Description
With this description regarding venture capital and high technology entrepreneurship martin kenney.
VENTURE CAPITAL
AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
RICHARD FLORIDA
Carnegie Mellon University
MARTIN KENNEY
Ohio State University
Venture capital clearly plays an important role in high technology entre-
EXECUTIVE preneurship. The purpose of this article is to explain the differences among
SUMMARY various venture capital complexes focusing on where venture capital is
important to innovation and entrepreneurship and conversely where it is
not. We do so through an empirical and historical examination of the seven
most important venture capital complexes: California (San Francisco1
Silicon Valley), Massachusetts (Boston), New York, Illinois (Chicago), Texas, Connecticut, and Min-
nesota (Minneapolis).
We establish a three-part tripartite typology for explaining the difSerences between these venture
capital complexes: I) technology-oriented complexes are located close to concentrations of high
technology intensive businesses, invest most of their funds locally, and are net attractors of capital;
2) finance-oriented complexes are located around financial institutions and export their capital; and
3) hybrid complexes mix characteristics of both technology andjnance-oriented venturing.
Our findings have a series of important practical implications. Although venture capital is not
absolutely necessary to facilitate high technology entepreneurship, well-developed venture capital
networks provide tremendous incentives for entrepreneurship by lowering the dificulties of entering
an industry. Venture capitalists use both their experience and their contacts to reduce many of the
information and opportuniry costs associated with new business formation. The importance of contact
networks and information to both deal flow and investment monitoring goes a low way toward explaining
why venture capitalists cluster tightly together. The availability of venture capital also attracts entre-
preneurs and high quality personnel to a region creating a virtuous circle of new enterprise formation,
innovation, and economic development.
We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance provided by the Economic Development Administration,
Ohio State University Urban Affairs Committee and the Ohio Board of Regents. Thanks are due Harvey Brooks,
Gordon Clark, Sam Cole, Marshall Feldman, Bennett Harrison, Ian MacMillan, and three anonymous reviewers
for their comments and assistance.
Address correspondence to Professor Richard Florida, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213.
Journal of Business Venturing 3, 301-319
0 1988 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc., 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010
0883-9026/88/$3.50
301
302 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
Private, nonproft, and subsidized public efforts aimed at providing venture capital and stim-
ulating high technology entrepreneurship must confront the fact that venture capital alone will not
magically generate entrepreneurship and economic development. It is important that such efforts
recognize the nonfinancial side of venture investing and attract experienced personnel who can tap
into established entrepreneurial networks and secure coinvestors. More sign$cantly, establishing
public venture funding in an area lacking the requisite entrepreneurial climate or technology infra-
structure may create a “catch 22” situation where locally oriented funds invest in bad deals or where
venture capital is simply exported to established high technology regions.
INTRODUCTION’
There is little doubt that venture capital plays a critical role in high technology entepreneurship
and economic change. Clearly, the vibrance and rapid growth of California’s Silicon Valley
and Boston-Route 128 area owe much to the significant amounts of venture capital available
there. The success stories of high flying start-ups like Fairchild, Intel, Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC), Apple Computer, Cray Computer, Sun Microsystems, Genentech, and
countless others stand in sharp contrast to the stagnation and decline found in older man-
ufacturing sectors. Thus, it is not surprising that both private and public sector actors have
become enamored with venture capital as a mechanism for incubating technology businesses
and generating economic growth.
Despite its importance in premier high technology regions, the availability of venture
capital does not necessarily translate into high technology entrepreneurship. Two of the
nation’s foremost locations of venture capital, New York and Chicago, are quite laggard in
terms of new business formation, innovation, and technology-based growth. These areas
serve simply to collect venture capital which they then export to a variety of locations.
The way that venture capital complexes arise and how they effect high technology
entrepreneurship are the major themes of this paper. We explore the origins and evolution
of seven important venture capital complexes and suggest a three part typology for under-
standing them.’ Technology-oriented complexes, such as San Francisco/Silicon Valley, are
located around concentrations of technology intensive businesses, assume a local investment
focus, and attract significant amounts of outside capital. Finance-based complexes, like New
York and Chicago, are located in areas where financial institutions are highly concentrated,
contain a high proportion of venture capital subsidiaries of financial corporations, and are
export-oriented. Hybrids mix characteristics of both financial and technology-oriented ven-
turing. This does not imply, however, that all hybrids are alike. Boston, Minneapolis, Texas,
‘We would like to acknowledge the information and assistance provided by the following venture capitalists
in the Midwest, northern California and Boston. David Morgenthaler and Charles James, who are headquartered
in Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio respectively, gave us an invaluable assistance in launching our research. Venture
capitalists we interviewed in northern California include: David Arscott, James Balderston, Frank Chambers,
William Chandler, Thomas Davis, Wallace Davis, Reid Dennis, John Dougery, WiIliam Edwards, Mary Jane
Elmore. Frankiin Johnson, Eugene Kleiner, Burton McMurtry, Steve Merrill, A&n? Rock, Peter Roshko. Craig
Tayior, Donald Valentine, David Wegm~n, and Paul Wythes, as well as Henry Riggs of Stanford University.
Those interviewed in Boston were: Peter Brooke, William Burgin, Richard Bumes, Craig Burr, Thomas Claflan,
Daniel Gregory, Harry Heeler. Paul Hogan, Joseph Powell, Patrick Sansonetti. John Shane, and Courtney Whiten.
2Venture capital firms are financial intermediaries that collect capita! from a variety of sources and redistribute
it via their investments. The precise origin of the funds that are collected and deployed by venture capitalists is
difficult to specify. While it is possible to examine the investors in venture capital partnerships, such as an endeavor
is problematic since large financial corporations and other institutional investors mobilize funds in national and
global markets. It is thus impossible to ascertain the precise origin of funds being supplied to venture capital firms.
However, examining the distinct clusters or complexes of venture capital activity remains important since venture
capitalists play a central role in collecting and mobilizing funds for high technology business formations.
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 303
and Connecticut can be better thought of as representing progressive points on a continuum
running from predominantly technology-oriented to predominantly finance-based venturing.
Our research further suggests that coinvestment forms an important link between the
various centers of venture capital activity. It allows venture capital firms located in export-
oriented financial complexes to participate in deals originated by venture capitalists in tech-
nology-oriented complexes. Extensive coinvesting facilitates long distance flows of venture
capital and reinforces the flow of venture capital toward locations that generate the best
potential investment opportunities.
This paper presents findings from a firm level data base on the venture capital industry.
The data base provides discrete information on venture capital investors, portfolio companies,
and participants in investment syndications. It has been compiled from reports in Venture
Capital J ournal that focus on venture capital investments in various areas. Although the
firm level data base does not comprise a fully representative sample of the venture capital
industry, it enables us to approximate more accurately the investment and coinvestment
patterns of the various complexes, and as such, allows us to understand better the evolution
of leading complexes.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes our
typology of leading venture capital centers. The following sections then explore their his-
torical evolution. A summary of major findings is presented in the concluding section and
their implications for both private and public sector practitioners are explored.
TYPOLOGY OF VENTURE CAPITAL COMPLEXES
Although venture capital activity has increased from approximately $3.5 billion in the 1970s
to more than $20 billion today, investments are heavily concentrated in a few areas (Venture
Economics 1983, 1985; Office of Technology Assessment 1984; Timmons et al. 1984; Florida
and Kenney 1988a). Just two regions, the Northeast and West, account for the bulk of all
venture capital resources, and within these regions: just three states--California, New York,
and Massachusetts-control approximately 60% of the venture capital pool. Venture capital
is tightly clustered in a few, distinct pockets across the United States.
Surprisingly, little research has been done on how venture capital evolves or why it
clusters. The literature on venture capital gives only passing attention to these issues (Bean,
Schiffel and Mogee 1975; Kozmetsky, Gill and Smilor 1985; Timmons et al. 1984). Although
the most recent geography literature (Green and MacNaughton 1987; Leinbach and Amrhein
1987) makes note of such clustering, it provides little understanding of differences among
various venture capital centers or of the implications of venture capital’s geography for high
technology entrepreneurship. The literature on technology innovation (Rothwell 1984; Roth-
well 1985; Freeman 1984) and high technology regions (Dorfman 1983; Oakey 1984; Mar-
kusen, Hall and Glasmeier 1987) affords only cursory mention to the role played by different
types of venture capital complexes in the formation of high technology regions.
Table 1 shows the differences that characterize the seven most important venture capital
complexes in terms of our three-part typology. It presents data on the number of firms, total
dollar volume of resources, and share of resources for California (Silicon Valley/San Fran-
cisco), New York, Massachusetts (Boston), Illinois (Chicago), Connecticut, Texas, and
Minnesota (Minneapolis). Although the data arrayed in this table represent state-wide ag-
gregates, the areas listed in parentheses comprise the predominant centers of venture capital
activity. Venture capital complexes are generally identified under these titles in the following
pages.
304 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
TABLE 1 A Typology of Leading Venture Capital Complexes
Capital
base
(millions
of
dollars)
Number
of
Firms
Number
of
top
fiflIlS”
Financial
index
Financial-
corporate
index
In state!
outstate
investment
ratio
Financial comp1e.w
New York 3,262
(20.0)b
Illinois 863
(Chicago)
(5.3)
Technology-Oriented CompI e.xes
California 5,296
(San Francisco/ (32.51
Siiicon Valley
Hybrid Complexes
Massachusetts 2,054
(Boston) (12.6)
Connecticut 794
(4.9)
Texas 775
14.8)
Minnesota 380
(Minneapolis) (2.3)
Total 13,424
(82.3)
U.S. Total 16,308
95 17
(15.0) (27.9)
23 4
(3.6) (6.6)
173 13
(27.31 (21.3)
60 8
(9.5)
(13.1)
21 2
(3.3) (3.3)
54 4
(8.5) (6.6)
15 2
(2.4) (3.3)
441 50
(69.6) (82.0)
634 61
1.05
1.00
0.59
0.59
1.00
1.00
0.50
-
-
1.26 -0.32
1.00 0.09
0.64
0.77
1.63
1.13
0.50
-
-
2.20
0.49
0.14
1.14
0.78
-
-
Sowces: Venwe Economics (1985); Venture Capiraf .lcxmal; Florida and Kenney (1988a)
“This is based on a grouping of the 61 most active venture capital firms as presented in Bygrave and Timmons ( 19861
bNumbers in parentheses represent percentage share of U.S. total.
Three of the complexes are significantly larger than the others. California is the largest
with $5.3 billion (32%) of the venture capital pool. New York is second with $3.2 billion
(20%), and Boston has $2 billion (12%) of the venture capital pool. California also has the
largest number of venture capital firms with 173, followed by New York with 95, and Boston
with 60. Chicago, Connecticut, and Texas each control approximately $800 million in venture
capital resources; Minnea~lis controls roughly half that amount. Taken together, the seven
venture capital complexes account for $13.2 billion (82.3%) in venture capital resources
and 441 (70%) venture capital firms.
Our typology for the venture capital industry is supported by the following suggestive
data. Four of the complexes are located in the only states that Glasmeier (1985) identifies
as having high rankings on the absolute number of high technology jobs and on the ratio of
high technology jobs to total m~ufactu~ng employment: California, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, and Texas. The remaining two centers, New York and Chicago, are among the
largest concentrations of financial resources in the United States, as well as Boston. The
San Francisco Bay area also houses a significant concentration of financial assets.
The indices in Table 1 shed additional light on our typology. The financial index
compares the number of venture capital subsidiaries of financial institutions to the number
of limited partnerships, while the financial-corporate index adds venture capital subsidia~es
of financial and industrial corporations together and compares them to the number of limited
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 305
partnerships. Index values of one suggest correspondence between categories; values below
one indicate a preponderance of nonfinancial and/or nonindustrial venture capital partner-
ships, whereas values above one suggest the opposite. Venture capital subsidiaries of large
corporations comprise a relatively large share of venture capital firms located in four com-
plexes: New York, Chicago, Connecticut, and Texas. The three remaining centers, Silicon
Valley/San Francisco, Boston, and Minneapolis, have larger relative concentrations of limited
partnerships.
The ratio of in state to out of state investments provides an interesting snapshot into
the investment patterns of the major complexes. According to these data, three complexes-
New York (0.32), Chicago (0.09), and Connecticut (0.14)-are export oriented. Only two
complexes, Silicon Valley/San Francisco (2.20) and Texas (1.14) favor in-state investments
over exports. Two others, Minneapolis (0.78) and Boston (0.49), make a considerable but
not overwhelming share of their investments in state.
Table 2 shows regional flow-of-funds data for the venture capital industry, provid-
ing better detail on the investment orientation of the various complexes. Before proceed-
ing though, it is important to note two caveats concerning these data. First, the flow-of-
funds data differ from the data on venture capital resources presented in Table 1. The
latter include the total capital under management. In 1982, venture capital investments
amounted to $1.8 billion or about one quarter of the total $7.6 billion under management.
Second, because of the peculiar manner in which regions are demarcated in this data base,
regional variables sometimes comprise reasonable proxies for state activity. For example,
the West region includes California and two other smaller states, and the New York re-
gion includes just New York and the adjacent state of New Jersey. Problems arise, how-
ever, in areas such as the Midwest where Chicago, a key center of venture capital activ-
ity, is subsumed within a broad geographic area. The case of New England is even more
problematic because Boston and Connecticut are combined as well as subsumed within a
broadly defined region.
The ratio of venture capital receipts to investments presented at the bottom of Table
2 provides a rough guide to venture capital flows between the various complexes. According
to these data, only California (2.25) and Texas (2.93) are net attractors of capital. The New
England region, which includes both Boston and Connecticut, simultaneously attracts and
exports capital, with imports and exports essentially balancing each other out. New York
(0.49) and the Midwest (0.70), with its primary center in Chicago are enormous exporters
of venture capital.
Taken together, the data shown above suggest a clear-cut investment pattern for venture
capital complexes. The financial complexes, New York and Chicago, clearly favor exports.
Silicon Valley/San Francisco not only retained the bulk of the venture capital it raised but
also attracted substantial outside capital. Although there is some variation in investment
flows for the hybrid complexes, each of these retained a sizeable share of the capital it
generated and each was able to attract significant capital from outside sources.
The following sections deploy a variety of quantitative and qualitative historical ma-
terial to document the unique characteristics of the various complexes. First, information
generated from our venture capital data base is used to examine investment and coinvestment
patterns and to identify links between complexes (Table 3). Second, the historical evolution
of each complex is documented through detailed examinations of primary source documents,
a thorough chronological review of the industry’s trade publication Venture Capital Journal
(hereafter abbreviated VCJ), reference to both published and unpublished secondary sources,
and extensive oral interviews with leading venture capitalists.
T
A
B
L
E
2
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
F
l
o
w
o
f
F
u
n
d
s
,
1
9
8
2
(
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
o
f
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
M
a
d
e
b
y
R
e
g
i
o
n
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
y
N
e
w
Y
o
r
k
/
T
e
x
a
s
/
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
/
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
R
e
g
i
o
n
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
N
e
w
J
e
r
s
e
y
M
i
d
a
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
S
o
u
t
h
M
i
d
w
e
s
t
G
u
l
f
C
o
a
s
t
P
l
a
i
n
s
R
o
c
k
i
e
s
S
o
u
t
h
w
e
s
t
N
o
r
t
h
w
e
s
t
I
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
S
h
a
r
e
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
N
e
w
Y
o
r
k
/
N
e
w
J
e
r
s
e
y
M
i
d
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
M
i
d
w
e
s
t
T
e
x
a
s
/
G
u
l
f
C
o
a
s
t
P
l
a
i
n
s
$
9
3
3
2
.
9
%
”
$
6
1
1
7
.
0
%
$
5
8
.
1
%
-
-
$
1
6
9
.
0
%
$
9
1
6
.
7
%
$
1
9
6
.
7
%
$
6
6
1
8
.
6
%
$
2
3
.
2
%
-
-
$
5
2
.
8
%
$
6
2
.
1
%
$
1
5
4
.
2
%
$
4
6
.
5
%
-
-
$
1
2
6
.
8
%
-
$
9
3
.
2
%
$
1
1
3
.
1
%
$
2
3
.
2
%
$
3
5
0
.
0
%
$
5
2
.
8
%
$
4
7
.
4
%
$
7
2
.
5
%
$
1
5
4
.
2
%
$
1
1
.
6
%
-
-
$
3
8
2
1
.
5
%
$
1
1
.
9
%
$
2
2
8
.
6
%
$
2
0
7
.
0
%
$
3
1
8
.
7
%
$
3
4
.
8
%
$
2
3
3
.
3
%
$
1
2
6
.
8
%
$
2
4
4
4
.
5
%
$
2
2
8
.
6
%
$
1
0
.
3
%
$
3
0
.
8
%
_
b
-
$
2
1
.
1
%
-
$
1
1
4
.
3
%
$
7
2
.
5
%
$
1
4
3
.
9
%
-
$
1
1
6
.
7
%
$
1
7
9
.
6
%
$
5
9
.
3
%
$
1
1
4
.
3
%
$
1
1
8
$
3
$
2
8
2
4
1
.
8
%
1
.
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
5
.
5
%
$
1
3
6
$
3
$
3
5
5
3
8
.
3
%
0
.
8
%
1
0
0
%
1
9
.
5
%
$
4
2
$
1
$
6
2
6
7
.
7
%
1
.
6
%
1
0
0
%
3
.
4
%
-
$
6
1
0
0
%
0
.
3
%
-
$
6
4
$
6
$
1
7
7
3
6
.
1
%
3
.
4
%
1
0
0
%
9
.
7
%
$
7
$
1
$
5
4
1
3
.
0
%
1
.
9
%
1
0
0
%
3
.
0
%
$
2
7
2
8
.
6
%
-
1
0
0
%
0
.
4
%
_
.
R
o
c
k
i
e
s
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
/
S
o
u
t
h
w
e
s
t
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
N
o
r
t
h
w
e
s
t
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
T
o
t
a
l
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
S
h
a
m
R
a
t
i
o
o
f
R
e
c
e
i
p
t
s
/
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
-
-
$
3
3
8
.
9
%
-
-
$
1
0
1
2
.
8
%
$
5
1
1
2
.
8
%
$
2
7
8
1
5
.
3
%
9
.
5
%
2
.
9
%
3
.
4
%
6
.
8
%
8
.
7
%
0
.
5
%
4
.
5
%
4
5
.
7
%
2
.
7
%
1
0
0
%
0
.
9
9
0
.
4
9
0
.
8
4
1
0
.
3
3
0
.
7
0
2
.
9
3
1
.
4
3
6
.
3
1
2
.
2
5
2
.
6
3
1
.
0
0
$
1
7
.
7
%
$
7
1
.
9
%
-
$
1
1
1
4
.
1
%
$
6
1
1
5
.
3
%
$
1
7
3
-
-
s
1
0
.
3
%
-
$
2
2
.
6
%
$
1
3
3
.
3
%
$
5
2
-
$
2
$
5
0
.
6
%
1
.
3
%
-
-
-
$
4
5
.
1
%
$
2
2
5
.
5
%
$
6
2
-
$
1
0
1
2
.
8
%
$
4
4
1
1
.
1
%
$
1
2
4
-
$
1
7
.
7
%
$
2
2
5
.
9
%
-
$
3
3
.
9
%
$
3
8
9
.
6
%
$
1
5
8
$
1
$
3
7
.
7
%
2
3
.
1
%
$
1
3
-
3
.
5
%
$
1
-
5
.
3
%
$
2
-
2
.
6
%
$
2
$
1
9
0
.
5
%
4
.
8
%
$
1
0
$
8
2
$
7
5
3
.
8
%
$
2
8
0
7
5
.
5
%
$
8
4
2
.
1
%
$
3
6
4
6
.
2
%
$
1
3
4
3
3
.
6
%
$
8
3
3
$
8
2
.
1
%
$
1
1
5
7
.
7
%
$
1
1
.
3
%
$
1
4
3
.
5
%
$
5
0
$
1
3
1
0
0
%
$
3
7
1
1
0
0
%
$
1
9
1
0
0
%
$
7
8
1
0
0
%
$
3
9
8
1
0
0
%
$
1
8
2
2
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
f
f
i
c
e
o
f
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
,
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
,
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
(
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
,
D
.
C
.
,
1
9
8
4
)
“
N
u
m
b
e
r
s
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
a
s
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
r
e
a
d
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
l
y
a
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
s
h
a
r
e
s
o
f
v
e
n
h
u
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
m
a
d
e
b
R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
u
n
d
e
r
$
1
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
.
0
.
7
%
2
0
.
4
%
1
.
0
%
4
.
3
%
2
1
.
8
%
1
0
0
%
308 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
TABLE 3 Investments and Coinvestments for Leading Venture Capital Complexes
NY MA CT CA IL MN TX Other/NA Total
New York Complex
Investments
Coinvestmens
Boston Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Connecricur Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
California Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Chicago Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Minneapolis Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Texas Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
31 8 4 32 5 0 8 40
(24.2) (6.3)
(3. I) (25.0) (3.9) (0.0) (6.3) (31.3)
59 23 5 77 19 7 5 56
(23.5) (9.2) (2.0) (30.7) (7.5) (2.8) (2.0) (22.3)
6 37
(5.4) (33.1)
56 83
(19.4) (28.7)
3 13
(4.2)
(20.3)
67 35
(25.0) (13.1)
I 17 1 142 I 4 11 29
(0.5) (8.3)
(0.5) (68.5)
(0.3 (1.9) (5.3) (14.1)
129 34 19 236 32 23 10 97
(21.5) (9.0) (3.2) (39.3)
(5.3) (3.8) (1.7) (16.2)
1 1 1 9 3 3 6 14
(2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (23.7)
(7.9) (7.9) (15.8) (36.8)
20 14 1 27 9 6 6 29
(17.9) (12.5) (0.9) (24.1) (8.1) (5.4) (5.4) (25.9)
0 2 0 5 2 21 1 17
(0.0) (4.2) (0.0) (10.4) (4.2) (43.8) (2.1) (35.4)
16 7 2 15 11 15 0 13
(20.2) (8.9) (2.5) (19.0) (13.9) (19.0)
(0.0)
(16.5)
0 10 0 16 1 0 55 21
(0.0) (9.7) (0.0) (15.5) (1.0) (0.0) (53.4) (20.4)
27 39 12 55 8 8 59 93
(9.0) (13.0) (4.0) (18.3) (2.7) (2.7) (19.6) (30.9)
0 26
(0.0) (23.2)
10 65
(3.5) (22.5)
8 18
(12.5) (28.1)
19 49
(7.1) (18.3)
0
(0.0)
13
(4.5)
1
(1.6)
5
(1.9)
2
(1.8)
3
(1.0)
1
(1.6)
1
(0.4)
5
(4.5)
6
(2.1)
4
(6.3)
9
(3.3)
36
(32.1)
33
(11.4)
36
(32.1)
83
(30.2)
128
251
112
289
64
268
206
600
38
112
48
79
103
301
Numbers m parentheses represent percentage share of total
FINANCIAL COMPLEXES: NEW YORK AND CHICAGO
The New York and Chicago complexes are good models of finance-oriented complexes.
Both are dominated by venture capital operations tied to major financial corporations or
other institutional sources of wealth.
The New York venture capital complex emerged during the Great Depression. Its
catalysts were venture capital funds linked to family fortunes, most notably the Rockefellers
(Venrock), Whitneys (J.H. Whitney and Company), and Phipps (Bessemer Securities). The
Rockefeller family made important venture investments in McDonnell Douglass and Eastern
Airlines during the late 193Os, while J.H. Whitney and Co. provided backing for Minute
Maid (VCJ November 1974, June 1979). In 1969, Venrock was set up as a formal venture
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 309
capital arm of the Rockefeller family. It has since provided early-stage financing for a host
of important high technology companies, such as Intel and Apple Computer (VCJ June
1979).
More than 40 New York venture capital funds are linked to financial institutions, such
as large commercial banks (i.e., Citicorp, Bankers Trust, and Irving Trust), or investment
banks (i.e., Merrill Lynch; Drexel, Bumham, Lambert (Lambda); Smith Barney (First
Century Partnership); and Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette. New York City also houses a
number of funds, like Rothschild and CMNY, which are affiliated with European investors
(VCJ June, August, October 1979).
Most investments made by New York venture capitalists go to other regions. Only
$66 million, or less than 20%, of the $355 million invested by New York venture capitalists
was kept in state. Over $136 million (38%) was exported to California, $61 million (17%)
was given to New England, and $31 million went (9%) to Texas. When inflows to New
York from other regions are taken into account, venture capital invested in the area reached
$173 million, barely half the total raised there.
The firm level data reinforce these findings. Barely one quarter of the 128 sample
investments made by New York venture capitalists were located in state. Another 25% were
located in California, with the next largest shares going to New England (9%), Texas (6.3%),
and Illinois (3.9%). New York firms also had dispersed patterns of coinvesting, cooperating
most frequently with California venture capitalists (30.7%), with one another (23.5%), and
to a lesser degree with venture capitalists in Illinois and Massachusetts. To facilitate such
long distance venturing, many venture capital firms in New York have opened remote
branches in high technology regions like Silicon Valley and Boston-Route 128.
The Chicago complex is similar in many ways to New York. It is comprised of 23
venture capital firms that control about half of all venture capital raised in the Midwest.
Allstate Insurance was very important to the rise of Chicago venture capital. In 1960, it
became one of the first financial institutions to set up a venture capital fund (VCJ 1975).
Allstate’s director, Ned Heizer, made very successful investments in young high tech com-
panies such as Control Data, Memorex, Scientific Data Systems, Teledyne, and others
(Bylinsky 1976). In 1969, Heizer left Allstate to form his own venture capital company,
which was the country’s largest venture capital limited partnership when it was organized.
Heizer Corporation became a training ground for venture capitalists and has in turn been
responsible for spinning off a number of important venture capital companies.
Chicago banks became active in venture capital during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
First National Bank of Chicago currently has two venture capital affiliates (First Capital
Corporation of Chicago and the Institutional Venture Capital Fund), as does Continental
Illinois (Continental Illinois Equity Corporation and Continental Illinois Venture Corpora-
tion). AMOCO and Sears have also made some significant venture capital commitments.
The Chicago venture capital industry is rounded out by the important partnership, Golder
Thoma, a number of smaller partnerships, and a few SBICs (VCJ August 1974, June 1981).
Like New York, the Chicago venture capital complex tends to export funds. This is
reflected in the flow-of-funds data for the Midwest, which we use as a rough proxy for
Chicago. Nearly 80% of the $177 million raised by the Midwest was exported, the most
significant amount going to California ($64 million). The firm level data clarify this trend.
Less than 10% of investments in our Chicago sample were located in Illinois. The largest
share of investments (23.7%) went to California and Texas (15.8%). Because of their export
orientation, Chicago venture capitalists coinvested frequently with venture capitalists located
310 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
elsewhere, particularly California (24%), New York (17.9%), and Boston (12.5%). Chicago
venture firms invest frequently with other ~n~ce-o~ented venture capitalists, especially
those in New York.
SILICON VALLEY/SAN FRANCISCO AS A
TECHNOLOGY-ORIENTED COMPLEX
The Silicon Valley/San Francisco venture capital complex is the best example of technology-
oriented venturing. Venture groups began to emerge in the Bay Area during the late 1950s
and early 1960s. Before then, entrepreneurs had to rely on industrial corporations or financial
firms in more established financial centers for early-stage funding. For example, Shockley
Transistor Corporation was started with backing from Beckman Industries, whereas financing
for Fairchild Semiconductor was provided by Fairchild Camera.
The early venture groups in the Bay Area took on a variety of forms. The first venture
capital firm in California, Draper, Gaither and Anderson, was founded in 1958 as a limited
partnership. The following year saw the establishment of two federally leveraged SBICs,
Continental Capital Corporation and Small Business Enterprises. Another SBIC, Draper and
Johnson, was set up in 1962. The important firm, Sutter Hill, was founded as the venture
capital arm of the real estate development firm. Bank of America and a number of other
commercial banks also provided venture financing for expanding businesses during this early
period.
In 1961, New York investment banker Arthur Rock formed a model limited partnership
with Tommy Davis of Kern County Land Company. Of even greater significance was the
revolving syndicate of independent investors centered around John Bryan and Bill Edwards,
which later came to be known as “the group.” One inte~ittent partner of “the group,” Reid
Dennis, was able to persuade his employer, Firemen’s Fund Insurance, to invest in a number
of new ventures.
The Bay Area venture capital industry thus emerged from a period of active experi-
mentation with different types of organizations for providing venture capital. The seminal
period, 1956-1963, witnessed the establishment of more than a dozen impo~ant venture
capital firms in San Francisco and Silicon Valley. Faced with acute difficulties mobilizing
funds and the need to share information and expertise, these early venture capitalists gradually
evolved into an interactive community trading information and participating together in
rudimentary coinvestments.
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the dramatic growth and reorganization of the
Silicon Valley venture complex. Much of this expansion came from the original group of
venture capitalists. In 1968, for example, Bryan and Edwards was established, and George
Quist, of Bank of America, set up Hambrecht and Quist. In 1974, Reid Dennis founded
Institutional Venture Associates with Burton McMurtry of Palo Alto Investment. Two years
later, Institutional Venture Associates split into two partnerships, McMurtry’s Technology
Venture Associates and Dennis’ Institutional Venture Partners (Wilson 1985). Tommy Davis
launched the important Mayfield Fund in 1974.
A variety of other actors entered the Silicon Valley venture industry during this period.
In 1968, Bessemer Securities became one of the first East Coast venture capital firms to
open a California branch. Eugene Kleiner of Fairchild Semiconductor was a cofounder of
the important firm Kleiner Perkins in 1974, while Donald Valentine, an alumnus of both
Fairchild and National Semiconductor, established Capital Management Services, Inc. (later
Sequoia Capital) around the same time. Citicorp opened a West Coast office in 1973. A
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 311
host of new partnerships (i.e., Idanta Partners and WestVen Management) were formed
during this period. Between 1968 and 1975, approximately 30 new or reconstituted venture
capital operations were established in the Bay Area.
This period also saw an increase in outside funds committed to venture capital. One
consequence was the emergence of the limited partnership-with professional venture cap-
italists managing capital provided by passive outside investors-as the dominant model for
venture capital. University endowments, financial institutions, and pension funds initially
bet on venture capitalists with proven track records. Over time, a growing group of former
entrepreneurs, past employees of venture firms, and outside personnel were able to attract
financial resources and launch limited partnerships.
The growth of Silicon Valley as an entrepreneurial center resulted in a shift in the
locus of venture capital activity from San Francisco to Silicon Valley. The office complex
located at 3000 Sand Hill Road, Menlo Park has been a virtual headquarters for venture
capital activity since it was constructed in the early 1970s. Today, it houses more than two
dozen venture capital firms, making it the largest single enclave of venture capital in the
United States (Wilson 1985).
The Bay Area venture complex witnessed its most recent growth phase during the late
1970s and early 1980s. This period saw an even more dramatic surge in outside funding to
the industry. The reduction in the tax rate on capital gains and the liberalization of restrictions
on pension fund investments were two reasons for this (McMurtry 1986). The “profit squeeze”
faced by many large corporations and the tremendous success of venture-backed start-ups
such as Intel and Apple Computer also attracted external capital to the industry (Case 1986;
Bygrave and Timmons 1986). This growing pool of funds encouraged significant spinoff
activity from established funds. Citicorp, for example, became a virtual training ground for
venture capitalists. Its alumni established a series of important partnerships during this period,
notably Arscott, Norton and Associates (1978), and Dougery, Jones and Wilder (1981).
Similarly, Merrill, Pickard, Anderson and Eyre was founded by members of Bank of Amer-
ica’s venture group.
The early 1980s saw the emergence of venture capital “megafunds,” as established
venture capitalists pyramided partnership funds on top of one another. This resulted in a
shift toward larger venture commitments and opened up an investment niche for seed funds
concentrating on very early stage investments, i.e., Alpha Partners, Crosspoint Ventures,
and Onset Partners (which was capitalized by a consortium of established venture capital
funds). Finally, a host of venture capital firms headquartered elsewhere opened California
offices, including L.F. Rothschild, J.H. Whitney, TA Associates, and General Electric
Venture Capital (GEVENCO). Between 1978 and 1982, more than 50 venture capital funds
were established in the Silicon Valley/San Francisco area (VCJ February, March 1980;
January, March, November, December 1981; February, March, May 1982).
In sharp contrast to New York and Chicago, California is a tremendous attractor of
venture capital. Three quarters ($280 million) of the $371 million it invested was placed in
state. Just 25% was exported, most of it going to New England and Texas. California claimed
nearly 50% of the capital invested by two regions, the Mid-Atlantic and Rockies, and
approximately 40% of the investments of New England, New York, and the Pacific North-
west. Capital inflows of $136 million from the New York area and an additional $118 million
from New England helped push the total amount of venture capital invested in California
to $833 million, or more than 45% of the total pool. California ended up nearly tripling its
endogenously raised resources as a result of such capital imports.
These findings are reinforced by the firm level data. Nearly 70% of the sample in-
312 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
vestments made by California venture capital firms were located in state. The next largest
concentrations were found in Massachusetts (8%) and Texas (5%). California venture cap-
italists also liked to coinvest with one another. Same state coinvesting represented 39% of
the deals in our California sample. California venture capitalists also participated fairly
regularly in investment syndications with New York City firms (21%), and to a lesser extent
with Massachusetts (90/o), and Texas funds (5%).
Venture capital in the Silicon Valley area evolved gradually alongside the high tech-
nology enterprises that spring up there. Venture capital thus became an integral part of what
we term a social structure of innovation (Florida and Kenney 1988): an interactive system
comprised of technology intensive enterprises, highly skilled human capital, high caliber
universities, substantial public/private research and development expenditures, specialized
networks of suppliers, support services such as law firms and consultants, strong entrepre-
neurial networks, and informal mechanisms for information exchange and technology trans-
fer.
The synergies among the various elements of this social structure created a unique
window of opportunity for the emergence of technology-oriented investing apart from tra-
ditional financial institutions. The growth of technology venturing then proceeded along a
learning curve characterized by the gradual accumulation of investment and management
skills on the part of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs alike. This in turn facilitated the
development of extended entrepreneurial networks that became conduits for sharing infor-
mation, making deals, and mobilizing resources. As a central component of such networks.
venture capital thus played an important role in incubating entrepreneurial activity, attracting
entrepreneurs, and accelerating rates of new business formation.
BOSTON AS A TECHNOLOGY-ORIENTED HYBRID
The venture capital industry in Boston is a hybrid complex, combining characteristics of
technology- and finance-based venture capital complexes. Boston was perhaps the first area
to possess some degree of organized venture capital. As early as 1911, the Boston Chamber
of Commerce was providing financial and technical assistance to new enterprises. In 1940,
the New England Industrial Development Corporation was launched to provide similar kinds
of assistance to new ventures (Kaplan 1948).
Boston was the home of American Research and Development (1946) the nation’s
first institutional venture fund. ARD was the creation of a prominent group of bankers and
industrialists who saw such an entity as a way to more effectively finance technology-
oriented enterprise (Liles 1977). In addition, a significant number of early venture capital
investments in the Boston area were made by private individuals and wealthy families both
from the Boston area and New York City.
By the early 1960s large Boston financial institutions also became involved in venture
capital. First National Bank of Boston established a program for providing loans to tech-
nology-oriented businesses and formed an SBIC affiliate. Around the same time, Federal
Street SBIC was established, a consortium of Boston banks.
Like Silicon Valley, Boston witnessed the development of a technology-oriented ven-
ture community parallel to the emergence of the Route 128 entrepreneurial complex. ARD’s
enormously successful investment in Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) in the late 1950s
provided a vital impetus to the climate for high technology entrepreneurship in Boston. DEC
plryed a significant role in the evolution of the Boston-Route 128 high technology center;
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 313
it became an incubator for more than 30 spinoffs, most notably Data General (Dorfman
1983).
ARD similarly became an incubator for venture capital funds. In 1963, Boston Capital
Corp. was founded by ARD alumnus, Joseph Powell. By the 197Os, ARD alumni were
instrumental in launching a host of top level partnerships including Palmer, Greylock, Charles
River Partnership, and Morgan Holland (VCJ March 1974, August 1975, November 1976).
In 1968, Peter Brooke left his position as manager of First National Bank of Boston’s high
technology loan program and later went on to launch TA Associates, which currently manages
more than $1.5 billion in capital. making it the largest venture capital fund in the country.
As the technology base of the Boston region developed, a host of partnerships were
organized by veteran venture capitalists. Both Burr, Egan and Deleage and Claflan Capital
Management were formed by former TA Associates employees, while the Venture Capital
Fund of New England was established by managers of First National Bank of Boston’s
venture group. The late 1970s and early 1980s also saw the formation of new funds, such
as Eastech and Zerostage, and the movement of branch offices of funds headquartered
elsewhere, such as Bessemer Venture Capital, to the Boston area.
Our interviews with Boston venture capitalists indicate that the Boston complex is not
nearly as tightly organized as that of San Francisco/Silicon Valley. There appears to be
much less information sharing and/or coinvesting among Boston venture capitalists, although
a number of Boston firms possess rather tight links to New York City venture capitalists.
In contrast to California, a significant number of Boston venture firms are involved in large-
scale financial transactions such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) which clearly fall outside
traditional venture capital activities.
The data on investments and coinvestments illuminate the hybrid characteristics of the
Boston complex. If we use data on the flow of funds for New England as a proxy, the
Boston complex essentially breaks even when imports and exports are taken into account.
Roughly one third ($93 million) of the $282 million invested by venture capitalists in New
England was placed within the region. A sizeable percentage was exported, with the largest
amounts going to California ($118 million), New York ($19 million), and Texas ($20
million). However, New England was able to replenish its capital exports with sizeable
inflows from other areas. These included inflows of $61 million from New York, $33 million
from California, and $16 million from the Midwest.
The firm level data clarify these trends. Boston venture capitalists concentrated ap-
proximately one third of their investments in state. More than 20% were made in California.
Boston venture capitalists coinvested regularly with one another as well as with venture
capitalists located in other complexes. Nearly 30% of investment syndications involving
Boston venture capital firms were with other Boston firms. whereas 22% were with venture
capitalists in California, and 19% were with New York firms. Even though Boston ven-
ture capitalists participate in a significant amount of long distance investing, the their
venture capital complex remains an important component of the Boston-Route 128 high
tech region and the broader social structure of innovation that characterizes that area.
DIFFERENCES AMONG HYBRID COMPLEXES: CONNECTICUT,
TEXAS, AND MINNEAPOLIS
The three remaining complexes~ America. Boston: Allen Unwin.
McMurty, B. 1986. Tax policy influences on venture capital. In R. Landau and D. Jorgensen, eds.,
Technology and Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: Ballinger, pp. 137-152.
Mears, W. 1981. Corporate Venture Capital: Can It Be Successful? Cambridge MA: Master’s Thesis,
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT.
Noone, C. and Rubel, S. 1970. SBfCs: Pioneers in Organized Venture Capital. Chicago: Capital
Publishing.
Oakey, R. 1984. High Technology Small Firms: Innovation and Regional Development in Britain and
the United States. New York: St. Martin’s.
Office of Technology Assessment. 1984. Technology, Innovation and Regional Economic Develop-
ment. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO.
Pratt, S. 1986. %uide to Venture Capital Sources. Wellesley, MA: Venture Economics.
Rothwell, R. 1985. Venture finance, small firms and public policy in the U.K. Research Policy
14:253-265.
Rothwell, R. 1984. The role of small firms in the emergence of new technologies, OMEGA: The
lnternat~onal Journal of management Science 12(1):19-29.
Ruvelson, A. 1971. The First SBIC. In S. Rubel and E. Novotny eds., How to Raise and Invest
Venture Capital, New York: Presidents Publishing House, pp. 199-208.
Saxenian, A. 1985. Silicon valley and route 128: Regional prototypes or historical exceptions. In M.
Castells, ed., High Technology, Space and Society, Berkeley, CA: Sage.
Senker, J. 1985. Small high technology firms: Some regional implications. Technovat~on 3:243-262.
Silver, A.D. 1984. Who’s Who in Venture Capital. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Supple, B. 1957. A business elite: German-Jewish financiers in nineteenth century New York. Business
History Review
Timmons, J. 1981. Venture capita1 activity in the US: A survey of the most active investors. In K.
Vesper, ed., Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 1981, Wellesley, MA: Babson College
Center for Entrepreneurial Studies.
Timmons, J., et al. 1984. Venture Capital Investment and the Development of High Technology
Companies. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation.
Timmons, J., Fast, N. and Bygrave, W. 1983. The flow of venture capita1 to highly innovative
technologic~ ventures. In J. Hornaday, J. Timmons and K. Vesper, eds., Frontiers of Entre-
preneurship Research 1983. Wellesley MA: Babson College, Center for Entrepreneurial Studies
316-35.
Tyebjee, T. and Bruno, A. 1984. A model of venture capitalist investment activity. Management
Science 30(9):1051-1066.
Venture Capital Journal. Various years cited in text.
Venture Economics. 1983. Regional Patterns of Venture Capital Investment. Prepared for the U.S.
Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C.
Venture Economics. 1985. The Venture Capital Industry: Opportunities and Considerations for Inves-
tors. Wellesley Hills, MA.
Venture Economics. Various years cited in text. Venture Capital Yearbook. Wellesley Hills, MA.
Wilson, J. 1985. The New Venturers: Inside the High Stakes World of Venture Capital. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing.
doc_867099250.pdf
With this description regarding venture capital and high technology entrepreneurship martin kenney.
VENTURE CAPITAL
AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
RICHARD FLORIDA
Carnegie Mellon University
MARTIN KENNEY
Ohio State University
Venture capital clearly plays an important role in high technology entre-
EXECUTIVE preneurship. The purpose of this article is to explain the differences among
SUMMARY various venture capital complexes focusing on where venture capital is
important to innovation and entrepreneurship and conversely where it is
not. We do so through an empirical and historical examination of the seven
most important venture capital complexes: California (San Francisco1
Silicon Valley), Massachusetts (Boston), New York, Illinois (Chicago), Texas, Connecticut, and Min-
nesota (Minneapolis).
We establish a three-part tripartite typology for explaining the difSerences between these venture
capital complexes: I) technology-oriented complexes are located close to concentrations of high
technology intensive businesses, invest most of their funds locally, and are net attractors of capital;
2) finance-oriented complexes are located around financial institutions and export their capital; and
3) hybrid complexes mix characteristics of both technology andjnance-oriented venturing.
Our findings have a series of important practical implications. Although venture capital is not
absolutely necessary to facilitate high technology entepreneurship, well-developed venture capital
networks provide tremendous incentives for entrepreneurship by lowering the dificulties of entering
an industry. Venture capitalists use both their experience and their contacts to reduce many of the
information and opportuniry costs associated with new business formation. The importance of contact
networks and information to both deal flow and investment monitoring goes a low way toward explaining
why venture capitalists cluster tightly together. The availability of venture capital also attracts entre-
preneurs and high quality personnel to a region creating a virtuous circle of new enterprise formation,
innovation, and economic development.
We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance provided by the Economic Development Administration,
Ohio State University Urban Affairs Committee and the Ohio Board of Regents. Thanks are due Harvey Brooks,
Gordon Clark, Sam Cole, Marshall Feldman, Bennett Harrison, Ian MacMillan, and three anonymous reviewers
for their comments and assistance.
Address correspondence to Professor Richard Florida, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213.
Journal of Business Venturing 3, 301-319
0 1988 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc., 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010
0883-9026/88/$3.50
301
302 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
Private, nonproft, and subsidized public efforts aimed at providing venture capital and stim-
ulating high technology entrepreneurship must confront the fact that venture capital alone will not
magically generate entrepreneurship and economic development. It is important that such efforts
recognize the nonfinancial side of venture investing and attract experienced personnel who can tap
into established entrepreneurial networks and secure coinvestors. More sign$cantly, establishing
public venture funding in an area lacking the requisite entrepreneurial climate or technology infra-
structure may create a “catch 22” situation where locally oriented funds invest in bad deals or where
venture capital is simply exported to established high technology regions.
INTRODUCTION’
There is little doubt that venture capital plays a critical role in high technology entepreneurship
and economic change. Clearly, the vibrance and rapid growth of California’s Silicon Valley
and Boston-Route 128 area owe much to the significant amounts of venture capital available
there. The success stories of high flying start-ups like Fairchild, Intel, Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC), Apple Computer, Cray Computer, Sun Microsystems, Genentech, and
countless others stand in sharp contrast to the stagnation and decline found in older man-
ufacturing sectors. Thus, it is not surprising that both private and public sector actors have
become enamored with venture capital as a mechanism for incubating technology businesses
and generating economic growth.
Despite its importance in premier high technology regions, the availability of venture
capital does not necessarily translate into high technology entrepreneurship. Two of the
nation’s foremost locations of venture capital, New York and Chicago, are quite laggard in
terms of new business formation, innovation, and technology-based growth. These areas
serve simply to collect venture capital which they then export to a variety of locations.
The way that venture capital complexes arise and how they effect high technology
entrepreneurship are the major themes of this paper. We explore the origins and evolution
of seven important venture capital complexes and suggest a three part typology for under-
standing them.’ Technology-oriented complexes, such as San Francisco/Silicon Valley, are
located around concentrations of technology intensive businesses, assume a local investment
focus, and attract significant amounts of outside capital. Finance-based complexes, like New
York and Chicago, are located in areas where financial institutions are highly concentrated,
contain a high proportion of venture capital subsidiaries of financial corporations, and are
export-oriented. Hybrids mix characteristics of both financial and technology-oriented ven-
turing. This does not imply, however, that all hybrids are alike. Boston, Minneapolis, Texas,
‘We would like to acknowledge the information and assistance provided by the following venture capitalists
in the Midwest, northern California and Boston. David Morgenthaler and Charles James, who are headquartered
in Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio respectively, gave us an invaluable assistance in launching our research. Venture
capitalists we interviewed in northern California include: David Arscott, James Balderston, Frank Chambers,
William Chandler, Thomas Davis, Wallace Davis, Reid Dennis, John Dougery, WiIliam Edwards, Mary Jane
Elmore. Frankiin Johnson, Eugene Kleiner, Burton McMurtry, Steve Merrill, A&n? Rock, Peter Roshko. Craig
Tayior, Donald Valentine, David Wegm~n, and Paul Wythes, as well as Henry Riggs of Stanford University.
Those interviewed in Boston were: Peter Brooke, William Burgin, Richard Bumes, Craig Burr, Thomas Claflan,
Daniel Gregory, Harry Heeler. Paul Hogan, Joseph Powell, Patrick Sansonetti. John Shane, and Courtney Whiten.
2Venture capital firms are financial intermediaries that collect capita! from a variety of sources and redistribute
it via their investments. The precise origin of the funds that are collected and deployed by venture capitalists is
difficult to specify. While it is possible to examine the investors in venture capital partnerships, such as an endeavor
is problematic since large financial corporations and other institutional investors mobilize funds in national and
global markets. It is thus impossible to ascertain the precise origin of funds being supplied to venture capital firms.
However, examining the distinct clusters or complexes of venture capital activity remains important since venture
capitalists play a central role in collecting and mobilizing funds for high technology business formations.
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 303
and Connecticut can be better thought of as representing progressive points on a continuum
running from predominantly technology-oriented to predominantly finance-based venturing.
Our research further suggests that coinvestment forms an important link between the
various centers of venture capital activity. It allows venture capital firms located in export-
oriented financial complexes to participate in deals originated by venture capitalists in tech-
nology-oriented complexes. Extensive coinvesting facilitates long distance flows of venture
capital and reinforces the flow of venture capital toward locations that generate the best
potential investment opportunities.
This paper presents findings from a firm level data base on the venture capital industry.
The data base provides discrete information on venture capital investors, portfolio companies,
and participants in investment syndications. It has been compiled from reports in Venture
Capital J ournal that focus on venture capital investments in various areas. Although the
firm level data base does not comprise a fully representative sample of the venture capital
industry, it enables us to approximate more accurately the investment and coinvestment
patterns of the various complexes, and as such, allows us to understand better the evolution
of leading complexes.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes our
typology of leading venture capital centers. The following sections then explore their his-
torical evolution. A summary of major findings is presented in the concluding section and
their implications for both private and public sector practitioners are explored.
TYPOLOGY OF VENTURE CAPITAL COMPLEXES
Although venture capital activity has increased from approximately $3.5 billion in the 1970s
to more than $20 billion today, investments are heavily concentrated in a few areas (Venture
Economics 1983, 1985; Office of Technology Assessment 1984; Timmons et al. 1984; Florida
and Kenney 1988a). Just two regions, the Northeast and West, account for the bulk of all
venture capital resources, and within these regions: just three states--California, New York,
and Massachusetts-control approximately 60% of the venture capital pool. Venture capital
is tightly clustered in a few, distinct pockets across the United States.
Surprisingly, little research has been done on how venture capital evolves or why it
clusters. The literature on venture capital gives only passing attention to these issues (Bean,
Schiffel and Mogee 1975; Kozmetsky, Gill and Smilor 1985; Timmons et al. 1984). Although
the most recent geography literature (Green and MacNaughton 1987; Leinbach and Amrhein
1987) makes note of such clustering, it provides little understanding of differences among
various venture capital centers or of the implications of venture capital’s geography for high
technology entrepreneurship. The literature on technology innovation (Rothwell 1984; Roth-
well 1985; Freeman 1984) and high technology regions (Dorfman 1983; Oakey 1984; Mar-
kusen, Hall and Glasmeier 1987) affords only cursory mention to the role played by different
types of venture capital complexes in the formation of high technology regions.
Table 1 shows the differences that characterize the seven most important venture capital
complexes in terms of our three-part typology. It presents data on the number of firms, total
dollar volume of resources, and share of resources for California (Silicon Valley/San Fran-
cisco), New York, Massachusetts (Boston), Illinois (Chicago), Connecticut, Texas, and
Minnesota (Minneapolis). Although the data arrayed in this table represent state-wide ag-
gregates, the areas listed in parentheses comprise the predominant centers of venture capital
activity. Venture capital complexes are generally identified under these titles in the following
pages.
304 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
TABLE 1 A Typology of Leading Venture Capital Complexes
Capital
base
(millions
of
dollars)
Number
of
Firms
Number
of
top
fiflIlS”
Financial
index
Financial-
corporate
index
In state!
outstate
investment
ratio
Financial comp1e.w
New York 3,262
(20.0)b
Illinois 863
(Chicago)
(5.3)
Technology-Oriented CompI e.xes
California 5,296
(San Francisco/ (32.51
Siiicon Valley
Hybrid Complexes
Massachusetts 2,054
(Boston) (12.6)
Connecticut 794
(4.9)
Texas 775
14.8)
Minnesota 380
(Minneapolis) (2.3)
Total 13,424
(82.3)
U.S. Total 16,308
95 17
(15.0) (27.9)
23 4
(3.6) (6.6)
173 13
(27.31 (21.3)
60 8
(9.5)
(13.1)
21 2
(3.3) (3.3)
54 4
(8.5) (6.6)
15 2
(2.4) (3.3)
441 50
(69.6) (82.0)
634 61
1.05
1.00
0.59
0.59
1.00
1.00
0.50
-
-
1.26 -0.32
1.00 0.09
0.64
0.77
1.63
1.13
0.50
-
-
2.20
0.49
0.14
1.14
0.78
-
-
Sowces: Venwe Economics (1985); Venture Capiraf .lcxmal; Florida and Kenney (1988a)
“This is based on a grouping of the 61 most active venture capital firms as presented in Bygrave and Timmons ( 19861
bNumbers in parentheses represent percentage share of U.S. total.
Three of the complexes are significantly larger than the others. California is the largest
with $5.3 billion (32%) of the venture capital pool. New York is second with $3.2 billion
(20%), and Boston has $2 billion (12%) of the venture capital pool. California also has the
largest number of venture capital firms with 173, followed by New York with 95, and Boston
with 60. Chicago, Connecticut, and Texas each control approximately $800 million in venture
capital resources; Minnea~lis controls roughly half that amount. Taken together, the seven
venture capital complexes account for $13.2 billion (82.3%) in venture capital resources
and 441 (70%) venture capital firms.
Our typology for the venture capital industry is supported by the following suggestive
data. Four of the complexes are located in the only states that Glasmeier (1985) identifies
as having high rankings on the absolute number of high technology jobs and on the ratio of
high technology jobs to total m~ufactu~ng employment: California, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, and Texas. The remaining two centers, New York and Chicago, are among the
largest concentrations of financial resources in the United States, as well as Boston. The
San Francisco Bay area also houses a significant concentration of financial assets.
The indices in Table 1 shed additional light on our typology. The financial index
compares the number of venture capital subsidiaries of financial institutions to the number
of limited partnerships, while the financial-corporate index adds venture capital subsidia~es
of financial and industrial corporations together and compares them to the number of limited
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 305
partnerships. Index values of one suggest correspondence between categories; values below
one indicate a preponderance of nonfinancial and/or nonindustrial venture capital partner-
ships, whereas values above one suggest the opposite. Venture capital subsidiaries of large
corporations comprise a relatively large share of venture capital firms located in four com-
plexes: New York, Chicago, Connecticut, and Texas. The three remaining centers, Silicon
Valley/San Francisco, Boston, and Minneapolis, have larger relative concentrations of limited
partnerships.
The ratio of in state to out of state investments provides an interesting snapshot into
the investment patterns of the major complexes. According to these data, three complexes-
New York (0.32), Chicago (0.09), and Connecticut (0.14)-are export oriented. Only two
complexes, Silicon Valley/San Francisco (2.20) and Texas (1.14) favor in-state investments
over exports. Two others, Minneapolis (0.78) and Boston (0.49), make a considerable but
not overwhelming share of their investments in state.
Table 2 shows regional flow-of-funds data for the venture capital industry, provid-
ing better detail on the investment orientation of the various complexes. Before proceed-
ing though, it is important to note two caveats concerning these data. First, the flow-of-
funds data differ from the data on venture capital resources presented in Table 1. The
latter include the total capital under management. In 1982, venture capital investments
amounted to $1.8 billion or about one quarter of the total $7.6 billion under management.
Second, because of the peculiar manner in which regions are demarcated in this data base,
regional variables sometimes comprise reasonable proxies for state activity. For example,
the West region includes California and two other smaller states, and the New York re-
gion includes just New York and the adjacent state of New Jersey. Problems arise, how-
ever, in areas such as the Midwest where Chicago, a key center of venture capital activ-
ity, is subsumed within a broad geographic area. The case of New England is even more
problematic because Boston and Connecticut are combined as well as subsumed within a
broadly defined region.
The ratio of venture capital receipts to investments presented at the bottom of Table
2 provides a rough guide to venture capital flows between the various complexes. According
to these data, only California (2.25) and Texas (2.93) are net attractors of capital. The New
England region, which includes both Boston and Connecticut, simultaneously attracts and
exports capital, with imports and exports essentially balancing each other out. New York
(0.49) and the Midwest (0.70), with its primary center in Chicago are enormous exporters
of venture capital.
Taken together, the data shown above suggest a clear-cut investment pattern for venture
capital complexes. The financial complexes, New York and Chicago, clearly favor exports.
Silicon Valley/San Francisco not only retained the bulk of the venture capital it raised but
also attracted substantial outside capital. Although there is some variation in investment
flows for the hybrid complexes, each of these retained a sizeable share of the capital it
generated and each was able to attract significant capital from outside sources.
The following sections deploy a variety of quantitative and qualitative historical ma-
terial to document the unique characteristics of the various complexes. First, information
generated from our venture capital data base is used to examine investment and coinvestment
patterns and to identify links between complexes (Table 3). Second, the historical evolution
of each complex is documented through detailed examinations of primary source documents,
a thorough chronological review of the industry’s trade publication Venture Capital Journal
(hereafter abbreviated VCJ), reference to both published and unpublished secondary sources,
and extensive oral interviews with leading venture capitalists.
T
A
B
L
E
2
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
F
l
o
w
o
f
F
u
n
d
s
,
1
9
8
2
(
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
o
f
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
M
a
d
e
b
y
R
e
g
i
o
n
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
y
N
e
w
Y
o
r
k
/
T
e
x
a
s
/
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
/
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
R
e
g
i
o
n
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
N
e
w
J
e
r
s
e
y
M
i
d
a
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
S
o
u
t
h
M
i
d
w
e
s
t
G
u
l
f
C
o
a
s
t
P
l
a
i
n
s
R
o
c
k
i
e
s
S
o
u
t
h
w
e
s
t
N
o
r
t
h
w
e
s
t
I
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
S
h
a
r
e
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
N
e
w
Y
o
r
k
/
N
e
w
J
e
r
s
e
y
M
i
d
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
M
i
d
w
e
s
t
T
e
x
a
s
/
G
u
l
f
C
o
a
s
t
P
l
a
i
n
s
$
9
3
3
2
.
9
%
”
$
6
1
1
7
.
0
%
$
5
8
.
1
%
-
-
$
1
6
9
.
0
%
$
9
1
6
.
7
%
$
1
9
6
.
7
%
$
6
6
1
8
.
6
%
$
2
3
.
2
%
-
-
$
5
2
.
8
%
$
6
2
.
1
%
$
1
5
4
.
2
%
$
4
6
.
5
%
-
-
$
1
2
6
.
8
%
-
$
9
3
.
2
%
$
1
1
3
.
1
%
$
2
3
.
2
%
$
3
5
0
.
0
%
$
5
2
.
8
%
$
4
7
.
4
%
$
7
2
.
5
%
$
1
5
4
.
2
%
$
1
1
.
6
%
-
-
$
3
8
2
1
.
5
%
$
1
1
.
9
%
$
2
2
8
.
6
%
$
2
0
7
.
0
%
$
3
1
8
.
7
%
$
3
4
.
8
%
$
2
3
3
.
3
%
$
1
2
6
.
8
%
$
2
4
4
4
.
5
%
$
2
2
8
.
6
%
$
1
0
.
3
%
$
3
0
.
8
%
_
b
-
$
2
1
.
1
%
-
$
1
1
4
.
3
%
$
7
2
.
5
%
$
1
4
3
.
9
%
-
$
1
1
6
.
7
%
$
1
7
9
.
6
%
$
5
9
.
3
%
$
1
1
4
.
3
%
$
1
1
8
$
3
$
2
8
2
4
1
.
8
%
1
.
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
5
.
5
%
$
1
3
6
$
3
$
3
5
5
3
8
.
3
%
0
.
8
%
1
0
0
%
1
9
.
5
%
$
4
2
$
1
$
6
2
6
7
.
7
%
1
.
6
%
1
0
0
%
3
.
4
%
-
$
6
1
0
0
%
0
.
3
%
-
$
6
4
$
6
$
1
7
7
3
6
.
1
%
3
.
4
%
1
0
0
%
9
.
7
%
$
7
$
1
$
5
4
1
3
.
0
%
1
.
9
%
1
0
0
%
3
.
0
%
$
2
7
2
8
.
6
%
-
1
0
0
%
0
.
4
%
_
.
R
o
c
k
i
e
s
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
/
S
o
u
t
h
w
e
s
t
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
N
o
r
t
h
w
e
s
t
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
T
o
t
a
l
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
S
h
a
m
R
a
t
i
o
o
f
R
e
c
e
i
p
t
s
/
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
-
-
$
3
3
8
.
9
%
-
-
$
1
0
1
2
.
8
%
$
5
1
1
2
.
8
%
$
2
7
8
1
5
.
3
%
9
.
5
%
2
.
9
%
3
.
4
%
6
.
8
%
8
.
7
%
0
.
5
%
4
.
5
%
4
5
.
7
%
2
.
7
%
1
0
0
%
0
.
9
9
0
.
4
9
0
.
8
4
1
0
.
3
3
0
.
7
0
2
.
9
3
1
.
4
3
6
.
3
1
2
.
2
5
2
.
6
3
1
.
0
0
$
1
7
.
7
%
$
7
1
.
9
%
-
$
1
1
1
4
.
1
%
$
6
1
1
5
.
3
%
$
1
7
3
-
-
s
1
0
.
3
%
-
$
2
2
.
6
%
$
1
3
3
.
3
%
$
5
2
-
$
2
$
5
0
.
6
%
1
.
3
%
-
-
-
$
4
5
.
1
%
$
2
2
5
.
5
%
$
6
2
-
$
1
0
1
2
.
8
%
$
4
4
1
1
.
1
%
$
1
2
4
-
$
1
7
.
7
%
$
2
2
5
.
9
%
-
$
3
3
.
9
%
$
3
8
9
.
6
%
$
1
5
8
$
1
$
3
7
.
7
%
2
3
.
1
%
$
1
3
-
3
.
5
%
$
1
-
5
.
3
%
$
2
-
2
.
6
%
$
2
$
1
9
0
.
5
%
4
.
8
%
$
1
0
$
8
2
$
7
5
3
.
8
%
$
2
8
0
7
5
.
5
%
$
8
4
2
.
1
%
$
3
6
4
6
.
2
%
$
1
3
4
3
3
.
6
%
$
8
3
3
$
8
2
.
1
%
$
1
1
5
7
.
7
%
$
1
1
.
3
%
$
1
4
3
.
5
%
$
5
0
$
1
3
1
0
0
%
$
3
7
1
1
0
0
%
$
1
9
1
0
0
%
$
7
8
1
0
0
%
$
3
9
8
1
0
0
%
$
1
8
2
2
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
f
f
i
c
e
o
f
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
,
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
,
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
(
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
,
D
.
C
.
,
1
9
8
4
)
“
N
u
m
b
e
r
s
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
a
s
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
r
e
a
d
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
l
y
a
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
s
h
a
r
e
s
o
f
v
e
n
h
u
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
m
a
d
e
b
R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
u
n
d
e
r
$
1
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
.
0
.
7
%
2
0
.
4
%
1
.
0
%
4
.
3
%
2
1
.
8
%
1
0
0
%
308 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
TABLE 3 Investments and Coinvestments for Leading Venture Capital Complexes
NY MA CT CA IL MN TX Other/NA Total
New York Complex
Investments
Coinvestmens
Boston Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Connecricur Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
California Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Chicago Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Minneapolis Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
Texas Complex
Investments
Coinvestments
31 8 4 32 5 0 8 40
(24.2) (6.3)
(3. I) (25.0) (3.9) (0.0) (6.3) (31.3)
59 23 5 77 19 7 5 56
(23.5) (9.2) (2.0) (30.7) (7.5) (2.8) (2.0) (22.3)
6 37
(5.4) (33.1)
56 83
(19.4) (28.7)
3 13
(4.2)
(20.3)
67 35
(25.0) (13.1)
I 17 1 142 I 4 11 29
(0.5) (8.3)
(0.5) (68.5)
(0.3 (1.9) (5.3) (14.1)
129 34 19 236 32 23 10 97
(21.5) (9.0) (3.2) (39.3)
(5.3) (3.8) (1.7) (16.2)
1 1 1 9 3 3 6 14
(2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (23.7)
(7.9) (7.9) (15.8) (36.8)
20 14 1 27 9 6 6 29
(17.9) (12.5) (0.9) (24.1) (8.1) (5.4) (5.4) (25.9)
0 2 0 5 2 21 1 17
(0.0) (4.2) (0.0) (10.4) (4.2) (43.8) (2.1) (35.4)
16 7 2 15 11 15 0 13
(20.2) (8.9) (2.5) (19.0) (13.9) (19.0)
(0.0)
(16.5)
0 10 0 16 1 0 55 21
(0.0) (9.7) (0.0) (15.5) (1.0) (0.0) (53.4) (20.4)
27 39 12 55 8 8 59 93
(9.0) (13.0) (4.0) (18.3) (2.7) (2.7) (19.6) (30.9)
0 26
(0.0) (23.2)
10 65
(3.5) (22.5)
8 18
(12.5) (28.1)
19 49
(7.1) (18.3)
0
(0.0)
13
(4.5)
1
(1.6)
5
(1.9)
2
(1.8)
3
(1.0)
1
(1.6)
1
(0.4)
5
(4.5)
6
(2.1)
4
(6.3)
9
(3.3)
36
(32.1)
33
(11.4)
36
(32.1)
83
(30.2)
128
251
112
289
64
268
206
600
38
112
48
79
103
301
Numbers m parentheses represent percentage share of total
FINANCIAL COMPLEXES: NEW YORK AND CHICAGO
The New York and Chicago complexes are good models of finance-oriented complexes.
Both are dominated by venture capital operations tied to major financial corporations or
other institutional sources of wealth.
The New York venture capital complex emerged during the Great Depression. Its
catalysts were venture capital funds linked to family fortunes, most notably the Rockefellers
(Venrock), Whitneys (J.H. Whitney and Company), and Phipps (Bessemer Securities). The
Rockefeller family made important venture investments in McDonnell Douglass and Eastern
Airlines during the late 193Os, while J.H. Whitney and Co. provided backing for Minute
Maid (VCJ November 1974, June 1979). In 1969, Venrock was set up as a formal venture
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 309
capital arm of the Rockefeller family. It has since provided early-stage financing for a host
of important high technology companies, such as Intel and Apple Computer (VCJ June
1979).
More than 40 New York venture capital funds are linked to financial institutions, such
as large commercial banks (i.e., Citicorp, Bankers Trust, and Irving Trust), or investment
banks (i.e., Merrill Lynch; Drexel, Bumham, Lambert (Lambda); Smith Barney (First
Century Partnership); and Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette. New York City also houses a
number of funds, like Rothschild and CMNY, which are affiliated with European investors
(VCJ June, August, October 1979).
Most investments made by New York venture capitalists go to other regions. Only
$66 million, or less than 20%, of the $355 million invested by New York venture capitalists
was kept in state. Over $136 million (38%) was exported to California, $61 million (17%)
was given to New England, and $31 million went (9%) to Texas. When inflows to New
York from other regions are taken into account, venture capital invested in the area reached
$173 million, barely half the total raised there.
The firm level data reinforce these findings. Barely one quarter of the 128 sample
investments made by New York venture capitalists were located in state. Another 25% were
located in California, with the next largest shares going to New England (9%), Texas (6.3%),
and Illinois (3.9%). New York firms also had dispersed patterns of coinvesting, cooperating
most frequently with California venture capitalists (30.7%), with one another (23.5%), and
to a lesser degree with venture capitalists in Illinois and Massachusetts. To facilitate such
long distance venturing, many venture capital firms in New York have opened remote
branches in high technology regions like Silicon Valley and Boston-Route 128.
The Chicago complex is similar in many ways to New York. It is comprised of 23
venture capital firms that control about half of all venture capital raised in the Midwest.
Allstate Insurance was very important to the rise of Chicago venture capital. In 1960, it
became one of the first financial institutions to set up a venture capital fund (VCJ 1975).
Allstate’s director, Ned Heizer, made very successful investments in young high tech com-
panies such as Control Data, Memorex, Scientific Data Systems, Teledyne, and others
(Bylinsky 1976). In 1969, Heizer left Allstate to form his own venture capital company,
which was the country’s largest venture capital limited partnership when it was organized.
Heizer Corporation became a training ground for venture capitalists and has in turn been
responsible for spinning off a number of important venture capital companies.
Chicago banks became active in venture capital during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
First National Bank of Chicago currently has two venture capital affiliates (First Capital
Corporation of Chicago and the Institutional Venture Capital Fund), as does Continental
Illinois (Continental Illinois Equity Corporation and Continental Illinois Venture Corpora-
tion). AMOCO and Sears have also made some significant venture capital commitments.
The Chicago venture capital industry is rounded out by the important partnership, Golder
Thoma, a number of smaller partnerships, and a few SBICs (VCJ August 1974, June 1981).
Like New York, the Chicago venture capital complex tends to export funds. This is
reflected in the flow-of-funds data for the Midwest, which we use as a rough proxy for
Chicago. Nearly 80% of the $177 million raised by the Midwest was exported, the most
significant amount going to California ($64 million). The firm level data clarify this trend.
Less than 10% of investments in our Chicago sample were located in Illinois. The largest
share of investments (23.7%) went to California and Texas (15.8%). Because of their export
orientation, Chicago venture capitalists coinvested frequently with venture capitalists located
310 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
elsewhere, particularly California (24%), New York (17.9%), and Boston (12.5%). Chicago
venture firms invest frequently with other ~n~ce-o~ented venture capitalists, especially
those in New York.
SILICON VALLEY/SAN FRANCISCO AS A
TECHNOLOGY-ORIENTED COMPLEX
The Silicon Valley/San Francisco venture capital complex is the best example of technology-
oriented venturing. Venture groups began to emerge in the Bay Area during the late 1950s
and early 1960s. Before then, entrepreneurs had to rely on industrial corporations or financial
firms in more established financial centers for early-stage funding. For example, Shockley
Transistor Corporation was started with backing from Beckman Industries, whereas financing
for Fairchild Semiconductor was provided by Fairchild Camera.
The early venture groups in the Bay Area took on a variety of forms. The first venture
capital firm in California, Draper, Gaither and Anderson, was founded in 1958 as a limited
partnership. The following year saw the establishment of two federally leveraged SBICs,
Continental Capital Corporation and Small Business Enterprises. Another SBIC, Draper and
Johnson, was set up in 1962. The important firm, Sutter Hill, was founded as the venture
capital arm of the real estate development firm. Bank of America and a number of other
commercial banks also provided venture financing for expanding businesses during this early
period.
In 1961, New York investment banker Arthur Rock formed a model limited partnership
with Tommy Davis of Kern County Land Company. Of even greater significance was the
revolving syndicate of independent investors centered around John Bryan and Bill Edwards,
which later came to be known as “the group.” One inte~ittent partner of “the group,” Reid
Dennis, was able to persuade his employer, Firemen’s Fund Insurance, to invest in a number
of new ventures.
The Bay Area venture capital industry thus emerged from a period of active experi-
mentation with different types of organizations for providing venture capital. The seminal
period, 1956-1963, witnessed the establishment of more than a dozen impo~ant venture
capital firms in San Francisco and Silicon Valley. Faced with acute difficulties mobilizing
funds and the need to share information and expertise, these early venture capitalists gradually
evolved into an interactive community trading information and participating together in
rudimentary coinvestments.
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the dramatic growth and reorganization of the
Silicon Valley venture complex. Much of this expansion came from the original group of
venture capitalists. In 1968, for example, Bryan and Edwards was established, and George
Quist, of Bank of America, set up Hambrecht and Quist. In 1974, Reid Dennis founded
Institutional Venture Associates with Burton McMurtry of Palo Alto Investment. Two years
later, Institutional Venture Associates split into two partnerships, McMurtry’s Technology
Venture Associates and Dennis’ Institutional Venture Partners (Wilson 1985). Tommy Davis
launched the important Mayfield Fund in 1974.
A variety of other actors entered the Silicon Valley venture industry during this period.
In 1968, Bessemer Securities became one of the first East Coast venture capital firms to
open a California branch. Eugene Kleiner of Fairchild Semiconductor was a cofounder of
the important firm Kleiner Perkins in 1974, while Donald Valentine, an alumnus of both
Fairchild and National Semiconductor, established Capital Management Services, Inc. (later
Sequoia Capital) around the same time. Citicorp opened a West Coast office in 1973. A
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 311
host of new partnerships (i.e., Idanta Partners and WestVen Management) were formed
during this period. Between 1968 and 1975, approximately 30 new or reconstituted venture
capital operations were established in the Bay Area.
This period also saw an increase in outside funds committed to venture capital. One
consequence was the emergence of the limited partnership-with professional venture cap-
italists managing capital provided by passive outside investors-as the dominant model for
venture capital. University endowments, financial institutions, and pension funds initially
bet on venture capitalists with proven track records. Over time, a growing group of former
entrepreneurs, past employees of venture firms, and outside personnel were able to attract
financial resources and launch limited partnerships.
The growth of Silicon Valley as an entrepreneurial center resulted in a shift in the
locus of venture capital activity from San Francisco to Silicon Valley. The office complex
located at 3000 Sand Hill Road, Menlo Park has been a virtual headquarters for venture
capital activity since it was constructed in the early 1970s. Today, it houses more than two
dozen venture capital firms, making it the largest single enclave of venture capital in the
United States (Wilson 1985).
The Bay Area venture complex witnessed its most recent growth phase during the late
1970s and early 1980s. This period saw an even more dramatic surge in outside funding to
the industry. The reduction in the tax rate on capital gains and the liberalization of restrictions
on pension fund investments were two reasons for this (McMurtry 1986). The “profit squeeze”
faced by many large corporations and the tremendous success of venture-backed start-ups
such as Intel and Apple Computer also attracted external capital to the industry (Case 1986;
Bygrave and Timmons 1986). This growing pool of funds encouraged significant spinoff
activity from established funds. Citicorp, for example, became a virtual training ground for
venture capitalists. Its alumni established a series of important partnerships during this period,
notably Arscott, Norton and Associates (1978), and Dougery, Jones and Wilder (1981).
Similarly, Merrill, Pickard, Anderson and Eyre was founded by members of Bank of Amer-
ica’s venture group.
The early 1980s saw the emergence of venture capital “megafunds,” as established
venture capitalists pyramided partnership funds on top of one another. This resulted in a
shift toward larger venture commitments and opened up an investment niche for seed funds
concentrating on very early stage investments, i.e., Alpha Partners, Crosspoint Ventures,
and Onset Partners (which was capitalized by a consortium of established venture capital
funds). Finally, a host of venture capital firms headquartered elsewhere opened California
offices, including L.F. Rothschild, J.H. Whitney, TA Associates, and General Electric
Venture Capital (GEVENCO). Between 1978 and 1982, more than 50 venture capital funds
were established in the Silicon Valley/San Francisco area (VCJ February, March 1980;
January, March, November, December 1981; February, March, May 1982).
In sharp contrast to New York and Chicago, California is a tremendous attractor of
venture capital. Three quarters ($280 million) of the $371 million it invested was placed in
state. Just 25% was exported, most of it going to New England and Texas. California claimed
nearly 50% of the capital invested by two regions, the Mid-Atlantic and Rockies, and
approximately 40% of the investments of New England, New York, and the Pacific North-
west. Capital inflows of $136 million from the New York area and an additional $118 million
from New England helped push the total amount of venture capital invested in California
to $833 million, or more than 45% of the total pool. California ended up nearly tripling its
endogenously raised resources as a result of such capital imports.
These findings are reinforced by the firm level data. Nearly 70% of the sample in-
312 R. L. FLORIDA AND M. KENNEY
vestments made by California venture capital firms were located in state. The next largest
concentrations were found in Massachusetts (8%) and Texas (5%). California venture cap-
italists also liked to coinvest with one another. Same state coinvesting represented 39% of
the deals in our California sample. California venture capitalists also participated fairly
regularly in investment syndications with New York City firms (21%), and to a lesser extent
with Massachusetts (90/o), and Texas funds (5%).
Venture capital in the Silicon Valley area evolved gradually alongside the high tech-
nology enterprises that spring up there. Venture capital thus became an integral part of what
we term a social structure of innovation (Florida and Kenney 1988): an interactive system
comprised of technology intensive enterprises, highly skilled human capital, high caliber
universities, substantial public/private research and development expenditures, specialized
networks of suppliers, support services such as law firms and consultants, strong entrepre-
neurial networks, and informal mechanisms for information exchange and technology trans-
fer.
The synergies among the various elements of this social structure created a unique
window of opportunity for the emergence of technology-oriented investing apart from tra-
ditional financial institutions. The growth of technology venturing then proceeded along a
learning curve characterized by the gradual accumulation of investment and management
skills on the part of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs alike. This in turn facilitated the
development of extended entrepreneurial networks that became conduits for sharing infor-
mation, making deals, and mobilizing resources. As a central component of such networks.
venture capital thus played an important role in incubating entrepreneurial activity, attracting
entrepreneurs, and accelerating rates of new business formation.
BOSTON AS A TECHNOLOGY-ORIENTED HYBRID
The venture capital industry in Boston is a hybrid complex, combining characteristics of
technology- and finance-based venture capital complexes. Boston was perhaps the first area
to possess some degree of organized venture capital. As early as 1911, the Boston Chamber
of Commerce was providing financial and technical assistance to new enterprises. In 1940,
the New England Industrial Development Corporation was launched to provide similar kinds
of assistance to new ventures (Kaplan 1948).
Boston was the home of American Research and Development (1946) the nation’s
first institutional venture fund. ARD was the creation of a prominent group of bankers and
industrialists who saw such an entity as a way to more effectively finance technology-
oriented enterprise (Liles 1977). In addition, a significant number of early venture capital
investments in the Boston area were made by private individuals and wealthy families both
from the Boston area and New York City.
By the early 1960s large Boston financial institutions also became involved in venture
capital. First National Bank of Boston established a program for providing loans to tech-
nology-oriented businesses and formed an SBIC affiliate. Around the same time, Federal
Street SBIC was established, a consortium of Boston banks.
Like Silicon Valley, Boston witnessed the development of a technology-oriented ven-
ture community parallel to the emergence of the Route 128 entrepreneurial complex. ARD’s
enormously successful investment in Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) in the late 1950s
provided a vital impetus to the climate for high technology entrepreneurship in Boston. DEC
plryed a significant role in the evolution of the Boston-Route 128 high technology center;
VENTURE CAPITAL AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 313
it became an incubator for more than 30 spinoffs, most notably Data General (Dorfman
1983).
ARD similarly became an incubator for venture capital funds. In 1963, Boston Capital
Corp. was founded by ARD alumnus, Joseph Powell. By the 197Os, ARD alumni were
instrumental in launching a host of top level partnerships including Palmer, Greylock, Charles
River Partnership, and Morgan Holland (VCJ March 1974, August 1975, November 1976).
In 1968, Peter Brooke left his position as manager of First National Bank of Boston’s high
technology loan program and later went on to launch TA Associates, which currently manages
more than $1.5 billion in capital. making it the largest venture capital fund in the country.
As the technology base of the Boston region developed, a host of partnerships were
organized by veteran venture capitalists. Both Burr, Egan and Deleage and Claflan Capital
Management were formed by former TA Associates employees, while the Venture Capital
Fund of New England was established by managers of First National Bank of Boston’s
venture group. The late 1970s and early 1980s also saw the formation of new funds, such
as Eastech and Zerostage, and the movement of branch offices of funds headquartered
elsewhere, such as Bessemer Venture Capital, to the Boston area.
Our interviews with Boston venture capitalists indicate that the Boston complex is not
nearly as tightly organized as that of San Francisco/Silicon Valley. There appears to be
much less information sharing and/or coinvesting among Boston venture capitalists, although
a number of Boston firms possess rather tight links to New York City venture capitalists.
In contrast to California, a significant number of Boston venture firms are involved in large-
scale financial transactions such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) which clearly fall outside
traditional venture capital activities.
The data on investments and coinvestments illuminate the hybrid characteristics of the
Boston complex. If we use data on the flow of funds for New England as a proxy, the
Boston complex essentially breaks even when imports and exports are taken into account.
Roughly one third ($93 million) of the $282 million invested by venture capitalists in New
England was placed within the region. A sizeable percentage was exported, with the largest
amounts going to California ($118 million), New York ($19 million), and Texas ($20
million). However, New England was able to replenish its capital exports with sizeable
inflows from other areas. These included inflows of $61 million from New York, $33 million
from California, and $16 million from the Midwest.
The firm level data clarify these trends. Boston venture capitalists concentrated ap-
proximately one third of their investments in state. More than 20% were made in California.
Boston venture capitalists coinvested regularly with one another as well as with venture
capitalists located in other complexes. Nearly 30% of investment syndications involving
Boston venture capital firms were with other Boston firms. whereas 22% were with venture
capitalists in California, and 19% were with New York firms. Even though Boston ven-
ture capitalists participate in a significant amount of long distance investing, the their
venture capital complex remains an important component of the Boston-Route 128 high
tech region and the broader social structure of innovation that characterizes that area.
DIFFERENCES AMONG HYBRID COMPLEXES: CONNECTICUT,
TEXAS, AND MINNEAPOLIS
The three remaining complexes~ America. Boston: Allen Unwin.
McMurty, B. 1986. Tax policy influences on venture capital. In R. Landau and D. Jorgensen, eds.,
Technology and Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: Ballinger, pp. 137-152.
Mears, W. 1981. Corporate Venture Capital: Can It Be Successful? Cambridge MA: Master’s Thesis,
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT.
Noone, C. and Rubel, S. 1970. SBfCs: Pioneers in Organized Venture Capital. Chicago: Capital
Publishing.
Oakey, R. 1984. High Technology Small Firms: Innovation and Regional Development in Britain and
the United States. New York: St. Martin’s.
Office of Technology Assessment. 1984. Technology, Innovation and Regional Economic Develop-
ment. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO.
Pratt, S. 1986. %uide to Venture Capital Sources. Wellesley, MA: Venture Economics.
Rothwell, R. 1985. Venture finance, small firms and public policy in the U.K. Research Policy
14:253-265.
Rothwell, R. 1984. The role of small firms in the emergence of new technologies, OMEGA: The
lnternat~onal Journal of management Science 12(1):19-29.
Ruvelson, A. 1971. The First SBIC. In S. Rubel and E. Novotny eds., How to Raise and Invest
Venture Capital, New York: Presidents Publishing House, pp. 199-208.
Saxenian, A. 1985. Silicon valley and route 128: Regional prototypes or historical exceptions. In M.
Castells, ed., High Technology, Space and Society, Berkeley, CA: Sage.
Senker, J. 1985. Small high technology firms: Some regional implications. Technovat~on 3:243-262.
Silver, A.D. 1984. Who’s Who in Venture Capital. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Supple, B. 1957. A business elite: German-Jewish financiers in nineteenth century New York. Business
History Review
Timmons, J. 1981. Venture capita1 activity in the US: A survey of the most active investors. In K.
Vesper, ed., Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 1981, Wellesley, MA: Babson College
Center for Entrepreneurial Studies.
Timmons, J., et al. 1984. Venture Capital Investment and the Development of High Technology
Companies. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation.
Timmons, J., Fast, N. and Bygrave, W. 1983. The flow of venture capita1 to highly innovative
technologic~ ventures. In J. Hornaday, J. Timmons and K. Vesper, eds., Frontiers of Entre-
preneurship Research 1983. Wellesley MA: Babson College, Center for Entrepreneurial Studies
316-35.
Tyebjee, T. and Bruno, A. 1984. A model of venture capitalist investment activity. Management
Science 30(9):1051-1066.
Venture Capital Journal. Various years cited in text.
Venture Economics. 1983. Regional Patterns of Venture Capital Investment. Prepared for the U.S.
Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C.
Venture Economics. 1985. The Venture Capital Industry: Opportunities and Considerations for Inves-
tors. Wellesley Hills, MA.
Venture Economics. Various years cited in text. Venture Capital Yearbook. Wellesley Hills, MA.
Wilson, J. 1985. The New Venturers: Inside the High Stakes World of Venture Capital. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing.
doc_867099250.pdf