR's MW
Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
Between 2010 and 2014, the changes in queue length at the Metro warehouses in Detroit and the
changes in the Midwest Premium price had a correlation coefficient of approximately 0.89, an
exceptionally high correlation.
1060
Many market participants, including many large aluminum users, contend that the longer
queues are pushing up the Midwest Premium, which is intended to reflect, in part, storage costs,
and that the increased Midwest Premium prices result in higher all-in aluminum prices. The
Aluminum Users Group, a coalition of large manufacturers including Novelis, Coca Cola,
MillerCoors, and others, wrote to the LME that market “distortions” due to long queues had
resulted in physical premiums that “are at least double their normal levels.”
1061
In 2013, a
MillerCoors representative testified before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee that the queues
had cost his company “tens of millions of dollars in excess premiums over the last several
years.”
1062
1060
Subcommittee calculation using information provided by Harbor Aluminum. See undated “HARBOR's
estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs HARBOR's MW Transactional
Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
1061
10/29/2012 letter from Aluminum Users Group to LME, PSI-AlumUsersGroup-01-000010-012.
1062
“Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
180
Prominent aluminum analysts agree with that view. J orge Vazquez of Harbor Aluminum
Intelligence, a leading industry analyst, has said that the emergence of long queues led directly to
higher premiums, commenting that warehouse practices were “being used as a platform to
inorganically inflate aluminum premiums at the expense of the aluminum consumer and at the
benefit of some warehouses, banks and trading companies.”
1063
In contrast, the LME and Goldman contend that longer queues have not affected the all-in
price for aluminum. Although both the LME and Goldman concede that the queue has affected
premium prices and the relative proportions of the all-in price attributable to the premium price
versus the LME price, they assert that the effect of the longer queue has been to drive the LME
portion down and the premium portion up, leaving the all-in price substantially unchanged.
1064
That analysis is a minority view, according to briefings provided to the Subcommittee by
numerous aluminum market participants and experts. Alcoa, the largest U.S. aluminum
producer, told the Subcommittee, for example, that the LME and premium prices are not
inversely related, but move independently of one another.
1065
In a recent filing with the SEC,
Alcoa wrote that the LME price and the aluminum premium each “has its own drivers of
variability.”
1066
Mr. Vazquez, the aluminum analyst, agreed with that view, indicating to the
Subcommittee that “there has been no empirical study or evidence or modeling that suggests
changes in LME prices and the Midwest Premium are inversely related,” as the LME and
Goldman have suggested.
1067
In fact, the LME and Midwest Premium prices can and often have
moved in the same direction.
The Subcommittee’s investigation found that, while there was disagreement about the
impact of the queue on the level of the all-in aluminum price, there was broad consensus that the
queue had affected Midwest Premium prices. The investigation also found that the price impacts
of the queue had created problems for aluminum users like beverage can producers and
automobile manufacturers who actually use aluminum, because the increasing difference
between the all-in price and the LME futures price made hedging price risk through the LME
market increasingly ineffective.
1068
A number of commercial users told the Subcommittee that
the lack of effective hedges damages planning and impacts revenues.
1069
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals,
MillerCoors LLC, at 9,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm.
1063
“Aluminum Premiums To Fall After LME Warehouse Plan?” Metal Miner, (11/8/2013),http://agmetalminer.com/2013/11/08/aluminum-premium-to-fall-after-lme-warehouse-plan/. ; Subcommittee
briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
1064
See 10/31/2013 “The Economic Role of a Warehouse Exchange” prepared by Goldman Sachs Commodity
Research (The development of the queues has not affected the total ‘physical’ price for aluminum),
GSPSICOMMODS00047511 - 545; 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,”
prepared by LME, at 24,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf (“[L]ong queues reduce the value of warrants, and . . . it was these
lower-value warrants which were being used to settle LME contracts and set LME price.”).
1065
Subcommittee briefing by Alcoa (8/5/2014);
1066
3/31/2014 Alcoa, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2014, at 45,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4281/000119312514157120/d701633d10q.htm.
1067
Subcommittee briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
1068
This was, in fact, the explicit reasoning used by the CME when it introduced its Aluminum MW U.S.
Transaction Premium contract in 2012. Undated, “FAQ: Aluminum MW US Transaction Premium Platts (25MT)
181
Historically, industrial users seeking to hedge their aluminum price risk over time used
futures, forwards, or swap transactions linked to LME prices. Trading records show that, in the
five years prior to Goldman’s purchase of Metro, the LME price as a percentage of the all-in
price for aluminum averaged over 95%, making LME futures a fairly effective hedge against all-
in aluminum price increases.
1070
Since 2010, however, the portion of the all-in price attributable
to the LME price has fallen steadily. For example, in J anuary 2014, the LME price made up
about 75% of the all-in price, eroding the value of LME futures as a hedge for aluminum’s all-in
price.
1071
At the same time, the Midwest Premium has grown in both in dollar terms and as a
percentage of the all-in aluminum price. At the end of February, 2010, just after Goldman
acquired Metro, the Midwest Premium was about $134, or about 6% of the all-in price. By the
end of J anuary 2014, the Midwest Premium was over $450, comprising about 22% of the all-in
price.
1072
Compounding the problem for aluminum users has been the difficulty in hedging the
growing premium portion of the all-in aluminum price. While the CME Group now offers
futures to manage price risks associated with the Midwest Premium, those new products are still
thinly traded.
1073
The end result is that aluminum users have been less able to hedge their price
risk and more susceptible to price changes due – not to market forces of supply and demand – but
to increased Midwest Premium prices highly correlated with longer warehouse queues.
According to industry aluminum users, those factors have cost manufacturers and consumers
billions of dollars.
1074
At the same time the increasing Midwest Premium prices have been causing problems for
aluminum users, the LME has said that the emergence of increasing premiums “convey[ed] an
advantage to the expertise of merchants and brokers, who have built-up strong modelling
capabilities around premiums and queues.”
1075
In other words, the increases in the Midwest
Premium have benefited aluminum traders.
(2) Goldman Involvement with Aluminum
Over the last five years, Goldman has dramatically increased its physical aluminum
activities. Beginning in 2010, it took control of a network of LME-approved warehouses, and
helped the warehouses in Detroit accumulate the largest stockpile of LME warranted aluminum
Swap Futures,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/files/faq_aluminum_mw_us_transaction_premium_swap.pdf.
1069
For example, one manufacturer who uses aluminum to build warships told the Subcommittee that its inability to
effectively hedge the all-in price has resulted in its taking costly measures, including buying substantial amounts of
physical aluminum to hold it for future use. Subcommittee briefing by Austal (10/30/2014).
1070
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
1071
Id.
1072
Id.
1073
Subcommittee briefing by CFTC staff (9/2/2014) .
1074
See, e.g., “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals,
MillerCoors LLC, at 9,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm .
1075
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 29,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
182
in the United States. It also dramatically increased its own physical inventory, building its
physical aluminum holdings from less than $100 million in 2009 to more than $3 billion at one
point in 2012. In addition, from 2009 until late 2012, Goldman had a significant ownership stake
in the LME itself, the primary exchange for trading aluminum. In short, Goldman owned
aluminum, traded in aluminum-related financial products, owned part of the exchange where
those products were traded, owned warehouses where aluminum was stored, and its warehouse
sat on the committee advising on the rules for how warehouses should operate. Those activities
made Goldman an increasingly influential participant in the aluminum markets.
(a) Building An Aluminum Inventory
Prior to 2010, Goldman’s physical aluminum activities appear to have been relatively
small. From 2008 to 2009, Goldman’s aluminum holdings fluctuated between about 1,600 and
44,000 metric tons, representing between $2 million and just under $100 million in assets.
1076
At
the time Goldman acquired Metro in February 2010, Goldman actually owned no physical
aluminum at all.
1077
As shown in the graph below, however, Goldman’s aluminum inventory
then began to skyrocket.
*Totals for 2012 and 2013 reflect Goldman Sachs aluminumholdings at the close of highest and lowest months
during those years. Physical holdings may have exceeded or been lower than month-ending figures.
Source: See 2/20/2013 letter fromGoldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
Goldman-02-000001, attaching Goldman chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R, at 2-R; 4/30/2014 letter from
Goldman letter to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-000001, Exhibit D, at 13.
1076
See 2/20/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
Goldman-02-000001, attaching Goldman chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000001-R, at 2-R.
1077
Id. at GSPSICOMMODS00000001, at 2-R.
M
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183
By the end of 2010, less than a year after purchasing Metro, Goldman’s physical
aluminum holdings grew to approximately 95,000 metric tons worth about $240 million. By the
fall of 2011, Goldman had nearly 350,000 metric tons worth more than $860 million.
1078
The
trend continued in 2012; by year’s end, Goldman’s aluminum holdings exceeded 1.5 million
metric tons worth more than $3.2 billion dollars.
1079
In early 2013, the company sold about half
of its aluminum.
1080
In September 2013, Goldman’s aluminum holdings totaled about 714,000
metric tons, with a market value of about $1.3 billion.
1081
One reason for the dramatic increase in Goldman’s physical aluminum trading was its
decision to expand its aluminum trading desk. In an interview, Christopher Wibbelman, Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Metro, explained that around the time Goldman purchased the
warehouse business, he was asked by Goldman to recommend some physical aluminum experts
with whom Goldman’s trading desk could discuss the aluminum market.
1082
He indicated that,
shortly thereafter, Goldman hired two aluminum traders he had recommended.
1083
Goldman’s
physical aluminum trading soon after began to increase and its inventory to grow.
In addition to its rapidly expanding aluminum trading operations, between mid-2009 and
the end of 2012, Goldman more than quadrupled its stake in the London Metal Exchange.
1084
By
2012, Goldman was second only to J P Morgan as the exchange’s largest shareholder.
1085
(b) Acquiring a Warehousing Business
Goldman also deepened its involvement with aluminum by purchasing Metro
International Trade Services LLC (Metro), the owner of a global network of LME-approved
warehouses that stored a variety of metals, including aluminum.
1086
Under Goldman’s
ownership, Metro implemented unprecedented practices to aggressively attract and retain
aluminum in its Detroit warehouses. Over the next few years, Metro’s Detroit warehouses
accumulated the largest stockpile of LME warranted aluminum in the United States.
According to Goldman, in 2009, it was approached by representatives of Metro about
buying the company.
1087
In February 2010, Goldman acquired Metro for about $450 million.
1088
1078
Id.
1079
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman letter to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-000001 -
006, at Exhibit D, GSPSICOMMODS00004116.
1080
Id.
1081
Id.
1082
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1083
Id.
1084
See 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-
000001 - 011, at 003, 004.
1085
See, e.g., “London Metal Exchange shareholders vote on takeover,” Reuters (7/24/2012),http://articles.chicagotribune.com/...t-lmevotel6e8ioig6-20120724_1_hkex-lme-board-
shareholders (“The LME's top shareholder is J PMorgan, with 1.4 million shares, followed by Goldman with 1.23
million.”).
1086
See 9/12/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J anuary 11, 2013 Questionnaire,” PSI-
GoldmanSachs-06-000001 - 021, at 017 (Exhibit C); “Goldman and J PMorgan Enter Metal Warehousing,” Financial
Times, J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kXv0R8iX. Metro is a Delaware corporation.
1087
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
184
Goldman’s purchase of Metro was the first of a series of warehouse acquisitions by financial
firms that were also involved in trading metals.
1089
Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments (GCPI) group conducted the
analysis and took the lead in the Metro acquisition.
1090
J acques Gabillon, a Goldman executive
based in London, led the GCPI effort and later became Chairman of Metro’s Board of
Directors.
1091
Goldman has said publicly that it does not consider Metro a “strategic business” for the
financial holding company.
1092
Goldman told the Subcommittee that its decision to buy Metro
was instead driven by: (1) the warehouse company’s potential to generate rental income arising
from storage of a glut of metal in the market (due to reduced demand from the financial crisis
and recession); and (2) the potential for the warehouse company’s rental income to act as a
counter-cyclical source of income compared to Goldman’s trading revenues.
1093
In 2011,
Goldman projected internally that, by April 2013, the Metro investment would have “returned
more than the full invested capital and continue to pay out substantial annual dividends.”
1094
At the time of the acquisition in 2010, Goldman stated publicly that Metro would
“continue to operate independently,” and the company’s top management remained largely in
place.
1095
Metro’s senior executives at the time of acquisition, including Christopher
1088
8/3/2011 “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-707486-500, at 493. Compare Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31,
2010, at Exhibit 21.1 (including “Metro International Trade Services LLC” as a subsidiary of GS Power Holdings
LLC), with Goldman Sachs Group, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009, at Exhibit 21.1 (not
listing GS Power Holdings LLC or Metro International as significant subsidiaries).
1089
A few months later, J PMorgan acquired Henry Bath & Sons which, like Metro, owned a global network of
warehouses storing aluminum and other metals traded on the LME. See, e.g., “Goldman and J PMorgan enter metal
warehousing,” Financial Times, J avier Blas (3/2/ 2010),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CkHqTn7n. In March 2010, Trafigura, a commodities trading and logistics company,
purchased NEMS Ltd. another LME-approved warehousing company. See 3/10/2010 Trafigura press release,
“Trafigura Beheer B.V. has acquired metal warehousing company NEMS Ltd.,”http://www.trafigura.com/media-
centre/latest-news/18580/#.U7rxFvldVu0. In September 2010, Glencore International, a commodities trading
company, purchased the Pacorini Group’s LME-warehousing assets. See “Glencore completes deal for Pacorini
Metal,” Reuters, Michael Taylor (9/14/2010),http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/14/pacorini-metals-
idUSLDE68D0RR20100914. The Pacorini warehouse in Vlissingen is the only other warehouse in the world with
lengthy aluminum queues.
1090
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1091
Id.
1092
7/31/2013 “LME Warehousing and Aluminum,” Goldman Sachs website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-r...hive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-31-
13.html.
1093
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014); Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/10/2014).
1094
8/3/2011 “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee,” prepared by Goldman, FRB-
PSI-707486 - 500, at 493.
1095
See “Goldman and J PMorgan enter metal warehousing,” Financial Times, J avier Blas (3/2/2010),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CkHqTn7n.; “Wall Street, Fed
Face off Over Physical Commodities,” Reuters, David Sheppard, J onathan Leff, and J osephine Mason (3/2/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/us-fed-banks-commodities-idUSTRE8211CC2012030.
185
Wibbelman, Mark Askew, and Michael Whelan, had each been with the company for more than
a decade, and were seasoned leaders intimately familiar with the warehousing business.
1096
At the same time, however, Goldman installed a new Board of Directors at Metro that
consisted exclusively of Goldman employees, including several executives in the company’s
Global Commodities group.
1097
The following chart identifies the Goldman employees who
served on the Metro Board at some point during the last five years:
Goldman Employees Who Served as Metro Board Members
2009 to 2014
Goldman Employee Goldman Department From Date To Date
Agran, Gregory Global Commodities 2/1/2010 12/1/2011
Attwood Scott, Victoria* Securities Div Compliance 2/1/2010 11/16/2012
Bulk, Maxwell* Global Deriv Ops Mgmt 2/1/2010 7/1/2014
Gabillon,J acques GCPI head 2/1/2010 CURRENT
Haynes, Oliver* Securities Div Compliance 10/30/2012 4/1/2014
Holzer, Philip EQ PIPG Sales 2/15/2010 3/1/2014
Murphy, Ken Archon** 3/1/2010 5/1/2011
Mancini,Robert* Assetco*** 2/1//2010 12/1/2012
McDonogh, Dermot Controllers' Admin 3/1/2010 CURRENT
Siewert, Richard Media Relations 10/1/2012 CURRENT
Weiss, Michael Securities Div Compliance 1/23/2013 CURRENT
West, Owen Natural Gas Trading 11/28/2011 CURRENT
*Former Goldman employee
**Archon refers to Archon LP, which is the predecessor to Goldman Sachs Realty Management LP.
***Assetco likely refers to GCPI, which stands for Global Commodities Principal Investments group.
Source: 8/15/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-000001 -
009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225; 11/11/2014 Briefing by Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee (describing Archon and Assetco).
In its documentation, Goldman indicated that it relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
merchant banking authority to purchase the Metro warehousing business.
1098
That authority
requires a financial holding company making a merchant banking investment to refrain from
becoming involved in the routine management of the portfolio company and that it sell the
company within ten years of acquisition.
1099
Despite Goldman’s assertions that it was “not
involved in the day-to-day management of the company,”
1100
after the acquisition, many
1096
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1097
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225.
1098
See 7/25/2012 Goldman “Presentation to Firmwide Client and Business Standards Committee: Global
Commodities,” FRB-PSI-200984, at 1000.
1099
See discussions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority in Chapter 2 and 3, above.
1100
7/31/2013 “LME Warehousing and Aluminum,” Goldman Sachs website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-r...hive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-31-
13.html.
186
business decisions by Metro required review and approval by Metro’s Board of Directors or a
Board subcommittee, both of which were comprised entirely of Goldman employees.
1101
Goldman has stated that “under the rules governing its purchase, we have to sell it within
ten years from the date we bought it.”
1102
Because Goldman characterized the Metro acquisition
as a merchant banking investment, it did not notify or obtain prior permission from the Federal
Reserve.
(c) Paying Incentives to Attract Outside Aluminum
Soon after its acquisition by Goldman, Metro significantly increased its spending on
“freight incentives” to entice aluminum owners to move metal into its Detroit warehouses.
Those financial incentives led to Metro’s loading aluminum into its Detroit warehouses at an
historic rate, resulting in Metro’s expanding its Detroit operations, building the largest aluminum
stockpile in the United States, and constructing a near monopoly of the U.S. LME aluminum
storage market. The unprecedented warehouse queues that were developed at Metro’s Detroit
warehouses forced metal owners to wait months, a year, or at one point nearly two years to get
their metal out of storage.
Storing an Aluminum Glut. Beginning in 2008, the financial crisis led to an
unprecedented increase in the aluminum inventories at LME-approved warehouses, as industrial
demand for the metal plummeted and metal owners sought to sell or store their excess stocks.
1103
As reflected in the graph below, between the end of J anuary 2008 and the end of February 2010,
global stocks of LME-warranted aluminum more than quadrupled, from less than 1 million to
more than 4.5 million metric tons.
1104
Inventories of LME-warranted aluminum in the United
States alone saw a similar dramatic increase, from less than 400,000 to nearly 2.1 million metric
tons over the same period.
1105
1101
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014). Approval was required, for example, for each
of the six merry-go-round deals described below.
1102
7/31/2013 “LME Warehousing and Aluminum,” Goldman Sachs website,http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-r...hive/goldman-sachs-physical-commodities-7-31-
13.html.
1103
See, e.g., 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 20,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1104
See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
1105
Id.
187
Source: Prepared by the Subcommittee using information provided by Novelis. See undated “LME Stocks 2014-05-
06,” prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001.
Metro was a prime beneficiary of the increasing aluminum stockpiles. Whereas in
J anuary 2008, less than 400,000 metric tons of LME warranted aluminum were in storage in the
entire United States,
1106
by the end of February 2010, Metro’s Detroit warehouses alone were
storing about 915,000 metric tons.
1107
Over the next two years, Metro’s Detroit aluminum stocks
continued to grow, reaching about 1 million metric tons in J anuary 2011, and about 1.4 million
metric tons by February 2012.
1108
A year later in 2013, they remained at nearly 1.4 million
metric tons
1109
and, by February 2014, Metro’s Detroit aluminum stocks stayed steady about 1.5
million metric tons, nearly all of which was on LME warrant.
1110
1106
Id.
1107
See 3/11/2010 “MITSI Holdings LLC[:] Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman
(hereinafter “3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting”), GSPSICOMMODS00009519 - 542, at 534.
1108
See 2/15/2011 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009492 - 505, at 500 (hereinafter “2/2011 MITSI Board Meeting”); 3/21/2012 “MITSI
Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009423 - 449,
at 429.
1109
See 3/26/2013 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009355, at 360, 363.
1110
See 3/24/2014“MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009268, at 273, 276.
0.00
1,000,000.00
2,000,000.00
3,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
6,000,000.00
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Gl obal LME Al umi num St ock s
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Its increased aluminum inventories were accompanied by significant gains in Metro’s
share of the U.S. LME aluminum storage market. According to internal materials provided to
Metro’s Board of Directors, in early 2012, Metro’s share of the U.S. LME aluminum storage
market stood at 70%.
1111
By February 2013, it topped 78%.
1112
A year later, in 2014, the
company’s share of the U.S. LME aluminum storage market exceeded 85%.
1113
To accommodate the increased aluminum inflows, Metro expanded its operations in
Detroit, tripling the number of its warehouses from about 9 or 10 in 2010, to nearly 30 in
2014.
1114
Paying Freight Incentives. Metro’s near-monopoly of the U.S. LME aluminum storage
market was built on the aluminum stored in its Detroit warehouses. In J anuary 2008, only
52,000 metric tons of LME-warranted aluminum was stored in LME-approved warehouses in
Detroit; by February 2014 Metro’s Detroit warehouses had more than 1.5 million metric tons,
1115
an astounding increase. According to the LME, “revenues generated by large stocks allowed
warehouses to offer incentives to attract more metal and this exacerbated the problem.”
1116
In
other words, the more metal Metro had, the more rent it received, and the more incentives it
could afford to pay.
Metro’s increasing budget allocation for aluminum freight incentives supports that
analysis. In early 2010, just after Goldman acquired the company, Metro paid nearly $37 million
in freight incentives to attract aluminum to its warehouses.
1117
That figure doubled in one year
to nearly $79 million in 2011, grew to nearly $103 million in 2012, and reached nearly $129
million in 2013, an increase of nearly 350% over four years.
1118
The rapid increase in freight payments took place with the knowledge and approval of the
Goldman employees sitting on Metro’s Board of Directors. The freight incentive payment
amounts were a regular part of the business review conducted by the Metro Board, using figures
supplied by Metro management. In fact, in the very first Board meeting conducted after
Goldman’s acquisition of Metro, the new Board of Directors, comprised of exclusively Goldman
employees, discussed freight incentives as a factor that would affect the company’s monthly cash
requirements.
1119
1111
3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 431.
1112
3/26/2013 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009355, at 360, 363.
1113
3/24/2014 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009268, at 273, 276.
1114
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1115
See undated Novelis internal data, prepared by Novelis, PSI-Novelis-01-000001; 3/24/2014 MITSI Holdings
LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009268, at 273.
1116
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 24,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1117
See 9/17/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-15-000001 - 007, at 006
(Exhibit A).
1118
Id.
1119
See 3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009519, at 530.
189
The growth in incentive payments was controversial, since it resulted in Metro’s affecting
the flow of physical aluminum in the U.S. marketplace.
1120
In October 2012, a coalition of large
aluminum users wrote to the LME complaining about “distortions” in the aluminum market,
including warehouse incentives that “lure[d] metal away from the physical market” and
contributed to increases in the Midwest Premium.
1121
J orge Vazquez, a leading aluminum
analyst, told the Subcommittee that while warehouse incentives have long been part of the
aluminum market, it was a completely new phenomenon to have a warehouse company, in this
case Metro, capture a critical mass of aluminum, use rent revenues from that critical mass to
increase its incentive payments, and outbid others in the market for aluminum.
1122
Warning Against Exceptional Inducements. The LME warehousing agreement, which
sets the rules by which LME warehouses operate, warns against “artificially” affecting the metals
markets by “Warehouses giving exceptional inducements”:
“[T]the proper functioning of the market through the liquidity and elasticity of stocks of
metal under Warrant should not be artificially or otherwise constrained by Warehouses
giving exceptional inducements or imposing unreasonable charges for depositing or
withdrawing metals, nor by Warehouses delaying unreasonably the receipt or dispatch of
metal, save where unavoidable due to force majeure.”
1123
The LME’s warehousing agreement has long provided the LME with authority to
investigate all charges levied. Since April 2014, it has also had the right to compel warehouse
companies to provide information about their activities, “including, without limitation, details of
all inducements paid to attract the load-in of metal and details of the provenance of loaded-in
metal, including information about metal which may have been previously in that Warehouse, or
in another facility operated by the same Warehouse or member of the Warehouse’s group.”
1124
In addition, under the agreement, the LME can “impose additional load-out requirements on a
Warehouse which the Exchange considers to have intentionally created or caused, or attempted
to create or cause, a queue by the use of inducements or any other method.”
1125
The LME’s authority to investigate and impose additional load-out requirements on
warehouses that intentionally create queues is designed to detect and prevent unfair warehouse
practices.
1126
In 2013, the LME stated in a report that warehouse inducements were “possibly[]
1120
Warehouses offering incentives directly compete against buyers offering more than the LME price to aluminum
sellers. As the LME put it, “[t]he warehouse incentive often underpins the willingness of merchants to bid a
premium for producers’ excess metal.” 11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,”
prepared by LME, at 27,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf
1121
See 10/29/2012 letter from Aluminum Users Group to the London Metal Exchange, PSI-AlumUsersGroup-01-
000010.
1122
Subcommittee interview of J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
1123
4/1/2014 “Terms and conditions applicable to all LME listed warehouse companies,” prepared by LME, at
Clause 9.3.1, LME_PSI0001406.
1124
Id. at Clause 9.3.3 - 9.3.4.
1125
Id.
1126
The LME’s powers to investigate and take inforcemant actions related to inducements may be limited.
However, the LME has introduced amendments to its warehousing agreement that may enhance its powers,
including by providing the LME with the power to compel warehouses to provide details of the inducements they
190
relatively commonplace,” but it had “not historically had cause to investigate” them.
1127
In
December 2013, however, as discussed in more detail below, the LME opened an investigation
into the inducements paid by Metro related to aluminum.
1128
The investigation included
examining the freight incentives Metro paid to attract metal owners whose aluminum was already
stored within its Detroit warehouses.
1129
(d) Paying Incentives to Retain Existing Aluminum
Under Goldman’s ownership, Metro’s efforts to build aluminum stocks in its Detroit
warehouses using incentives were not limited to offering freight incentives to attract so-called
“free metal” from outside its warehouses. Metro also offered millions of dollars in incentives to
a few large metal owners whose aluminum was already stored inside the Metro warehouse
system. Most of those transactions involved Metro paying millions of dollars in incentives for a
financial firm to cancel its warrants on metal held in Metro warehouses; join the queue to exit the
Metro warehouse system; upon reaching the head of the queue, load out the metal from one
Metro warehouse and re-load it into another Metro warehouse nearby; and later re-warrant the
aluminum. Those “merry-go-round” deals resulted, not only in Metro’s retaining the metal
inside its system, but also in lengthening its load-out queue and essentially blocking other metal
owners from exiting Metro warehouses. When asked to identify all of these types of deals,
Goldman identified six involving over 600,000 metric tons of aluminum.
1130
Metro also saw four large proprietary aluminum cancellations involving about 500,000
metric tons of aluminum held by Goldman or J PMorgan whose warrant cancellations further
lengthened the Detroit warehouse queue. In addition, Metro disclosed 13 transactions in which it
received “break fees” from metal owners who withdrew aluminum from its U.S. warehouses
earlier than planned and where the amount of those fees was linked to the Midwest Premium
price. By obtaining fees linked to a rising Midwest Premium, Metro could potentially benefit
financially in still another way from maintaining a long queue.
pay, and the LME may impose additional load-out requirements on warehouses that it determines have intentionally
created or caused or attempted to creat or cause, a queue by the use of inducements or any other method. 11/7/2014,
“Consultation on Changed to the Warehouse Agreement,” prepared by LME,https://www.lme.com/~/media/files/notices/2014/2014_11/14%20319%20w149%20consultation%20on%20changes
%20to%20the%20warehouse%20agreement.pdf.
1127
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 55,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf. See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-
md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York), Declaration of Mark Bradley in Support of the London Metal Exchange’s
Motion to Dismiss All Complaints (5/23/2014), LME_PSI0000696, at 700 (representatives of both Metro and
Pacorini, the companies that own warehouses with significant queues, sit on the LME’s Warehousing Committee).
1128
12/4/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046656 [sealed exhibit].
1129
12/6/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046658 [sealed exhibit]; 3/10/2014 letter from LME
to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046827 [sealed exhibit].
1130
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon, (10/14/2014); 10/22/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-22-000001. As discussed below, one of the six deals involved warrants that had
already been cancelled and were already in the queue to exit the warehouse. In that deal, Metro paid incentives for
the owner to stay in the queue, load out its metal from one Metro warehouse into another, and place the metal on
warrant.
191
Lengthening the Queue and Blocking the Exits. Warehouse income depends upon the
rent and other fees paid by metal owners storing metal. Warehouses that pay freight incentives
to attract aluminum can offset that cost through higher rents, longer rental periods, or additional
fees. A warehouse queue, which requires metal owners to wait in line – paying rent until they
exit – offers one way to boost rental income. If the metal owner at the head of the queue has a
large amount of metal, it may take weeks or months to load it out, essentially blocking the exits
for other metal owners still waiting in line and paying rent.
A queue forms when metal owners cancel their warrants and seek to load out their metal
from a warehouse at a rate that exceeds the LME’s daily warehouse load-out requirement. The
LME specifies the minimum amount of metal that a warehouse must load-out each day.
Between 2003 and 2011, the LME’s minimum load-out rate was 1,500 metric tons per day for
the largest LME warehouses, such as Metro’s Detroit warehouses.
1131
In April 2012, the LME
increased that number to a rate ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 metric tons a day, depending upon a
warehouse’s closing stock level.
1132
In November 2013, the LME adopted a rule that would
have linked a warehouse’s load-in rate to its load-out rate as of April 2014, but the rule was
subjected to a court challenge.
1133
Metro nevertheless began voluntarily complying with the new
rule in April.
1134
After the court challenge failed, the LME announced on October 27, 2014, that
it would proceed with the rule.
1135
The new rule provides that, as of February 2015, a warehouse
which has a queue over 50 days and which continues to load in metal, will be subject to
additional load-out requirements aimed at reducing the queue and preventing new queues from
forming in the future.
1136
Together, the LME’s rules create a minimum daily load out rate for LME-approved
warehouses; they do not place any cap on the amount of metal that may be loaded out each day.
A warehouse may always load out more than the specified minimum. According to Goldman,
however, while the LME sets a minimum rather than maximum daily rate, “it is well understood
by market participants that LME warehouses have an incentive to maximize inventory and rent
and are likely to deliver metal at the minimum load-out rate.”
1137
Despite the emergence of long
1131
See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02481-KBF (USDC SD New York),
Opinion and Order (4/11/2014), at LME_PSI0001137 - 167, at 149; Undated “Europe-Economics Analysis
Conducted for the LME,” Executive Summary, at 1, LME website,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Studies/Warehouse%20minimum%20loading%20out%20rates/E
urope%20Economics-Summary.pdf.
1132
See 11/17/2011, “Changes to LME Policy for Approval of Warehouses in Relation to Loading Out Rates –
Result of Consultation With Warehouse Companies,” prepared by LME, LME_PSI0001085 - 089.
1133
11/10/2014 email from LME to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-06-000001 - 003, at 002.
1134
Id.
1135
11/10/2014 email from LME to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-06-000001 - 003, at 002.
1136
LME Policy Regarding the Approval of Warehouses, Revised 1 February 2015, LME, LME_PSI0002257 -
2278. The new rule does not address the issue of whether numerous warehouses may share a single load-out queue,
nor does it make any determinations on the appropriateness of the incentives and penalties that contributed to the
queue at Metro.
1137
See 8/6/2013 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Reputational Risk Questions MITSI Holdings LLC,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700124 - 150, at 129.
192
queues under Goldman’s ownership, Metro has largely continued the practice of loading out
aluminum at, and not above, the LME’s minimum daily rate.
1138
In addition, the LME does not require Metro to apply the minimum load out rate to each
one of its warehouses, but rather allows Metro to apply the load-out rate on a collective basis, to
all of Metro’s warehouses in the Detroit area as a whole. As a result, Metro has combined all of
its Detroit warehouses into a single warehouse system for purposes of the LME minimum load-
out rate, created a single exit queue for the entire system, and generally allowed metal to exit the
system at, but not above, the LME minimum daily rate.
1139
Metal owners who get to the head of
the Metro Detroit queue typically use all of the available exit “slots” to load out their metal, so
that no one else can load out metal at the same time.
Goldman and Metro’s use of the LME load-out rate as a maximum rather than minimum
load-out rate has been targeted as an abusive practice in over a dozen class action suits.
1140
At a
2013 Senate hearing, one commercial aluminum user had this to say:
“[W]hat’s happening is that the aluminum we are purchasing is being held up in
warehouses controlled and owned by U.S. bank holding companies, who are members of
the LME, and set the rules for their own warehouses. These bank holding companies are
slowing the load-out of physical aluminum from these warehouses to ensure that they
receive increased rent for an extended period time. Aluminum users like MillerCoors are
being forced to wait in some cases over 18 months to take physical delivery due to the
LME warehouse practices or pay the high physical premium to get aluminum today. This
does not happen with any of the other commodities we purchase. When we buy barley
we receive prompt delivery, the same with corn, natural gas and other commodities. It is
only with aluminum purchased through the LME that our property is held for an
extraordinary period of time, with the penalty of paying additional rent and premiums to
the warehouse owners, until we get access to the metal we have purchased.”
1141
The LME told the Subcommittee that it did not maintain records of queues before 2010,
but the view of its personnel was that any queues that may have existed prior to that year were
“short-lived” and the result of inclement weather or other discreet events such as a labor
strike.
1142
That changed in 2010, the same year Goldman purchased Metro.
1138
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S.Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager,
Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 3 - 4,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-
113shrg82568.htm.
1139
Subcommittee interview of Leo Prichard (10/6/2014).
1140
See In Re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121435 (USDC
SDNY)(8/29/2014)(describing allegations contained in multiple the class action lawsuit complaints).
1141
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S.Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager,
Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 3 - 4,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-
113shrg82568.htm.
1142
9/5/2014 letter from The London Metal Exchange to Subcommittee, LME_PSI0000001 - 004, at 002.
193
Beginning in 2010, as reflected in the graph below, Metro’s Detroit warehouses
developed a queue which, overall, grew longer and longer each year.
1143
In March 2010, just
after Goldman purchased Metro, the Detroit warehouses had a queue that was slightly more than
40 days.
1144
A year later, in March 2011, the Detroit queue had more than tripled, exceeding 150
days.
1145
By March 2012, it had doubled again, to nearly 300 days.
1146
The queue passed 500
days in October 2013, and 600 days two months later.
1147
In May 2014, the queue to get
aluminum out of Metro’s Detroit warehouses reached a stunning 674 days.
1148
That meant an
aluminum owner seeking to remove its aluminum from the Detroit warehouses would have to
wait in line – paying rent – for almost two years.
Source: Prepared by the Subcommittee using information provided by Harbor Aluminum. See undated
“HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs HARBOR's MW
Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
Large aluminum users have denounced the Detroit queue as unreasonable and damaging
to aluminum markets, and have called the LME’s current warehousing system “dysfunctional
and prone to manipulation.”
1149
In addition, as described above, the increases in the Metro
1143
The queue length records were compiled by Harbor Aluminum using LME records, and produced to the
Subcommittee. See “HARBOR’s estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses,”
prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1144
Id.
1145
Id.
1146
Id.
1147
Id.
1148
Id.
1149
9/9/2013 letter from Aluminum Users Group to LME, “13/208:A201;W076,” PSI-AlumUsersGroup-01-000002,
at 004.
194
Detroit queue were highly correlated with increases in the aluminum Midwest Premium over the
same time period which, in turn, became a growing component of the all-in price of aluminum.
Some industrial aluminum users have charged that the longer queues led to higher Midwest
Premium prices, costing their companies millions of dollars.
1150
More broadly, one aluminum
user, MillerCoors, estimated that the dysfunctional aluminum market had imposed an estimated
“additional $3 billion expense on companies that purchase aluminum.”
1151
While long queues
and increasing Midwest Premium prices were hurting aluminum users, the LME has said that the
emergence of increasing premiums “convey[ed] an advantage to the expertise of merchants and
brokers, who have built-up strong modelling capabilities around premiums and queues.”
1152
In
addition, as described earlier, at the same time Goldman was approving Metro practices that
lengthened its queue, it was ramping up its own aluminum trading operations.
Driving the Queue Length. The Subcommittee investigation found that a significant
contributor to the Detroit queue length was a number of large warrant cancellations by a small
group of financial institutions, including Deutsche Bank; Red Kite, a London hedge fund;
Glencore, a commodities trading firm based in Switzerland; J PMorgan; and Goldman. Deutsche
Bank, Red Kite, and Glencore were all involved in “merry-go-round” deals in which aluminum
was loaded out of one Metro warehouse and loaded into another. The cancellations involving
J PMorgan and Goldman involved metal that they held for themselves. Each of the five financial
firms cancelled 100,000 metric tons or more, an amount that would have been unprecedented for
Metro’s Detroit warehouses just a few years earlier.
Merry-Go-Round Deals. Metro’s merry-go-round deals took place in 2010, 2012, and
2013. According to a Metro executive, the deals began in the summer of 2010, just a few
months after Goldman acquired Metro, when Metro became concerned that owners of aluminum
in its warehouses were removing the metal from its warehouses and storing it elsewhere, leading
to a loss of revenue.
1153
In an effort to curb that loss, Metro executives and the Metro Board of
Directors, composed exclusively of Goldman employees, made a strategic decision to – for the
first time – “market” Metro incentives to metal owners that already had metal stored in Metro’s
warehouses.
1154
Ultimately, those efforts led to at least six deals with three customers: Deutsche Bank,
Red Kite, and Glencore.
1155
Although each deal involved millions of dollars, none was
1150
“Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals,
MillerCoors LLC, at 9,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm.
1151
Id., prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 4.
1152
11/2013 “Summary Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME, at 29,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1153
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1154
Id.
1155
Subcommittee interviews of J acques Gabillon, (10/14/2014) and Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014). See also
10/22/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-22-000001.
195
formalized in a signed contract.
1156
Instead, details were spelled out in an unsigned contract,
emails, and invoices.
1157
In each deal, Metro provided financial incentives to the owner of the aluminum stored in
its warehouses to: (1) wait in the queue; (2) upon reaching the head of the queue, load out its
metal from a Metro warehouse; (3) deliver the metal to another nearby Metro warehouse; and (4)
warrant the metal while in the second Metro warehouse. Each deal led to aluminum being
loaded out of one Metro warehouse in Detroit and loaded right back into another, a practice that
one Metro forklift operator later told the New York Times amounted to a “merry-go-round of
metal.”
1158
Because Metro used a single exit queue for all of its Detroit warehouses combined, when
a warehouse client in a merry-go-round deal got to the head of the queue and started loading out
metal, that client essentially blocked the exits for any other metal owner seeking to leave the
Metro Detroit warehouse system. In addition, instead of 1,500 or 3,000 metric tons of aluminum
leaving the Metro warehouse system each day as envisioned by the LME’s daily minimum load
out requirement, in the merry-go-round deals, the aluminum that left the Detroit warehouses
nearly all came right back into the Metro warehouse system.
1159
The net impact for Metro was
that, each day in which the front of the queue was occupied by a metal owner executing a merry-
go-round deal, its warehouses lost virtually no metal. At the same time, the merry-go-round
deals made money for Metro, not only by preventing the loss of metal, but also by helping to
lengthen the Detroit queue, extending the period during which other metal owners had to pay
rent to Metro.
Increases in the Detroit queue length were highly correlated with increases in the
Midwest Premium, which ultimately affected the entire aluminum market. Goldman, through its
employees on the Metro Board of Directors, reviewed and approved each of the merry-go-round
deals that lengthened the queue, and throughout the years in which the merry-go-round
transactions took place, Goldman actively traded aluminum.
(i) Deutsche Bank Merry-Go-Round Deal
Goldman acquired Metro in February 2010, and Metro conducted its first merry-go-round
deal in September 2010, with DB Energy Trading, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank.
1160
It
involved 100,000 metric tons of aluminum, most of which was loaded out of one Metro
warehouse and immediately loaded into another. The transaction was not suggested by Deutsche
Bank, but by Metro personnel, and reviewed and approved by Metro senior executives and the
1156
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1157
See, e.g., Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro (6/21/2013), GSPSICOMMODS00046873; Red Kite Master Fund Ltd.
invoice to Metro (11/13/2012), GSPSICOMMODS00046876.
1158
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014); “A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure Gold,”
New York Times, David Kocieniewski,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-
to-banks-pure-gold.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
1159
The vast majority of the metal that came back into a Metro warehouse was ultimately placed back on warrant,
while, as of earlier this year, a fraction of it had not been placed on warrant.
1160
9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
196
Metro Board of Directors’ Commercial Decisions Subcommittee, composed exclusively of
Goldman employees.
1161
According to Deutsche Bank, the 100,000 metric tons of aluminum at issue was held by
Deutsche Bank for its own account as part of a so-called “cash and carry” trade.
1162
Consistent
with its general practice, Deutsche Bank entered into negotiations with Metro’s agent seeking
discounted rent.
1163
According to Deutsche Bank, Metro declined to provide the discounted rent
directly, but suggested instead that Deutsche Bank move the metal to a cheaper off-warrant
storage site at other Metro warehouses.
1164
According to Deutsche Bank, Metro proposed that
Deutsche Bank cancel the warrants for the aluminum stored in the LME-approved warehouses,
wait in the queue to load out the metal, transport the aluminum to other Metro warehouses, and
after a period of less expensive or free rent, re-warrant the metal.
1165
While both Deutsche Bank and Metro have acknowledged to the Subcommittee that the
proposed transaction did, in fact, occur, no formal written contract was signed by both parties.
Instead, the terms of the agreement were spelled out in a contract that was signed by Deutsche
Bank employees,
1166
but which Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman told the Subcommittee was
never signed by Metro.
1167
The Subcommittee understands that an agreement was nevertheless
reached generally in line with the terms of the contract signed by Deutsche Bank.
The agreement involved Deutsche Bank cancelling warrants associated with 100,000
metric tons of aluminum stored in Metro’s Detroit warehouses, requesting “the maximum
number of [load-out] Slots” in the queue, loading the metal out of the warehouses, and
transporting the metal to other Metro warehouses in Detroit.
1168
By requesting the “maximum
number of Slots,” Deutsche Bank essentially ensured that the aluminum in the deal would fill
Metro’s load-out requirement from the day the first lot of Deutsche Bank metal reached the front
of the queue until all of its aluminum was loaded out, which would take more than 65 business
days at the minimum load out rate of, then, 1,500 metric tons per day. The agreement also
1161
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1162
Subcommittee briefing by Deutsche Bank legal counsel (10/22/2014). A “cash and carry” trade occurs when a
trader buys physical metal, often through LME warrants, and enters into a forward contract to sell the metal at a
specified price on a specified date in the future. The trader seeks to set a price in the forward contract that will
exceed the cost of storing, insuring, and financing the purchase of the metal during the period until the sale is
executed. The prolonged “contango” in the aluminum market during 2011 and 2012, in which future aluminum
prices were higher than current prices, made these types of trades profitable. Banks and their holding companies,
with access to low-cost financing, increasingly entered into cash and carry trades. For more information on these
trades, see, e.g., “Aluminum Premiums Seen by Rusal Exceeding 500 on Demand,” Bloomberg, Agnieszka
Troszkiewicz (6/3/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-03/aluminum-premiums-seen-by-rusal-
exceeding-500-on-demand.html; 11/7/2014 email form Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-
000001 - 003, at 002.
1163
11/7/2014 email from Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-000001 - 003, at 002.
1164
Subcommittee briefing with Deutsche Bank legal counsel (10/22/2014).
1165
Id.
1166
See 9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
1167
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1168
9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
197
involved Metro capping Deutsche Bank’s rent while its aluminum was in the queue waiting to be
loaded out.
1169
According to the unsigned contract, Deutsche Bank was responsible for paying $42.95
per metric ton in costs to move the metal from one Metro warehouse to another. However, the
contract also contained a provision in which Metro committed to pay the bank the same amount,
$42.95, for every metric ton of metal that was subsequently re-warranted and stored at a Metro
warehouse. The effect was to offset Deutsche Bank’s costs so long as its aluminum was re-
warranted and stored in another Metro warehouse, essentially enabling Deutsche Bank to move
its metal to the new location for free.
1170
In addition, according to Deutsche Bank, Metro then
provided the bank with discounts equal to “roughly 15 cents/ton/day for the period from
September 15, 2010 to February 16, 2011,” a substantial savings.
1171
Finally, the agreement imposed a substantial penalty on Deutsche Bank if it elected to do
anything other than re-load the aluminum into a new Metro Detroit warehouse and re-warrant it.
The agreement provided that, if Deutsche Bank sold the metal to a third party at any point during
the five months covered by the deal, it would have to pay Metro a fee of $65 per metric ton, or
about $6.5 million for 100,000 metric tons of aluminum.
1172
The agreement essentially provided Deutsche Bank with the rent discount it had sought,
but instead of applying the discount in a straightforward manner to the aluminum already stored
in a Metro warehouse – a discount permissible under LME rules – Metro required Deutsche
Bank to cancel its warrants, join the queue, leave the warehouse, and move its metal to a new
Metro warehouse. The question is why Metro imposed that merry-go-round process as the
condition for Deutsche Bank’s rent discount.
There appears to have been no logistical reason to move the metal outside of the LME-
approved storage space. None of the Metro Board of Directors presentations from that period
discuss a shortage of LME-approved storage space. To the contrary, they show LME inventory
levels in Detroit dropping immediately following the deal.
1173
Further, Metro CEO Christopher
Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that he was not aware of any shortage of LME-storage
capacity in Metro’s Detroit facilities at that time.
1174
The most immediate consequence of the transaction was Deutsche Bank’s cancellation of
warrants on 100,000 metric tons of aluminum, which immediately contributed to the queue at the
Detroit warehouses. On September 15, 2010, there was a short queue in Detroit of about 20
days.
1175
One week later, on September 22, 2010, a few days after Deutsche Bank cancelled the
1169
Id.
1170
As stated by Deutsche Bank’s legal counsel, “the net cost to Deutsche Bank of moving this metal was zero.”
11/7/2014 email from Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-000001 - 003, at 002.
1171
Id.
1172
9/15/2010 Warrant Finance Agreement between DB Energy Trading LLC and Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS000047438.
1173
See, e.g., 11/15/2010 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009559 - 574, at 566.
1174
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1175
See undated “HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs
HARBOR's MW Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
198
warrants, Metro had a queue of nearly 120 days, a significant portion of which was attributable
to the bank’s warrant cancellation.
1176
The presence of that nearly 120-day queue meant that any
metal owner that cancelled warrants after September 22, 2010, would not only have to wait
behind Deutsche Bank for their metal to be loaded out of the warehouse, but would also have to
pay rent to Metro while waiting.
Of the original 100,000 metric tons of aluminum subject to the deal, approximately
70,000 metric tons left one Metro warehouse for another Metro warehouse in Detroit, and were
then re-warranted.
1177
The remaining 30,000 metric tons were placed back on warrant before
they were actually loaded out.
1178
Thus, in the end, all 100,000 metric tons were back on warrant
at Metro at the end of the deal. The re-warranting of that metal ensured that if Deutsche Bank
wanted to exit the Metro warehouse system in the future, it would have to rejoin the queue once
more before it could take possession of its aluminum.
Expressing Concerns. Metro’s merry-go-round transaction with Deutsche Bank raised
concerns with at least one senior Metro executive. In early December 2010, Mark Askew,
Metro’s Vice President of Marketing, sent an email to Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman
expressing concerns about the Deutsche Bank deal.
1179
Mr. Askew relayed that a customer had
“asked about rumours they’d heard on 100 k cancellation in Sep[tember] that we were blocking
others.”
1180
The only 100,000 metric ton cancellation in September at Metro was the one
involving Deutsche Bank. The rumor, as relayed by Mr. Askew, focused explicitly on whether
Metro was “blocking others.”
Mr. Askew’s email also expressed his own concern about the transaction: “I remain
concerned, as I have expressed from [the] start, regarding ‘Q management’ etc (esp in light of
conversation Michael said he had with Paco on the same a few weeks back).”
1181
Mr.
Wibbelman explained to the Subcommittee that Mr. Askew had “never liked the idea” of
offering financial incentives to existing Metro customers.
1182
Mr. Wibbelman denied that the
Deutsche Bank deal was designed to help put a queue in place to block other clients from quickly
leaving the Detroit warehouses.
1183
As explained earlier, the longer Metro Detroit warehouse queue had two immediate
consequences. It forced other metal owners to wait in line before they could exit and pay rent to
Metro while waiting. In addition, the longer queue was highly correlated with higher Midwest
Premiums which, according to some experts and industrial users, increased the all-in price for
1176
Id.
1177
11/7/2014 email from Deutsche Bank legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-DB-01-000001 - 003
1178
Id.
1179
12/4/2010 email from Mark Askew, Metro, to Christopher Wibbelman, Metro (12/4/2010),
GSPSICOMMODS000047422.
1180
Id.
1181
Id. The Subcommittee was told that “Paco” referred to a competitor, Pacorini Metals, which operated a metals
warehouse in Vlissingen, Netherlands, which was also developing an unprecedented queue. Subcommittee
interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014).
1182
Id. Mr. Wibbelman further told the Subcommittee that he believed that part of Mr. Askew’s dislike of the deals
was that Mr. Askew was not a part of them and was not compensated for them as a salesperson. Id.
1183
Id.
199
aluminum. Higher aluminum prices increased the value of aluminum stockpiles and could also
be used to benefit trading activities in the aluminum market.
(ii) Four Red Kite Merry-Go-Round Deals
Metro conducted four merry-go-round deals with Red Kite, a London-based hedge fund
that is active in the physical commodities markets. In each of the years 2011, 2012, and 2013,
Red Kite, through either Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. or Red Kite Management Ltd., was one of
Metro’s top ten customers.
1184
The four merry-go-round deals all took place in 2012, and
involved a total of nearly 440,000 metric tons of aluminum.
1185
Approximately 410,000 metric
tons were loaded out of Metro warehouses and right back into other Metro warehouses.
1186
Because a small amount of metal never left Metro, a total of nearly 95% of the nearly 440,000
metric tons of aluminum either never left Metro or was loaded out of Metro only to be loaded
back in to Metro warehouses. Each of the four Red Kite deals, like the Deutsche Bank deal, was
reviewed and approved by Metro senior executives and the Goldman employees on the Metro
Board’s Commercial Decisions Subcommittee.
1187
First Three Red Kite Deals. The first three deals with Red Kite took place from
J anuary through March of 2012. In those transactions, Metro offered financial incentives for
Red Kite to cancel warrants on a combined total of 250,000 metric tons of aluminum, wait in
line, load out the metal from Metro warehouses, load it back into other Metro warehouses, and
re-warrant the metal.
1188
The incentives offered by Metro included: (1) paying a “day one” cash
incentive to the metal owner when the metal warrants were cancelled,
1189
(2) offering a period of
free rent, and (3) paying another cash incentive for re-warranting.
1190
As in the Deutsche Bank
deal, each transaction required Red Kite to pay a substantial cash penalty to Metro if Red Kite
did anything other than re-load the metal into a Metro warehouse and re-warrant it.
1191
The
terms for all three deals, each of which involved millions of dollars, were set out, not in formal
signed contracts, but in emails and invoices.
1192
Expressing Additional Concerns. Around the same time that Metro entered into the
first of the series of Red Kite deals, in February 2012, the Metro Vice President of Marketing,
Mark Askew, sent an email to Michael Whelan, Metro’s Vice President of Business
1184
See 10/20/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, GSPSICOMMODS00047431 - 432.
1185
See 12/19/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009332 - 354, at 348 (indicating a combined total of 410,000 metric tons, which later
increased by another 30,000 metric tons, when the final deal rose from 160,000 to nearly 190,000 warrants).
1186
Id.
1187
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1188
See 3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 437.
1189
This incentive may have been intended to off-set fees associated with the subsequent loading out of metal.
1190
3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 437.
1191
Id.
1192
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
200
Development, copying Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman and Metro Chief Operating Officer
Leo Prichard, again expressing concerns about engaging in “queue management.”
1193
Neither Mr. Wibbelman nor Mr. Prichard responded.
1194
Mr. Whelan responded to Mr.
Askew’s email by defending the transaction:
“[W]e are not participating in queue management. We have done an off warrant storage
deal with a customer who was going to remove the metal and place [it] in an off warrant
warehouse. We were able to provide an off-warrant storage option and make a
commercial deal that doesn’t in any way violate the rules of the LME.”
1195
While Mr. Whelan’s email described the Red Kite deal as “off warrant storage,” all of the
250,000 metric tons of metal involved in the first three deals were subsequently re-warranted.
1196
So were the approximately 160,000 tons of aluminum moved to new Metro warehouses in the
fourth and final deal. In addition, while Mr. Whelan stated that the merry-go-round transactions
did not violate LME rules, Metro told the Subcommittee it had never actually consulted with the
LME to obtain its view of the deals.
1197
Although Mr. Askew’s concerns about how the queue was being managed were directly
communicated in writing to senior Metro employees on two occasions, J acques Gabillon,
Chairman of the Metro Board of Directors, told the Subcommittee that he was not aware of
them.
1198
While the deals themselves were discussed at Metro’s Board meetings, Mr. Askew’s
concerns appear to have not been.
1199
Minutes from a March 2012 Metro Board meeting where
the “off-warrant deals” were discussed, for example, do not mention Mr. Askew’s concerns or
indicate any discussion of whether the deal was appropriate or consistent with LME rules.
1200
Mr. Askew’s earlier email raised the issue of whether the merry-go-round deals were
being used for “blocking others” – preventing metal owners from gaining possession of their
stored metal within a reasonable period of time. The deals also created a false impression that
metal was leaving the Metro system when, in fact, the metal was simply being moved around.
Another concern is that the merry-go-round deals contributed to a longer warehouse queue
which, in turn, was highly correlated with higher Midwest Premium prices, leading to charges by
industrial users that the queues were distorting the aluminum market and increasing aluminum
1193
2/25/2012 email from Mark Askew, Metro, to Michael Whelan, Leo Prichard and Christopher Wibbelman,
Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00047422, at 423.
1194
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1195
2/25/2012 email from Michael Whelan, Metro, to Mark Askew, Leo Prichard and Christopher Wibbelman,
Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00047422, at 423.
1196
See 12/19/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009332, at 348.
1197
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014) and J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014). As
discussed below, without commenting specifically about Metro, the LME told the Subcommittee that “the LME
would view such behavior as a contravention of the "spirit" of the relevant requirements, it may be difficult to argue
that it constituted a contravention of the "letter" of those requirements.”
1198
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1199
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014) and J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1200
3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423.
201
costs for consumers. There is no record, however, of any of those problems being discussed at
Metro Board meetings at the time.
Fourth Red Kite Deal. After Mr. Askew’s email, Metro entered into a fourth merry-go-
round deal with Red Kite. That fourth and final deal between Red Kite and Metro was the
largest. On November 5, 2012, Metro’s warehouse manager emailed representatives of Red Kite
about a large amount of aluminum that Red Kite was then storing at Metro warehouses in
Detroit.
1201
The metal was being held in the name of Barclays Bank as part of a financing
agreement between the bank and Red Kite.
1202
When the Metro manager emailed Red Kite, the
aluminum was still under LME warrant in the Detroit warehouses.
1203
The Metro email contained terms for another merry-go-round deal under which Red Kite
was to “immediately” cancel warrants for 150,000 metric tons of metal,
1204
place the metal
“asap” in the Detroit queue and, upon reaching the front of the queue, load the metal out of one
Metro warehouse and into another Metro warehouse in the Detroit area.
1205
In exchange, Metro
agreed to pay Red Kite cash incentives totaling $196 per metric ton of metal that completed the
loop and was re-warranted.
1206
The cash incentives had two components. Like the previous Red Kite deals, Metro
promised to pay a “day one” incentive, in this case equal to $36 per metric ton, when Red Kite
cancelled the warrants.
1207
The deal provided a second cash incentive of $160 per metric ton
when the metal was re-warranted.
1208
Together, Red Kite would receive $36 per metric ton upon
cancellation and another $160 per metric ton upon re-warranting at other Metro warehouses, for
a combined cash incentive of $196 per metric ton.
1209
In addition, Metro committed to discount
the rent it would charge Red Kite at the new warehouse locations and, as in other deals, pay the
cost of shipping the metal from one warehouse to the other.
While Red Kite retained the right to either sell the metal when it reached the front of the
queue or move it to a warehouse company other than Metro, as before, the Metro agreement
1201
See 11/5/2012 email from Gabriella Vagnini, Metro, to Barry Feldman, Red Kite, GSPSICOMMODS00046684.
1202
See 9/26/2014 email from Barclays Capital Inc. to Subcommittee, “Barclays [BARC-AMER.FID670446],” PSI-
Barclays-02-000001.
1203
See 11/5/2012 email from Gabriella Vagnini, Metro, to Barry Feldman, Red Kite, GSPSICOMMODS00046684.
1204
Id. The total amount of aluminum in the transaction later increased to nearly 190,000 tons. 4/15/2012 Simmons
& Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850.
1205
11/5/2012 email from Gabriella Vagnini, Metro, to Barry Feldman, Red Kite, GSPSICOMMODS00046684.
1206
See 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850, at 854.
1207
See 3/21/2012 “MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009423, at 437. See also Red Kite Master Fund Limited invoice to Metro (11/13/2012),
GSPSICOMMODS00046876 (reflecting an amount of “USD 36.00 PMT”).
1208
See, e.g., 1/28/2014 Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046879 (reflecting an
amount of “USD 160.00 PMT”); 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A,
GSPSICOMMODS00046850, at 854.
1209
The “day one” incentive may have been intended to offset certain fees and costs associated with loading out the
metal.
202
imposed a penalty if Red Kite did so. Specifically, if Red Kite did not direct the metal back to
Metro warehouses, Red Kite would have to pay Metro a penalty of about $66 per metric ton.
1210
The transaction proposed by Metro involved tens of millions of dollars, but was never
formalized in a signed contract; the November 5 Metro email and a handful of invoices
1211
appear to be the only documentation of the details of the agreement.
1212
Red Kite started
cancelling its warrants just two days later, on November 7, 2012. Over the next six weeks, the
hedge fund continued to cancel warrants as the amount of aluminum included in the deal reached
nearly 190,000 metric tons.
1213
Prior to the deal, the queue in Detroit was just over 300 days
long.
1214
By the end of December, just after the last of Red Kite’s cancellations, the queue was
just under 500 days, with a significant portion of that increase attributable to Red Kite’s warrant
cancellations.
1215
In the end, of the nearly 190,000 metric tons covered by the fourth Red Kite merry-go-
round deal, about 182,000 metric tons were loaded out of Metro warehouses.
1216
Of that, about
160,000 metric tons simply went out of some Metro warehouses and back into other Metro
warehouses.
1217
Thus, nearly 90% of the metal shipped as pursuant to the deal went from Metro
right back to Metro. Metro records show that, pursuant to this deal, Metro arranged for more
than 4,300 truck shipments, moving the metal from some Metro warehouses to other Metro
warehouses in the Detroit area, at a cost of more than $1 million.
1218
That came on top of the
$26 million that Red Kite billed Metro for incentive payments under the deal.
1219
(iii) Glencore Merry-Go-Round Deal
In February 2013, Metro entered into the sixth and final merry-go-round deal disclosed
by Goldman. The deal was struck with Glencore, a Swiss company active in physical
commodity markets. The transaction involved Glencore’s loading out about 91,400 metric tons
of aluminum from Metro warehouses in Detroit, only to load the same amount into other Metro
1210
The $66 per ton fee represented the cost of the $36 prepaid incentive plus an additional $30 per ton. 4/15/2012
Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850, at 854.
1211
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014). See also, e.g., 11/13/2012 Red Kite Master
Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046876 (reflecting an amount of “USD 36.00 PMT”); 12/20/2012
Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046877; 1/28/2014 Red Kite Master Fund Ltd.
invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046878; 1/28/2014 Red Kite Master Fund Ltd. invoice to Metro,
GSPSICOMMODS00046879 (reflecting an amount of “USD 160.00 PMT”).
1212
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014)
1213
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, at 4, GSPSICOMMODS00046850.
1214
See undated “HARBOR's estimated aluminum load-out waiting time in LME Detroit Warehouses vs
HARBOR's MW Transactional Premium,” prepared by Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAluminum-03-000004.
1215
Id..
1216
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850. The remaining
21,600 metric tons – totaling about 10% of the original deal amount – were shipped outside of the Metro warehouse
system, because Red Kite had sold the metal to a third party.
1217
The 21,600 tons were purchased from Red Kite and shipped to another warehouse. See 4/15/2012 Simmons &
Simmons letter to London Metal Exchange, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850.
1218
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, shipment spreadsheet, GSPSICOMMODS00046902.
1219
Id. at Invoice Summary, GSPSICOMMODS00046872.
203
warehouses nearby, and warranting the metal. Metro’s records reflect that all of the
approximately 90,000 metric tons simply shuffled between different Metro warehouses.
1220
The Glencore deal differed from Metro’s other merry-go-round agreements in that it did
not require Glencore to first cancel its warrants. That was because the company had already
cancelled the warrants, and the metal was already in the queue to exit Metro’s warehouses.
1221
Prior to execution of the deal, as with the other merry-go-round deals, the Glencore deal was
reviewed and approved by senior Metro executives and by the Metro Board’s Commercial
Decisions Subcommittee, composed exclusively of Goldman employees. In addition, it was
presented to the full Metro Board which, again, consisted solely of Goldman employees.
1222
According to Goldman, the Glencore deal the following components. The first
component, which covered about 50,000 metric tons of aluminum, was similar to past deals, in
that Metro agreed to pay a cash incentive, this time $198 per ton, for any metal that the company
subsequently re-warranted at a Metro warehouse.
1223
The second component involved two physical aluminum swaps. In the first swap, Metro
arranged for Glencore to receive 21,000 metric tons of aluminum free on truck (FOT) in
Baltimore from another metal owner, plus $15 per metric ton from Metro, in return for
Glencore’s delivering to that third party warrants for 21,000 metric tons in Detroit.
1224
Mr.
Wibbelman explained that Metro was able to help arrange the swap, because the owner of the
aluminum in Baltimore had previously committed to shipping more than that amount, which he
estimated at approximately 80,000 metric tons, to Metro.
1225
Mr. Wibbelman explained that
Metro simply asked the metal owner to replace the obligation to deliver 21,000 metric tons to
Metro with an obligation to deliver 21,000 metric tons to Glencore. The second swap involved
Metro’s arranging for Glencore to receive 20,000 metric tons of aluminum FOT in Mobile from
yet another metal owner, plus $20 per metric ton from Metro, in return for Glencore’s again
delivering to that third party warrants for 20,000 metric tons in Detroit.
1226
By engaging in this transaction, Glencore was able to obtain 41,000 metric tons of
aluminum from other warehouses, plus cash. Glencore told the Subcommittee that this
1220
However, according to Glencore, at least 70,000 metric tons was metal that had just previously been on-warrant
at Metro. 11/7/2014 email from Glencore to Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001, at 003. According to
Goldman and Glencore, the deal involved a warrant incentive for 50,000 metric tons, as well as two swaps, one for
20,000 metric tons and another for 21,000. In addition, according to Glencore there was another deal that involved a
separate warrant incentive for 25,000 to 75,000 additional metric tons. 11/7/2014 email from Glencore to
Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001 - 003, at 003.
1221
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850; 11/7/2014 email
from Glencore to Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001 - 003, at 002.
1222
See 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, at 6, GSPSICOMMODS00046839; 12/19/2012 “MITSI
Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009332 - 354,
at 348.
1223
See 6/21/2013 Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046873 (reflecting 50,046.872 metric tons
at $198 per metric ton); Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
1224
See 9/24/2013 Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046875 (reflecting 21,407.022 metric tons
at $15 per metric ton); Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
1225
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014).
1226
See 6/21/2013 Glencore Ltd. invoice to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046874 (reflecting 19,949.939 metric tons
at $20.15 per metric ton); Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
204
transaction also allowed Glencore to save on the costs on shipping metal from Detroit.
1227
According to Glencore, Metro was able to keep approximately 91,000 metric tons in its Detroit
warehouses on warrant, as well as save the costs of shipping 21,000 metric tons of metal to
Detroit from Baltimore.
1228
When the aluminum covered by the merry-go-round deal reached
the head of the queue, each day on which that metal was loaded out, Metro experienced no net
loss of metal, while other metal owners were effectively blocked from leaving the Metro
system.
1229
As a result of the deal, all 91,000 metric tons covered by the deal were subsequently
warranted.
1230
To execute the transaction, Metro arranged for more than 2,200 individual truck
shipments between Metro warehouses in the Detroit area and paid nearly $500,000 for those
shipments.
1231
In addition, a Metro invoice summary indicated that, as of March 2014, the
warehouse had been billed about $11 million by Glencore for the incentive payments under the
agreement.
1232
At about the time of this deal, Michael Whelan, who had taken the lead on this deal as
well as the other merry-go-round transactions, was promoted.
1233
After a more than a dozen
years at Metro, Mark Askew resigned.
1234
Transporting Merry-Go-Round Metal. When asked whether the merry-go-round deals
complied with LME rules, J acques Gabillon, Chairman of the Metro Board of Directors as well
as head of Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments group, told the Subcommittee
that they did.
1235
He stated that, if metal associated with cancelled warrants was loaded back into
the same warehouse from which it came, that would have violated an LME requirement that
precludes warehouses from counting metal that is off warrant but “still on the Warehouse’s
premises” toward their load-out obligations.
1236
But the LME rules did not preclude a warehouse
from loading out metal and then moving into a nearby warehouse belonging to the same
company, according to Mr. Gabillon.
1237
He told the Subcommittee that, to ensure no LME
1227
Subcommittee briefing by Glencore (10/31/2014).
1228
Id.
1229
While the deal did not involve new cancellations, and so did not, by itself, lengthen the queue, by remaining in
line, it blocked the exits and ensured that metal that would otherwise have been loaded out of Metro’s system stayed
within Metro.
1230
4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046850. According to
Glencore, approximately 71,000 metric tons of the metal that was ultimately placed on warrant at Metro was
previously on warrant at Metro, while the remaining 20,000 tons were not previously on warrant at Metro.
11/7/2014 email from Glencore to Subcommittee, PSI-Glencore-01-000001 - 003, at 003. Nevertheless, the net
effect was that Metro kept 91,000 metric tons on warrant at Metro.
1231
Id. at shipment spreadsheet, GSPSICOMMODS00047097.
1232
Id. at Invoice Summary, GSPSICOMMODS00046872.
1233
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1234
See “Marketing vice president Askew quits metals warehouse” Reuters (4/12/2013),
Metrohttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/metals-warehousing-askew-idUSL5N0CZ1HA20130412.
1235
Subcommittee interview with J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1236
Id. See also “Terms and conditions applicable to all LME listed warehouse companies,” LME website, at
¶6.3.2,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Proposed%20revised%20Warehouse
%20Agreement.pdf.
1237
Subcommittee interview with J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
205
violation occurred, Metro had set up a system to exclude the originating warehouse from the list
of possible destinations for metal being loaded out of that warehouse.
1238
While Mr. Gabillon
said that the Metro merry-go-round deals complied with the LME load-out rules, the LME itself
has not, to date, made a public determination on that issue, as discussed below.
The Metro system for transporting metal that was part of a merry-go-round deal produced
some unusual metal movements. For example, on October 2, 2013, several trucks were loaded
with aluminum at a Metro warehouse on Lafayette Street in Mount Clemens, Michigan, destined
for another Metro warehouse about twelve miles away. That same day, several trucks were
loaded with aluminum at a third Metro warehouse in New Baltimore, Michigan, and shipped to
the Lafayette Street warehouse. The next day, the Lafayette Street warehouse again shipped out
several truckloads of aluminum only to be on the receiving end of metal shipments the day after
that.
1239
In short, over the space of two days, the Lafayette Street warehouse saw truckloads of
virtually identical aluminum shipments depart, arrive, depart, and arrive again.
On another occasion, in November, 2013, Metro loaded aluminum out of one warehouse
and moved it into another warehouse about 200 feet away across a parking lot.
1240
Goldman told
the Subcommittee that warehouse personnel didn’t know whether the metal was moved across
the parking lot on the property to the second warehouse, or instead was driven around the block
on public streets.
1241
In any event, multiple trucks trundled tons of aluminum from one
warehouse location to the other just a few feet away.
1242
On another three-day period in December 2013, pursuant to a merry-go-round deal,
trucks carrying tons of aluminum transported that aluminum to and from the exact same
warehouses in a circular pattern at odds with rational warehouse activity. The trucks loaded the
aluminum from the first warehouse, unloaded it at the second, picked up different lots of
aluminum from the second warehouse, and drove it to the first where it was unloaded. Those
trucks bearing similar loads of aluminum did not transport the metal for free, but imposed
substantial costs on Metro to carry out the transactions.
Thousands of similar shipments occurred during the course of Metro’s merry-go-round
deals. In fact, according to Goldman, between February 2010 and J anuary 2014, more than
625,000 tons of aluminum were loaded out of a Metro warehouse in Detroit only to be loaded
right back into another Metro facility in Detroit, all part of the Metro metal merry-go-round.
1243
In the end, while the truck movements created a false impression that metal was actually leaving
the Metro warehouses, in fact, almost all of the metal was simply being moved around the
warehouse system in Detroit.
Reacting to the Metro Merry-Go-Round. Metro’s practice of loading metal out of one
Metro warehouse only to load it back into another Metro warehouse came to the public’s
attention through a J uly 20, 2013, front-page New York Times article that disclosed the practice
1238
Id.
1239
See 4/15/2012 Simmons & Simmons letter to LME, chart, GSPSICOMMODS00046906 - 615.
1240
See Spreadsheet prepared by Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00046902, at 974 - 975.
1241
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/24/2014).
1242
See Spreadsheet prepared by Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00046902, at 974 - 975.
1243
10/22/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-22-000001 - 002, at 002.
206
and raised fresh concerns about the integrity of the aluminum market.
1244
The article quoted a
former Metro forklift operator who described a “merry-go-round of metal,” and indicated that the
practice had become a running joke among some warehouse workers.
1245
On J uly 23, 2013, the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Protection held a hearing on bank involvement with physical commodities, and
focused attention more broadly on the Metro Detroit warehouse queue, raising concerns that it
was distorting the aluminum market and inflating aluminum prices.
1246
One witness from
MillerCoors testified that companies like Metro had created bottlenecks that slowed the removal
of aluminum from their warehouses, and forced metal owners to pay additional rent. He further
testified that those actions had cost MillerCoors “tens of millions of dollars in excess premiums
over the last several years,” and imposed an estimated “additional $3 billion expense on
companies that purchase aluminum.”
1247
In an attempt to quiet the uproar, Goldman issued a
statement offering, as one media report put it, “to speed up delivery of aluminum to users of the
metal and proposed changes to industry rules amid claims that its warehouse unit created
shortages and drove up prices.”
1248
Despite that offer, in August 2013, more than a dozen class action lawsuits were filed
against Goldman, Metro, the LME, and others, by aluminum purchasers claiming:
“[D]efendants together arranged to stockpile aluminum in warehouses in the Midwestern
portion of the United States and delayed load-outs of such aluminum, causing storage
costs to increase. This led to an increase in the Midwest Premium, a price component
that incorporates a number of inputs including storage costs. Plaintiffs allege that their
purchases of aluminum are priced with reference to the Midwest Premium, and that they
therefore paid inflated prices.”
1249
Triggering LME Investigation. Another development from the New York Times article
was that, shortly after its publication, an LME examiner visited Metro and made a number of
inquiries into Metro’s practices. Several months later, on December 4, 2013, the LME notified
Metro that the exchange had opened a formal investigation “into the circumstances surrounding
the movement of primary aluminum between listed warehouses” operated by Metro in
1244
“A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure Gold,” New York Times, David Kocieniewski,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-
gold.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
1245
Id. Concerns about Metro’s lengthening queue and its effect on aluminum markets had begun years earlier. See,
e.g., “Wall Street Gets Eyed in Metal Squeeze,” Wall Street J ournal, Tatyana Shumsky and Andrea Hotter
(6/17/2011),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304186404576389680225394642.
1246
See “Examining Financial Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?” hearing before the U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Protection, S. Hrg. 113-67 (7/23/2013), opening statement of Subcommittee Chairman Sherrod Brown,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg82568/html/CHRG-113shrg82568.htm.
1247
Id., prepared testimony of Tim Weiner, Global Risk Manager, Commodities/Metals, MillerCoors LLC, at 4.
1248
“Goldman Sachs Offers Aluminum to Clients Stuck in Queue,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore and Agnieszka
Troszkiewicz (7/31/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/goldman-sachs-offers-aluminum-to-
clients-stuck-in-queue.html.
1249
See In Re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121435 (USDC
SDNY)(8/29/2014)(court decision describing allegations; it dismissed the class action suits for lack of standing).
207
Detroit.
1250
A few days later, LME sent Metro a request for documents and information about
Metro’s cancellation practices, the inducements it offered to metal owners who participated in
the merry-go-round transactions, and whether Metro considered those metal shipments consistent
with its load-out obligations under LME rules.
1251
The LME also asked why Metro had not
consulted the exchange about the practice before engaging in it.
1252
On J anuary 27, 2014, Metro responded to the LME’s letter.
1253
The response drew upon
information provided by a number of Metro and Goldman employees, including J acques
Gabillon, head of Goldman’s GCPI group and Chairman of Metro’s Board of Directors. Metro’s
response detailed the last Red Kite deal and the Glencore deal described above.
1254
As to the
unusual movements of metal that resulted from the deals, Metro asserted that once the aluminum
was loaded onto a truck, the owner of the metal was entitled to send it anywhere the owner
wanted — including back to Metro. Metro wrote:
“[Metro] considers metal that is loaded free on truck (FOT) at the owner’s instruction, in
accordance with the order of priority required by the LME … to count towards the
operator’s load-out obligations. At that point, the warehouse operator has released
possession of the metal and thus has loaded-out the metal from its warehouse. The LME
has long recognized the right of the metal owner to decide what to do with free metal,
and, as the operator of LME-approved warehouses, Metro is bound to respect the owner’s
instruction.”
1255
Metro stated that, “consistent with LME requirements, Metro deducts metal from its
inventory once a bill of lading has been signed by both Metro and the truck operator.”
1256
Metro
also wrote that LME’s external auditors had reviewed Metro’s operations pursuant to inventory
audits in 2012, and “no material issues” were noted in the Audit Summary or any follow up.
1257
On March 10, 2014, LME sent another letter to Metro, asking for details about Metro’s
vetting and approval process for the deals, and asking for new information, including whether
Metro employees had “brokered” the merry-go-round deals identified in Metro’s J anuary letter,
and whether Metro had considered asking LME “as to the appropriateness” of the deals.
1258
LME also asked whether “Metro consider[ed] that the incentives it offered contributed to the
perpetuation of metal queues in Detroit.”
1259
On April 15, 2014, Metro replied to the LME’s letter.
1260
Metro said that it was “unable
to pinpoint which party first initiated the Transactions.”
1261
As to whether the warehouse
1250
12/4/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046656 [sealed exhibit].
1251
12/6/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046658 [sealed exhibit].
1252
Id.
1253
1/27/2014 letter from Simmons & Simmons to LME, GSPSICOMMODS00046661.
1254
Id. at Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046666. The four previous merry-go-round deals were not within the
time scope of the LME’s document request.
1255
1/27/2014 letter from Simmons & Simmons to LME, GSPSICOMMODS00046661, 662.
1256
Id.
1257
Id.
1258
3/10/2013 letter from LME to Metro, GSPSICOMMODS00046827, at 828 [sealed exhibit].
1259
Id. at GSPSICOMMODS00046827, 831.
1260
4/15/2012 letter from Simmons & Simmons to LME, GSPSICOMMODS00046834.
208
company had considered asking the LME its view of the deals, Metro stated that the company
“regards its process for reviewing all transactions to be a matter of sound corporate practice and
governance and therefore did not make enquiries to the LME regarding the [Red Kite and
Glencore] Transactions.”
1262
Metro also denied that the merry-go-round deals had contributed to
the perpetuation of the queue stating that “Metro has no influence over warrant
cancellations.”
1263
Metro made that statement even after paying millions of dollars in incentives
for warrant cancellations.
Metro also attempted to justify the incentives offered to Red Kite and Glencore, by
explaining that it was “competing with other storage options available” to those companies.
1264
Metro also continued to assert that the deals were consistent with LME rules:
“Metro does not consider the incentives it offered to be ‘exceptional inducements’ that
‘artificially or otherwise constrained’ the ‘proper functioning of the market through the
liquidity and elasticity of stocks of metal under warrant.’ (Clause 9.3.1 of the Warehouse
Agreement.)”
1265
The Subcommittee is not aware of any correspondence between LME and Metro since Metro’s
April reply. The LME would not comment on the existence or status of the investigation.
1266
The Subcommittee then asked the LME whether it would “consider it a violation of its
load out rule for an owner of multiple warehouses to "load out" metal from one warehouse only
to load it back in to another warehouse owned by the same company in the same geographic
region.” The LME told the Subcommittee that “while the LME would view such behavior as
inconsistent with the "spirit" of the relevant requirements, it may not violate the "letter" of those
requirements because the relevant terms may be susceptible to more than one interpretation.”
1267
The LME has recently initiated a consultation on changes to its warehousing requirements to
stop the practice.
1268
(e) Benefiting from Proprietary Cancellations
In addition to the merry-go-round deals, four large proprietary cancellations by J PMorgan
and Goldman also measurably lengthened the Detroit queue. The J PMorgan cancellations
1261
Id at 837.
1262
Id at 838.
1263
Id at 844.
1264
Id. at 843.
1265
Id at 842.
1266
The LME has consistently declined the Subcommittee’s invitations to discuss the matter, citing the LME’s role
as a regulator. In particular, the LME stated that “as an instrumentality of the government of the United Kingdom
and a market regulator, the LME maintains strict confidentiality of ongoing investigations into approved warehouses
and therefore we are unable to provide further information. … The LME’s confidentiality obligations stem from
multiple sources.” 11/10/2014 letter from LME to Subcommittee, LME_PSI0002459, at 461.
1267
Id..
1268
11/7/2014 “Consultation and Proposed Amendments to the Policies and Procedures Relating to the LME’s
Physical Delivery Network,” prepared by LME,https://www.lme.com/~/media/files/notices/2014/2014_11/14%20318%20a310%20w148%20physical%20network
%20reform%20consultation%20notice.pdf.
209
involved about 200,000 metric tons of aluminum and took place in J anuary and December 2012.
The Goldman cancellations involved more than 300,000 metric tons of aluminum and took place
in May and December 2012.
JPMorgan Cancellations. In J anuary 2012, J PMorgan cancelled warrants for nearly
100,000 metric tons of aluminum held at Metro in Detroit. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee
that the aluminum belonged to J PMorgan Chase Bank, which was not acting as an agent for any
client but was acting on its own behalf, and that the purpose of the cancellation was, in part, to
replenish its readily available stocks of aluminum.
1269
At the beginning of J anuary 2012, the
Detroit queue was approximately 115 days. By J anuary 20, after J PMorgan had cancelled its
warrants for 100,000 metric tons, the queue had increased to 216 days.
1270
A significant portion
of that increase was attributable to J PMorgan’s cancellation. According to J PMorgan, after
waiting about nine months to get through the queue, the majority of the aluminum was shipped
out of the Metro warehouse and into a Henry Bath LME-approved warehouse in Baltimore.
1271
Nearly a year later, in December 2012, J PMorgan cancelled warrants for another
approximately 95,000 metric tons of aluminum. The bank told the Subcommittee that it was the
direct owner of the aluminum, it was not acting on behalf of a client, and the purpose of the
cancellation was to use the aluminum in various future transactions.
1272
In mid-December 2012,
prior to the cancellation, the queue in Detroit was less than 350 days. By the end of that month
the wait for aluminum approached 500 days, with the increase appearing to be largely
attributable to warrant cancellations by J PMorgan, Red Kite, and Goldman.
1273
J PMorgan
waited in the queue for more than one year. In early 2014, the metal was shipped out of the
Metro warehouses.
1274
According to J PMorgan, some of the aluminum was ultimately sold to
clients and the remainder was shipped to other warehouses.
1275
Goldman Cancellations. In 2012, the same year as the J PMorgan cancellations,
Goldman engaged in two large acquisitions of aluminum warrants followed by cancellations of
many of those warrants. The cancellations involved more than 300,000 tons of aluminum worth
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, in 2012, it began to focus on building trading
relationships with aluminum consumers and set out to increase its physical holdings of aluminum
1269
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014).
1270
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1271
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014). At the time, J PMorgan owned the Henry Bath warehouses. In
March 2014, J PMorgan reached an agreement to sell its physical commodities business to Mercuria Energy Group,
including the Henry Bath warehousing business. See Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/14); 3/19/2014
J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan announces sale of its physical commodities business to Mercuria Energy
Group Limited,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1394963095027&c=J PM_Content_C.
1272
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014).
1273
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1274
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (9/5/2014).
1275
Id.
210
to do business with those clients.
1276
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it had determined that
purchasing aluminum warrants on the LME was the most cost-effective way to build its physical
inventory and set out to buy readily available aluminum, meaning aluminum that was not in a
warehouse with a queue, such as Metro.
1277
According to Goldman records, in March 2012, it held about 277,000 metric tons of
aluminum.
1278
Goldman told the Subcommittee that it entered into a large number of LME
futures contracts with warrants for delivery of aluminum in April 2012.
1279
At the same time, the
company sold futures contracts to deliver LME aluminum warrants in May and J une.
1280
At the
time, the vast majority of warrants used to settle LME aluminum trades were associated with
aluminum held in either Detroit or Vlissingen. Since those warrants were associated with
aluminum held in warehouses with long queues, they were the least valuable and the most likely
to be used to settle futures trades.
1281
According to Goldman, its goal was to buy so many LME
warrants for April delivery that at least some of those warrants would be for aluminum held in
warehouses without queues.
1282
Goldman executed the trades in April 2012, which increased its physical aluminum
holdings that month to nearly 780,000 tons of aluminum with a market value of more than $1.6
billion.
1283
According to Goldman, however, the effort to secure warrants in warehouses without
queues was unsuccessful, and the company used many of the warrants it had bought to meet its
May and J une trading commitments.
1284
On May 15, 2012, in the midst of that series of trades, Goldman cancelled warrants
associated with almost 50,000 metric tons of physical aluminum in Metro’s Detroit warehouses.
In mid-J uly 2012, Goldman cancelled warrants for another 45,000 metric tons in Detroit, for a
combined total of 95,000 metric tons.
1285
Prior to Goldman’s first set of cancellations, in mid-
1276
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1277
Id. Finding warrants for aluminum at warehouses without queues was difficult since the two warehouses with
the vast majority of LME warranted aluminum were the Metro warehouses in Detroit and the Pacorini warehouses in
Vlissingen, both of which had long queues for removal of metal. A later public report issued by the LME in
November 2013, noted the problem, observing that, of the aluminum warrants used to settle trades on September 18,
2013, for example, 99% were associated with aluminum in a warehouse with a queue. See 11/2013 “Summary
Public Report of the LME Warehousing Consultation,” prepared by LME,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Warehousing/Warehouse%20consultation/Public%20Report%20of%20the%20
LME%20Warehousing%20Consultation.pdf.
1278
2/20/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, at chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000002-R.
1279
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1280
Id.
1281
Id; Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/10/2014).
1282
Id; See 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001 - 011,
at 007; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1283
2/20/2013 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, at chart, GSPSICOMMODS00000002-R.
1284
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
-011, at 007; Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/10/2014).
1285
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-
000001 - 013, Exhibit C, at 011.
211
May 2102, the queue in Detroit was about 285 days.
1286
By mid-J uly 2012, after the last of
Goldman’s cancellations, it had increased by nearly a third to around 370 days.
1287
A few months later, in December 2012, driven by what Goldman called a “longer-term
strategy to developing our consumer franchise business,” the company again set out to
significantly increase its holdings of physical aluminum.
1288
According to Goldman, discussions
with aluminum consuming clients had identified “interest in having Goldman Sachs serve as a
source of supply for metal in the future and as a counterparty on forward-starting hedge
transactions.”
1289
Goldman told the Subcommittee that, despite its failure to obtain any significant number
of warrants outside of Detroit and Vlissingen during the prior spring, it decided to try the same
strategy again – buying such a large volume of LME warrants that at least some would likely
come from warehouses without queues.
1290
Goldman ultimately purchased LME futures
contracts for December delivery with warrants for more than 1 million tons aluminum, a huge
amount. At the same time, the company sold a large number of futures contracts for J anuary
2013.
1291
In the midst of that series of trades, Goldman’s physical aluminum holdings grew to more
than 1.5 million metric tons of aluminum worth more than $3.2 billion, nearly five times the
amount held just weeks earlier. As with the first attempt, however, Goldman obtained few
warrants for aluminum in a warehouse without a queue. According to Goldman, it then used
about half of the LME warrants to settle its short J anuary contracts. Even after that, at the end of
J anuary 2013, Goldman held nearly 825,000 metric tons of aluminum worth more than $1.76
billion.
1292
Goldman said that the LME warrants that were not used to settle the J anuary contracts
were then cancelled, which significantly increased the queue in Metro’s Detroit warehouses as
well as the queue in the Pacorini warehouses located in Vlissingen, Netherlands where much of
the warranted aluminum was located.
1293
Over just three days in mid-December 2012, Goldman
cancelled warrants for more than 227,000 metric tons of aluminum in Detroit.
1294
1286
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses, prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1287
Id.
1288
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007.
1289
Id.
1290
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007; Subcommittee briefing by Goldman (7/16/2014).
1291
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007.
1292
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-
000001 - 013, Exhibit D, at 013.
1293
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001
- 011, at 007.
1294
4/30/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “April 2, 2014 Email,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-09-
000001 - 013, Exhibit C, at 011.
212
Why Goldman thought that the second aluminum trade would succeed when the first
failed is unclear, but what is clear is that, for a second time, Goldman’s cancellations lengthened
the Metro Detroit queue. In mid-December 2012, prior to Goldman’s cancelling the warrants,
the queue in Detroit was just under 350 days.
1295
By the end of December 2012, the wait to get
aluminum out of the Metro warehouse system was approaching 500 days, with the increase
largely attributable to warrant cancellations by J PMorgan, Red Kite, and Goldman.
1296
As explained earlier, longer queues in Detroit were highly correlated with higher
Midwest Premiums.
1297
According to Goldman, longer queues and higher Midwest Premiums
would directly impact LME prices.
1298
At the same time Goldman was cancelling its warrants, it
was actively trading financial products tied to the price of aluminum, including the LME price.
(f) Benefiting from Fees Tied to Higher Midwest Premium Prices
Under Goldman’s ownership, Metro entered into a series of transactions that enabled it to
benefit financially from the rising Midwest Premium, which was highly correlated to its own
lengthening queue in Detroit.
As explained above, the Midwest Premium is a key price component in U.S. aluminum
contracts that, along with the LME price, produces the all-in price for physical aluminum. The
premium is intended to reflect, among other factors, storage costs for aluminum. While the
Midwest Premium used to be an inconsequential part of the all-in price, about 4%; over the last
five years, it has increased substantially, and, since J anuary 2014, has been more than 20% of the
all-in price. As shown in a graph earlier, between 2010 and 2014, the increases in the Midwest
Premium have had an extremely high correlation of 0.89 with increases in the length of the
Metro Detroit queue.
1299
In other words, when the queue lengthened, the Midwest premium
almost always increased.
In response to Subcommittee questions, Goldman disclosed that, from 2010 through
2014, in at least 13 arrangements, Metro received payments from some warehouse clients of
amounts that were directly or indirectly tied to the Midwest Premium price.
1300
Agreements that
1295
See undated “Harbor’s Estimated Aluminum Load-Out Waiting Time in LME Detroit Warehouses,” prepared by
Harbor Aluminum, PSI-HarborAlum-01-000001.
1296
Id.
1297
For another explanation of the correlation between the queue and the Midwest Premium price, see In Re
Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121435 (USDC SDNY)(8/29/2014)(court
decision summarizing the position taken by aluminum buyers: “LME stored aluminum in the Detroit area
determines the level of the Midwest Premium. As trader rather than user dynamics took root in the LME
warehouses, the level of the Premium became driven by trading dynamics rather than actual supply and demand of
aluminum users. … A direct result of this was to increase storage duration, thus storage costs, thereby increasing
the Midwest Premium.”).
1298
Goldman has strenuously argued, however, that queues simply impact the LME price in relation to the physical
price. Put another way, in Goldman’s opinion, as the queue gets longer, the Midwest Premium gets higher and the
LME price falls, yet the “all in price” remains the same. See “The economic role of a warehouse exchange,”
Goldman, Sachs (10/31/2013), GSPSICOMMODS00047511, at 513.
1299
See chart entitled, “Detroit Queue and Platts MW Aluminum Premium,” above.
1300
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001 - 10, at 002 and
Appendix A, GSPSICOMMODS00046531; and 10/3/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee,
PSI-GolmanSachs-27-000001 and attachment, GSPSICOMMODS46630.
213
potentially link Metro revenues to the Midwest Premium raise conflict of interest concerns, since
a Metro financial interest in the premium price would create an incentive for the company to
develop and maintain longer queues.
Each month since Goldman acquired Metro, Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal
Investment (GCPI) group produced a one-page management brief for Isabelle Ealet, who was
Global Head of GS Commodities until she was promoted to co-head of the Securities Division in
2012.
1301
The Metro management briefs included such information as Metro’s gross year-over-
year profit, inventory projections, and business highlights.
1302
The J une 2011 management brief
stated that “Metro showed another month of record financial performance,” and highlighted
“Extraordinary income from counterparties sharing physical premium with Metro after
delivering metal previously under financing deals into the physical market.”
1303
Ms. Ealet told
the Subcommittee that she did not recall that briefing document and could not explain how
Metro’s counterparties were “sharing physical premium with Metro.”
1304
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the “premium sharing” payments referenced in the
brief and other payments like it were “a means of compensating Metro for, among other things,
rent discounts Metro provided based on the understanding that the customer would hold metal
for a period that is longer than the period for which the customer ultimately held the metal in
Metro’s warehouses.”
1305
Goldman identified 29 agreements between 2010 and 2014 in which a customer paid
Metro a “break fee” for selling physical aluminum that was held at a Metro warehouse under a
discount rent agreement.
1306
Thirteen of those 29 agreements were associated with the sale of
metal stored in Metro warehouses in the United States.
1307
The Midwest Premium was the
applicable premium in those sales. It appears that Metro earned more than $7.3 million in break
fees from those 13 agreements.
1308
Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that Metro got a better deal
out of the break fees than it would have if Metro had simply continued with the discount rent
agreements.
1309
The amounts were also sufficiently large that they were brought to the attention
of the head of Goldman’s Commodities division and described as “Extraordinary income” in
“another month of record financial performance.”
1310
The premium sharing arrangements gave
1301
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1302
See, e.g., 6/2011 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009668.
1303
Id.
1304
Subcommittee interview with Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014).
1305
10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001at 002.
1306
Id. The “break fee” refers to a fee paid by the client for breaking the agreement with Metro to keep its metal in a
Metro warehouse for a specified period of time. Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1307
Id. 10/2/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-GoldmanSachs-21-000001, at 2, and
attachment,GSPSICOMMODS00046531; 10/3/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-
GoldmanSachs-27-00001, and attachment, GSPSICOMMODS00046630.
1308
Id.
1309
Subcommittee interview with Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1310
6/2011 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009668.
214
Metro another financial reward for longer queues,
1311
since longer queues were highly correlated
with higher Midwest Premium prices – higher prices that produced additional income for Metro
through the premium sharing agreements.
(g) Sharing Non-Public Information
A second set of issues involves the extent to which Metro shared commercially valuable,
non-public information with Goldman employees who were involved in commodities and trading
in the aluminum markets.
Background on Information Sharing. In the regular course of business, LME-
approved warehouses acquire information on warehouse metal stocks, current and future metal
shipments, LME warrant cancellations, and warehouse queue lengths that is not available
generally to market participants. The LME has recognized that traders privy to such warehouse
information before it becomes available to the broader market could use that non-public
information to benefit their trading strategies, gaining an unfair advantage over the rest of the
market and their own counterparties. To prevent inappropriate sharing or the misuse of market
sensitive information, the LME has required warehouse companies who are affiliated with
trading companies to set up information barriers between the two.
The LME requirements relating to erecting so-called “Chinese walls” between the
warehouse and trading operations state that “it is essential that personnel engaged in trading
activities in relation to the LME market do not come into possession of any Confidential
Information” from the warehouse, including warehouse stock figures, proposed or actual metal
shipments to or from an LME warehouse, and information relating to the issuance and
cancellation of LME warrants.
1312
The requirements state that such confidential information
may be provided only to certain “Designated Individuals” and that the number of such
individuals at affiliated trading companies should be “kept to a minimum.”
1313
Under LME
requirements, information shared with a trading company “will be confined to common directors
and others who have management responsibility for both entities.”
1314
Prior to its purchase of Metro, Goldman identified the “perception of misuse of
confidential [Metro] information” as a key investment risk.
1315
To address that risk, Goldman
issued a policy to ensure compliance with LME information sharing requirements, warning:
“It is strictly prohibited for Metro to disclose any information about pending metal
deposits or withdrawals or to give any specific information relating to storage terms,
client deals or financing transactions to individuals within [Commodities Sales and
1311
Of course, the principal reward was the ability to charge additional rent to those who may want to exit Metro’s
Detroit warehouses, but were blocked by the queue.
1312
11/17/2011 “Information Barriers Between Warehouse Companies and Trading Companies,” prepared by LME,
at 1-3 (hereinafter, “LME Information Barrier Rules,”),https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2011/2011_11/11_334_A326_W173_Information_Barriers_Between_
Warehouse_Companies_and_Trading_Companies.pdf.
1313
Id. at 4.
1314
Id.
1315
See 8/6/2013 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Reputational Risk Questions MITSI Holdings LLC,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700124 - 150, at 130.
215
Trading or any other Goldman personnel not approved to receive information]. It is also
prohibited for Metro staff to share any information which is reported to or published by
the LME ahead of publication to the market.”
1316
Despite that Goldman policy, and a corresponding one at Metro, the Subcommittee found
that confidential Metro information was made available to dozens of Goldman
employees, including personnel active in trading commodities.
Metro Executives. Metro’s CEO, COO, and Chairman of the Board all told the
Subcommittee that they viewed Metro’s and Goldman’s information barrier policies as
prohibiting them from sharing specific Metro-related information with Goldman
aluminum traders or others involved in trading aluminum.
1317
Beginning in April 2012, the LME began mandating that warehouse companies affiliated
with a trading company engage a third party to ensure that their policies and procedures
complied with the exchange’s information barrier requirements.
1318
Metro hired
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to conduct its 2012 and 2013 reviews.
According to Goldman, the PwC reviews took place over several weeks in which the
auditor independently tested and verified each of the controls put in place by Metro to protect
against inappropriate sharing of confidential warehouse information. Both PwC reviews
concluded that Metro’s assertions that its information barriers were in compliance with LME
requirements were “fairly stated, in all material aspects.”
1319
PwC’s assessments, however, were
limited to reviewing Metro’s information barriers, since the LME requirement applies only to
warehouse companies and not to their affiliated trading companies. PwC did not undertake a
similar review of Goldman.
Goldman Access to Metro Information. For its part, Goldman told the Subcommittee
that internal audits of Goldman’s information barriers have not identified problems. While a
significant number of Goldman employees are authorized under Metro’s and Goldman’s policies
to receive confidential information from Metro, Goldman advised the Subcommittee that
“Compliance has found no unauthorized instances where Metro confidential information was
transmitted to Goldman Sachs sales and trading personnel.”
1320
1316
3/26/2014 “Information Barrier Policy: Metro and Other GS Business and Personnel,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00004059 - 076, at 066.
1317
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014), Leo Prichard (10/6/2014 ), and J acques
Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1318
11/17/2011 “Information Barriers Between Warehouse Companies and Trading Companies,” prepared by LME,
at 6, 7,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2011/2011_11/11_334_A326_W173_Information_Barriers_Between_
Warehouse_Companies_and_Trading_Companies.pdf.
1319
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman Sachs to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001-11, at
5.
1320
See 8/6/2013 “Federal Reserve Bank of New York Reputational Risk Questions MITSI Holdings LLC,”
prepared by Goldman, FRB-PSI-700124-150, at 133; 8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee,
“Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-Goldman-11-000001 - 011, at 010.
216
Goldman’s information barriers policy identifies three categories of “Designated
Individuals” who are permitted access to certain confidential Metro information. One group
consists of certain employees in Goldman’s Global Commodities Principal Investments (GCPI)
group. A second group is made up of Goldman employees who sit on Metro’s Board of
Directors. A third group includes certain senior managers in Goldman’s Securities Division.
1321
Global Commodities Principal Investments. As mentioned above, GCPI is the group
within Goldman’s Global Commodities group that makes equity investments in commodities-
related businesses like power plants and coal mines, and it was GCPI personnel who conducted
the analysis and strategy that led to Goldman’s purchase of Metro.
1322
Ten Goldman employees assigned to GCPI have been authorized to receive monthly data
packages from Metro containing warehouse related confidential information.
1323
GCPI data
packages include information on Metro stock levels, warrant cancellations, deal-specific freight
incentives, rent discounts, and future metal flows, the latter of which is referred to as Metro’s
“deal pipeline.” For example, for the month ending November 2012 the GCPI data packet
showed more than 550,000 tons of metal under contract for delivery to Metro’s Detroit
warehouse. Of that amount, the data packet indicated that only about 110,000 metric tons had
been warranted and that 74,000 metric tons of metal already in the warehouse was awaiting
warranting, the latter figure being particularly sensitive market information because it was not
reflected in public stock reports.
1324
Goldman told the Subcommittee that its GCPI personnel requires detailed non-public
information from Metro on a monthly basis to conduct business planning, estimate cash flows,
and support Metro. Information on Metro’s “deal pipeline,” meaning metal that is under contract
for delivery to Metro warehouses, is information not included in the LME’s public warehouse
stock reports until the metal was delivered and warranted. It is important to prevent such
information from being shared with traders as it could give a trading company an advantage by,
for example, allowing it to better predict spreads between cash and futures aluminum prices.
Such insight could not only inform a firm’s trading strategy but would allow it to assess risks
associated with particular trades.
1325
Goldman Employees on Metro Board. A second group of persons designated to
receive confidential Metro information are the Goldman employees who sit on the Metro Board.
Following its purchase of Metro, Goldman installed a new Board of Directors consisting
exclusively of Goldman employees, more than half of whom were from the Global Commodities
group. Board Members included individuals associated with commodity trading, commodity
operations, and GCPI. One Board Member ran Goldman’s Natural Gas and Power Trading
1321
3/26/2014 “Information Barrier Policy: Metro and Other GS Business and Personnel,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00004059 - 076, at 060, 066.
1322
Subcommittee briefing by Goldman Sachs (7/16/2014).
1323
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001-009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225.
1324
12/1/2012 MITSI Holdings, LLC, GCPI data packet, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00040203, at 205; 2/19/2010 “Conflict Management Procedures Between Metro and Other GS
Businesses and Personnel,” prepared by Metro and Goldman, FRB-PSI-602457 - 471, at 458.
1325
Subcommittee briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
217
group and was head of GCPI during his time on the Board.
1326
While the composition of the
Board has varied since 2010, it has always been wholly comprised of Goldman employees, many
from Goldman’s Global Commodities group.
1327
Metro supplies each Board member with
information packets which are produced and distributed on a quarterly basis.
1328
Goldman has said that the format of the Board packets “ensures that no market sensitive
non public information is disclosed.”
1329
While less detailed than the data packets provided to
GCPI employees, the Board packets have included substantial information about future expected
metal flows and stock levels. For example, the packet produced for an October 2012 Board
meeting described the “Current Deal Pipeline”
1330
for metal to be delivered to Metro
warehouses, indicated “Metro has another 277 [thousand metric tons] booked,” and “Detroit
continues to be the key inbound location for Metro.”
1331
In another example, information provided to the Board in J une 2013, showed more than
576,000 tons of metal, including 400,000 tons of aluminum, in Metro’s deal pipeline at the end
of May 2013. The Board packet also stated that Detroit “continues to be the key inbound
location for Metro with another 431 [thousand metric tons] of metal expected.”
1332
Again, experts told the Subcommittee that information on existing and upcoming
aluminum flows could be commercially valuable to a trading company by providing insight into
market direction, helping with predictions of future spreads, and informing the strategic direction
for its trading activities.
1333
Senior Goldman Managers. The third and final group of Goldman employees
designated to receive confidential Metro information work for the Goldman Securities Division.
The Securities Division at Goldman oversees the Global Commodities group, including
Commodity Sales, Commodity Trading, and GCPI. Isabelle Ealet is the current co-head of the
Securities Division and is responsible for the Division’s commodity-related business. Prior to
1326
See 12/5/2011 MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009287 - 309, at 290; 3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman ,
GSPSICOMMODS00009519 - 542, at 534 (Gregory Agran left Metro’s Board of Directors at the end of 2011).
1327
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001 - 009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046225. See also chart listing Metro Board members, above.
1328
8/8/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Goldman-11-000001 - 011, at 009.
1329
3/26/2014 “Information Barrier Policy: Metro and Other GS Business and Personnel,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00004059 - 076, at 063.
1330
3/2010 MITSI Board Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009519 - 542, at 535
(“Metro’s deal book pipeline consists of a series of committed deals based on verbal agreements with market
counterparties”).
1331
10/4/2012 MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009398 - 422, at 409.
1332
6/19/2013 MITSI Holdings LLC Board of Directors Meeting, prepared by Metro and Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009378 - 397, at 387.
1333
Subcommittee briefing by J orge Vazquez (9/30/2014).
218
being named to that position in J anuary 2012, Ms. Ealet was global head of the Commodities
group.
1334
Beginning in March 2010, Ms. Ealet began receiving monthly reports, called a
“management brief,” that provided her with confidential Metro information, including
information about future metal flows in Metro’s deal pipeline.
1335
For example, a September
2010 brief discussed an off-warrant deal reached for 100,000 metric tons of aluminum at Metro
and included a graph projecting Metro stock balances.
1336
Similarly, a November 2011 brief
stated that Metro expected to put in excess of 100,000 metric tons on warrant the following
month.
1337
Subsequent briefs discussed future metal flows, referring to “strong 2013 pipeline,”
and metal outflows “offset by a strong pipeline and inflows.”
1338
LME’s information barrier requirements state “it is essential that personnel engaged in
trading activities in relation to the LME market do not come into possession of any Confidential
Information”
1339
The LME has told the Subcommittee, however, that “personnel engaged in
trading activities” as discussed in its requirements would not necessarily include executives, such
as Ms. Ealet, even though they supervised trading activities.
1340
According to the exchange,
whether or not the prohibition on access to confidential information applied would depend on the
extent of the supervisor’s involvement in setting trading strategy.
1341
Ms. Ealet told the
Subcommittee that while she was not typically involved in the day-to-day management of
trading, she may become involved in specific trades or issues from time to time.
1342
Other Goldman Employees. At the Subcommittee’s request, Goldman identified more
than 30 additional Goldman employees, other than the groups already discussed, who, since
2010, have been provided access to confidential Metro information.
1343
They include individuals
working in the bank’s Market Risk Management & Analysis, tax, litigation, accounting, audit,
compliance, derivatives, and commodities departments.
1344
1334
“2 Securities Heads Are Latest to Leave Goldman,” New York Times, Susanne Craig (1/11/2012),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/global-securities-co-heads-to-leave-
goldman/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
1335
Subcommittee interview of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014).
1336
9/2010 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009675.
1337
11/2011 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009670.
1338
4/2013 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by Goldman,
GSPSICOMMODS00009664; 9/2013 “Metro International Trade Services Management Brief,” prepared by
Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009690.
1339
11/17/2011 “Information Barriers Between Warehouse Companies and Trading Companies,” prepared by LME,
at 1-3,https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2011/2011_11/11_334_A326_W173_Information_Barriers_Between_
Warehouse_Companies_and_Trading_Companies.pdf.
1340
Subcommittee briefing by LME (8/1/2014).
1341
Id.
1342
Subcommittee interview of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014).
1343
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-
000001-009, at Exhibit A, GSPSICOMMODS00046226.
1344
Id.
219
The Subcommittee interviewed, among others, Gregory Agran, who formerly headed
GCPI and is now the Global co-head of Commodities for Goldman; J acques Gabillon, the
current head of GCPI and Chairman of Metro’s Board of Directors; and Isabelle Ealet, former
Global Head of Commodities and current co-head of Goldman’s Securities Division. Ms. Ealet
and Mr. Agran told the Subcommittee that they could not recall any instance in the past five
years in which any commercially sensitive warehouse information had been shared in violation
of the Goldman information-sharing policy. Nor could either recall any occasion on which a
concern was raised that the information barriers policy had been violated.
1345
Mr. Gabillon recalled one information-sharing related incident that had been registered
by Michael Whelan, a senior Metro executive, who brought that matter to Mr. Gabillon’s
attention in 2013.
1346
According to Mr. Gabillon, the incident involved a Goldman commodities
trader who came to him and expressed unhappiness with a zinc-related transaction involving
Metro in New Orleans.
1347
Mr. Gabillon said the interaction was unusual as it was the only
occasion he could recall in which a trader approached him directly about a Metro-related issue.
Mr. Gabillon said that he told the trader to take the complaint to his own reporting chain. Mr.
Gabillon also said that he reported the incident to compliance.
1348
However, according to Christopher Wibbelman, another senior executive at Metro,
Michael Whelan, the company’s Vice President of Business Development, had registered a
concern about an interaction between a Goldman trader and Mr. Gabillon.
1349
The incident was
apparently the same as that referred to by Mr. Gabillon and discussed above. A J une 2013 email
from Mr. Whelan to Mr. Wibbelman, apparently referring to the interaction, stated that Mr.
Whelan was resigning from the company and identified concerns with Metro’s “Chinese Wall”
policy. Mr. Whelan wrote:
“I have some questions and concerns regarding the Chinese Wall Policy that is in place
which regulates the interaction between Metro International, its customers, and J . Aron
[Goldman’s primary commodities trading subsidiary]. This morning’s confrontation was
extremely questionable.”
1350
Mr. Wibbelman told the Subcommittee he could not recall the details of the “confrontation”
referred to in the 2013 email.
1351
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the bank’s compliance department subsequently
determined that no breach of the LME information barriers policy had occurred with respect to
the incident, but declined to provide any documentation.
1352
Metro’s CEO, Christopher
Wibbelman, told the Subcommittee that he believed that Goldman came to that conclusion, in
1345
Subcommittee interviews of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014) and Gregory Agran (10/14/2014).
1346
Subcommittee interview of J acques Gabillon (10/14/2014).
1347
Id.
1348
Id.
1349
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1350
6/14/2013 email from Michael Whelan to Christopher Wibbelman, “Resignation,”
GSPSICOMMODS00047430.
1351
Subcommittee interviews of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1352
10/20/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-20-
000001 - 041, at 002 - 003.
220
part, because the LME Chinese Wall policy covers only information that could flow from the
warehouse company to Goldman.
1353
Goldman told the Subcommittee that the compliance
review involved its Legal Department, and asserted and declined to waive attorney-client
privilege in refusing to provide documents related to that review.
1354
All told, nearly 50 Goldman employees, including Commodities executives and traders,
have had access to confidential Metro information, including information that could be
commercially valuable to a trading company.
1355
(h) Current Status
Current relations between Goldman and Metro appear to be strained. In addition, in mid-
2014, Goldman announced it was “exploring” a possible sale of the warehouse business.
Strained Relations. Prior to its acquisition by Goldman, Metro had built a robust
warehousing business. Its senior executives, including Christopher Wibbelman, Mark Askew,
and Michael Whelan, had each been with the company for more than a decade, and had been
intimately involved in its economic well-being.
1356
After being acquired by Goldman, Metro’s executives were required to obtain approval
for a large swath of Metro’s business activities, including each of the merry-go-round deals
described above.
1357
According to Metro CEO Christopher Wibbelman, Metro employees found
it, at times, “demanding” to work for Goldman.
1358
He indicated, for example, that Goldman
traders sometimes pressured Metro employees to provide free or discounted rent when storing
metal in the warehouses that Metro found not commercially viable.
1359
Mr. Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that he “never rolled over” to Goldman, and that
Metro was repeatedly told by its Chairman of the Board, J acques Gabillon, that Metro should
always act in the best interests of Metro.
1360
Nevertheless, according to Mr. Wibbelman, at one point, there was what Mr. Wibbelman
called a “falling out” between Metro and Goldman.
1361
The contours of that dispute remain
unclear, with some evidence suggesting that it involved Goldman’s decision to not store zinc in
Metro after receiving an incentive from Metro to store it there.
1362
The dispute was ultimately
raised to Metro’s Chairman of the Board, J acques Gabillon, and Isabelle Ealet, for resolution.
1353
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1354
10/20/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-20-
000001 - 041, at 002 - 003.
1355
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-up Requests,” PSI-Goldman Sachs-17-
000001 - 005, at 002, and Exhibits A and B, PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-000007, 009 (also listed as
GSPSICOMMODS00046225 - 226).
1356
Subcommittee interview of Christopher Wibbelman (10/6/2014).
1357
Id.
1358
Id.
1359
Id.
1360
Id.
1361
Id.
1362
Id.
221
Mr. Wibbelman told the Subcommittee that the matter was resolved, but relations remained
strained. He said that, unlike his former marketing staff, he had not spoken with Goldman’s
traders about sales issues in perhaps eight or nine months.
1363
Resignations and Departures. One of the complicating factors in determining what
happened at Metro is the significant turnover in personnel. Since the end of 2012, key personnel
have left both Metro and Goldman. In February 2013, Mark Askew, Metro’s Vice President for
Marketing resigned after repeatedly raising concerns with Metro’s “queue management.”
1364
Shortly thereafter, despite a recent promotion, Michael Whelan, another senior Metro executive,
resigned, citing concerns with Metro’s “Chinese Wall Policy” in his resignation email.
1365
The
senior aluminum trader at Goldman, who was hired after a referral by Mr. Wibbelman, also
resigned.
1366
Lastly, a Goldman compliance executive who served on Metro’s Board of
Directors also left at about that time to take a new job.
1367
In May 2014, a Goldman spokesman stated publicly that Goldman was “exploring a sale”
of its warehousing business, but as of November 2014, Goldman still owns it.
1368
(3) Issues Raised by Goldman Involvement with Aluminum
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Goldman’s foray into physical aluminum and the
metals warehouse business is the extent to which, within three years, its actions significantly
impacted U.S. aluminum markets. Goldman’s ownership of Metro, Metro’s rise to dominance in
the U.S. LME aluminum storage business, and the long queues to remove metal from Metro have
generated LME rule changes, Senate hearings, a New York Times expose, class action litigation,
and ongoing allegations by industrial aluminum users that Metro’s and Goldman’s actions have
increased aluminum prices and disrupted the aluminum market as a whole. Concerns include
conflicts of interest, access to commercially valuable non-public information, and unfair trading
advantages.
(a) Conflicts of Interest
The facts discovered by the Subcommittee raise at least four different types of conflict of
interest issues, involving the merry-go-round trades, proprietary metal cancellations, premium
sharing, and Goldman’s authority over Metro operations.
Merry-Go-Round Transactions. The merry-go-round trades created multiple conflicts
of interest for Metro and its owner, Goldman. Those warehouse clients were asked to get into or
stay in the warehouse queue to load out their metal. Cancellations of their warrants, which
1363
Id.
1364
12/4/2010 email from Mark Askew, Metro, to Christopher Wibbelman, Metro, GSPSICOMMODS000047422.
1365
6/14/2013 email from Michael Whelan to Christopher Wibbelman, “Resignation,”
GSPSICOMMODS00047430.
1366
“Goldman Sachs heads of metals to retire,” Financial Times, J ack Farchy (10/11/2012),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/497280ba-13d0-11e2-8260-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Ii1Mkdjk.
1367
This compliance staffer joined a Geneva-based commodities trading firm.
1368
See, e.g., “Goldman Puts Metals Warehouse Business Up For Sale,” Wall Street J ournal, Tatyana Shumsky and
Christian Berthelsen (5/20/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303468704579574283591643044.
222
typically involved 100,000 or more metric tons of aluminum, significantly increased the length
of the Metro Detroit queue. The longer queue was highly correlated with higher Midwest
Premium prices, since that premium reflects, in part, metal storage costs, and longer queues
meant increased rental payments. Higher Midwest Premiums, according to most experts with
whom the Subcommittee spoke, also meant higher aluminum prices. Lengthening the queue,
then – “queue management” – could be seen as, not only producing more rental income for
Metro, but also higher prices for the aluminum held or being traded by Goldman.
When a metal owner involved with a merry-go-round trade got to the head of the
warehouse queue, it often took weeks or months to load out its metal, essentially blocking the
exits for all other metal owners until it was done. At the end of the process, the metal owner in
the merry-go-round transaction re-loaded its metal into another Metro warehouse, and in the
overwhelming number of cases, re-warranted the metal. The end result was that the delays
imposed on the other metal owners in the Metro system appear to have had little economic
rationale, but increased revenues to Metro and its owner, Goldman. The merry-go-round trades
also involved an element of deception, since the metal being loaded “out” did not actually leave
the Metro system at all, but went from one Metro warehouse to another.
1369
The LME is still
considering whether such in-system transfers meet its minimum load-out requirement.
The evidence indicates that Goldman personnel, through the Metro Board of Directors
and otherwise, reviewed and approved the merry-go-round deals. That meant senior Goldman
personnel knew of the deals ahead of time, including the size, nature, and, in some instances, the
timing of the cancellations. Goldman personnel acquired that information during the same
period that Goldman itself was accumulating physical aluminum and engaging in substantial
aluminum-related transactions.
In the end, the merry-go-round trades resulted in some clients receiving surreptitious
financial incentives for leaving their metal within the Metro warehouse system while, at the same
time, making it harder for other warehouse clients to exit. The deals resulted in more rent for
Metro, offered trading opportunities for Goldman, and had the effect of distorting the aluminum
market.
Other Warehouse Transactions. Other Metro warehouse transactions also raised
conflict of interest concerns. Like the merry-go-round transactions, the large proprietary
aluminum cancellations by Goldman and J PMorgan added to the Metro Detroit queues, were
correlated with increases in the Midwest Premium price, and blocked the exits for other metal
holders seeking to withdraw metal from the Metro system. Because longer queues also
contributed to increased Metro rental income, Goldman’s proprietary cancellations raised the
conflict of interest concern that its actions added to Metro’s revenues at the expense of Metro’s
clients, while ultimately benefiting Goldman as the owner of Metro.
1369
Metro counted the more than 600,000 metric tons of aluminum loaded “out” in the six merry-go-round deals as
helping it meet the LME’s daily minimum load out requirement, even though it appears that nearly all of that metal
was loaded right back into a Metro warehouse. See 4/15/2014 letter from Metro legal counsel to LME,
GSPSICOMMODS00046834 - 849, at Appendix A, 835; 12/19/2012 MITSI Holdings LLC Board Meeting,
prepared by Metro and Goldman, GSPSICOMMODS00009332 - 354, at 348.
223
The premium sharing payments, described earlier, allowed Metro to profit when the
Midwest Premium rose. That type of financial incentive, which was not publicly disclosed,
converts a warehouse company from a neutral actor in the aluminum marketplace to a biased
market participant favoring higher premium prices. The LME has told the Subcommittee,
however, that provided those arrangements did not relate to an LME contract, they would not
violate LME rules prohibiting a warehouse company from taking a direct or indirect interest in
an LME contract.
1370
Influencing Warehouse Management. Still another set of conflict of interest concerns
involved Goldman’s influence over Metro policies and actions. Because Metro was acquired as
a merchant banking investment, Goldman was not permitted under U.S. law to routinely manage
or control Metro. The evidence indicates, however, that Goldman required Metro senior
management to clear many business decisions through the Board of Directors, which was
composed exclusively of Goldman employees. That included Board review and approval of the
merry-go-round deals. Later, when Metro was publicly criticized for its lengthy queues, it was
Goldman who announced that it would swap metal with any aluminum end user waiting in
Metro’s queue.
1371
In addition, Goldman provided significant assistance to Metro’s legal and
compliance functions.
Goldman might contend that Metro’s decisions about financial incentives, including in
the merry-go-round deals, involved millions of dollars and novel arrangements that were not
matters of routine management and so should have been subject to Board oversight. Goldman
may, in fact, have been involved with reviewing and approving all of Metro’s financial incentive
programs. But when a trading company influences the incentives paid by a warehouse company
to attract or retain metal, its actions may, as they did here, end up influencing prices in the
corresponding markets. Similarly, if a trading company influences the incentives paid to metal
owners for cancelling warrants, it also influences the length of the warehouse queue which, as
discussed above, is highly correlated with the Midwest Premium price. The same is true for a
trading company that influences a warehouse company’s load out policies, which have a direct
impact on the warehouse queue. In all of these cases, the trading company’s influence over the
warehouse company’s actions may provide the trading company with trading advantages.
Each of these conflicts is embedded in the larger issue of commodity trading companies
owning commodity warehousing companies. Traditionally, LME-approved warehouses were
owned by companies that were not engaged in trading. It is only in the last five years that a
significant portion of LME-approved warehouses have come under the ownership of companies
that trade in the commodity markets.
1372
That new development raises serious conflict of interest
concerns illustrated by the Metro-Goldman relationship.
1370
10/15/2014 email from LME legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-03-000001 - 004.
1371
See, e.g., “Goldman Sachs Offers Aluminum to Clients Stuck in Queue,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore
(7/31/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/goldman-sachs-offers-aluminum-to-clients-stuck-in-
queue.html.
1372
See earlier discussion.
224
(b) Aluminum Market Impact
The Metro warehouse practices described above also had a broader market impact. In the
last five years, Metro has expanded rapidly and, by early 2014, controlled 85% of the U.S. LME
aluminum storage market. It also developed an extraordinarily long queue that was highly
correlated with the recent, unprecedented increases in the Midwest Premium.
Metro’s warehouse practices in Detroit likely contributed to the Midwest Premium’s
rapid rise since 2010, in both real dollar terms and in its growing percentage of the all-in price of
aluminum. That percentage increase necessarily reduced the percentage of the all-in aluminum
price attributable to the LME reference price, undermining the ability of aluminum users to
effectively hedge their price risks on the LME futures market. Higher premium prices and less
effective hedging tools have caused widespread difficulty for aluminum users facing volatile
aluminum prices, including in the defense, transportation, beverage, and construction sectors.
These facts suggest that changes in aluminum prices over the past several years may not have
been simply the product of fundamental market forces of supply and demand, but also responses
to the warehousing practices and transactions described in this report. To restore the integrity of
warehousing operations and aluminum pricing, it seems essential to separate warehouse
companies from trading companies.
(c) Non-Public Information
A third set of concerns highlighted by Goldman’s physical aluminum activities involves
the issue of a trading company’s gaining unfair advantages through access to commercially
valuable, non-public information. When Goldman acquired Metro, it acquired a company with
vast amounts of commercially valuable, non-public information about aluminum including, with
respect to incoming and outgoing metal shipments, information regarding large cancellations,
metal re-warranting, non-LME metal stockpiles, and queue lengths. As described earlier, access
to that type of information can give a commodity trader an unfair advantage over trading
counterparties.
While both Metro and Goldman have information barrier policies designed to implement
the LME’s requirements, those policies and LME’s rules nevertheless allowed over 50 Goldman
employees, including some with trading and trading management responsibilities, to receive
routine reports with commercially valuable, non-public information from Metro.
1373
For
example, Gregory Agran, sat on Metro’s Board of Directors at the same time he headed a
commodities trading desk for Goldman and worked alongside Goldman aluminum traders on the
same trading floor in New York.
1374
Similarly, Isabelle Ealet, who was, for most of the relevant
period, Head of Global Commodities at Goldman, received information about Metro while, at the
1373
8/15/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-up Requests,” PSI-Goldman Sachs-17-
000001 - 005, at 002, and Exhibits A and B, PSI-GoldmanSachs-17-000007, 009 (also listed as
GSPSICOMMODS00046225 - 226).
1374
Subcommittee interview of Gregory Agran (10/14/2014).
225
same time, exercising responsibility over all of Goldman’s commodities-related trading
operations, including aluminum trading.
1375
When Goldman acquired Metro and obtained access to non-public Metro information, it
also increased its aluminum trading, hired new aluminum traders friendly with Metro
management, accumulated massive aluminum holdings, engaged in outsized aluminum
transactions, and traded in aluminum-related swaps.
1376
In addition, Goldman employees,
through the Metro Board of Directors and otherwise, reviewed and approved the merry-go-round
deals, which meant Goldman personnel had non-public information about the deals ahead of
time, including the size, nature, and timing of the cancellations.
If Metro or Goldman were to violate the LME’s information barrier requirements, the
LME could rescind approval of Metro’s warehouse system. But doing so could disrupt LME
trading worldwide and damage the LME itself, making it a difficult penalty to impose.
1377
Another problem is that U.S. law today does not prohibit the use of material, non-public
information in commodity transactions in the same manner as securities transactions. For most
of its 200-year history, commodity futures markets were relatively small in size and dominated
by commodity producers and users seeking to hedge price risks. They traditionally controlled
roughly 70% of the futures trading, while speculators controlled only about 30%.
1378
Today,
however, those percentages have reversed, and financial firms – including bank holding
companies – have become the dominant players in commodity markets.
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission adopted a
rule that is intended to implement an “insider trading” prohibition that is similar to the
longstanding prohibition on insider trading in the securities laws.
1379
It is unclear, however, if
the CFTC’s new prohibition applies to the facts described here, and if so, how it might work.
For example, even assuming that the LME rule and Metro information barrier policies
established a sufficient duty to not trade based on non-public warehouse information, it is
unclear whether the scope of the prohibition would cover trading in the physical markets, as
opposed to the financial markets. If markets are to be fair in their operations, larger traders
should be legally precluded from using material non-public information gained from warehouse
ownership to benefit their trading activities in the physical and financial markets for
commodities stored in those warehouses.
1375
Subcommittee interview of Isabelle Ealet (10/14/2014). Ms. Ealet told the Subcommittee that, despite receiving
written Metro briefings and occasional updates from J acques Gabillon, she exercised little to no oversight of Metro
operations and was generally not involved in individual commodities trading strategies or positions. Id.
1376
See 9/17/2014 letter from Goldman legal counsel to Subcommittee, “Follow-Up Requests,” PSI-GoldmanSachs-
15-000001 - 015, at 003.
1377
The LME may be in the process of establishing new, more practical penalties and enforcement powers.
11/10/2014 email from LME to Subcommittee, PSI-LME-06-000001 - 003.
1378
See “Excessive Speculation and Compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act,” hearing before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, S. Hrg. 112-313 (11/3/2011) , at 32-33,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg72487/pdf/CHRG-112shrg72487.pdf (testimony of CFTC Chairman Gary Genseler indicating that, 2011,
80% of the oil futures market participants were speculators, as opposed to producers or consumers).
1379
See “Rule 180.1: The CFTC Targets Fraud and Manipulation,” New York Law J ournal, David Mesiter, J ocelyn
Strauber and Brittany Bettman, (4/7/2014),http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202649563488/Rule-1801-
The-CFTC-Targets-Fraud-and-Manipulation?slreturn=20141010180332.
226
In the meantime, a trading company that has access to non-public information from a
warehouse company presents the former with ongoing opportunities to use that information to
benefit its trading activities.
(4) Analysis
All three of the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee were heavily
involved with aluminum trading. In addition, Goldman was not the only financial holding
company that owned a network of LME-approved warehouses. For four years, J PMorgan owned
the Henry Bath network of LME warehouses, although those warehouses operated without
lengthy queues and J PMorgan sold the business in 2014.
Goldman’s aluminum activities and its ownership of Metro illustrate troubling issues
involving conflicts of interest, market distortions, and the potential to gain unfair trading
advantages from non-public information, all of which can arise when a financial holding
company owns a commodity-related business at the same time it is actively trading the same
commodities. Since being acquired by Goldman, Metro’s practices have likely added billions of
dollars in costs to a wide range of aluminum users, from beer makers to car manufacturers to
defense companies that make warships for the Navy. It is past time for the Federal Reserve and
other regulators, including the LME, to adopt and enforce needed safeguards on this high risk
physical commodity activity.
227
V. MORGAN STANLEY
Morgan Stanley has a long history of involvement with a vast array of physical
commodities. For many years prior to becoming a bank holding company in 2008, Morgan
Stanley built up an extensive series of businesses involving oil products, adding natural gas as a
secondary focus in recent years, among other commodities. This case study examines Morgan
Stanley’s involvement with natural gas through trading, investments in a major pipeline
company, and actions to construct its own natural gas compression facility. It also examines
how Morgan Stanley once ran an empire of oil-related commodity activities, including trading,
storing, transporting, and supplying oil products, including supplying jet fuel to airlines. Each of
the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee was heavily involved with oil
and natural gas activities; this case history illustrates common issues involving operational risks
and conflicts of interest.
A. Overview of Morgan Stanley
Morgan Stanley is a large global financial services firm incorporated under Delaware law
and headquartered in New York City.
1380
It is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
under the ticker symbol “MS.”
1381
In addition to being one of the largest financial holding
companies in the United States, Morgan Stanley conducts operations in more than 25 countries
andhas over 55,000 employees.
1382
In 2013, Morgan Stanley reported total consolidated assets
of $833 billion, $32 billion in revenues, and net income of $3.6 billion.
1383
Morgan Stanley Leadership. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of Morgan Stanley is J ames P. Gorman.
1384
He has been Chief Executive Officer since 2010 and
Chairman of the Board since 2012.
1385
His predecessor was J ohn J . Mack. The Chief Operating
Officer is J ames Rosenthal, and the Chief Financial Officer is Ruth Porat.
1386
The Global Co-
Heads of Morgan Stanley Commodities are Simon Greenshields and Colin Bryce.
1387
Three
other senior commodities executives are Peter Sherk, Head of North American Power and Gas;
1380
2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 1,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm.
1381
Undated “Investor Relations,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/ir/
sec_filings.html.
1382
Id.; undated “Global Offices,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/offices/
index.html; undated “Morgan Stanley,” prepared by New York Times, New York Times website,http://dealbook.on.nytimes.com/public/overview?symbol=MS; 6/30/2014 “Holding Companies with Assets Greater
Than $10 Billion,” prepared by the National Information Center using data from the Federal Reserve, Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council website,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
1383
2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 50,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm; 12/31/2013
“Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Morgan Stanley with the
Federal Reserve.
1384
2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 21,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm.
1385
Id.
1386
Id.
1387
1/9/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-624436 -
508, at 450.
228
Deborah Hart, Chief Operating Officer of North American Power and Gas; and Nancy King,
Global Head of Oil Liquids Flow.
1388
(1) Background
Morgan Stanley was formed by former members of J .P. Morgan & Company after
enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
1389
Because the Glass-Steagall Act required the
separation of commercial banking and investment banking activities, in 1935, Henry S. Morgan,
and Harold Stanley left J .P. Morgan & Company, which chose to remain a bank, and formed
Morgan Stanley as a separate securities firm.
1390
Since its formation, the firm has grown
significantly while conducting a wide range of securities, investment, and other financial
activities, including trading in commodities. Morgan Stanley first registered with the CFTC as a
futures commodity merchant in 1982,
1391
and over the next few years began trading oil and
natural gas futures and options.
1392
In 1986, Morgan Stanley became a publicly traded
corporation.
1393
Bank Holding Company. In September 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis,
Morgan Stanley submitted,
1394
and the Federal Reserve approved on the same day,
1395
an
application to become a bank holding company with access to Federal Reserve lending
programs. At the same time, Morgan Stanley converted an industrial bank it held in Utah into a
national bank under supervision of the OCC.
1396
Morgan Stanley also elected to become a
financial holding company.
1397
Today, Morgan Stanley owns two banks with federal deposit
1388
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
005.
1389
Undated “Company History - Interactive Timeline,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/timeline/index.html#/year/1930.
1390
Id.
1391
Undated “Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,” National Futures Association BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=UpygXzt3Ct4=&rn=N.
1392
1/9/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-624436 -
508, at 450; 2/11/2013 presentation “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley for the Subcommittee (hereinafter, “2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview”), PSI-
MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, at 004.
1393
Undated “Company History - Interactive Timeline,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/timeline/index.html#/year/1980.
1394
9/21/2008 “Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by Morgan Stanley for prior
approval to acquire 100% of Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association and thereby become a Bank Holding
Company Pursuant to Section 3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act and a Declaration to become Financial
Holding Company pursuant Section 225.82 of Regulation Y,” prepared by Morgan Stanley and filed with the
Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-302972 - 996 (full capitalization of some words omitted).
1395
9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain
NonBanking Activities,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf; 9/21/2008 Morgan Stanley press
release, “Morgan Stanley Granted Federal Bank Holding Company Status by U.S. Federal Reserve Board of
Governors,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/6933.html.
1396
9/21/2008 “Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain
NonBanking Activities,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, at 1,http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf .
1397
Undated “Financial Holding Companies,” prepared by the Federal Reserve,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
229
insurance, Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A. and Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A.
1398
At the end of
2013, their combined deposits totaled about $112 billion.
1399
Key Subsidiaries. In addition to its banks, other key Morgan Stanley subsidiaries
include Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, a U.S. broker-dealer and futures commission merchant;
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, another U.S. broker-dealer and futures commission
merchant; and Morgan Stanley Capital Services LLC, a U.S. swap dealer.
1400
Morgan Stanley
Capital Group Inc. is its leading U.S. subsidiary in the commodities area; it is also a swap
dealer.
1401
Its leading U.K. subsidiary is Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc, which is
registered as a broker-dealer.
1402
Major Business Lines. According to Morgan Stanley, it has three primary business
segments: (1) Institutional Securities, which provides financial advisory, capital-raising, lending,
trading, and investment services to institutional clients such as corporations, hedge funds, and
other financial institutions; (2) Wealth Management, which provides similar services to
individual investors “through a network of 16,784 global representatives in 649 locations”; and
(3) Investment Management, which provides equity, fixed income, real estate investing, and
merchant banking activities and services for institutional investors, high net worth individuals,
hedge funds, private equity funds, and real estate funds.
1403
The Institutional Securities
1398
Undated “BankFind Results: Morgan Stanley,” prepared by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),http://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/results.html?name=Morgan+Stanley&fdic=&address=&city=&state=&zip=
(listing seven FDIC registered banks with the “Morgan Stanley” name, but identifying Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A.
and Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A. as the only two banks with active FDIC status). Morgan Stanley Bank,
N.A. is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah and has only one location. It was first established as an industrial
bank on May 25, 1990, as Mountainwest Financial Corp. In 1998, it changed to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Bank,
Inc., and took its current name in 2008, when it also converted into a commercial bank under OCC supervision. See
undated “Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association (FDIC #: 32992),” prepared by FDIC, FDIC website,http://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank=32992&name=Morgan Stanley Bank,%20National%20A
ssociation&searchName=Morgan%20Stanley&searchFdic=&city=&state=&zip=&address=&tabId=1. Morgan
Stanley Private Bank, N.A. is headquartered in Purchase, New York and also owns “Morgan Stanley Trust Office”
in Wilmington, Delaware. Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A was established on August 12, 1996, under the name
“Dean Witter Trust FSB” as a stock savings bank in J ersey City, New J ersey. On March 24, 1998, it changed its
name to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Trust FSB. On December 10, 2001, the bank changed its name again to
“Morgan Stanley Trust.” On J uly 1, 2010, the bank changed to its current name and converted into a commercial
bank under OCC supervision. See undated “Morgan Stanley Private Bank, National Association (FDIC #: 34221),”
prepared by FDIC, FDIC website,http://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank=34221&name=
Morgan%20Stanley%20Private%20Bank,%20National%20Association&searchName=Morgan%20Stanley&search
Fdic=&city=&state=&zip=&address=&tabId=1. See also 6/30/2013 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report, filed with
the SEC on 8/2/2013, at 8-9,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513317186/d542053d10q.htm.
1399
2013 Annual Report for Morgan Stanley, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, at 98,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242d10k.htm.
1400
7/1/2014 “2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan” (hereinafter “2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan”),
prepared by Morgan Stanley, at 9,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/morgan-stanley-1g-
20140701.pdf.
1401
Id.
1402
Id.
1403
Id. at 9-12. See also 2012 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/26/2013, at 2-6,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513077191/d484822d10k.htm
230
segment’s trading and sales activities include both financial and physical commodity
activities.
1404
Commodities. With respect to commodities, Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that
the “overwhelming majority of business in physical commodities resides in Morgan Stanley
Commodities,” which is part of its Institutional Securities business segment.
1405
“Morgan
Stanley Commodities,” also referred to at times as “Global Commodities” and, in the past, as the
“Worldwide Commodities Group,” is headquartered in Purchase, New York.
1406
In 2013,
Morgan Stanley Commodities managed “365 dedicated front office employees and over 1,000
total employees… covering markets 24 hours per day.”
1407
Within the commodities group, Morgan Stanley maintained five offices, or “desks,”
organized around particular types of commodities: (1) Oil Liquids; (2) North American
Electricity and Natural Gas; (3) European Union and Asia Pacific Electricity and Natural Gas;
(4) Metals; and (5) Other Commodities.
1408
In addition, Morgan Stanley Commodities
maintained a “Principal Investments” office that invested on behalf of Morgan Stanley in
commodity-related businesses; a “Global Marketing” office which marketed physical
commodities and commodity-related services; and a “Commodities Risk Management” office,
which analyzed and monitored risks associated with commodities transactions.
1409
One key legal entity executing activities on behalf of Morgan Stanley Commodities was
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (MSCG), which conducted the bulk of its commodities
trading in the futures, swaps, options, forwards, and spot markets.
1410
MSCG also, through
various subsidiaries, owned key physical commodity businesses,
1411
including the Heidmar
Group, a marine transportation company,
1412
Wellbore Capital LLC, an oil and gas exploration
1404
2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan, at 10; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1405
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee (hereinafter “2013 Morgan Stanley
response to Subcommittee questionnaire”), PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 021, at 1. See also 8/29/2014 “Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” FRB-PSI-00000001 - 009, at 005, 007 (showing
Commodities is part of Institutional Securities); 2014 Morgan Stanley Resolution Plan, at 10; 2012 Morgan Stanley
Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/26/2013, at 3-4,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513077191/d484822d10k.htm. Morgan Stanley
explained to the Subcommittee that its Wealth Management business segment had also maintained, since 2008, a
small inventory of precious metals, but was not otherwise involved with physical commodities. 2013 Morgan
Stanley response to Subcommittee questionnaire, at 6.
1406
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also 5/7/2009 “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley (hereinafter “2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview”),
FRB-PSI-618889 - 908, at 893.
1407
2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview, at 4.
1408
Id. at 011-027. See also 2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 893.
1409
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 893.
1410
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also 2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities
Overview, at 901.
1411
See 2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, Exhibit 21, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242dex21.htm.
1412
8/2/2006 “Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. signs definitive agreement to acquire the Heidmar Group,”
Morgan Stanley press release,http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/3767.html.
231
company,
1413
and Wentworth Holdings LLC, a shell company seeking to build natural gas
compression facilities, as described further below.
1414
In addition, MSCG personnel sometimes
executed physical commodity supply contracts, such as contracts to supply jet fuel to airlines as
described below.
1415
Morgan Stanley also owned numerous other subsidiaries involved with
physical commodities, including, for example, TransMontaigne Inc., which operated an oil
storage and pipeline company as described below; MSDW Power Development Corporation,
which developed power plants and solar power companies, and Morgan Stanley Commodities
Trading Hong Kong Holdings Limited.
1416
Commodities-Related Merchant Banking. In addition to its commodities group,
Morgan Stanley engaged in commodity-related activities through certain investment funds and
merchant banking activities undertaken in other areas of the bank. Morgan Stanley’s Investment
Management business segment included a unit called “Merchant Banking and Real Estate
Investments.”
1417
It housed at least two Morgan Stanley partnerships with commodity-related
investments.
1418
The first was Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners LP (MSIP) which Morgan Stanley
established in 2007.
1419
A Morgan Stanley subsidiary, MS Infrastructure GP LP, acted as
MSIP’s general partner; Morgan Stanley employees actually directed and oversaw the
investments; and Morgan Stanley was the largest single investor with a nearly 11% ownership
stake valued at about $430 million.
1420
MSIP raised $4 billion for investments in infrastructure
projects around the world, focused in part on energy and utility projects.
1421
One key holding
was Southern Star Central Corporation which owns natural gas storage facilities and pipelines in
the U.S. Midwest, described further below.
1422
Others were Continuum Wind Energy which
1413
See, e.g., 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001
- 034, at 008, 034.
1414
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
004 (tracing ownership chain from MSCG to Wentworth Holdings LLC).
1415
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1416
Id.
1417
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1418
Id.; 8/29/2014 presentation, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 005; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 326.
1419
8/29/2014 presentation, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009.
1420
Id. at 002, 006, 009 (disclosing $430 million MSIP investment by Morgan Stanley in fund that raised $4 billion
overall); Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014); 10/24/2014 presentation “Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475,
at 456; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321
- 382, at 328.
1421
8/29/2014 presentation, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009, 011; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform
Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 331. See also undated “OECD Assets within
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Portfolios,” prepared by Morgan Stanley Infrastructure,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/portfolio.html.
1422
See 8/23/2012 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Acquires Full Ownership
of Southern Star Central Corp.,”http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/pdf/msin_08232012.pdf.
232
developed and financed wind farms in India; SAESA Group, which is the second largest energy
distributor in Chile; and Zhaoheng Hydropower, which operated hydropower plants in China.
1423
The second partnership within Merchant Banking and Real Estate Investments is Morgan
Stanley Global Private Equity.
1424
Like the infrastructure partnership, a Morgan Stanley
subsidiary acted as the general partner; Morgan Stanley employees actually directed and oversaw
its investments; and Morgan Stanley was the largest single investor with an ownership interest
varying from 23% to 33% since 2008.
1425
Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity has sponsored
five investment funds, some of which have made commodity-related investments. The most
recent fund, for example, has investments in Triana Energy, a U.S. natural gas exploration and
production company; Trinity, a U.S. carbon dioxide pipeline company; and Sterling Energy, a
U.S. natural gas gathering, processing, and marketing company.
1426
In 2013, Morgan Stanley prepared a list of its “Commodities Division Merchant Banking
Investments” and provided it to the Federal Reserve.
1427
The list identified investments in a new
TransMontaigne oil storage facility expected to begin operations in late 2013, an aircraft fuel
storage facility at an airport in the Netherlands, and a number of solar power projects.
1428
The
list did not include any reference, however, to the commodity-related investments made by the
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure or Global Private Equity investment funds.
1429
In J une 2014,
Morgan Stanley reported to the Federal Reserve that it held merchant banking investments with a
total value of about $11 billion, of which about $5 billion was held under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act; it remains unclear how many of those were commodity related and whether the total
included the commodity-related projects in the two investment funds.
1430
Commodities Trading. At the same time it conducts a wide range of physical
commodity activities, Morgan Stanley trades commodities-related financial instruments,
including futures, swaps, and options, involving billions of dollars each day. Morgan Stanley is
among the ten largest financial institutions in the United States trading financial commodity
instruments, according to Coalition Development Ltd., a company that collects commodity
1423
See 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-
400321 - 382, at 333; undated “Home,” on the Continuum Wind Energy website,http://continuumenergy.in/
(providing the company history and stating it is majority-owned by MSIP); 11/8/2011 Morgan Stanley press release,
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Announces Sales of Its Interest in SAESA Group,”http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/pdf/11082011.pdf (indicating MSIP acquired a 50% ownership
interest in SAESA Group in 2008, and sold it in 2011).
1424
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014);10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners[:]
Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 460 [sealed exhibit].
1425
See 5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006,
at 003.
1426
See undated “Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity - Portfolio,” Morgan Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html.
1427
Undated “Commodities Division Merchant Banking Investments,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-
400001 - 382, at 318.
1428
Id.
1429
Id.
1430
6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies - FR Y-
12,” prepared by Morgan Stanley and filed with the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-800009 - 012.
233
trading statistics.
1431
OCC data indicates it is one of the largest financial institutions trading
commodity-related derivatives.
1432
Commodities Revenues. Historically, commodity activities provided a significant
revenue stream for Morgan Stanley. Over time, revenues derived from this area have dropped
substantially. According to an internal Morgan Stanley presentation, in 2008, the commodities
group produced about $3 billion in revenues for the firm,
1433
with “22% and 26% [c]ompound
[a]nnual [g]rowth [r]ates for revenues and [p]rofit efore [t]ax, respectively.”
1434
The Federal
Reserve estimated that, as of March 31, 2011, Morgan Stanley had about $13.1 billion in
commodities-related assets, of which about $9 billion “relate[d] to the ownership and trading of
oil-related commodities” and $900 million “relate[d] to the ownership and trading of electricity
and natural gas in North America.”
1435
In a 2013 presentation to the Subcommittee, however, Morgan Stanley provided data
showing that its commodities revenues had declined every year since 2008.
1436
From a total of
$3 billion in 2008, its net revenues had fallen by two-thirds in 2012, to $912 million.
1437
The oil
liquids desk experienced the greatest drop in revenues, falling from $1.4 billion in 2008, to a
2012 total of $676 million.
1438
(2) Historical Overview of Involvement with Commodities
According to Morgan Stanley, it first began trading physical and financial commodities
in the early 1980s.
1439
Its first foray was in 1982, after it registered as a futures commissions
merchant, trading precious metals.
1440
Over the next few years, Morgan Stanley also began
1431
9/2014 “Global & Regional Investment Bank League Tables - 1H2014,” prepared by Coalition Development
Ltd., PSI-Coalition-01-000019 - 025, at 020 - 021.
1432
12/31/2013 “OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013,” prepared
by OCC, at Tables 1 and 2,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
1433
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 896; 2013 Morgan Stanley response to Subcommittee
questionnaire, at 5.
1434
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at 891.
1435
6/19/2011 internal Federal Reserve email, “MS Commodities details for 4(o) memo,” FRB-PSI-200942-200943,
at 943.
1436
2013 Morgan Stanley Business Overview, at 009.
1437
Id.
1438
Id. See also “Morgan Stanley Said to Cut 10% of Commodities J obs Amid Rut,” Bloomberg, Michael J . Moore
(6/20/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-06-20/morgan-stanley-said-to-cut-commodities-jobs-as-
revenue-declines.html (“Morgan Stanley is cutting jobs in its commodities business, one of the Wall Street’s three
biggest, after Chief Executive Officer J ames Gorman said revenue the past two quarters was among the unit’s worst
in 18 years.”).
1439
See undated document prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled, “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities
at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs between 1997 and Present,” FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 452 (presenting two
timelines described as having been submitted by Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve “[d]uring exams”) [sealed
exhibit]. The same two timelines appear in an undated document prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled,
“Appendix: Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Timelines” (hereinafter “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities
Timelines”), FRB-PSI-000025 [sealed exhibit]. In addition, one of the timelines appears in 2009 “Morgan Stanley
Global Commodities Overview,” FRB-PSI-618889 – 908, at 892; and in 2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities
Business Overview, at PSI-MorganStanley-01-000011, at 011 - 027.
1440
2009 “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, FRB-PSI-618889 - 908.
234
trading crude oil and natural gas.
1441
In 1984, Morgan Stanley entered into a joint venture with
Transco Energy Company and others to form the Natural Gas Clearinghouse (NGC), which
“brokered and marketed natural gas and gas liquids” and owned pipeline transportation
operations.
1442
In 1985, Morgan Stanley bought out the other investors to acquire sole
ownership, then sold NGC in 1989.
1443
In the late 1980s, according to Morgan Stanley, it also
began intensifying its activities associated with storing oil, chartering oil transport, and refining
oil products.
1444
During all of this period, Morgan Stanley operated, not as a bank, but as a
securities firm that had no restrictions on its commodity-related investments.
During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Morgan Stanley continued to increase
its commodities trading activities as well as its investments in physical commodity businesses.
According to Morgan Stanley, in the 1990s, it expanded into trading base metals and electricity,
while making investments in a hydroelectric power producer, aluminum manufacturer, and steel
rolling mill.
1445
Over time, Morgan Stanley acquired additional interests in power plants,
holding, directly or through subsidiaries, interests in seven power plants (two in the United States
and five abroad), seven wind generation companies, and thirteen solar power generation
companies.
1446
In addition, according to Morgan Stanley, between 1990 and 2000, it invested in the
following commodity-related ventures: a company that produced fertilizer and other agricultural
minerals and chemicals; a pork production facility and packing plant; “the largest methanol
production facility in the U.S.”; and two natural gas companies, one of which owned an interstate
natural gas pipeline and marketing facility.
1447
Other commodity-related holdings included an
investment in the Tennessee Valley Steel Corporation; an entity which owned two major
ethylene production facilities and five processing plants; and a railroad freight transporter.
1448
By September 30, 1997, Morgan Stanley reported that, through Morgan Stanley Capital Group
Inc. and Morgan Stanley & Co. International, it was engaged in a “variety of commodity
derivative and physical commodity transactions … [in] crude oil and oil liquids, natural gas,
electricity and other power and energy commodities and metals.”
1449
In 2000, Morgan Stanley joined other financial institutions and oil companies in founding
the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), an electronic trading facility specialized in commodity-
1441
Id. See also 7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174 - 178
(citing investments in various natural gas producing, processing, and transportation ventures).
1442
5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 171.
1443
Id.
1444
“Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview,” PSI-618889 - 908.
1445
Id. See also 5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 169 - 171.
1446
See 11/27/2009 chart prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled, “Commodities Activities at Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley,” FRB-PSI-200944 - 959, at 952 [sealed exhibit]. See also 8/31/2005 “Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Reply to Morgan Stanley” (hereinafter “FERC Reply”), prepared by FERC, FERC website,http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20050831171232-ER94-1384-030.pdf (listing as parties to a FERC
enforcement action some Morgan Stanley wholly-owned subsidiaries that owned or operated power plants).
1447
5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 169-170; 7/8/2010 letter
from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173. - 182, at 175.
1448
5/17/2011 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200167 - 172, at 171; 7/8/2010 letter from
Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at175.
1449
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 173.
235
linked financial instruments.
1450
Morgan Stanley further expanded its commodities activities
into the areas of coal and freight (2001), biofuels (2005), emissions (2004), and agriculture
(2007).
1451
Morgan Stanley also became involved with power plants, acquiring 100% ownership
of a number of power plants, including power plants in Nevada, Georgia, and Alabama.
1452
All
of these activities took place prior to Morgan Stanley’s conversion to a bank holding company in
September 2008.
During the twenty-five year period from 1982 to 2007, Morgan Stanley concentrated
significant resources on building its investments related to oil products, acquiring businesses
involved in, not only the trading of oil-linked financial instruments, but also the production,
storage, transport, and delivery of physical oil products, as further explained below. Morgan
Stanley reported that, by 2008, oil liquids accounted for approximately fifty percent of its
Worldwide Commodities Group balance sheet.
1453
In September 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, when Morgan Stanley applied to
become a bank holding company, its application included this description of its commodity
activities:
“The Applicant trades as principal and maintains long and short proprietary trading
positions in the spot, forward and futures markets in several commodities, including
metals (base and precious), agricultural products, crude oil, oil products, natural gas,
electric power, emissions credits, coal, freight, liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) and related
products and indices. The Applicant is a market-maker in exchange-traded options and
futures and OTC options and swaps on commodities, and offers counterparties hedging
programs relating to productions, consumption, reserve/inventory management and
structured transactions, including energy-contract securitizations. The Applicant is also
an electricity power marketer in the U.S. and owns five electricity generating facilities in
the U.S. and Europe. The Applicant owns TransMontaigne Inc. and its subsidiaries, a
group of companies operating the refined petroleum products marketing and distribution
business, and an interest in the Heidmar Group of companies, which provide international
marine transportation and U.S. marine logistics services.”
1454
1450
Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Timelines; “Intercontinental Exchange to Acquire NYSE for $8.2
Billion,” Bloomberg, Nina Mehta & Nandini Sukumar (12/20/12),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-
20/intercontinentalexchange-said-in-merger-talks-with-nyse-euronext.html (explaining the Intercontinental
Exchange as a “12-year-old energy and commodity futures bourse” with Morgan Stanley as its lead adviser).
1451
“2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview”, FRB-PSI-618889 - 908.
1452
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (11/18/2014); 2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the
SEC on 2/25/2014, Exhibit 21,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242dex21.htm.
1453
2009 Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview, at FRB-PSI-000897.
1454
9/21/2008 “Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by Morgan Stanley for prior
approval to acquire 100% of Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association and thereby become a Bank Holding
Company Pursuant to Section 3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act and a Declaration to become Financial
Holding Company pursuant Section 225.82 of Regulation Y,” FRB-PSI-302972 - 996, at 979 (full capitalization of
some words omitted).
236
The application noted that, in 2007, Morgan Stanley had formed a “Merchant Banking Division”
which included “private equity funds and [an] infrastructure investing group.”
1455
Morgan Stanley’s 2008 application also included these overall observations on its
commodities activities, as well as a request for a five-year grace period to “conform or divest any
impermissible activities”:
“Physical commodities may exceed the Federal Reserve’s cap of 5% of Tier 1 capital.
The commodities business extends beyond the Federal Reserve restriction that physical
commodities be limited to those for which derivative contracts have been authorized for
trading on a U.S. futures exchange by the CFTC. … Accordingly, Morgan Stanley
respectfully requests that the Federal Reserve grant a five-year grace period during which
Morgan Stanley can conform or divest any impermissible activities or investments.”
1456
Although Morgan Stanley’s application acknowledged that it might be asked to divest some of
its physical commodity activities, the Federal Reserve did not, in 2008, make that request.
After becoming a bank holding company, Morgan Stanley continued for a number of
years to expand its physical commodity activities. By 2013, Morgan Stanley had accumulated a
long list of commodity-related subsidiaries. They included Heidmar Group, Inc., Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Inc., Morgan Stanley International Holdings, Inc., Morgan Stanley
Petroleum Development LLC, Morgan Stanley Renewables, Inc., MSDW Power Development
Corp., MS Solar Holdings Inc., MS Solar Solutions Corp., Olco Petroleum, South Eastern
Electric Development Corporation, South Eastern Generating Corp., and TransMontaigne Inc.,
each of which had been involved with acquiring interests in businesses that handle physical
commodities.
1457
(3) Current Status
When the Federal Reserve initiated its special review of financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities in 2010, Morgan Stanley was one of the ten banks it
examined in detail. Morgan Stanley was also featured in the October 2012 Summary Report
issued by the Federal Reserve’s Commodities Team summarizing the findings of the special
review.
1458
The 2012 Summary Report described Morgan Stanley’s wide-ranging physical
commodity activities. According to the report, Morgan Stanley held operating leases on more
1455
Id. at 982.
1456
Id. at 986.
1457
See, e.g., 2013 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/25/2014, Exhibit 21,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514067354/d639242dex21.htm; undated document
prepared by the Federal Reserve entitled, “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs between 1997 and Present,” FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 444-446 [sealed exhibit].; 7/8/2010 letter
from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at181.
1458
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510 [sealed exhibit].
237
than one hundred oil storage tank fields with a global storage capacity of 58 million barrels;
1459
“18 natural gas storage facilities in US and Europe with total lease payments as high as
$2[billion]”;
1460
and six power plants, three of which were in the United States.
1461
The 2012
Summary Report also noted that Morgan Stanley had “over 100 ships under time charters or
voyages for movement of oil product, and was ranked 9
th
globally in shipping oil distillates in
2009.”
1462
According to the report, Morgan Stanley also planned to increase its capacity to ship
liquefied natural gas.
1463
The 2012 Summary Report also identified multiple concerns with Morgan Stanley’s
physical commodities operations. One Federal Reserve concern was that Morgan Stanley, like
its peers, had insufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic
event. The report noted at one point that, while Morgan Stanley had calculated a potential oil
spill risk of $360 million, through “aggressive assumptions” and “diversification benefits,” it had
reduced that total by nearly 70% to $54 million, allocating risk capital for only that much smaller
amount.
1464
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report expressed concern that Morgan Stanley had
determined that the “operational and event risks of owning power facilities” was capped at the
dollar value of those facilities in the event of their total loss, with some insurance to cover “the
death and disability of workers” and some facility replacement costs, but leaving all other
expenses, including a “failure to deliver electricity under contract,” to be paid by the holding
company.
1465
At another point, the 2012 Summary Report compared the level of Morgan
Stanley’s capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with “extreme loss
scenarios,” and found that, like its peers, “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by $1
billion to $15 billion.
1466
If Morgan Stanley were to incur losses from its physical commodity
activities while maintaining insufficient capital and insurance protections, the Federal Reserve,
and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, could be asked to rescue the firm.
In 2013, when the Subcommittee asked Morgan Stanley about its physical commodity
activities, the financial holding company provided information that, consistent with the 2012
Summary Report, depicted far-reaching commodity operations. Morgan Stanley reported trading
in the physical commodities of aluminum, copper, gold, lead, palladium, platinum, silver,
rhodium, zinc, coal, crude oil, heating oil, ethanol, fuel oil, gasoline, jet kerosene, naphtha, and
natural gas.
1467
Morgan Stanley also reported maintaining inventories of many physical
commodities. In 2012, the last complete year of data provided to the Subcommittee, those
1459
Id. at 485.
1460
Id.
1461
Id.
1462
Id. at 486.
1463
Id.
1464
Id. at 493 - 494.
1465
Id. at 494.
1466
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
1467
3/4/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-03-000001 - 003, at
003.
238
inventories included 5,300 metric tons of aluminum, 3,600 metric tons of copper, 1.7 million
barrels of crude oil, 5.8 million barrels of heating oil, and 6.2 million barrels of gasoline.
1468
“Optimizing” its Commodity Activities. In September 2014, Morgan Stanley told the
Subcommittee that, while it did not intend to exit the physical commodities business entirely, it
was exiting its “global physical oil merchanting business,” meaning its worldwide business of
buying, selling, storing, and transporting oil for clients, including through its U.S. subsidiary,
TransMontaigne.
1469
Morgan Stanley explained:
“Morgan Stanley has decided to exit certain of its physical commodities business lines,
including its global physical oil merchanting business and its investment in
TransMontaigne, Inc.
Morgan Stanley plans to realign its commodities business to be more client focused. It
plans to continue developing its global commodities business, which is focused on
providing risk management and financing services to its clients across the commodities
space, including risk intermediation, liquidity provision, lending and investor business, as
well as providing supply solutions to its clients.”
1470
On J uly 1, 2014, Morgan Stanley completed the sale of TransMontaigne to NGL Energy
Partners LP for $200 million cash plus an additional $347 million for inventory transferred at
closing.
1471
This sale transferred to NGL Energy a significant portion of Morgan Stanley’s
physical commodity activities, including extensive oil and gas storage and pipeline capacity in
the United States. On December 20, 2013, Morgan Stanley also entered into an agreement with
a subsidiary of Rosneft Oil Company to sell the rest of its global oil merchanting business.
1472
Rosneft is a Russian state-owned corporation that is the country’s largest petroleum company
and third largest gas producer.
1473
Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Rosneft another large
segment of its physical commodity activities, including oil storage facility leases and a large
inventory of oil products. Morgan Stanley has since indicated publicly that the planned sale may
not close due to recent sanctions imposed by the United States on Rosneft in connection with
1468
Id.
1469
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel (9/11/2014); 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley
legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at 003.
1470
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
003.
1471
7/2/2014 NGL Energy press release, “NGL Energy Partners LP Announces Completion of Acquisition of
TransMontaigne GP and Related Assets,”http://www.nglenergypartners.com/investor-relations/news/. See also
“Morgan Stanley to sell oil business TransMontaigne to NGL Energy,” The Wall Street J ournal, J ustin Baer,
(6/9/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanley-sells-stake-in-transmontaigne-to-ngl-1402316959.
1472
6/30/2014 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report , filed with the SEC on 8/5/2014, at 113,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514295874/d763478d10q.htm; 12/20/2013 Morgan
Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to sell global oil merchanting business to Rosneft,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
1473
See 7/16/2014 Treasury press release, “Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial
Services and Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's
Sovereignty,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx.
239
Russia’s incursions into Ukraine.
1474
If the sale does not proceed, Morgan Stanley has indicated
that it will work to locate another buyer for the rest of its oil merchanting business.
1475
In contrast to its efforts to exit its oil merchanting business, in recent years, Morgan
Stanley has taken actions to continue and even expand its physical natural gas holdings. In 2012,
the Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners investment fund acquired a 100% ownership of
Southern Star, a large natural gas pipeline company in the Midwest, as explained below.
1476
In
2013, Morgan Stanley initiated an effort to build, own, and operate compressed natural gas
facilities in Texas and Georgia, as described below.
1477
In August 2014, Morgan Stanley
purchased a large number of natural gas trading book assets from Deutsche Bank, consisting
primarily of financial rather than physical assets, also described below.
1478
In October 2014, however, Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it was
reconsidering its natural gas activities and may sell both Southern Star and its compressed
natural gas project.
1479
In November 2014, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Executive Officer J ames
Gorman gave a public interview in which he indicated that Morgan Stanley was in the process of
“optimizing” its commodities business to eliminate ownership and operation of physical assets:
“We’ve been pretty clear about our commodities businesses. It essentially is two
businesses. We have physical businesses, where we actually own and operate physical
assets. We store fuel, we own pipelines, we ship oil …. And on the other side is the
trading business, where we facilitate trading for people in need to hedge their exposure to
wheat, or pork bellies, or silver, or gold, or whatever commodity. And what I’ve said by
optimizing is, we’re not going to be in the physical side. …. All we’re doing by
optimizing is removing the ownership and operation of [the] physical commodity
plant. What other firms do is their business, that’s what Morgan Stanley is going to
do.”
1480
Morgan Stanley explained to the Subcommittee that these plans apply only to its
commodities division, but not to other areas of the bank, and that the commodities division
would be focusing on “its core strength – providing intermediation, risk management, and supply
1474
See id.; 9/12/2014 Treasury press release, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions within the Russian
Financial Services, Energy and Defense or Related Materiel Sectors,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx; “Morgan Stanley says ‘no assurance’ Rosneft deal will close,” Reuters (10/10/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/morgan-stanley-rosneft-idUSL2N0S524L20141010 .
1475
11/18/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-25-000001 – 008, at
002.
1476
Undated “OECD Assets within Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Portfolios” prepared by Morgan Stanley, Morgan
Stanley website,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/; 8/29/2014 presentation “Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 – 037;
Subcommittee interview of Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1477
8/29/2014 presentation “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 006.
1478
See 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 -
009.
1479
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley legal counsel (10/22/2014).
1480
11/13/2014 interview of J ames Gorman, Bloomberg,http://www.bloomberg.com/video/morgan-stanley-ceo-
gorman-on-industry-strategy-OPPkV0QFQqC4J AbdcvImYQ.html.
240
services – rather than owning transportation, storage, or other infrastructure assets that are used
in connection with physical commodities.”
1481
Morgan Stanley also wrote:
“Morgan Stanley expects to continue to purchase, sell, and make and take delivery of
physical commodities in connection with its core business of providing intermediation
and risk management to its clients. … Effective hedging strategies include transacting in
physical commodities. Morgan Stanley Commodities division will use fully-vetted third
party owners and operators of any facilities used to transport, store, produce, generate, or
modify those commodities.”
1482
These explanations indicate that Morgan Stanley is reducing its physical commodities activities,
but not exiting the area.
1481
11/18/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-25-000001 – 008, at
004.
1482
Id. at 004 – 005.
241
B. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas
Morgan Stanley has long been an active trader of natural gas. Over the last five years, it
has also used shell companies and merchant banking investments controlled by Morgan Stanley
personnel to invest in an array of physical natural gas businesses. Over the last year, Morgan
Stanley set up three shell companies under the name of Wentworth to build and operate a $355
million compressed natural gas facility in Texas. In one of the first operations of its kind, the
facility is designed to produce containerized gas on a large-scale, primarily for export to Central
America and the Caribbean. In addition, Morgan Stanley has engaged in commodity-related
merchant banking activities through two investment funds it controls, Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners and Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity. Those merchant banking
activities include a large natural gas pipeline company in the Midwest, Southern Star, as well as
natural gas exploration, production, and processing facilities around the country. Because
Morgan Stanley relied on its merchant banking and grandfather authorities, Morgan Stanley did
not notify or obtain prior permission from the Federal Reserve to engage in those physical
natural gas activities.
Morgan Stanley’s physical natural gas activities raise multiple concerns, including using
shell companies to conduct physical commodity activities, unfair competition in commercial
enterprises, insufficient capital and insurance to protect against operational and catastrophic
event risks, conflicts of interest arising from obtaining non-public information about natural gas
supplies and transport, while trading natural gas in the financial markets, and inadequate
safeguards on high risk natural gas activities.
(1) Background on Natural Gas
Natural gas is an odorless, gaseous mixture of hydrocarbons dominated by methane.
1482
It is a primary source of energy in the United States, representing nearly one quarter of U.S.
energy consumption.
1483
In the United States, natural gas consumption is second only to oil,
followed by coal, nuclear, and other energy sources.
1484
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
estimates that one-third of U.S. natural gas consumption goes to “residential and commercial
uses, such as heating and cooking; one-third to industrial uses; and one-third to electric power
production.”
1485
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), natural gas
consumption has increased in the United States over the past five years, particularly in the
1482
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
1483
“Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,” hearing before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S Hrg. 110-235 (6/25/2007 and 7/9/2007), at 210 (hereinafter “2007 Subcommittee Hearing”). See
also undated “Uses,” NaturalGas.org,http://naturalgas.org/overview/uses/.
1484
See 7/3/2013 EIA report “Energy sources have changed throughout the history of the United States,”http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11951. In 2013, the United States consumed approximately 26
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. See “Frequently Asked Questions,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=50&t=8.
1485
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
242
industrial sector, due to low prices.
1486
Inexpensive natural gas has been directly linked, for
example, to increased manufacturing and related jobs.
1487
U.S. natural gas exports have also
been growing.
1488
Natural Gas Production. The United States has become a leading producer of natural
gas. According to the American Gas Association:
“Beginning in 2006, domestic natural gas production began to grow and has done so
every year since, primarily due to the development of domestic, onshore, unconventional
resources – specifically shale gas – to the point where the U.S. is now the world’s largest
gas producer.”
1489
EIA has indicated that it anticipates natural gas production will grow by 5% in 2014, and another
2% in 2015, driven by industrial demand.
1490
According to DOE, in recent years, 80% to 90%
of the natural gas used in the United States was produced domestically.
1491
Natural Gas Infrastructure. To produce usable energy from natural gas, an extensive
infrastructure is required. It includes pipelines, initial treatment plants, refineries, and storage
facilities. More than 2.4 million miles of underground pipelines transport natural gas from gas
fields and wellheads to refineries, utilities, residences, and industrial sites, “provid[ing] service to
more than 177 million Americans.”
1492
Initial treatment plants process raw natural gas to ready
it for transport to larger refineries.
1493
Refineries remove additional impurities and fluids to
produce “pipeline quality” dry natural gas.
1494
Storage facilities capture and pressurize gas for
later use. As the American Gas Association has explained:
“Natural gas utilities purchase natural gas during warm-weather months, when it
traditionally costs less, and store it for later use on cold days. Storage can account for half
1486
See 9/2014 “Short-term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” section on “Natural Gas,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1487
See, e.g., “J ob growth expected from cheap natural gas,” USA Today, Paul Davidson (3/27/2012),http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-03-27/natural-gas-manufacturing-
boom/53812740/1 (One estimate was that inexpensive natural gas “could help U.S. manufacturers save $11.6 billion
a year and create more than 500,000 jobs by 2025.”).
1488
See 9/2014 “Short-term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” section on “Natural Gas,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1489
2014 “Natural Gas Supply and Prices,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Supply and Prices.pdf.
1490
“Short-term energy and winter fuels outlook,” (10/07/2014), EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1491
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
1492
2014 “Get the Facts: Pipeline Safety,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Pipeline Safety.pdf.
1493
See, e.g., 1/2006 “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production
and Its Transportation to Market,” prepared by EIA Office of Oil and Gas, at 3,http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf.
1494
Id.
243
of some utilities’ natural gas supplies on winter’s coldest days, contributing to reliable
service.”
1495
Currently, natural gas in storage continues to outpace historical norms.
1496
Exporters of natural
gas use Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) or Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facilities to prepare the
gas for shipment.
Natural Gas Markets. Natural gas prices are determined through two types of markets,
physical and financial. As explained in an earlier Subcommittee report examining the natural
gas market:
“Natural gas prices are determined through the interaction of the two major types of
markets for natural gas: the cash (or ‘physical’) markets, which involve the purchase and
sale of physical quantities of natural gas; and the financial markets, which involve the
purchase and sale of financial instruments whose prices are linked to the price of natural
gas in the physical market.”
1497
In the cash markets, natural gas prices are generally negotiated by the buyers and sellers.
1498
Key market participants are natural gas producers, distributors, utilities, and industrial users.
In the financial markets, natural gas can be traded through a variety of financial
instruments, including futures, swaps, options, and forwards. One key financial instrument,
listed by the CME Group Inc., is a standardized natural gas futures contract for 10,000 mmBtu
(millions of British thermal units) of natural gas.
1499
Known as the Henry Hub natural gas
futures contract, it is the “third-largest physical commodity futures contract in the world by
volume,” and is widely used as a benchmark price for physical natural gas transactions in the
United States.
1500
The contract can be settled financially or through the physical delivery of
natural gas, although physical settlement is atypical.
1501
The contract is traded on the CME
Globex and CME Clearport trading platforms, and by open outcry on the NYMEX floor.
1502
The
natural gas futures market has numerous participants, and Henry Hub futures contracts typically
have substantial open interest on a daily basis. Natural gas can also be traded through a variety
of financially-settled, over-the-counter swaps and options on the Intercontinental Exchange
1495
2014 “Natural Gas Supply and Prices,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Supply and Prices.pdf.
1496
9/2014 “Short-term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” section on “Natural Gas,” EIA website,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
1497
2007 Subcommittee Hearing at 224.
1498
Id.
1499
See “Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-
gas_contract_specifications.html?gclid=COeq9vj3tb0CFYhaMgodJ GwAfw.
1500
“Henry Hub Natural Gas Volume,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-
gas/natural-gas_quotes_volume_voi.html?gclid=CN3syN245bwCFRPxOgodghMAzg. It is known as the Henry
Hub futures contract, because the contract price is based on delivery of the natural gas at the Henry Hub in
Louisiana, where a number of natural gas pipelines converge.
1501
Id. See also 2007 Subcommittee Hearing, at 224.
1502
See “Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-
gas_contract_specifications.html?gclid=COeq9vj3tb0CFYhaMgodJ GwAfw.
244
(ICE).
1503
The natural gas financial market as a whole is a large, complex, and active trading
market.
Natural Gas Prices. Natural gas prices have traditionally been volatile.
1504
Seasonal
demand for natural gas, which typically peaks during winter months and drops during summer
months, contributes to the price volatility.
1505
In the physical markets, over time, natural gas
spot market prices have ranged from $3 to $13/mmBtu, with current prices on the low end
around $4.
1506
Natural gas is currently one of the least expensive sources of energy in the United
States.
1507
*Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
1508
Natural Gas Incidents. Natural gas is highly flammable, and leaks can lead to
explosions. Between 1994 and 2013, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) identified 944 serious pipeline
incidents.
1509
PHMSA defines a “serious incident” as one including a fatality or injury requiring
hospitalization.
1510
Those 944 incidents included 362 fatalities and 1,397 injuries.
1511
The data
1503
See “Natural Gas,” ICE website,https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_NatGas_Brochure.pdf.
1504
See id.
1505
Id.
1506
Id.
1507
“Levelized cost and levelized avoided cost of new generation resources in the annual energy outlook 2014,” EIA
Energy Outlook 2014, (05/07/2014),http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm.
1508
“Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (10/1/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm.
1509
See undated “Pipeline serious incident 20 year trend,” PHMSA website,https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages.
1510
See undated “Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, PHMSA website,http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/datastatistics/pipelineincidenttrends.
1511
See undated “Pipeline serious incident 20 year trend,” PHMSA website,https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages.
245
includes incidents involving natural gas distribution, gathering, and transmission, as well as
liquefied natural gas and other hazardous liquids.
1512
Four years ago, the Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) experienced a “deadly”
natural gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno, California.
1513
On September 9, 2010, a natural gas
pipeline operated by PG&E ruptured, releasing large quantities of natural gas which ignited and
started fires in the area surrounding the pipeline.
1514
As a result, eight people died, 51 people
required hospitalization, and 38 homes were destroyed.
1515
According to PHMSA, the estimated
property damage from the explosion was over $220 million.
1516
The California Public Utilities
Commission continues to review the incident and is reportedly considering levying a $1.4 billion
penalty against PG&E, which would be “the biggest safety fine in the state’s history.”
1517
Natural gas storage facilities have also experienced explosions. Perhaps the worst was in
1944 in Cleveland when, as one newspaper described it, “a natural gas tank filled with over
90,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas exploded, destroying everything within a mile-radius in a
wall of fire. The blaze continued uncontrolled for over nine hours.”
1518
Regulatory Framework. Natural gas facilities, including natural gas wellheads, gas
fields, pipelines, gathering processes, initial treatment facilities, refineries, liquefied natural gas
facilities, and compressed natural gas facilities, are heavily regulated. The Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act, for example, authorizes the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to set
minimum safety requirements both for the transportation of natural gas by pipeline and for
natural gas pipeline facilities.
1519
In response, DOT, through its Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, has promulgated an extensive set of safety regulations for pipe
design, equipment maintenance, fire protection, and personnel qualifications, among other
matters.
1520
Compliance with those safety regulations is overseen and enforced primarily by the
states.
1521
To build and operate a natural gas facility also requires permits from the Department
of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, among others.
1522
State agencies must also
1512
See undated “Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, PHMSA website,http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/datastatistics/pipelineincidenttrends.
1513
Undated “Pacific Gas & Electric pipeline rupture in San Bruno, CA,” PHMSA website,http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/facts-and-stats/recent-incidents/sanbruno-ca/. See also “California
pipeline disaster brings more scandal for PG&E,” Bloomberg, Mark Chediak, (9/16/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...e-disaster-brings-more-scandal-for-pg-e.html.
1514
Undated “Pacific Gas & Electric pipeline rupture in San Bruno, CA,” PHMSA website,http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/facts-and-stats/recent-incidents/sanbruno-ca/.
1515
Id.
1516
Id.
1517
See “California pipeline disaster brings more scandal for PG&E,” Bloomberg, Mark Chediak, (9/16/2014),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...e-disaster-brings-more-scandal-for-pg-e.html.
Several plaintiffs have filed a civil suit against PG&E, because of the San Bruno pipeline explosion. See Bou-
Salman v. PG&E Corp., Civ. No. 524283 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013).
1518
“Cleveland East Ohio Gas Explosion,”http://counterspill.org/disaster/cleveland-east-ohio-gas-explosion.
1519
49 U.S.C. § 60102(a)(2).
1520
See 49 C.F.R. § 192.1-192.1015, 193.2001-193.2917.
1521
See, e.g., 2014 “Get the Facts: Pipeline Safety,” American Gas Association website,http://www.aga.org/Newsroom/factsheets/Documents/Pipeline Safety.pdf.
1522
See 9/3/1953 Executive Order 10485, National Archives,http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/10485.html (granting the Department of Energy power to accept permit
246
be consulted. Under the Natural Gas Act, any entity seeking to import or export natural gas must
first obtain authorization from the U.S. Department of Energy.
1523
In addition, under the Natural
Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversees the construction and operation of
natural gas projects, including certain pipelines and storage facilities, as well as their rates and
charges.
1524
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Natural Gas
Morgan Stanley has been trading financial instruments linked to natural gas since 1989,
and became involved with conducting physical natural gas activities in the 1990s. In 2010,
through a Morgan Stanley investment fund, it purchased an ownership interest in a natural gas
pipeline company, Southern Star, and in 2012, took full ownership of that company. In 2013,
Morgan Stanley intensified it physical natural gas activities by launching a plan to build and
operate a large-scale compressed natural gas facility in Texas.
(a) Trading Natural Gas
In 2013, Morgan Stanley described itself as “a significant participant in the energy
markets, with substantial activity (both physical and financial)” in natural gas, among other
commodities.
1525
Morgan Stanley has been trading in natural gas since 1989.
1526
Its activities in
the natural gas sector have included “trading and investing in physically-settled forward
contracts, options, futures, options on futures and similar contracts, both over-the-counter and
exchange-listed on natural gas.”
1527
Morgan Stanley has bought and sold physical natural gas
1528
as well as cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
1529
on spot markets. In addition, it has “helped
domestic natural gas producers price hedge” domestic shale gas.
1530
Natural gas trading at Morgan Stanley is conducted within the Commodities group’s
“North America Power/Gas Management Organization,” which, in 2013, had 72 full-time
employees.
1531
The Commodities group tracks revenues by desk rather than individual
applications for natural gas facilities); see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L 91-190, codified
at 42 U.S.C. §4321 (requiring a permit for any large environmental project that receives federal funding).
1523
15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
1524
See 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, at MS-PSI-00000016; “Natural Gas,” FERC website,http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas.asp; Natural Gas
Act, Sections 3 and 7.
1525
2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities: Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, PSI-
MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, 005.
1526
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 177.
1527
Id.
1528
See, e.g., “Deal or No Deal, Morgan Stanley Commodity Trade Shrinks,” WHTC, Matthew Robinson and Scott
Disavino (6/7/2012),http://whtc.com/news/articles/2012/jun/07/deal-or-no-deal-morgan-stanley-commodity-trade-
shrinks/.
1529
See, e.g., id.; “Morgan Stanley LNG traders leave for Glencore – sources,” Reuters (6/6/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/06/morgan-lng-idUSL5N0EI0QD20130606.
1530
2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities: Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, PSI-
MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, at 010.
1531
Id. at 021. This organization is also referred by other, similar names. See, e.g., 1/9/2013 “Morgan Stanley
Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-624436 - 508, at 450 (referring to a
“North American Electricity/Natural Gas” desk).
247
commodity and does not break out financial activities from physical activities.
1532
The following
table shows the net revenues from the desk that handles both electricity and natural gas financial
and physical activities, indicating that, while substantial, those revenues have declined by two-
thirds from 2008 to 2012:
Morgan Stanley Natural Gas and Electricity Net Revenues
2008-2012
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
North American
Power & Gas
$382 million $239 million $384 million $280 million $335 million
Asian Pacific-
European
Power & Gas
$539 million $293 million $179 million $112 million -$21 million
Total $921 million $532 million $563 million $392 million $314 million
Source: 2/11/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-02-000002.
On August 15, 2014, Morgan Stanley expanded its natural gas activities by purchasing a
portfolio of North American natural gas assets from Deutsche Bank.
1533
According to Morgan
Stanley, the portfolio consisted of “listed commodity futures contracts and options on
commodity futures contracts; cash-settled over-the-counter swap and swap option agreements;
and physical forward agreements.”
1534
It stated that no physical commodity infrastructure assets
were part of the transaction.
1535
In addition, Morgan Stanley noted that, of the “13,200 discrete
transactions … only 24 were physically-settled forward contracts”; the rest were financially-
settled.
1536
Morgan Stanley noted that the delivery dates for those transactions ranged from 2014
to 2017.
1537
(b) Planning to Construct a Compressed Natural Gas Facility
In 2013, in a major expansion of its physical natural gas activities, Morgan Stanley
Commodities launched an effort to construct a $355 million compressed natural gas (CNG)
facility in Texas, using shell corporations run by Morgan Stanley personnel.
1538
The objective
was to construct the facility, initiate large-scale compressed natural gas operations, and sell the
containerized gas, primarily by exporting it to countries in Central America and the Caribbean.
1532
2/11/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-02-000001 - 004, at
002.
1533
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
002.
1534
Id.
1535
Id. Deutsche Bank originally entered into these transactions with “five middle-market Canadian gas marketers
and Natural Gas Exchange, Inc., as counterparties.”
1536
Id. Morgan Stanley purchased 22 fixed price natural gas forward agreements and 2 basis transactions. Morgan
Stanley also entered into a swap agreement with the three Deutsche Bank entities. Under the terms of that
agreement Morgan Stanley “agreed to take both the future commodity price and credit risk of the [Deutsche Bank]
contracts being sold.”
1537
Id.
1538
Id. at 008.
248
Compressed natural gas (CNG) is natural gas stored at high pressure in containers of
various sizes.
1539
CNG has most often been used to power vehicles.
1540
CNG has also been
viewed as a way to export natural gas, providing an alternative to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG),
although no large-scale CNG exporting operations currently exist in the United States.
1541
In
November 2013, Emera CNG, LLC, a Canadian energy company, filed the first application
submitted to DOE to export CNG on a large scale; portions of that application are still under
DOE consideration.
1542
Also in 2013, the United States approved construction of a $10 billion
LNG facility in Quintana Island, Texas, known as the “Freeport LNG Project,” to export natural
gas in liquefied form.
1543
Morgan Stanley launched its CNG project around the same time,
seeking to establish a CNG facility in the same general vicinity as the Freeport LNG Project.
Morgan Stanley claimed that it could engage in this new activity under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley grandfather clause, even though it had never before built or run a CNG facility.
Morgan Stanley reasoned that it could act under the grandfather clause, because it had long dealt
with natural gas that is pressurized when it moves through natural gas pipelines, including
pipelines operated by its TransMontaigne subsidiary, even though a plant designed to produce
massive amounts of natural gas for export would require more intensive pressure on a much
larger scale.
1544
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it also had experience building
complex energy facilities, pointing, for example, to its 2000 construction of a 360 megawatt
electrical plant in Nevada known as the Naniwa power plant.
1545
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that when it inquired about the project,
Morgan Stanley explained that it had decided to construct the CNG facility, because it saw a
“market opportunity.”
1546
According to the Wentworth application, Morgan Stanley’s primary
target market is Central American and Caribbean countries that have no existing natural gas
pipelines, and where Morgan Stanley believes CNG can be delivered at a relatively low price.
1547
In a letter to the Subcommittee, Morgan Stanley wrote that “the CNG business is being
developed in order to deliver a cheap and cleaner source of fuel to power generators and other
commercial end users who need access to reliable natural gas supplies … [and to] assure long
1539
See undated “Natural Gas Fuel Basics,” DOE website,http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_basics.html.
1540
Id.
1541
Subcommittee briefing by the U.S. Department of Energy (10/14/2014).
1542
Id.; 11/20/2013 “Application of Emera CNG LLC for Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export
Compressed Natural Gas,” Docket No. 13-157-CNG,” filed by Emera CNG, LLC,http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/2013_applications/13_157_cng.pdf. See also
“Two new natural gas export plans set up challenge to controversial policy,” Platts, Brian Scheid (12/27/2013),http://blogs.platts.com/2013/12/27/lng-2projects/.
1543
“Energy Department authorizes additional volume at proposed Freeport LNG facility to export liquefied natural
gas,” (11/15/2013),http://energy.gov/articles/energy-department-authorizes-additional-volume-proposed-freeport-
lng-facility-export. See also, e.g., “U.S. Approves Expanded Gas Exports,” Wall Street J ournal, Keith J ohnson and
Ben Lefebvre (5/18/2013),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324767004578489130300876450.
1544
See undated document, “Draft Talking Points Regarding Commodities Plans to Sell and Export Compressed
Natural Gas,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, PSI-MorganStanley-000001 – 043, at 04 2- 043.
1545
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (11/18/2014).
1546
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve, (9/19/2014).
1547
Id.
249
term delivery of this fuel source.”
1548
Morgan Stanley indicated that the new facility would
deliver CNG to both domestic and foreign clients.
1549
Forming Shell Corporations. To conduct work on the CNG project, on October 21,
2013, Morgan Stanley, through its key commodities subsidiary, Morgan Stanley Capital Group,
formed two wholly-owned shell companies in Delaware, Wentworth Compression LLC and
Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC.
1550
Seven months later, on April 1, 2014, Morgan Stanley
incorporated a third wholly-owned shell company in Delaware, Wentworth Holdings LLC, and
transferred to it the stock of the two earlier companies, so that they became its wholly-owned
subsidiaries. The current Wentworth ownership structure is as follows:
Wentworth Ownership Structure
Source: 9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000004.
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that none of the three Wentworth companies has
any employees of its own “at present.”
1551
Instead, all three companies “rely upon the expertise
1548
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001, at 008.
1549
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve, (9/19/2014).
1550
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 at 003.
See also the incorporation papers for the three Wentworth entities, MS-COM-0001 - 006.
1551
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001, at 005.
250
and day-to-day involvement of employees of Morgan Stanley” to carry out their activities.
1552
According to Morgan Stanley, the Wentworth companies utilize “the breadth of the firm,
including support in legal, tax, risk management and many other areas.”
1553
In addition to relying on Morgan Stanley employees for day-to-day operations, the three
Wentworth companies rely on Morgan Stanley Commodities executives for their leadership.
1554
All three Wentworth companies list the same Board members, officers, and managers. The
President and Manager of each company is Simon Greenshields, Global Co-Head of Morgan
Stanley Commodities. The companies also have the same three Vice-Presidents and Managers:
Nancy King, Global Head of Oil Liquids Flow; Peter Sherk, Head of North American Power and
Gas; and Deborah Hart, Chief Operating Officer of North American Power and Gas.
1555
Each of
these individuals is formally employed by Morgan Stanley Capital Group (MSCG) and works for
the Morgan Stanley Commodities group.
1556
In a letter to the Subcommittee, Morgan Stanley
stated that “strategic management and operational decision-making at the Wentworth entities …
is made by MSCG [Morgan Stanley Capital Group] employees.”
1557
In addition to relying on Morgan Stanley for its leadership and employees, the three
Wentworth companies rely on it for office space. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that
none of the Wentworth companies has its own office. Instead, the Wentworth companies have
designated as their place of business the same building used by Morgan Stanley Commodities in
Purchase, New York.
1558
As Morgan Stanley put it: “the principal administrative business for
each of the Wentworth entities is conducted within the Commodities group at Morgan Stanley’s
offices located in Purchase, NY.”
1559
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it formed the Wentworth entities for the sole
purpose of acting as the owner and operator of the CNG facility and to market the containerized
gas. When asked for the origin of the name, Morgan Stanley explained that “in the early phases
of the project,” it had considered locating the CNG facility in the City of Port Wentworth, near
the Port of Savannah in Georgia, but later decided to develop the Texas site first.
1560
Constructing the CNG Facility. Morgan Stanley has expended substantial resources on
the CNG project to date. Among other steps, it has entered into an Engineering, Procurement,
and Construction Agreement with H.P. Industries to design and build the CNG facility.
1561
H.P.
Industries, in turn, has contracted with a third party for the facility design.
1562
Morgan Stanley
1552
Id. at 008.
1553
Id.
1554
Id. at 005.
1555
Id.
1556
Id.
1557
Id. at 006.
1558
See, e.g., In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Application of Wentworth Gas
Marketing LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,” (5/13/2014), at 3,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf (listing the Purchase, New York address as the
“principal place of business” of Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC and Wentworth Compression LLC).
1559
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001-009.
1560
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
004.
1561
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000006.
1562
Id.
251
has selected a possible site for the facility, 50 acres known as Parcel 19, which is owned by the
Port of Freeport in Texas.
1563
H.P. Industries has entered into an access agreement to inspect the
site,
1564
and has hired a professional consulting firm to provide a required site assessment.
1565
H.P. Industries has also commenced a “Phase I environmental review.”
1566
H.P. Industries has
also placed an order for the facility compressors, since they require lead time to procure.
1567
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee it is currently negotiating a lease with Port
Freeport and working to obtain electrical and natural gas pipeline connections for the site.
1568
Morgan Stanley indicated that it had also evaluated potential insurance, but did not plan to obtain
actual insurance until the facility begins construction.
1569
In May 2014, Morgan Stanley filed an application with the Department of Energy’s
Office of Fossil Energy seeking “long-term authorization” to export containerized gas.
1570
The
application was filed in the name of Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, and sought authority to
export 60 billion cubic feet of CNG annually for a 20-year period.
1571
It requested authorization
to “export CNG using intermodal transportation containers via truck and ocean-going carrier” to
any country with which the United States as a Free Trade Agreement.
1572
The application
explained that Wentworth planned to move CNG from Parcel 19 “via truck approximately one
mile to the Port of Freeport,” where it would then be “shipped on vessels charted by Wentworth
Gas to various destinations.”
1573
The application also indicated that, “in the near term,” it
planned to sell CNG to countries in Central America and the Caribbean.
1574
The Department of
Energy granted Wentworth authorization to export CNG in October 2014.
1575
Morgan Stanley estimated the total construction cost for the CNG facility at up to $55
million.
1576
It indicated that fabrication of the natural gas shipping containers would require an
1563
See In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Application of Wentworth Gas
Marketing LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,” (5/13/2014), at 4,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf .
1564
See 5/12/2014 “Access Agreement,” between H.P. Industries LLC and Port Freeport, attached as Appendix C to
“Application of Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,”
(5/13/2014), filed with the U.S. Department of Energy in In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-
63-CNG,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf.
1565
Id.
1566
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000006.
1567
Id.
1568
Id.
1569
Id. at 007.
1570
In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Application of Wentworth Gas Marketing
LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas,” (5/13/2014),http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/06/f16/14_63_cng_tracy.pdf.
1571
Id. at 1.
1572
Id.
1573
Id. at 4.
1574
Id. at 2.
1575
See In re Wentworth Gas Marketing LLC, FE Docket No. 14-63-CNG, “Order Granting Long-term
Authorization to Export Compressed Natural Gas by Vessel From a Proposed CNG Compression and Loading
Facility at the Port of Freeport, Texas, to Free Trade Agreement Nations,” (10/7/2014),http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/ord3515.pdf.
1576
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 at 008.
252
“initial investment of up to $300 million.”
1577
Morgan Stanley projected that a second facility in
Georgia would have an “equivalent” cost of $55 million.
1578
Shipping containers for that second
facility would be an additional expense.
Morgan Stanley’s plans to build CNG facilities were not widely known until its DOE
application for export authority was made public and became the subject of a news report.
1579
Some media reports described the effort to set up a large-scale CNG export operation as
unusual.
1580
Others noted that the Morgan Stanley proposal to export 60 billion cubic feet per
year far exceeded the earlier Emera proposal to export 9 billion cubic feet.
1581
Some negative
reactions to the proposal also suggested it may be controversial, with opposition focused
primarily on exporting large amounts of low-cost domestic natural gas to other countries.
1582
Informing the Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve personnel in Washington, D.C. told
the Subcommittee that they first became aware of the Morgan Stanley CNG project when it was
disclosed in the August 2014 media report, nearly a year after Morgan Stanley had begun work
on it.
1583
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it provided “an initial, oral notice” of the
project to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in November 2013, and provided
detailed information in May 2014, in response to a FRBNY request for information about its
grandfather activities.
1584
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that its personnel received
the information in May 2014, but did not focus on the Wentworth project prior to the news
report.
1585
The Federal Reserve also told the Subcommittee that it was still analyzing the CNG
project to determine whether it was an appropriate use of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
grandfathering authority.
1586
When the Subcommittee spoke with the Federal Reserve about the project, the Federal
Reserve representatives indicated they had been under the impression that Morgan Stanley had
1577
Id.
1578
Id. at 007.
1579
See “Morgan Stanley plans natural gas export plant in new commodities foray,” Reuters, Anna Louie Sussman
(8/29/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/29/us-morganstanley-naturalgas-idUSKBN0GT0B320140829.
1580
See, e.g., “Morgan Stanley Forays Into Natural Gas Commodities,” Stocks.org, J ennifer Zhang (8/29/14),http://stocks.org/energy-solar/morgan-stanley-nysems-forays-into-natural-gas-commodities/25180/ (“There has not
been another project like this in the industry.”); “Morgan Stanley subsidiary plans $30 million – $50 million Texas
maritime CNG export facility,” NGV Today (9/3/2014),http://ngvtoday.org/2014/09/03/morg...million-50-million-texas-maritime-cng-export-
facility/ (indicating an energy expert describing it as “one of the first such CNG export projects he was aware of”).
1581
“Morgan Stanley Forays Into Natural Gas Commodities,” Stocks.org, J ennifer Zhang (8/29/14),http://stocks.org/energy-solar/morgan-stanley-nysems-forays-into-natural-gas-commodities/25180/. See also
“Morgan Stanley subsidiary plans $30 million – $50 million Texas maritime CNG export facility,” NGV Today
(9/3/2014),http://ngvtoday.org/2014/09/03/morg...million-50-million-texas-maritime-cng-export-
facility/.
1582
See, e.g., discussion about the Morgan Stanley CNG proposal on CNGchat.com,http://www.cngchat.com/forum/showthread.php?12170-Morgan-Stanley-Wentworth-Gas-Marketing-plan-30-to-
50M-EXPORT-plant-at-Freeport-TX.
1583
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (9/19/2014).
1584
11/18/2014 Morgan Stanley letter to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-25-000001 – 008, at 003; 5/19/2014
letter from Morgan Stanley to FRBNY, PSI-MorganStanley-26-000005 – 044.
1585
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (9/19/2014).
1586
Id.
253
acquired the Wentworth companies as unrelated, pre-existing businesses; the Federal Reserve
indicated that it had not been aware, until informed by the Subcommittee, that the Wentworth
companies were shell corporations formed and run by Morgan Stanley employees.
1587
When
asked, the Federal Reserve representatives indicated that they were unaware of any other
instance in which a financial holding company had formed shell corporations and then used them
to build an industrial facility to handle physical commodity activities.
1588
(c) Investing in a Natural Gas Pipeline Company
Over the past decade, in addition to trading natural gas financial instruments and
launching the CNG construction project, Morgan Stanley has used its merchant banking
authority to invest in an array of physical natural gas businesses, including a large natural gas
pipeline company in the Midwest known as Southern Star. Morgan Stanley’s investment in
Southern Star is through an investment fund called Morgan Stanley Infrastructures Partners LP,
which is located within Morgan Stanley’s Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investing group and
is administered, advised, and overseen by Morgan Stanley personnel.
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partnership. Although Morgan Stanley portrays
Southern Star as owned by an investment fund in which Morgan Stanley holds only a minority
interest, that investment fund, Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners LP (MSIP), is intimately
connected to Morgan Stanley. MSIP was established by Morgan Stanley in 2007, and is
managed by Morgan Stanley employees operating out of Morgan Stanley offices.
1589
Morgan
Stanley was the largest investor in MSIP’s initial infrastructure fund, supplying $430 million.
MSIP owns 100% of Southern Star.
Although MSIP is controlled by Morgan Stanley, it has a complex ownership structure
that reflects different groups of investors and projects. At the apex of the ownership structure is
Morgan Stanley. In the next tier is MS Holdings, Inc., which is wholly owned by Morgan
Stanley.
1590
MS Holdings, in turn, owns 100% of Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, Inc. (MSI).
1591
MSI is the manager of MSIP.
1592
MSI is also a business unit within Morgan Stanley’s Merchant
Banking & Real Estate Investing group.
1593
MSI currently has 37 employees, all of whom are
Morgan Stanley employees in the Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investing group and work
exclusively on MSIP infrastructure projects.
1594
1587
Id.
1588
Id.
1589
See 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 006; 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Southern Star Follow
Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 458; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 326. See also “Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” (8/29/2014), MS-PSI-00000001 at 006.
1590
See 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 456.
1591
Id.
1592
Id. See also 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 002.
1593
See 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 005.
1594
Id. at 008; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
254
The remaining layers of MSIP’s ownership structure grow increasingly complex.
Virtually all of the remaining entities are shell entities with no employees or offices of their own.
One key entity is Morgan Stanley Infrastructure GP LP (MSIGP), which is the general partner of
MSIP. MSIGP is a shell entity with no employees of its own. Its general partner is MSI, and
MSI employees actually administer MSIGP, meaning that, on a practical level, MSI manages
MSIP.
1595
Also included within the ownership structure are multiple limited partnerships and
“feeder vehicles” that group together certain types of investors and “feed” their investment
dollars to MSIP and its infrastructure projects. The following graphic depicts MSIP’s full
ownership structure:
1595
See 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 457; 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of
Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 002 and 006.
255
Source: Chart included in 10/24/14 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, at MS-PSI-00000456.
256
MSIP Investments. MSIP is a closed investment fund with a 15-year term ending in
2022.
1596
MSIP raised about $4 billion for its investments, most of which are ongoing.
1597
To
find investors, MSI “utilize[d] Morgan Stanley’s institutional and wealth management
distribution networks … work[ing] through three sales channels.”
1598
According to Morgan
Stanley, investors contributed about $3.6 billion or nearly 90% of MSIP’s investment capital.
1599
Those investors included pension funds, financial institutions, corporations, endowment funds,
high net worth individuals, and some Morgan Stanley employees.
1600
The remaining 10.74% of
MSIP’s investment capital, about $430 million, came from Morgan Stanley, its single largest
investor.
1601
MSIP has been profitable, with a gross internal rate of return of about 12%.
1602
According to Morgan Stanley, MSIP has several categories of investments including “Energy
and Utilities (oil and gas pipelines, regulated electricity assets, transmission and distribution
systems, and water distribution and treatment).”
1603
Out of a list of 16 MSIP investments
provided by Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, eight involved physical commodity
activities.
1604
They included an electricity, heating, and cooling facility in the United States; a
large electricity distributor in Chile; a natural gas distribution company in Spain; hydropower
plants in China; and a wind power developer and operator in India.
1605
As of March 31, 2013,
Southern Star was MSIP’s largest single investment.
1606
Southern Star. MSIP owns 100% of Southern Star Central Corp., the parent company
of Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline Inc., its wholly owned subsidiary.
1607
MSIP purchased
40% of Southern Star’s shares in 2010, and acquired the remaining 60% in 2012.
1608
Morgan
1596
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 012; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 332.
1597
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009; 9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-PSI-400321 - 382, at 332, 381.
1598
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 351.
1599
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 006 and 009.
1600
Id. at 009; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1601
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009, footnote 1.
1602
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 336.
1603
Id. at 327.
1604
Id. at 333.
1605
Id. See also 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 467; Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners website,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/portfolio.html.
1606
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 336.
1607
See 8/23/2012 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners acquires full ownership of
Southern Star Central Corp.,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/e5a5716e-8ff9-4b44-b073-
ba6255f5b077.html.
1608
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 003; Morgan Stanley corporate website,http://www.morganstanley.com/infrastructure/portfolio.html; 8/23/2012 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan
Stanley Infrastructure Partners acquires full ownership of Southern Star Central Corp.,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/e5a5716e-8ff9-4b44-b073-ba6255f5b077.html. MSIP acquired
the remaining shares from GE Energy Financial Services, Inc. (GE), which resulted in a change in control for
257
Stanley relied on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley merchant banking authority to buy the company and,
under the statutory requirements, generally must sell the company within ten years, by 2020.
1609
Southern Star was founded in 1904, and is headquartered in Owensboro, Kentucky.
1610
It
“is the primary gas transmission and natural gas storage facility provider” in certain areas of the
Midwest, with approximately 6,000 miles of pipeline serving Colorado, Kansas, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming.
1611
Its pipeline system has a delivery capacity of
approximately 2.4 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas per day, and its primary function is
delivering gas to local natural gas distributors in its service areas.
1612
Southern Star serves a
number of metropolitan areas including St. Louis, Kansas City, and J oplin in Missouri, and
Kansas City, Wichita, Topeka, and Lawrence in Kansas.
1613
Southern Star operates eight underground natural gas storage fields: seven in Kansas and
one in Oklahoma.
1614
The fields have a “natural gas storage capacity of approximately 47 Bcf
and aggregate delivery capacity of approximately 1.3 Bcf of natural gas per day.”
1615
Southern
Star also has transportation contracts with 127 natural gas shippers, which include:
“regulated natural gas distribution companies, municipalities, intrastate pipelines, direct
industrial users, electrical generators, gas marketers and producers. Central transports
natural gas to approximately 528 delivery points, including natural gas distribution
companies and municipalities, power plants, interstate and intrastate pipelines, and large
and small industrial and commercial customers.”
1616
In addition, Southern Star has 41 compressor stations to facilitate natural gas transport.
1617
Southern Star Ownership. As indicated earlier, Southern Star is wholly owned by
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners LP (MSIP), an investment fund that is administered,
advised, and controlled by Morgan Stanley personnel. According to Morgan Stanley, MSIP uses
a “typical Holding Company, Operating Company ownership structure commonly used for
regulated pipelines” under oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
1618
According to Morgan Stanley, MSI, which manages MSIP, “formed two intermediate
holding companies: MSIP Southern Star, LLC (March 2010) and MSIP Southern Star II, LLC
Southern Star. See Southern Star Central Corp. 10-Q, 09/30/2013, at 8,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034913000016/southernstar10q9302013r189.pdf.
1609
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 014.
1610
See undated “About Southern Star,” Southern Star website,http://www.sscgp.com/about-southern-star/.
1611
Southern Star Central Corp. Form 10-Q for fiscal year ending 6/30/2014, SEC website, at 8,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034914000020/southernstar10q6302014doc.htm.
See also “About Southern Star,” Southern Star website,http://www.sscgp.com/about-southern-star/.
1612
Southern Star Central Corp. Form 10-Q for fiscal year ending 6/30/2014, SEC website, at 8,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034914000020/southernstar10q6302014doc.htm.
1613
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 016.
1614
Southern Star Central Corp. 10-K, 12/31/2013, page 2,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260349/000126034914000002/southernstar201310kdoc.htm.
1615
Id.
1616
Id.
1617
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 016. According to Southern Star, it is not involved with natural gas production,
refining, or liquefied natural gas. Id. at 019.
1618
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” 8/29/2014, MS-PSI-00000001 at 003.
258
(September 2012) to acquire and hold” MSIP’s ownership interests in Southern Star.
1619
Those
two intermediate holding companies wholly own MSIP-SSCC Holdings LLC (MSIP-SSCC),
which, in turn, owns Southern Star’s parent corporation.
1620
The following graphic is a
simplification of Southern Star’s ownership structure:
Source: 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, at FRB-PSI-00000004.
The two intermediate holding companies are ultimately owned by MSIP, through the
complex ownership structure of limited partnerships and feeder vehicles indicated earlier. The
three entities depicted in the graphic above represent the 380 global investors that have invested
in MSIP.
1621
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, as a result of the MSIP ownership
structure, it ultimately holds a 10.74% indirect ownership interest in Southern Star.
1622
1619
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 003.
1620
Id.
1621
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014). Morgan Stanley explained that Morgan Stanley
Infrastructure Partners A Sub, LP is the feeder vehicle used by foreign investors; Morgan Stanley Infrastructure
Partners LP is the feeder vehicle used by domestic investors; and Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Investors LP is the
feeder vehicle used by Morgan Stanley employees, including former employees. Id.
1622
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” (8/29/2014), MS-PSI-00000001 at 002.
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that the Volcker Rule requires it to reduce its holdings in investment funds
to 3%, but asserted that MSIP was covered by an exception for illiquid funds. Subcommittee briefing by Morgan
Stanley (9/8/2014).
259
Board of Directors. The Southern Star Board of Directors consists of three MSI senior
executives who are also Morgan Stanley employees.
1623
The Board meets quarterly and reviews
information on Southern Star’s financial performance, business activities and development
projects, volume throughput, compliance issues, environmental issues, and capital spending
plans, among other issues.
1624
When asked by the Subcommittee if Southern Star’s Board
presentations were ever given to the Morgan Stanley Commodities group, several MSIP
representatives said “absolutely not.”
1625
In addition to Board meetings, Morgan Stanley indicated that monthly meetings were
held between Southern Star and MSI personnel to discuss business activities.
1626
Morgan
Stanley representatives told the Subcommittee that while its employees worked with Southern
Star management, they were aware that, under the merchant banking statutory restrictions,
Morgan Stanley was prohibited from becoming involved in the company’s day-to-day
operations.
1627
At the same time, Morgan Stanley indicated that its employees had reviewed
Southern Star’s vendors, performed counterparty assessments, utilized Morgan Stanley’s legal
and insurance expertise to assist Southern Star, and exercised oversight over pipeline safety
issues.
1628
In 2010, the Board of Directors, which consists of Morgan Stanley employees,
directed Southern Star to create a Chief Compliance Officer position to oversee pipeline
integrity, safety issues, and regulatory compliance.
1629
Incidents. As a natural gas business, Southern Star faces a range of operational risks,
including pipeline ruptures, natural gas leaks, and damages caused by natural disasters like
tornadoes or earthquakes. According to Morgan Stanley, Southern Star has “a strong safety and
environmental record,” with no material incidents over the past ten years.
1630
According to documents found on the website of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), prior to Morgan Stanley’s acquisition of the company, one of Southern Star’s
pipelines was ruptured in 2006, by an unrelated contractor doing work for a third party.
1631
The
accident occurred on September 29, 2006, in Mound Valley, Kansas. According to the NTSB
materials, Double M Construction Company was doing trenching work for a natural gas well
project.
1632
While trenching, an operator of Double M struck Southern Star’s underground
pipeline, which ran through the property. The ruptured pipeline leaked gas, which then came
into contact with the running trenching machine and caused a large explosion and fire. One
1623
“Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Overview of Southern Star,” (8/29/2014), MS-PSI-00000001 - 37, at
023.
1624
Id.
1625
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1626
Id.
1627
Id.
1628
Id.
1629
Id.
1630
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 026.
1631
U.S. Department of Transportation, “Incident report – gas transmission and gathering systems, Southern Star gas
pipeline,” (10/11/2006), PSI-USDOTIncidentRpt_Oct06-000001. See also “Kansas State Fire Marshal Department
Fire Investigation Summary Report,” (12/12/2006), Case No. 24731, PSI-KSFireMarRpt_Nov06-000001 - 024, at
001-003. See also “Kansas Corporation Commission Report and Recommendation in the matter of the investigation
of Double M Construction, Inc.”, Docket no. 07-MMCP-469-SHO, (11/13/2006), PSI-KSFireMarRpt_Nov06-
000001 - 24, at 013-024.
1632
Id. The owner of the natural gas well project was Admiral Bay Resources, Inc., which had contracted with
Double J Construction Company, who in turn had subcontracted with Double M Construction to do the trenching.
260
Double M Construction employee died, and there was substantial property damage.
1633
The
Kansas State Fire Marshal determined that Southern Star was aware of the illegal trenching near
its underground pipeline before the accident occurred, but did not report it.
1634
When asked why,
Southern Star stated that it did not have an obligation to report the conduct under Kansas law,
which the Fire Marshal determined to be true.
1635
No government agency assessed a penalty
against Southern Star in connection with the incident. Southern Star was named as a defendant
in a wrongful death case filed against Double J Pipeline Construction, which was settled in 2009,
in part with a payment from Southern Star’s insurance policy.
1636
Southern Star’s pipeline infrastructure has also suffered damage due to natural disasters.
In May 2013, Southern Star reported damage to its pipelines in Cement, Oklahoma, after a
tornado hit the town.
1637
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that insurance experts within the Merchant
Banking and Real Estate Investment group have met with Southern Star to discuss the adequacy
and pricing of insurance policies, and helped Southern Star obtain a comprehensive insurance
program.
1638
Its policies include insurance protecting against pollution incidents, well issues,
property damage, damage from sabotage or terrorism, business interruption, and commercial
crime, as well as directors’ and officers’ liability.
1639
Morgan Stanley-Southern Star Relationship. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee
that it had a classic merchant banking relationship with Southern Star, in which it oversaw its
overall business but did not participate in its day-to-day operations.
1640
In response to questions,
Morgan Stanley said that it was not Southern Star’s primary banker and did not loan it
money.
1641
Morgan Stanley indicated that it also did not perform any natural gas trading
activities on behalf of Southern Star.
1642
In addition, according to Morgan Stanley, Southern
Star did not provide physical natural gas or related services to Morgan Stanley, including the
Morgan Stanley Commodities group.
1643
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that
information from Southern Star was shared with MSI employees in the Merchant Banking and
Real Estate Investment Group, but not with anyone in the Morgan Stanley Commodities
group.
1644
1633
Id. Double M Construction was found to have been trenching illegally under Kansas law, because it did not
follow certain protocols. The Kansas State Fire Marshal Department provided a report that concluded the incident
was an accident, and there was no intentionally malicious conduct that led to the explosion. Id.
1634
Id.
1635
Id.
1636
See Foran vs. Double J Pipeline Construction, L.L.C., et al., Docket No. CJ -2007-29 (USDC D. Okla.), “Order
Approving Settlement” (7/31/2009); 10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners[:] Southern Star Follow
Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 473 [sealed exhibit].
1637
See “Energy infrastructure largely spared Oklahoma tornado’s fury,” Reuters, (5/21/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/21/us-usa-tornadoes-energy-idUSBRE94K0Q920130521.
1638
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014). See also 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure
Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 032.
1639
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 032.
1640
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
1641
Id.
1642
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 036.
1643
Id. at 025.
1644
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (9/8/2014).
261
MSIP II. Morgan Stanley noted that MSI was sponsoring a second infrastructure
investment fund, MSIP II, which was in the process of raising another $4 billion and would
concentrate on energy, utility, and transportation projects.
1645
Morgan Stanley told the Federal
Reserve that it expected “energy-related infrastructure will constitute a majority of the deal flow
in MSIP II.”
1646
It identified possible “Americas” investments in “
natural gas gathering, processing, storage and LNG facilities; natural gas fired turbines; and wind
and solar activities.
1647
Morgan Stanley also indicated that “MSI officers will invest $25 million
in MSIP II,” to align their interests with those of investors.
1648
MSIP II has raised about $1.5
billion as of late 2014.
1649
The plans for MSIP II indicate that Morgan Stanley intends to
continue to invest billions of dollars in natural gas and other commodity-related businesses for
years to come.
(d) Investing in Other Natural Gas Facilities
Southern Star is not Morgan Stanley’s only natural gas investment, nor is MSIP the only
Morgan Stanley merchant banking entity that has invested in natural gas. A second is Morgan
Stanley Global Private Equity, a business unit which, like Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, is
located within Morgan Stanley’s Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investing group.
1650
As its
name suggests, Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity is the financial holding company’s leading
private equity investment arm. Currently, Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity has one active
fund, Morgan Stanley Capital Partners V.
1651
Like MSIP, the Morgan Stanley Capital Partners V investment fund was established by
Morgan Stanley and is managed by Morgan Stanley employees operating out of Morgan Stanley
offices. It has an ownership structure almost as complicated as that of MSIP.
1652
Morgan
Stanley is its largest investor, having held an ownership interest of between 23% and 33% in the
fund since 2008.
1653
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that MSIP and Morgan Stanley
Capital Partners V, which are both within the Merchant Banking and Real Estate Investment
group, share senior leadership but not other employees.
1654
In 2013, Morgan Stanley Global
Private Equity had about 50 employees, all of whom were employed by Morgan Stanley.
1655
1645
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 331, 344.
1646
Id. at 352.
1647
Id.
1648
Id. at 346.
1649
8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” prepared by Morgan Stanley,
MS-PSI-00000001 - 037, at 009.
1650
10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 459 [sealed exhibit].
1651
Id. Four predecessor funds sponsored by Morgan Stanley Capital Partners “have either been fully realized or are
in liquidation.” Id.
1652
Id. at 389-390.
1653
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
003.
1654
10/24/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners: Southern Star Follow Up Questions,” prepared by Morgan
Stanley, MS-PSI-00000455 - 475, at 466.
1655
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 326. In a recent job listing seeking an investment professional for Morgan Stanley Capital
Partners (MSCP), Morgan Stanley wrote: “MSCP employs a fully-integrated Operating Partner model and is unique
among middle market private equity firms in its ability to leverage the global network and resources of Morgan
Stanley to benefit the investment team and management teams with whom we partner to drive value creation.”
October 2014 posting for “Vice President, Morgan Stanley Capital Partners,” LinkedIn,
262
Morgan Stanley Capital Partners V has raised about $1.5 billion.
1656
Its investment
portfolio currently includes at least three natural gas-related investments: Triana Energy, Trinity,
and Sterling Energy.
1657
Triana Energy Investments LLC owns 70% of a natural gas exploration
and production company in West Virginia.
1658
Trinity Investment Holdings, LLC owns 70% of
“one of the largest independent CO2 [carbon dioxide] pipeline systems in the US.”
1659
Sterling
Investment Holdings LLC owns 63% of a natural gas gathering and processing company,
Sterling Energy Investments LLC, and is headquartered in Denver, Colorado.
1660
Like Southern Star, these natural gas companies have Morgan Stanley employees on their
boards of directors and meet on a regular basis with Morgan Stanley personnel. They have
similar operational and environmental risks as Southern Star.
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Natural Gas Activities
Morgan Stanley’s expanding physical natural gas activities raise multiple concerns,
including its decision to build and operate a commercial natural gas business using shell
companies, unfair competition concerns, insufficient capital and insurance to protect against
catastrophic event risks, conflicts of interest arising from controlling natural gas supplies while
trading natural gas financial instruments, and inadequate safeguards.
(a) Shell Companies
Although Morgan Stanley has long traded natural gas and, for the last decade, invested in
merchant banking natural gas businesses, it appears to have never before produced CNG or built
a commercial energy facility. Additionally, the most striking and unusual aspect of Morgan
Stanley’s physical natural gas activities is its recent decision to introduce the use of shell
companies. Morgan Stanley’s formation and use of shell companies, run by Morgan Stanley
employees, to build and operate a CNG facility appears to be an unprecedented use of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority.
By using shell entities with no employees or physical presence of their own, and
installing its own senior executives as the shells’ directors and officers, Morgan Stanley
essentially created a corporate alter ego to operate a new commercial business. Morgan Stanley,
through its shell entities, became the designer, builder, and soon-to-be operator of a new CNG
facility, as well as the marketer and exporter of its products. Morgan Stanley chose, not only for
the first time to start a new physical commodities business, but also to use shell companies tohttps://www.linkedin.com/jobs2/view..._company_other_jobs&trk=job_view_company_othe
r_jobs.
1656
9/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Platform Review,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for FRBNY, FRB-
PSI-400321 - 382, at 326 (listing Merchant Banking and Real Estate Investing Funds, which includes MSCP V);
10/14/2014 email from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, “MS Questions,” PSI-MorganStanley-18-
000001 [sealed exhibit].
1657
See Morgan Stanley Global Private Equity Fund website, portfolio list,http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html. See also 5/21/2013
letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at 004.
1658
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
004.
1659
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
004. See alsohttp://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/invest_management/private_equity/portfolio.html.
1660
5/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-05-000001 - 006, at
004.
263
initiate construction of a complex, untested natural gas facility with no operational track record
or established market. Its actions raise a number of potential legal, operational, and financial
risks.
Equally troubling is that Morgan Stanley embarked on this course of action, despite its
novel elements, with only an “initial oral notice” to its regulator. While Morgan Stanley
supplied additional information later, it was not until media reports alerted the Federal Reserve
to the CNG project a year after Morgan Stanley began work on it, that regulators focused on the
details. Even then, regulators didn’t understand that Morgan Stanley was using shell companies
with no employees and no prior business activities, and able to operate on a day-to-day basis
only by utilizing Morgan Stanley’s own personnel.
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it is still considering whether the
Wentworth companies represent an appropriate exercise of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather
authority. Since the Wentworth companies represent Morgan Stanley’s first foray into the
physical CNG industry, it cannot contend that the grandfather clause is protecting against the
forced disinvestment of an existing commodity activity. In fact, it is difficult to see how the
word “grandfather” applies. If Morgan Stanley is permitted to proceed, it will represent a major
expansion of the ability of financial holding companies with grandfather authority to enter into
commercial businesses. They will no longer have to buy an existing enterprise; they can start the
business themselves.
1661
Allowing financial holding companies to start commercial businesses
using shell entities managed by their own personnel cannot be reconciled with the longstanding
bar against mixing banking and commerce or the intended scope of the grandfather clause.
In late October 2014, a media report indicated that Morgan Stanley may be considering
selling the Wentworth companies and the CNG project to a third party.
1662
(b) Unfair Competition
A second concern raised by Morgan Stanley’s CNG project is the issue of unfair
competition. Morgan Stanley apparently told the Federal Reserve that it launched the CNG
project because it saw a “market opportunity.” It acted around the same time as another
company, Emera CNG LLC, filed an application to export CNG. The Wentworth application
sought a similar authorization, except that it requested permission to export 60 billion cubic feet
of CNG per year instead of the 9 billion sought by Emera. The competing applications show that
Morgan Stanley, through its Wentworth shell entities, is in direct competition in the natural gas
distribution business with a commercial enterprise.
Morgan Stanley’s ability to compete commercially in an industry in which it has no prior
experience is due, in part, to the inherent advantages that financial holding companies have when
competing against businesses that don’t own banks. Morgan Stanley has immediate access to
inexpensive, ready credit through its bank subsidiary, enabling its borrowing costs to nearly
1661
When Goldman decided to enter the physical uranium business, Goldman acquired an existing company,
Nufcor, whose employees declined to stay on and were replaced with Goldman personnel. In so doing, Goldman
essentially turned a substantive company into a shell. Goldman’s employees then took over a longstanding, well
established business operation and expanded it. Goldman did not start up the business. In its CNG project, Morgan
Stanley has dispensed with taking over an existing business with a track record of success, in favor of initiating a
completely new business enterprise.
1662
See “Morgan Stanley looks at sale of gas export venture,” Financial Times, Gregory Meyer, Tom Braithwaite
and Gina Chon (10/21/2014),http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76c23932-58c7-11e4-a31b-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3GuK83tj9.
264
always undercut those of a nonbank competitor. Another advantage is Morgan Stanley’s
relatively low capital requirements. In 2012, the FRBNY Commodities Team determined that
corporations engaged in oil and gas businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover
potential losses, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8%
to 10%, making it much easier for them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.
1663
Less expensive financing and lower capital are two key factors underlying the traditional
U.S. ban on mixing banking with commerce. Morgan Stanley’s direct competition with an
energy company to construct a CNG export facility is simply not the type of activity that, under
U.S. banking principles, is appropriate for a bank holding company. If Morgan Stanley sees
CNG exports as a good market opportunity, it should be financing or investing in one or more of
the companies entering that business rather than competing to run the business itself.
(c) Catastrophic Event Risks
A third set of concerns involves the catastrophic event risks attached to Morgan Stanley’s
CNG project and investments in Southern Star and other natural gas portfolio companies.
The CNG project, which seeks to produce containerized natural gas on a large scale that
Morgan Stanley describes as “unique,”
1664
and which does not exist in the United States today,
carries numerous risks. Building the facility and arranging for electrical and pipeline
connections raises a host of operational issues, as does moving the natural gas by truck and
vessel. The flammability and explosive nature of natural gas intensify the catastrophic event
risks. Hurricanes, tornados, and floods in Texas compound the problem. Additional financial
risks arise from the absence of an existing market for large scale CNG exports, and the necessity
for CNG exports to compete with LNG exports. Morgan Stanley’s liability for any mishap
affecting the CNG project is particularly acute, since it owns and is in the process of uilding and
operating the facility through shell corporations run by Morgan Stanley employees.
Southern Star, as an established natural gas pipeline company, poses similar catastrophic
event risks. While Morgan Stanley takes the position that it would have little or no liability for a
catastrophic event at Southern Star, because it is a merchant banking investment in which
Morgan Stanley has only an indirect 11% ownership interest, the level of Morgan Stanley’s
control over the investment fund that owns Southern Star makes the liability issue less clear cut.
Southern Star is 100% owned by Morgan Stanley Investment Partners (MSIP), which
was formed by and is closely affiliated with Morgan Stanley, its largest investor. Morgan
Stanley employees manage MSIP, help it find investors, and oversee its investments. Those
Morgan Stanley employees sit in Morgan Stanley offices and control MSIP’s investments.
Morgan Stanley employees also control Southern Star’s Board of Directors, and advise it on
financial, insurance and tax issues. In addition, Morgan Stanley, through its Board Members,
oversees Southern Star vendors and pipeline safety, integrity, and compliance efforts.
As explained earlier, if a catastrophic event were to occur either in the United States or,
in connection with CNG exports to foreign countries, multiple legal theories could be used to try
to assign a portion of the liability to Morgan Stanley. Arguments could be made that Morgan
1663
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200499.
1664
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 at 008.
265
Stanley was the owner and operator of the CNG facility involved in the event, the owner of the
natural gas, or knowingly entrusted the natural gas to an incompetent operator, including
operators in foreign ports and facilities.
1665
Morgan Stanley might be required to defend against
claims in a state court, U.S. federal court, or foreign court, under the different laws in each
jurisdiction. A financial institution viewed as being potentially liable for damages could see
customers or counterparties withdraw funds, refrain from doing business, or demand increased
compensation to continue doing business with the institution in light of its increased credit risk.
Morgan Stanley does not appear to be prepared for those types of unanticipated financial
consequences. In 2012, the FRBNY Commodities Team found that Morgan Stanley had
insufficient capital and insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event.
1666
The
2012 Summary Report prepared a chart comparing the level of capital and insurance coverage at
four financial holding companies, including Morgan Stanley, against estimated costs associated
with “extreme loss scenarios.” It found that at each institution, including Morgan Stanley, “the
potential loss exceed[ed] capital and insurance” by $1 to $15 billion.
1667
That shortfall leaves the
Federal Reserve, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, at risk of having to provide financial support to
Morgan Stanley should a catastrophic event occur.
(d) Conflicts of Interest
Still another set of issues raised by Morgan Stanley’s natural gas activities involves
conflicts of interest. The conflicts arise from the fact that Morgan Stanley trades natural gas
financial products at the same time it is intimately involved with an array of physical natural gas
activities. Its conduct raises questions about two sets of conflict of interest concerns, one
involving non-public information and the other involving natural gas supplies.
While commodities laws do not bar the use of non-public information by traders in the
financial markets in the same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading advantages
deepen when one commodities trader has access to significant non-public information. Morgan
Stanley’s merchant banking investments put Morgan Stanley employees on the boards of
multiple companies involved with different aspects of the natural gas business, from natural
production to pipelines to storage to LNG cargoes to CNG exports. Those board positions
provide Morgan Stanley personnel with access to a massive amount of non-public information
about the physical natural gas market.
When asked about this informational advantage, Morgan Stanley personnel explained
that merchant banking was lodged in a different part of the bank than commodities, and merchant
banking employees did not share non-public information about their portfolio companies with
commodities personnel. The following graphic shows that the Commodities group falls under
the Institutional Securities segment of the financial holding company, while the Merchant
Banking and Real Estate Investments group falls under the Investment Management segment:
1665
See discussion in the Goldman and uranium section above.
1666
See 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498.
1667
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499. The recent decision in the BP oil spill case suggests that the “extreme loss” scenarios may entail
expenses beyond those contemplated as recently as 2012.
266
Morgan Stanley
Institutional Securities
Group
Wealth Management
Investment
Management
Source: 8/29/2014 “Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, Overview of Southern Star,” MS-PSI-
00000001 - 037, at 007. “MB & REI” stands for Merchant Banking & Real Estate Investments.
While the two activities are lodged in separate parts of the financial holding company,
and the Subcommittee saw no evidence of the misuse of confidential Southern Star information,
Morgan Stanley commodity traders could gain non-public information from their colleagues
about natural gas activities providing useful market intelligence for natural gas trades. In
addition, the Wentworth shell companies are directly managed by employees in the Commodities
group, meaning all non-public information related to the CNG project would be immediately and
fully accessible to Morgan Stanley natural gas traders. The potential exists for Morgan Stanley
commodity traders to use that non-public information to gain an unfair trading advantage over
other market participants, including their customers and counterparties.
A second conflict of interest issue is whether Morgan Stanley would gain an unfair
degree of control over CNG supplies if it actually completed construction of the planned CNG
facility. The facility is apparently being designed to export 60 billion cubic feet of CNG per
year. Given the infancy of the CNG export market, Morgan Stanley’s plans suggest a significant
market presence. Morgan Stanley’s control over the timing and amount of the CNG it hopes to
export raises questions about whether it could use its exports to benefit its natural gas trading
activities. Those market manipulation concerns, and their accompanying legal, financial, and
reputational risks, would not exist if Morgan Stanley remained a financial intermediary and
trader in the natural gas financial market rather than increasing its involvement in physical
natural gas activities.
(e) Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of issues involves the lack of regulatory safeguards related to financial holding
company involvement with high risk physical natural gas activities. Natural gas is flammable
and explosive. Natural gas prices are unpredictable and volatile. Large scale CNG exports have
no established markets.
[Other groups omitted]
Commodities
[Other groups omitted]
MB & REI
MSI
MSIP
267
Because Morgan Stanley has relied on the grandfather clause to build and operate the
CNG facility and on the merchant banking authority to invest in Southern Star and other natural
gas companies, it has not notified or obtained prior permission from the Federal Reserve to
engage those activities. For its part, the Federal Reserve has failed to issue guidance on the
proper scope of the grandfather clause, including whether it may be used to authorize physical
commodity activities that a holding company has never before conducted. The Federal Reserve
has also failed to require annual disclosure of a comprehensive list of commodity-related
activities undertaken under the grandfather and merchant banking authorities, so that it can learn
of, track, and analyze those activities.
Because Morgan Stanley has relied on the grandfather clause for its CNG project,
Morgan Stanley has not been required by the Federal Reserve to include the market value of that
project when calculating compliance with the complementary physical commodities limit
prohibiting those activities from exceeding 5% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital.
The only cap on the size of Morgan Stanley’s CNG activities is the statutory prohibition that its
grandfathering activities not exceed 5% of Morgan Stanley’s consolidated assets, a limit set so
high as to be no restriction at all. In addition, its commodity-related merchant banking activities
have been allowed to accumulate with no volume limit at all.
Morgan Stanley’s physical natural gas activities disclose that, due to inadequate reporting
requirements, the Federal Reserve is at times left in the dark about important physical
commodity activities being conducted under the grandfather and merchant banking authorities.
They also disclose that the Federal Reserve has failed to put key safeguards in place to limit the
size and risks associated with those activities and to ensure the safe and sound operation of the
financial holding company.
(4) Analysis
Despite the sale of portions of its oil merchanting business, Morgan Stanley remains
heavily involved in physical commodities, as evidenced by its initiation of the CNG project and
ongoing investments in natural gas businesses like Southern Star. Morgan Stanley’s utilization
of the Wentworth shell companies to build and operate a CNG export facility is an
unprecedented and inappropriate use of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather authority. Its
extensive natural gas merchant banking activities demonstrate the need for a size limit on those
investments. The catastrophic risks presented by its natural gas activities indicate Morgan
Stanley needs to increase its capital and insurance to protect U.S. taxpayers against being called
on to shore up the firm. Potential market manipulation opportunities also call out for stronger
oversight and preventative safeguards.
All of the financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee have been
involved with financial and physical natural gas activities. It is past time for the Federal Reserve
to enforce needed safeguards on this high risk physical commodity activity.
268
C. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Crude Oil
For more than 25 years, Morgan Stanley has engaged in extensive physical oil activities.
Prior to its 2008 conversion to a bank holding company, Morgan Stanley built a wide-ranging
physical oil business, including activities associated with producing, storing, supplying, and
transporting oil. As part of that effort, Morgan Stanley purchased companies involved in various
stages of the energy supply chain, such as TransMontaigne, which managed nearly 50 oil storage
sites within the United States and Canada; Heidmar, which managed a fleet of 100 vessels
delivering oil internationally; and Olco Petroleum, which blended oils, sponsored storage
facilities, and ran about 200 retail gasoline stations in Canada. As part of its activities, Morgan
Stanley supplied crude oil to a large European refinery, home heating oil to Northeastern
utilities, and jet fuel to airlines. Over the last few years, Morgan Stanley began to reduce the
extent of its physical oil activities. In 2013, it decided to sell many of its physical oil assets. In
2014, it sold TransMontaigne and some of its oil storage and transport facilities to an unrelated
party. It arranged to sell additional physical oil assets to Rosneft, a Russian state owned
company, only to see that transaction suspended when the United States imposed sanctions on
Rosneft in connection with Russian incursions into Ukraine. In September 2014, Morgan
Stanley told the Subcommittee that it intended to complete its exit from most of its physical oil
business, although it would take longer than planned.
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities present a classic case study of banking mixed
with commerce, raising concerns about financial and catastrophic event risks as well as conflicts
of interest from simultaneously trading both financial and physical oil products.
(1) Background on Oil
Crude oil, also known as petroleum, is a naturally occurring liquid formed through the
heating and compression of organic materials beneath the earth’s crust over an extended period
of time.
1668
Crude oil and the products derived from it – including gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel,
propane, and heating oil – are some of the most commonly used sources of energy in the
world.
1669
The most common method of extracting crude oil from the earth is drilling.
1670
In the
method most commonly used in the oil industry, an extractor drills to the depth at which
geologists believe oil is located. The driller then inserts a tube into the newly drilled hole so that
the oil can flow through to the surface. Oil drilling can take place on land or offshore on a
seabed using a drilling platform. Oil can also be extracted from “oil sands,” typically beds of
sand or clay mixed with water and a form of crude oil.
1671
A third method of extraction involves
1668
See 7/29/2009 “What is Crude Oil? A Detailed Explanation on this Essential Fossil Fuel,” prepared by the
Editorial Department, Oilprice.com website,http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/What-Is-Crude-Oil-A-Detailed-
Explanation-On-This-Essential-Fossil-Fuel.html.
1669
See 6/19/2014 “Oil Crude and Petroleum Products Explained,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website
,http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home.
1670
7/29/2009 “What is Crude Oil? A Detailed Explanation on this Essential Fossil Fuel,” prepared by the Editorial
Department, Oilprice.com, website,http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/What-Is-Crude-Oil-A-Detailed-
Explanation-On-This-Essential-Fossil-Fuel.html.
1671
Id.
269
“hydraulic fracturing,” which typically involves injecting water, sand, and chemicals under high
pressure into petroleum-bearing rock formations such as shale to create new fractures in the rock
and increase oil or natural gas flow to a well.
1672
The bulk of oil production worldwide comes from state-owned oil companies.
1673
Large
privately owned oil companies and smaller independent oil companies also play a key role in oil
production. The five countries with the greatest crude oil production are Saudi Arabia, the
United States, Russia, China, and Canada.
1674
In 2013, about 12.4 million barrels per day were
produced in the United States, comprising roughly 14% of the crude oil produced worldwide.
1675
The United States was also the world’s leading crude oil user during that time, consuming about
18.8 million barrels per day in 2013.
1676
Other prominent oil-consuming nations include China,
J apan, and India.
1677
Crude Oil Infrastructure. Crude oil requires a complicated infrastructure to make the
oil usable for U.S. industry. First, the crude oil must be located and produced, using drilling rigs,
oil sand processing, or hydraulic fracturing techniques. Next, it must be transported, typically by
oil tanker, pipeline, or railway.
1678
Commonly, oil is taken by pipeline to a port, where it is
loaded onto an ocean-going tanker and transported to its ultimate destination.
1679
Within the
United States, oil is typically transported via pipeline, but due to a recent spike in oil production,
despite more than 190,000 miles of pipeline,
1680
the existing U.S. pipeline network cannot reach
or accommodate all of the oil requiring transport within U.S. borders.
1681
Oil companies have
1672
See undated “Hydraulic Fracturing,” prepared by U.S. Geological Society, U.S. Geological Society website,http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/HydraulicFracturing.aspx.
1673
9/30/2014 “Energy in Brief: Who are the major players supplying the world oil market?” U.S. Energy
Information Administration website, ,http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/world_oil_market.cfm. As it is
used here, the term “production” refers to the process by which crude oil is extracted from oil reserves in a particular
place.
1674
See undated “International Energy Statistics: 2013 Petroleum Production,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1&cid=regions,&syid=2013&eyid=2013
&unit=TBPD.
1675
See undated “International Energy Statistics: 2013 Petroleum Production,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1. One barrel
is equivalent to 42 U.S. gallons. 5/22/14 “Frequently Asked Questions,” U.S. Energy Information Administration
website,http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=24&t=10.
1676
See undated “International Energy Statistics: 2013 Petroleum Consumption,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproje...&pid=5&aid=2&cid=regions&syid=2013&eyid=2013&
unit=TBPD.
1677
Id.
1678
9/29/2014 “Transporting Oil and Natural Gas,” American Petroleum Institute website,http://www.api.org/oil-
and-natural-gas-overview/transporting-oil-and-natural-gas.
1679
Id.
1680
See undated “Oil and Natural Gas Overview,” American Petroleum Institute website,http://www.api.org/oil-
and-natural-gas-overview/transporting-oil-and-natural-gas/pipeline/where-are-the-oil-pipelines. See also 2013 “U.S.
Refineries, Crude Oil, and Refined Products Pipelines” prepared by American Energy Mapping, American
Petroleum Institute website,http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-overview/transporting-oil-and-natural-
gas/pipeline/~/media/Files/Oil-and-Natural-Gas/pipeline/US-Pipeline-Map-API-Website3.pdf.
1681
See “Oil boom downside: Exploding trains,” Politico, Kathryn A. Wolfe and Bob King (6/8/2014),http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/exploding-oil-trains-energy-environment-107966.html.
270
increasingly turned to the railway system to transport the excess.
1682
On occasion, they also use
tanker trucks.
1683
The crude oil is typically transported to a refinery to process it into refined oil
products. The United States currently has about 142 oil refineries.
1684
The refined oil products
are typically stored at the refinery until they are transported to a broker or end user, such as a
utility, airline, gasoline station, or industrial plant.
Crude Oil Markets and Prices. Crude oil is the largest and most actively traded
commodity market in the world, with numerous physical and financial trading venues and market
participants.
1685
There are currently hundreds of crude oil and refined oil products available for
trade.
1686
Because of the size of the market and the many participants, crude oil prices are set
globally, typically using U.S. dollars.
1687
Over the last ten years, crude oil prices have been
volatile, with the most notorious price swings in 2008, when oil spiked at $147 per barrel and
then fell to about $32 per barrel, a difference of $115 in less than six months.
1688
This year, from
August to October 2014, crude oil prices fell from about $100 to about $80 per barrel, a 20%
drop in two months.
1689
1682
Id. See also undated “Rail Accidents Involving Crude Oil and Ethanol Releases,” NTSB report by Paul L.
Stancil, NTSB website, at slide 2,https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/presentations/Opening Presentation Rail Accide
nts%20Involving%20Crude%20Oil%20and%20Ethanol%20Releases.pdf.
1683
See 10/31/2013 “EIA’s new map layers provide more detailed information on petroleum infrastructure,” U.S.
Energy Information Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13611.
1684
See 6/25/2014 “Petroleum & Other Liquids,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website,http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_cap1_dcu_nus_a.htm.
1685
See undated “Crude Oil Futures Quotes,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-oil/light-sweet-crude.html.
1686
See, e.g., undated “ICE Crude & Refined Oil Products,” prepared by ICE Futures Europe, ICE Futures Europe
website, at 6,https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_Crude_Refined_Oil_Products.pdf.
1687
See 7/2014 “Crude Oil Methodology and Specifications Guide,” prepared by Platts, Platts’ website, at 3, 8,http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Con...s/MethodologySpecs/Crude-oil-methodology.pdf.
See also “Why Do Oil Prices Swing So Wildly?” CBS Money Watch, Cait Murphy (9/1/2009),http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-do-oil-prices-swing-so-wildly/.
1688
See, e.g., undated “Spot Price Series History,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website, “Cushing, OK
WTI Spot Price FOB,”http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D.
1689
Id.
271
Source: 10/8/2014 “Historical Crude Oil Prices and Price Chart,” InfoMine website ,http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/crude-oil/all/.
In the financial markets, crude oil and refined oil products can be traded through a variety
of financial instruments, including futures, swaps, options, and forwards. The most actively
traded crude oil future in the United States is a standardized contract for 1,000 barrels of West
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, which is listed by CME Group Inc.
1690
The WTI contract is
traded on the CME Globex and CME Clearport trading platforms, and by open outcry on the
NYMEX floor.
1691
The contract can be settled financially or through the physical delivery of
WTI, although physical settlement is atypical. Another leading crude oil future is a standardized
contract for 1,000 barrels of Brent crude oil, which is traded on ICE Futures Europe and cash
settled.
1692
It is the most actively traded crude oil future in the world.
1693
Crude oil and refined
oil products can also be traded through a variety of financially-settled, over-the-counter swaps
and options on the Intercontinental Exchange.
1694
1690
See “Crude Oil Futures Contract Specs,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-
oil/light-sweet-crude_contract_specifications.html. The contract price is based upon delivery of WTI crude oil, a
light, sweet crude oil produced in Texas, at Cushing, Oklahoma, where a number of oil pipelines converge.
1691
Id.
1692
See “Brent Crude Futures,” ICE Futures Europe website,https://www.theice.com/products/219/Brent-Crude-
Futures.
1693
See “The Growth of Brent Crude Oil,” Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) website,https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_Brent_Infographic.pdf. The contract price is based upon delivery of Brent
crude oil, a light, sweet crude oil produced in the North Sea.
1694
See oil products listed on the ICE website,https://www.theice.com/products.
272
In the physical market, crude oil and refined oil products are bought and sold in
thousands of trading venues around the world, typically using bilateral contracts. The contracts
are settled using electronic, voice, or in-person transactions involving a variety of producers,
brokers, intermediaries, and end users. Often, Brent and WTI futures prices are used as
benchmark prices in the contracts used to buy and sell physical oil.
Crude Oil Incidents. Extracting, storing, refining, and transporting crude oil, which is
highly flammable, carry ever-present risks of fire and explosion.
1695
They also present a variety
of environmental risks, including oil spills. Past catastrophic events include the 2011 BP
Deepwater Horizon incident involving an oil spill from a deep-sea drilling platform,
1696
the 2010
Kalamazoo River incident involving a ruptured oil pipeline,
1697
and the 1989 Exxon-Valdez
incident involving an oil spill from a shipwrecked oil tanker.
1698
Additionally, crude oil is
extremely toxic and can cause health issues in the event of physical contact, inhalation,
ingestion, or chronic exposure.
1699
Recently, railway transport of oil has also emerged as an environmental and safety issue.
New oilfields using hydraulic fracturing techniques, particularly in the North Dakota Bakken
shale formation, often have no pipeline access, and railroads have increasingly been used to carry
unprecedented volumes of crude oil across the country. According to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the amount of crude oil transported by rail has increased
from about 10,000 carloads in 2005, to 400,000 carloads in 2013.
1700
At a recent forum, the
NTSB described nine “significant” crude oil railway accidents since 2006, involving 2.8 million
gallons of oil.
1701
One of the deadliest oil train crashes occurred in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, on
J uly 6, 2013, when 63 railcars jumped the rails, setting off a chain of explosions and sending
1695
See 2/1/2013 “Safety Data Sheet: Crude Oil, Sweet or Sour,” prepared by J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corp., J P
Morgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobSer...oil.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1320592138413&bl
obheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-
Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
1696
See 1/2011 “Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling,” Report to the President,
prepared by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
1697
See 9/15/2010 prepared testimony of EPA Administrator Lisa P. J ackson, “Enbridge Pipeline Oil Spill new
Marshall, Michigan,” hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/pdfs/enbridge_lpj_testimony_20100915.pdf.
1698
See 5/1989 “The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Report to the President,” prepared by the National Response Team,http://www.akrrt.org/archives/response_reports/exxonvaldez_nrt_1989.pdf.
1699
See 2/1/2013 “Safety Data Sheet: Crude Oil, Sweet or Sour,” prepared by J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corp., J P
Morgan website, at 3,https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobSer...oil.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1320592138413&bl
obheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-
Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
1700
See undated “Rail Accidents Involving Crude Oil and Ethanol Releases,” NTSB report, NTSB website, at slide
2,https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/presentations/Opening Presentation Rail Accide
nts%20Involving%20Crude%20Oil%20and%20Ethanol%20Releases.pdf.
1701
Id. at slide 5. The NTSB reported 16 crude oil and ethanol accidents since 2006. The combined accidents
resulted in “48 fatalities, 281 [derailed tank cars], 2.8 million gallons of crude oil released, 2.0 million gallons of
ethanol released, [and] fires and environmental damage.” Id.
273
burning oil rolling through the small town, resulting in 47 deaths.
1702
The majority of the crude
oil accidents identified by the NTSB occurred in the last eighteen months, five of them since the
J uly 2013 accident: Aliceville, Alabama (November 2103); Casselton, North Dakota (December
2013); New Augusta, Mississippi (J anuary 2014); Plaster Rock, New Brunswick (J anuary 2014);
and Vandergrift, Pennsylvania (February 2014).
1703
Explosions, fires, and oil spills caused
extensive property and environmental damage. While some railroads have voluntarily
strengthened their safety procedures and retrofitted their tank cars and equipment, others have
not.
1704
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Oil
For more than 25 years, Morgan Stanley has been an active participant in physical and
financial oil markets. Acting as an investment bank, the firm began buying and selling both oil
futures and physical barrels of oil in the mid-1980s. Over the next 10 years, Morgan Stanley
gradually increased its involvement in the physical side of the oil industry, purchasing or leasing
oil storage facilities and pipelines; expanding into refined oil products such as heating oil, diesel,
gasoline, and jet fuel; and chartering oil transport ships. From 2006 to 2008, it purchased
companies involved with oil exploration, storage, distribution, pipelines, blending, and even
gasoline service stations. When the financial crisis began roiling markets worldwide, Morgan
Stanley converted to a bank holding company on an emergency basis in September 2008.
Despite its new status as a holding company restricted to the business of banking, with implied
taxpayer backing, Morgan Stanley continued its physical oil activities. In a 2011 internal
analysis, the Federal Reserve wrote that Morgan Stanley “controls a ‘vertically-integrated model’
spanning crude oil production, distillation, storage, land and water transport, and both wholesale
and retail distribution.”
1705
That same year, Morgan Stanley began to reduce its physical oil activities. By 2012, its
revenues were less than half of what they were in 2008.
1706
In 2013, Morgan Stanley began
exiting some of its physical oil activities, and in 2014, took steps to sell major assets.
1707
It has
1702
See 1/21/2014 National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendations, at 2, 6-7,http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/R-14-004-006.pdf (discussing Lac-Mégantic railway derailment). See
also “Who’s liable for the Lac-Mégantic disaster,” Montreal Gazette, Adam Kovac and Riley Sparks (8/10/2013),http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/liable+Mégantic+disaster/8775349/story.html; “The Dark Side of the Oil
Boom,” Politico, Kathryn A. Wolfe and Bob King, (6/8/2014),http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/exploding-
oil-trains-energy-environment-107966.html.
1703
See undated “Rail Accidents Involving Crude Oil and Ethanol Releases,” NTSB report, NTSB website, at slide
4,https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/presentations/Opening Presentation Rail Accide
nts%20Involving%20Crude%20Oil%20and%20Ethanol%20Releases.pdf. See also “The Dark Side of the Oil
Boom,” Politico, Kathryn A. Wolfe and Bob King, (6/8/2014) (analyzing 40 years of federal data showing a
dramatic increase in oil train incidents over the past five years).
1704
See, e.g., 9/2014 “Moving Crude Oil by Rail,” prepared by Association of American Railroads, Association of
American Railroads website,https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-
Papers/Crude%20oil%20by%20rail.pdf.
1705
6/21/2011 “Section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act -- Commodity-related Activities of Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200936 - 941, at 937.
1706
See 2/11/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-02-000001 - 004,
at 002.
1707
See discussion in the overview of Morgan Stanley, above.
274
not yet, however, completely exited the physical oil business, due in part to international
conflicts, and may require another year to do so.
(a) Building a Physical Oil Business
Morgan Stanley first registered with the CFTC as a commodities trader in 1982, initiating
its career as an oil trader in the financial commodity markets.
1708
In a 2010 letter to the Federal
Reserve, Morgan Stanley wrote:
“Morgan Stanley has been trading as principal in crude oil since 1984 and in refined
products since 1985. Over the past 25 years, Morgan Stanley has grown into one of the
preeminent energy trading firms, serving an expansive cross-section of US and foreign
corporations, municipalities and others seeking to access these markets and, as such,
Morgan Stanley provides significant liquidity to these markets.”
1709
Morgan Stanley became active in the physical oil markets around the same time.
According to one oil historian, it began trading crude oil under Louis Bernard, a senior partner at
the firm, and Neal Shear, a commodities trader recruited from J . Aron & Co.
1710
As part of that
effort, the firm also hired two oil traders from oil companies, J ohn Shapiro from Conoco, and
Nancy Kropp from Sun Oil.
1711
The oil historian wrote that, at the same time Morgan Stanley
launched its oil futures trading operation, “[t]o ensure a constant stream of information about the
market’s movements ahead of its rivals,” it leased “a few oil storage containers” in Cushing,
Oklahoma.
1712
As a result, “[h]our by hour, the traders in New York would be aware of whether
there was a surplus or a shortage” of the West Texas Intermediate crude oil that provided the
benchmark price for crude oil futures traded on the NYMEX.
1713
Trading primarily in crude oil, Morgan Stanley gradually increased the size of its oil desk
until, by 1990, it reportedly included 40 people.
1714
In March 1990, Morgan Stanley hired Olav
Refvik, an oil trader from Statoil who, together with J ohn Shapiro, provided the leadership for its
oil commodity activities over the next decade.
1715
By 1993, Morgan Stanley expanded its oil
1708
See undated “Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,” National Futures Association BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=UpygXzt3Ct4=&rn=N. See also 10/10/2014 letter
from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 - 003, at 001.
1709
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174. See also 5/4/2009
“Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Board of
New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, 631 [sealed exhibit] (stating that “Morgan Stanley is one of the largest players
in the physical and financial commodities trading space,” trades “Oil Liquids,” and has been “an active player in the
commodities markets for over 25 years”).
1710
Oil: Money, Politics and Power in the 21st Century, Tom Bower (Grand Central Publishing 2010), at 48 and 49.
1711
Id. at 49.
1712
Id.
1713
Id. See also “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis
(3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570 (indicating that, in 1986, Mr. Shapiro
convinced Morgan Stanley to lease oil storage tanks in Cushing, store low-priced crude oil, and wait for increased
prices).
1714
Bower, at 136.
1715
Id.
275
trading efforts into Canada, Europe and Asia, opening trading desks in Calgary, London,
Singapore, and Tokyo.
1716
Becoming “King of New York Harbor.” At the suggestion of Mr. Refvik, Morgan
Stanley began to lease substantial oil storage facilities, not only in Cushing, Oklahoma, but also
in New York, New J ersey, and Connecticut.
1717
Those facilities were used to store oil
transported to the United States by ship until needed at nearby refineries or shipment to clients
via pipelines that supplied the East Coast. They also enabled Morgan Stanley to store oil while
waiting for better prices. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it entered into its first oil
storage agreement in the New York-New J ersey-Connecticut area with Wyatt Inc. in the late
1980s or early 1990s.
1718
By 1994, it also had oil storage agreements with IMTT-Bayonne in
New J ersey and GATX Terminal Corp. in Staten Island, New York.
1719
Mr. Refvik was
eventually dubbed “King of New York Harbor,”
1720
and reportedly helped integrate Morgan
Stanley’s physical and financial oil trading efforts.
1721
Morgan Stanley records show that, in the month of September 1997, among other
activities, it bought and sold about 7 million of barrels of heating oil, gasoline, and diesel with
over two dozen counterparties in the Northeast.
1722
That same month, it bought and sold about
5.7 million barrels of gasoline with over 40 counterparties in Texas.
1723
It also leased storage
facilities for heating oil, diesel, and kerosene, and at the end of the month, paid taxes on an
inventory of nearly 2 million barrels of heating oil and 951,000 barrels of diesel.
1724
In 1997,
Morgan Stanley also entered into contracts to “process, refine, blend or otherwise alter crude oil
into refined products,” and to transport oil via pipelines and chartered vessels.
1725
(b) Conducting Physical Oil Activities
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities continued to expand over the years and continued
to include storing, supplying, transporting, and processing oil. It conducted those activities
through both its Liquids Oil Desk in the Commodities group and through business subsidiaries
owned by Morgan Stanley Capital Group, its primary commodities trading arm.
Storing Oil. One of Morgan Stanley’s primary physical oil activities was to store vast
quantities of oil in facilities located within the United States and abroad. According to Morgan
1716
Id. at 146.
1717
Id.; 10/10/14 letter from Morgan Stanley’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 -
003, at 001.
1718
10/10/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 - 003, at
001.
1719
Id.
1720
See “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis
(3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570; “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking,
Commerce, and Commodities,” Saule T. Omarova, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 314 (2013).
1721
“Noble Oil Desk Says Goodbye to Refvik, the ‘King of NY Harbor,’” Reuters, David Sheppard (10/23/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/noble-refvik-idAFL1E8LNH2M20121023.
1722
7/8/2010 letter from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174.
1723
Id. at 175.
1724
Id.
1725
Id. at 176.
276
Stanley, in the New York-New J ersey-Connecticut area alone, by 2011, it had leases on oil
storage facilities with a total capacity of 8.2 million barrels, increasing to 9.1 million barrels in
2012, and then decreasing to 7.7 million barrels in 2013.
1726
Morgan Stanley also had storage
facilities in Europe and Asia.
1727
According to the Federal Reserve, by 2012, Morgan Stanley
held “operating leases on over 100 oil storage tank fields with 58 million barrels of storage
capacity globally.”
1728
Morgan Stanley leased its storage facilities from its wholly-owned subsidiary,
TransMontaigne which specialized in oil storage and transport services, and from unrelated third
parties. Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, of the 40 to 50 million barrels of storage
capacity it leased in 2013, it estimated that about 15 million barrels were leased from
TransMontaigne and about 35 million barrels were leased from unrelated third parties.
1729
Morgan Stanley used its storage facilities to build inventories with millions of barrels of
different types of oil. The following chart provides the total Morgan Stanley inventories for five
types of oil products from 2008 to 2012:
Morgan Stanley Physical Oil Inventories
2008-2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Crude Oil 1.1 million 633,000 12.3 million 1.0 million 1.7 million
Heating Oil 7.3 million 15.2 million 11.4 million 9.0 million 5.8 million
Jet/Kerosene 4.6 million 10.6 million 6.6 million 5.8 million 4.0 million
Gasoline 4.5 million 7.6 million 5.3 million 7.5 million 6.2 million
Fuel Oil 974,000 1.8 million 1.9 million 1.4 million 1.7 million
In Barrels
Source: 3/4/2013 letter fromMorgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-03-000002, 007.
Supplying Oil. In addition to storing oil, over the years, Morgan Stanley became an oil
supplier for a variety of end users. From 2008 to 2013, for example, it supplied crude oil to
several refineries. One contract was with a major European oil and chemical company, Ineos
Group Ltd., which had oil refineries in France and Scotland.
1730
Under their agreement, from
1726
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 - 005, at
001-002.
1727
See, e.g., 5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 634 [sealed exhibit].
1728
10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team, (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 485 [sealed exhibit]. See
also 2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for the
Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000001 - 027, at 008 (indicating that, in 2013, Morgan Stanley had “~50
million bbl [barrels] of leased oil liquids storage capacity”).
1729
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/11/2013).
1730
See, e.g., undated “Company: Ineos at a glance,” Ineos website,http://www.ineos.com/company/; 7/23/2007
Ineos press release, “Ineos and Morgan Stanley announce oil refining agreement,”http://www.ineos.com/news/ineos-group/ineos-and-morgan-stanley-announce-oil-refining-
277
2008 to 2012, Morgan Stanley provided the Ineos refineries with a total of about 500 million
barrels of crude oil.
1731
Morgan Stanley also entered into crude oil supply agreements with the
Toledo Refining Company LLC in March 2011, and with Delaware City Refining Company
LLC in April 2011, both of which were later assigned to PBF Holding Company LLC.
1732
Both
agreements have since concluded. In addition, in August 2012, Morgan Stanley entered into an
agreement with Paulsboro Refining Company LLC to purchase its refined oil products; that
contract was also later assigned to PBF Holding Company LLC and has since
ended.
1733
Currently, according to Morgan Stanley, it has no oil supply contracts with any
refineries.
Morgan Stanley also has a long history of supplying home heating oil and diesel to
utilities and other customers in the Northeast. According to one oil historian, Mr. Refvik was
responsible for increasing Morgan Stanley’s involvement with refined oil products like heating
oil, diesel, and jet fuel.
1734
Refined oil products represent a complex market with a variety of
logistical, operational, and financial risks, since over 100 types of crude oil are produced
worldwide, require differing refining procedures in summer and winter, and must be delivered to
an appropriate refinery able to serve specific markets.
1735
In 1991, Mr. Refvik reportedly led Morgan Stanley to purchase an insolvent oil refinery
in Connecticut, and use it to supply heating oil and diesel on a daily basis to customers in the
Northeast.
1736
Over the next few years, Morgan Stanley leased additional oil storage facilities in
New J ersey and Connecticut.
1737
In 2001, during an unexpected cold snap, Morgan Stanley
became a leading supplier of home heating oil in the region, reportedly able to sell oil when
others ran out.
1738
Since 2008, Morgan Stanley has held an inventory of millions of barrels of
home heating oil with a total dollar value of as much as $1.3 billion at a time.
1739
In 2011 alone,
Morgan Stanley purchased 950,000 barrels of home heating oil from the U.S. Heating Reserve
when the reserve switched to a different fuel.
1740
agreement/?business=INEOS+Group; “Morgan Stanley to Supply Crude Oil to Ineos,” Reuters, (7/23/2007),http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/23/morgan-stanley-ineos-idUSL2388575320070723.
1731
See 2009 “Morgan Stanley Global Commodities Overview,” FRB-PSI-618889 – 908. See also 10/24/2014
email from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-22-000001 - 003, at 002. See also,
e.g., “ChinaOil Takes over Morgan Stanley’s Ineos Marketing Deal,” Reuters, Chen Aizhu (3/14/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-morgan-ineos-petrochina-idUSBRE82D06E20120314.
1732
10/24/2014 email from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-22-000001 - 003, at
001.
1733
Id.
1734
Bower, at 136; “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann
Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570.
1735
See, e.g., 12/2/2009 “A Detailed Guide on the Many Different Types of Crude Oil,” Oilprice.com website,http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/A-Detailed-Guide-On-The-Many-Different-Types-Of-Crude-Oil.html.
1736
Bower at 138-139.
1737
See “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis
(3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570.
1738
Id.
1739
See 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 003; 3/4/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, at PSI-MorganStanley-03-000002, 007.
1740
See 2/3/2011 DOE press release, “DOE Accepts Bids for Northeast Home Heating Oil Stocks,”http://energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-accepts-bids-northeast-home-heating-oil-stocks; 2/10/2011 DOE press release,
“DOE Completes Sale of Northeast Home Heating Oil Stocks,”http://energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-completes-sale-
278
From at least 2003 to the present, Morgan Stanley has also been a routine supplier of
physical jet fuel to airlines operating in the United States, as described in more detail below. In
addition, it became the major oil supplier to TransMontaigne, which keeps a variety of fuels at its
storage sites across the country to service client needs.
1741
For example, under a “Terminal
Servicing Agreement,” Morgan Stanley Capital Group sold physical refined oil products on a
“just-in-time” basis to TransMontaigne affiliates which then re-sold them to their customers.
1742
Transporting Oil. In connection with its physical oil storage and supply activities,
Morgan Stanley also became an active participant in the transportation of oil.
1743
It focused in
particular on oil tankers, purchasing ownership interests in companies that handled the logistics
for chartering vessels, including the Heidmar Group and Global Energy International, described
below. According to Morgan Stanley, its shipping operation enabled it to transport physical oil
products from less to more expensive markets and to meet its oil supply obligations.
1744
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2009, Morgan Stanley “was ranked 9
th
globally in shipping
oil distillates,” and by 2012, had “over 100 ships under time charters or voyages for movement
of oil product.”
1745
In addition to oil transport ships, Morgan Stanley, through its wholly-owned subsidiary,
TransMontaigne, moved oil via pipelines, trucks, and railroad cars.
1746
In each mode of
transportation, Morgan Stanley focused on leasing, rather than owning, the vessels, vehicles, or
railways used to move the oil.
Producing and Processing Oil. In addition to storing, supplying, and transporting oil,
Morgan Stanley devoted a small portion of its physical oil business to oil exploration and
production. Rather than purchase companies directly engaged in oil exploration or production,
Morgan Stanley acquired a company that provided financing to those companies. In 2006,
Morgan Stanley became the 99.5% owner of Wellbore Capital, LLC, a Dallas firm which
northeast-home-heating-oil-stocks. The U.S. Heating Reserve was established in 2000, to ensure available supplies
at a reasonable cost in the event of an emergency. See undated “Heating Oil Reserve,” U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Fossil Energy website,http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/heating-oil-reserve. In 2011, the
U.S. Heating Reserve was reduced from 2 million to 1 million barrels, and replaced all of the heating oil with diesel,
a cleaner burning fuel. See undated “Heating Oil Reserve,” U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy
website,http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/heating-oil-reserve.
1741
See, e.g., 11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products
Support,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 124.
1742
Id.
1743
See 6/21/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-06-000001 - 006,
002.
1744
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/11/2013); 2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000001–027, at 016;
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 634, 636 [sealed exhibit].
1745
2012 Summary Report, at 486 [sealed exhibit]. See also 2/11/2013 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Business
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley for the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000001–027, at 008
(indicating that, in 2013, Morgan Stanley had “~100 vessels on average under time and spot charter”).
1746
See, e.g., TransMontaigne website,http://www.transmontaignepartners.com/map/, and information below.
279
“invest
1747
According to its
website, in 2010, Wellbore Capital’s portfolio was valued at $100 million and included oil and
gas working interest investments, including about 90 wells and 65,000 net acres in Texas,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana.
1748
In addition, in 2009, Morgan Stanley acquired a 43.75%
ownership interest in a Wellbore subsidiary, Big C Gathering LLC, which ran a processing
facility for raw crude oil and natural gas.
1749
Acquiring Oil Related Businesses. To conduct its physical oil activities, Morgan
Stanley purchased a number of companies involved in different sectors of the oil market.
According to a 2009 Federal Reserve examination, Morgan Stanley’s “Strategic Transactions
Group,” which designed principal investments for Morgan Stanley within the “Global
Commodities Investments” group, purchased 15 companies from 2006 to 2009.
1750
Three key
acquisitions were TransMontaigne, Olco Petroleum, and Heidmar.
TransMontaigne. On September 1, 2006, in a major expansion of its physical oil
activities, Morgan Stanley purchased TransMontaigne Inc., a company based in Denver,
Colorado and engaged in oil sales, storage, and transport.
1751
TransMontaigne became a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Morgan Stanley Capital Group, the major commodities arm of the financial
holding company, and Morgan Stanley employees took a majority of the seats on
TransMontaigne’s Board of Directors. TransMontaigne became a key contributor to Morgan
Stanley’s physical oil storage, supply, and transport activities.
Through various subsidiaries and affiliates, the TransMontaigne group of companies
offered multiple oil-related supply, storage, and transport services. TransMontaigne Inc.
described itself as “a leading wholesale fuel provider,” offered a variety of unbranded fuels for
sale, and also provided fuel transport services and commercial marine fuel supply.
1752
Its
affiliate, TransMontaigne Partners, provided “integrated terminaling, storage, transportation and
related services for customers engaged in the distribution and marketing of” a variety of oil and
chemical products.
1753
Those products included “gasolines, diesel fuels, heating oil and jet
fuels,” as well as “residual fuel oils and asphalt.”
1754
TransMontaigne’s policy was not to
purchase or market the products that it handled or transported.
1755
1747
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at
008, 034.
1748
See undated “Investments,” Wellbore Capital LLC website,http://www.wellborecapital.com/investments.html.
1749
See 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 031.
1750
See 5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 636 [sealed exhibit].
1751
See 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 029 - 030.
1752
See undated “About TMG,” TransMontaigne Inc. website,http://www.transmontaigne.com/about-tmg/.
1753
2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 5,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm
1754
Id.
1755
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at
013.
280
According to its SEC filings, TransMontaigne maintained storage facilities throughout
the United States, primarily in the Midwest, along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, in Texas,
along the Gulf Coast, and in the Southeast.
1756
Its five key operations involved: (1) receiving
refined oil products from pipeline, ship, barge, or railcar sources and transferring them to storage
tanks located at TransMontaigne terminals; (2) storing the refined oil products in
TransMontaigne tanks; (3) monitoring the volume of the refined products in the tanks; (4)
disbursing the refined oil products out of the tanks using pipelines and other distribution
equipment; and (5) heating residual fuel oils and asphalt stored in the tanks.
1757
In 2013,
Montaigne had nearly 50 storage facilities with a total storage capacity of about 24 million
barrels.
1758
It also had about 140 miles of pipeline.
1759
In addition, the website indicated that a
number of the storage sites could accept or arrange oil delivery or transport via tanker truck,
railway, or vessel.
1760
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, over the years, it typically utilized 60% to
70% of TransMontaigne’s available storage.
1761
In its 2013 annual SEC filing, TransMontaigne
LP reported that “Together, Morgan Stanley Capital Group and TransMontaigne [are] our largest
customer and we receive a substantial majority of our revenue from them.”
1762
According to
Morgan Stanley, in 2012, TransMontaigne – together with all of its subsidiaries -- generated net
revenues totaling nearly $475 million in revenue.
1763
TransMontaigne Inc. is the parent corporation in the TransMontaigne group of
companies. Until 2014, it was 100% owned by Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. which is, in
turn, wholly owned by the Morgan Stanley financial holding company.
1764
Its key subsidiary
was TransMontaigne LP, a publicly traded master limited partnership, over 20% of whose
ownership was retained by Morgan Stanley and TransMontaigne. TransMontaigne LP owned
over a dozen subsidiaries involved in oil storage, distribution, and transportation. The following
chart depicts its ownership structure in 2013.
1765
1756
See 2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 10,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm.
1757
Id.
1758
See undated “Operations Map,” prepared by TransMontaigne, TransMontaigne website,http://www.transmontaigne.com/map/; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1759
See undated “Pipeline Safety,” TransMontaigne website,http://www.transmontaignepartners.com/about-
transmontaigne-limited-partners/pipeline-safety/.
1760
Id.
1761
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1762
2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 36,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm.
1763
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 021, at
017.
1764
2013 TransMontaigne, L.P. Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/11/2014, at 6,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746914002098/a2218768z10-k.htm
1765
Id.
281
TransMontaigne also had operations in Canada, held since 2010 through a wholly-owned
subsidiary, TransMontaigne Canada Holdings Inc. The Canadian operations included over 60 oil
terminals, plants, and pipeline operations.
1766
By 2013, TransMontaigne Canada Holdings Inc.
had three subsidiaries: Canadian Canterm Terminals Inc. (CanTerm), TransMontaigne
Marketing Canada Inc. (TMCI), and TMG Canadian Holdings LLC. The first two subsidiaries
were acquired from Olco Petroleum, described below. The following chart depicts the Canadian
companies.
1767
1766
See undated “Corporate Structure,” TransMontaigne Marketing Canada Inc. website,http://web.archive.org/web/20131209060736/http://transmontaignecanada.ca/index-1.html.
1767
Id.
282
Source: 10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-
005, at 002.
CanTerm operated two marine terminals in Montreal and Quebec City, as well as land
terminals to store petroleum, chemical, and other bulk commodities.
1768
Its marine terminals
offered pipeline, dock lines, truck, and railway connections as well as oil blending operations.
1769
TMCI marketed and distributed oil products like gasoline, biodiesel, and heating oil on a
wholesale basis.
1770
TMG Canadian Holdings LLC owned Olco Petroleum, described below.
1768
See 3/27/2014 Vopak press release, “Vopak acquires two distribution terminals in Canada,”http://www.vopak.com/uploads/tx_vopak/news/03-27_Press_release_Canterm_UK.pdf. See also Canterm Canadian
Terminals, Inc. website,http://web.archive.org/web/20130823051055/http://canterm.com/canterm/en/index.htm.
1769
See undated “Vopak Terminals of Canada - Montreal, Quebec,” Vopak website,http://www.vopak.com/north-
america/vopak-terminals-of-canada-montreal-quebec-cbm.html. See also undated, “Vopak Terminals of Canada -
Quebec City,”http://www.vopak.com/overview/terminal-overview/north-americanorth-america/canada/north-
americavopak-terminals-of-canada-quebec-city-cbm.html.
1770
See 4/2/2013 Parkland Fuel Corporation press release, “Parkland Fuel Corporation Enters Quebec Market with
New Supply Agreement and Assumption of TransMontaigne Business,”http://www.parkland.ca/investors/news/news_post?source=http://parkland.mwnewsroom.com/press-
releases/parkland-fuel-corporation-enters-quebec-market-wit-tsx-pki-201304020864113001&type=1 (describing
TMCI assets).
283
In March 2014, Morgan Stanley sold CanTerm to Vopak Terminals QC Inc.
1771
On J uly
1, 2014, Morgan Stanley sold the rest of TransMontaigne – other than its Canadian holdings – to
NGL Energy Partners LP for $200 million plus an additional $347 million for inventory
transferred at closing.
1772
NGL Energy Partners is a publicly-traded company that owns and
operates a variety of energy businesses focused on oil logistics, water treatment services, and
retail propane.
1773
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it sold TransMontaigne as part of
its larger decision to exit the physical oil merchanting business.
1774
Olco Petroleum. A few months after purchasing TransMontaigne, on December 15,
2006, Morgan Stanley acquired a 60% ownership stake in Olco Petroleum Group Inc. (Olco
Petroleum).
1775
Founded in 1986, Olco Petroleum was a Canadian company which blended,
marketed, and distributed refined oil products in Ontario and Quebec, including gasoline,
propane, and biodiesel fuels.
1776
At the time of purchase, it owned a network of over 200 retail
gasoline stations, some with convenience stores or carwashes, in eastern Canada.
1777
Its holdings
included CanTerm, the oil marketing, terminal, and blending company, described above.
1778
In 2006, Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., through TransMontaigne Inc., took
possession of the Olco shares.
1779
In September 2008, the same month Morgan Stanley became
a bank holding company, it acquired the remaining 40% of Olco Petroleum, making Olco
Petroleum a wholly-owned subsidiary of TransMontaigne Inc.
1780
Olco’s gasoline stations were
gradually sold, but its Canadian storage, marketing, and distribution services continued.
1781
In 2010, Morgan Stanley reorganized Olco, which became Olco Petroleum Group
ULC.
1782
That same year, TransMontaigne reorganized its Canadian holdings, creating the new
holding company, TransMontaigne Canada Holdings, Inc.
1783
One of the subsidiaries of the new
1771
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002.
1772
See 7/2/2014 NGL Energy Partners press release, “NGL Energy Partners LP announces completion of
acquisition of TransMontaigne GP and related assets,”http://www.nglenergypartners.com/investor-relations/news/.
See also “Morgan Stanley to sell oil business TransMontaigne to NGL Energy,” The Wall Street J ournal, J ustin Baer
(06/09/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanley-sells-stake-in-transmontaigne-to-ngl-1402316959.
1773
See undated “About Us,” NGL Energy Partners website,http://www.nglenergypartners.com/about-us/.
1774
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/14/2014).
1775
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002; 2/28/2007 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report, filed with the SEC on 4/6/2007, at 34,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312507075695/d10q.htm. See also “Morgan Stanley
bought 60 pct of Olco Petroleum,” Reuters (2/13/2007),http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/13/idUSN1316645820070213.
1776
See undated “Company Overview of OLCO Petroleum Group Inc.,” Bloomberg Businessweek,http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=875628.
1777
Id.
1778
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002.
1779
Id.
1780
Id.; See 2009 TransMontaigne LP Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 3/8/2010, at 12,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/000104746910001852/a2197078z10-k.htm
1781
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1782
10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001-005, at
002.
1783
Id.
284
holding company was TMG Canadian Holdings LLC, which became the holder of 100% of the
Olco shares, as depicted in the chart above.
1784
In addition, Olco’s subsidiary, CanTerm, was
moved out of Olco to become a stand-alone subsidiary of TransMontaigne Canadian Holdings,
Inc., again as shown in the chart above.
1785
As indicated earlier, Morgan Stanley sold CanTerm in March 2014. When Morgan
Stanley sold TransMontaigne to NGL Energy Partners in J uly 2014, it retained TransMontaigne
Canadian Holdings Inc.
1786
As of October 2014, Morgan Stanley still owns that holding
company, along with Olco Petroleum, continuing its involvement with physical oil storage
facilities and pipelines in Canada.
1787
Heidmar. In 2006, a third key acquisition by Morgan Stanley was taking 100%
ownership of the Heidmar Group Inc., a Connecticut marine logistics company which provided
chartering and scheduling services for a fleet of independently owned oil transport vessels.
1788
Two years later, in 2008, Morgan Stanley sold 49% of its ownership interest to Shipping Pool
Investors Inc. and another 2% to Heidmar executives, leaving Morgan Stanley with a 49%
interest in the company.
1789
Morgan Stanley representatives sit on the Heidmar Board of
Directors.
Founded in 1984, Heidmar Holdings, Inc. is “one of the world’s leading commercial
tanker operators with a fleet of approximately 100 ships.”
1790
It helps deliver “crude oil and
blending components which power the world’s cars, planes, trains, trucks, and heat homes
around the globe.”
1791
Heidmar does not own the ships it operates; it works with independent
owners to form pools of vessels that service certain geographic areas.
1792
It then provides
scheduling, chartering, and related logistics services for clients needing to charter a vessel either
for a specific period of time or for a particular voyage.
Additionally, in 2008, Morgan Stanley purchased a “30% interest in Global Energy
International Limited, a Singapore company that provides international marine services and
supplies bunker fuel and other oil products through its own fleet of 23 vessels.”
1793
1784
Id.
1785
Id.
1786
Id.
1787
Id.
1788
See 5/15/2009 “Morgan Stanley Responses to Permissibility Analysis on Commodities Activities Follow-up,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley for the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200405 - 418, at 412; 2009 “Morgan Stanley Global
Commodities Overview,” FRB-PSI-618889 – 908; 7/16/ 2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-Morgan Stanley-07-000001 - 034, at 007 and 030; 5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities
Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at
637 [sealed exhibit].
1789
2012 Morgan Stanley Annual Report, filed with the SEC on 2/26/2013, at 3,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312513077191/d484822d10k.htm; undated “About,”
Heidmar Inc. website,http://www.heidmar.com/history/.
1790
Undated “About,” Heidmar Inc. website,http://www.heidmar.com/what-we-do/.
1791
Id.
1792
Id.
1793
7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at
007.
285
Morgan Stanley relied on the ships provided by Heidmar and Global Energy to meet its
oil supply obligations and to locate, buy and transport oil cargoes around the world.
1794
In 2009,
Morgan Stanley shipped about 16.3 million barrels of oil per month in about 165 vessel
movements, using either ships or barges.
1795
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that while it
used to charter about 100 vessels per month, by 2014, it was down to leasing 10 to 15 vessels per
month.
1796
Incidents. Morgan Stanley oil-related subsidiaries occasionally experienced accidents or
incidents involving oil. Since 2006, TransMontaigne, has had 36 incidents recorded in the
database kept by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHSMA).
1797
Two incidents resulted in consent agreements with states.
The first, on October 3, 2006, involved about 70,500 gallons of regular unleaded gasoline which
overflowed the top of a tank in Rogers, Arkansas; the tank was owned and operated by
TransMontaigne Partners LP and its subsidiary Razorback, LLC.
1798
According to the consent
agreement with the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (DOEQ), about 9,000 cubic
yards of contaminated soil had to be excavated and treated on site.
1799
Another 17,800 gallons of
gasoline were also removed.
1800
Another incident took place on J anuary 28, 2010, when a
pipeline ruptured in Fairfax County, Virginia and discharged about 280 gallons of diesel fuel into
a nearby body of water.
1801
TransMontaigne paid a civil fine of about $114,000.
1802
Of the 36
incidents, six involved cargo tank crashes or derailments in which gasoline or diesel fuel were
released and were considered “serious incidents” by the Hazardous Materials Information
System (HMIS).
1803
There were no hazardous materials-related injuries or fatalities in those six
incidents, and the total amount of damages ranged between $146,000 to $553,000.
1804
(c) Exiting the Physical Oil Business
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, in 2013, it decided that it would refocus its
commodities activities to become more “customer driven.”
1805
As part of that decision, Morgan
1794
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 634 [sealed exhibit].
1795
Id.
1796
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1797
See 10/27/2014 “Incident Reports Database Search,” PHSMA Office of Hazardous Materials Safety website,https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/search.aspx (using search term “TransMontaigne” in the
classification of “Shipper/Offeror”).
1798
In re TransMontaigne Partners, L.P., Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality, Consent Administrative
Order, at 2 (5/19/2010),http://www.adeq.state.ar.us/ftproot/Pub/WebDatabases/Legal/CAO/LIS_Files/10-086.pdf.
1799
Id.
1800
Id.
1801
State Water Control Board Enforcement Action – Order by Consent Issued to TransMontaigne Operating
Company L.P. at 3, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (8/4/2011),http://www.deq.virginia.gov/Portals...lOrders/TransMontaigneOperatingAug042011.pdf.
1802
Id. at 4.
1803
See 10/27/2014 “Incident Reports Database Search,” PHSMA Office of Hazardous Materials Safety website,https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/search.aspx (using search term “TransMontaigne” in the
classification of “Shipper/Offeror,” and selecting for crashes or derailments).
1804
Id.
1805
Subcommittee briefings by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014 and 9/11/2014).
286
Stanley told the Subcommittee that “Morgan Stanley has decided to exit certain of its physical
commodities business lines, including its global physical oil merchanting business and its
investment in TransMontaigne, Inc.”
1806
Declining Revenues. In 2009, a Federal Reserve examination reported that Morgan
Stanley’s global oil business had produced nearly 60% of the revenues generated by the
Commodities group and called it “the most important source of revenues.”
1807
According to
Morgan Stanley, while its oil liquids business has generated revenues and profits in every fiscal
year since 2008, its revenues and profits have steadily declined.
1808
The following chart shows
the decline in revenues:
Morgan Stanley Oil Desk Net Revenues
2008-2013
Source: 7/16/2013 and 10/17/2014 letters fromMorgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee,
PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034, at 005 and PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 - 005, at 003.
To implement its decision to exit the physical oil business, as explained earlier, in J uly
2014, Morgan Stanley sold TransMontaigne to NGL Energy Partners, although it retained some
assets, including TransMontaigne’s holdings in Canada.
1809
Morgan Stanley also attempted to
sell to Rosneft Oil Company a number of the global physical oil assets held by Morgan Stanley
Commodities, primarily through Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. in the United States, and by
Morgan Stanley International Holdings, Inc. internationally.
1810
Morgan Stanley entered into a sales agreement with a subsidiary of Rosneft Oil Company
on December 20, 2013.
1811
Rosneft is a Russian state-owned corporation that is the country’s
1806
9/19/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-13-000001 - 009, at
003.
1807
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 633 [sealed exhibit]. See also 5/7/2009 “Global Commodities
Overview,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-618889 - 908, at 897.
1808
7/1/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley to FRBNY, FRB-PSI-302759 - 768, at 768; 10/17/2014 letters from
Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 - 005, at 003.
1809
See 10/17/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-19-000001 -
005, at 002.
1810
See 10/10/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-17-000001 -
003, at 002.
1811
See 12/20/2013 Morgan Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to Sell Global Oil Merchanting Business to
Rosneft,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
Fiscal Year Net Revenues
2008 $1.3 billion
2009 $1.2 billion
2010 $822 million
2011 $677 million
2012 $676 million
287
largest petroleum company and third largest gas producer.
1812
The agreement covered Morgan
Stanley’s physical oil inventories, storage leases, shipping charters, blending services, supply
contracts, and its 49% stake in Heidmar, among other assets.
1813
The transaction was expected to
close during the second half of 2014, after regulatory approvals.
1814
The Federal Trade
Commission provided its approval on J une 17, 2014.
1815
The European Commission provided it
approval on September 4, 2014.
1816
In March 2014, however, as a result of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine’s Crimean
peninsula, the United States government imposed sanctions on a number of Russian individuals
and entities, including companies that operate in the energy sector.
1817
In September 2014, the
United States expanded the sanctions, specifically naming Rosneft as one of the energy
companies.
1818
Morgan Stanley has indicated publicly that, because of the sanctions, the sale
may not be finalized.
1819
If the sale is not concluded, Morgan Stanley has indicated it will
continue to look for a buyer.
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Crude Oil Activities
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities raise multiple concerns, including the wholesale
mixing of banking and commerce; financial, operational and catastrophic event risks; insufficient
capital and insurance coverage to protect against potential losses; conflicts of interest arising
from controlling crude oil supplies while trading crude oil financial instruments; and the need for
stronger safeguards.
1812
See 7/16/2014 U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, “Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities
Within the Financial Services and Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those
Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx.
1813
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/14/2014). See also 6/30/2014 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report,
filed with the SEC on 8/5/2014, at 113,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514295874/d763478d10q.htm; 12/20/2013 Morgan
Stanley press release, “Morgan Stanley to Sell Global Oil Merchanting Business to Rosneft,”http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
1814
See 6/30/2014 Morgan Stanley Quarterly Report, filed with the SEC on 8/5/2014, at 113,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312514295874/d763478d10q.htm.
1815
6/17/2014 “20141062: Rosneft Oil Company; Morgan Stanley,” Federal Trade Commission Premerger
Notification Program, FTC website,http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-
termination-notices/20141062.
1816
“EU executive clears acquisition of Morgan Stanley’s oil unit by Rosneft,” Reuters, (9/4/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-rosneft-morgan-stanley-idUSKBN0GZ0ZP20140904.
1817
See undated “Ukraine and Russia sanctions,” U.S. Department of State website,http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.
1818
See 9/12/2014 U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions
within the Russian Financial Services, Energy, and Defense or Related Material Sectors,”http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2629.aspx. “Treasury has also imposed sanctions that
prohibit the exportation of goods, services (not including financial services), or technology in support of exploration
or production for Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil, to five
Russian energy companies – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Rosneft – involved in these types
of projects.” Id.
1819
See, e.g., “Morgan Stanley says ‘no assurance’ Rosneft deal will close,” Reuters (10/10/2014),http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/morgan-stanley-rosneft-idUSL2N0S524L20141010.
288
(a) Mixing Banking with Commerce
Morgan Stanley spent 25 years building a vast physical oil business, involving producing,
refining, storing, transporting and supplying oil products. That vast commercial physical oil
enterprise is not the type of financial activity that, under U.S. law and practice, was envisioned as
appropriate for a bank or bank holding company.
Because Morgan Stanley was immersed in physical oil activities prior to 1997, and was
still engaged in them when it converted to a bank holding company in 2008, those activities are
more appropriately protected from divestiture by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley grandfather clause
than, for example, its compressed natural gas venture which was begun five years after it became
a bank holding company. But even those Morgan Stanley commercial business activities that are
protected by grandfather status raise the same concerns that led to bans on mixing banking with
commerce in the first place. Those concerns include, as discussed in Chapter 2, unfair economic
advantages due to the bank holding company’s access to inexpensive credit from its subsidiary
bank; unfair informational advantages due to the bank holding company’s access to non-public
information from its commercial and client activities; conflicts of interest that can arise between
the bank holding company and its clients when competing commercially; potential distortions of
credit decisions by an affiliated bank that wants to support its holding company; the dangers of
market manipulation; increased bank and systemic risks arising from industrial activities; and the
undue concentration of economic power that results when a bank holding company becomes a
major player, not only in the provision of credit, but also in a vital energy sector. On top of those
concerns is the reality of a bank holding company with so many complex enterprises in so many
geographic areas that it becomes too big to manage or regulate.
In its 2012 report, the FRBNY Commodities Team that conducted the broad review of
financial holding company involvement with physical commodities expressed “
[c]oncerns” that their engagement in “commercial/physical commodity activities breaches the
separation of banking and commerce and place
net.”
1820
As stated earlier, to conduct its physical oil activities, Morgan Stanley has relied on the
grandfather clause. The grandfather clause has one built-in safeguard – a volume limit
prohibiting grandfathered activities from exceeding 5% of the holding company’s consolidated
assets. For Morgan Stanley, that limit is so high – 5% of $833 billion or $41 billion – that it
functions as no limit at all.
1821
While the Federal Reserve could have imposed a lower limit to
ensure grandfathered activities are operated in a safe and sound manner, it has not yet done so.
1820
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200482 [sealed exhibit]. See also undated but likely early 2011
“Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs between 1997 to Present,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 429 [sealed exhibit] (expressing concern about “industrial
activities [that have] created new and increased potential liability for firms with access to the federal safety net
supporting the banking system”).
1821
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies,” Form FR Y-9C, filed by Morgan
Stanley with the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve website,http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/FinancialReport.aspx?parID_RSSD=2162966&parDT=20140630&parRpt
Type=FRY9C&redirectPage=FinancialReport.aspx .
289
The details of Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities illustrate how far financial holding
companies have been allowed to crossthe line between banking and commerce. While Morgan
Stanley is currently reducing its physical oil activities, other banks may attempt to enter the
physical oil business, unless better safeguards are put in place.
(b) Multiple Risks
Morgan Stanley’s physical oil business creates multiple risks that don’t normally
confront a bank. Oil products are flammable and explosive. Oil spill and other catastrophic
event risks surround multiple aspects of Morgan Stanley’s physical oil activities, from oil
transport ships, tanker trucks, and railway cars, to ruptured pipelines and storage facilities.
Financial risks also pose a threat, especially in the case of huge oil inventories. From September
to October 2014, crude oil prices fell 20%, from about $100 to $80 per barrel, immediately
depressing the dollar value of physical inventories and disrupting the economics of oil transport
and supply contracts.
Valuation risks are another area of concern. In 2009, Federal Reserve examiners
reviewing Morgan Stanley’s physical commodities activities wrote:
“Examiners noted complex risks around valuation and risk measurement of the oil
storage business. Market risk involved appears material; as per 2008 backtesting results,
the Firm lost $152 [million] on a single trading day … attributable to market movements
in oil storage. Furthermore, differences exist in the income recognition regimes between
GAAP accounting, which requires marking oil in storage to spot prices, and Morgan
Stanley’s internal economic valuation based on the oil storage model ….”
1822
Still another set of concerns involves Morgan Stanley’s efforts to mitigate the risks posed
by its physical oil activities, including from an oil-related incident. The Federal Reserve
Commodities Team found that Morgan Stanley, among other financial holding companies, had
allocated insufficient levels of capital and insurance to cover potential losses. The 2012
Summary Report noted at one point that, while Morgan Stanley had calculated a potential oil
spill risk of $360 million, through “aggressive assumptions” and “diversification benefits,” it had
reduced that total by nearly 70% to $54 million, allocating risk capital for only that much smaller
amount.
1823
The 2012 Summary Report also noted that insurance for catastrophic events in oil
shipping is typically capped at $1 billion, “and firms cannot cover any amount beyond the cap
through insurance.”
1824
In addition, the Federal Reserve Commodities Team determined that the
potential losses associated with an “extreme loss scenario” at four financial holding companies,
including Morgan Stanley, would exceed the capital and insurance coverage at each financial
holding company by $1 billion to $15 billion.
1825
That shortfall leaves the Federal Reserve, and
1822
5/4/2009 “Morgan Stanley Commodities Risk Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-304627 - 645, at 629 [sealed exhibit].
1823
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 - 494 [sealed exhibit].
1824
Id. at 491.
1825
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
290
U.S. taxpayers, at risk of having to provide financial support to Morgan Stanley should a
catastrophic event occur.
In addition to the catastrophic event, valuation, insurance and capital concerns, the
Morgan Stanley case history shows how a multi-million-dollar sale of oil assets can collapse
from unrelated political events. Even exiting the business has risks.
(c) Conflicts of Interest
Morgan Stanley has stated openly that its physical oil activities provide valuable market
information to its traders in the financial markets. Here’s how one 2005 article described Morgan
Stanley’s physical commodity activities and comments by one of its leaders, J ohn Shapiro:
“Having access to barges and storage tanks and pipelines gives the bank additional
options, to move or store commodities, that most energy traders don’t pursue. And by
having its finger on the pulse of the business, it hopes to get a more subtle feel for the
market, a crucial asset to a trader.
‘Being in the physical business tells us when markets are oversupplied or undersupplied,’
says Mr. Shapiro. ‘We’re right there seeing terminals filling up and emptying.’”
1826
A Federal Reserve analysis made a similar point, noting:
“The relationship of the firms [Morgan Stanley and Goldman] with their wholly and
partially owned companies is not that of a passive investor. In addition to the financial
return, these direct investments provide MS [Morgan Stanley] … with important
asymmetrical information on conditions in the physical markets such as production and
supply/demand information, etc., which a market participant without physical global
infrastructure would not necessarily be privy to.”
1827
While U.S. commodities laws do not bar the use of non-public information by traders in
the financial markets in the same way as securities laws, concerns about unfair trading
advantages deepen when the commodities trader is a major financial institution with access to
significant non-public information.
Additional questions involve whether any Morgan Stanley personnel ever stepped over
the line by playing the physical markets off the financial markets to manipulate oil prices.
1828
Those types of suspicions would not arise if Morgan Stanley were not trading in both the
physical and financial oil markets at the same time.
1826
“Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110971828745967570.
1827
Undated but likely early 2011 “Comparison of Risks of Commodity Activities at Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs between 1997 to Present,” prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200428 - 454, at 439 [sealed exhibit].
1828
See, e.g., “U.S. Suit Sees Manipulation of Oil Trades,” New York Times, Graham Bowley (5/24/2011),http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/business/global/25oil.html?_r=0 (discussing cases charging market
manipulation of oil prices).
291
(4) Analysis
The three financial holding companies examined by the Subcommittee were heavily
involved with both financial and physical oil activities. While Morgan Stanley is currently
reducing those activities, it still operates a vast physical oil business. Physical oil activities raise
a host of troubling questions, from catastrophic event risks to valuation problems to financial
risks to market manipulation issues. The risks permeating the physical oil business call out for
increased capital and insurance to cover potential losses and protect taxpayers from being asked
to step in after a disaster. Market manipulation opportunities require additional oversight and
preventative safeguards. It is past time for the Federal Reserve to provide guidance on the scope
of the grandfather clause and enforce overdue safeguards on this high risk physical commodity
activity.
292
D. Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel
Morgan Stanley has sometimes explained the benefits of its participation in physical oil
activities by highlighting its role in providing jet fuel to an airline during and after
bankruptcy.
1829
Morgan Stanley has been involved with physical jet fuel for many years, as a
subset of the physical oil activities examined in the prior section. While its jet fuel supply,
transport, credit intermediation, and hedging services have sometimes benefited airlines, they
have also at times imposed costs that hurt rather than helped the airlines involved. In two
specific cases reviewed by the Subcommittee, the airlines appear to have determined that
Morgan Stanley’s services were not worth the cost and have discontinued their participation in
jet fuel agreements with Morgan Stanley.
(1) Background on Jet Fuel
J et fuel is one of several specialized types of fuel derived from crude oil.
1830
During the
refining process, a complex separation procedure divides crude oil into materials needed for
several types of refined oil products, including jet fuel.
1831
The separation process takes place at
crude oil refineries which then store the resulting jet fuel until it is shipped.
1832
Due to the many
different crude oils and refining procedures available, many different grades of jet fuel can be
produced. Morgan Stanley has identified 80 different jet fuel markets around the world.
1833
The primary commercial end-users of jet fuel are airlines. In recent years, jet fuel has
also become the largest annual expense for many airlines. One major domestic airline told the
Subcommittee that its fuel costs were by far its largest expense, totaling $12 billion in 2013,
roughly 34% of its total annual expenses.
1834
A non-U.S. airline also identified jet fuel as its
largest expense, reporting 2013 jet fuel costs of nearly $8.35 billion, 39% of its operating
costs.
1835
1829
See, e.g., 4/17/2014 public comment letter submitted by Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve in connection
with the Federal Reserve’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities
(hereinafter, “2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter”), at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-
1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1830
10/24/2011 presentation, “An Introduction to Petroleum Refining and the Production of Ultra Low Sulfur
Gasoline and Diesel Fuel,” prepared by MathPro, Inc. for the International Council on Clean Transportation, at 2,http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT05_Refining_Tutorial_FINAL_R1.pdf.
1831
Id.
1832
Id.
1833
2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6.
1834
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014). See also 2/20/2014 United Airlines10-K filing with the
SEC, at 6,http://ir.unitedcontinentalholdings.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=83680&p=irol-
SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJ kLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lwYWdlPTk0MTAxMzgm
RFNFUT0wJ lNFUT0wJ lNRREVTQz1TRUNUSU9OX0VOVElSRSZzdWJ zaWQ9NTc%3d#tx624298_10 (listing
its 2013 jet fuel-related expenses at $13.14 billion and its total operating expenses in 2013 as $37 billion).
1835
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 001;
See 2013 - 14 Annual Report, Emirates Group, at 52,http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_report_2014.pdf.
293
Supplying and Transporting Jet Fuel. Most jet fuel suppliers are large oil or refining
companies, including BP, Chevron, Exxon, Shell and Valero, which are not only involved in the
production of jet fuel, but also typically have arrangements in place to transport the fuel to the
airports where it is needed.
1836
J et fuel is most commonly transported via pipelines, oil transport vessels, or tanker
trucks.
1837
After being refined, jet fuel suppliers typically transport the fuel to one of several
large oil storage facilities in the United States.
1838
From there, the fuel is typically transported to
storage tanks at airports.
1839
Since each phase of transportation and storage could corrupt the
quality of the fuel, each phase is heavily regulated, and the jet fuel is closely monitored.
1840
Transporting jet fuel requires adherence to a special set of operation and maintenance
requirements.
1841
For example, jet fuel transportation pipelines must operate within strict
parameters for flow rate, pressurization, filtration, and internal coating to mitigate corrosion.
1842
J et fuel is also classified as a “static accumulator,” and requires treatment with certain additives
while in transit to prevent issues with its electrical conductivity.
1843
Airports are also subject to
extensive regulation regarding how jet fuel is to be delivered, stored, and dispensed for end
use.
1844
Jet Fuel Prices. J et fuel prices have a history of volatility. J et fuel prices vary across the
country and experienced 20% price swings in 2013.
1845
Typically, the price of jet fuel is
determined by referencing the average price from the previous week as recorded by Platts, an
information company that provides benchmark price assessments for a variety of
commodities.
1846
Because the jet fuel market is relatively small, analysts often use the price of
crude oil as an indicator for the price of jet fuel. The recent 20% drop in crude oil prices could
translate into lower jet fuel prices as well.
1847
The following chart tracks the jet fuel price
changes over the past five years.
1836
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1837
“J et Fuel Pipelines and Storage Require Special Operation, Maintenance Considerations,” Anup Sera & Mott
MacDonald, Pipeline and Gas J ournal, Volume 236 No. 12 (December 2009),http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.co...torage-require-special-operation-maintenance-
considerations?page=show.
1838
Id.
1839
Id.
1840
Id.
1841
Id.
1842
Id.
1843
Id.
1844
See, e.g., “Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing,” National Fire Prevention Association § 407(4)-(5) (2012);
“Standard for J et Fuel Quality Control at Airports,” Air Transport Association of America, Specification 103,
Revision 2006.1 (2006); see also “Are You Complying With J et Fuel Regulations?,” Millennium Systems
International (10/3/2014),http://www.millenniumsystemsintl.com/techarticles/airbeat_julaug03.htm.
1845
See “US Airlines Find Fuel for Less in 2013 … But Not Everywhere,” Platts: The Barrel Blog, Matt Kohlman
(8/2/2013),http://blogs.platts.com/2013/08/02/jet-shifts/. See also “Spot Prices: Crude Oil in Dollars per Barrel,
Products in Dollars per Gallon,” U.S. Energy Information Administration website (10/29/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm. .
1846
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1847
“Spot Prices: Crude Oil in Dollars per Barrel, Products in Dollars per Gallon,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration website (10/29/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm.
294
Source: “J et Fuel Price,” AirportWatch (10/8/2014),http://www.airportwatch.org.uk/?page_id=2092.
In the financial markets, jet fuel can be traded through futures, options, swaps, and
forwards, both on exchange and over-the-counter. The New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) lists several types of jet fuel options and futures.
1848
The IntercontinentalExchange
(ICE) lists 19 different jet fuel swap contracts.
1849
The financial market for jet fuel is
substantially smaller than the financial market for crude oil, with fewer participants and
outstanding contracts.
1850
U.S. airlines are active in both the physical and financial jet fuel markets. The
Subcommittee was told that, today, U.S. airlines employ a number of different methods to hedge
their jet fuel costs. Many airlines hedge only a portion of their fuel for only specified periods of
time. Of the major U.S. airlines, for example, United Airlines generally hedges a portion of its
jet fuel costs for the next year; Southwest Airline generally hedges a portion of its jet fuel costs
for the next four to five years; and Delta Airlines, which purchased its own jet fuel refinery in
2012, trades aggressively in the jet fuel markets on an ongoing basis; while U.S. Airways and
1848
See “CME Group All Products – Codes and Slate,” CME Group (10/2/2014),http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/products/#pageNumber=1&sortField=oi&sortAsc=false&subGroup=18.
1849
See “ICE OTC Products List: Crude Oil and Refined Products,” Intercontinental Exchange (8/2012),https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_OTC_Cleared_Product_List.pdf.
1850
Compare “Gulf Coast J et (Platts) Up-Down Volume,” CME Group (10/20/2014),http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/ene...st-jet-fuel-vs-nymex-no-2-heating-oil-platts-
spread-swap_quotes_volume_voi.html (listing 100 total jet fuel futures contracts traded on the NYMEX October 20,
2014); with “Crude Oil Volume,” CME Group (October 20, 2014),http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-
oil/light-sweet-crude_quotes_volume_voi.html?foi=O&41927.50656=(listing almost 595,000 total crude oil futures
and options traded on the NYMEX during the same time frame).
295
American Airlines have generally stopped hedging altogether.
1851
Those differing approaches
indicate there is no consensus among end-users on how to effectively control jet fuel price risks.
Jet Fuel Incidents. In addition to financial risks, jet fuel poses both safety and
environmental risks. J et fuel is categorized as a combustible, highly toxic material subject to
regulation under the federal Toxic Substances Control Act.
1852
It is extremely flammable both as
a liquid and a gas, and exposure to certain oxidizing agents or sources of ignition can result in a
flash fire or explosion.
1853
Handling the fuel involves exposure to toxic substances and can
result in physical infirmities.
1854
Transporting high volumes of jet fuel carries the risk of a large-
scale environmental incident, such as an oil spill. J et fuel incidents cover a variety of fact
patterns. Incidents include a tanker truck crash that released 10,000 gallons of jet fuel that
ignited and engulfed a highway ramp;
1855
a 2010 spill of jet fuel from a tanker truck crash in
Massachusetts;
1856
an emergency release of 5,000 gallons of jet fuel into U.S. waters by an
aircraft during an emergency landing;
1857
the theft of a jet fuel tanker truck from a Houston
airport;
1858
and a jet fuel contamination event that caused landing difficulties for an aircraft
carrying 322 passengers.
1859
(2) Morgan Stanley Involvement with Jet Fuel
Morgan Stanley has been participating in physical jet fuel activities since at least 2003.
Since then it has stored and transported millions of barrels of jet fuel per year, while participating
in financial transactions to hedge volatile jet fuel costs. Over a ten-year period from 2003 to
2013, Morgan Stanley became the primary jet fuel supplier for United Airlines. For a four-year
period, from 2004 to 2008, it entered into a series of hedges with the airlines Emirates to manage
its price risks. In both cases, Morgan Stanley’s activities produced mixed results for the airlines.
1851
See, e.g., “US Airlines are Taking the Hedge Off on J et Fuel,” Platts, Matthew Kohlman, David Elward, and Su
Yeen Chong (9/1/2014),http://blogs.platts.com/2014/09/01/us-airlines-hedging/; “How Delta Bought A Refinery
And Wound Up Saving Its Rivals A Ton Of Cash,” Business Insider, Benjamin Zhang (9/1/2014),http://www.businessinsider.com/delta-airlines-fuel-prices-2014-8#ixzz3GhARNyYq; “The ‘Fixer’ at Southwest
Airlines,” CNBC, Kate Kelly (5/2/2012),http://www.cnbc.com/id/47254760#.; Subcommittee briefing by United
Airlines (10/9/2014).
1852
“J et Fuel/Kerosene Hazards Identification,” J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (6/2/2008), at 9-11,https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobSer...el.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1158593470387&blo
bheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-
Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
1853
Id. at 7.
1854
Id. at 5-9.
1855
3/13/2001 Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management press release, “Driver of Tanker Truck
Charged; Tipover Caused Major J et Fuel Spill Last Summer,”http://www.dem.ri.gov/news/2001/pr/0313012.htm.
1856
See, e.g., 6/2010 “After Incident Report[:] Foxboro J et Fuel Tanker Spill,” prepared by MassDEP Field
Assessment and Support Team,http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dep/cleanup/sites/fox610.pdf.
1857
See, e.g., 5/6/2009 Washington State Department of Ecology press release, “Ecology will not take enforcement
action against Asiana Airlines,”http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2009news/2009-102.html.
1858
See, e.g., “Trespasser jumps fence, steals truck with jet fuel from Hobby Airport,” KHOU.com news station
(7/24/2014),http://www.khou.com/story/news/investigations/2014/07/29/12673286/.
1859
Undated description of 4/13/2010 incident, “A333, Hong Kong China, 2010 (LOC RE GND FIRE),” Skybrary,http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/A333,_Hong_Kong_China,_2010_(LOC_RE_GND_FIRE). See also undated
“Misfueling,” prepared by AOPA Air Safety Foundation,http://www.aopa.org/-
/media/Files/AOPA/Home/Pilot%20Resources/ASI/Safety%20Briefs/SB04.pdf.
296
United eventually ended its fuel supply agreement with Morgan Stanley, after determining it
could procure its own jet fuel at a lower cost. The Emirates Airline eventually ended its jet fuel
hedging with Morgan Stanley after its hedging led to an unexpected $440 million expense for the
airline.
(a) Storing, Supplying, and Transporting Jet Fuel Generally
Morgan Stanley has acted as a jet fuel supplier for airlines since at least 2003, when it
won a contract to supply jet fuel to United Airlines.
1860
In 2005, a media report provided this
description of its efforts:
“United Airlines, fighting intense financial pressure, decided in late 2003 it needed a
better way to get fuel to its planes. To get that job done, it went to an unusual place:
Morgan Stanley.
Now, employees of the bank scour the world for jet fuel for the airline. They charter
barges, lease pipelines and schedule tanker trucks, delivering more than a billion gallons
a year to United’s hubs. They even send inspectors to make sure no one tampers with the
stuff.”
1861
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, between 2008 and 2012, it maintained jet
fuel inventories of between 4 million and 10.6 million barrels per year.
1862
The following chart
shows those jet fuel inventories peaking in 2009, maintaining high volumes in 2010 and 2011,
and then declining in 2012:
Morgan Stanley Physical Jet Fuel Inventories
2008-2012
Jet Fuel/Kerosene 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Barrels in Storage 4.6 million 10.6 million 6.6 million 5.8 million 4.0 million
Dollar Value $272 million $934 million $703 million $713 million $521 million
Barrels in Transit 2.6 million 6.6 million 6.5 million 5.7 million 4.1 million
Dollar Value $165 million $594 million $700 million $709 million $532 million
Source: 7/16/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-03-000002 - 003.
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that it stored its jet fuel at over 50 storage
facilities across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Asia.
1863
They included a small number
of facilities managed by its then wholly-owned subsidiary, TransMontaigne, which had multiple
1860
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). In a 2010 letter to the Federal Reserve, Morgan Stanley
asserted that it had engaged in physical and financial trading of jet fuel “as of September 30, 1997,” but did not
provide any specific evidence showing that it handled physical jet fuel on or before that date. See 7/8/2010 letter
from Morgan Stanley to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200173 - 182, at 174.
1861
“Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110971828745967570,00.html.
1862
7/16/2013 Letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 -
034, at 002 - 003, 022.
1863
4/12/2013 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-04-000001 - 007,
at 005 - 007; Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
297
sites in the United States;
1864
by its indirect subsidiary, Canterm Canadian Terminals, which had
storage facilities in Canada;
1865
and by Aircraft Fuel Supply B.V., a Dutch company which
stored jet fuel in the Netherlands and in which Morgan Stanley held a minority ownership
interest.
1866
Morgan Stanley also indicated that, between 2008 and 2012, it transported up to 6.6
million barrels of jet fuel per year, as shown in the above chart.
1867
Morgan Stanley told the
Subcommittee that it purchased jet fuel in markets around the world, and often transported the
fuel by ship to other markets, including ships chartered through its subsidiaries, Heidmar and
Global Energy International.
1868
Its search for lower-cost jet fuel cargoes was illustrated in a
2011 news report which noted that Morgan Stanley had purchased two jet fuel cargoes in
Singapore, each containing “100,000 barrels at 10 cents a barrel over benchmark quotes, the
smallest premium in a week.”
1869
Morgan Stanley was reported as obtaining lower prices than
two other firms described in the article.
1870
According to Morgan Stanley, since 2003, it has supplied jet fuel to a variety of airlines,
including United Airlines, US Airways, American Airlines, Emirates Airlines, Southwest
Airlines, and Societe Air France. To better understand Morgan Stanley’s involvement with jet
fuel, the Subcommittee examined more closely its interactions with two of those airlines, United
and Emirates.
(b) Supplying Jet Fuel to United Airlines
Morgan Stanley, through its subsidiary Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., first entered
into a long-term contract to supply jet fuel to United Airlines in 2003.
1871
Prior to that
agreement, United had been procuring jet fuel for its own operations,
1872
and, according to
Morgan Stanley, maintaining up to a month’s inventory of fuel which was “creating significant
operational overhead and a need for costly financing.”
1873
In 2003, while United was
1864
See discussion in prior section about TransMontaigne.
1865
See discussion in prior section about Canterm.
1866
8/1/2013 Letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-08-000001.
1867
7/16/2013 Letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to the Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-07-000001 - 034,
at 002-003, 022.
1868
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also discussion in prior section about Heidmar and
Global Energy International; 2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-
1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1869
“Morgan Stanley Buys J et Fuel at Reduced Premium: Oil Products,” Bloomberg, Yee Kai Pin (10/20/2011),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-...et-fuel-at-reduced-premium-oil-products.html.
1870
Id.
1871
Feb. 2013 Morgan Stanley Commodities: Business Overview, PSI-MorganStanley-01-000010, at 10; 11/3/2009
“Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122; Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1872
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014). See also “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-
Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110971828745967570,00.html.
1873
2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter”), at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-
1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
298
maintaining that inventory and transporting jet fuel, its parent corporation was undergoing
bankruptcy reorganization.
1874
In an effort to free up the cash required to maintain its fuel
supply operations, United issued a general solicitation seeking bids on a contract to take over that
function.
1875
Morgan Stanley won the contract, which was finalized in early 2004, and approved
by the bankruptcy court.
1876
Supplying the Jet Fuel. The agreement originally had a term of three years.
1877
Under
the agreement, United transferred virtually all of its jet fuel assets to Morgan Stanley, including a
jet fuel inventory then worth several hundred million dollars, storage tanks at various locations,
pipeline space, supply agreements, and trading activity, in exchange for a large cash payment
from Morgan Stanley.
1878
Morgan Stanley, for its part, promised to supply jet fuel to United at
market prices using the average jet fuel price during the prior week published by Platts, with a
differential added for certain locations.
1879
United generally paid Morgan Stanley shortly before
delivery of the fuel.
1880
Morgan Stanley agreed to deliver the jet fuel at specified locations, including directly to
storage tanks at some airports.
1881
Morgan Stanley also agreed to purchase any excess stored jet
fuel from United.
1882
Morgan Stanley bore title and all “risk of loss” for the jet fuel stored at an
airport location until United removed the jet fuel from the airport storage facility.
1883
United and Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that, under the agreement, Morgan
Stanley supplied “most” of United’s domestic fuel needs, but not all.
1884
United explained that,
for example, at O’Hare Airport where it had substantial fuel requirements, Morgan Stanley
typically delivered a two-week fuel supply right to the airport and allowed United to draw it
1874
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014). See also “Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-
Fashioned Way: In Barrels,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (3/2/2005),http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110971828745967570,00.html.
1875
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1876
Id. See also In re UAL Corp., Case No. 02-B-48191, “Order Authorizing the Debtors to Enter Into a J et Fuel
Supply Agreement With Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 365 and Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 6004 and 6006,” (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 2003).
1877
See 9/2003 “J et Fuel Supply Agreement between Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. and United Air Lines, Inc.
and United Aviation Fuels Corporation,” (hereinafter, “2003 United-Morgan Stanley Supply Contract”), at 20, ¶
10.1, PSI-UnitedAirlines-01-000003 - 044, at 022.
1878
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014); 11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations
Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122
(“Under the agreement MSGC owns and manages the inventories required to support deliveries to UAL and has
been assigned from them, the storage and transportation agreements needed to support this business.”).
1879
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1880
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014); 11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations
Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122
(“Deliveries are via in tank stock transfers and are settled on a prepay basis, one business day prior to delivery.”).
1881
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1882
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014); see also 2003 United-Morgan Stanley Supply Contract,
at 18, ¶ 5.6, PSI-UnitedAirlines-01-000020.
1883
2003 United-Morgan Stanley Supply Contract, ¶ 2.8, PSI-UnitedAirlines-01-000016.
1884
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also11/3/2009
“Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,” prepared by
Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122 (describing the supply agreement as “intended to cover the majority
of United’s demand for fuel at airport locations in the United States”).
299
down as needed, while charging United a financing fee for holding the fuel.
1885
At other
airports, United explained that it helped negotiate supply arrangements with unrelated jet fuel
suppliers, working with Morgan Stanley to ensure the lowest-cost arrangements.
1886
United said
those other jet fuel providers included BP, Chevron, Exxon, Shell and Valero, among others.
1887
United also explained that, at the O’Hare Airport, Unitedt sometimes sold excess fuel to other
airlines, generally once per week to a foreign airline on a spot basis, making a small profit from
the sales, and Morgan Stanley continued that practice.
1888
According to United, under another contract provision, any profits earned from physical
jet fuel trading in connection with the supply contract were split evenly between United and
Morgan Stanley, while any losses from that trading were allocated solely to Morgan Stanley.
1889
According to Morgan Stanley and United, the supply contract was extended several
times, resulting in Morgan Stanley’s acting as United’s primary jet fuel supplier for ten years,
from 2003 to 2013.
1890
Overall, under the agreement, Morgan Stanley supplied United with
between $1 billion and $3 billion of jet fuel per year.
1891
To meet its contractual obligations, Morgan Stanley maintained an extensive jet fuel
inventory at multiple locations.
1892
To protect against price changes in the value of that
inventory and in its ability to meet United’s needs on a cost effective basis, Morgan Stanley told
the Subcommittee that it hedged its fuel holdings with short futures using similar oil products,
such as home heating oil, the price of which tended to rise and fall in tandem with the price of jet
fuel.
1893
In addition, Morgan Stanley charged United margin “on a daily basis, taking into
account both the outstanding exposure for financial and physical trades as well as the profit
sharing balance that may be owed” to the airline.
1894
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that one of the main benefits from the
arrangement for United was that Morgan Stanley’s stronger credit profile enabled it to buy fuel
at less expensive prices than United, which in 2003, was still in bankruptcy proceedings.
1895
1885
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1886
Id.
1887
Id.
1888
Id.
1889
Id.
1890
Subcommittee briefings by United Airlines (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1891
10/24/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-24-000001 - 004, at
001-002, [sealed exhibit].
1892
See prior chart and discussion of storage facilities. See also 12/3/2008 memorandum from Federal Reserve ,
“Commodities Overview Meeting Minutes,” FRB-PSI-304806 - 807 (noting that Morgan Stanley provided United
“with 50% of its jet fuel via Transmontaigne.”).
1893
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley, (2/4/2014); Oil: Money, Politics and Power in the 21st Century,
Tom Bower ((Grand Central Publishing 2010), at 137.
1894
11/3/2009 “Morgan Stanley ISG Commodity Operations Summary for Physical Energy Products Support,”
prepared by Morgan Stanley, FRB-PSI-619109 - 129, at 122.
1895
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014). See also 2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter,
at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/20140421/R-1479/R-1479_041814_124930_
510776321432_1.pdf.
300
Morgan Stanley said that it sold the fuel to United at better prices than United paid
previously.
1896
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that when the contract began ten years ago, it had
to import most of the jet fuel from Europe and Asia, but that U.S refineries later began producing
more of the fuel, reducing its cost and price volatility.
1897
Morgan Stanley indicated that it
purchased some of the jet fuel from the European refinery with which it had a crude oil supply
contract, Ineos, as well as from a refinery in the United States.
1898
It noted that after United
emerged from bankruptcy, it became less reliant on Morgan Stanley’s credit support.
1899
Exiting the Supply Contract. In 2010, United merged with Continental Airlines, and as
part of that merger, Continental managers initiated a review of United’s fuel operations.
1900
According to United, the new management team determined that Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel
services were costly due to various management and financing fees, and that its credit support
was no longer needed to obtain better fuel prices. Ultimately, the team decided that United
would be better off supplying its own jet fuel and managing its own jet fuel assets.
1901
United told the Subcommittee that it began phasing out Morgan Stanley as its primary
fuel supplier in 2011, and formally ended the contract in 2013.
1902
According to United, it now
issues annual contracts on a location-by-location basis and accepts competitive bids from private
companies to meet its jet fuel needs for the year.
1903
United explained that it generally selected
more than one supplier at each location to prevent supply disruptions and encourage competitive
prices.
1904
United told the Subcommittee that while Morgan Stanley no longer managed its fuel
needs, Morgan Stanley continued to provide it with physical fuel. United indicated that, as of
October 2014, Morgan Stanley was the fifth-largest supplier of jet fuel to United, providing
roughly 6% of United’s fuel purchases.
1905
1896
2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/
20140421/R-1479/R-1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1897
Subcommittee briefing by Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014).
1898
Id.
1899
Id.
1900
Subcommittee briefing by United Airlines (10/9/2014).
1901
Id.
1902
Id.
1903
Id.
1904
Id.
1905
Id.
301
(c) Hedging Jet Fuel Prices with Emirates
A second jet fuel relationship involves Morgan Stanley’s role in working with Emirates, a
state-owned airline in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to manage the airline’s jet fuel price
risk.
1906
Emirates operates a transportation hub in Dubai and conducts flights to multiple airports
in the United States.
1907
In 2004, the airline’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the
Board was Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, uncle to the current ruler of Dubai, Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid.
1908
For at least a decade, fuel costs have been the airline’s largest single expense.
1909
In
2005, its fuel bill exceeded $3 billion.
1910
In 2013, its jet fuel costs totaled nearly $8.35 billion,
representing 39% of the airline’s total operating costs.
1911
According to Emirates, it had engaged
in a variety of hedging strategies over the years with a variety of counterparties to manage its
price risk, including crude oil hedges with Morgan Stanley.
1912
The airline indicated that, prior
to 2009, it often had “multiple hedges in place at any one time, covering multiple future
periods.”
1913
Initiating the Hedging. According to both Morgan Stanley and the airline, they began
participating in crude oil hedges to limit Emirates’ jet fuel price risk in 2004.
1914
Morgan
Stanley devised and Emirates agreed to participate in those hedges from 2004 to 2008.
1915
Morgan Stanley told the Subcommittee that the hedges were designed and executed by its
commodities traders based in its London and New York offices.
1916
Morgan Stanley described
1906
The Morgan Stanley-Emirates Airline relationship was discussed in a book released in 2014. See The Secret
Club That Rules the World: Inside the Fraternity of Commodities Traders, Kate Kelly (Penguin Group 2014), at 79-
81.
1907
See, e.g., “Featured Destinations,” Emirates Airline website,http://www.emirates.com/us/english/destinations_offers/destinations/america/index.aspx.
1908
See 2009 - 10 Annual Report, Emirates Group, at 1, 10,http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_report_2010.pdf.
1909
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
001.
1910
See 4/16/2005 report, “Independent auditor’s report to the Government of Dubai,” prepared for Emirates
Airlines by PricewaterhouseCoopers, PSI-Excerpt2005EmiratesAuditor’sReport-000001 - 027, at 014.
1911
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
001. See also 2013 - 14 Annual Report, Emirates Group, at 52,http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_report_2014.pdf (reported in UAE dirhams).
1912
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
002 - 003.
1913
Id. at 001 - 004.
1914
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002; 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 002
- 003.
1915
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002; 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at -
004.
1916
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002. See also 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 -
007, at 004 (“The hedge products and pricing were devised by Morgan Stanley and presented to Emirates. Emirates
302
the hedges as including a “capped double-down swap,”
1917
while Emirates said it used “cap-swap
double-down extendable hedges” as part of the hedging strategy.
1918
The hedges were complex financial structures which included put and call options,
contracts for differences, and other financial instruments.
1919
According to Morgan Stanley, the
hedges were designed with the expectation that crude oil would trade within a specified price
range,
1920
which varied from a range of about $7 to about $40, with the exact prices and price
ranges varying from year to year.
1921
According to the airline, if crude oil prices stayed within
the specified price range, the airline was paid by the counterparty, Morgan Stanley, the hedge
was successful, and the airline saved money on its fuel costs.
1922
If oil prices traded below the
specified range, the airline was required to pay Morgan Stanley.
1923
Emirates told the Subcommittee that it made money from its fuel hedging strategy “in
most years,” including the three years preceding the fiscal year at issue, and that it saved a total
of about $600 million over that three-year period,
1924
or an average of $200 million per year. In
2008, however, crude oil prices spiked, climbing as high as $147 per barrel in J uly and
exceeding the $110 upper bound specified in the hedging agreement then in place between the
airline and Morgan Stanley.
1925
Crude oil prices then plummeted over the next few months. By
early 2009, oil prices were in the $40 range,
1926
below the lower bound specified in the
hedge.
1927
Incurring a $440 Million Loss. Emirates told the Subcommittee that, as a result of the
oil price swings, it incurred substantial losses from the hedge, which gradually added up to
hundreds of millions of dollars owed to Morgan Stanley.
1928
When those unexpected losses
began to accumulate, Morgan Stanley could have but did not offer to renegotiate the terms of the
hedging agreement. Instead, in November 2008, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Executive Officer J ohn
Mack flew to Dubai with Georges Makhoul, then President of Morgan Stanley’s Middle East and
Africa group, and Marc Mourre, then Vice Chairman of Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities
decided which of these products best matched its needs, and for what timeframe, and so it was ultimately
responsible for implementing the hedge.”).
1917
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002.
1918
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 004.
1919
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
002.
1920
Id.
1921
Id. See also 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 -
007, at 004.
1922
See 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at
004.
1923
Id.
1924
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 005.
1925
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001, at 003.
1926
See “Spot Prices: Crude Oil in Dollars Per Barrel, Products in Dollars Per Gallon,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration (10/22/2014),http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm.
1927
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 005 -
006.
1928
Id.
303
group, to meet with the airline about its financial obligations under the hedge.
1929
The Morgan
Stanley executives met with Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, head of the airlines, and
may have also met with his nephew, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, ruler of Dubai.
1930
In
J anuary 2009, the Investment Company of Dubai provided a credit guarantee to Morgan Stanley
representatives in support of the airline.
1931
The airline settled the hedge by paying Morgan Stanley and other counterparties a total of
$440 million.
1932
This hedging loss is recorded primarily in its financial statement for the 2008-
2009 fiscal year as a $428 million loss, due to timing issues and accounting requirements.
1933
Emirates told the Subcommittee that it was the first time in which a loss had been recorded on its
fuel-related hedges with Morgan Stanley.
1934
The airline described the loss as “unusual” and
“large,” and said that it “had a material impact on Emirates’ annual profit for that financial year,
but it did not threaten the long-term financial viability of the airline.”
1935
Ending Fuel-Related Hedging. Emirates told the Subcommittee that after incurring the
$440 million loss, it changed its policy and stopped entering into hedges related to jet fuel
prices.
1936
The airline wrote: “Emirates is no longer hedging its fuel costs and so it is not
trading with Morgan Stanley on the fuel side.”
1937
The airline has maintained this policy since
2009.
Supplying Physical Jet Fuel. Although Emirates ended its fuel hedging relationship
with Morgan Stanley, the relationship between the two has continued in other capacities. For
example, since 2010, after winning a public competitive bidding process, Morgan Stanley has
supplied Emirates with physical jet fuel at several U.S. airports, including three during 2014.
1938
Morgan Stanley indicated that, since 2010, it has provided about 42 million gallons of jet fuel per
1929
Subcommittee briefings by United (10/9/2014) and Morgan Stanley (2/4/2014); 9/29/2014 letter from Morgan
Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at 003.
1930
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001, at 003
(“A meeting took place in November 2008 between Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, J ahn Mack, George
Makhoul, and Marc Mourre.”); 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 006 (indicating that the client “understands that such a meeting may have taken
place”). See also The Secret Club That Rules the World: Inside the Fraternity of Commodities Traders, Kate Kelly
(Penguin Group 2014), at 81 (stating that the meeting included Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid).
1931
9/29/2014 letter from Morgan Stanley legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-MorganStanley-15-000001 - 004, at
003.
1932
Id. at 004; See also 10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-
000001 - 007, at 005.
1933
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airline legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 005.
The fiscal year for the Emirates Airline was from April 1, 2008 to March 31, 2009.
1934
Id.
1935
Id.
1936
10/14/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-02-000001 - 007, at 001,
006.
1937
Id. at 001 - 007.
1938
Id.; 10/9/2014 letter from Emirates Airlines legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-Emirates-01-000001 - 00004, at
002 (stating Morgan Stanley supplies physical jet fuel to the Emirates Airline at airports in Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Washington D.C.).
304
year to Emirates, delivering the fuel directly to the airports.
1939
The airline also uses other jet
fuel suppliers in the United States.
1940
(3) Issues Raised by Morgan Stanley’s Involvement with Jet Fuel
Morgan Stanley has told the Federal Reserve that its physical jet fuel activities benefit the
airlines and demonstrate why financial holding companies should be permitted to engage in
physical commodity activities.
1941
The activities involving United Airlines and Emirates,
however, provide anecdotal evidence of instances in which Morgan Stanley’s fuel supply and
hedging activities lost, rather than saved, the airlines money.
(a) Thin Benefits
Morgan Stanley has attempted to portray itself as an ally of airlines seeking access to jet
fuel and protection from jet fuel price risks. Citing its dealings with United, Morgan Stanley has
asserted that its ability to purchase, store, and transport physical jet fuel saved United a
significant amount of overhead expenses and the need to obtain expensive financing.
1942
Morgan
Stanley also claimed that its stronger credit profile enabled it to buy jet fuel at lower prices and
pass those savings onto the airline.
1943
In reality, those benefits appear to have been limited to the period during which United
was experiencing financial distress. Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel supply activities assisted the
airline while the parent corporation was going through bankruptcy proceedings. Once the airline
emerged from bankruptcy and regained its financial footing, it decided that Morgan Stanley’s
fuel assistance, with its fees and financing charges, was actually more expensive than if the
airline were to procure its own fuel directly. It began to phase out Morgan Stanley’s role in
2011, and ended it in 2013. United’s action indicates that Morgan Stanley was no longer saving
the airline money on its fuel operations.
The results of the jet fuel hedging provided by Morgan Stanley to Emirates were also
mixed. The complex hedging structures that Morgan Stanley provided to the airline over a four-
year period, from 2004 to 2008, saved the airline money, but cost it significant losses in 2009.
The hedges appeared to reduce the airline’s fuel expenses by about $200 million per year
between 2005 and 2008, but then cost the airline $440 million in the next year – an
unanticipated, material loss. In response, in 2009, Emirates decided to stop hedging its fuel
prices altogether, a policy it has maintained for five years.
The market response to Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel activities is clear: one airline
terminated its fuel supply contract; the other terminated its hedging relationship. Those results
detract from the strength of Morgan Stanley’s claims that its physical jet fuel activities provide
1939
Id.
1940
Id.
1941
See 2014 Morgan Stanley Public Comment Letter, at 6,http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/April/
20140421/R-1479/R-1479_041814_124930_510776321432_1.pdf.
1942
Id.
1943
Id.
305
significant commercial and financial benefits that should be continued. The facts also suggest
that the benefits provided by Morgan Stanley were neither unique nor long-lasting. Other market
participants now compete for the annual fuel supply contracts issued by United Airlines. Still
others offer hedging strategies to Emirates Airline. While Morgan Stanley now provides jet fuel
to both United and the Emirates Airline, plenty of other fuel providers are doing the same.
(b) Operational and Catastrophic Event Risks
Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel activities also continue to carry environmental and catastrophic
event risks. Storing and transporting jet fuel is risky. Fires, explosions, and leaks present threats
that traditional banks and bank holding companies do not confront. Volatile fuel prices also
continually threaten to disrupt the economics of jet fuel supply operations; the 20% drop in crude
oil prices in one month, from September to October 2014, illustrate the price risk. Still another
risk is the small size of the jet fuel market whose limited participants make preventing or
recovering from a financial loss especially difficult.
(4) Analysis
Morgan Stanley is not the only financial holding company to have engaged in physical jet
fuel activities. Goldman has supplied jet fuel to Delta Airlines;
1944
and J PMorgan acquired
substantial jet fuel inventories when it purchased RBS Sempra in 2010,
1945
and held jet fuel
inventory at 28 locations across the United States, Asia, and Europe in 2013.
1946
Both financial
holding companies are incurring the same kinds of risks as Morgan Stanley. Those financial,
environmental, and catastrophic event risks make physical jet fuel activities inappropriate for
banks and bank holding companies. It is past time for the Federal Reserve to enforce needed
safeguards on this high risk physical commodity activity.
1944
See, e.g., 10/28/2011 Goldman presentation to the Goldman Board of Directors, “Global Commodities Physicals
Activities,” FRB-PSI-700019 (“We are contracted to supply jet fuel to Delta Airlines on a just-in-time basis,
reducing the need for them to maintain a large inventory[.]”).
1945
5/26/2010 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-301884 (listing the
acquisition of jet fuel inventories from RBS Sempra).
1946
9/13/2013 response to Subcommittee questionnaire, J PM-COMM-PSI-000001 - 019, at 003-004.
306
VI. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
J PMorgan Chase & Co. (J PMorgan), one of the largest financial institutions in the United
States, conducted among the largest physical commodity activities of any U.S. financial holding
company until its recent decision to exit the area. Prior to 2014, J PMorgan conducted activities
involving crude oil, natural gas, coal, industrial metals, metals storage facilities, and electrical
power generation. At the same time, it was the largest commodities trader of any U.S. financial
institution. This case study focuses on J PMorgan’s acquisition of multiple electrical power
plants, including one that led to a $410 million penalty for manipulating electricity prices; its
extensive copper activities, which operate outside of normal size limits and include a proposal
for a copper-backed exchange traded fund which has raised conflict of interest and market
manipulation concerns among industrial copper users; and its actions to circumvent prudential
limits on the size of its physical commodity activities.
A. JPMorgan Overview
J PMorgan Chase & Co. is a global financial services firm incorporated under Delaware
law and headquartered in New York City.
1947
It is listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) under the ticker symbol “J PM.”
1948
In addition to being the largest financial holding
company in the United States, J PMorgan conducts operations in more than 60 countries with
over 260,000 employees.
1949
As of December 31, 2013, it had a market capitalization of $211
billion and consolidated assets totaling more than $2.4 trillion.
1950
In 2013, J PMorgan reported
net revenues nearing $97 billion and net income of almost $18 billion.
1951
JPMorgan Leadership. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
J PMorgan Chase & Co. is J amie Dimon, who has held those posts since 2006.
1952
The Chief
Operating Officer is Matthew Zames, and the Chief Financial Officer is Marianne Lake.
1953
The
head of the Global Commodities Group, from 2006 to 2014, was Blythe Masters.
1954
She was
recently replaced by two co-heads of the group, J ohn Anderson and Mike Camacho.
1955
J ohn
1947
7/1/2014 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Resolution Plan Public Filing (hereinafter “2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan”),
at 4,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/jpmorgan-chase-1g-20140701.pdf; “Holding
Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion,” (as of 6/30/2014), National Information Center (using Federal
Reserve data),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx.
1948
Undated “About Us,” J PMorgan website,http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/about-us.htm.
1949
Id.
1950
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 4.
1951
2013 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Annual Report, filed with SEC on 2/20/2014, at 62,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961714000289/corp10k2013.htm.
1952
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 30; undated “Members of the Board,” J PMorgan website,http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/board-of-directors.htm.
1953
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 30.
1954
See 4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 125
(listing Global Commodities Group executives). See also “The Legacy of J PMorgan's Blythe Masters,” Bloomberg
Businessweek, Sheelah Kolhatkar (4/3/2014),http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-03/the-legacy-of-
jpmorgans-blythe-masters.
1955
9/19/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to
Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorgan-12-000001 - 003, at 001.
307
Anderson is also the Chief Executive Officer of J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation.
1956
Until he retired in 2013, Francis Dunleavy was the head of Principal Investing within the
Commodities Group.
1957
(1) Background
The modern J PMorgan is the product of a merger between J .P. Morgan & Co. and The
Chase Manhattan Corp. in 2000.
1958
Both J .P. Morgan & Co. and the Chase Manhattan Corp.
were themselves the culmination of multiple bank mergers and acquisitions over time. J .P.
Morgan & Co. was originally Drexel, Morgan & Co., founded by J ohn Piermont Morgan and
Anthony Drexel in New York in 1871, as a merchant banking partnership.
1959
After the Glass-
Steagall Act required the separation of banks and securities firms in 1933, the company chose to
continue operating as a commercial bank.
1960
The Chase Manhattan Corp. was a product of The
Bank of The Manhattan Co., which was founded in 1799, by former U.S. Senator and future U.S.
Vice President Aaron Burr.
1961
Over time, The Bank of The Manhattan Co. merged with a
number of other banks, including the Chemical Banking Corp. in 1996.
1962
After the merger that
produced J PMorgan Chase & Co. in 2000, additional acquisitions followed, including Bank One
Corp., a major Midwestern bank in 2004. During the financial crisis, J PMorgan also acquired, in
2008, the Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
1963
Financial Holding Company Status. On March 13, 2000, pursuant to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, J PMorgan Chase & Co. elected to become a financial holding company.
1964
The holding company owns several banks. Its principal U.S. bank subsidy is J PMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., a large national bank with branches in 23 states.
1965
Another key U.S. bank
subsidiary is Chase Bank USA, N.A., which is J PMorgan’s credit card-issuing bank.
1966
1956
6/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s April 23, 1024
Briefing Follow-Up,” PSI-J PMC-11-000001 - 002, at 001.
1957
See 4/2011 “Global Commodities – Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 125
(listing Global Commodities Group executives). See also “J PMorgan energy exec at center of power-market flap
retires,” Reuters, (11/7/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/us-jpmorgan-commodity-dunleavy-
idUSBRE9A616H20131107.
1958
“The History of J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” J PMorgan website, at 19 (hereinafter, “History of J PMorgan Chase &
Co.”),http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/document/shorthistory.pdf.
1959
Id. at 5.
1960
Id. at 12.
1961
Id. at 2.
1962
Id. at 19.
1963
Id.
1964
See “Institution History for J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” National Information Center (using Federal Reserve data),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionHistory.aspx?parID_RSSD=1039502&parDT_END=99991231
(showing it was actually The Chase Manhattan Corporation that elected to become a financial holding company on
March 13, 2000; following its merger later that year with J PMorgan, the financial holding company changed its
name to J .P. Morgan Chase & Co.).
1965
See 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 5,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-
plans/jpmorgan-chase-1g-20140701.pdf; 2013 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Annual Report, filed with SEC on 2/20/2014,
at 1,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961714000289/corp10k2013.htm.
1966
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 6; 2013 J PMorgan Chase & Co. Annual Report, filed with SEC on
2/20/2014, at 1,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961714000289/corp10k2013.htm.
308
Key Subsidiaries. Two key nonbank U.S. subsidiaries are J .P. Morgan Securities LLC,
its primary registered U.S. broker-dealer, investment advisor, and futures commission merchant;
and J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, which conducts commodities derivatives
transactions as well as physical commodities transactions.
1967
A key U.K. subsidiary is J .P.
Morgan Securities PLC (formerly J .P. Morgan Securities Ltd.) which, among other activities,
deals in commodity derivatives.
1968
Major Business Lines. In its 2014 Resolution Plan, J PMorgan identified five major
business segments. The first is its Corporate and Investment Bank, which provides services
related to fixed income, equities, commodities, and global investment banking, among other
areas.
1969
The second business segment is Commercial Banking, which provides financing,
investment banking, and asset management services to large clients, including corporations,
municipalities, and financial institutions.
1970
The third is Asset Management, which provides
institutional, high-net-worth, and retail investors with global investment services, and currently
manages client assets totaling $2.3 trillion.
1971
The fourth is Corporate/Private Equity, a segment
that includes J PMorgan’s treasury functions, Chief Investment Office, and other major corporate
units for the holding company and bank.
1972
The last is Consumer and Community Banking,
which includes J PMorgan’s retail banking, credit card, mortgage, and lending services.
1973
Commodities Activities. The Corporate and Investment Bank includes the Global
Commodities Group (GCG), which is J PMorgan’s leading commodities-related business unit.
1974
In 2012, the Group had over 600 employees.
1975
GCG is organized around four categories of
physical commodities: metals, energy, agricultural, and environmental.
1976
GCG personnel
conduct financial trades involving those commodities using a variety of financial instruments,
including swaps, forwards, futures, and options. They also provide clients with commodities-
related risk management services, market intelligence, financing, structuring, market-making,
and other services.
1977
GCG personnel also conducted the bulk of J PMorgan’s physical commodity activities.
Those activities included, at times, the purchase, sale, transport, and storage of various
1967
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 5.
1968
9/19/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to
Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorgan-12-000001 - 003, at 002; 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 5-6.
1969
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 7-8.
1970
Id. at 7, 9.
1971
Id. at 7, 9-10.
1972
Id. at 7, 10.
1973
Id. at 7-8.
1974
11/4/2009 “J PM Energy Ventures Energy Corporation [:] Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by Federal
Reserve, FRB-PSI-200611 - 632, at 613 [sealed exhibit]; undated “Commodities,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities.
1975
1/2012 “J P Morgan Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 - 592, at 546. The
number of employees has since decreased. See, e.g., 9/2013 “Self Assessment,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-
301370 - 378, at 374.
1976
See undated “Commodities,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities.
1977
See undated “J .P. Morgan Global Commodities Group – Client Solutions Provider,” prepared by J PMorgan,
FRB-PSI-200822 - 826, at 822; 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9.
309
commodities, including oil products, natural gas products, coal, metals, electricity, and
agricultural products.
1978
In addition, GCG provides clients with a range of physical commodity
services, including risk management solutions, commodity-linked financing, physical hedging
solutions, off-take and supply agreements, and transportation and storage of assets.
1979
In 2014,
J PMorgan reported that the GCG had over 2,200 active clients.
1980
The key legal entity executing activities on behalf of the Global Commodities Group is
J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC).
1981
J PMVEC was formed in 2005, as a
Delaware corporation. It has no U.S. or European employees or offices of its own, and instead
acts through GCG employees.
1982
J PMVEC is the key legal entity that actually executes the bulk
of J PMorgan’s financial and physical commodities trading as well as other commodities-related
activities, either directly or through subsidiaries or affiliates.
1983
One example of the physical commodity activities undertaken by J PMorgan is what the
bank has referred to as “Project Liberty.”
1984
In 2012, using its complementary authority,
J PMVEC entered into a long term oil supply agreement with Philadelphia Energy Solutions
Refining and Marketing (PESRM), a joint venture between the Carlyle Group and Sunoco to
operate one of the largest oil refineries in the United States.
1985
According to J PMorgan, under a
five-year contract, J PMVEC agreed to supply “100% of the crude oil and feedstocks” required
by the refinery and to purchase “the majority of the refined products” as they were produced.
1986
J MPVEC then sold “around half of the refinery products back to Sunoco for its retail distribution
1978
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9.
1979
4/2011 “Our Commodities Franchise and Our Competitive Advantages,” prepared by J .P.Morgan, FRB-PSI-
623086 - 127, at 089.
1980
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9. This figure is down nearly one-third from the 3,000 clients J PMorgan
reported in 2011. See 4/2011 “Our Commodities Franchise and Our Competitive Advantages,” prepared by
J .P.Morgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 089.
1981
See, e.g., 9/16/2005 letter from J PMorgan’s legal counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000478 - 536 (discussing J PMVEC’s activities).
1982
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
1983
Id. See also, e.g., 9/16/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000478 - 536, at 486 (discussing J PMVEC’s activities);
12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant
to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-02-
000010 - 059, at 014 (“J PMVEC currently engages as principal in commodity derivatives transactions and offers a
full range of derivatives to its clients across the spectrum of crude oil, coal, electricity and natural gas-related risks.
In addition, J PMVEC enters into physical transactions in the natural gas, crude oil, coal and electricity markets and
makes and takes delivery of these commodities.”).
1984
See 1/24/2013 “Commodities Physical Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301379 - 382, at 381
(chart entitled, “Physical Operating Risk Review of Project Liberty”) (hereinafter, “2013 Project Liberty Chart”);
10/6/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to Follow-Up
Questions,” PSI-J PMorganChase-14-000001 - 009.
1985
10/6/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses to
Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorganChase-14-000001 - 009, at 001, 006. J PMorgan undertook this activity after
obtaining permission from the Federal Reserve to use a “third party to alter or refine commodities” on its behalf.
See 11/25/2008 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co.,”
prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000553 - 558 (requesting that authority); 4/20/2009 letter from
Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 - 002 (granting J PMorgan’s request).
1986
2013 Project Liberty Chart, FRB-PSI-301379 - 382, at 381.
310
network” and sold the rest to third parties.
1987
To implement the agreement, J PMVEC leased or
subleased about 14.5 million barrels of storage for crude and refined products on and around the
refinery premises.
1988
The crude oil and feedstocks provided by J PMVEC “arrive[d] via ship
and rail.”
1989
This project illustrates J PMorgan’s intimate involvement with buying,
transporting, storing, and selling key physical commodities.
1990
Commodities-Related Merchant Banking. In addition to GCG, J PMorgan has engaged
in commodity-related activities through certain investment funds and merchant banking activities
undertaken in other areas of the bank. For example, J PMorgan Infrastructure Investments
Group, located within the Global Real Assets section of the Asset Management business
segment, oversees investment funds focused on infrastructure projects.
1991
The Group, through
J PMorgan Investment Management, Inc., has 35 investment professionals who advise and help
manage the J PMorgan Infrastructure Investments Fund.
1992
The Fund, which was established in
2006, and whose general partner is J PMorgan IIF Acquisitions LLC, has raised $3 billion for
investments in power plants, oil and gas pipelines, and electricity distribution assets, among
other projects.
1993
The Fund operates with capital raised from third party investors; according to
J PMorgan, it has not contributed any of its own money to the Fund.
1994
Additional commodity-
related projects have been funded by J .P. Morgan Partners LLC, formerly known as J PMorgan
Capital Partners, a “private equity division of J PMorgan & Co.” that raises capital from third
party investors.
1995
In J une 2014, J PMorgan reported to the Federal Reserve that it held merchant banking
investments with a total value of about $10 billion, but it is unclear how many of those were
commodity related and whether the total included any projects administered by the Infrastructure
Investments or J .P. Morgan Partners funds.
1996
1987
Id.; 10/6/2014 letter from J PMorgan’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, “J PMorgan Chase & Co’s Responses
to Follow-Up Questions,” PSI-J PMorganChase-14-000001 - 009, at 002.
1988
Id.
1989
2013 Project Liberty Chart, prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301379 - 382, at 381.
1990
In October 2014, J PMorgan sold Project Liberty to Bank of America. Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan
(10/10/2014).
1991
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003 -
004. For more information about J PMorgan’s Global Real Assets section, see 12/3/2012 “Virginia Port Partners
Proposal for Port of Virginia PPTA,” prepared by J .P. Morgan Asset Management for Virginia’s Office of
Transportation Public-Private Partnerships, at 4,http://www.vappta.org/resources/RREEF and J PMorgan_Detailed%20Proposal.pdf.
1992
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003 -
004; 12/3/2012 letter from J PMorgan IIF Acquisitions LLC and Maher Terminals LLC to Virginia Office of
Transportation Public-Private Partnerships, at 1, and 12/3/2012 “Virginia Port Partners Proposal for Port of Virginia
PPTA,” at 3 - 4,http://www.vappta.org/resources/RREEF and J PMorgan_Detailed%20Proposal.pdf.
1993
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 004;
12/3/2012 letter from J PMorgan IIF Acquisitions LLC and Maher Terminals LLC to Virginia Office of
Transportation Public-Private Partnerships, at 1, and 12/3/2012 proposal at 4,http://www.vappta.org/resources/RREEF and J PMorgan_Detailed%20Proposal.pdf.
1994
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 004.
1995
“J .P. Morgan Partners,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorganpartners. In addition,
some J .P. Morgan Partners professionals formed CCMP Capital Advisors, LLC and Panorama Capital, LLC which
“manage the J PMP investments pursuant to a management agreement entered into with J PMorgan Chase & Co.” Id.
1996
See 6/30/2014 “Consolidated Holding Company Report of Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies - FR
Y-12,” filed by J PMorgan with the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-800005 - 008, at 006.
311
Commodities Trading. At the same time it conducts a wide range of physical
commodity activities, J PMorgan trades commodities-related financial instruments, including
futures, swaps, and options, involving billions of dollars each day. J PMorgan is the largest
financial institution in the United States trading financial commodity instruments, according to
Coalition Development Ltd., a company that collects commodity trading statistics.
1997
OCC
data indicates it is also among the largest financial institution trading commodity-related
derivatives.
1998
Commodity Revenues. According to J PMorgan, at the end of 2013, it had commodity-
related contracts, including swaps, futures, options, and forwards, with a total dollar value of
$763 billion, down from a 2012 year-end total of $1 trillion.
1999
Separately, J PMorgan reported
that, in 2013, its physical commodities activities had a total dollar value of about $10.2 billion,
down from $16.2 billion the year before.
2000
(2) Historical Overview of Commodities Activities
According to J PMorgan Chase & Co., in a short history of the bank, the company was
“built on the foundation of more than 1,000 predecessor institutions.”
2001
They include such
well-known banks as J .P. Morgan & Co., The Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank One, Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., Chemical Bank, The First National Bank of Chicago, and National Bank of
Detroit.
2002
At times, J PMorgan’s predecessor banks were involved with securities or commodity
activities that led to the bank’s being subjected to Congressional scrutiny. As explained earlier,
the 1912 Pujo money trust hearings held by the U.S. House of Representatives focused, in part,
on actions taken by J . Pierpont Morgan and J .P. Morgan and Co. to form “trusts” that acted as
holding companies for massive commercial enterprises, including businesses that handled
physical commodities, such as railroads, oil companies, steel manufacturers, and shipping and
mining ventures.
2003
After the 1929 stock market crash, the Pecora hearings in the U.S. Senate
1997
See 9/2014 “Global & Regional Investment Bank League Tables-1H2014,” prepared by Coalition Development
Ltd., PSI-Coalition-01-00019 - 025, at 020.
1998
2013 “OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity Fourth Quarter 2013,” prepared by
OCC, at Tables 1 and 2,http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq413.pdf.
1999
2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 23,http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/jpmorgan-
chase-1g-20140701.pdf.
2000
See 12/31/2012 “Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D,
Item M.9.a.(2),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20121231.PDF. See
also12/31/2013 2013 “J PMorgan FR Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR
Y-9C,” Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a.(2),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20131231.PDF.
2001
Undated “The History of J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” J PMorgan website, at 1,http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-J PMC/document/shorthistory.pdf.
2002
Id.
2003
See “Money Trust Investigation: Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States,” hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, HRG-1912-BCU-0017 (5/16/1912),
Y4.B22/1:M74/2-1,http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1912-bcu-
0017?accountid=45340 (first of multiple days of hearings continuing into 1913); The House of Morgan, Ron
Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 67-68 (railroad trusts), 81-86 (U.S. Steel trust), 100-103 (shipping trust), and 123
(copper trust), 150-156 (Pujo hearings).
312
took testimony from J . P. (“J ack”) Morgan and highlighted actions taken by J . P. Morgan & Co.
in the underwriting and trading of questionable securities, including securities related to utility
companies, and providing new stocks at below market prices to government officials.
2004
In
1935, in response to the Glass-Steagall Act’s mandating the separation of banks and securities
firms, J .P. Morgan & Co. decided to remain a bank and spun off its securities activities to a
newly formed company, Morgan Stanley, discussed above.
2005
JPMorgan Chase Bank. Fifty years later, J PMorgan Chase Bank, began to conduct
financial and, later, physical commodity trades. The bank’s involvement with commodities
followed actions taken by the OCC during the 1980s, permitting national banks to engage in an
increasingly large array of commodity activities. As discussed earlier, the first step was in 1982,
when the OCC explicitly authorized national banks to execute and clear trades in futures
contracts.
2006
A J PMorgan bank affiliate, J .P. Morgan Futures, Inc., registered as a futures
commission merchant that same year.
2007
In 1986, the OCC authorized national banks to trade
commodity-related futures for themselves and on behalf of clients, act as broker-dealers and
market makers for exchange traded options, and provide margin financing to clients trading
commodities.
2008
Also in 1986, Chase Manhattan Bank – another J PMorgan predecessor bank –
entered into reportedly the first oil-related swap with Koch Industries, introducing the concept of
swaps linked to the price of physical commodities.
2009
In 1987, the OCC authorized national
banks to engage in transactions involving commodity price index swaps.
2010
The OCC continued to broaden bank authority to engage in commodity activities during
the 1990s. In 1993, the OCC authorized national banks to hedge permissible banking activities
by making or taking physical delivery of commodities, and to engage in related physical
2004
See, e.g., “Stock Exchange Practices,” report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S.Hrg.
73-1455, (6/6/1934),https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/pdf/Pecora_FinalReport.pdf, and associated
hearings from J anuary 1933 to May 1934 (known as the Pecora hearings); The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow
(Grove Press 1990), at 352-373.
2005
See, e.g., The House of Morgan, Ron Chernow (Grove Press 1990), at 385.
2006
Undated OCC Interpretive Letter (7/23/1982), unpublished, PSI-OCC-01-000011 - 012.
2007
See J P Morgan Futures Inc. FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Details.aspx?entityid=jSzQxZANWxY=&rn=Y. That FCM license was
withdrawn in 2011. Id. In addition, J P Morgan Securities LLC currently holds an FCM license that Bear Stearns
obtained in 1982. See J P Morgan Securities LLC FCM information, NFA BASIC website,http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/Details.aspx?entityid=7YD6PX+m0vo=.
2008
See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 356 (1/7/1986), PSI-OCC-01-000026 - 028 (authorizing a bank subsidiary
to trade agricultural and metal futures for clients seeking to hedge bank loans); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 372
(11/7/1986) PSI-OCC-01-000043 - 044 (authorizing a bank subsidiary to act as a broker-dealer and market maker
for exchange-traded options for itself, its affiliated bank, and clients); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 380 (12/29/1986)
PSI-OCC-01-000046-061, at 047 - 048, 060, reprinted in Banking L. Rep. CCH ¶ 85,604 (authorizing a bank to
provide margin financing to its clients to trade commodities; and to execute and clear client transactions involving
futures and options on exchanges and over the counter).
2009
See 7/2009 “Oil Derivatives: In the Beginning,” EnergyRisk magazine (J uly 2009), at 31,http://db.riskwaters.com/data/energyrisk/EnergyRisk/Energyrisk_0709/markets.pdf. The swap was a bilateral
contract in which, for a four-month period, one party agreed to make payments to the other for 25,000 barrels of oil
per month using a fixed price per barrel, while the other party agreed to make payments using the average monthly
spot price for oil.
2010
See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-5 (7/20/1987), PSI-OCC-01-000100-106, at 106. This letter was
requested by Chase Manhattan Bank, a predecessor to J PMorgan.
313
commodity activities such as “storing, transporting, and disposing of the commodities.”
2011
In
1995, the OCC gave banks broad authority to engage in physically-settled transactions involving
metals, as well “ancillary activities” such as storing, transporting, and disposing of them.
2012
J PMorgan Chase Bank took advantage of each of the OCC grants of authority to expand
the bank’s commodities activities.
2013
In addition to trading commodity futures, forwards, and
options, the bank also conducted derivatives transactions, including derivatives related to
commodities. It was later discovered that, from 1992 to 2001, J PMorgan Chase Bank entered
into twelve energy trades with Enron involving $3.7 billion, in transactions later exposed as
hidden loans that disguised the extent of Enron’s indebtedness.
2014
J PMorgan Chase Bank
eventually became the largest swaps dealer in the United States.
JPMorgan Holding Company. In 1999, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act expanded
permissible activities for bank holding companies, J PMorgan took advantage of the changes in
the law and, in 2000, elected to become a financial holding company under the Act.
2015
Over
time, the holding company also became involved with commodities.
In 2003, due in part to the growing role of banks in commodities under OCC supervision,
the Federal Reserve began to relax its rules regarding commodity activities by financial holding
companies. One of the Federal Reserve’s earlier steps was to give bank holding companies more
leeway to participate in physically settled transactions, allowing them to take or make delivery of
documents giving title to physical commodities on an “instantaneous pass-through basis,” for
commodities approved by the CFTC for trading on an exchange.
2016
Also in 2003, the Federal
Reserve began granting requests by financial holding companies to engage in complementary
commodity activities under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. J PMorgan applied for and received a
complementary order in 2005.
2017
In 2004, J PMorgan acquired Bank One Corporation, a major Midwestern bank. Prior to
that purchase, both J PMorgan Chase & Co. and J PMorgan Chase Bank had the Federal Reserve
2011
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358 - 366, at 365..
2012
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368-374, at 372 - 374; OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 1073 (10/19/2006), PSI-OCC-01-000425 - 432, at 425 (allowing banks and their foreign branches to
engage in “customer-driven, metal derivative transactions that settle in cash or by transitory title transfer”); OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141 (allowing banks to buy and sell physical
copper).
2013
See 9/16/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank, “J PM Chase Application for
Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000478 - 532 (describing its physical commodity activities
over the years).
2014
See “The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse-Volume 1,” Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, S. Hrg. 107-618, (J uly 23 and 30, 2002), at 231, 264.
2015
See “Institution History for J PMorgan Chase & Co.,” National Information Center (using Federal Reserve data),http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionHistory.aspx?parID_RSSD=1039502&parDT_END=99991231.
2016
See 68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (7/3/2003); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii)(B).
2017
See 7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase
Application for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 103; 9/16/2005 letter from
J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve, “J PM Chase Application for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000478 - 532. 11/18/2005 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities
Complementary to a Financial Activity,” in response to a request by J P Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull.
C57 (2006),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
314
as their primary regulator. After the acquisition, J PMorgan Chase Bank was classified as a
national bank, and its primary regulator became the OCC.
2018
Bear Stearns Acquisition. The physical commodity profile of J PMorgan expanded
dramatically four years later. In March 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis and essentially
at the request of the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
(Bear Stearns), a large investment bank that was then nearly insolvent.
2019
At the time, Bear
Stearns had extensive physical commodity holdings and was active in a number of physical spot
markets.
2020
Bear Stearns was especially active in the energy markets and used its subsidiary,
Bear Energy, to acquire ownership interests in dozens of power plants.
2021
Through its
acquisition of Bear Stearns, J PMorgan gained control of a vast number of new physical
commodity assets and activities.
UBS Acquisition. In 2009, J PMorgan further expanded its physical commodity
activities when it acquired UBS Commodities Canada Ltd. and UBS AG’s agricultural trading
business.
2022
Those purchases gave J PMorgan an increased presence in the Canadian natural
gas, power and crude oil physical and financial markets, and enlarged its agricultural commodity
holdings.
2023
Refining Authority. Also in 2009, J PMorgan requested, and the Federal Reserve
approved, complementary authority for J PMorgan to “engage a third party to alter or refine
commodities” on its behalf.
2024
J PMorgan later used this authority to sell crude oil to a refinery
and buy back the refined products.
2025
It has also used the authority to hire third parties to blend
heating oil, jet kerosene, and gasoline fuels to produce oil products that meet specific national,
regional, or client standards.
2026
RBS Sempra Acquisition. In 2010, J PMorgan again substantially increased its physical
commodities profile when, in two separate transactions in J uly and October, for $1.6 billion, it
acquired the ownership stake of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in RBS Sempra, a joint
2018
See “Institution Directory for J PMorgan Chase Bank, National Association,” Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation website,https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/confirmation_outside.asp?inCert1=628.
2019
See undated Federal Reserve press release, “Bear Stearns, J PMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,”http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm.
2020
See, e.g., 7/31/2008 “Supervisory Plan, Risk Assessment Program & Institutional Overview of J PMorgan Chase
& Co.” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-305013-030 (identifying Bear Stearns assets being integrated
into J PMorgan) [sealed exhibit].
2021
See 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 -576, at 547; 7/17/2008
memorandum from the OCC to the File, “Quarterly review of risk, performance and significant developments” for
J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-303773 - 818, at 779 - 780 [sealed exhibit](listing Bear Energy assets as of 2008, including
tolling and load agreements, gas storage facilities, gas transport facilities, and power plants). See also “Bear
Stearns’s Trading Unit Draws Interest,” Wall Street J ournal, Ann Davis (4/5/2008),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120735754695191559?mod=googlenews_wsj&mg=reno64-wsj.
2022
1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 - 576, at 547.
2023
Id.; “J .P. Morgan to Acquire UBS’ Canadian Energy and Global Agricultural Businesses,” prepared by
J PMorgan,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHoYAtnF5ydo.
2024
See 4/20/2009 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-11-000001 - 002 [sealed exhibit].
2025
See information on Project Liberty, above.
2026
9/10/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001 - 011, at 006.
315
venture between RBS and Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company.
2027
The two acquisitions
provided J PMorgan with extensive North American and European energy and commodity
operations involving oil, natural gas, metals, coal, plastics, agricultural products, emissions, and
electricity.
2028
J PMorgan’s expanded physical commodity operations included more than 130
new storage and warehousing facilitiesin ten countries.
2029
Henry Bath Acquisition. As part of the RBS Sempra acquisition, J PMorgan took
ownership of Henry Bath & Sons, Ltd., which owned and managed a worldwide network of
commodity storage warehouses licensed by the London Metal Exchange.
2030
The Henry Bath
storage facilities facilitated the holding, making delivery, and taking delivery of physical
commodities, primarily metals but also other commodities.
2031
Through its ownership of Henry
Bath, J PMorgan gained warehousing operations in 19 port locations across the United States,
Europe, Asia, and Middle East.
2032
London Metal Exchange. J PMorgan extended its reach again by inheriting shares and
buying an ownership stake in the London Metals Exchange (LME), the leading futures market in
metals.
2033
J PMorgan became the LME’s largest shareholder, holding an 11% ownership
stake,
2034
until the LME was sold to a Hong Kong exchange in 2012, when J PMorgan sold all of
its shares to the exchange.
2035
In 2013, J PMorgan was appointed a member of a key LME
advisory group that deals directly with the LME Board.
2036
In addition, J .P. Morgan Securities
2027
J PMorgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, at 184,http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000163/corp10k2011.htm#s50873
1DA912EFDF440782294EA306391. See also 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan,
FRB-PSI-301543 - 576, at 547.
2028
See 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 - 576, at 547; 7/1/2010
J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
2029
7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
2030
See id.; undated, “Merchant Banking Investment in Henry Bath ,” FRB-PSI-000580 - 582. See also undated
“Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel Hedging,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200822 - 826, at 824
(listing the licensing authorities as the London Metal Exchange, the London International Financial Futures, Options
Exchange, and Intercontinental Exchange).
2031
See undated “Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel Hedging,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200822 -
826, at 824.
2032
See 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 -576, at 552; undated
“Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel Hedging,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200822 - 826, at 824.
2033
2/13/2013 OCC email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Commodities Quarterly Update,” OCC-PSI-00000374.
2034
6/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMC-11-000001 - 002, at 001.
2035
See, e.g., 12/6/2012 London Metal Exchange press release, “HKEx and LME announce completion of
transaction,”http://www.lme.com/en-gb/news-and-events/press-releases/press-releases/2012/12/hkex-and-lme-
announce-completion-of-transaction/.
2036
See, e.g., “LME Starts User Advisory Group After $2.2 Billion Takeover,” Bloomberg, Agnieszka Troszkiewicz
(1/8/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/lme-starts-user-advisory-group-after-2-2-billion-takeover-
1-.html (indicating J PMorgan was one of 14 members of the advisory committee).
316
plc, a U.K. subsidiary, has remained a “Category 1 ring-dealing member” of the LME exchange,
with special trading status on the LME floor.
2037
In J anuary 2012, in a presentation prepared by J PMorgan for its clients, it described its
“growth” in commodities over the prior few years as “consistent and dramatic.”
2038
It stated that
its commodities personnel had acquired “deep expertise across all commodity types (600
employees in 20+locations worldwide)” and an “[e]xpansive financial and physical
platform.”
2039
It stated that “J .P. Morgan’s Global Commodities Group offer[ed] clients a
comprehensive set of market making, structuring, risk management, financing and warehousing
capabilities across the full spectrum of commodity asset classes.”
2040
(3) Current Status
When the Federal Reserve initiated its special review of financial holding company
involvement with physical commodities in 2010, J PMorgan was one of the ten banks it examined
in detail. J PMorgan was also featured in the October 2012 Summary Report issued by the
Federal Reserve’s Commodities Team summarizing the findings of the special review.
2041
The 2012 Summary Report described J PMorgan’s wide-ranging physical commodity
activities. It stated that J PMorgan had a “significant global oil storage portfolio (25 [million
barrel] capacity) … along with 19 Natural Gas storage facilities on lease with an average tenor of
2.8 years”;
2042
“14 tolling agreements … of which one is for a power plant that generates 6% of
the maximum total output in the California Electricity grid, and potentially up to 12% of average
electricity demand;”
2043
“direct ownership of 4 power plants”;
2044
direct ownership of the Henry
Bath global network of metals warehouses;
2045
and an industrial metal inventory that “was as
high as $8 [billion].”
2046
The 2012 Summary Report also noted that J PMorgan and Goldman
together had a “total of 20-25 ships under time charters or voyages transporting oil [and]
Liquified Natural Gas.”
2047
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report identified multiple concerns with J PMorgan’s
physical commodity operations. One concern was that J PMorgan had insufficient capital and
insurance to cover potential losses from a catastrophic event. The report noted at one point that,
while J PMorgan had calculated a potential oil spill risk of $497 million, through “aggressive
assumptions” and “diversification benefits,” it had reduced that total by nearly 90% to $50
2037
See undated “Membership[:] Ring dealing,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/en-
gb/trading/membership/category-1-ring-dealing/j_p_morgan-securities-plc/.
2038
1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301543 -576, at 547.
2039
Id. at 546.
2040
Id. at 547.
2041
See 10/3/2012 “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team” (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477-510 [sealed exhibit].
2042
Id. at 485.
2043
Id.
2044
Id.
2045
Id. at 486.
2046
Id.
2047
Id. See also 4/2011 “Global Commodities – Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at
095 (indicating J PMorgan then had “13 Time Chartered Vessels”).
317
million, allocating risk capital for only that smaller amount.
2048
The 2012 Summary Report also
noted that J PMorgan had determined that the “operational and event risks of owning power
facilities” was capped at the dollar value of those facilities in the event of their total loss, with
some insurance to cover “the death and disability of workers” and some facility replacement
costs, but leaving all other expenses, including a “failure to deliver electricity under contract,” to
be paid by the holding company.
2049
At another point, the 2012 Summary Report compared the
level of J PMorgan’s capital and insurance reserves against estimated costs associated with
“extreme loss scenarios,” and found that “the potential loss exceeds capital and insurance” by $1
billion to $15 billion dollars.
2050
If J PMorgan were to incur losses from its physical commodity
activities while maintaining insufficient capital and insurance protections, the Federal Reserve,
and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, could be asked to rescue the firm.
The 2012 Summary Report expressed concerns about J PMorgan attempts to expand its
physical commodity activities still further. It described several recent instances in which the
Federal Reserve had denied J PMorgan requests for new activities, including trading oil products
not approved by the CFTC for trading on exchanges, and keeping rather than divesting its
ownership of the Henry Bath warehouses.
2051
The 2012 Summary Report also noted that
J PMorgan had booked “significant amounts of base metals in the national bank entity” that,
together with the bank’s other physical commodities, produced aggregate holdings of “10.0% of
tier 1 capital as of Sept ’12 … an all time high in physical holdings.”
2052
As discussed below, a
J PMorgan report to the Federal Reserve, together with other information provided to the
Subcommittee, indicates that, in September 2012, it actually had about $17.4 billion in physical
commodity assets (excluding its holdings of gold, silver, and commodity-related merchant
banking assets), which was then equal to nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital.
2053
At the time,
J PMorgan was subject to a Federal Reserve limit that prohibited its physical commodity assets
from exceeding 5% of its Tier 1 capital, but J PMorgan had interpreted that limit to allow it to
exclude major categories of assets, bringing its total below the 5% limit.
2054
In 2013, when the Subcommittee asked J PMorgan about its physical commodity
activities, the financial holding company provided information that, consistent with the Federal
Reserve’s 2012 Summary Report, illustrated its far-reaching commodity operations. J PMorgan
reported trading in the physical commodities of cocoa, coffee, aluminum, copper, gold, lead,
nickel, palladium, platinum, silver, tin, zinc, coal, crude oil, electricity, heating oil, gasoline, jet
2048
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200493 [sealed exhibit].
2049
Id. at 497.
2050
Id. at 498, 509. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses
had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%.
Id. at 499.
2051
Id. at 505.
2052
Id. at 506.
2053
See 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators,
FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at 387. See also discussion of J PMorgan’s compliance with the 5% limit, below, including
its decision to exclude its bank’s assets when calculating its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying
with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2054
For more information, see discussion below on J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits.
318
kerosene, and natural gas.
2055
J PMorgan also reported maintaining inventories of many physical
commodities. In 2011 (the last complete year of figures provided to the Subcommittee), those
inventories included, at various times, as much as 3.3 million metric tons of aluminum (an
amount which is more than half of U.S. aluminum consumption that year
2056
), 200,000 metric
tons of copper, 100,000 metric tons of lead, 6.4 million barrels of crude oil, 3.6 million barrels of
heating oil, 900,000 barrels of gasoline, 3.4 million barrels of jet kerosene, and 51.9 billion cubic
feet of natural gas.
2057
In addition, J PMorgan reported owning or controlling tolling agreements
at 31 power plants.
2058
When J PMorgan first met with the Subcommittee, it indicated that the holding company
was in the process of exiting the physical commodity business. In 2013, it sold about half its
power plants.
2059
In March 2014, J PMorgan announced publicly that it had reached agreement to
sell a large portion of its physical commodities operations, including its physical oil, gas, power,
warehousing facilities, and energy transportation operations, to Mercuria Energy Group Ltd. for
approximately $3.5 billion.
2060
When the sale was finalized in October 2014, only about one-
third of the assets actually went to Mercuria, at a cost of about $800 million.
2061
J PMorgan told
the Subcommittee that it had sold most of the remaining two-thirds to other buyers, including its
metals inventory, oil supply contract with a Philadelphia refinery, and other assets.
2062
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that, as of October 2014, it had dramatically reduced its
involvement with physical commodities.
2063
2055
9/10/13 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001-013, at 002 -
005. See also 9/2013 “Global Commodities Compliance Self Assessment,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-
301370 - 378, at 372.
2056
See undated “Primary Aluminum Consumption, 2011-2013,” European Aluminum Association website,http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-consumption-in-world-regions/ (indicating that North
American primary aluminum consumption in 2011 was 5.1 million metric tons).
2057
3/22/13 J PMorgan legal counsel letter to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015 - 018, at 018.
2058
See 2014 J PMorgan chart, “Power Plants Owned or Controlled via Tolling Agreements, 2008 to present,” J PM-
COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
2059
7/26/2013 “J .P. Morgan to Explore Strategic Alternatives for its Physical Commodities Business,”https://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=780681; “From Refineries To Power
Plants — A Rundown Of J P Morgan's Huge Portfolio Of Physical Assets,” Reuters, J onathan Leff and David
Sheppard (7/28/2013),http://www.businessinsider.com/jp-morgan-portfolio-of-physical-assets-2013-7.
2060
3/19/2014 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan announces sale of its physical commodities business
to Mercuria Energy Group Limited,”https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1394963095027&c=J PM_Content_C; 2014 J PMorgan Resolution Plan, at 9.
2061
10/3/2014 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan Completes Sales of Physical Commodities Assets,”http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=874514; Subcommittee briefing by
J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2062
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2063
Id. See also “J PMorgan has not ‘exited physical commodities’ despite sale,” Financial Times, Neil Humes
(11/3/2014),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/00a2ae9e-60e7-11e4-894b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IF0BzSSM
(quoting J ohn Anderson, co-head of the J PMorgan Global Commodities Group: “It’s a bit of a misnomer to say we
have exited physical commodities. … We won’t move crude around anymore but we will finance oil in tanks.”).
319
B. JPMorgan Involvement with Electricity
J PMorgan is an active trader in the physical and financial electricity markets. It entered
the power plant business for the first time in 2008, when in the midst of the financial crisis, at the
request of the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan acquired the assets of Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns
controlled over two dozen power plants at the time. As part of that transaction, J PMorgan
acquired “tolling agreements” that enabled it to supply fuel to the power plants and then sell the
power they produced to wholesalers. J PMorgan also acquired direct ownership interests in a
number of power plants. In 2010, J PMorgan increased its power plant activities by acquiring
control over four more power plants, including two from a larger acquisition of physical
commodity assets from RBS Sempra. At its height, J PMorgan owned or had rights to the energy
output of 31 power plants across the country. According to one 2013 press report, J PMorgan
controlled “more than 2,950 megawatts of electricity through such deals, enough to power every
one of Indiana's 2.8 million homes.”
2064
When J PMorgan acquired its power plants, it did not have authority to own or operate
them, and sought broad authority from the Federal Reserve to conduct power plant activities.
The Federal Reserve eventually authorized J PMorgan to enter into tolling agreements, energy
management contracts, and long-term supply contracts with power plants, but declined to
authorize J PMorgan to take direct ownership of a commercial power plant as a complementary
activity. J PMorgan responded by asserting merchant banking authority to retain its direct
ownership of the three power plants. J PMorgan also entered into several disputes with state and
federal electricity regulators over how it was conducting its power plant activities. In J uly 2013,
J PMorgan paid $410 million to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to settle
charges that it used manipulative bidding tactics that produced excessive wholesale electricity
payments in California and Michigan. Also in 2013, FERC ordered J PMorgan to stop blocking
the modification of two California power plants to improve grid reliability. In 2014, under
pressure from the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan began exiting the power plant business.
J PMorgan’s power plant activities raise multiple concerns, including market
manipulation, insufficient capital and insurance to protect against catastrophic event risks, and
inadequate safeguards to stop financial holding company involvement with impermissible
physical commodity assets.
(1) Background on Electricity
Electricity is a physical product that is produced from the conversion of natural resources
such as oil, gas, uranium, solar energy, water, or wind into a flow of electrons.
2065
Electricity is a
personal and commercial necessity today, providing lighting and heating for residential homes,
businesses, and governments, while powering computers, electronic devices, machines, and an
increasing number of vehicles. Since electricity is produced by a flow of electrons, it is not
2064
“J PMorgan's U.S. power plants and energy trading deals,” Reuters (7/25/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/jpmorgan-ferc-idUSL1N0FV0KF20130725.
2065
“Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 1,http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
320
easily stored and, in most cases, must be produced as required. Supply and demand change
continuously, leading to great variations in price.
Electricity Production. Electricity is different from most physical commodities in that it
is a secondary energy source – that is, it is produced through the conversion of other
commodities, including coal and natural gas.
2066
According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, in 2013, about 39% of the 4 trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity generated in the
United States came from power plants fueled by coal.
2067
Power plants fueled by natural gas
provided roughly 27% of the U.S. electricity supply.
2068
Other prominent sources of electricity in
the United States include nuclear energy, hydropower, and renewable energy sources such as
solar and wind energy.
2069
Electricity Infrastructure. The process of providing electricity for end users in the
United States involves three major types of infrastructure. First, electricity is produced at one of
the 5,800 major power plants across the country or at one of many smaller generation
facilities.
2070
Second, the electricity is transported across a series of high voltage transmission
lines to more localized population centers across the country.
2071
As of 2008, the United States
contained approximately 450,000 miles of those power lines.
2072
Third, local distribution systems
transport the electricity to its final destination in homes, businesses, and government offices,
either by overhead power lines or underground cables.
2073
This three-step process is summarized
in the following graphic:
2066
Id. at 1.
2067
“Electricity in the United States,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/12/2014),http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states.
2068
Id.
2069
“What is U.S. electricity generation by energy source?,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/12/2014),http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3.
2070
“Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure,” American
Society of Civil Engineers (2011), at 15,http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Failure_to_Act/SCE41 report_Final-lores.pdf.
2071
Id.
2072
Id.
2073
Id.
321
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission website,
http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Failure_to_Act/SCE41 report_Final-lores.pdf
Electricity has been generated and transported in this fashion since the development of
interconnected power lines in the 1920s.
2074
Due to the complexity of the system and aging
infrastructure, the United States currently faces increasing grid reliability problems.
2075
Electricity Markets. Electricity markets have two main components: retail and
wholesale.
2076
As the names suggest, the retail market concerns the sale of electricity to end-
users or consumers, while the wholesale market involves the sale of electricity between
producers, distributors, traders, and electric utilities.
2077
Within the wholesale market, electricity
is traded like any other commodity in both physical and financial trading venues.
Physical electricity is traded in two primary markets: the day-ahead market and the real-
time market. As its name suggests, the day-ahead market produces binding schedules for the
production and consumption of electricity one day before it is needed.
2078
Because of the
difficulty inherent in storing electricity, the day-ahead market is as forward-looking a market as
exists in the electricity markets. The real-time market operates to cover the differences between
2074
Id. at 16.
2075
See, e.g., “U.S. Electrical Grid Gets Less Reliable as Outages Increase and R&D Decreases,” Professor Massoud
Amin, Director of the Technological Leadership Institute, University of Minnesota (2011 with updates),http://tli.umn.edu/blog/security-te...ets-less-reliable-as-outages-increase-and-rd-
decreases/.
2076
“Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 37,http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
2077
Id.
2078
Id. at 64.
322
what is provided for in the day-ahead market and the amount of electricity actually needed by
end-users during the day.
2079
The real-time market is significantly smaller than the day-ahead
market, accounting for only about 5% of total scheduled energy use.
2080
Both the day-ahead and
real-time markets are subject to oversight by Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)and
independent system operators (ISOs),
2081
which are independent, membership-based, non-profit
organizations that “ensure reliability and optimize supply and demand bids for wholesale electric
power.”
2082
In addition to the physical markets, electricity can be traded in financial markets, using a
variety of financial products, including electricity-related futures, swaps, and options.
Electricity-related financial products are available on regulated exchanges and over the counter.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), for example, has offered electricity futures since
1996.
2083
One of the more widely traded is a financially-settled futures contract tracking prices
for 40 megawatts-hours of electricity during real-time peak hours, which can be traded
electronically or by open outcry on the floor of the NYMEX.
2084
Electricity futures, options, and
swaps are also available on the Intercontinental Exchange
2085
and Nodal Exchange, a CFTC-
registered exchange focused on electricity financial products for North American power
markets.
2086
Participants in the electricity financial markets include power providers and
suppliers seeking to hedge price risk, as well as speculators seeking to profit from changes in
electricity prices.
2087
While much smaller than the crude oil and natural gas markets, electricity
markets are nevertheless active, with many participants.
2088
Electricity Prices. Electricity prices are typically volatile in the short term, due to the
inability to store electricity and sudden swings in demand and supply due to weather, plant
shutdowns, and other factors.
2089
Electricity prices have also been subject to high profile cases of
2079
Id. at 65.
2080
Id.
2081
Id. at 64.
2082
“About 60% of the U.S. Electric Power Supply is Managed by RTOs,” U.S. Energy Information Administration,
(4/4/2011),http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=790.
2083
3/9/2012 presentation, “The Evolution of the CME Group Electricity Complex,” CME Group, at 6,http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Leach_Brad.pdf.
2084
See contract specifications for the “PJ M Western Hub Real-Time Peak Calendar-Month 2.5 MW Futures,” CME
website,
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/electricity/pjm-peak-calendar-month-lmp-swap-
futures_contract_specifications.html.
2085
See, e.g., electricity listings on the Intercontinental Exchange website,https://www.theice.com/products/Futures-
Options/Energy/Electricity
2086
See electricity listings on the Nodal Exchange website,http://www.nodalexchange.com/.
2087
See, e.g., “Utilities Turn to Global Markets to Hedge Commodity Risks,” Black & Veatch, Samuel Glasser
(2014),http://bv.com/Home/news/solutions/s...nt/utilities-turn-to-global-markets-to-hedge-
commodity-risks.
2088
See, e.g., 9/13/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-07-000001 -
021, attachment at J PM-COMM-PSI-000019.
2089
See, e.g., “Big bets on power cleared by regulator,” Financial Times, Gregory Meyer (1/21/2014),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a3d69d2-81f8-11e3-87d5-00144feab7de.html#axzz3FwLSMWhx (“Electricity is
typically the most volatile commodity market because it cannot be easily stored, forcing huge price swings to
balance supply and demand. Peak prices more than doubled overnight when extreme cold gripped the northern US
in early J anuary.”).
323
price and supply manipulation, such as cases involving Enron
2090
and, more recently, major
financial institutions.
2091
The following graph,
2092
prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, illustrates the volatility and overall increase in electricity prices from 1999 to 2013:
U.S. City Average Electricity Prices per Kilowatt
Power Plants. The United States currently has about 5,800 major power plants across
the country as well as smaller generation facilities that produce electricity.
2093
Many sell their
electricity output directly to distributors or end-users. Alternatively, many power plants sell their
electricity output to third parties via “tolling agreements,” who market the electricity to others.
A tolling agreement typically requires the “toller” to make periodic payments to the
power plant owner to cover the plant’s operating costs plus a fixed profit margin.
2094
In
exchange, the power plant gives the toller the right to all or part of the plant’s power output. As
part of the agreement, the toller typically supplies or pays for the fuel used to run the plant.
Since the toller has the right to the electricity output, it also determines the price at which to sell
it.
2090
See, e.g., United States v. Belden, Criminal Case No. No. CR 02-0313 MJ J (USDC ND Calif. 2002), Plea
Agreement, file:///C:/Users/eb45550/Downloads/usbelden101702plea.pdf; “Enron Forced Up California Prices,
Documents Show,” New York Times, Richard A. Oppel, J r. and J eff Gerth (5/7/2002),http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/business/enron-forced-up-california-prices-documents-show.html.
2091
See discussion, below.
2092
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Data, “Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject,” Series Id. No.
APU000072610, U.S. city average, Electricity per kilowatt (10/14/2014).
2093
“Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure,” American
Society of Civil Engineers (2011), at 15,http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Failure_to_Act/SCE41 report_Final-lores.pdf.
2094
See 2008 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60, C64
(2008) (hereinafter “RBS Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2008comp.pdf. The
order authorized both the Royal Bank of Scotland and a joint venture called RBS Sempra Commodities that the
Royal Bank of Scotland had formed with Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company, to enter into tolling agreements.
324
Some power plants have also entered into Volumetric Production Payment (VPP)
agreements with financial holding companies. VPP agreements typically require the financial
holding company to provide upfront financing to the power plant for the purchase of fuel, in
exchange for a designated share of the electricity produced when production
occurs.
2095
According to J PMorgan, VPP agreements are usually between three and seven years
in length, and typically give the financial holding company the right to receive title to the
fuel.
2096
VPP transactions can be viewed as short term loans using electricity production as
security for the loan.
Financial holding companies involved with power plants typically use tolling agreements
or VPP agreements to obtain and sell electricity on the physical markets.
Power Plant Incidents. Power plants, like other industrial worksites, are subject to a
variety of operational and catastrophic event risks. They include mechanical and electrical
failure of equipment, fires associated with lack of maintenance, insufficient training of key
individuals, and the use of substandard material.
2097
Since power plants vary in size, location,
fuel source, age, and design, their risks are particular to the specific plant involved.
One of the worst power plant incidents in recent years involved the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) Kingston Fossil Plant in Tennessee. The coal-fueled Kingston Plant was built
in the 1950s, to supply the nearby Oak Ridge atomic energy installations with electricity.
2098
On
December 22, 2008, the walls of a containment dike holding coal ash gave way, suddenly
releasing 5.4 million cubic yards of material into the surrounding area,
2099
enough to fill three
football stadiums.
2100
Within an hour, approximately 300 acres were affected, as the fast moving
ash destroyed homes and altered the natural landscape.
2101
Fortunately, no fatalities resulted.
TVA has reportedly spent approximately $1.1 billion on cleanup costs, fines, and legal fees
associated with the spill, with cleanup work scheduled to continue well into 2015.
2102
To cover
2095
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan Chase legal counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase
Application for Complementary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 221, at 037.
2096
Id.
2097
See, e.g., “Keeping power plants online with risk management,” Utility Week, Paul Newton (3/2/2011),http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/K...ine-with-risk-management/795972#.VBb9_2ORKUw.
2098
See “Executive Summary for Root Cause Analysis of Kingston Dredge Cell Failure,” TVA website (6/26/2009) ,
at 1,http://www.tva.gov/kingston/rca/FINAL-062609_Executive_Summary-REV3.pdf.
2099
Id.
2100
“The Spill: What happened and why?” educational video on TVA website,http://www.tva.gov/kingston/education/index.htm.
2101
See “Executive Summary for Root Cause Analysis of Kingston Dredge Cell Failure,” TVA website (6/26/2009),
at 1,http://www.tva.gov/kingston/rca/FINAL-062609_Executive_Summary-REV3.pdf; “Ash Slide at TVA
Kingston Fossil Plant,” Tennessee Department of Environment & Conservation,http://tn.gov/environment/kingston/.
2102
“TVA deserves credit for coal-ash spill cleanup efforts,” Knoxville News Sentinel, editorial, (7/2/2013),http://www.knoxnews.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-tva-deserves-credit-for-coal-ash-spill. See also “Coal Ash
Spill Cleanup Could Cost $825 Million,” NBC News, (2/12/2009),http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29166267/ns/us_news-environment/t/coal-ash-spill-cleanup-could-cost-
million/#.VDRTTaPD9aQ.
325
the costs, TVA imposed a surcharge on customer electricity bills, projected to continue until
2024.
2103
Another major power plant incident occurred at the Kleen Energy Systems power station
in Middletown, Connecticut, which experienced a major explosion during the construction of the
plant in February 2010. The blast killed five and injured dozens, and tremors with earthquake
force could be felt across much of the state.
2104
Early estimates from property damage and
business interruption alone put the losses at $150 million, which did not include liabilities
resulting from death and injuries due to the accident.
2105
Other events, such as power plant fires, are more common. Earlier this year, for example,
a four-alarm fire at a power plant in Colorado Springs, Colorado substantially damaged the plant,
injured one worker, caused a brief power loss for 22,000 customers, and closed the plant.
2106
The
fire chief predicted that the plant would be “inoperable for some time,” and utilities officials
indicated that the plant would have to purchase replacement power from other sources at a higher
cost.
2107
The plant had previously experienced another fire in 2002.
Regulatory Framework. Electrical power plants are subject to regulation by multiple
agencies at the federal, regional, and state levels. The primary federal regulator is the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which oversees interstate wholesale electricity rates,
the reliability of the electrical grid, and the stability of energy markets in the United States.
2108
Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs), formed at
the regional or state level, also have key oversight responsibility for power plant facilities and
electricity rates.
2109
Their responsibilities include tariff administration, monitoring of wholesale
electricity markets, and management of the transmission system.
2110
(2) JPMorgan Involvement with Power Plants
Over the course of three years, from 2008 to 2010, J PMorgan acquired 31 power plants
across the country. J PMorgan has valued its power plant tolling agreements at more than $2
billion,
2111
with related capacity payments worth $1.2 billion.
2112
At the time of acquisition,
2103
“TVA deserves credit for coal-ash spill cleanup efforts,” Knoxville News Sentinel editorial, (7/2/2013),http://www.knoxnews.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-tva-deserves-credit-for-coal-ash-spill.
2104
See, e.g., “5 Dead, Dozens Hurt in Connecticut Power Plant Blast,” New York Times, Robert D. McFadden
(2/7/2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/nyregion/08explode.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2105 “Munich Re leads coverage on Kleen Energy Explosion” Business Insurance, Michael Bradford And Zack
Phillips (2/14/2010),http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100214/ISSUE01/302149988.
2106
“Drake Power Plant fire will be costly; hard to say how much,” The Gazette (5/6/2014),http://gazette.com/drake-power-plant-fire-will-be-costly-hard-to-say-how-much/article/1519474.
2107
Id.
2108
Subcommittee briefing by FERC (7/30/2013); 7/29/2014 testimony of FERC Acting Chairman Cheryl A.
LaFleur before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, “FERC
Perspective: Questions Concerning EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan and other Grid Reliability Challenges,”http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20140729091732-LaFleur-07-29-2014.pdf.
2109
“Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 60 - 62,http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
2110
Id. at 63 - 65.
2111
See, e.g., 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301383 -396, at
387.
326
J PMorgan did not have authority to enter into a tolling agreement with a power plant, much less
own one, and petitioned the Federal Reserve for broad authority to conduct power plant
activities. The Federal Reserve eventually authorized J PMorgan to enter into tolling agreements,
energy management contracts, and long-term supply contracts with power plants, but declined to
authorize J PMorgan to take direct ownership of a commercial power plant, as an impermissible
mixing of banking and commerce. J PMorgan responded by asserting that it would retain its
direct ownership of three power plants through its merchant banking authority. J PMorgan also
entered into a number of regulatory battles with state and federal regulators over its power plant
activities. Among other penalties, J PMorgan was barred from bidding in the California
wholesale electricity market for six months in 2013, and, in J uly 2013, paid $410 million to settle
charges that it had manipulated wholesale electricity prices in California and Michigan. That
same year, J PMorgan was ordered by FERC to stop blocking plant modifications to improve grid
reliability. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee it has now determined to exit the power plant
business, but will need four more years to do so.
(a) Acquiring Power Plants
J PMorgan acquired control of 31 power plants over a two-year period from 2008 to 2010.
In most instances, it acquired a tolling agreement to purchase the plant’s electricity output; in
some cases, it acquired a direct ownership interest in the power plant. It acquired the power
plants in three phases, in transactions involving Bear Stearns, AES, and RBS Sempra.
2008 Bear Stearns Acquisition. J PMorgan first entered the power plant business in
2008, when at the request of the Federal Reserve, it purchased The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.
which was then under financial distress.
2113
As part of that acquisition, J PMorgan acquired Bear
Energy LP which owned or held tolling agreements with 27 power plants across the country.
2114
Bear Energy, formed in 2006, was located in Houston.
2115
By 2008, it was engaged in a
wide range of physical and financial energy-related commodity activities. They included energy
and electricity trading, power plant management, and power plant restructuring services. It held
ownership interests in or tolling agreements with over two dozen power plants.
2116
The
acquisition of Bear Energy gave J PMorgan a significant presence in the power plant business.
Of the 27 power plants that Bear Energy transferred to J PMorgan in May 2008, 16 were
located in California.
2117
Three were located in Colorado, and one each in Alabama, Florida,
2112
See 9/30/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, chart at J PM-COMM-PSI-000048.
2113
See 11/4/2009 memorandum, “Control Validation Target Exam,” prepared by J PMC Ventures Energy
Corporation, FRB-PSI-200611 - 632, at 627; 8/2/2013 Federal Reserve press release, “Bear Stearns, J PMorgan
Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,”http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm.
2114
See undated 2014 J PMorgan chart, “Power Plants Owned or Controlled via Tolling Agreements, 2008 to
present,” (hereinafter, “J PMorgan Power Plants Chart”), J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
2115
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (2/11/2014). See also “Bear Stearns's Trading Unit Draws Interest,” Wall
Street J ournal, Ann Davis (4/5/2008),http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB120735754695191559.
2116
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (2/11/2014); 7/17/2008 “Quarterly review of risk, performance and
significant developments,” prepared by OCC regarding J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-303773 - 780, at 777 (listing Bear
power plant assets acquired by J PMorgan) [sealed exhibit].
2117
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
327
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New J ersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
2118
One was a coal-fired
plant; the rest were fueled by natural gas.
2119
According to the head of Bear Energy, Paul Posoli,
who was hired by J PMorgan to continue to run the Houston operation: “At the time of the
merger, Bear Energy was managing over 9,000MW [megawatts] of generation … and [had] a
very established national presence.”
2120
J PMorgan usedits key commodities subsidiary, J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy
Corporation (J PMVEC), to conduct its power plant business.
2121
Of the 27 power plants
transferred from Bear Energy, J PMVEC assumed tolling agreements for 17. J PMVEC also took
a direct ownership interest in eight power plants. Of those eight, it took a 100% ownership
interest in two power plants in Colorado; a 50% ownership share in another Colorado power
plant; a 30% ownership share in three power plants in California; a 14% ownership share in one
power plant in Texas; and a 1% ownership share in a power plant in Maine.
2122
In addition, in
one instance involving a power plant in California, rather than take an ownership interest or
tolling agreement, J PMorgan simply assumed a lease for the plant.
2123
Finally, through its Global
Commodities Group Principal Investments unit, J PMorgan took a 100% ownership stake in one
power plant in Florida, Central Power & Lime.
2124
Ownership was held through a subsidiary of
J PMVEC.
2125
To conduct its new power plant activities, J PMorgan retained the head of Bear
Energy and many of its employees in a new J PMorgan “Houston Energy” office.
2126
2010 Huntington Acquisitions. Almost two years later, J PMorgan acquired short-term
tolling agreements on the electricity output of two more Southern California power plants,
Huntington Beach 3 and 4.
2127
J PMorgan entered into the new tolling agreements with AES
Corporation, the owner of the plants.
2128
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it entered into the
tolling agreements, in part, because it had already acquired tolling agreements with the two sister
power plants on the same site, Huntington Beach 1 and 2, through the 2008 Bear Stearns
2118
Id.
2119
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2120
“J P Morgan's integration of Bear Energy,” Risk.net (1/13/2009),http://www.risk.net/energy-
risk/feature/1523435/jp-morgan-integration-bear-energy.
2121
See, e.g., 12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase &
Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” (hereinafter “J PM Notice
Requesting Tolling Agreements”), prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033, at 014, footnote 2;
9/10/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorganChase-06-000001- 013, at 008.
2122
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
2123
Id. at 025; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014). The lease expired in J une 2010, and J PMorgan
terminated its relationship with the power plant at that time.
2124
See J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000025; 10/2009 “Global Commodities Deep Dive Risk
Review,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200634 - 655, at 644 (identifying Central Power as a 100% owned
equity asset in a list of assets in the “Global Commodities Principal Investments Portfolio”); Subcommittee briefing
by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2125
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 -008, at 002.
2126
See, e.g., 7/17/2008 “Quarterly review of risk, performance and significant developments,” prepared by OCC
regarding J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-303773 - 780, at 777.
2127
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000022; In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding
Strategies, Docket Nos. IN11-8-000 and IN13-5-000, FERC “Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement
(7/30/2013), at 4, ¶19, and “Stipulation and Consent Agreement” (7/30/2014) at 3, ¶8, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068;
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2128
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan legal counsel (10/29/2014).
328
acquisition.
2129
J PMorgan stipulated in legal pleadings with FERC that it entered into the tolling
agreements for the two plants “to develop experience with the California market before the AES
4000 plants [the California power plants J PMorgan had previously acquired from Bear Stearns]
began returning to J PMVEC’s control in J anuary 2011.”
2130
J PMVEC assumed control of the
Huntington Beach 3 and 4 tolling agreements in J anuary 2010. Those tolling agreements
increased J PMorgan’s portfolio to 29 power plants.
2010 RBS/Sempra Acquisition. Six months later, in J uly 2010, J PMorgan expanded its
power plant activities yet again when it purchased energy-related commodity assets from RBS
Sempra, a joint venture between the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS) and Sempra Energy,
for $1.7 billion.
2131
Along with other assets, it acquired two more power plants, one in
Washington state and one in Maryland.
2132
Both were fueled with natural gas.
2133
J PMVEC
assumed a tolling agreement with the plant in Washington.
2134
In contrast, through its Global
Commodities Group Principal Investments unit, J PMorgan took direct ownership of the Panda
Brandywine plant in Maryland, acquiring a 100% ownership stake. J PMorgan held ownership
through its subsidiary, J PMVEC.
2135
J PMorgan then leased the plant back to the owners who
agreed to run it, and entered into a tolling agreement to acquire 100% of the plant’s electricity
output.
2136
This complex arrangement raised a number of issues over time.
Two months later, in September 2010, separate from the RBS Sempra transaction,
J PMorgan acquired 100% of the shares of the Kinder J ackson power plant in J ackson, Michigan,
becoming a direct owner of the plant.
2137
J PMorgan already had a tolling agreement with the
plant, which it acquired in 2008, as part of the Bear Stearns acquisition. In 2010, when the plant
was put up for sale, J PMorgan’s Global Commodities Group Principal Investments unit arranged
for the outright purchase of the power plant from Kinder Morgan Power Company and others for
about $143 million.
2138
Ownership of the plant was held through a subsidiary of J PMVEC.
2139
Generally, when J PMorgan entered into a tolling agreement with a power plant, it
promised, not just to buy the electricity produced, but also to supply natural gas to the plant for
the duration of the tolling agreement.
2140
In addition, J PMorgan entered into specific long-term
fuel supply agreements with three power plants acquired from Bear Stearns.
2141
2129
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014). See also J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-
000024.
2130
In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, Docket Nos. IN11-8-000 and IN13-5-000,
“Stipulation and Consent Agreement” (7/30/2013), at 3, ¶8, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068.
2131
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (2/11/2014).
2132
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022, 025; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2133
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2134
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000022.
2135
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 -008, at 002.
2136
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2137
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, at J PM-COMM-PSI-000025.
2138
See 8/13/2010 memorandum, “KJ Toll Disposition Plan,” prepared by J PMorgan Commodity Principal
Investment Team for the Commodities Principal Investment Committee, FRB-PSI-300066 - 093, at 066.
2139
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 -008, at 002.
2140
Id.
2141
Id.
329
Inadequate Oversight. About a year after J PMorgan assumed control of the Houston
office that formerly belonged to Bear Energy and which J PMorgan was using to oversee its
power plant assets, the Federal Reserve conducted an examination to “gain a better
understanding of the firm’s physical energy trading activities and the processes in place to
control and manage risks.”
2142
The examination tested, in part, whether J PMorgan had
adequately extended its “corporate compliance program” to include the new Houston office.
2143
The Federal Reserve concluded it had not.
2144
A 2010 internal Federal Reserve examination
document also noted that J PMorgan’s own internal audit team had found that J PMVEC did not
have the technical capability to evaluate its power plants’ compliance with “technical,
operational and engineering suitability standards”:
“For power plants in which J PMVEC has an equity interests, internal audit indicated that
it does not have the technical, operations or engineering capability to review the
compliance programs of such power plants.”
2145
In response to the Federal Reserve’s supervisory letter raising the issue, J PMorgan formulated a
plan to strengthen its compliance oversight of the Houston office and its supervision of
J PMVEC’s power plants.
2146
31 Power Plants. The following chart summarizes J PMorgan’s two-year acquisition
effort which, by 2010, produced its portfolio of 31 power plants.
2142
1/5/2010 report, “Combined Scope/Product Memo[:] J PMC Energy Ventures Corporation Corporate
Compliance,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300210 - 220, at 212 [sealed exhibit].
2143
Id.
2144
See 1/28/2010 supervisory letter from Federal Reserve Bank of New York to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300332 - 334
[sealed exhibit].
2145
1/5/2010 report, “Combined Scope/Product Memo[:] J PMC Energy Ventures Corporation Corporate
Compliance,” prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FRB-PSI-300210 - 220, at 217 [sealed exhibit].
2146
3/15/2010 letter from J PMorgan to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PMorgan Chase & Co. Houston
Energy,” FRB-PSI-301163 - 168.
330
Power Plant
Location
MW
Capacity
Fuel
Date JPM
Assumed
Control JPM Entity
Owned or
Tolled by
JPM
Percentage
of JPM
ownership Current Status
OLS Camarillo Camarillo, California 29 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 30% Sold
OLS Chino Chino, California 29 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 30% Sold
Carson
Cogeneration
Carson, California 49 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition} J PMVEC Owned 33% Sold
Grays Harbor Satsop, Washington
480 (Summer)
520 (Winter)
Gas
12/1/2010
(RBS/Sempra
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Terminated
Greeley Cogen Greeley, Colorado 32 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 100% Sold
Thermo Cogen Ft. Lupton, Colorado 272 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 100% Sold
Brush
Cogeneration
Brush, Colorado 70 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisit10n) J PMVEC Owned 50% Sold
Gregory Power
Partners
Gregory, Texas 345 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 14% Sold
Evangeline (Cleco)
Evangeline,
Louisiana
758 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Terminated
Ironwood
South Lebanon,
Pennsylvania
664 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Sold
Red Oak
Sayreville, New
J ersey
764 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A Sold
Rumford Cogen Rumford, Maine 85 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 1% Sold
Mojave
Cogeneration
Boron, California 55 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Leased 100%
Lease Not
Renewed
Alamitos 1
Long Beach,
California
184 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 2
Long Beach,
California
184 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 3
Long Beach,
California
336 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Power Plants Owned or Controlled Via Tolling
Agreements by JPMorgan Since 2008
331
Alamitos 4
Long Beach,
California
336 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 5
Long Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Alamitos 6
Long Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Huntington Beach
1
Huntington Beach,
California
225.8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Huntington Beach
2
Huntington Beach,
California
225 .8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Huntington Beach
3
Huntington Beach,
California
225
Gas
l/1/2010
(AES Contract)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A Taken Offline
Huntington Beach
4
Huntington Beach.
California
227
Gas
l/1/2010
(AES Contract)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A Taken Offline
Redondo Beach 5
Redondo Beach,
California
183.8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Redondo Beach 6
Redondo Beach,
California
183.8 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Redondo Beach 7
Redondo Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Redondo Beach 8
Redondo Beach,
California
504 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Tolling
Agreement until
end of 2018
Lindsay Hill
(Tennaska)
Billingsley, Alabama 844 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Tolled N/A
Sold to Mercuria
Kinder J ackson J ackson, Michigan 545 Gas
5/30/2008
(Bear Stearns
Acquisition) J PMVEC Owned 100%
Expected sale in
2016
Central Power &
Lime
Brooksville, Florida 60 Biomass
5/30/2008
(Bear Steams
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Owned 100%
Operated by
Florida Power &
Development
Panda Brandywine
Brandywine,
Maryland
230
Gas
Oil
12/1/2010
(RBS/Sempra
Acquisition)
J PMVEC Owned 100%
J PM energy
mngmt contract;
3d party operator
Source: J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022-025
332
(b) Requesting Broad Authority for Power Plant Activities
J PMorgan got into the power plant business as a result of the larger Bear Stearns acquisition
during the financial crisis. At that time, J PMorgan did not have authority to conduct power plant
activities, but the Federal Reserve Bank of New York gave J PMorgan a two-year grace period to
decide how to handle the Bear Stearns assets. A little over a year after it acquired the power plants,
J PMorgan asked the Federal Reserve for broad complementary authority to own and manage them.
While the Federal Reserve agreed to provide J PMorgan with complementary authority to enter into
tolling agreements, energy management, and long-term supply contracts with the power plants, the
Federal Reserve declined to allow J PMorgan simply to buy power plants outright or engage in so-
called “financial restructuring” of power plants it owned. J PMorgan responded in part by asserting
that it would nevertheless retain direct ownership of three power plants by treating them as merchant
banking investments. After the Federal Reserve expressed increasing concern about its power plant
activities and J PMorgan entered into multiple regulatory disputes over how it was conducting those
activities, J PMorgan decided to exit the business over the next four years.
Two-Year Grace Period. Prior to acquiring the Bear Energy power plants in 2008,
J PMorgan had never engaged in power plant activities, and never sought complementary authority to
enter into a tolling agreement or other contract with a power plant. J PMorgan’s 2005 complementary
order did not explicitly address either power plants or electricity. As part of the Bear Stearns
transaction, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York gave J PMorgan a letter stating that “any assets or
activities acquired from Bear Stearns that J PMorgan is not currently permitted to own or engage in
shall be treated as permissible assets or activities for a period of two years.”
2147
That two-year grace
period applied to the 27 power plants acquired from Bear Stearns, deeming them “permissible”
assets. J PMorgan conducted power plant activities involving the Bear Stearns power plants
throughout the two-year grace period, which extended from March 2008 to March 2010, while it
sought an official grant of complementary authority to cover its power plant assets.
About two weeks after the Bear Stearns transaction in March 2008, the Federal Reserve
issued the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) a complementary order that provided broader authority for
physical commodity activities than prior complementary orders and, for the first time, explicitly
authorized activities involving power plants and electricity.
2148
Specifically, the RBS order allowed
RBS to enter into tolling agreements with power plant owners, energy management contracts with
power generation facilities, and long-term electricity supply contracts with large industrial and
commercial customers.
2149
Request for Tolling and Energy Management Authority. On December 30, 2009,
J PMorgan submitted two separate applications to the Federal Reserve to expand its 2005
complementary authority to match the authority provided to RBS for power plants and electricity.
2147
3/16/2008 letter from FRBNY to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-17-000003-05 at 04. See also 10/21/2014 letter from
J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003. During that two-year grace period,
J PMorgan sometimes referred to the power plants and related activities as “grandfathered activities,” but that was a
reference to their being allowed under the grace period; the assets were never held under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
grandfather clause since J PMorgan was ineligible to rely on that statutory authority for its physical commodity activities.
2148
See RBS Order, at C60. The order applied to both the Royal Bank of Scotland and a joint venture called RBS Sempra
Commodities that the Royal Bank of Scotland had formed with Sempra Energy, a U.S. energy company.
2149
Id.
333
The first application requested complementary authority to enter into tolling agreements with
power plant owners.
2150
In its application, J PMorgan provided the following expansive definition of
the authority it was seeking, explaining that tolling agreements:
“may involve, among other things, purchasing fuel used to produce electricity, entering into
agreements for the transportation of fuel, entering into options to purchase electricity, taking
title to electricity and entering into agreements for the transmission and sale of electricity.”
2151
J PMorgan wrote that one reason the Federal Reserve should grant the authority was that it would
provide J PMorgan with access to “important market information”:
“The Complementary Activities will further complement the Existing Business by providing
J PMVEC [J PMorgan’s subsidiary] with important market information. The ability to be
involved in the supply end of the commodities markets through tolling agreements provides
access to information regarding the full array of actual producer and end-user activity in those
markets. The information gathered through this increased participation will help improve
J PMVEC’s understanding of market conditions and trends while supplying vital price and risk
management information that J PMVEC can use to improve its financial commodities
derivative offerings. …
y participating in the widest possible variety of commodities markets and transactions,
J PMVEC will gain access to price and related market information and acquire more
experience in the markets for physical commodities that it can use to better serve its
customers and manage its own risks, which will lead to increased revenues and lower costs,
all of which will improve J PMVEC’s and J PM Chase’s profits and enhance their
soundness.”
2152
J PMorgan offered to accept the same limitations on the new authority as appeared in the RBS
order. The key limitation was that J PMorgan would continue to limit the aggregate market value of
all of its physical commodities resulting from physical commodity trading to no more than 5% of its
Tier 1 capital, and that when calculating that aggregate value, it would include the present value of all
capacity payments made in connection with any energy tolling agreement.
2153
The second application requested complementary authority to enter into “energy
management” agreements with power generators.
2154
In its application, J PMorgan provided a broader
definition of energy management contracts than appeared in the RBS order.
2155
J PMorgan wrote:
2150
J PM Notice Requesting Tolling Agreements,
PSI-FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033. See also In Re Make-Whole
Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, FERC Docket Nos. IN11-8-000 and IN13-5-000, FERC “Order Approving
Stipulation and Consent Agreement (7/30/2013), 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, (hereinafter “Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement”) at 2,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130730080931-IN11-8-000.pdf.
2151
J PM Notice of Tolling Agreements, at 013.
2152
Id. at 019 - 020, 032.
2153
Id. at 032 - 033.
2154
12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to
Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000561 -
567.
2155
The RBS order described the approved energy management contracts as follows:
334
“Under an EMA [energy management agreement], energy traders, schedulers, and related
support personnel provide asset optimization services and accounting services to a power
plant owner. The energy trader will provide market information and recommend hedging
strategies, including capacity and transmission management services and advice regarding
switching between fuel inputs. Energy traders and schedulers assist the plant owner with the
acquisition and delivery of fuel inputs to the plant. In addition, the energy trader will provide
interface services for the power plant owners with independent system operators
(‘ISOs’)/regional transmission organizations (‘RTOs’) and will schedule plant output to
ISOs/RTOs and other power purchasers based on energy prices in the open market. … An
energy trader may also provide credit intermediation services to the power plant owner with
respect to the owner’s counterparties. For example, in connection with such credit services,
the energy trader might post collateral to an ISO or RTO on behalf of a plant owner as part of
a credit arrangement to ensure delivery …. The energy trader, in turn, will collect money
from the ISO or RTO and those funds will be available to the energy trader as a part of the
plant owner’s collateral arrangement with the energy trader.”
2156
J PMorgan offered to accept several limitations on the new energy management authority, modeled
after the RBS order. The first was to ensure that “revenues attributable to J PMVEC’s Energy
Management Services will not exceed 5 percent of J PM Chase’s total consolidated operating
revenues.”
2157
That 5% limit is substantially higher than the cap normally included in complementary
orders limiting the market value of physical commodity holdings to no more than 5% of tier 1 capital,
but it was the same limit as provided to RBS.
Request for One-Year Extension. About a month later, on February 5, 2010, in the absence
of a Federal Reserve ruling on its December 2009 applications, J PMorgan sent a letter to the Federal
Reserve asking for a one-year extension of the Bear Stearns grace period so that it could continue to
engage in “energy tolling, energy management and the purchase and financial restructuring of power
plants,” that would otherwise be impermissible activities.
2158
The request, which was eventually
granted, enabled J PMorgan to continue its power plant activities until March 2011. In the meantime,
it acquired additional power plant assets in J anuary and J uly 2010, as described above.
Request for Abrogation of Volume Limits. In addition to requesting a one-year extension
of the grace period, the February 2010 letter made several other requests to expand J PMorgan’s
power plant activities as well as its other physical commodity activities as a whole. First, the letter
asked the Federal Reserve essentially to eliminate any limit on J PMorgan’s complementary physical
“[T]he energy manager provides transactional and advisory services to power plant owners. The transactional
services consist of SET [Sempra Energy Trading Corporation] acting as a financial intermediary, substituting its
credit and liquidity for those of the owner to facilitate the owner’s purchase of fuel and sale of power. SET’s
advisory services include providing market information to assist the owner in developing and refining a risk-
management plan for the plant. SET also provides a variety of administrative services to support these
transactions.”
RBS Order, at 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C65.
2156
12/30/2009 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co. Pursuant to
Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” (hereinafter “J PM Notice to Provide Energy
Management”), prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000559 - 567, at 564 - 565.
2157
Id. at 566.
2158
2/5/2010 letter from J PMorgan to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300286 - 290, at 286.
335
commodity activities, including the cap linked to 5% of its tier 1 capital.
2159
The letter asserted that
the 5% cap might “curtail not only its tolling activities but also its other physical trading activities
going forward,” putting J PMorgan at a competitive disadvantage.
2160
The letter also objected to the
much higher limit on its energy management services of 5% of its total consolidated operating
revenues, contending “such limitations are not necessary from a safety and soundness perspective
since the main components of this activity involve activities similar to those already conducted by
J PMC.”
2161
The letter proposed allowing its physical commodity activities to proceed without any
volume limit, “pursuant to robust risk management processes subject to regulatory examination.”
2162
Request for Restructuring Authority. In addition to requesting elimination of all volume
limits, the February 5 letter asked the Federal Reserve to allow it to continue to engage in another
power plant activity which it called “financial restructuring.”
2163
The letter described the activity as
“purchasing equity interests in power plants and subsequently restructuring and renegotiating the
power plant’s commodity purchase agreements and energy sale agreements with a view to making
the plant more efficient.”
2164
The letter explained that the new activity was “a natural outgrowth of
the energy management activities” and used the same expertise to restructure “the input and output
contracts entered into by power plants.”
2165
J PMorgan wrote:
“[T]his activity involves investing for a financial return in a way that allows J PMC to gain
valuable insight into the power market which can enhance J PMC’s overall commodities
business. … J PMC conducts this activity as a component of its overall commodities trading
and client business. J PMC’s goal is to augment its financial trading and not run the operation
of the plant as a commercial venture in a vacuum. As such, J PMC views this activity as
complementary to J PMC’s core commodities business.”
2166
The letter also indicated that J PMorgan might need to take ownership of power plants while
the restructuring was going on, with a view toward selling the plants one to two years later. It
explained that “
broad authority to renegotiate and act as counterparty to contracts with the plant is determined not to
constitute day to day management of the plant.”
2167
In response to the letter, the Federal Reserve granted the one year extension, allowing
J PMorgan to continue to treat its power plant activities as permissible activities, including
restructuring activities, until March 16, 2011, while it considered the other requests for expanded
authority to conduct power plant and other physical commodity activities.
2168
New Complementary Authority. On J une 30, 2010, 18 months after J PMorgan submitted
its applications and more than two years after it initiated its power plant activities, the Federal
2159
Id. at 287.
2160
Id.
2161
Id.
2162
Id.
2163
Id. at 288 – 289.
2164
Id. at 288.
2165
Id.
2166
Id.
2167
Id. at 289.
2168
See 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed
exhibit]; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
336
Reserve granted some, but not all, of the new authority J PMorgan had sought.
2169
By letter, the
Federal Reserve authorized J PMorgan to enter into tolling agreements and energy management
contracts with power plant owners.
2170
The letter also “confirmed” J PMorgan’s complementary
authority to enter into long-term electricity supply contracts, but “only with large commercial and
industrial end-users.”
2171
The Federal Reserve letter reasoned that the restriction to large customers
would ensure J PMorgan transacted with financially sophisticated purchasers and remained a
wholesale intermediary.
2172
The letter also imposed a number of restrictions on the authorities it
granted to ensure J PMorgan conducted its power plant activities in a safe and sound manner. The
restrictions included limiting its tolling payments to not more than 5% of J PMorgan’s tier 1 capital,
and limiting its energy management contract revenues to not more than 5% of J PMorgan’s total
consolidated operating revenues.
2173
By allowing J PMorgan to hold tolling agreements, energy management contracts, and long
term supply contracts with the power plants acquired from Bear Energy, the J une 30 letter made the
vast majority of its power plant activities permissible. In the case of three power plants that
J PMorgan owned outright, however, the Central Power & Lime plant in Florida, Panda Brandywine
plant in Maryland, and Kinder J ackson plant in Michigan, the new complementary order did not
authorize their direct ownership as either a financial or complementary activity. In addition, the
Federal Reserve did not provide any restructuring authority, because according to the Federal
Reserve, J PMorgan never submitted a formal application requesting it.
2174
According to J PMorgan,
the Federal Reserve did not want J PMorgan managing power plants, which the restructuring authority
would have necessitated, so it dropped the effort.
2175
Switch to Merchant Banking Authority. On February 23, 2011, J PMorgan notified the
Federal Reserve that, rather than rely on complementary authority for the three power plants it owned
outright, J PMorgan intended to assert merchant banking authority to continue owning them.
2176
A
March 2011 internal Federal Reserve examination document stated that J PMorgan had taken the new
stance, “because they believe [the Federal Reserve Board of Governors] staff is not inclined to
consider financial restructuring of power plants to be a complementary activity.”
2177
This document
suggests that J PMorgan’s assertion of merchant banking authority was a direct response to, as well as
an effort to circumvent, the Federal Reserve’s decision not to permit direct ownership of power plants
as a complementary activity. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that its assertion of merchant banking
2169
6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580.
2170
Id.
2171
Id. at 575. The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that J PMorgan did not formally request authority to enter into
long-term electricity supply contracts, because it viewed its 2005 complementary order as already providing it; the
Federal Reserve explained that the J une 30 letter clarified that J PMorgan did have that authority. Subcommittee briefing
by the Federal Reserve (10/16/2014).
2172
6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, at FRB-PSI-302574 - 575.
2173
Id. at 573.
2174
11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee,
PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002.
2175
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2176
See 3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604 [sealed exhibit].
See also undated document, prepared by J PMorgan for the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300352 - 353 (describing how
J PMorgan planned to move from engaging in plant restructuring to merchant banking with respect to the affected power
plants); Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/14).
2177
3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed
exhibit].
337
authority was permissible, because it was not running any of the three power plants directly, but was
relying on third parties to operate them.
2178
After noting J PMorgan’s revised justification for its ongoing direct ownership of the power
plants, the 2011 Federal Reserve examination document noted that J PMorgan had indicated that it
intended to divest itself of all three power plants.
2179
As of 2014, however, more than three years
after making that representation to the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan still retains possession of all three.
Of those three plants, J PMorgan acquired its ownership interest in the Central Power & Lime
plant in Florida in 2008, as part of the Bear Energy acquisition.
2180
In the case of the Panda
Brandywine plant in Maryland, J PMorgan acquired its shares as part of the RBS Sempra acquisition
in J uly 2010, leased the plant back to the same owners to run, and then entered into a tolling
agreement with the leaseholders.
2181
With respect to the Kinder J ackson plant in Michigan, J PMorgan
originally held a tolling agreement with the plant, but when it became available for sale in September
2010, J PMorgan purchased it outright from the owners.
2182
J PMorgan took each of these actions
without having authority to take direct ownership of a commercial enterprise like a power plant; it
bought the latter two plants while awaiting a response to its request for appropriate complementary
authority. Its ownership of the three power plants has now extended from four to six years.
A Federal Reserve examination document expressed frustration with J PMorgan’s stance. It
stated: “J PM has pressed on the boundaries of permissible activities including integrating merchant
banking investments into trading activities and pursuing activity that may appear ‘commercial in
nature,’ as well as pushed regulatory limits and their interpretation.”
2183
With respect to J PMorgan’s
power plant activities, it stated:
“J PMC holds power plants (Panda Brandywine and Kinder Morgan/J ackson) under a
combination of authorities. FRB has previously indicated to the firm this is impermissible
and is [in] discussion with the firm about conforming or divesting of these activities.”
2184
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee, and the Federal Reserve confirmed, that the Federal
Reserve has never explicitly determined that J PMorgan lacked merchant banking authority to own the
three power plants.
2185
J PMorgan explained that, prior to the Federal Reserve making that
determination, J PMorgan informed the Federal Reserve that it was planning on selling all of its
power plant holdings, which rendered the issue moot. As of October 2014, J PMorgan still has not
completely divested itself of its ownership interests in the three power plants.
2178
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014 and 10/10/2014).
2179
3/3/2011 “Outstanding Issues,” prepared by Federal Reserve examiners, FRB-PSI-304602 - 604, at 602 [sealed
exhibit];
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2180
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000025.
2181
Id.
2182
8/13/2010 memorandum, “KJ Toll Disposition Plan,” prepared by J PMorgan Commodity Principal Investment Team
for the J PMorgan Commodities Principal Investment Committee , FRB-PSI-300066 - 093.
2183
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 examination document, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at
J PM,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 299 [sealed exhibit].
2184
Id. at 301.
2185
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014); email from the Federal Reserve to the Subcommittee (11/6/2014).
338
(c) Conducting Power Plant Activities
For six years, from 2008 to 2014, J PMorgan owned or controlled between 15 and 31 power
plants across the country. In most cases, it held a long-term tolling agreement with the power plants.
To carry out those tolling agreements, in most cases J PMorgan supplied the natural gas that fueled
the plants and then took control of the plants’ electricity output and sold it. J PMorgan used its wholly
owned subsidiary, J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC), to execute the vast majority
of its electricity and natural gas trades supporting its power plant activities.
2186
A large block of J PMorgan’s power plants, 18 in all, were located in California. J PMorgan
has sold some of those plants and currently holds a tolling agreement for 12, all of which are owned
by AES Corporation (AES). The tolling agreement between J PMorgan and AES runs through 2018
at which time it will terminate.
2187
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it has re-tolled all 12 power
plants to Southern California Edison,
2188
and has asked the plant owner, AES, to release it from the
tolling agreement, but AES has declined, preferring to rely on J PMorgan’s creditworthiness to ensure
the tolling payments are made.
2189
For that reason, J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it expects
the tolling agreement to continue for the next four years until the termination date in 2018.
2190
Regulatory Disputes. During the six years it has had control of the California power plants,
J PMorgan has entered into multiple regulatory disputes with the California Independent System
Operation Corporation (CAISO), California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) over its power plant activities.
In one set of disputes, it battled state and federal regulators over the regulators’ assertion that
J PMorgan had made inaccurate statements and failed to provide requested information in an
investigation into the pricing practices at some of its California plants during 2010 and 2011.
2191
To
punish and deter that misconduct, FERC suspended for six months, from April to October 2013,
J PMorgan’s ability to sell electricity at market rates in California and elsewhere in the United States,
costing it potentially millions of dollars.
2192
In a related regulatory dispute, described more fully
below, in J uly 2013, J PMorgan paid $410 million to settle charges by FERC that some of its plants
used improper bidding tactics that manipulated California and the Midwest's wholesale electricity
2186
See, e.g.,
J PM Notice Requesting Tolling Agreements, PSI-FederalReserve-02-000012 - 033, at 014, 018-019, 026.
2187
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2188
Id. See also 2/15/2013 Advice Letter No. 2853-E (U 338-E), filed by Southern California Edison with the Public
Utilities Commission of the State of California, Energy Division, “Bilateral Capacity Sale and Tolling Agreement
Between Southern California Edison Company and BE CA LLC” (seeking Commission approval of J PMorgan’s re-
tolling agreements with Southern California Edison).
2189
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2190
Id.
2191
See, e.g., FERC v. J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, Civil Case No. 1:2012-MC-00352-DAR (USDC DC),
“Memorandum in Support for Petition by [FERC] for an Order to Show Cause Why this Court Should Not Enforce
Subpoenas for Production of Documents” (7/2/2012).
2192
See In re J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, FERC Docket No. EL12-103-000, “Order Suspending Market-
Based Rate Authority,” (11/14/2012), 141 FERC ¶ 61,131. See also “J PMorgan's California energy dealings draw more
fire,” Los Angeles Times, Marc Lifsher (11/16/2012),http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/16/business/la-fi-
jpmorganchase-power-20121116.
339
markets.
2193
J PMorgan’s improper bidding tactics also caused CAISO and CPUC to make numerous
rule and tariff changes to prevent similar practices in the future.
A third dispute involved an effort by CAISO to modify two power plants near Los Angeles,
Huntington Beach 3 and 4, to increase electrical grid reliability.
2194
CAISO had entered into a
contract with the owner of the plants, AES, to convert both plants into “synchronous condensers” that
provide voltage support to move electricity through the grid and increase grid reliability.
2195
That
contract was to take effect in J anuary 2013, but J PMorgan claimed that, due to certain tolling and
supplemental agreements it had with AES, CAISO had to obtain J PMorgan’s consent to the plant
modifications, which it declined to provide, even though both plants had been taken out of
service.
2196
J PMorgan cited construction costs, harm to the economic value of its power plant
investments, alternative solutions, and the unlikeliness of grid problems as reasons for not
proceeding.
2197
CAISO eventually brought the dispute to FERC, which ruled that J PMorgan could
not use its tolling agreement with AES to continue to block the proposed modifications to improve
grid reliability.
2198
In each of those three regulatory disputes, J PMorgan incurred substantial legal expense as
well as ill will from regulators, utilities, wholesalers, and the California public.
2199
Current Status. In addition to the 12 California power plants with which it has tolling
agreements and re-tolled to Southern California Edison, J PMorgan still owns power plants in
Michigan, Maryland, and Florida. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it has arranged for the sale
of the Kinder J ackson plant in Michigan, but the transaction cannot take place for another year, until
early 2016.
2200
J PMorgan indicated that the second plant, located in Florida, was converted by
J PMorgan from a coal-fired plant to a biomass facility, is being run by an unrelated third party, and
has been up for sale, but not yet sold. According to J PMorgan, the third plant, Panda Brandywine, is
located in Maryland, is run by a J PMorgan subsidiary, KMC Thermo, and is also up for sale.
2201
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it intends to exit the power plant business.
2202
Despite
that intent, J PMorgan expects to continue in the tolling agreement for the 12 California power plants
for the next four years, plants to hold the Michigan plant for another year, and is uncertain when it
will be able to sell the Florida and Maryland plants.
2193
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement; “J P Morgan to pay $410m in penalties for manipulating
electricity prices,” Associated Press (7/30/2013),http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/30/jpmorgan-ferc-
penalty-energy-prices.
2194
See In Re California Independent System Operator Corporation, FERC Docket No. EL13-21-000, FERC “Order on
Petition for Declaratory Order” (1/4/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,016. See also “J PMorgan reduces presence in California
power market, Reuters, Scott DiSavino (5/10/2013),http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-10/news/sns-rt-utilities-
jpmorganedisoninternational-update-20130510_1_aes-corp-southern-california-edison-ferc.
2195
See In Re California Independent System Operator Corporation, FERC Docket No. EL13-21-000, FERC “Order on
Petition for Declaratory Order” (1/4/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,016, at 1-3.
2196
Id. at 3-4.
2197
Id. at 10, 12.
2198
Id. at 20. J PMorgan appealed FERC’s decision, but later re-tolled its California power plants to Southern California
Edison, including its consent rights for the Huntington Beach power plants. It then dropped the litigation.
2199
See, e.g., “State’s power-plant fight with J PMorgan Chase is a legacy of deregulation mess,” Sacramento Bee, Dale
Kasler (12/10/2012),http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/10/176938/californias-power-plant-fight.html.
2200
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2201
J PMorgan Power Plant Chart, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025, at 025.
2202
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
340
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Electricity
J PMorgan’s power plant activities raise multiple concerns. First and foremost are concerns
that J PMorgan used some of its power plants to engage in a manipulative scheme to receive excessive
payments for electricity from Independent Systems Operators in California and Michigan. Additional
issues include J PMorgan’s allocating insufficient capital and insurance to protect against catastrophic
event risks, and the Federal Reserve’s failure to impose adequate safeguards to prevent misconduct
and protect taxpayers.
(a) Manipulating Electricity Prices
The most important issue illustrated by J PMorgan’s power plant activities is how physical
commodity activities can involve a financial holding company in price and market manipulation
misconduct, leading to consumers paying excessive electricity charges, violations of law, penalties,
legal expenses, and reputational damage.
Overview of Price Manipulation. In J uly 2013, J PMorgan paid $410 million to settle
charges brought by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that it used multiple pricing
schemes to manipulate electricity payments to the power plants it controlled in California and
Michigan.
2203
J PMorgan admitted to an agreed set of facts, did not admit to violations of law, but
agreed to disgorge “unjust profits” and pay a multi-million-dollar fine.
2204
The manipulative bidding
practices that were the focus of the case were employed by J PMorgan’s subsidiary, J PMorgan
Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC). The misconduct involved power plants in California and
Michigan, from 2010 through 2012, in the electricity markets overseen by the California Independent
System Operator (CAISO) and by the Midwest (now Midcontinent) Independent System Operator
(MISO). The Enforcement staff of FERC found that between September 2010 and November 2012,
J PMVEC engaged in 12 types of improper bidding strategies.
2205
In the process, FERC determined
that J PMVEC violated the Commission’s “Anti-Manipulation Rule” and employed fraudulent
schemes that resulted in “a fraud on electricity market participants in CAISO and MISO.”
2206
FERC Enforcement alleged that J PMVEC exploited loopholes in the electricity pricing
regulations in California and Michigan, and engaged in manipulative trading schemes “to make
profits from power plants that were usually out of the money [i.e., unprofitable] in the marketplace.”
2203
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement; 7/30/3013 FERC press release, “FERC, J P Morgan Unit
Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-
3/07-30-13.asp#.VEAgZ6PD9aR. The FERC Consent Agreement followed a filed claim in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. FERC v. J .P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, Civil Case No. 1:2012-MC-00352-DAR
(USDC DC 2012), “Memorandum in Support for Petition by [FERC] for an Order to Show Cause Why this Court Should
Not Enforce Subpoenas for Production of Documents” (7/2/2012). See also “J P Morgan to Pay $410 million in U.S.
settlement” Bloomberg, Brian Wingfield and Dawn Kopecki (7/30/2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-
30/jpmorgan-to-pay-410-million-in-u-s-ferc-settlement.html.
2204
FERC Consent Agreement, at 15-19.
2205
. 7/30/2013 FERC news release, “FERC, J PMorgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to
Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VC8CUKPD9aQ.
2206
Id.; FERC Consent Agreement at 13-14. See also FERC Anti-Manipulation Rule, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2012) (stating it
is unlawful to fraudulently manipulate the energy market).
341
FERC also alleged that J PMVEC’s bidding strategies were “designed to create artificial conditions
that forced the regulators to pay J PMVEC above the market at premium rates.”
2207
To turn its usually unprofitable power plants into profitable ones, J PMVEC traders submitted
electronic bids that were calculated to falsely appear to be attractive to the bidding software used by
California and Michigan electricity authorities, but were designed to result in above-market rate
payments. To initiate the bidding scheme, J PMVEC’s traders submitted bids that offered to sell
electricity at rates well below J PMVEC’s cost in generating the electricity, which meant the offers
usually lost money, if accepted. J PMVEC was willing to make those artificially low offers, which
were really nothing more than loss leaders, so that it could then participate in CAISO’s and MISO’s
“make-whole” payment mechanisms.
2208
Those mechanisms allow CAISO and MISO to compensate
generators at above-market prices to provide an incentive for plant owners to participate in the
bidding auctions and ensure grid reliability. J PMVEC used the make-whole payments in connection
with its bidding strategies to more than make up for the money it lost at market rates, frequently
receiving, in the end, twice its costs plus the same market payments that other market participants
received, without adding any grid reliability benefits.
2209
J PMVEC’s bidding schemes caused California and Michigan electricity authorities to pay
approximately $124 million in “excessive” payments to J PMorgan.
2210
When CAISO and MISO
officials realized what J PMVEC was doing, they objected and asked J PMVEC to stop. According to
FERC, J PMVEC continued creating new bidding schemes more than a year after it had been notified
it was under investigation – even as CAISO and MISO were re-writing the bidding rules to address
the prior schemes.
2211
For example, after CAISO shut down one bidding scheme in April 2011,
J PMorgan began two new schemes that led to another CAISO intervention in J une 2011 to halt them
as well.
2212
Power Plants Involved with the Bidding. J PMVEC used several power plants in its bidding
schemes. Most prominent were a set of power plants, located in California, which were owned by the
AES Corporation (AES) and were part of the Bear Energy acquisition in 2008.
2213
J PMVEC also
used the Kinder J ackson power plant in Michigan, another plant acquired through the 2008 Bear
Energy acquisition. In each case, J PMorgan, through its subsidiary, J PMVEC, had acquired Bear
Stearns’ long-term tolling agreement with the plant.
2214
The tolling agreements gave J PMVEC the
right to sell the plants’ electricity output and keep the profits from the sales.
2215
2207
7/30/2012 FERC news release, “FERC, J PMorgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to
Ratepayers,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VC8CUKPD9aQ.
2208
In the CAISO system, make-whole payments are called “Bid Cost Recovery” or “BCR” payments. MISO has several
different types of make-whole payments.
2209
FERC Consent Agreement, at 11-13.
2210
Id. at 15.
2211
Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, at 2, 5 (indicating that the FERC investigation began in August
2011, but that J PMVEC continued implementing new bidding strategies until November 2012).
2212
FERC Consent Agreement, at 10.
2213
Id. at 1.
2214
Id.
2215
Id.
342
When J PMVEC first acquired the tolling agreement involving the AES power plants in
California, all of the tolling rights had been subleased to Southern California Edison.
2216
Starting in
2011, as the subleased tolling agreements began to expire, J PMVEC began to re-gain control of the
plants. On J anuary 1, 2011, J PMVEC re-gained control of four power plants. By J anuary 1, 2012,
J PMVEC had re-gained control of six more.
2217
In addition, in a separate transaction in J anuary 2010,
J PMVEC acquired from the plant owner, AES, short-term tolling rights with two additional
California power plants, Huntington Beach 3 and 4, which J PMorgan took on to gain experience in
the California market.
2218
Development of Bidding Strategies. According to FERC, the bidding strategies at issue
were developed by J PMVEC personnel based in a J PMorgan office in Houston.
2219
The Houston
office was run by Francis Dunleavy, who reported directly to Blythe Masters, the head of J PMorgan’s
Global Commodities Group.
2220
At the time the bidding schemes were developed, J PMVEC’s
California and Michigan plants could not compete profitably with other electricity plants in the
CAISO and MISO markets.
2221
According to FERC, “[Blythe] Masters kept close tabs on the
California and Michigan plants, in part, because she viewed the AES … plants as ‘our largest risk
position.’”
2222
J PMorgan’s senior management expected Mr. Dunleavy to find a way to make the
California and Michigan plants profitable and to generate an “‘appropriate return’ which meant a
17% return on equity.”
2223
In 2010, after J PMorgan took over the Huntington Beach 3 and 4 power
plants, it began pursing ways for them to become more profitable.
In 2010, J PMVEC hired a new employee who would become a key designer of its improper
bidding strategies. On April 29, 2010, the resume of J ohn Bartholomew made its way to the attention
of Mr. Dunleavy.
2224
Mr. Bartholomew was then employed at Southern California Edison and had
previously interned at FERC.
2225
On his resume, he stated that he had identified a “flaw in the market
mechanism … causing CAISO to misallocate millions of dollars.”
2226
Mr. Bartholomew indicated
that it was possible to profit by gaming the system, rather than selling electricity at a profit at market
rates.
2227
In a matter of hours after Mr. Bartholomew sent his resume to the Houston office, Mr.
2216
Id. at 2.
2217
Id.
2218
Id. at 3.
2219
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 117 [sealed exhibit].
2220
Id. See also 3/14/2011 email exchange between Francis Dunleavy, J PMorgan, and Blythe Masters, J PMorgan,
“Privileged and Confidential – CAISO update,” PSI-FERC-02-000067 (showing Mr. Dunleavy discussing the CAISO
matter with Ms. Masters).
2221
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 117-119 [sealed exhibit].
2222
Id. at 118.
2223
Id. at 019.
2224
See 4/29/2010 email exchange between Francis Dunleavy, J PMorgan, and Rob Cauthen, J PMorgan, “Resume for
Power,” PSI-FERC-02-000009 - 010, at 009.
2225
Id.
2226
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 120 [sealed exhibit]. The Bartholomew resume stated: “Identified flaw in the
market mechanism Bid Cost Recovery that is causing the CAISO to misallocate millions of dollars.” 4/29/2010 email
exchange between Francis Dunleavy and Rob Cauthen, “Resume for Power,” PSI-FERC-02-000009 - 010, at 009.
2227
See 4/29/2010 email exchange between Francis Dunleavy, J PMorgan, and Rob Cauthen, J PMorgan, “Resume for
Power,” PSI-FERC-02-000009 - 010, at 009.
343
Dunleavy instructed others to “get him in ASAP.”
2228
Mr. Bartholomew began working at J PMVEC
in J uly 2010.
2229
Shortly after starting, Mr. Bartholomew began to develop manipulative bidding strategies
focused on CAISO’s make-whole mechanism, called Bid Cost Recovery or BCR payments. The
strategies were designed to cause CAISO and MISO to make payments at premium prices above the
market rates, and produce millions of dollars in profits for J PMorgan.
2230
Regional Electricity Markets. To understand the bidding strategies, some background on
the CAISO and MISO electricity markets is necessary. CAISO and MISO are Independent System
Operators (ISOs) that operate regional wholesale markets for electricity, and are regulated by
FERC.
2231
In their wholesale electricity markets, the sellers – who are generally power plants or
parties like J PMVEC who control power plant output – and the buyers – who are generally
distributors that provide electricity to retail customers – submit bid and offer prices at which they are
willing to transact.
2232
CAISO and MISO both operate “Day Ahead” and Real Time” regional
markets for physical electricity.
2233
As explained earlier, the Day Ahead market is a forward market
that allows participants buy and sell one day ahead of the date on which the electricity is actually
delivered; the Real Time market operates on the day the electricity is transmitted.
2234
In general,
CAISO and MISO provide the power seller with an “award” if the ISO agrees to buy electricity from
the seller.
2235
Even if a seller receives an ISO Day Ahead “award,” it may not produce all of the
energy called for in the award.
2236
If the ISO does not, in the end, instruct the generator to produce all
of the energy specified in the award, the generator can “buy back” the unneeded portion of the award
in the Real Time market.
2237
Because of this system, in the Real Time market, some sellers/power generators become
potential buyers of electricity in the Day Ahead market.
2238
If a generator receives an award in the
Day Ahead market and then buys back a portion of the award in the Real Time market, the generator
is said to be receiving a ‘decremental’ or reduced energy award.
Payments to Generators. ISOs such as CAISO and MISO pay power generators for
electricity. When CAISO and MISO pay power generators, they ordinarily do so at market rates.
2239
As noted above, in certain circumstances, they also pay power generators “make-whole” payments
2228
Id.
2229
FERC Consent Agreement, at 2.
2230
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 120 [sealed exhibit].
2231
FERC Consent Agreement, at 3.
2232
Id.
2233
Id.
2234
Id. at 4 (explaining that due to the two different markets, the prices from each exchange for the same hour may differ).
See also “Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics,” Staff report of the Division of Energy Market
Oversight, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7/2012), at 65,http://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf (describing the markets generally).
2235
FERC Consent Agreement, at 4.
2236
Id.
2237
Id.
2238
Id. at 5.
2239
Id.
344
under applicable market rules designed to ensure grid reliability.
2240
Under CAISO’s BCR
mechanism, CAISO generally guarantees payments to cover a plant’s costs for starting up and
running its plants at the lowest level – called “minimum load” – if the plant gets a Day Ahead award,
even if the plant later buys back in the Real Time market the entire portion of the award above its
minimum load. The BCR payments, again, provide an incentive for power sellers to participate in
electricity markets and increase grid reliability. BCR payments “provide additional compensation to
generators when market revenues are insufficient to cover the ‘bid cost’ of a resource the ISO has
committed.”
2241
In the CAISO system, the BCR rules allow bidders to be paid up to twice their real
costs for running a minimum load, which can result in electricity customers paying excessive
electricity charges.
JPMVEC Manipulation. According to the stipulated facts, on September 8, 2010,
J PMVEC began to implement one of its bidding strategies in the CAISO market.
2242
The strategy had
been developed by Mr. Dunleavy, Mr. Bartholomew, and Andrew Kittell in J PMorgan’s Houston
office. The strategy was used in connection with the Huntington Beach 3 and 4 plants and,
eventually, other AES plants as J PMVEC regained control of them.
2243
As part of the strategy, in the
Day Ahead market, J PMVEC submitted the lowest bid allowed under CAISO rate schedules.
2244
The
bid was generally at the rate of -$30 per megawatt hour, which meant that J PMVEC was offering a
negative bid and was willing to pay the buyer to take the electricity, despite the costs involved in
producing it.
2245
Its bids were reviewed by electronic software, which did not grasp the intent behind
J PMVEC’s below-cost bids. J PMVEC’s -$30 bids were well below where the Day Ahead Market
actually settled, which was typically in the positive range of $30 - $35 per megawatt hour, so the bids
routinely secured Day Ahead awards from CAISO.
2246
J PMVEC was then given a Day Ahead award
at the prevailing market price regardless of its initial low bid price.
2247
In addition, its traders knew
that if J PMVEC won a Day Ahead award, J PMVEC could also qualify for a BCR payment on its
minimum load equal to twice its costs, resulting in a total payment well in excess of market prices.
2248
To obtain the BCR payment, the bidding strategy required J PMVEC to place a followup bid
in the Real Time market. On the days that it received Day Ahead awards, J PMVEC submitted
followup bids in the Real Time market, generally above the market price by only a small amount to
ensure its bids were taken.
2249
In each bid, J PMVEC sought to reduce its award in the Day Ahead
market to no more than its minimum load, which it knew would elicit a BCR payment. After the
close of bids in the Real Time market, CAISO’s electronic system generally provided a decremental
2240
Id.
2241
Id. “Bid cost” refers to the price the power generating unit has submitted to the ISO.
2242
Id. at 6.
2243
Id. at 5-6.
2244
Id. at 6. CAISO’s rate schedules are often referred to as the “tariff.” See “Help – Glossary,” FERC website
(8/20/2013),http://www.ferc.gov/help/glossary.asp#T (defining “tariff” as “[a] compilation of all effective rate schedules
of a particular company or utility. Tariffs include General Terms and Conditions along with a copy of each form of
service agreement”).
2245
FERC Consent Agreement, at 7. Sellers can havelegitimate reasons to make a negative bid, such as wind farms
which may be entitled to tax credits greater than their negative bid.
2246
Id.
2247
Id.
2248
3/13/2013 report, “In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies,” prepared by FERC Enforcement
Staff, PSI-FERC-02-000116 - 182, at 123 [sealed exhibit].
2249
FERC Consent Agreement, at 7.
345
electricity award to J PMVEC, reducing the actual amount of energy it was required to produce to its
minimum load. For that minimum load amount, the software typically awarded J PMVEC a BCR
payment equal to twice its costs for producing the electricity. In essence, J P Morgan sold high priced
electricity to CAISO, received a BCR payment equal to twice its costs, and also received a payment
at the prevailing marketplace price for the electricity provided – in effect, it was paid three times for
the same electricity.
Unjust Profits. The result of the bidding strategy was an immediate increase in J PMVEC
power plant revenues, which totaled several million dollars in just the first month.
2250
By the second
month in October 2010, J PMVEC estimated that the bidding strategy could produce profits of
between $1.5 and $2 billion through 2018.
2251
According to the stipulated facts, in the six-month
period between September 8, 2010 and March 10, 2011, the two Huntington Beach power plants
produced market revenues of $21.9 million, while accruing costs of $29.5 million, producing a loss of
$7.6 million.
2252
During the same period, however, the two plants collected BCR payments totaling
$34.6 million, resulting in an overall six-month profit of $27 million – from inefficient plants that
usually could not compete successfully in the marketplace.
2253
As evidence of the success of this
strategy, in the midst of that stretch, a J PMVEC employee sent an email to several colleagues with an
image of Oliver Twist extending a bowl and the subject line: “Please sir! mor BCR!!!!”
2254
In addition to this scheme, which was its most profitable, FERC Enforcement found that
J PMVEC engaged in 11 other manipulative bidding strategies from September 2010 through
November 2012, in both the CAISO and MISO markets. FERC officials told the Subcommittee that
in the years since Congress gave FERC enhanced anti-manipulation authority in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, the CAISO and MISO regulators had never before witnessed the degree of blatant rule
manipulation and gaming strategies that J PMorgan used to win electricity awards and elicit make-
whole payments.
2255
Penalties. To settle the manipulation charges, J PMorganagreed to disgorge $124 million in
“unjust profits” to CAISO to be allocated for the benefit of current CAISO ratepayers; $1 million in
“unjust profits” to MISO for the benefit of current MISO ratepayers; and a civil penalty of $285
million to the United States Treasury.
2256
Other Financial Institutions. J PMorgan is not the only financial holding company that has
been charged with manipulating electricity prices. In J uly 2013, FERC issued an order assessing civil
penalties against Barclays and its traders for manipulating electricity prices in California from 2006
to 2008, directing it to pay compensatory damages, interest and penalties totaling $435
2250
Id. at 6.
2251
Id.
2252
Id. at 7-8.
2253
Id.
2254
11/22/2010 email from Luis Davila, J PMorgan, to J ohn Rasmussen and Ryan Martin, J PMorgan, “Please sir! mor
BCR!!!!,” PSI-FERC-02-000042. The image of Oliver Twist in the body of the email can be viewed at this website:
2255
Subcommittee briefing by FERC (7/11/2013).
2256
FERC Stipulation and Consent Agreement, at 15 - 19.
346
million.
2257
Specifically, FERC found that Barclays and its traders manipulated “prices on 655
product days over 35 product months in the … regulated physical markets at the four most liquid
trading points in the western United States.”
2258
According to FERC, Barclays and its traders carried
out this scheme “by building substantial monthly physical index positions in the opposite direction of
the financial swap positions they assembled at the same points ….”
2259
By building physical positions
in the index, Barclays was able to move the index price so that its financial swap positions would
benefit.
2260
FERC found that Barclays’ trading in physical index positions “was ‘not intended to get
the best price on those trades’ and was ‘not responding to supply and demand fundamentals,’ but
instead was intended to ‘benefit” Barclays’ related Financial Swap positions.”
2261
Barclays is
contesting both the charges and penalty.
In addition, in J anuary 2013, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $1.6 million to settle FERC
charges that it manipulated electricity markets in California in 2010.
2262
FERC alleged that that the
manipulation involved using physical positions to benefit derivative positions in financial markets.
2263
Together, the J PMorgan, Barclays and Deutsche Bank cases demonstrate a variety of ways in
which financial holding companies have taken advantage of their power plant activities to manipulate
electricity prices to their benefit. They also demonstrate the critical importance of regulatory
oversight and enforcement to stop unfair practices.
(b) Allocating Insufficient Capital and Insurance to Cover Potential Losses
A completely different set of issues raised by J PMorgan’s power plant activities involves its
exposure to the catastrophic event risks associated with commercial industrial ventures. Power plants
are large industrial complexes subject to a wide range of catastrophic event risks. Many are powered
with natural gas, which is flammable and explosive. Over a two-year period, J PMorgan gained
exposure to 31 natural gas and coal-fueled power plants across the country, at a time when it knew
virtually nothing about the business. Federal Reserve examiners found that J PMorgan did not have
the technical, operations or engineering capability to review the power plants’ compliance with
2257
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041
(7/16/2013). The CFTC has also charged hedge funds with market manipulation, demonstrating that financial firms have
the means to manipulate commodity futures and swap prices. See, e.g., CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, Case No. 07-
CV-6682 (DC) (USDC SDNY)(7/25/2007); 8/12/2013 CFTC press release, “Amaranth Entities Ordered to Pay a $7.5
Million Civil Fine in CFTC Action Alleging Attempted Manipulation of Natural Gas Futures Prices,” (describing how, in
2009, the CFTC collected $7.5 million in fines from a hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors LLC, and its Canadian subsidiary
for attempted manipulation of natural gas futures prices in 2006); CFTC v. Moncada, Case No. 09-CV-8791 (USDC
SDNY)(12/4/2012)(describing how, in 2012, the CFTC charged two related hedge funds, BES Capital LLC and Serdika
LLC, with attempted manipulation of wheat futures prices in 2009; they are contesting the charges).
2258
FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Docket No. IN08-8-000, Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041, at 3
(716/2013).
2259
Id.
2260
Id.
2261
Id. at 4.
2262
See In re Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC, FERC Case No. IN12-4-000, “Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement,” (1/22/2013), 142 FERC ¶ 61,056,http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130122124910-
IN12-4-000.pdf .
2262
1/22/2013 FERC news release, “FERC Approves Market Manipulation Settlement with Deutsche Bank,”http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-1/01-22-13.asp
2263
Id.
347
regulatory standards, and the Federal Reserve Commodities Team found that J PMorgan’s capital and
insurance levels were insufficient to protect it against potential losses from a catastrophic event.
Placing accurate values on power plants, tolling agreements, and related assets are critical to
financial holding companies allocating adequate capital and insurance to cover potential losses. The
2012 Summary Report prepared by the Federal Reserve Commodities Team warned, however, that
the valuation techniques being used by financial holding companies for their physical commodity
activities were not consistent, comprehensive, or reliable. The 2012 Summary Report looked in
particular at how financial holding companies were valuing power plants. It determined that most
held the plants on their books as an investment at cost, and used tolling agreements to capture the
ongoing economic value. Tolling agreements typically capture the value of the difference between a
plant’s fuel inputs (coal or gas) and its output (electricity). The 2012 Summary Report determined
that, while that approach provided a liquid derivative representation of an illiquid, hard-to-value
asset, it also had weaknesses that would not be reflected in stress tests.
2264
It pointed out, for example,
that depending upon how a tolling agreement was worded, a financial holding company might have
to make payments to buy output from a power plant that wasn’t producing any power, or have to buy
all of the production of a facility whose output is no longer valuable, expenses that might not be
disclosed in a typical stress test.
In addition, the 2012 Summary Report found that the insurance coverage at the financial
holding companies appeared to be insufficient. It noted that “[p]hysical commodities is a notoriously
fat-tailed business with [the] insurer only covering limited losses for some risks.”
2265
The 2012
Summary Report found that “n all cases … insurance for … catastrophic events is capped at a
certain level (typically US $1 billion) and firms cannot cover any amount beyond the cap through
insurance.”
2266
It also noted that the financial holding companies used “aggressive assumptions” to
minimize estimated losses from a catastrophic event.
2267
In the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill
case, BP had reportedly self-insured for up to $700 million,
2268
but projections now place its liability
at $42 billion, with another possible $18 billion in fines, almost 85 times greater than what BP had
self- insured for.
With respect to J PMorgan, the 2012 Summary Report stated that J PMorgan had determined
that the “operational and event risks of owning power facilities” were capped at the dollar value of
those facilities in the event of their total loss, with some insurance to cover “the death and disability
of workers” and some facility replacement costs, but leaving all other expenses, including a “failure
to deliver electricity under contract,” to be paid by the holding company.
2269
At another point, the
2012 Summary Report prepared a chart comparing the level of capital and insurance coverage at four
financial holding companies, including J PMorgan, against estimated costs associated with “extreme
2264
10/3/2012 report, “Physical Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Commodities Team (hereinafter, “2012 Summary Report”), FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 482 [sealed exhibit].
2265
Id. at 509. See also id. at 500 (noting that insurance companies “do not have comfortable ways to assess the rail risk
and thus avoid insuring the tails” for catastrophic events, such as multi-billion dollar oil spills).
2266
Id. at 491.
2267
Id. at 493 - 494.
2268
See “BP Oil Spill Damages to Stretch Insurance Coverage,” Oilprice.com, Gloria Gonzalez (8/2/2010),http://oilprice.com/The-Environment...l-Damages-To-Stretch-Insurance-Coverage.html.
2269
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200494 [sealed exhibit]. See also 5/18/2011 presentation, “Commodities
Operational Risk Capital,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300727 - 736, at 729.
348
loss scenarios.” It found that at each institution, including J PMorgan, “the potential loss exceed[ed]
capital and insurance” by $1 billion to $15 billion.
2270
Still another problem involves J PMorgan’s direct ownership of three power plants. Although
J PMorgan has contracted with third parties to operate those plants, it still owns 100% of their shares.
U.S. federal law attaches liability for catastrophic environmental events to both owners and operators.
By choosing to become the direct owner of the three power plants, instead of holding tolling
agreements with them as permitted under its complementary authority, J PMorgan has increased the
financial holding company’s liability for damages, should disaster strike.
Even well–run power plants carry catastrophic event risks. If the worst case scenario should
occur, J PMorgan should be prepared to cover the potential losses, without U.S. taxpayer assistance.
(c) Erecting Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of issues involves the absence of effective regulatory safeguards and enforcement
related to financial holding company involvement with power plants. One key regulatory gap is the
Federal Reserve’s lack of procedures to handle market manipulation problems. Because banks have a
limited history of involvement with physical commodities, and market manipulation violations are
typically detected and enforced by non-banking regulators such as the CFTC, SEC, or FERC, the
Federal Reserve has few mechanisms in place to educate or alert examiners to signs of market
manipulation. At the same time, the 2012 Summary Report warned that virtually every financial
holding company it examined had been “accused or charged” with “manipulating markets.”
2271
Those
charges can lead to violations of law, reimbursement of excessive consumer electricity bills, multi-
million-dollar fines, and reputational damage. Regulatory safeguards should be erected to ensure
bank examiners act against improper practices by establishing examination procedures, implementing
preventative measures, and strengthening coordination with enforcement agencies.
A second problem exposed by J PMorgan’s power plant activities is how financial holding
companies are permitted to retain and profit from the impermissible holding of physical commodity
assets for years at a time. J PMorgan had no legal authority to directly own a power plant, yet it
acquired one in 2008, and two more in 2010, and still has them years later. When J PMorgan’s
application for complementary authority to own those plants was turned down, it asserted its
merchant banking authority to keep them. At the same time, knowing of the Federal Reserve’s
concern about its direct ownership of a commercial enterprise like a power plant, J PMorgan promised
to exit the power plant business, but plans to take years to do so. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee
that its tolling agreement for 12 California power plants will take another four years to finish, its
planned sale of a Michigan plant is on hold for another year, and its attempts to locate buyers for two
other power plants are moving slowly. Despite the passage of years and multiple warnings about
directly owning the power plants, and the increased liability attached to direct ownership, the Federal
Reserve has yet to force J PMorgan to divest itself of those assets. More broadly, the Federal Reserve
appears to have a track record of repeatedly extending deadlines for the sale of impermissible assets,
2270
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200498, 509 [sealed exhibit]. The 2012 Summary Report also noted that
commercial firms engaged in oil and gas businesses had a capital ratio of 42%, while bank holding company subsidiaries
had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%. Id. at 499.
2271
Id. at 492.
349
in the end allowing banks to retain them for multiple years. Today, safeguards to ensure the sale of
impermissible physical commodity assets appear dysfunctional, with little certainty to protect U.S.
taxpayers at risk when financial holding companies ignore the restrictions on their activities.
(4) Analysis
When the Subcommittee investigation examined financial holding company involvement with
electricity, it found multiple levels of involvement affecting power generation in the United States
and around the world. All three financial holding companies examined by the Subcommitteetraded
electricity, had tolling agreements or ownership interests in power plants around the world, supplied
fuel to power plants, and engaged in some form of power plant energy management. Their power
plant activities ranged widely, from capturing the energy output of alternative energy plants using
wind, solar, hydropower, and other energy sources; to installing residential rooftop solar systems; to
building wind farms; to becoming the primary supplier of coal, natural gas, or uranium to multiple
utilities. Power plant activities are fraught with market manipulation issues, operational and
catastrophic event risks, and impermissible commercial activities. It is past time for the Federal
Reserve to impose needed safeguards to limit financial holding company involvement with this high
risk physical commodity activity.
350
C. JPMorgan Involvement with Copper
For many years, J PMorgan has engaged in a wide range of physical copper activities.
Because federal bank regulators currently treat copper as “bullion,” equivalent to gold or silver,
J PMorgan has been permitted to accumulate copper holdings without the normal size limits that
apply to other metals and has amassed, at times, copper inventories exceeding $2 billion.
J PMorgan has also participated in copper-related physical and financial trading, and proposed a
copper-backed exchange traded fund that some industrial copper users allege raises conflict of
interest and market manipulation concerns.
(1) Background on Copper
Copper is a naturally occurring metal which, due to its “high ductility, malleability, and
thermal and electrical conductivity, and its resistance to corrosion,” has become “a major
industrial metal, ranking third after iron and aluminum in terms of quantities consumed.”
2272
Copper is widely used in the electrical, construction, and electronics industries,
2273
which
together comprise approximately 56% of global industrial copper consumption.
2274
It is also
important to the defense industry, transportation, and industrial machinery.
2275
When mined, copper is produced as part of a mixture of materials that usually includes
iron and sulfur.
2276
Producing pure copper metal requires a multistage process which typically
includes concentrating the copper found in low-grade ore; smelting – heating and chemically
treating -- the ore to extract the copper; and then applying electrolytic refining to produce a
“copper cathode,” meaning copper material with a purity of 99.95%.
2277
Another way copper
can be purified is through the “acid leaching of oxidized ores.”
2278
Copper recycling contributes
a significant share of copper supply worldwide.
2279
Most of the world’s copper comes from Chile, whose mines produced 5.7 million metric
tons of copper in 2013.
2280
The next largest copper producers are China, with 1.7 million metric
tons in 2013; Peru with 1.3 million metric tons, and the United States with 1.2 million metric
2272
Undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/.
2273
See Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8 (4/5/2013), at 33,
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278680/000119312505011426/ds1a.txt.
2274
See 9/19/2014 “Production and Consumption,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/copper/http://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-ferrous/copper/production-and-consumption/.
2275
See undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/.
2276
See undated “What is a Copper Cathode?”http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-copper-cathode.htm.
2277
See undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/; undated “What is a Copper Cathode?”http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-copper-cathode.htm.
2278
Undated “Copper Statistics and Information,” U.S. Geologic Survey website,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/.
2279
Id.
2280
See 2/2014 “U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries,” U.S. Geological Survey website, at 48-
49,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2014/mcs2014.pdf.
351
tons.
2281
In 2013, U.S. production accounted for about 7% of global annual copper
production.
2282
Despite rising copper prices, copper mines have increased production only
modestly, due in part to declining extractions from old mines and delays in new mining
projects.
2283
In the physical markets, according to copper manufacturers, about 85% of the copper
produced annually is sold via long-term supply contracts.
2284
Those contracts typically specify
the amount of copper to be delivered on specific dates, at prices linked to benchmark copper
prices that vary over time.
2285
The most common benchmark price is the copper futures price
established on the London Metal Exchange (LME), the largest financial market for metals.
Physical contracts also typically specify a “locational premium,” reflecting storage and
transportation expenses associated with providing copper at a specified location.
2286
Collectively, the benchmark price and locational premium typically comprise the “all-in” price
for copper.
Copper Prices. Over the last decade, copper prices have experienced significant
volatility, including “unpredictable” fluctuations,
2287
creating price risks for producers and end
users.
2288
As shown in the chart below, prices per metric ton fell from $8,500 in 2008, to under
$3,000 in 2009, and then spiked to over $10,000 in December 2010 and J anuary 2011, reaching
all-time highs. Over a three-month period from August through October 2014, copper prices
fluctuated between $7,100 and $6,600 per metric ton, a difference of nearly 10%.
2289
2281
See 2/2014 “U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries,” U.S. Geological Survey website, at 48-
49,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2014/mcs2014.pdf.
2282
See 2/2014 “Mineral Commodity Summaries,” U.S. Geological Survey website, at 48,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2014/mcs2014.pdf.
2283
See 4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8, at 38, SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010313002224/dp37414_s1a8.htm
2284
See 7/18/2012 letter from Copper Manufacturers to SEC, “Re: File Number SR-NYSEArca-2-12-66 PSI-
VandenbergFeliu_to_SEC(J uly2012)-000001-005, at 004-005.
2285
Id.
2286
See 4/16/2012 SEC “Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade Shares of the J PM XF Physical
Copper Trust,” Release No. 34-66816, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, at 13 (hereinafter “SEC Notice”), SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2012/34-66816.pdf.
2287
4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8, at 15, SEC
website,http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=8803483.
2288
See 7/18/2012 letter from Copper Manufacturers to SEC, “Re: File Number SR-NYSEArca-2-12-66 PSI-
VandenbergFeliu_to_SEC(J uly2012)-000001-005, at 004-005.
2289
See undated “Historical price graph for Copper,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-
ferrous/copper/ (showing copper futures prices from August 1 to October 21, 2014).
352
Source: “Historical Copper Prices and Price Chart,” InfoMine Inc. (10/14/2014),http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/copper/all/.
In the financial markets, copper can be traded through a variety of financial instruments,
including futures, swaps, options, and forwards. The most active copper trading takes place on
the LME.
2290
The LME identifies four categories of metals: “precious metals,” which include
gold and silver; “non-ferrous” or “base” metals, which include copper, aluminum, nickel, and
zinc, among others; “steel billet,” which includes steel, and “minor metals,” which include cobalt
and molybdenum.
2291
The LME provides multiple copper futures contracts for trading.
2292
The
standardized LME futures contracts involve 25 metric tons of “Grade A Copper,” and may be
settled financially or by delivery of physical copper.
2293
In 2013, copper was among the most
actively traded base metal futures on the LME.
2294
LME prices provide the global price
benchmarks used in contracts around the world for the physical purchase or sale of copper.
2295
2290
See LME website,https://www.lme.com/ (“More than 80% of global non-ferrous business is conducted here and
the prices discovered on our three trading platforms are used as the global benchmark.”).
2291
See undated “Metals,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/. The LME is planning to add
platinum, and palladium to its precious metals category by the end of 2014. See 10/16/2014 LME press release,
“LME wins bid for provision of London Platinum and Palladium Prices,”https://www.lme.com/news-and-
events/press-releases/press-releases/2014/10/lme-wins-bid-for-provision-of-london-platinum-and-palladium-prices/.
2292
See undated “Copper,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-ferrous/copper/.
2293
See undated “LME Copper physical specification,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/non-
ferrous/copper/contract-specifications/physical/, and “2013 Trading Volumes,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/reports/monthly-volumes/annual/2013/.
2294
See, e.g., “2013 Trading Volumes,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/reports/monthly-
volumes/annual/2013/.
2295
See LME website,https://www.lme.com/ (“More than 80% of global non-ferrous business is conducted here and
the prices discovered on our three trading platforms are used as the global benchmark.”); 1/17/2013 Form S-1
Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment, at 40.
353
Copper as Bullion. Although for more than 100 years, copper has been traded on world
markets and in the United States as a base metal with industrial uses,
2296
both the Federal
Reserve and the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) currently classify copper
as a type of “bullion,” a classification normally reserved for precious metals like gold and silver.
That regulatory decision affects how financial holding companies are allowed to trade copper.
The National Bank Act expressly authorizes U.S. national banks “to exercise … all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking,” including the
“buying and selling of exchange, coin, and bullion.”
2297
“Bullion” is not defined in the Act.
Instead, the OCC, which regulates national banks, has defined the term through interpretative
letters, and the Federal Reserve has defined it through regulation.
For many years, the OCC defined “bullion” as “uncoined gold or silver in bar or ingot
form.”
2298
In 1991, at the request of a bank, the OCC issued a letter which expanded the
definition to include platinum.
2299
Four years later, in 1995, again at the request of a bank, the
OCC expanded the definition to include palladium.
2300
While platinum and palladium – like
gold and silver – have industrial uses, all four have traditionally been traded internationally as
precious metals, held primarily for their exchange value rather than industrial use.
A few months after the palladium decision, however, once again at the request of a bank,
the OCC expanded the definition of “bullion” a third time to include – for the first and only time
– a base metal: copper.
2301
While copper has been used in coins, it has never been traded
internationally as a precious metal; it has always been classified and traded as a “base,” “non-
ferrous,” or “industrial” metal. Since adding copper to the definition in 1995, the OCC has not
added any other metal to the definition of “bullion.”
The OCC’s inclusion of copper in the definition of “bullion” materially altered its
regulatory treatment for commodity purposes. Prior to its inclusion, copper was subject to all of
the limitations imposed by the OCC on bank involvement with physical commodities, including
the 5% limit placed by the OCC on physical commodities acquired as hedges for derivative
transactions.
2302
Once defined as “bullion,” however, copper could be treated in the same way as
gold and silver, and exempted from a number of physical commodities restrictions, including
size limits.
2303
2296
See, e.g., undated “Production and consumption,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/metals/non-
ferrous/copper/production-and-consumption/ (indicating copper began trading on the LME in 1877).
2297
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh).
2298
See, e.g., Banking Circular 58 (Rev.), OCC (11/3/1981),http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/bulletins/pre-
1994/banking-circulars/bc-1981-58.pdf.
2299
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 553 (5/2/1991), PSI-OCC-01-000112-113.
2300
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141, at 137 (citing OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 683 (7/28/1995) (approving palladium within the definition of “bullion”)).
2301
Id. at 135.
2302
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 - 374.
2303
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141, (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
For more information, see discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits, below.
354
The Federal Reserve has also designated copper as “bullion” in a regulation stating that
“uying, selling and storing” physical copper is a “permissible” nonbank activity.
2304
The
Federal Reserve explained to the Subcommittee that physical copper could be held and traded by
financial holding companies under that regulatory authority and thereby avoid any size limits
applicable to complementary, merchant banking, or grandfathering activities.
2305
The Federal
Reserve also indicated that financial holding companies would not have to include their copper
holdings when reporting the market value of their physical commodity assets to the Federal
Reserve.
2306
By treating copper as bullion, the OCC and Federal Reserve have enabled banks
and their holding companies to hold physical copper outside of the limits that apply to all other
base metals.
(2) JPMorgan’s Involvement with Copper
J PMorgan is an active trader of physical and financial copper. In recent years, it has
engaged in physical copper activities that included outsized transactions and massive copper
inventories. J PMorgan also designed and proposed a copper-backed exchange traded fund
(ETF), a controversial investment fund which was to be the first ETF backed by a physical
industrial metal in the United States. The ETF was designed to acquire copper, place it in
storage, and sell investment securities whose value would be tied to copper prices. Some
industrial users of copper opposed the proposed ETF, alleging it would artificially restrict copper
supplies and raise copper prices and price volatility, unconnected to fundamental forces of
supply and demand. J PMorgan has since placed its ETF proposal on hold, but has not withdrawn
its proposed registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
J PMorgan’s physical copper activities raise financial risk, conflict of interest, and market
manipulation concerns.
(a) Trading Copper
J PMorgan has been trading metals, including copper, for many years.
2307
J PMorgan
conducts its copper activities through its Global Metals Group which, according to J PMorgan, is
a “core component” of its Global Commodities Group.
2308
The Global Commodities Group, and
its Global Metals Group, are part of the financial holding company.
2309
For years, however, the
majority of J PMorgan’s metals trading has been booked, not through the financial holding
company, but through J PMorgan Chase Bank.
2310
The OCC told the Subcommittee that
2304
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii) (2/28/1997) (stating that permissible nonbank activities include: “Buying,
selling and storing bars, rounds, bullion, and coins of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, copper, and any other metal
approved by the Board, for the company's own account and the account of others, and providing incidental services
such as arranging for storage, safe custody, assaying, and shipment.”).
2305
10/28/2014 email from the Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-16-000001.
2306
Id.
2307
See, e.g., 1/2012 “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 838
(indicating the Global Metals Group has been transacting business with clients “over the past 30 years”).
2308
Id.
2309
Id.
2310
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014); 10/23/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-16-000001.
355
J PMorgan Chase Bank is the only national bank that, in recent years, has engaged in extensive
physical metals trading and maintained a large physical metals inventory.
2311
Two legal entities actually execute metal trades for the bank. The first is a U.K. bank
subsidiary, J .P. Morgan Securities PLC, which is a market maker for metals on the LME as well
as an LME “Category 1 ring dealer” which gives it special trading status on the exchange.
2312
The second is J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC), a U.S. subsidiary of the
financial holding company.
2313
J PMVEC has employees who work for both the holding
company and the bank, and handle both financial and physical commodity activities, in an
arrangement that has been disclosed to and permitted by the Federal Reserve.
2314
The Global Metals Group operates a metals trading desk that conducts both financial and
physical copper activities.
2315
Its financial activities include trading copper futures, swaps,
options, and forwards, as well as financing arrangements, structured transactions, and hedging
transactions for clients. Physical activities include buying and selling physical copper on the
spot market and through LME warrants.
2316
Although the Global Metals Group is located within
the financial holding company, the traders on its metals trading desk are employed by the bank
or J .P. Morgan Securities PLC, the bank’s subsidiary.
2317
The metals desk traders are also
“empowered to act for other legal entities within the J PM group through service agreements that
are in place between entities and through ‘dual-hatting’ arrangements, whereby individuals can
be officers of more than one legal entity in the group.”
2318
In other words, the same traders on
the metals trading desk can book metals trades for both the bank and the financial holding
company.
J PMorgan’s physical metal holdings increased after its acquisition of Bear Stearns in
2008
2319
and RBS Sempra in 2010.
2320
As part of the RBS Sempra acquisition, J PMorgan
2311
Subcommittee briefing by OCC (9/22/2014).
2312
10/23/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-16-000001.
2313
Id.
2314
See 7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase & Co.
Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan (requesting a
complementary order to conduct physical commodity activities), PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 012 - 013
(discussing J PMVEC).
2315
See, e.g., excerpts from undated J P Morgan presentation, “Introduction to J PM Commodities & Steel
Hedging/J P Morgan Global Commodities Group,” FRB-PSI-301592; 1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM
Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 838.
2316
See, e.g., undated J PM presentation, “Introduction to J PM Commodities and Steel Hedging,” at FRB-PSI-
301592; 1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865.
2317
10/23/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-16-000001.
2318
Id. See also 7/21/2005 “Notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by J PMorgan Chase &
Co. Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,” prepared by J PMorgan, PSI-
FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 012 - 013 (indicating J PMVEC employees can work for both the bank and
holding company).
2319
See, e.g., 7/31/2008 “Supervisory Plan, Risk Assessment Program & Institutional Overview of J PMorgan Chase
& Co.” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-305013-030 (identifying Bear Stearns assets being integrated
into J PMorgan) [sealed exhibit].
2320
See, e.g., “2010 CA Quarterly Summary Global Commodities Group,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-300645
- 649, at 645; 1/ 2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 836;
7/1/2010 J PMorgan press release, “J .P. Morgan completes commodities acquisition from RBS Sempra,”
356
gained ownership of the Henry Bath & Sons global network of warehouses, most of which were
certified by the London Metal Exchange to store LME metals, including copper.
2321
J PMorgan
began marketing Henry Bath warehousing services along with its other financial and physical
activities involving metals, including copper.
2322
J PMorgan is also, through J .P. Morgan
Securities PLC, a “ring dealing” member of the LME, meaning that its traders can trade copper
and other metals on the floor of the LME, and a member of the LME Copper Committee.
2323
In 2011, J PMorgan described its “base metals” trading activities as “[c]lient-focused
trading of aluminium, copper, zinc, lead, nickel and tin in Asia, Europe and the Americas.”
2324
It
noted that, during 2010, it had executed transactions involving more than 1 million metric tons of
metal with a value of $4 billion; and, in 2011, held “1.2 million metric tonnes of [metals]
inventory in various global locations with a value of $4.2 [billion].”
2325
In 2012, in a
presentation prepared for clients, J PMorgan stated that it was “a member of all the world’s
leading metals exchanges,” traded “metal forwards and options including long dated contracts,”
had experience with “larger transactions,” and was a “leading trader in physical metal.”
2326
J PMorgan also noted that, in 2013, its metals business had 650 “[f]inancial” and 166 ‘[p]hysical”
clients.
2327
J PMorgan’s physical metal activities resulted in its holding multi-billion-dollar
inventories of various metals, including inventories that experienced significant volatility. For
example, in 2010, J PMorgan’s inventory of nickel peaked at nearly $2.2 billion, only to fall
nearly 85% soon after.
2328
Similarly, in 2011, J PMorgan’s platinum holdings peaked at nearly
$1.5 billion, only to fall sharply after its peak.
2329
In the largest single base metals holding seen
by the Subcommittee, in J anuary 2012, J PMorgan held a nearly $7.5 billion inventory of
aluminum, consisting of a whopping 3.5 million metric tons of aluminum,
2330
an amount
exceeding over half of the entire North American annual consumption of aluminum that year.
2331
https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=J PM_redesign/J PM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid
=1277505237241.
2321
See, e.g., 4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at
101.
2322
See, e.g., 1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 838, 841.
2323
See undated “LME Membership,” list of “Ring Dealing” members, LME website,http://www.lme.com/en-
gb/trading/membership/category-1-ring-dealing/j_p_morgan-securities-plc/; LME Copper Committee, LME
website,https://www.lme.com/about-us/corporate-structure/committees/copper-committee/.
2324
4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 101.
See also “Commodities[:] Metals,” J PMorgan website (listing copper as a “base metal”),https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities/metals
2325
4/2011 “Global Commodities - Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 101.
2326
1/2012 J PMorgan presentation, “J PM Commodity Capabilities,” FRB-PSI-200832 - 865, at 840. See also
9/2013 “Global Commodities Compliance Self Assessment,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301370 - 378, at
372.
2327
6/24/2013 “Global Commodities BCC,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301397 - 442, at 411.
2328
See 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015.
2329
Id.
2330
11/10/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-23-000001.
2331
See undated “Primary Aluminum Consumption, 2011-2013,” European Aluminum Association website,http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-consumption-in-world-regions/ (indicating that North
American primary aluminum consumption in 2012 was 5.3 million metric tons).
357
JPMorgan Copper Inventories. In recent years, as part of its copper activities,
J PMorgan has held substantial inventories of physical copper and sometimes conducted outsized
transactions to build or reduce its holdings. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that virtually all of
its physical copper, like its other base metals, has been held in the name of J PMorgan Chase
Bank.
2332
J PMorgan provided the Subcommittee with information on the market value of its
physical copper holdings each year between 2008 and 2013.
2333
The following chart shows how
its copper inventories increased tenfold in value over that time period, and how the size of its
copper holdings varied significantly during the year:
JPMorgan Physical Copper Inventories by Market Value
2008-2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013**
Year-End
Totals*
$148 million $304 million $660 million $1.26 billion $1.13 billion $1.7 billion
Maximum
During Year
$242 million $551 million $1.65 billion $2.72 billion $1.22 billion N/A
* Amounts as of the end of the fiscal year. ** As of J une 28, 2013.
Data provided by J PMorgan uses monthly inventory values.
Source: Attachment to 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015;
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as of
J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” at FRB-PSI-301388.
In December 2010, several media reports named J PMorgan as the undisclosed trader
behind a $1.5 billion copper transaction that allegedly led to a single trader holding, as indicated
in an LME daily report on warrants, between 50% and 80% of the existing LME warrants for
copper, then representing about 350,000 metric tons of copper.
2334
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that, while it did purchase substantial amounts of copper in November and
December 2010, it did so through multiple transactions on behalf of more than 50 clients, and the
“trade data does not appear to support the theory that J .P.Morgan’s copper warrant position was
the result of a single large trade.”
2335
J PMorgan also told the Subcommittee that its copper
trading decisions were completely unrelated to its proposal for a copper-based exchange traded
fund (ETF), described below, noting that the copper trading decisions were made by the metals
2332
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2333
See 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015; 9/26/2013
“Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as of
J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” at FRB-PSI-301388.
2334
See, e.g., “J P Morgan revealed as mystery trader that bought £1bn-worth of copper on LME,” The Telegraph,
Louise Armitstead and Rowena Mason (12/4/2010),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
industry/8180304/J P-Morgan-revealed-as-mystery-trader-that-bought-1bn-worth-of-copper-on-LME.html; “A
Single Trader, J P Morgan, Holds 90% Of LME Copper,” Zero Hedge, Tyler Durden (12/21/2010),http://www.zerohedge.com/article/single-trader-jp-morgan-holds-90-lme-copper. See also 12/15/2010 LME daily
“Warrant Banding Report,” PSI-LME-06-000001 (showing a single trader holding between 50% and 80% of total
LME warrants for copper at that time); 10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 002 (indicating LME copper warrants totaled 350,000 metric tons at the time).
2335
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 002. See
also Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan legal counsel (10/29/2014).
358
trading desk, which was completely separate from the “Commodity Investor Products” group
that was designing the ETF.
2336
J PMorgan indicated that according to its records, in December 2010, its copper
inventory, which included both LME warrants and a small amount of non-LME warranted
copper, “ranged from approximately 198,000 metric tonnes to 213,000 metric tonnes” of copper
during the month, which was “approximately 57% to 61%” of all LME copper warrants available
at the time.
2337
The market value of its inventory, shown in the above chart, peaked at about
$1.65 billion. The increases in J PMorgan’s copper inventory took place at the same time copper
prices were reaching all-time highs, and as the copper market was anticipating J PMorgan’s
proposed copper-backed ETF.
2338
An April 2011 internal analysis by J PMorgan of the operating risks facing its Global
Commodities group took particular note of the size of its copper holdings during November
2010, which it described as representing “approx[imately] 52% of the published LME stock,”
observing that the large position had triggered LME scrutiny of the trading desk.
2339
Federal
Reserve records indicate that J PMorgan may have had even more copper than its trading data
shows for December 2010. A 2011 Federal Reserve document that was part of the preparation
for its special physical commodities review noted that, in December 2010, J PMorgan had
reported holding about “332,000 tons of copper (over 50% of available physical inventory) in
their own storage facilities.”
2340
Regardless of the exact amount of J PMorgan’s copper holdings in late 2010, the facts
indicate that J PMorgan held a significant portion of the physical copper available for trading in
the United States. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that, due to its large position in copper, it
received LME guidance instructing it to lend some of its holdings to the market.
2341
On
December 15, 2010, J PMorgan used the bulk of its copper warrants to settle other obligations,
and substantially reduced its inventory to 56,000 tons which represented “roughly 16% of LME
copper warrants at that time.”
2342
At the time of the December transactions, copper prices were
near all-time highs.
2343
2336
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan legal counsel (10/29/2014); 10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel
to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 005; 11/13/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to
Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-24-000001. Both the metals trading desk and the Commodity Investor Products
group are, however, located within the Global Commodities Group at J PMorgan.
2337
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan - 18-000001 - 005, at 002.
2338
See, e.g., “J P Morgan revealed as mystery trader that bought £1bn-worth of copper on LME,” The Telegraph,
Louise Armitstead and Rowena Mason (12/4/2010),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/8180304/J P-Morgan-revealed-as-mystery-trader-that-
bought-1bn-worth-of-copper-on-LME.html (“Traders said J P Morgan's name had been circulating the market all day
as the most likely buyer, especially since it is about to launch a physically-backed ‘exchange-traded fund’ (ETF) in
copper imminently. One metals broker dealing on the LME said: ‘The story is that they're positioning themselves
in front of the ETF. There's been a lot of speculation it’s them.’).
2339
4/2011 “Global Commodities – Operating Risk,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-623086 - 127, at 120.
2340
2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200455 - 476,
at 464 [sealed exhibit]; Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (11/27/2013).
2341
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 003.
2342
Id.
2343
See, e.g., “Historical Copper Prices and Price Chart,” prepared by InfoMine Inc.,http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/copper/all/.
359
After reducing its copper holdings in December, in the first three months of the next year,
2011, J PMorgan re-built its physical copper inventory, attaining a market value even larger than
before.
2344
At one point during 2011, as indicated in the chart above, its copper inventory
peaked with a market value of $2.7 billion. J PMorgan then sold a large amount of copper,
reducing its inventory by about half so that, by the end of the fiscal year, the market value of its
remaining copper holdings was about $1.26 billion.
2345
In September 2012, according to
J PMorgan, the dollar value of its copper holdings had dropped slightly to about $1.1 billion.
2346
As of J une 2013, J PMorgan reported to its regulators that its physical copper inventory had
increased once more, to about $1.7 billion, which J PMorgan described as a “key risk position” in
the bank.
2347
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that, since then, it had substantially reduced its
copper inventory so that, in September 2014, it had a market value of about $368 million.
2348
J PMorgan’s records show that, in recent years, the bank regularly engaged in massive
copper trades that built and reduced its billion-dollar copper inventories. Due to the regulators’
classification of copper as bullion, those activities operated outside of the OCC and Federal
Reserve size limits on physical commodity activities to reduce risk.
(b) Proposing Copper ETF
In addition to trading copper in the physical and financial markets, in October 2010,
J PMorgan filed a registration statement seeking to establish a copper-backed Exchange Traded
Fund (ETF) which would have been the first ETF in the United States backed by a physical
industrial metal.
2349
The proposed ETF was designed to purchase physical copper, store it in the
Henry Bath warehouses owned by J PMorgan, and issue securities linked to the value of that
copper. The securities could then be sold and traded on U.S. securities exchanges. The proposed
ETF stirred controversy among industrial end-users of copper who viewed it as likely to cause
artificial supply shortages and higher and more volatile copper prices by removing large amounts
of copper from the marketplace for indeterminate amounts of time.
2350
While J PMorgan
characterized the ETF as providing “a simple and cost-effective means of making an investment
similar to an investment in copper,”
2351
others compared it to the Hunt Brothers’ silver scandal
and characterized it as an attempt to legally corner and squeeze the copper market to raise
2344
Id.; “J PMorgan Physical Copper Inventories by Market Value chart,” above.
2345
3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000015. See also
10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049.
2346
Attachment to 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049.
2347
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as
of J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at 388.
2348
Attachment to 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049.
2349
See 10/22/2010 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J .P. Morgan Physical Copper Trust, filed by J PMorgan, SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000119312510234452/ds1.htm.
2350
See, e.g., 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC on behalf of
copper end-users and a copper merchant, File Number SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
2351
4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8, at 3, SEC
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010313002224/dp37414_s1a8.htm.
360
prices.
2352
The proposal went through a lengthy review process at the SEC which, in 2012,
approved a rule change to allow the ETF to be listed on an exchange for trading, but J PMorgan
then placed the project on hold.
2353
Commodity-based ETFs. Exchange traded funds enable investors to buy and sell
interests in a fund on a stock exchange in the same way that investors can use the stock exchange
to buy and sell shares in a corporation.
2354
The first ETF issuing securities linked to commodity
prices appeared on a U.S. stock exchange in 2004, when interests in an ETF linked to gold prices
began trading.
2355
Commodity-related ETFs can attract smaller investors more easily than
commodity exchanges which use standardized futures and swaps contracts requiring relatively
large investments; for example, LME copper futures currently require an initial investment of
about $6,500 to purchase a single contract.
2356
Interests in commodity-related ETFs typically
trade for much less. Currently, retail investors and market participants can buy and sell interests
in a wide variety of commodity-related ETFs, some of which reference a single commodity
2357
and others of which track broad commodity indexes.
2358
Commodity-related ETFs use several different methods to establish their value. Some
track one or more commodity indexes; some acquire commodity-related futures or other
financial instruments; others acquire an inventory of actual physical commodities; while still
others may offer a combination of those techniques, in each case linking the ETF’s value to the
value of the specified commodities. By investing in commodity-related ETFs, investors gain or
lose value according to the rise or fall in the relevant commodity prices.
2359
JPMorgan Copper ETF. In October 2010, J PMorgan filed an S-1 registration statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposing to create an ETF called the “J .P.
Morgan Physical Copper Trust.”
2360
In 2011, the name was changed to “J PM XF Physical
Copper Trust” (J PMorgan Copper ETF).
2361
The ETF was structured as a Cayman Island trust
whose assets were limited to a single physical commodity, copper. Its investment objective was
2352
See, e.g., “Who Cornered the Copper Market? (J PM, J J C, COPX, SCCO, FCX),” 247WallStreet (12/23/2010),http://247wallst.com/commodities-me...ered-the-copper-market-jpm-jjc-copx-scco-fcx/;
“Copper: Part 2, The Next ETF,” J ack H. Barnes website (12/4/2010),http://jackhbarnes.wordpress.com/2010/12/04/copper-part-2-the-next-etf/.
2353
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2354
3/11/2013 letter from Senator Carl Levin to SEC, “J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Form S-1 Registration
Statement,” (hereinafter, 2013 Levin letter”), PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000001 - 015, at 002.
2355
Id; “How gold ETFs have transformed the market in 10 years,” Market Watch, Myra P. Saefong (3/29/2013),http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-gold-etfs-have-transformed-market-in-10-years-2013-03-29.
2356
See “Copper,” LME website,https://www.lme.com/en-gb/metals/non-ferrous/copper/.
2357
See, e.g., “SPDR Gold Shares: An Exchange Traded Gold Security,”http://www.spdrgoldshares.com/.
2358
See, e.g., “iShares S&P GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust,”http://www.ishares.com/us/products/239757/ishares-
sp-gsci-commodityindexed-trust-fund.
2359
See 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000001 - 015, at 002.
2360
10/22/2010 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J .P. Morgan Physical Copper Trust, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000119312510234452/ds1.htm.
2361
6/10/2011 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 4, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010311002278/dp23025_s1a4.htm.
361
to reflect the spot price of copper, less trust expenses and fees.
2362
J PMorgan affiliates were to
serve as the fund’s investment adviser, administer the trust, acquire the copper, store it at
J PMorgan-owned Henry Bath warehouses, and help sell securities to investors, among other
services, all of whose costs would be borne by the investors in the fund.
2363
J PMorgan also
disclosed in the proposed registration statement that it planned to have the ETF indemnify
J PMorgan and its affiliates from any lawsuit filed by an aggrieved investor.
2364
According to the proposed registration statement, the J PMorgan Copper ETF would not
sell individual securities in the investment fund; instead, it would sell large blocks, or “Creation
Units,” of 2,500 securities each to “Authorized Participants” (APs) who were authorized to sell
them to individual investors.
2365
To obtain a block of securities, the AP would be required to
deliver to the ETF a specified amount of physical copper whose dollar value would support the
fund.
2366
After delivering the copper, the AP could begin selling the ETF securities to investors
who could, in turn, trade them on a U.S. stock exchange.
2367
J PMorgan indicated in the
registration statement that it planned to act as one of the Authorized Participants.
J PMorgan’s registration statement explained that, if copper prices increased, the value of
the ETF securities would increase, and investors would gain; conversely, if prices dropped, the
securities’ values would fall, and investors would lose.
2368
If the fund attracted sufficient
investment, the ETF could sell more blocks of securities to Authorized Participants in exchange
for additional copper deliveries.
2369
If investors left the fund, the ETF could reduce its copper
holdings, selling the copper on the spot market or through other arrangements.
2370
After several years of debate and controversy, on December 14, 2012, the SEC approved
a proposed rule change by NYSE Arca Inc. to list the copper ETF for trading.
2371
A copper
merchant and four industrial copper end-users sent a joint request for the SEC to reconsider its
decision, warning that the ETF’s removal of physical copper from the market would disrupt
supply and demand fundamentals, cause damaging price increases, and lead to commercial
supply shortages.
2372
But in March 2013, the SEC reaffirmed its decision.
2373
2362
See 4/5/2013 Form S-1 Registration Statement, J PM XF Physical Copper Trust, Amendment No. 8 (hereinafter,
“J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8”), at 1, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1503754/000095010313002224/dp37414_s1a8.htm.
2363
Id. at 83 - 84.
2364
Id. at 87. See also 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000014.
2365
Id. at 85 - 86.
2366
See 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000003.
2367
Id.
2368
See J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8, at 15.
2369
Id. at 78 - 79.
2370
See 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000002.
2371
See 12/14/2012 SEC Release No. 34-68440, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, “Self-Regulatory Organizations;
NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed
Rule Change as Modified by Amendment No. 1 to List and Trade Shares of the J PM XF Physical Copper Trust
Pursuant to NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.201,” filed by the SEC,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2012/34-
68440.pdf.
2372
See 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC, File Number SR-
NYSEArca-2012-28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
2373
See 3/28/2013 SEC Release No. 34-69256, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, “Self-Regulatory Organizations;
NYSE Arca, Inc.; Response to Comments Submitted After the Issuance on December 14, 2012, of a Notice of Filing
362
Challenges were also filed to J PMorgan’s proposed registration statement, contending
that it failed to provide sufficient information to investors about, among other matters, how
J PMorgan’s copper activities could affect the fund; what roles would be played by J PM affiliates
in administering the fund, and how those affiliates would be compensated; whether J PMorgan’s
interests were aligned with or could adversely affect the fund’s clients; and how the fund would
handle conflict of interest and market manipulation issues.
2374
Over the course of two years,
J PMorgan amended its proposed registration statement eight times to address numerous
concerns,
2375
but the statement has yet to be deemed effective by the SEC.
2376
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that it has placed its copper ETF proposal on indefinite hold.
2377
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan Involvement with Copper
J PMorgan’s copper activities raise two sets of concerns. The first focuses on the
loophole in the regulatory rules for physical commodities that exempts copper from size limits
and other safeguards to ensure physical commodity activities are carried out in a financially safe
and sound manner. The second focuses on the conflict of interest and market manipulation
concerns related to the proposed J PMorgan Copper ETF.
(a) Unrestricted Copper Activities
Over the past five years, J PMorgan has conducted massive copper trades, including some
in late 2010 involving billions of dollars and over 50% of the LME’s total copper warrants. In
2011, its physical copper inventory peaked at more than $2.7 billion. To the Subcommittee’s
knowledge, J PMorgan is the only large U.S. financial holding company that conducts copper
trading primarily through its federally insured national bank.
of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change as Modified by
Amendment No. 1 to List and Trade Shares of the J PM XF Physical Copper Trust Pursuant to NYSE Arca Equities
Rule 8.201,” filed by the SEC, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2013/34-69256.pdf/.
2374
See, e.g., 2013 Levin letter, PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000001 - 015.
2375
See 4/5/2013 J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8.
2376
Subcommittee briefing by the SEC (10/8/2014).
2377
Error! Main Document Only.Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014). The J PMorgan registration
statement represents the largest proposed copper ETF to date, but it is not the only proposal. A second is the
BlackRock iShares Copper Trust, which was proposed in 2011, and approved by the SEC in 2013, but still not
finalized. See 9/2/2011 Form S-1 Registration Statement, iShares Copper Trust, Amendment No. 4, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ edgar/data/1504251/000119312511240231/ds1a.htm; 2/22/2013 SEC Release No. 34-
68973, File No. SR-NYSEArca-2012-66, "Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of
Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change as Modified by
Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 to List and Trade Shares of the iShares Copper Trust Pursuant to NYSE Arca Equities
Rule 8.201," filed by SEC,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2013/34-68973.pdf. Additionally, a London-
based investment firm called ETF Securities introduced a physical copper ETF in Europe that is similar to, but much
smaller than, the J PMorgan and BlackRock proposals. It holds only about 3,400 metric tons of copper, while the
J PMorgan and BlackRock proposals collectively seek to place in storage about 70% of the current copper stocks in
LME warehouses. See "SEC Approves J PMorgan's Plan For Copper ETF, First in US," Reuters (12/17/2012),http://www.moneynews.com/Markets/SEC-J PMorgan-Copper-ETF/2012/12/17/id/467985/.
363
As discussed in the following section, both the OCC and the Federal Reserve impose size
limits on physical commodity activities to ensure they do not threaten the safety and soundness
of the financial institutions conducting those activities.
2378
The OCC limits banks to settling no
more than 5% of their derivative transactions by taking physical delivery of commodities. The
Federal Reserve limits financial holding companies to conducting complementary physical
commodity activities at no more than 5% of their Tier 1 capital. Activities involving “bullion,”
however, are exempted, not only from those limits, but also from any monitoring and reporting
requirements related to the size of physical commodity activities.
J PMorgan informed the Subcommittee that it did not include any of its copper holdings
when calculating the market value of its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying
with the OCC and Federal Reserve size limits.
2379
J PMorgan indicated, for example, that when it
added up the dollar value of its physical commodity holdings to gauge compliance with the
OCC’s derivatives limit, it omitted its copper holdings, which often exceeded $1 billion.
2380
J PMorgan explained that it also did not include copper – or any of the metal holdings at its bank
– when calculating compliance with the Federal Reserve’s complementary limit, because they
were not held pursuant to its complementary authority from the Federal Reserve.
2381
When the
Subcommittee asked the Federal Reserve about J PMorgan’s exempting its copper holdings from
the regulatory size limits, the Federal Reserve confirmed that copper trading activities are, in
fact, conducted under a separate Federal Reserve grant of regulatory authority for “bullion,”
2382
and so were not conducted under J PMorgan’s complementary authority and were not subject to
the 5% limit.
2383
Exempting “bullion” from physical commodity limits and reporting requirements rests on
the traditional role of banks using gold and silver as mediums of exchange; while anachronistic,
that exception has been viewed as a limited one.
2384
Extending the definition of “bullion” to
copper dramatically stretched the exception. In its 1995 interpretative letter deciding that copper
could be treated as “bullion,” the OCC ignored copper’s longstanding, worldwide trading status
as a base metal, and instead highlighted other characteristics:
“Copper, like platinum and palladium, has been used to mint legal-tender coins. …
Additionally, copper, like platinum and palladium, is bought and sold as a metal in a
mass standardized as to weight and purity.”
2385
Focusing on the use of copper in coins and the use of standardized weight and purity
requirements in copper trading does not explain, however, why copper merits special status.
Other base metals, such as zinc, nickel, and even steel, have been used to make coins in the
2378
See discussion of J PMorgan’s involvement with size limits, below.
2379
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2380
Id.
2381
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014). For more information about exempting its bank’s holdings
from the Federal Reserve’s size limit, see discussion in the next section, below.
2382
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii).
2383
10/30/2014 email from the Federal Reserve to the Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 002-003.
2384
The Subcommittee did not examine the gold, silver, platinum, and palladium trading undertaken by the financial
institutions that are the subject of this Report, and has no data on the actual size of that trading activity.
2385
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135, 138.
364
United States. In fact, the penny – the U.S. coin most closely associated with copper – has been
composed of 97.5% zinc since 1984.
2386
Moreover, a broad swath of base metals, including
aluminum, lead, steel, and uranium, are traded using standardized weight and purity
requirements.
2387
Even today, more than 15 years after the OCC’s determination, banks –
including J PMorgan Chase Bank,
2388
trading firms,
2389
analysts,
2390
and exchanges
2391
continue
to treat copper for trading and risk management purposes as a base metal, not a precious metal.
U.S. bank regulators’ contrary stance is out of alignment with worldwide trading norms.
Given copper’s widely-accepted trading status as a base metal, the impact of copper price
volatility on end-users, and financial holding company involvement with massive copper
inventories and transactions, the Federal Reserve and OCC should treat copper as subject to all
the same size limits and reporting requirements that apply to other base metals. Otherwise,
copper will continue to provide a loophole that can be used to circumvent otherwise applicable
2386
See undated “The Composition of the Cent,” United States Mint,http://www.usmint.gov/about_the_mint/fun_facts/?action=fun_facts2.
2387
See “Metals Used in Coins and Medals,” Coins of the UK, Tony Clayton (3/9/2014),http://www.coins-of-the-
uk.co.uk/pics/metal.html.
2388
See e.g., undated “Commodities,” J PMorgan website,https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities/metals (listing copper as a “base metal”
on its Products & Solutions webpage); 9/26/2013 “FED/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan,
FRB-PSI-301383-396, at 388 (including copper, along with aluminum, nickel, and zinc, under the heading “Base
Metal” and identifying a copper holding as one of the bank’s “Key Risk Positions”); 7/24/2013 “Mining
commodities: The focus shifts to the supply side,” prepared by Goldman,http://ucore.com/Commodities_Supply_Side.pdf (explaining in a 2013 report on investment strategies that, because
copper was expected to underperform zinc and lead: “Copper has shifted to [their] least preferred base metal on a 6-
18 month view”); 12/10/2010 “2011 Outlook: A Commodity Bull Market,” prepared by Morgan Stanley, at 1,7,
file:///C:/Users/am44209/Downloads/COMMODITIES_2011_OUTLOOK.pdf (describing copper as Morgan
Stanley’s “favorite base metal,” with “copper fundamentals” that “remain the strongest in the base metal complex”).
2389
See, e.g., undated “Base Metals,” Mercuria Energy Trading,http://www.mercuria.com/trading/base-metals
(listing copper, along with aluminum, lead, zinc, nickel and tin, on its “base metals” information page); undated
“Trading: Refined metals: Products,” Trafigura website,http://www.trafigura.com/trading/non-ferrous-and-
bulk/refined-metals/ (describing its metals business as dealing “mainly in London Metal Exchange (LME)
deliverable grades for the major base metal markets, including copper, lead, zinc, nickel and aluminium”); undated,
“Base metals[:] Copper,” Metal Bulletin website,http://www.metalbulletin.com/Base-
metals/Copper.html#axzz3GEGCyEkl.
2390
See, e.g., 4/9/2012 “CPM Group: Commodities Views-Apr 9,” prepared by CPM Group,http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/14-CPM_Commodities_Views_8-14_2012-04-09.pdf; undated, “Base
Metals,” CPM Group,http://www.cpmgroup.com/our-commodities-coverage/base-metals (listing copper as a base
metal on the website and in the weekly commodities view report of CPM Group, a commodities research firm).
2391
See, e.g., 9/4/2014, “New Products Briefing - LME and HKEx: Base Metals Seminar,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/news-and-events/...-products-briefing-_-lme-and-hkex--singapore/
(announcing a new base metals seminar to launch London Metal mini contracts “in base metals such as copper,
aluminum and zinc”); 9/5/2014, “Precious Metals Price Data and Matching and Clearing Services,” LME website,http://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Notices/2014/2014_09/14%20269%20A261%20Precious%20Metals%20Price%
20Data%20and%20Matching%20and%20Clearing%20Services.pdf (omitting copper from its precious metals price
data and clearing services); undated, “Metals Product Slate,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/metals/ (listing copper and aluminum in its “base metal” subgroup and not under
its “precious metals” subgroup.); undated “Commodity Market Commentary: Energy, Metals and the Soft
Commodities,” CME Group website,http://www.cmegroup.com/education/featured-reports/cpm-group-
commodities-views.html (listing copper in the base metals subgroup).
365
physical commodity safeguards important to protecting U.S. taxpayers from risks related to
physical commodity activities.
(b) ETF Conflicts of Interest
A second set of concerns involves J PMorgan’s proposal to construct an Exchange Traded
Fund (ETF) backed by physical copper. While this proposal is currently on hold, the relevant
registration statement has not been withdrawn from the SEC by J PMorgan, and the registration
process could be easily re-started.
2392
For that reason, the J PMorgan Copper ETF continues to
raise conflict of interest and market manipulation concerns that need to be addressed.
One area of potential conflicts of interest involves J PMorgan’s ownership of a significant
copper inventory and its active copper trading activities at the same time it has been working to
create a copper-backed ETF. As indicated earlier, J PMorgan’s copper inventory fluctuated from
2010 to 2013, peaking at $2.7 billion but rarely falling below $1 billion in market value.
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that its massive copper acquisitions were unrelated to its
ETF.
2393
Nevertheless, its copper-backed ETF was designed to acquire a large physical copper
inventory, and its registration statement indicated that J PMorgan planned to be one of the
Authorized Participants that would deposit physical copper with the fund in exchange for ETF
securities. In late 2010, in the two months after the ETF registration was first filed with the SEC,
J PMorgan initiated trades that led to its amassing an enormous copper inventory. Analysts at the
time predicted copper prices would rise as a result of J PMorgan’s large copper purchases.
2394
Soon after, J PMorgan sold the bulk of its copper holdings over a short period of time, suddenly
increasing the marginal amount of copper available for trading, while contributing to volatility
and downward pressure on copper prices. Those large trades demonstrate how J PMorgan could
impact the value of the copper placed in its copper-backed ETF and do so through trades that
could be beneficial or adverse to potential ETF investors.
By forming and administering the ETF, J PMorgan would also have positioned itself to
gain access to commercially valuable, non-public ETF information that could have been used to
benefit its trading activities, again, at times, in ways that could have been adverse to ETF
investors. J PMorgan had arranged for its affiliates to advise and administer the ETF, necessarily
giving them access to the ETF’s internal records on copper investments and physical copper
movements. Those J PMorgan affiliates would have gained access, for example, to information
about plans by an Authorized Participant to buy physical copper to place in the ETF, an action
which, if known beforehand, could have provided J PMorgan traders with an opportunity to profit
from marginal supply shortages and rising copper prices. Alternatively, information that ETF
investors were leaving the fund and might trigger a release of copper into the marketplace could
have provided J PMorgan traders with an opportunity to short copper futures and benefit from
lower prices. In that instance, J PMorgan could have initiated trades against the interests of ETF
investors seeking higher copper prices. The J PMorgan registration statement recognized that
2392
Subcommittee briefing by the SEC (10/8/2014).
2393
10/31/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-18-000001 - 005, at 005.
2394
See, e.g., “Copper price set to rise further after J P Morgan bet,” The Telegraph, Rowena Mason (12/6/2010),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...82493/Copper-price-set-to-rise-further-after-
J P-Morgan-bet.html.
366
possibility, stating that it had “not established formal procedures to resolve potential conflicts of
interest,” which would protect investors in the event that J PMorgan affiliates traded against the
interests of the ETF investors.
2395
Still another set of issues involves potential manipulation of copper prices. By amassing
large amounts of physical copper, the J PMorgan Copper ETF would have made the copper
market more susceptible to being squeezed by speculators. In 1996, a major scandal over copper
prices involved the purchase of massive amounts of copper by the Sumitomo Corporation’s chief
copper trader who used those copper holdings to corner and squeeze the market and artificially
inflate copper prices.
2396
Additional squeezes in the copper market by unnamed traders amassing
large copper holdings have generated media reports over the last few years.
2397
The J PMorgan
Copper ETF could have made the market even more susceptible to squeezes, because it would
have been used by market participants to remove copper from the available market supply which,
in turn, could have inflated copper prices. J PMorgan’s own registration statement acknowledged
that the ETF, “as it grows, may have an impact on supply and demand for copper that ultimately
may affect the price of the shares in a manner unrelated to other factors affecting the global
markets for copper.”
2398
In other words, the ETF, by removing copper from the marketplace,
could affect copper prices in a way unrelated to fundamental supply and demand forces and
which could act effectively as a manipulation of the price.
The market manipulation problem would have been magnified by the fact that the ETF’s
activities would have taken place without oversight from commodities regulators, because ETFs
operate in securities markets and are not currently subject to commodities regulation. Instead,
because ETFs issue securities to their investors, ETFs are currently regulated solely by securities
regulators like the SEC, and not by commodities regulators, like the LME or Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). By holding physical copper that is not subject to LME warrants,
the J PMorgan Copper ETF could have positioned itself to control a substantial portion of the
available supply of physical copper without triggering LME or CFTC surveillance, rules, or
reporting requirements.
How the ETF planned to detect and prevent its misuse as a means of market manipulation
was not addressed in the J PMorgan Copper ETF registration statement. As Subcommittee
Chairman Levin put it in a letter challenging the registration:
2395
J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8, at 23.
2396
See, e.g., Global Derivative Debacles: From Theory to Malpractice, Laurent L. J acque (World Scientific 2010),
Chapter 7, at 97–101; “The Copper King: An Empire Built On Manipulation,” Investopedia, Andrew Beattie
(undated),http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/mr-copper-commodities.asp.
2397
See, e.g., “Copper market expects squeeze, big holding appears,” Reuters, Eric Onstad, (7/2/2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-copper-tightness-idUSBRE8610XK20120702; “The Big Squeeze -
mystery hand scoops up copper,” Reuters (12/20/2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/copper-squeeze-
idUSL6N0J X2FG20131220 (“Someone has made a near billion-dollar bet on copper this week, virtually cornering
the world's key stocks of the metal. That has stoked worries of a supply squeeze, as warehouses run low on a raw
material vital to global industry, and has raised questions about commodity exchanges' efforts to curb attempts to
manipulate prices by aggressively heavy trading.”); “Single Firm Holds More Than 50% of Copper in LME
Warehouses,” Wall Street J ournal, Sarah Kent, Ese Erheriene, Ira Iosebashvili (10/26/2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/single-firm-holds-more-than-50-of-copper-in-lme-warehouses-
1414361984?cb=logged0.02992292078844988.
2398
J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 8, at 21.
367
“The S-1 [registration statement] does not identify, discuss, or present actions that could
be taken to address the legal issues that might arise if the ETF itself is seen as fostering
price distortions, squeezes, corners, or other price manipulations in the copper market.
Nor does the S-1 detail what policies and procedures J PMorgan would follow to ensure
that its other trading and business interests are not impermissibly conflicted with those
invested in [the J PMorgan Copper ETF]. …
As currently configured, the [J PMorgan Copper ETF] Trust contains no provisions to
prevent high investor demand from causing an increase in copper prices or, alternatively,
a quick drop in demand from driving down copper prices. The risk of a bubble in the
copper market creates a corresponding risk that the bubble will eventually burst. If that
happens, investors may dump thousands of metric tons of copper back onto the market,
swamping the market and depressing the price, impacting not only copper-reliant
industries around the world, but also possibly producing large gains for any parties
shorting the copper market.”
2399
The many conflict of interest and market manipulation concerns raised by an ETF backed
by physical commodities are not fully addressed or resolved in the J PMorgan Copper ETF
registration statement or the existing regulatory framework. If a financial holding company
were to be found to have engaged in market manipulation through an ETF, it could lead to
copper price distortions, civil and criminal actions by law enforcement agencies, lawsuits by
ETF investors, legal expenses, penalties, and other consequences.
(c) Potential Economic Impacts of a Copper ETF
Aside from conflict of interest and market manipulation concerns, a copper-backed ETF
may have significant impacts on the broader economy, by increasing commodity costs and price
volatility for consumers and producers. Some commentators have said the financialization of
base metals would “wreak havoc on the US and global economy.”
2400
Those commentators note
that the intent of a commodity-based ETF is to provide speculators with a way to bet on the price
of the underlying commodity. Two supply and demand curves result – one for the physical
commodity such as metal, and another for the financial product related to that metal. Although
the two are integrally related, they are distinct. For example, investors in a copper ETF may not
be interested in using the copper; their goal may simply be to profit from changes in copper
prices. Their investments are likely to drive up prices for consumers who actually use physical
copper by reducing the supply of copper available on the market.
The market impact of a copper ETF may be exacerbated by the fact that copper has not
historically been held for investment purposes.
2401
Copper is expensive to store and difficult to
2399
2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000008.
2400
“Copper ETF Plan Would ‘Wreak Havoc,’” Financial Times, J ack Farchy (3/23/2012),http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7d32d4c-a4fb-11e1-b421-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DOphziCJ .
2401
See, e.g., 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC, File Number
SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, at 26 – 28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-
28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
368
transport.
2402
Its supply and demand functions have traditionally been set according to
commercial and personal uses, and not as a store of value.
2403
That means, if a copper ETF were
to be established, manufacturers, fabricators, and other industrial businesses that use copper
would be forced to compete with speculators holding copper as a passive asset, changing the
market dynamics of copper’s supply and demand functions and introducing greater volatility.
2404
For those reasons, the acquisition and holding of copper for investment purposes may
have a greater impact on physical markets
2405
and the broader economy
2406
than ETFs holding
palladium, platinum, silver, or gold. At the same time, a commodity-backed ETF can have a
significant impact on the price and volatility of the underlying commodity, even when a precious
metal is involved. For example, gold-related ETFs first surfaced in 2004,
2407
with dozens of
similar ETFs springing up over time.
2408
Today, it has become clear that significant movements
in the gold-related ETFs have had direct impacts on the price of physical gold.
2409
As one
analyst in the field noted: “You watch the flow of money …. No matter what the supply-and-
demand fundamentals [for physical gold] may suggest, if that money’s flowing, those prices are
going to move.”
2410
The Wall Street J ournal cited as a possible explanation for the impact of
gold ETFs on physical gold prices, the relatively small size of the gold market, estimated at $236
billion in annual sales in 2012, and the ETFs’ significant share of those sales.
2411
A copper-based ETF could create a similar dynamic with copper prices, with potentially
even more dramatic effects on copper producers and consumers around the world, because of the
larger size of the copper market.
(d) Inadequate Safeguards
A final set of concerns involves the lack of regulatory safeguards applicable to both
copper and copper-backed ETFs. The regulatory decision to treat copper as “bullion” has
already exempted copper as a class from OCC and Federal Reserve size limits intended to reduce
risk. Similar regulatory gaps apply to copper-backed ETFs. Because commodity-related ETFs
issue securities to investors, they operate outside of all commodity regulation and oversight, even
2402
See, e.g., J PMorgan Copper Trust Registration Statement, Amendment No. 1, at 40-41.
2403
See, e.g., 1/9/2013 letter from Robert B. Bernstein, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, filed with the SEC, File Number
SR-NYSEArca-2012-28, at 26 – 28, SEC website,http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2012-
28/nysearca201228-30.pdf.
2404
Id. See also 2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000003.
2405
See “Speculative Influences on Commodity Futures Prices,” Christopher Gilbert (2010),http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20101_en.pdf, at 8.
2406
See “The Growing Financialisation of Commodity Markets: Divergences between Index Investors and Money
Managers,” J ournal of Developmental Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 6, (2012), J örg Mayer (UNCTAD), at 752 - 753.
2407
2013 Levin letter, at PSI to SEC (March 11 2013)-000002.
2408
See, e.g., Form S-1 Registration Statement, streetTRACKS Gold Trust, Amendment No. 5 (11/16/2004),
Securities and Exchange Commission website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1222333/000095013604004007/file001.htm; Form S-1 Registration
Statement, iShares COMEX Gold Trust, Amendment No. 4 (1/25/2005), Securities and Exchange Commission
website,http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278680/000119312505011426/ds1a.txt.
2409
“Does a Big ETF Drive Gold’s Price?” Wall Street J ournal, Rob Curran (5/5/2013),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324030704578426613352725022.
2410
Id.
2411
Id.
369
though they directly impact both commodity prices and commodity trading. In addition,
physical metals like copper generally fall outside of federal regulation, which currently focuses
on the financial market for metals rather than the physical market, even though contracts to buy
metals like copper in the physical market may reference prices set in the LME futures market.
Federal banking regulators should treat ETFs backed by physical commodities as within
the category of physical commodity activities subject to their oversight. ETFs backed by
physical commodities carry conflict of interest and market manipulation risks that can threaten
the safety and soundness of affiliated banks and their holding companies. Federal bank
regulators should make it clear that those ETFs are physical commodity activities subject to
review, and impose regulatory constraints to reduce their risks, including size limits and
safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest and market manipulation. Commodity regulators like
the CFTC should also work with the SEC to apply position limits or other restrictions to ETF
owners, organizers, and authorized participants to prevent the misuse of ETFs backed by
physical commodities to manipulate commodity prices.
(4) Analysis
J PMorgan has a long history as an active trader in copper markets. At times, it has
amassed copper holdings worth billions of dollars, carrying financial risks due to volatile copper
prices. It is not the only financial holding company with large copper holdings; for example, in
J anuary 2011, according to the Federal Reserve, Goldman held copper worth $2.3 billion.
2412
Those copper holdings should be subject to the same size limits as all other physical
commodities, but currently are not. Federal bank regulators should ensure that copper’s status as
“bullion” does not lead to federally insured banks and their holding companies engaging in
copper activities on an unrestricted basis, but instead ensure they operate within limits that
reduce the risks associated with investing in such a volatile commodity.
In addition, while J PMorgan has placed its plan to offer a copper-backed ETF on hold, it
could revive that proposal at any time. If it were to obtain approval of its registration statement,
the resulting copper-backed ETF could distort copper markets worldwide with artificial supply
shortages and price swings, create conflicts of interest between J PMorgan and the ETF investors,
and expose J PMorgan to possible legal actions to prevent or halt market manipulation. If
allowed to proceed, J PMorgan could also set an ill-advised precedent for other bank-sponsored
commodity-backed ETFs that could raise similar concerns and have similar negative impacts on
commodity markets. Regulators should act now to make clear that ETFs backed by physical
commodities will be treated as a physical commodity activity subject to oversight, and develop
safeguards to detect and prevent conflicts of interest and market manipulation.
2412
2011 “Work Plan for Commodity Activities at SIFIs,” prepared by the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-200455 - 476,
at 464 [sealed exhibit].
370
D. JPMorgan Involvement with Size Limits
This final part of the J PMorgan case study examines, not a particular commodity, but
issues related to financial holding company compliance with regulatory limits on the size of their
physical commodity holdings. Those size limits were established to reduce the risks associated
with those activities, protect the safety and soundness of the banks and their holding companies,
and ensure that the banks and their holding companies remain engaged primarily in the business
of banking and conduct only a limited amount of physical commodity activities.
The Federal Reserve, which is the primary regulator for financial holding companies,
imposes several distinct limits on physical commodity activities. Depending on which authority
is being relied upon, the activity may be: (i) limited to not more than 5% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital; (ii) limited to not more than 5% of the financial holding company’s
total consolidated assets (a much larger number); or (iii) subject to no limit at all. In addition,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which is the primary regulator for national
banks, has its own size limit on physical commodity activities. It requires that physical
commodities transactions be conducted in only a “nominal” amount, comprising “no more than
5%” of the bank’s commodity derivative transactions. Neither regulator has issued formal
guidance on how to implement their limits or, until recently, required regular reports tracking
compliance. Nor are their limits coordinated in any comprehensive or coherent way.
The Federal Reserve and OCC size limits applicable to J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase
Bank respectively were the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit on complementary activities, and the
OCC 5% limit on commodity derivative transactions that are physically settled. For years,
J PMorgan and its bank employed aggressive interpretations on how to interpret and apply those
two limits, at times without alerting regulators to their actions. In some cases, J PMorgan and
J PMorgan Chase Bank implemented their respective size limits in ways that were later – after the
regulators learned of them – rejected by the Federal Reserve or OCC. In other circumstances, its
aggressive interpretations and implementation methodologies were allowed to continue, even
after regulators learned of them.
The end result was that J PMorgan maintained physical commodity holdings far larger
than the limits would suggest. In September 2012, for example, J PMorgan held physical
commodity assets – excluding gold, silver, and commodity-related merchant banking assets –
that had a combined market value of $17.4 billion, which at the time equaled nearly 12% of its
Tier 1 capital of $148 billion. J PMorgan asserted, however, that due to various exclusions
allowing it to omit certain categories of assets when calculating compliance, the market value of
its physical commodity assets for purposes of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit was only $6.6
billion or 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it had not
yet objected to the exclusions J PMorgan was using to claim compliance with the 5% limit. That
J PMorgan could claim to be in compliance with a 5% limit when its physical commodities were,
in fact, more than double that size demonstrates how the current regulatory limits are riddled
with exclusions, poorly coordinated, and currently ineffective to protect taxpayers from financial
holding companies engaging in excessive amounts of high risk physical commodity activities.
371
(1) Background on Size Limits
Financial holding companies and their banks, when engaged in physical commodity
activities, are subject to several sets of prudential limits on size enforced by the Federal Reserve
and OCC.
Federal Reserve Limits. As explained earlier, the Federal Reserve historically
permitted very little involvement by bank holding companies in physical commodities
markets.
2413
Then in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created a new category of “financial
holding companies” and authorized them to engage in complementary, grandfathered, and
merchant banking activities that could include physical commodities. The Federal Reserve
responded by broadening the physical commodity activities that bank holding companies could
conduct.
2414
For a financial holding company to engage in complementary activities, it must first
obtain permission from the Federal Reserve. Beginning in 2000, the Federal Reserve authorized
over a dozen financial holding companies to engage in “complementary” activities involving
physical commodities.
2415
In the orders and letters granting that complementary authority, the
Federal Reserve typically noted that the intent of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley complementary
provision was “to allow the [Federal Reserve] Board to permit FHCs [financial holding
companies]” to engage in the specified commercial activities “on a limited basis.”
2416
The Federal Reserve also imposed a number of limitations on the financial holding
companies receiving complementary authority. One key limitation stated that, “to limit the
potential safety and soundness risks of Commodity Trading Activities,” the “market value of
commodities held” by the financial holding company “must not exceed 5 percent” of the
financial holding company’s “consolidated tier 1 capital.”
2417
In addition, the financial holding
company was required to notify the Federal Reserve if the market value of its physical
commodities “exceeds 4 percent of its tier 1 capital.”
2418
The Federal Reserve imposed that
same volume limit and reporting requirement on all of the financial holding companies given
complementary authority to engage in physical commodity activities.
2419
A later internal Federal Reserve memorandum described the twin objectives of the 5%
limit as:
2413
See discussion in Chapter 2, above, on the history of bank involvement with physical commodities.
2414
See discussion in Chapter 3, above, describing Federal Reserve actions after the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
2415
See discussion in Chapter 3 above, describing the Federal Reserve grants of complementary authority to
financial holding companies from 2000 to 2009.
2416
See, e.g., 11/18/2005 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by J P Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 - C59, at C57
(2006) (hereinafter, “2005 J PMorgan Complementary Order”),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_2006comp_p2.pdf.
2417
Id. at C58.
2418
Id.
2419
See citations to the individual orders in Chapter 3. Neither Goldman nor Morgan Stanley has ever requested or
received a complementary order; they rely instead on other authorities, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
grandfather and merchant banking authorities, to conduct their physical commodity activities.
372
“intended to both limit the level of activity that ‘appears commercial in nature’ and to
address safety and soundness concerns related to non-traditional risk from industrial
commodities activities.”
2420
Physical commodity activities undertaken as complementary activities were not the only
activities subject to limits. In addition, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act imposed a limit on the
physical commodity activities that could be undertaken by firms that converted to bank holding
companies under the so-called “grandfather clause.”
2421
The statute specified that physical
commodity activities undertaken through the grandfather clause had to be limited to “not more
than 5 percent of the total consolidated assets of the bank holding company.”
2422
In addition, the
statute authorized financial holding companies to engage in “merchant banking” activities which,
among other types of business, could include physical commodity activities.
2423
Initially, the
Federal Reserve imposed a limit on the overall size of merchant banking activities, generally
capping them at no more than 30% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital, but that cap
was removed more than a decade ago.
2424
Since then, physical commodity activities undertaken
pursuant to the merchant banking provision have operated with no size limit at all.
Each of the size limits imposed on financial holding company involvement with physical
commodities was intended, in part, to reduce the safety and soundness risks associated with those
activities. The Federal Reserve, however, has not issued any written guidance on how each of
the limits should be applied, or how they should be integrated so that they work together
efficiently and effectively. Nor, until recently, did the Federal Reserve impose routine reporting
requirements to determine whether financial holding companies were appropriately valuing their
physical commodity assets and accurately reporting compliance with the 5% limit.
2425
Instead,
the Federal Reserve essentially relied on its examiners and the financial holding companies
themselves to ensure the complementary, merchant banking, and grandfathering limits were
implemented in appropriate ways.
OCC Limits. A second set of limits on physical commodity activities was imposed by
the OCC, which regulates federally-insured national banks, in contrast to the bank holding
companies regulated by the Federal Reserve.
Like bank holding companies, federally-chartered banks have historically held
inventories of precious metals, such as gold or silver, but not other types of physical
commodities in any significant quantities. In 1993, the OCC significantly altered this landscape
2420
Undated but likely the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 301 [sealed exhibit].
2421
See discussion in Chapter 3, above, regarding the grandfather clause.
2422
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, §103(a).
2423
See discussion in Chapter 3, above, regarding merchant banking authority.
2424
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds); Capital; Leverage and
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy, Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity
Investments, 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (1/25/2002) (adopting a final rule that ended the size limit while imposing specific
capital requirements for merchant banking investments).
2425
While the Federal Reserve has long had access to, and general reporting regarding, financial holding companies’
commodities activities, the specifics regarding compliance with applicable size limits, were not, until recently,
regularly provided to the regulators.
373
when it issued an Interpretive Letter that deemed it permissible for national banks to hedge their
commodity-linked derivative transactions by taking or making delivery of physical commodities,
subject to certain limitations.
2426
Two years later, in 1995, the OCC broadened and clarified this
new physical commodity hedging authority with another Interpretive Letter.
2427
The OCC
explicitly limited this hedging authority by imposing a number of requirements and restrictions,
including that the authorized transactions needed to be:
• “nominal,” and that “no more than 5% of its total transactions involving Eligible
Commodities would involve actual physical delivery;”
• “Hedge Transactions” used to “manage risk” arising out of permissible commodity-
linked financial transactions;
• made only with “Eligible Commodities,” meaning physical metals that were not
deemed to be bullion and coin, including aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc,
cobalt, platinum, iridium, palladium, and rhodium;
2428
• “customer-driven;” and not “entered into for speculative purposes.”
2429
The Interpretive Letter did not detail how the specified limitations and safeguards were to
be implemented. For example, the letter did not detail how the 5% limit should be calculated or
applied. In addition, since 1995, the OCC has not issued any formal guidance on its 5% limit,
nor, until recently, required regular reporting on compliance with it. Instead, similar to the
Federal Reserve, until very recently, the OCC essentially relied on its examiners and the
financial holding companies themselves to implement the limit in an appropriate way.
(2) JPMorgan’s Aggressive Interpretations
J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank have both, over the years, employed aggressive
interpretations and practices when complying with the regulatory size limits.
2430
J PMorgan,
which exercised a wide range of complementary activities involving physical commodities, was
subject to the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. J PMorgan Chase Bank, which conducted a large
amount of physical commodities activities involving primarily physical metals like aluminum
and copper, was subject to the OCC’s separate 5% limit. From 2005 to 2012, despite those
purported size limits, J PMorgan accumulated massive physical commodity holdings far in excess
of 5% of its Tier 1 capital.
2426
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 632 (6/30/1993), PSI-OCC-01-000358 - 366.
2427
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 - 374.
2428
Id. Three months later, the OCC issued another Interpretive Letter allowing banks to treat copper as “bullion,”
which effectively excluded copper from the 5% limit imposed by the OCC. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693
(11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141.
2429
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684 (8/4/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000368 - 374. The OCC also prohibited the bank
from being a “dealer or market-maker” in the physical commodity transactions; required the bank to “take delivery
by accepting warehouse receipts or simultaneous ‘pass-through’ delivery to another party;” and precluded the bank
from taking “a net position” in the commodities. Id.
2430
In this section, unless otherwise indicated, “J PMorgan” refers to the holding company, J PMorgan Chase & Co.,
while “J PMorgan Chase Bank” refers to its primary national bank subsidiary.
374
J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank claimed to be in compliance with the Federal
Reserve and OCC size limits, despite the actual size of their physical commodity holdings, by
excluding and minimizing the value of various assets when calculating the market value of their
respective holdings. Until 2012, both regulators had largely relied on J PMorgan and J PMorgan
Chase Bank to track their own compliance and report any breaches of the regulatory limits.
When the regulators learned of their aggressive interpretations and practices in connection with
the limits, they disallowed some, while allowing others to continue.
J PMorgan’s compliance practices came into the spotlight in late December 2011, when
J PMorgan Chase Bank engaged in a massive physical commodities transaction, involving $1.6
billion in aluminum, and breached the OCC’s limit. To bring the bank back into compliance
with the OCC limit, the bank “sold” about $1.1 billion in aluminum to a nonbank affiliate of the
J PMorgan holding company, J PMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (J PMVEC). J PMorgan
informed the Federal Reserve that it had exceeded the 4% reporting threshold for physical
commodities, but would not exceed the 5% limit. That transaction led to both Federal Reserve
and OCC examiners asking questions about the compliance of both J PMorgan and J PMorgan
Chase Bank with their respective size limits. The Federal Reserve examiners learned for the first
time that the financial holding company had not been including the value of its bank’s physical
commodity assets when reporting the market value of it physical commodity holdings to the
Federal Reserve. The OCC examiners learned that the bank had earlier exceeded the OCC limit
without disclosing the breach to OCC examiners, and then remained in breach of the limit,
ultimately for about a month.
The Federal Reserve and OCC examiners also learned that, when the physical commodity
assets of the financial holding company and bank were combined, they far exceeded 5% of the
financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital, and had exceeded that level in every month of 2011.
J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank nevertheless asserted they were in full compliance with
both the Federal Reserve and OCC 5% limits, except for the one-month period, because they
could use exclusions and other valuation techniques that brought down the value of their
respective assets to below the regulatory limits. Despite concerns expressed by Federal Reserve
and OCC examiners about J PMorgan’s excluding its bank’s assets when calculating the financial
holding company’s physical commodity holdings, the Federal Reserve legal department has so
far declined to object to J PMorgan’s approach.
(a) Making Commitments
In 2004 and 2005, J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank sought expanded
authority to engage in physical commodity activities from their respective regulators. To
obtain that authority, both made commitments to comply with the size limits designed to
reduce the associated risks.
2004 JPMorgan Chase Bank Commitments to the OCC. In 2004, as its merger with
Bank One was being finalized, J PMorgan Chase Bank sent a letter to the OCC essentially
alerting it to the physical commodity activities then taking place within the bank, and seeking
confirmation that those activities were permissible. The J PMorgan Chase Bank letter stated:
375
“The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information regarding the Bank's
current commodity derivative activities and to request the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency's (the "OCC") concurrence with our view that entering into (1) cash-settled
derivative transactions in natural gas, crude oil, power, coal, emissions and weather, (2)
physically-settled transactions in the form of transitory title transfers in natural gas, crude
oil, power, emissions and coal, including volumetric production payment transactions,
and (3) physical commodity transactions in natural gas, crude oil, coal and emissions, all
as described more fully below, is permissible for a national bank.”
2431
To persuade the OCC to support continuation of its physical commodity activities, in its
letter J PMorgan Chase Bank made a number of commitments, including that: (1) all of its
commodity related transactions would be to assist customers, and not for purposes of
speculation; (2) it would establish comprehensive risk management practices and policies; and
(3) when the bank took delivery of physical commodities, it would act as a financial intermediary
and that “taking delivery of a physical commodity should be incidental to such financial
intermediation.”
2432
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that the bank never received a specific
written response from the OCC, but its understanding was that the activities described in its letter
were, in fact, permissible.
2433
2005 JPMorgan Commitments to the Federal Reserve. Nine months after J PMorgan
Chase Bank sent the letter to the OCC, its holding company, J PMorgan, sent one to the Federal
Reserve applying for complementary authority to engage in physical commodity activities
through the financial holding company.
2434
The letter asked that J PMorgan be allowed to
“expand its commodities derivatives activities to include physical transactions in the natural gas,
crude oil and emissions allowance markets” through an affiliate, J PMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation (J PMVEC).
2435
The letter indicated that J PMVEC’s “front office” employees would
also be employees of J PMorgan Chase Bank, and the bank would also supply administrative and
operational support for J PMVEC.
2436
J PMVEC would then execute commodity trades for both
the bank and the holding company.
The letter requested complementary authority that would allow J PMorgan, through
J PMVEC, to trade as a principal using commodity-related futures, swaps, options, forwards, and
similar contracts.
2437
The letter indicated that, if given the authority, in many cases, J PMorgan
would either settle the contracts on a financial basis (without making or taking physical delivery
of the commodities) or use paperwork to take legal title to the physical commodities and transfer
that title “instantaneously” to a third party.
2438
The letter also stated that, in other cases,
2431
10/26/2004 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to OCC, “Commodity Derivative Activities of J PMorgan Chase
Bank,” OCC-PSI-00000266 - 298, at 266.
2432
Id. at 267.
2433
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014). However, the OCC subsequently engaged
the bank in extended discussions, some of which resulted in the OCC providing numerous Interpretive Letters to the
bank during 2005 and 2006. Subcommittee briefing by OCC (11/14/2014).
2434
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 000028.
2435
Id. at 007 (internal citations omitted).
2436
Id. at 012.
2437
Id. at 009.
2438
Id.
376
J PMorgan would take legal title to physical commodities for “a relatively short period of
time.”
2439
In addition, the letter stated that J PMorgan “d[id] not expect to own, control or
operate entities in the Unites States that are involved in the production, distribution, storage or
processing of physical commodities for the purposes of engaging in those activities.”
2440
J PMorgan’s 2005 letter to the Federal Reserve also made a number of specific
commitments if it were granted expanded authority to conduct physical commodity activities.
They included commitments that J PMorgan would:
• “limit the amount of physical commodities that it holds at any one time to 5% of its
consolidated Tier 1 Capital,” a limit which, for reference purposes, it estimated was
about $3.5 billion on December 31, 2004, based on J PM Chase Tier 1 capital at that
time of $69.4 billion;
2441
• “assure proper risk management and controls over the [physical commodity
activities]”;
2442
• “make and take physical delivery of, or store, only commodities, such as natural gas,
crude oil, and emissions allowances, that have been approved by the CFTC for
trading on U.S. futures exchanges”;
2443
• “not acquire or operate facilities in the Unites States for the extraction, transportation,
storage or distribution of commodities. … [but if J PMorgan nevertheless ended up
owning such a facility] J PMorgan will not hold any such interest as a means to
engage in the underlying commercial activity”;
2444
• “not process, refine, store or otherwise alter commodities in the United States”;
2445
• “contract with a third party for any services that it needs in connection with the
handling of any commodity”;
2446
and
• “only use storage and transportation facilities owned and operated by third parties”
and “enter into service agreements only with accredited, reputable independent third
party facilities.”
2447
2439
Id.
2440
Id. at 020. Five years later, as part of its RBS Sempra acquisition, J PMorgan acquired the Henry Bath
warehouses, which were plainly engaged in the storage of physical commodities. While the Federal Reserve gave
J PMorgan an initial grace period to operate the warehouse company, it did not provide complementary authority or
agree that J PMorgan could use merchant banking authority to retain ownership of the company. In 2014, J PMorgan
sold Henry Bath to a third party. For more information, see discussion of Henry Bath in Chapter 3, above.
2441
Id. at 026. Tier 1 capital is generally comprised of “equity capital and published reserves from post-tax retained
earnings” and is a “principal form of eligible capital to cover market risks.” 6/2006 “International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version,” prepared by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1 - 333, at 14 and 16,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
2442
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” at PSI-FederalReserve-01-
000001 - 028, at 026.
2443
Id.
2444
Id. at 027.
2445
Id. Four years later, in response to its request, J PMorgan obtained complementary authority to engage a third
party to conduct those activities on its behalf. See 4/20/2009 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan,
PSI-
FRB-11-000001 - 002, at 001 (allowing it to “engage a third party to alter or refine commodities after J PM takes
delivery in connection with its Physical Commodity Trading”) [sealed exhibit].
2446
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” at PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 027.
377
J PMorgan was one of the first financial holding companies to apply for complementary
authority to engage in physical commodity activities.
2448
The Federal Reserve granted its request
on November 18, 2005.
2449
In the order granting the new authority, the Federal Reserve wrote
that it was authorizing J PMorgan to engage in the new activities “on a limited basis.”
2450
The
order also stated:
“As a condition of this order, to limit the potential safety and soundness risks of
Commodity Trading Activities, the market value of commodities held by J PM Chase as a
result of Commodity Trading Activities must not exceed 5 percent of J PM Chase’s
consolidated tier 1 capital. J PM Chase also must notify the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York if the market value of commodities held by J PM Chase as a result of its
Commodity Trading Activities exceeds 4 percent of its tier 1 capital.”
2451
The order was also “specifically conditioned on compliance with all the commitments”
J PMorgan had made in its application.
2452
(b) Expanding Its Physical Commodity Activities
As described earlier, J PMorgan used its new complementary authority to engage in a
wide range of physical commodity activities. J PMorgan’s expansion into physical commodities
was fueled, in part, by a handful of major acquisitions as well as an agreement with a major
refinery. In 2008, through its Bear Stearns acquisition, J PMorgan gained rights to, or ownership
interests in, 27 power plants and a host of energy-related assets, including pipeline and storage
leases.
2453
In 2009, through a UBS acquisition, J PMorgan obtained crude oil, natural gas, power,
and agricultural assets in Canada.
2454
In 2010, as part of a $1.6 billion RBS Sempra acquisition,
J PMorgan obtained global oil, natural gas, coal, and metal assets; European power and gas
assets; and the Henry Bath network of warehouses.
2455
In 2012, J PMorgan entered into a long-
term agreement with a large oil refinery in Philadelphia, in which it agreed to supply crude oil
and feedstocks to the refinery and purchase 100% of its refined oil products.
2456
According to internal OCC and Federal Reserve analyses, in September 2012,
J PMorgan’s physical commodity assets reached an all-time high.
2457
J PMorgan’s own records
show that, in 2012, its physical commodity inventories were substantial. By 2013, J PMorgan
had begun to prepare quarterly charts for its regulators that tracked its physical commodity
2447
Id.
2448
Only Citibank preceded it, receiving the first grant of complementary authority from the Federal Reserve in
2003. See 10/2/2003 Federal Reserve “Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a
Financial Activity,” in response to a request by Citigroup, Inc., 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 508 - 511 (12/2003),http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/2000s/frb_122003.pdf.
2449
See 2005 J PMorgan Complementary Order, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 - C59.
2450
Id. at C57.
2451
Id. at C58.
2452
Id. at C59.
2453
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding the Bear Stearns acquisition.
2454
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding the UBS acquisition.
2455
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding the RBS Sempra acquisition.
2456
See discussion in the J PMorgan Overview, above, regarding Project Liberty.
2457
See email from OCC staff to FRBNY staff, “Meeting?,” OCC-PSI-0000077 - 079; 2012 Summary Report, at
FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506 [sealed exhibit].
378
holdings and compared their market value to its Federal Reserve and OCC size limits. In
September 2013, J PMorgan prepared a chart for its regulators that included information about its
physical commodity holdings as of September 28, 2012, and compared those holdings to its Tier
1 capital as of that date, which was about $148 billion.
2458
The chart first provided data on the physical commodity holdings of J PMorgan, the
financial holding company. It showed that, as of September 28, 2012, the market value of the
“Physical Inventory” held by the financial holding company – referred to as “J PMVEC & Non
Bank Subs” – was about $6.6 billion, or about 4.5% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1
capital of $148 billion.
2459
That $6.6 billion total excluded, however, several major categories of
physical commodity holdings at the financial holding company, including all of the physical
commodities held by its national bank, all of the financial holding company’s gold, silver,
platinum, palladium, and copper assets, and all of the financial holding company’s physical
commodities held through an exercise of its merchant banking authority.
2460
The result was that
the $6.6 billion total reflected only a portion of the physical commodity assets actually held by
the financial holding company.
The chart also provided data on the physical commodity holdings of J PMorgan Chase
Bank. It showed that, on the same date, September 28, 2012, the market value of the “Base
Metals” inventory held by J PMorgan Chase Bank was approximately $8.1 billion.
2461
That total
suggested that the bank held a larger inventory of physical commodities than the entire financial
holding company. At the same time, that $8.1 billion total also excluded certain categories of
assets at the bank, including its gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper holdings. In
response to a Subcommittee request, J PMorgan also provided separately, as of September 28,
2012, the total market value of the bank’s copper, platinum, and palladium inventories, which
together totaled about $2.7 billion.
2462
When the financial holding company’s physical commodities inventory of $6.6 billion is
added to the bank’s metals inventory of approximately $8.1 billion – still excluding gold, silver,
and all merchant banking commodity assets – and the bank’s copper, platinum, and palladium
inventories of $2.7 billion are added in as well, the total market value of J PMorgan’s combined
physical commodity inventories on September 28, 2012, was $17.4 billion. That $17.4 billion
was about 11.75% of the financial holding company’s Tier 1 capital of $148 billion, which
meant that it was more than twice the size allowed by the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit, were it to
apply.
2458
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators, FRB-
PSI-301383 - 396, at 387. See also 2012 excel spread sheet, “Physical Inventory Limit Monitor-
9.17.12_Final.xlsx,” prepared by the OCC, OCC-PSI-0000080 (stating that, in 2012, J PMorgan had Tier 1 capital of
$148 billion).
2459
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators, FRB-
PSI-301383 - 396, at 387; Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2460
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014).
2461
9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its regulators, FRB-
PSI-301383 - 396, at 387.
2462
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, at attachment, J PM-COMM-PSI-000049
(indicating that, on September 28, 2012, J PMorgan Chase Bank held $1.13 billion worth of physical copper, $872
million worth of physical platinum, and $656 million worth of physical palladium for a total market value of $2.7
billion).
379
The information provided by J PMorgan indicates that the size of its physical commodity
holdings were actually far in excess of the 5% regulatory limits that were created to reduce the
risks associated with those assets. J PMorgan told the Subcommittee, however, that it was in full
compliance with all of its regulatory limits, because it was allowed to exclude whole categories
of assets, including its bank’s assets, under its interpretation of those limits.
2463
The Federal
Reserve told the Subcommittee that, after researching the issue, it had not yet objected to
J PMorgan’s interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit on complementary activities,
because it was a possible interpretation that would, in fact, allow the financial holding company
to exclude many of its physical commodity assets.
2464
That J PMorgan could be found to be in
compliance with a 5% limit at the same time the actual market value of its physical commodity
assets totaled nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital demonstrates how the Federal Reserve’s regulatory
limit, as currently enforced, has become riddled with exclusions and ineffective in capping the
size of a financial holding company’s physical commodity holdings.
(c) Stretching the Limits
For years, J PMorgan and J PMorgan Chase Bank have applied aggressive interpretations
to stretch the size limits imposed by the Federal Reserve and OCC on the amount of physical
commodities they are allowed to hold. To stay under the limits, they have routinely excluded
assets and minimized the value of others. Some of these interpretations were known to the
regulators; others were not. As a result of these efforts, J PMorgan often held physical
commodities assets whose combined market value far exceeded 5% of its Tier 1 capital.
From 2005, when it received its first complementary order, until early 2012, Federal
Reserve examiners appear to have been largely unaware of how J PMorgan was calculating its
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. It was not until 2012 that Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) examiners learned that, for over six years, J PMorgan had been
excluding all of the commodities held in J PMorgan Chase Bank when calculating the market
value of its commodity holdings for purposes of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2465
J PMorgan
had excluded its bank’s holdings despite the financial holding company’s having committed to
“limit the amount of physical commodities that it holds at any one time to 5% of its consolidated
Tier 1 Capital,” with no express caveat for bank assets.
2466
After learning of J PMorgan’s
exclusion, despite concerns expressed by its examiners, the Federal Reserve has yet to require
J PMorgan to include its bank’s assets when valuing the physical commodities held by the
financial holding company.
Similarly, from 1995 until early 2012, the OCC appears to have been unaware of how
J PMorgan Chase Bank calculated its compliance with the OCC’s 5% limit. Beginning in 2012,
2463
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2464
Subcommittee briefings by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014) and OCC (9/22/2014).
2465
Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013) and (10/8/2014).
2466
7/21/2005 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority,” PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 028, at 026. Again, the complementary order
was “specifically conditioned on compliance with all the commitments made to the Board.” 11/18/2005 “J PMorgan
Chase & Co. New York, New York Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial
Activity,” Federal Reserve website, at 7,http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20051118/attachment.pdf.
380
as the OCC examined the bank’s practices more closely, it issued a series of supervisory letters
criticizing and disallowing some of those practices, as explained below. In response, J PMorgan
Chase Bank agreed to change those practices and also recently sold much of the physical metals
inventory that had been held in the bank’s name. Today, J PMorgan asserts that both the bank
and holding company continue to be in full compliance with the Federal Reserve and OCC size
limits.
Excluding Bank Assets. Perhaps the most striking aspect of J PMorgan’s approach to the
size limits is its assertion that it can exclude all of its bank’s extensive physical commodity
holdings when reporting to the Federal Reserve on the total market value of the financial holding
company’s physical commodity assets. Since 2005, when it was first granted complementary
authority by the Federal Reserve to conduct physical commodity activities, J PMorgan has been
under an obligation to keep the market value of its physical commodity assets below 5% of its
Tier 1 capital and to report to the Federal Reserve any instance in which those assets exceeded
4% of its Tier 1 capital. Normally, a financial holding company’s assets include the assets of its
bank subsidiaries, since they are typically the largest, and may be the only, subsidiaries of the
holding company. Yet since 2005, J PMorgan has apparently never included the physical
commodities held by J PMorgan Chase Bank when calculating the market value of the financial
holding company’s physical commodity assets for purposes of complying with the Federal
Reserve’s 5% limit.
2467
The Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it first learned of J PMorgan’s practice in
early 2012.
2468
Internal documents from the Federal Reserve, OCC, and J PMorgan chronicle
what happened. The precipitating event came in J anuary 2012, when J PMorgan reported to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) that its physical commodity assets had recently
exceeded 4% of its Tier 1 capital, the reporting threshold established in its 2005 complementary
order.
2469
According to the Federal Reserve and contemporaneous documents, when the FRBNY
examiners asked J PMorgan what caused the increase in the market value of its physical
commodity assets, J PMorgan indicated that, on or around December 21, 2011, J PMorgan Chase
Bank purchased about $1.9 billion of physical aluminum on behalf of a client.
2470
J PMorgan
told the Subcommittee that, as a result, the bank’s total physical aluminum holdings on that date
rose to $6.5 billion.
2471
A few weeks later, on J anuary 10, 2012, J PMorgan Chase Bank’s
2467
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
2468
Id.
2469
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY Staff to OCC staff, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049.
2470
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013);
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY Staff to OCC staff,
“J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049. J PMorgan legal counsel described the transaction to the
Subcommittee as a swap in which J PMorgan “(1) delivered contracts for approximately 860,000 tons of aluminum
to [its customer], (2) paid [the customer] a locational premium of ten million dollars, and (3) received from [the
customer] warrants for approximately 860,000 tons of aluminum in Vlissingen.” 10/30/2014 letter from J PMorgan
legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-17-000001 - 003, at 002. J PMorgan legal counsel also indicated that
the correct total for the transaction was $1.68 billion, rather than $1.9 billion reported at the time; the discrepancy
between the two numbers is not explained. 11/5/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
J PMorgan-22-000001 - 004, at 001.
2471
11/10/2014 email from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-23-000001 - 004, at 001.
381
aluminum inventory peaked at “3,501,365 metric tonnes,” which J PMorgan estimated had “a
total value of approximately $7.48 billion.”
2472
Those enormous holdings put the bank over the OCC’s size limit, so to get back under
the limit, the bank decided to sell a large amount of the aluminum to J PMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation (J PMVEC), an affiliate of the financial holding company.
2473
Emails between
regulators indicate that, a month later, as of J anuary 24, 2012, the bank’s physical aluminum
holdings had decreased in value to $4.9 billion.
2474
According to an internal Federal Reserve
email at the time, J PMorgan told FRBNY examiners that nearly 80% of the aluminum at issue –
purportedly worth $3.8 billion – would continue to be held by J PMorgan Chase Bank, while
about $1.1 billion in aluminum would be sold to J PMVEC a subsidiary of the financial holding
company, which meant J PMorgan would have to add it to the physical commodity assets subject
to the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2475
According to J PMorgan, the additional aluminum put the
financial holding company’s assets over the 4% reporting threshold, which was why J PMorgan
had notified the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
2476
According to Federal Reserve emails, when J PMorgan informed its FRBNY examiners
about the details of the aluminum trade, it marked the first time that the FRBNY examiners
discovered that J PMorgan was not “reporting the full balance of its aluminum inventory for
compliance with the 5% of Tier 1 capital rule, but rather only the portion that is held in non-bank
affiliates.”
2477
Upon further inquiry, the FRBNY examiners learned that, during 2011,
J PMorgan’s physical commodities holdings, when the bank’s assets were included (but
excluding bullion), had ranged from $8.9 billion to $14.4 billion, and exceeded 5% of
J PMorgan’s Tier 1 capital in every month of the year.
2478
The FRBNY examiners were told that,
as of February 2012, J PMorgan’s total physical inventory (excluding bullion) was “$12.4 billion,
2472
Id. at 001. At 3.5 million metric tons, J PMorgan Chase Bank’s aluminum holdings were so large that they
exceeded more half of the physical aluminum consumed in North America that year. See undated “Primary
Aluminum Consumption, 2011-2013,” European Aluminum Association website,http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-consumption-in-world-regions/ (indicating North
American primary aluminum consumption in 2012 was 5.3 million metric tons).
2473
Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013) and J PMorgan (10/10/2014); 2/15/2012 email from
FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049, at 049.
2474
2/1/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-
200827 - 831, at 831. It is unclear how the value of the bank’s aluminum holdings dropped from $7.48 billion to
$4.9 billion, a difference of $2.58 billion, over the course of that month.
2475
2/1/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-
200827 - 831, at 831. J PMorgan legal counsel has indicated that the correct value of the aluminum sold to J PMVEC
was $921 million rather than $1.1 billion, writing that, on J anuary 19, 2012, J PMorgan Chase Bank sold, “in an
arms-length, at-market transaction, 419,400 metric tonnes of aluminum to J PMVEC at $2,196.75 per metric tonne,
or approximately $921 million.” 11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-
19-000001 - 004, at 001 - 002. The discrepancy between the $921 million reported to the Subcommittee in the
November 2014 letter and the $1.1 billion reported to the Federal Reserve in 2012, is not explained.
2476
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2477
Id. See also Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (12/13/2013) and (10/8/2014) (confirming Federal
Reserve examiners first learned of the exclusion in 2012).
2478
2/17/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-
PSI-200827 - 831, at 827.
382
which would exceed their 5% of Tier 1 capital limit (~$7.5 bn) by about $5 billion if the limit
were applicable.”
2479
The discovery that J PMorgan was excluding its bank’s holdings when calculating its
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit raised concerns among the FRBNY examiners
that J PMorgan was either bypassing the limit or the limit itself was ineffective in ensuring safety
and soundness. As one FRBNY examiner wrote in an email: “It strikes me that the 5% Tier 1
capital limit should apply to all activity (whether its conducted in a bank or non-bank) given that
the limit is relative to the consolidated organization’s [T]ier 1 capital.”
2480
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it discussed the aluminum trade in a meeting with
the OCC on J anuary 17, 2012.
2481
It was two days later, on J anuary 19, 2012, that J PMorgan
Chase Bank actually sold the 419,400 metric tons of aluminum to J PMVEC.
2482
On February
15, 2012, the FRBNY examiners raised the matter with their OCC counterparts who were
already aware of J PMorgan’s large aluminum trade
2483
and already analyzing how the new
aluminum holdings in the bank affected the OCC’s separate 5% limit.
2484
The OCC limit
focused, not on Tier 1 capital, but on the percentage of derivative trades that resulted in the
physical delivery of commodities to the bank. The FRBNY examiners learned that the OCC
examiners had determined that the aluminum trade had caused J PMorgan Chase Bank to breach
the OCC’s 5% limit by a large margin over the course of a month, from December 21, 2011
through J anuary 20, 2012, the day on which the aluminum transfer by the bank to J PMVEC
settled.
2485
When asked about these developments, J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it reduced
its holdings as quickly as it could, came back under the OCC’s limit within 30 days, and never
breached the Federal Reserve’s separate 5% limit at all.
2486
J PMorgan explained to the
Subcommittee that the bank’s efforts to quickly reduce its aluminum holdings had been stymied,
not only by the holidays, but also by a decline in the notional amount of outstanding derivatives
held by the bank, which is the denominator for the OCC 5% calculation.
2487
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that it had hedged nearly all of its aluminum position by selling forward contracts,
2479
Id. It is unclear whether these figures included the entire amount of aluminum then held by the bank and its
holding company.
2480
Id. at 829.
2481
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2482
11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-19-000001- 004, at 001 - 002.
2483
Subcommittee briefing by the OCC (9/22/2014); 2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J P
Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049; 2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum
inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-200827 - 831, at 829.
2484
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000047 - 049, 048.
2485
8/1/2012 email from J PMorgan to OCC staff, “5% limit calculation method,” OCC-PSI-00000324 (indicating
the sustained breach of the OCC limit);
11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-
J PMorgan-19-000001 - 004, at 002 (reflecting that the “transaction settled on J anuary 20, 2012”). J PMorgan Chase
Bank later attempted to change how it calculated compliance with the OCC limit, by using average holdings over a
three or twelve month period, which would have minimized the impact of large trades like the aluminum trade in
late 2011. That methodology was disallowed by the OCC. See discussion, below.
2486
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2487
10/30/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-17-000001 - 003, at 002.
383
and thus had relatively small “net” aluminum positions that it could dispose of to reduce its
overall holdings.
2488
When asked about excluding the bank’s assets when reporting the market value of the
financial holding company’s physical commodity assets to the Federal Reserve, J PMorgan
explained that the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit applied only to physical commodity holdings
acquired as a result of complementary activities; that the bank did not and could not act under
“complementary” authority since only financial holding companies could employ that authority;
that the bank’s activities took place under a separate grant of authority from the OCC to accept
physical deliveries of commodities in a small percentage of derivatives trading transactions; and
that the bank’s physical commodity holdings were, therefore, separate from and not subject to
the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2489
J PMorgan also expressed surprise that the Federal Reserve had been unaware of its
ongoing exclusion of the bank assets.
2490
A J PMorgan representative told the Subcommittee
that, at some point in early 2010, she had a conversation with Federal Reserve personnel in
Washington, D.C. that she thought indicated they “must have known there were metals in the
bank.”
2491
Federal Reserve representatives told the Subcommittee, however, that they were
unaware of that earlier conversation, had been unaware of the financial holding company’s
practice, and it was clear that the examiners in New York first learned of the practice in
connection with the aluminum transaction in 2012.
2492
The internal emails exchanged between
the FRBNY and OCC examiners in early 2012 also indicate that J PMorgan’s FRBNY examiners
had been unaware of the exclusion prior to that time.
In early February 2012, the FRBNY examiners consulted with the Federal Reserve’s
legal department to determine whether J PMorgan was permitted to exclude its bank’s physical
commodity holdings when calculating the market value of its physical commodity assets for
purposes of the 5% limit, on the theory that the bank’s assets were held under “separate authority
granted by the OCC … rather than under FRB compl[e]mentary authority.”
2493
The Federal
Reserve legal department concluded that J PMorgan’s interpretation was a possible interpretation
of the limit and that it would not object to that interpretation.
2494
Despite that legal analysis, the
FRBNY examination team remained “very concerned … [with] not looking at the activity across
the consolidated organization [because] f we don’t do that the limit strikes us as not very
meaningful.”
2495
J PMorgan and the Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that J PMorgan continues to
exclude physical commodities held by J PMorgan Chase Bank when calculating the market value
of the physical commodity assets held by the financial holding company.
2496
The Federal
2488
11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-19-000001 - 004, at 002.
2489
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2490
Id.
2491
Id.
2492
Subcommittee briefing by Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
2493
2/1/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-PSI-
200827 - 831, at 831.
2494
Id. at 828.
2495
Id.
2496
Subcommittee briefings by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014) and J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
384
Reserve acknowledged to the Subcommittee that it typically looks at a bank holding company
holistically, and includes all bank assets when evaluating the holding company’s assets. The
Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that it was unable to identify any other instance in which,
when calculating the assets held by the financial holding company, it excluded the assets of a
subsidiary bank.
2497
Excluding Other Assets. Bank assets were not the only assets J PMorgan excluded when
calculating the market value of the financial holding company’s physical commodity assets for
purposes of complying with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
A second exclusion was its copper holdings. As indicated in the prior section, J PMorgan
is an active trader of copper and, from 2008 to 2012, maintained physical copper inventories
whose value ranged from $148 million to $2.7 billion, with holdings frequently in excess of $1
billion.
2498
J PMorgan told the Subcommittee that it did not include any of its copper holdings
when calculating compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2499
J PMorgan explained to
the Subcommittee that its physical copper was not only held by its bank, but it was also
categorized as “bullion,” and for both reasons could be excluded from its physical commodity
holdings for purposes of complying with both the Federal Reserve and OCC limits.
2500
As
indicated earlier, the OCC has treated copper as bullion for years.
2501
The Federal Reserve told
the Subcommittee that it explicitly authorizes banks to deal in bullion, including copper, and as a
result, a financial holding company could hold copper under that separate authority rather than
under its complementary authority, and so exclude its copper holdings when calculating
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s complementary 5% limit.
2502
While excluding copper is
permissible according to regulators, excluding billion-dollar copper inventories from regulatory
size limits, despite copper’s trading status as a base metal, and the risk that even small price
decreases could dramatically lower the value of large holdings, seems to have little economic
rationale from a safety and soundness perspective.
Still another exclusion that J PMorgan employed for two years involved the power plants
it obtained through its Bear Stearns acquisition in 2008. At that time, among other physical
commodity assets, J PMorgan acquired tolling agreements and ownership interests in 27 power
plants.
2503
J PMorgan later put a market value on the tolling agreements with those and a few
2497
Subcommittee briefing by the Federal Reserve (10/8/2014).
2498
See discussion above;
attachment to 3/22/2013 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, J PM-
COMM-PSI-000015 - 018, at 015; 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, page
entitled: “Key Risk Positions – as of J une 28, 2013[:] Key Risk Positions in Bank,” at FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at
388.
2499
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (10/10/2014).
2500
Id.
2501
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 693 (11/14/1995), PSI-OCC-01-000135 - 141 (defining copper as bullion). See
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii) (stating that a permissible nonbank activity includes: “Buying, selling and storing bars,
rounds, bullion, and coins of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, copper, and any other metal approved by the Board,
for the company's own account and the account of others, and providing incidental services such as arranging for
storage, safe custody, assaying, and shipment.”).
2502
10/29/2014 email from the Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, “Outstanding requests,” PSI-FRB-16-000001 -
002.
2503
See discussion above; undated 2014 J PMorgan chart, “Power Plants Owned or Controlled via Tolling
Agreements, 2008 to present,” prepared by J PMorgan for the Subcommittee, J PM-COMM-PSI-000022 - 025.
385
other power plants in the range of $2 billion to $2.3 billion.
2504
In addition to the sheer size of
those holdings, the normal practice at the time was for financial holding companies to include the
market value of those types of power plant assets in their physical commodity holdings subject to
the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. Despite those factors, J PMorgan excluded its power plant assets
when calculating its compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit for over two years.
Prior to the Bear Stearns acquisition in 2008, J PMorgan had never engaged in power
plant activities or sought complementary authority to do so. As part of the Bear Stearns
transaction, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) gave J PMorgan a two-year grace
period during which “any assets or activities acquired from Bear Stearns that J PMorgan is not
currently permitted to own or engage in shall be treated as permissible assets or activities for a
period of two years.”
2505
That grace period applied to the 27 power plants, as part of the Bear
Stearns acquisition. J PMorgan took the position that, for the next two years, it held the power
plants under the authority of the FRBNY two-year grace period, and not under its
complementary authority, and so could exclude them when calculating the market value of its
physical commodity holdings subject to the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2506
J PMorgan took that
position even though the FRBNY letter contained no language related to excluding the value of
permissible assets from J PMorgan’s physical commodity holdings.
J PMorgan held the Bear Stearns power plants from March 2008 to March 2010, without
including their market value in its calculations of the total market value of its commodity
holdings for purposes of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. There is no indication that J PMorgan
informed the Federal Reserve of its practice, or that the Federal Reserve inquired about the
matter. On February 5, 2010, J PMorgan asked the Federal Reserve to extend the grace period
for another year, and also explicitly requested permission to conduct its energy tolling and other
power plant activities outside of the 5% limit.
2507
The Federal Reserve extended the grace period
for one more year, until March 2011.
On J une 30, 2010, the Federal Reserve issued a complementary order authorizing
J PMorgan to conduct its power plant activities as complementary activities.
2508
At the same time,
the Federal Reserve denied J PMorgan’s request to exclude the value of its power plant assets
when calculating compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit, instead explicitly directing
inclusion of the market value of its various power plant assets.
2509
It was only after the new
complementary order was issued that J PMorgan began to include the value of its power plant
2504
See, e.g., 9/26/2013 “Fed/OCC/FDIC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan for a meeting with its
regulators, FRB-PSI-301383 - 396, at 387.
2505
3/16/2008 letter from FRBNY to J PMorgan, PSI-FRB-17-000001 - 005, at 004 [sealed exhibit].
2506
10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 003.
2507
2/5/2010 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to the Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300286 - 290, at 286, 287
(stating: “[T]he Board has indicated that it has in the past subjected tolling activities of [financial holding
companies] to the [5%] limit because tolling contracts expose the toller to the risk that the plant proves to be
uneconomical to operate, which can occur when the cost of producing power is greater than the power’s market
price. However, given the competitive disadvantages that J PMC would suffer from having to manage its entire
physical commodity and tolling activity under the [5%] limit, J PMC respect[fully] submits that the risks involved in
tolling can be managed pursuant to robust risk management processes subject to regulatory examination.”).
2508
6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580.
2509
Id. at 578 - 579.
386
assets when calculating its compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2510
The end result
was that, for more than two years after acquiring the 27 Bear Stearns power plant interests, from
March 2008 to J uly 2010, J PMorgan excluded their $2 billion value from its calculation of
compliance with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. Because the Federal Reserve never decided the
issue, it is unclear whether J PMorgan’s exclusion was permissible, and whether the same
approach may be applied by J PMorgan or other financial holding companies when acquiring
physical commodity assets that enjoy a two-year grace period before being required to conform
with Federal Reserve requirements.
A third exclusion involved leases on oil and gas storage facilities. The FRBNY
Commodities Team found that, while leases on power plants were included in the calculation of
the market value of a financial holding company’s physical commodity assets, some financial
holding companies excluded “leases on infrastructure such as oil and gas storage facilities.”
2511
A different Federal Reserve examination document noted that J PMorgan was “leasing oil and
natural gas storage” as well as “oil tankers and pipeline capacity.”
2512
J PMorgan told the
Subcommittee that it normally excluded those types of infrastructure leases from its market value
calculations for purposes of the 5% Federal Reserve limit.
2513
The Commodities Team stated in
its 2012 Summary Report that it was “investigating [the] interpretation of the rule.”
2514
The
Federal Reserve told the Subcommittee that, currently, such leases are normally not included in
the calculation of a financial holding company’s physical commodity assets for purposes of the
5% limit.
2515
The Federal Reserve also noted that its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
raised questions about whether such leasing arrangements should be approved as complementary
activities at all and solicited public comment on how to reduce the safety and soundness risks
they present.
2516
Reducing Asset Values. In addition to excluding assets, J PMorgan also used techniques
to minimize the value of its assets when calculating the overall market value of its physical
commodity holdings for purposes of complying with the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit. In
particular, it used two techniques to try to reduce the market value of its power plant assets, once
it was required to include them in its overall physical commodity holdings. After the Federal
Reserve learned that J PMorgan was using those techniques on its power plant assets, it
disallowed them.
The first involved a netting practice. When J PMorgan began including power plant
tolling agreements in its Federal Reserve calculation for the first time in 2010, it initially
calculated the values on a “net” basis, which reduced their market value.
2517
According to
2510
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014).
2511
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506 [sealed exhibit].
2512
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 299 [sealed exhibit].
2513
Subcommittee briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2514
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 506 [sealed exhibit].
2515
11/17/2014 email from Federal Reserve to Subcommittee, PSI-FRB-21-000001 - 002, at 002.
2516
Id. See also Federal Reserve advance notice of proposed rulemaking, “Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed.
Reg. 3329 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-21/pdf/FR-2014-01-21.pdf.
2517
Subcommittee briefings by J PMorgan (4/23/2014) and (10/10/2014).
387
J PMorgan, once the Federal Reserve learned of this practice, the regulator disallowed it.
2518
On
J uly 5, 2011, J PMorgan raised the issue again, formally asking the Federal Reserve for
permission to “exclude from its calculation of the 5% Limit the value of its rights under Energy
Tolling agreements to the extent that J PM Chase has effectively assigned its rights … to an
unaffiliated third party.”
2519
In other words, J PMorgan proposed that if it had a tolling
agreement with a power plant, but then assigned or “re-tolled” that agreement to an independent
third party, then J PMorgan could calculate the agreement’s market value according to the netted
revenues it would receive from the re-tolled agreement.
2520
J PMorgan noted that payments
under a re-tolling agreement would “not necessarily offset dollar for dollar” the payments owed
by J PMorgan under the original tolling agreement, and so proposed that it be allowed to net out
the “present value of future committed receivables” from third parties against the payments owed
by J PMorgan under the original tolling agreement.
2521
J PMorgan calculated that the netting
technique would reduce the market value of its tolling agreements by about $300 million, from
$2.3 billion to $2.0 billion.
2522
The Federal Reserve denied J PMorgan’s request to use netting when valuing its tolling
agreements.
2523
An internal Federal Reserve memorandum reviewing J PMorgan examination
issues explained: “FRB [Federal Reserve Board] denied this request for several reasons,
including that permitting netting would have allowed the firm to enter into unlimited tolling
agreements, which would have been inconsistent with the spirit of the 5% limit on physical
activity.”
2524
In other words, the Federal Reserve viewed the 5% limit as a way of limiting the
amount of physical commodity activities that a financial holding company may conduct, and so
opposed a netting arrangement that, in effect, would have removed the limit with respect to
tolling agreements.
A second technique J PMorgan used involved reducing the market value of the “capacity
payments” paid in connection with its power plants. The Federal Reserve has defined a
“capacity payment” as a “fixed periodic payment that compensates the power plant owner for its
fixed costs.”
2525
When it received complementary authority to enter into tolling agreements in
J une 2010, J PMorgan committed to including “the present value of all capacity payments to be
made by it in connection with energy tolling agreements in calculating its compliance with” the
5% limit.
2526
On J uly 5, 2011, J PMorgan asked to modify that commitment by excluding certain
portions of the capacity payments, including “debt and equity payments associated with the
power plant” and variable “operating” and “maintenance” expenses, so that a much smaller
2518
Id.
2519
7/5/2011 “Request to modify a commitment made by J PMorgan Chase & Co. in connection with its notice to,
and approval by, the Federal Reserve to engage in energy tolling,” prepared by J PMorgan and submitted to the
Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300258 – 263, at 260.
2520
Id.
2521
Id. at 261.
2522
Id.
2523
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 302 [sealed exhibit].
2524
Id.
2525
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 345.
2526
Id. See also 6/30/2010 letter from the Federal Reserve to J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-302571 - 580, at 578.
388
portion of the capacity payments – reflecting only “fixed costs” – would count towards the 5%
limit.
2527
An internal J PMorgan document indicates that J PMorgan actually made that change in its
valuation methodology in November 2010, without getting prior approval from regulators.
2528
According to projections by J PMorgan, the change potentially reduced the capacity payments
that would count towards the cap from about $2.1 billion to about $560 million, a reduction of
nearly 75%.
2529
In 2011, the Federal Reserve rejected the change in methodology, reasoning that
capacity payments include the “total fixed periodic payments as specified in a tolling contract,”
not just the “fixed operating costs.”
2530
The Federal Reserve’s rejection of J PMorgan’s two techniques to lower the reported
market value of its power plant assets represent rare occasions in which the Federal Reserve did
not go along with J PMorgan’s efforts to reduce the impact of the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
Stretching the OCC Limit. Since 1995, the OCC has expressly prohibited a national
bank from accepting or delivering physical commodities in more than 5% of its derivative
transactions. Yet, from 1995 until 2012, it appears as though J PMorgan Chase Bank was largely
unaware of the OCC’s 5% limit, and may have even believed that it was 20%.
2531
J PMorgan
Chase Bank also used aggressive interpretations and loopholes to reduce the impact of the OCC
limit.
Among other measures, J PMorgan Chase Bank’s actions included calculating the value
of its metals inventory: (1) on a physical volume basis, meaning tracking metric tons, instead of
tracking the dollar value of those tons; (2) on an aggregated basis, meaning applying the limit to
the overall amount of its metals holdings instead of applying the limit on a metal-by-metal
basis;
2532
and (3) on a total notional amount basis, meaning measuring the amount of the bank’s
derivatives holdings on a notional rather than net basis, which inflated the base against which the
2527
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 345. See also 3/3/2011
Federal Reserve document, “Resolved Issues,” FRB-PSI-304601 - 604, at 604 (discussing “Tolling Calculation –
Capacity Payment”) [sealed exhibit].
2528
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 345. See also Subcommittee
briefing by J PMorgan (4/23/2014).
2529
Undated but likely late 2010 or early 2011 J PMorgan memorandum, “CONFIDENTIAL - Methodology for
Calculating Capacity Payments for Purposes of 5% Limit,” FRB-PSI-300345 - 347, at 347; Subcommittee briefing
by J PMorgan (4/23/2014). See also 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 505 [sealed exhibit].
2530
3/3/2011 Federal Reserve document, “Resolved Issues,” FRB-PSI-304601 - 604, at 604 (discussing “Tolling
Calculation – Capacity Payment”) [sealed exhibit]. See also 2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at
505 [sealed exhibit].
2531
See 1/25/2012 email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Guidance on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000343-345 (“The bank
used to believe it was 20% and I asked them to show me where they got that interpretation.”).
2532
See, e.g., 1/11/2012 email from Mark Lenczowski, J PMorgan, to OCC staff, “Consolidated OCC Summary 10
J an 2012,” OCC-PSI-00000336; 1/25/2012 email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Guidance on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-
00000343 - 345 (allowing aggregating) [sealed exhibit].
389
5% limit was applied.
2533
Taken together, these three interpretations rendered the OCC’s 5%
limit effectively meaningless as a risk management or prudential safeguard.
2534
Additionally, J PMorgan Chase Bank attempted to replace the OCC’s requirement to
calculate the tonnage of physical assets held by the bank on a specific day, with using the
average tonnage over a 12-month or 3-month rolling period, which would have allowed the bank
to take delivery of more physical commodities overall.
2535
In addition to those calculation
strategies, J PMorgan Chase Bank also omitted data on the bank’s holdings of “base metals,
investor products, and agricultural and soft commodities” from a report to the OCC on its
physical commodity assets;
2536
and employed anticipatory and portfolio hedging tactics that
stretched the permissible relationship between its physical commodity transactions and the
derivative transactions they were supposedly hedging.
2537
The OCC has objected to some of
those tactics, but has not registered objections to others.
In December 2011, J PMorgan Chase Bank made a transfer of approximately $1 billion in
physical aluminum
2538
to J PMVEC, which was outside the bank, but run by many of the same
employees. This transaction moved physical metal to the financial holding company, but did not
act as a derivative hedge for the bank. As a result, it triggered more intensive reviews of the
bank’s conduct by the OCC.
Over the next three years, the OCC cited a number of concerns with how J PMorgan was
complying with the agency’s 5% limit. In March 2012, the OCC sent a Supervisory Letter to
J PMorgan Chase Bank identifying significant control weaknesses and regulatory non-
compliance in how the bank was conducting its commodity activities, including with respect to
its implementation of the 5% limit.
2539
The OCC sent a followup Supervisory Letter in J une
2013.
2540
In April 2014, after concluding an extensive analysis of J PMorgan Chase Bank’s
activities, the OCC found that the bank was “making or taking physical delivery of metal in
connection with spot and forward transactions in a manner that [was] beyond the scope of metals
2533
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001 - 008, at 006.
2534
For example, a bank could still be in compliance with the OCC 5% limit if it held a long derivatives position for
1 million tons of aluminum that was offset by a short derivatives position for 999,999 tons of aluminum, but then
had 99,000 physical tons of nickel, representing 5% of the total notional tonnage of derivatives. The net derivatives
exposure in aluminum is just 1 ton, and yet it could be “hedged” with 99,000 tons of physical nickel. The OCC
confirmed for the Subcommittee that this extreme example would be consistent with the 5% limit as currently
applied. However, the OCC noted that the facts in this example may run afoul of other requirements set forth in the
OCC’s Interpretive Letters, such as the hedging requirement. Subcommittee briefing by the OCC (9/22/2014).
2535
See, e.g., 1/10/2012 email from Michael Kirk, OCC, to Fred Crumlish, OCC, “GCG Exam, Bank seeks guidance
on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000342; 2/15/2012 email from Mark Lenczowski, J PMorgan, to Michael Kirk, OCC, “5%
Limit Calculation,”OCC-PSI-00000324; 10/4/2012 email from Michael Kirk, OCC, to Fred Crumlish, OCC, “Mark
Lenszowki Call on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000346(disallowing averaging) [sealed exhibit].
2536
See 6/27/2013 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2013-36, OCC-PSI-00000312 - 314 (citing 3/28/2012 OCC
Supervisory Letter J PM-2012-13 (requiring corrected report) [sealed exhibit].
2537
See 4/15/2014 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2014-23, OCC-PSI-00000315 - 320 [sealed exhibit].
2538
While contemporaneous documents reflected the transaction as valued at $1.1 billion, J PMorgan legal counsel
told the Subcommittee that the transaction was an “arms-length, at-market transaction” for “approximately $921
million.” 11/5/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-19-000001 - 004, at 002.
2539
See 3/28/2012 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2012-13, OCC-PSI-00000303 [sealed exhibit].
2540
See 6/27/2013 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2013-36, OCC-PSI-00000312 [sealed exhibit].
390
activities authorized in OCC interpretive letters.”
2541
In other words, the bank was engaging in
physical spot market transactions, forward contracts, and swaps that were not clearly customer-
driven or linked to hedging transactions, as required by OCC rules.
In May 2014, J PMorgan Chase Bank informed the OCC that it would cease the
impermissible activities by J uly 1, 2015, and thereafter conduct them “in a subsidiary or affiliate
of the Bank for which such activities are permissible” under Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
2542
The bank further committed that, prior to J uly
1, 2015, it would keep its base metals “within the quantitative limits established by the
OCC.”
2543
On J une 27, 2014, the OCC essentially accepted J PMorgan Chase Bank’s proposal,
giving J PMorgan more time to reconfigure its currently impermissible derivative and physical
commodity activities.
2544
(3) Issues Raised by JPMorgan’s Involvement with Size Limits
J PMorgan’s actions raise a number of concerns about the effectiveness of the existing
Federal Reserve and OCC limits to assess and limit the size of physical commodity activities at
banks and their holding companies. Those size limits were developed to promote the safety and
soundness of banks and their holding companies, and protect U.S. taxpayers from physical
commodity activities posing outsized financial, operational, and catastrophic event risks. The
facts show that J PMorgan was able to reduce the impact of both sets of limits by using
aggressive interpretations that, in some cases, took years for regulators to uncover and, in other
cases, identified loopholes that the regulators have so far failed to close. Key issues include the
ongoing exclusion of key assets when applying the limits, valuation methodologies that
minimize the value of some assets, the absence of comprehensive, standardized reports to track
compliance with the limits, and a current lack of coordination that, together, allow financial
holding companies to amass billions of dollars in physical commodity holdings far in excess of
5% of its Tier 1 capital.
(a) Excluding Bank Assets
The 2005 order granting J PMorgan’s complementary authority was explicitly conditioned
upon J PMorgan’s commitment to “limit the amount of physical commodities that it holds at any
one time to 5% of its consolidated Tier 1 Capital.”
2545
The order contains no caveat exempting
J PMorgan’s bank which, even in 2005, held billions of dollars in physical commodities. As far
as the Subcommittee has been able to determine, J PMorgan is alone among financial holding
companies in claiming that its obligation to limit the size of its physical commodity holdings
excludes the physical commodities held by its bank. The Federal Reserve itself has been unable
2541
4/15/2014 OCC Supervisory Letter J PM-2014-23, OCC-PSI-00000315 – 320, at 315[sealed exhibit]. The OCC
took exception, in particular, to J PMorgan Chase Bank’s extensive activities in the spot markets for base metals.
2542
5/15/2014 letter from J PMorgan Chase Bank to OCC, “Supervisory Letter J PM-2014-23 (the “Letter”),” OCC-
PSI-00000321, at 321 [sealed exhibit].
2543
Id. This pledge did not, however, include copper which remains exempt from the OCC’s size limit.
2544
6/27/2014 letter from OCC to J PMorgan Chase Bank, “Management Response to SL J PM-2014-23, MRA
Follow-Up,” OCC-PSI-00000323 [sealed exhibit].
2545
7/21/2005, letter from J PMorgan counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “J PM Chase Application
for Compl[e]mentary Authority”, PSI-FederalReserve-01-000001 - 221, at 026.
391
to identify for the Subcommittee any other instance in which it disregards a financial holding
company’s subsidiary bank when evaluating the size of the financial holding company’s assets or
when evaluating the financial holding company’s compliance with a safety and soundness
limitation on its holdings.
Disregarding the bank’s physical commodity holdings is particularly inappropriate in the
case of J PMorgan, since the same employees, working for J PMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation, execute physical commodity transactions on behalf of both the holding company
and the bank.
2546
That arrangement has meant, on a practical level, that the holding company
and its bank have long conducted their physical commodity activities in an integrated fashion,
sharing personnel, support functions, and infrastructure. J PMorgan disclosed that arrangement
when it sought complementary authority in 2005; there was no indicating then, nor was the
Federal Reserve aware for the next seven years, that J PMorgan planned to exclude its bank’s
holdings when reporting the market value of its physical commodity assets for purposes of
complying with the 5% limit.
The Federal Reserve and OCC’s own examiners have expressed concern that excluding
the bank’s assets has rendered the 5% limit ineffective. One Federal Reserve examiner wrote
that the examination staff was “very concerned … [with] not looking at the activity across the
consolidated organization [because] f we don’t do that the limit strikes us as not very
meaningful.”
2547
Another Federal Reserve examiner, in a communication with the OCC, noted
the “mismatch” between allowing a financial holding company to use the Tier 1 capital amount
for the entire “consolidated” group, but then exclude consideration of the substantial assets at the
bank:
“The FRS [Federal Reserve System] limit maintains that the firm cannot hold a market
value of physical commodities and certain assets (e.g. tolling agreements) exceeding 5%
of the consolidated organization's Tier 1 capital; the firm supplies a file each month
showing physical commodity balances in relation to Tier 1 capital. Our lawyers [at the
Federal Reserve] have told us that this limit only applies to the subsidiaries and not the
national bank, which is under separate authority granted by the OCC. This creates
something of a mismatch between numerator and denominator in the FRS limit as the
numerator is only for the subsidiaries while the denominator is the entire firm. We
realized this was more of an issue than previously known when the firm moved
approx[imately] $1.8B[illion] of physical aluminum from the bank into the subsidiary
(J PMVEC) for the stated reason of avoiding breaching the OCC limit of 5% of total
transactions going to physical delivery, and thus saw that physical balances in the bank
were more substantial than previously known. Thus, we thought it would be important to
2546
Id. at 012.
2547
2/15/2012 email from FRBNY staff to Federal Reserve staff, “aluminum inventory balances at J PMC,” FRB-
PSI-200827 - 831, at 828. See also 10/25/2012 email from OCC staff to Federal Reserve Staff, “Regulatory limit
framework around physical commodities,” FRB-PSI-624379 - 382, 380 (“one partial solution to address fully
consolidated concerns would be to have FRB clarify to include holdings on a consolidated basis.”).
392
understand how you implement IL [Interpretive Letter] 684 and jointly explore how we
can ensure commodities are limited to the levels intended.”
2548
Emails from OCC examiners express similar concerns with excluding the bank’s commodity
holdings from the Federal Reserve’s 5% limit.
2549
The Federal Reserve’s failure to object to J PMorgan’s unusual interpretation of the 5%
limit has allowed J PMorgan to exclude billions of dollars in physical commodities held at its
bank when reporting the market value of its physical commodity assets to the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve’s inaction may also act as an incentive for other financial holding
companies to follow suit and locate physical commodities within their federally insured banks to
avoid triggering the Federal Reserve limit, a development that would create more, rather than
less, risk for U.S. taxpayers.
2550
Excluding billions of dollars in bank assets when calculating the physical commodity
holdings of the bank’s holding company is contrary to the Federal Reserve’s normal practice and
creates an unbridgeable gap between its 5% limit and the actual physical commodity assets held
by financial holding companies. In 2012, J PMorgan had $17.4 billion in physical assets
representing nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital, but was allowed to report to the Federal Reserve
that it had only $6.6 billion in physical assets representing 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. The
reported figures were about one-third of the actual physical assets (excluding gold, silver, and
commodity-related merchant banking assets) held by the financial holding company. The
Federal Reserve should not permit or support that type of pretense. Instead, the Federal Reserve
should employ its normal practice of viewing a financial holding company’s assets holistically,
and apply its limit accordingly.
(b) Excluding and Undervaluing Other Assets
J PMorgan’s practice of excluding other assets from its physical commodities reporting,
including the 27 Bear Stearns power plants, and oil and gas leases, as well as its methodology
changes to lower the reported value of its tolling agreements and capacity payments, is evidence
of a relationship in which the financial holding company was continually trying to find loopholes
to reduce the impact of the safety and soundness limit on size put in place by the Federal
Reserve. Federal Reserve examiners recognized the problem in a memorandum providing an
overall analysis of J PMorgan’s physical commodity activities:
“Since 2006 the firm [J PMorgan] has significantly grown its physical activities, largely
through acquisition, and joined the top tier (along with MS [Morgan Stanley] and GS
[Goldman Sachs]) among banks in commodities. … Amid this growth, J PM has pressed
on the boundaries of permissible activities including integrating merchant banking
investments into trading activities and pursuing activity that may appear ‘commercial in
nature,’ as well as pushed regulatory limits and their interpretation. …
2548
5/30/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff, “J PMC Physical Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000033 - 035, at
033.
2549
See, e.g., 2/15/2012 internal OCC email, “J P Commodities,” OCC-PSI-00000040 - 043.
2550
It is possible that implementation of Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act would restrict the ability of a bank to take this course of action.
393
In 2012 the SSO team [examination team for J PMorgan] identified a weakness in the
FRS [Federal Reserve System] limit which caps commodity inventory and certain
activities to 5% of the consolidated organization’s Tier 1 capital. … [T]he FRS limit
was only partially effective in constraining the firm’s commercial commodities activities.
J PM’s expansion in physical commodities – both in the bank and nonbank – has brought
the market value of its commercial commodity activity well above 5% of consolidated
Tier 1 capital.”
2551
Despite this finding, the Federal Reserve appears to have taken no action to date to make its 5%
limit more effective, such as by requiring the inclusion of bank assets, copper inventories, oil and
gas leases, and assets acquired through acquisitions. The Federal Reserve’s possible rulemaking
offers an opportunity to address those issues and strengthen its size limits.
OCC examiners experienced a similar set of tactics used by J PMorgan to avoid safety and
soundness limitations, and issued three supervisory letters in three years to eliminate
impermissible physical commodity transactions at J PMorgan’s federally-insured bank. Recently,
J PMorgan has taken action to sell major components of its physical commodity activities,
including much of the metals inventory held at its bank, which may reduce its overall physical
commodity holdings and the risks those holdings represent.
(c) Operating Without Written Guidance or Standardized Periodic
Reports
Although size limits are among their most powerful safety and soundness tools to reduce
the risks associated with physical commodity activities, neither the Federal Reserve nor the OCC
has issued formal written guidance on how their respective size limits are to be implemented. In
the absence of written guidance, J PMorgan employed aggressive interpretations that attempted to
maximize the amount of physical commodities it would be permitted to hold under both limits.
While it has recently reduced its physical commodity holdings, the issues J PMorgan raised,
including how to value certain assets, what assets can be excluded, and whether derivative
holdings can be calculated on a notional rather than net basis, have not been publicly addressed
or even disclosed. The lack of written guidance also invites financial institutions to develop their
own implementation strategies that require time and resources from regulators to detect and
analyze. Standardized rules in formal guidance would help clear up ambiguities in the regulatory
limits and enable both financial institutions and regulators to implement the limits in a more
efficient and effective manner.
A related problem has been the lack of standardized periodic reports tracking compliance
with the regulatory size limits. For years, the Federal Reserve and OCC relied on information
provided by J PMorgan on an ad hoc basis to enforce their respective regulatory limits. It was
only after the 2011 aluminum trade raised questions about J PMorgan’s actions that the Federal
Reserve began receiving from J PMorgan periodic information in a standardized format regarding
its compliance with the size limits.
2552
It was also at that point that the OCC learned J PMorgan
2551
Undated but likely in the second half of 2013 memorandum, “Commodities Focused Regulatory Work at J PM,”
prepared by Federal Reserve, FRB-PSI-300299 - 302, at 299, 301 [sealed exhibit].
2552
See 10/21/2014 letter from J PMorgan legal counsel to Subcommittee, PSI-J PMorgan-15-000001-000008, at 002.
394
Chase Bank had breached its 5% limit
2553
– and that bank personnel had inaccurately thought the
limit was 20%, not 5%.
2554
The documents produced to the Subcommittee indicate that it was not until early 2013,
that the Federal Reserve and OCC began receiving, on at least a quarterly basis, information in a
standardized format related to both the holding company and bank’s compliance with the Federal
Reserve and OCC size limits.
2555
That reporting aligns with a recommendation made by the
FRBNY Commodities Team that the Federal Reserve should require “formal reporting of
physical commodity exposures” including with respect to the “5% tier 1 capital limit.”
2556
The
Federal Reserve and OCC should take the next step and make those reports public so that
policymakers, analysts, and market participants can develop a better understanding of the
physical commodities held by large banks and their holding companies.
(d) Rationalizing Patchwork Limits
A final issue involves the failure of the Federal Reserve to rationalize the existing
patchwork of limits that now apply to financial holding companies engaged in physical
commodity activities. As explained earlier, a financial holding company’s physical commodity
activities are currently subject to a limit of 5% of Tier 1 capital when conducted under its
complementary authority; and a limit of 5% of its consolidated assets when conducted as a
grandfathered activity. Physical commodities held by a financial holding company’s bank are
subject to a separate OCC 5% limit on physical delivery of commodities in connection with
derivative transactions. Physical commodities acquired under the merchant banking authority
have no size limit at all. Neither do activities involving copper, platinum, or palladium.
Collectively, these limits create a complex Venn diagram with spotty coverage and significant
gaps. The complementary limit is also riddled with exclusions.
One Federal Reserve Bank of New York examiner took particular issue with the lack of
coordination between the Federal Reserve and OCC 5% limits.
“In part because the two regulatory limits reference separate metrics (Tier 1 capital and
percentage of physical delivery) and legal entities (the Bank and BHC subsidiaries), the
resultant dual-limit framework is less effective and vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage.
The Firm may increase physical commodity holdings in the booking entity where it
perceives the most regulatory leeway and both regulators may be challenged to limit
overall physical holdings to intended levels.”
2557
2553
See, e.g., 2/28/2013 email from Mark Lenczowski, J PMorgan, to Michael Kirk and others, OCC, “MRA
Review,” OCC-PSI-00000389 - 390; 1/20/2012 email from Blythe Masters, J PMorgan, to Michael Kirk, OCC,
“Consolidated OCC Summary 19 J an 2012,” OCC-PSI-00000340 (apologizing for the OCC’s learning about a limit
breach “after the fact”).
2554
1/25/2012 email from OCC staff to OCC staff, “Guidance on 5% rule,” OCC-PSI-00000343 - 345, at 343 [sealed
exhibit].
2555
See, e.g., 2/12/2013 “Fed/OCC Quarterly Meeting,” prepared by J PMorgan, FRB-PSI-301443 - 451, at 447.
2556
2012 Summary Report, at FRB-PSI-200477 - 510, at 484 [sealed exhibit].
2557
10/25/2012 email from FRBNY staff to OCC staff and FRBNY staff, “Re: Regulatory limit framework around
physical commodities,” FRB-PSI-4000179 - 181, at 181 [sealed exhibit].
395
The examiner further noted: “The current regulatory limit framework is thus siloed to some
extent without an overall limit.”
2558
Nothing in the law necessitates this lack of coordination and consistency across
regulatory authorities. Nothing in the statutory text or legislative history of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act suggests that the Federal Reserve’s broad authority to protect the safety and
soundness of financial institutions and the U.S. financial system was intended to be limited in
any way, such as by precluding the establishment of an integrated, comprehensive, coherent limit
on physical commodity activities.
To the contrary, Section 5(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act gives the Federal
Reserve broad authority “to issue such regulations and orders … as may be necessary to enable it
to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter and prevent evasions thereof.”
2559
That
broad grant of authority provides the legal foundation for the Federal Reserve to issue
regulations or orders establishing limits on physical commodity activities authorized under the
Bank Holding Company Act.
2560
In fact, pursuant to its broad authority under the Bank Holding Company Act and its
responsibility to ensure the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system, the Federal
Reserve has already imposed size limits on physical commodity activities undertaken with
respect to both the merchant banking and complementary authorities. With respect to merchant
banking, the Federal Reserve initially limited the size of those activities to no more than 30% of
a financial holding company’s consolidated Tier 1 capital.
2561
Later, the Federal Reserve
repealed that limit after adopting rules imposing additional capital charges on those activities.
2562
The imposition and subsequent removal of the merchant banking limit was not provided for in
the statute, but was instead grounded on the Federal Reserve’s authority to administer the Bank
Holding Company Act and safeguard the U.S. banking system. Similarly, the existing 5% limit
imposed by the Federal Reserve on complementary physical commodity activities is not
expressly required or authorized by the statute authorizing complementary activities. Rather, the
statute is silent on the amount of activity allowable under the complementary authority,
2563
and
yet the Federal Reserve has imposed, not only a size limit, but also other conditions on each
financial holding company given that authority to ensure complementary activities are carried
out in a safe and sound manner.
2564
2558
Id.
2559
12 U.S. Code § 1844.
2560
As discussed in Chapter 3, above, it is the Bank Holding Company Act that authorizes financial holding
companies to engage in physical commodity activities that are financial in nature or incidental thereto under Section
4(k)(1)(B);
complementary to financial activities under Section 4(k)(1)(B);
merchant banking investments under
Section 4(k)(4)(H); or grandfathered under Section 4(o).
2561
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (restricting merchant banking investments to no more than 30% of the financial holding
company’s Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its Tier 1 capital after excluding private equity funds).
2562
“Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy, Guidelines; Capital Maintenance:
Nonfinancial Equity Investments,” 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (1/25/2002) (adopting a final rule that ended the size limit
while imposing specific capital requirements for merchant banking investments).
2563
See 12 U.S.C. §1843(j).
2564
See e.g., 2005 J PMorgan Complementary Order, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 - C59 (imposing numerous restrictions
on the complementary powers authorized).
396
Using its broad authority to administer the Bank Holding Company Act and ensure the
safe and sound operation of financial holding companies, the Federal Reserve can remedy the
current ineffective and incoherent set of size limits on physical commodity activities. One
solution would be for the Federal Reserve to impose a single limit on all of the physical
commodity activities conducted by a financial holding company and its affiliates – no matter
how authorized – to no more than 5% of the financial holding company’s consolidated Tier 1
capital. That approach would simplify, rationalize, and strengthen the most important safeguard
ensuring that financial holding companies conduct physical commodity activities on a limited
basis, in a safe and sound manner, with minimal risk that U.S. taxpayers would one day be called
upon for another multi-billion-dollar bailout.
In addition, the Federal Reserve could provide better guidance on how to calculate the
market value of physical commodities for purposes of complying with the size limit. In its 2012
Summary Report, the FRBNY Commodities Team stated that it was already “formulating
specific guidance on the appropriate calculation methodology to be used by J PMC [J PMorgan]
as well as peer firms.” Two years later, however, that guidance has yet to be circulated or made
public. In addition, the various limits remain compartmentalized. The Federal Reserve’s current
rulemaking offers an opportunity to correct the many problems with the size limits on physical
commodity activities.
(4) Analysis
The Federal Reserve and OCC have each imposed limits on the physical commodity
activities that may be undertaken by a bank or financial holding company. Those size limits are
intended to reduce risks that, in a worst case scenario, could lead to taxpayer bailouts. As
currently configured and implemented, however, the limits do not impose a meaningful overall
cap on the amount of physical commodity activities that may be conducted by a financial holding
company and its federally insured bank. They are riddled with multi-billion-dollar exclusions
and are compartmentalized in ways that reduce their effectiveness. The current problems are
brought home by J PMorgan’s ability to amass physical commodities valued at $17.4 billion,
representing nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital, at the same time it was allowed by regulators to
calculate that its holdings totaled just $6.6 billion, representing 4.5% of its Tier 1 capital. The
differences between those two sets of figures are startling, troubling, and need to be resolved.
On J anuary 21, 2014, the Federal Reserve issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on financial holding company involvement with physical commodities.
2565
That
rulemaking effort addresses, in part, the question of differing authorities and limits, and offers a
way to remedy the faults of the current system. The OCC should also revise its physical
commodities limit to prevent it from being undermined or gamed. To promote the safety and
soundness of the banks and their holding companies, and to prevent potential abuses, the current
patchwork of limits on physical commodities activities using different measures should be
reconciled across authorities and regulators.
2565
See Federal Reserve advance notice of proposed rulemaking, “Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking
Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies related to Physical Commodities,” 79 Fed. Reg.
3329 (J an. 21, 2014),http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-21/pdf/FR-2014-01-21.pdf.
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