Description
Two prior papers by Merchant (1985b, 1990) have explored the use and effects of five management
controls at the profit center level of a large U.S. hrm. This study extends the investigation to a crosscuhural
context. Data were collected horn hrst-line profit center managers at Toshiba - a Japanese
manufacturer matched in size and industry to Merchant’s (anonymous) U.S. firm. These data were
combined with those of Merchant to test four predictions derived from Hofstede’s (1980) taxonomy
of national culture.
Accounting. Orgnnfzatkm and Sockty, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, pp. 175-192, 1996
Copyright 0 1996 Elswier Science Ltd
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THE USE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL!3 AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA
MANIPULATION AND MANAGEMENT POPIA:
A JAPAN VS U.S. COMPARISON
CHEE W. CHOW
San Di ego State Uni versi ty
YUTAKA KATO
Kobe Uni versi ty
and
KENNETH A. MERCHANT
Uni versi ty of Southern Cal i forni a
Abstract
Two prior papers by Merchant (1985b, 1990) have explored the use and effects of five management
controls at the profit center level of a large U.S. hrm. This study extends the investigation to a cross-
cuhural context. Data were collected horn hrst-line profit center managers at Toshiba - a Japanese
manufacturer matched in size and industry to Merchant’s (anonymous) U.S. firm. These data were
combined with those of Merchant to test four predictions derived from Hofstede’s (1980) taxonomy
of national culture. The tin- supported the predictions that relative to their U.S. counterparts, the
Japanese profit center managers were subject to tighter procedural controls and controls via directives
given at meetings. Further, when faced with the same level of control tightness, they did not engage in as
high a level of dysfunctional activities. However, contrary to prediction, the Japanese managers were
subject to significantly tighter controls overall than were the U.S. managers. Copyright 0 19% gtsevier
Science Ltd.
In the current era of increasing globalization of
business, the transferability of management
practices across national boundaries is an issue
of significant concern. Much evidence has been
reported on how national cultures differ and
how people of different national origins have
different views of, and reactions to, manage-
ment practices (e.g. Itami, 1991; Bartlett &
GhoshaI, 1989; Steers, 1989; Birnberg & Snod-
grass, 1988; Yang, 1984; Child, 1981; PascaIe &
Athos, 1981; Hofstede, 1980). These studies
have shown that the effectiveness of manage-
ment practices often depends on the presence
or absence of a set of particular cultural condi-
tions.
One important area to explore the potential
for cross-border transferability is that of manage-
ment control system design. The control sys-
tems used at managerial levels in many U.S.
corporations have been subjected to much criti-
cism because the systems allegedly make U.S.
managers excessively short-term oriented and
prone to manipulate performance data (e.g.
Busi ness Week, 1992; Council on Competitive-
The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of S. Mark Young, the anonymous reviewers, and workshop participants
at Harvard University, Indiana University, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, especially Pekin Ogan and Jamie Pratt.
175
176 C. W. CHOW et al.
ness, 1992; Jacobs, 1991). Many of the critics
point to the great success of Japanese corpora-
tions and suggest that managers of U.S. firms can
learn from their Japanese counterparts (e.g. Gib-
ney, 1992; Thurow, 1991; Duffy, 1988; Dore,
1987; Hasegawa, 1986; Lawrence & Dyer,
1983; Vogel, 1979; Cole, 1979; Yang, 1977).
The objective of this study is to provide evi-
dence useful for addressing descriptive and eva-
luative questions about control systems at the
profit center organization level, which is often
where a Iirm’s competitive advantage is won or
lost (Porter, 1980). To a large extent, this
research was exploratory because little prior
evidence has been reported about the features
of Japanese firms’ control systems at managerial
levels. Considerable research (e.g. Young, 1992;
Sakurai, 1990; Cusumano, 1985) has focused on
Japanese control innovations at the shop floor
level of the organization (e.g. just-in-time sys-
tems, kanban systems, total quality control),
and a few studies (Bailes & Asada, 1991; Shields
et al ., 1991; Tai, 1990; Anyane-Ntow, 1987;
Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Daley et al ., 1985;
Pucik & Hatvany, 1983) have specifically com-
pared Japanese and U.S. firms’ practices in stra-
tegic planning, budgeting, performance
evaluation, and cost accounting systems. How-
ever, we are aware of no research that has
addressed the transferability of management
controls placed on profit center managers
with the level of specificity of the current study.
This study involved collecting data from sam-
ples of profit center managers in one U.S. Iirm
(which must go unnamed) and one Japanese
firm (Toshiba). These firms were matched on
size and industry. They were selected because
both are prominent within their countries and
representative of the local management prac-
tices. The paper documents similarities and dif-
ferences between what can be called the firms’
“control strategies”: the types of control tools
used and the importance placed on each type
(Merchant, 1985a). The findings show that over-
all, Japanese managers are subject to tighter con-
trols than their U.S. counterparts. But when
faced with controls of equal tightness, they are
less likely to manipulate performance measures
and to discard their good investment ideas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section discusses the notion
of national culture and its potential effects on
the functioning of alternate controls. This dis-
cussion is used as the basis for deriving four
hypotheses regarding differences between the
use and effects of controls in U.S. vs Japanese
firms. Then the data collection procedures are
discussed and the results are presented. The
final section provides a discussion and conclud-
ing comments.
NATIONAL CULTURE AND PROFIT
CENTER-LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEMS
A control system can be defined to include
all devices that help ensure the proper beha-
vior of people in the organization (Merchant,
1985a). Using a combination of unstructured
interviews and a questionnaire survey of 54
profit center managers from a large, diversified
U.S. manufacturer, Merchant (1985b, 1990) stu-
died the uses and effects of controls on profit
center managers’ discretionary program expen-
ditures. Such expenditures, for example, for
new product development, employee develop
ment, and basic research, are important to
study because they are exactly the types of
expenditures said to be adversely affected by
systems that cause U.S. managers to be exces-
sively short-term oriented (myopic).’ The
’ In a third study conducted at the profit center level of analysis, Merchant (1989) focused on the design and use of
incentive compensation contracts. Using interviews with (coincidentally) 54 profit center managers from 12 diverse,
unrelated corporations, he identified some important tradeoffs in the design of incentive contracts for profit center
managers, including those between short- and long-run incentives, implicit and explicit promises, and monetary and
non-monetary rewards. While the use of incentive contracts is of interest, the scope of this study was limited only to
the set of controls examined in Merchant (1985b, 1990). It should be noted, however, that all fhms link all of the controls
studied here to one or more forms of rewards and punishments.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION 177
expenditures are investments in the future;
they produce little or no profits in the current
measurement period (quarter or year).
In his U.S. study, Merchant found that profit
center managers’ discretionary program spend-
ing decisions were affected by a broad set of
controls, the most Important of which can be
classified into five categories: net income tar-
gets, expense targets, headcount constraints,
procedural controls (requirements for
approvals), and directives given by higher man-
agement typically in formal meetings. He also
found that the various types of controls tended
to be used to reinforce each other, so the
measures of the impacts of each of the types
of controls could be aggregated to provide
an indication of overall control system
“tightness”.*
Given the continued trend towards globallza-
tion, an obvious follow-on question to Mer-
chant’s findings is: Should we expect the
control systems used in non-U.S. firms, and
their effects, to be different from those used
in U.S. lirms? Answers to these questions are
important, as they can indicate the degree to
which firms can profitably emulate the control
systems of their successful foreign competitors
as well as export their own controls to overseas
operations. Yet direct evidence on these ques-
tions has not yet been reported. In the case of
Japan and the U.S., a study by Snodgrass and
Grant (1986) hypothesized that individuals ln
Japanese organizations experience less explicit
(formal) control than do their U.S. counter-
parts, but the empirical results falled to support
this hypothesis. Further, the effects of the con-
trols were not explored.
There is accumulating evidence that suggests
the existence of a link between national cul-
tural variables and profit center-level control
system choices. A number of authors have con-
cluded that people from different nations have
diverse work-related cultures (Adler et al .,
1986; Laurent, 1983; Hofstede, 1980, 1991)
as well as different attitudes towards, or reac-
tions to, the same set of controls (Chow et al .,
1991, 1994; Kreder & Zeller, 1988; Blrnberg &
Snodgrass, 1988; Lincoln et al ., 1978; Horovltz,
1980). These Iindings, combined with knowl-
edge about the significantly different histories
and cultures of the U.S. and Japan (e.g.
McMlllan, 1984), suggest that U.S. and Japa-
nese Iirms’ control system choices should
not necessarily be identical, or even similar.
Controls that are effective ln one cultural set-
ting might not be effective, and might even be
dysfunctional, in another, significantly differ-
ent cultural setting.
Numerous approaches to the study of
national culture have been proposed (e.g.
Adler et al ., 1986; Schein, 1985; Frost et al .,
1985; Triandls, 1984; Brislin, 1983; Child,
1981; Hofstede, 1980, 1991). We organize our
discussion around Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cul-
tural taxonomy because it is well supported
emplrlcally and because it is arguably the most
widely cited and employed in buslness and
accounting research (e.g. Gudykunst & Tlng-
Toomey, 1988; Harrison, 1992; Jaeger, 1983;
Kreacic & Marsh, 1986; Ronen & Shenkar,
* To the extent that controls are aimed at infhtencing behavior, the ultimate measure of a control system’s tightness should
be the extent of its behavioral effects. Such effects probably would vary with both the number of different controls used
and their stringency. Merchant (1985b, 1990) only examined a ftxed set of control system elements. As such, his Iindings
can be viewed as being focused on the stringency aspect of these controls, as manifested in their impacts on the fhm’s
resource allocation decisions. To preserve comparability between the Japanese and U.S. data, Merchant’s (1985b, 1990)
approach was followed in the current study. Accordingly, our tindings ate silent on the effects of varying the number of
control elements used.
178 C. W. CHOW et al.
1985; Soeters & Schreuder, 1988; Triandis,
1984).
Using a survey of some 116,000 individuals
from 72 countries, Hofstede (1980) identified
four important dimensions of work-related
national culture and suggested (1983, 1984,
1991) that specific relationships exist between
these cuIturaI dimensions and individuals’ pre-
ferences and actions in an employment setting.
Hofstede’s four cuhural dimensions are as
follows:
1. I ndi vi dual i sm us Col l ecti vi sm relates to
people’s selfconcept: “I” or “we”. Hofstede
suggested that people from a collectivistic cuI-
ture are motivated by group interests and
emphasize the maintenance of interpersonal
harmony, while people from an individualistic
culture tend to place their self-interests ahead
of those of the group.
2. Large us Smal l Power Di stance relates to
people’s acceptance that power in institutions
and organizations is distributed unequally. Hof-
stede suggested that individuals high on power
distance prefer, or at least have greater accep
tance of, centralization of decision-making
authority.
3. Hi gh us Low Uncertai nty Avoi dance
refers to the degree to which the members of
a society feel comfortable with uncertainty and
ambiguity. Hofstede suggested that people high
in uncertainty avoidance prefer to reduce
uncertainty or ambiguity by relying on written
or unwritten rules of behavior, formalization of
organizational structure, and standardization of
procedures.
4. Mascul i ni ty us Femi ni ni ty reflects prefer-
ences for achievement and material success as
opposed to emphases on relationships and the
quality of life. Hofstede suggested that people
high on masculinity tend to prefer basing
rewards on performance, whereas those low
on this dimension (i.e. high on femininity) pre-
fer to base reward allocations more highly on
needs.
In Hofstede’s (1980) study, workers from
Japan, the U.S., and other countries had the
following scores on the four cultural dimen-
sions:
Mean for:
39
J apan U.S. countri es
Individualism 46 91 51
Power Distance 54 40 51
Uncertainty Avoidance 92 46 64
MascuIinity 95 62 51
Thus, Hofstede’s results suggest sharp differ-
ences between the U.S. and Japanese cuI-
tures. U.S. culture is much more
individualistic than that of the Japanese, but
Japanese culture is higher on the other three
cuIturaI dimensions, especially uncertainty
avoidance.
Numerous other researchers (e.g. Harris &
Moran, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1984; Mitchell,
1974; Sampson, 1977; Spence, 1985) also have
isolated individualism as a predominant trait of
U.S. nationals and the self-interest motive as
being the cornerstone of American worldview
and management theories. On the other hand,
students of Japanese cuhure have noted the
Japanese tendency to place the interests of
the collective over those of the self (Befu,
1980; Kamata, 1982; Morsbach, 1980; Ouchi,
1981; Reischauer, 1977; Smith, 1983). These
conclusions were supported by the finding of
a recent study by Wolff et al . (1992) that
employee identification with company values
was significantly higher in Japan than the U.S.
Measured on a scale of 100, Japanese workers
scored 85, 66% higher than the U.S. workers’
score of 56. The Japanese score, which the
authors (p. 147) called “astounding”, was the
highest rating in the 33 industrial countries
surveyed; the U.S. was in the middle of the
pack. Together with Hofstede, these studies
provide a basis for predicting systematic differ-
ences in the use and effects of controls in the
U.S. and Japan.
To the extent that U.S. nationals are more
likely to emphasize their individual interests
over those of the firm, firms with predomi-
nantly U.S. rather than Japanese employees
should be less able to rely on employees’ self
motive in achieving its objectives. These firms
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION 179
should have more to gain from instituting a
tight management control system. Thus, we
predict that, overall, U.S. profit center man-
agers are subject to tighter controls than are
their Japanese counterparts:
Hl: Overall, the controls imposed on U.S.
profit center managers are tighter than
those imposed on their Japanese coun-
terparts.
While this holistic hypothesis is consistent
with the divergence between Japanese and
U.S. cultures on the (perhaps dominant) indi-
vidualism dimension, the other cultural dimen-
sions identified by Hofstede also have
implications for the use of controls. Since
the current study does not examine the use
of incentive awards, the masculinity dimen-
sion of culture will be ignored because its
control system implications relate primarily
to preferences regarding rewards. Of the
remaining two dimensions, Hofstede sug-
gested a positive relationship between uncer-
tainty avoidance and preferences/tolerances
for rules and standardized procedures. Since
the Japanese are much higher in uncertainty
avoidance, they can be expected to rely more
heavily on procedural controls because such
controls would be perceived as being more
desirable (or at least less undesirable) by
those whose behaviors are being controlled.
The higher power distance of the Japanese,
meanwhile, implies that they are more open
to receiving directives from their superiors.
These two predictions are summarized in the
following two hypotheses:
HZ: Compared to their U.S. cotmterparts,
Japanese profit center managers are sub
ject to tighter procedural controls.
H3: Compared to their U.S. counterparts,
Japanese profit center managers are sub
ject to tighter controls through direc-
tives given by superiors at meetings.
An issue raised by the preceding analysis is:
How can Japanese profit center managers be
subject to looser controls overall, yet also
face tighter controls through procedures and
directives? Reconciling this apparent inconsis
tency requires recognizing that different types
of controls function as a package. Controls can
serve as complements or substitutes for one
another, and they also may differ in both mag-
nitude and area of impact.3 While summing the
effects of different controls is one way to mea-
sure their overall tightness, it is important to
recognize that different mixes of controls can
provide the same overall tightness (level of
behavioral assurance).* Thus, it is possible for
overall control tightness to be higher for one
national group while at the same time some
individual controls have the opposite direc-
tional relationship. This would be so especially
if different controls have unequal constraining
or motivating effects on behavior (e.g. one con-
trol may have many times the effect of
another), and each national group emphasizes
those controls that are most desirable or accep
table to its members.
Beyond these control tightness issues, the
Japan-U.S. cultural divergence also has implica-
tions for the effects of controls. Merchant
(1990) found that pressure to meet financial
3 Analogous to looser overall controls coupled with greater tightness for some subparts is a garment that has a loose fit
overall, but is tight in some areas (e.g., the waist). The view that the various parts of a control system should be
approached as an interrelated package is not new. Many writers (e.g., Flamhohz, et al., 1985; Hayes, 1977; IChandwaIla,
1972; Otley, 1980; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978) have expressed a slmiIar position. However, extant research stiIl is
predominantly focused on smaIl subsets of controls in isoknion from the rest of the control system.
’ To the extent that different controls may reinforce each other, a linear aggregation approach probably cannot fuRy
capture the effects of a set of controls. We adopted the summation approach due to lack of guidance from the Literature
about the nature and magnitudes of such intetacdve/synetglstic effects. Identliying and calibrating such effects is a fruittul
direction for future research.
180 C. W. CHOW et al.
targets significantly increased the U.S. man-
agers’ tendency to engage in two types of dys-
functional activities - manipulation of
performance measures and overemphasizing
projects with short-term payoffs. The other cul-
tural dimensions are silent on this issue, but the
lower individualism (i.e. higher collectivism) of
the Japanese suggests that when faced with the
same degree of control tightness, Japanese
profit center managers would not engage in
dysfunctional activities, such as excessively
short-term oriented behavior or manipulation
of performance measures, to the same extent
as their U.S. counterparts. This prediction is
based on Hofstede’s (1980) suggestion, and
the findings of empirical research (e.g. Bond
et al., 1982; Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis,
1986) that people higher in collectivism are
more willing to subjugate their personal inter-
ests to those of the collective. Thus:
H4: Controlling for the degree of control
system tightness, the extent of dysfunc-
tional behavior is lower among Japanese
than U.S. profit center managers.
METHOD
Sample
Data from the U.S. firm came from Mer-
chant’s (1985b, 1990) sample of 54 first-level
profit center managers. Toshiba was selected
as the best Japanese match, in terms of size
and industry, to the U.S. firm. Both are among
the 50 largest industrial firms in the world;
both have many profit centers; the core busi-
nesses of both firms are electronics-related, but
both firms are somewhat diversified; both firms
are considered to be well managed and leaders
in their industries; the firms’ management
styles are considered to be representative of
those predominating in their country; and
neither firm was involved in any unusual activ-
ities at the time of the study, such as the
restructuring that has been taking place at Mat-
sushita (Ono & Williams, 1992). The Japanese
researcher on the team approached Toshiba’s
top management, and consent was given for
the firm’s participation in the study.
To ensure comparability between the two
national samples, the Toshiba sample, like its
U.S. counterpart, was limited to: (1) the lowest
level of profit center managers (i.e. the man-
agers had functional, not profit center, man-
agers, reporting to them); (2) profit centers
which included both manufacturing and mar-
keting functions (i.e. no “pseudo” profit cen-
ters were included); and (3) profit centers run
by managers based in the corporation’s home
country, so as not to dilute the effects of
national culture. Following Merchant’s
(1985b, 1990) procedure, the survey was dis-
tributed with a cover letter from corporate
management. Both strict confidentiality and
anonymity were guaranteed, and the survey
included a pre-stamped return envelope
addressed to the Japanese member of the
research team. Surveys were distributed to all
37 of Toshiba’s division managers. All
responded, yielding a 100% response rate as
compared to 95% for the U.S. sample. How-
ever, only 28 of the Japanese responses were
usable because nine of the respondents indi-
cated that they had profit center managers
reporting to them.
Descriptive data suggested that the two
national samples were comparable on some
key characteristics. The profit centers in both
firms were large; the mean (standard deviation)
number of employees for the Japanese profit
centers was 1570 0.10) Japan-U.S. difference in any of the
matching variables.
Table 4 presents the results of comparing
short-term emphasis and manipulation of per-
formance measures for each matched sample.
For all three matched samples, both dysfunc-
tional effects scores were significantly lower
for the Japanese managers. Thus, H4 was sup
ported: Japanese managers who faced the same
levels of control tightness as their U.S. counter-
parts did not engage in dysfunctional activities
to the same extent as the latter.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Given the current trend towards globaliza-
tion of business, the transferability of manage-
ment practices across national boundaries has
become an issue of increasing importance. This
study sought to shed light on this issue by
means of a cross-cultural comparison. The
tightness and effects of five organizational con-
trols were compared between profit center
managers from a Japanese and a U.S. manufac-
turing firm matched on both size and industry.
The taxonomy of national culture developed by
Hofstede (1980), supplemented by knowledge
of other studies on Japanese and U.S. culture,
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION
187
provided the basis for predicting systematic
differences between the two national samples.
We predicted (Hl) that, relative to their U.S.
counterparts, Japanese managers would be sub
ject to looser controls overall. This prediction
was based on the premise that Japanese
nationals are much higher in collectivism,
which in turn provides greater assurance to
their employers that they would place the col-
lective interest of their firm ahead of their per-
sonal interests. Contrary to this prediction, our
data suggested that Japanese managers are sub
ject to significantly tighter controls than their
U.S. counterparts.
We also predicted that because Japanese cul-
ture is higher in uncertainty avoidance and
power distance, Japanese managers would be
subject to tighter procedural controls and con-
trols through directives, typically given in
meetings with superiors (H2 and H3). Both of
these predictions were supported.
The contrary Gnding of the use of relatively
tight controls in a culture high in collectivism
seems interesting and important, but we do not
yet have a complete understanding of its causes
and implications. This finding might be related
to a similar apparent contradiction described
by McGraw (1986), who noted that the high
emphasis on “consensual” decision making in
Japan would seem to imply high decision mak-
ing participation, yet data suggest that “the
Japanese system of relationships and hierar-
chies tends to channel vital decisions into a
few hands” (p. 375). McGraw speculated that
the Japanese tendency toward centralization-
may be derived from the Tokugawa period in
Japan with its systematic stifling of dissent.
Our overall control-tightness finding may
have a similar historical cause as that noted
by McGraw, or it may be due to any of many
possible unmeasured variables, such as the ease
with which these forms of controls can be used
in Japan. For example, high use of directives
from upper management and procedural con-
trols may be linked to the Japanese firms’ life-
time employment policies which may limit
employees’ abilities to leave their firm even
when faced with these relatively stifling forms
of controls.
Our final hypothesis addressed the interac-
tion between controls and national culture in
producing dysfunctional behavioral effects. We
predicted that when faced with the same con-
trol tightness as their U.S. counterparts, the
more collectivistic Japanese managers would
not be as short-term oriented or as prone to
manipulate performance measures as the U.S.
managers. This prediction was supported.8
Relating to the effects of controls, one unex-
pected finding was that while the Japanese
managers are subjected to tighter controls
than their U.S. counterparts, they are encour-
aged to make all of the types of discretionary
investments we listed, while the U.S. managers
are discouraged from making all of these
investments except short-term cost reductions
(see Table 1, Panel B). Culture would seem
* An alternate interpretation of our finding relating to H4 is that relative to their U.S. counterparts, the Japanese profit
center managers may have been less willing to disclose their participation ln dysfunctional behaviors even anonymously. If
such “social desirability” bias did affect the Japanese managers’ responses, this still would suggest a greater perceived
social cost to such behaviors, and would imply a great reluctance among Japanese managers to engage ln them. On the
other hand, Japanese managers’ ability to engage in such behaviors may be restricted due to their iirm’s other controls
(e.g., centralixed accounting for revenues and expenses). Our data did not permit us to differentiate among these alternate
explanations, and we acknowledge this as a limitation that needs to be overcome by future studies.
188 C. W. CHOW et al.
certain to play a role in the explanation of this organizational and aggregation level of this
Ii.nding.9 study tend to change slowly.
As a whole, our results support the conten-
tion that differences in national culture do
affect individuals’ preferences for and reac-
tions to controls at the profit center level. For
purposes of designing controls in a cross-
national setting, these lindings suggest the
need to identify both the key dimensions on
which national cultures differ and how these
cultural differences influence individuals’ reac-
tions to controls. In the specific case of trans-
ferring control systems between Japan and the
U.S., our findings suggest that both the compo-
sition and tightness of the system may need to
be modified to fit the other nation’s culture.
It must be emphasized, however, that this
study was subject to several significant limita-
tions. Overcoming these limitations is a worth-
while direction for future research. First, our
data were collected from only one firm from
each country, and these findings certainly
require validation by other studies of other
firms and larger sample sizes. Firms tend to
have their own corporate cultures (e.g. Hof-
stede, 1991; Schein, 1985), so no firm provides
a perfect representation of central national cul-
tural tendencies, and the findings of the current
study may have been confounded by this
omitted variable.
Third, while the set of controls studied was
broad, it still did not capture all the aspects and
attributes of the companies’ control systems.
Other aspects of the control system (e.g. the
selection and sociallzatlon process, nature and
size of performance-based incentives, the
degree of difficulty and extent of participation
allowed ln setting performance targets) also are
likely to play significant roles in motivating
employees and constrain@ their behavior.
Inclusion of these additional variables can shar-
pen the findings, in part by capturing their
interaction with the controls included in this
study. Another reason for expanding the set
of control system features is that different cul-
tures may use different mixes of control system
subparts.
Second, the data from the U.S. and Japan
were collected several years apart, and control
practices and the economic environment may
have changed in the interim. This temporal
separation admittedly is a concern, but we
believe that its effect was probably minimal
because the data were collected during similar
recessionary periods in each country. Another
consideration is that control systems at the
Fourth, the current study has examined only
two potential effects of controls, and both
were dysfunctional (discouragement of new
ideas and manipulation of performance mea-
sures). Controls can be expected to have other
behavioral consequences that have major impli-
cations for the organization’s short-term and
long-term success, such as job effort, coopera-
tiveness, truthfulness of communications with
colleagues, job tension, and turnover. Expand-
ing the set of dependent variables to include
other consequences - both positive and nega-
tive - could provide additional insights.
Fifth, our study has focused on Japanese and
U.S. managers in their homecountry settings. If
national culture does have a major impact on
people’s preferences for, and reactions to, con-
trols, then we might expect Japanese (U.S.) man-
agers working in U.S. (Iapanese) settings to
exhibit behaviors similar to those of their fellow
nationals in their respective homecountries.
y To develop a fuller understanding about this and our other tindings, including those that were contrary to our expecta-
tions, followup interviews and discussions of our findings were conducted with three of the Toshiba profit center
managers in our sample. (We were unable to get permission for a more broad-based followup such as was feasible for
Merchant (1985b. 1990).) Unfortunately, after a wait of over three years and a number of enquiries, we still have not heard
from the fum regarding our request to incorporate materials from these interviews. We attribute the lack of action from
Toshiba to personnel reassignments within the company and the company’s management having been preoccupied with
substantial restructuring subsequent to our data collection, rather than concern over the sensitivity of the interview
contents.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION 189
Studies which examine such mixes between
lndivlduals’ national cultures and employment
settings can provide further insights into the
role of national culture in controls.
Sixth, further work to refine cultural con-
cepts and measures of controls would provide
sharper predictions and tests. For example,
Hofstede (1991) acknowledged that his ideas
may be biased due to their being based on
Western conceptions of culture. The risk of
bias may be small because, for example, the
Chinese CulturaI Connection (1987) has found
a hlgh degree of empirical convergence
between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and
dimensions identified with a “Chinese Value
Survey” (CVS) lnstrument based on Chinese
cultural concepts. Hofstede’s dimensions of
power distance, individualism and masculinity
were all highly correlated with cultural dimen-
sions identified by the CVS. The Chinese value
study, however, identified a fifth dimension,
labelled Confucian Dynamism. Hofstede
(1991) suggests that this addltional dimension
and his uncertainty avoidance dimension are
perhaps less universal than the other three of
his dimensions. We did not extend our discus-
sion to include the Confucian Dynamism con-
cept because we were unable to discern clear-
cut implications for control systems, but tests
of potential relationships might provide inter-
esting Iindlngs.
Studies of cultural effects are complex under-
takings in poorly charted waters. As is apparent
from our finding regarding overall control tight-
ness that was contrary to our prediction, we
still have much to learn about the relationships
between national culture and controls. The
relationships are probably more complex than
that implied by our univarlate and linear aggre-
gation approach. Just as the parts of a control
system operate as a package, each individual
simultaneously embodies all the dimensions of
national culture. Furthermore, just as controls
have the potential to complement or substitute
for one another, multiple cultural dimensions
may affect individuals’ preferences for, and/or
reactions to a given control ln interactive ways.
For example, ln an uncertain environment, one
way to insulate lndivldual managers’ measured
performance from the effects of noncontrolla-
ble factors is to evaluate managers relative to
one another (i.e. relative performance evalua-
tlon) (Chow & Haddad, 1991; Maher, 1987).
Because of their higher uncertainty avoid-
ance, the Japanese can be expected to have a
higher preference for this evaluation approach.
Yet relative performance evaluation also entails
explicit interpersonal comparisons and overt
competition, both of which are inconsistent
with the preference of high collectivism indivi-
duals to avoid interpersonal conflict and to pre-
serve interpersonal harmony. Thus, the net
preference for and reactions to relative perfor-
mance evaluation will depend on the relative
strengths of the effects of each of these cultural
dimensions. While our findings about proce-
dural controls and controls through directives
suggest that univarlate approaches can provide
insights into some relationships, it is almost
certain that more complex relationships exist.
Much room exists for future research to
explore how the various cultural dimensions
interactively affect individuals’ preferences for
and reactions to various forms and mixes of
controls.
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Two prior papers by Merchant (1985b, 1990) have explored the use and effects of five management
controls at the profit center level of a large U.S. hrm. This study extends the investigation to a crosscuhural
context. Data were collected horn hrst-line profit center managers at Toshiba - a Japanese
manufacturer matched in size and industry to Merchant’s (anonymous) U.S. firm. These data were
combined with those of Merchant to test four predictions derived from Hofstede’s (1980) taxonomy
of national culture.
Accounting. Orgnnfzatkm and Sockty, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, pp. 175-192, 1996
Copyright 0 1996 Elswier Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. ALI rights reserved
0361-3682/96 $15.00+0.00
03613682(95)0003&5
THE USE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL!3 AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA
MANIPULATION AND MANAGEMENT POPIA:
A JAPAN VS U.S. COMPARISON
CHEE W. CHOW
San Di ego State Uni versi ty
YUTAKA KATO
Kobe Uni versi ty
and
KENNETH A. MERCHANT
Uni versi ty of Southern Cal i forni a
Abstract
Two prior papers by Merchant (1985b, 1990) have explored the use and effects of five management
controls at the profit center level of a large U.S. hrm. This study extends the investigation to a cross-
cuhural context. Data were collected horn hrst-line profit center managers at Toshiba - a Japanese
manufacturer matched in size and industry to Merchant’s (anonymous) U.S. firm. These data were
combined with those of Merchant to test four predictions derived from Hofstede’s (1980) taxonomy
of national culture. The tin- supported the predictions that relative to their U.S. counterparts, the
Japanese profit center managers were subject to tighter procedural controls and controls via directives
given at meetings. Further, when faced with the same level of control tightness, they did not engage in as
high a level of dysfunctional activities. However, contrary to prediction, the Japanese managers were
subject to significantly tighter controls overall than were the U.S. managers. Copyright 0 19% gtsevier
Science Ltd.
In the current era of increasing globalization of
business, the transferability of management
practices across national boundaries is an issue
of significant concern. Much evidence has been
reported on how national cultures differ and
how people of different national origins have
different views of, and reactions to, manage-
ment practices (e.g. Itami, 1991; Bartlett &
GhoshaI, 1989; Steers, 1989; Birnberg & Snod-
grass, 1988; Yang, 1984; Child, 1981; PascaIe &
Athos, 1981; Hofstede, 1980). These studies
have shown that the effectiveness of manage-
ment practices often depends on the presence
or absence of a set of particular cultural condi-
tions.
One important area to explore the potential
for cross-border transferability is that of manage-
ment control system design. The control sys-
tems used at managerial levels in many U.S.
corporations have been subjected to much criti-
cism because the systems allegedly make U.S.
managers excessively short-term oriented and
prone to manipulate performance data (e.g.
Busi ness Week, 1992; Council on Competitive-
The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of S. Mark Young, the anonymous reviewers, and workshop participants
at Harvard University, Indiana University, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, especially Pekin Ogan and Jamie Pratt.
175
176 C. W. CHOW et al.
ness, 1992; Jacobs, 1991). Many of the critics
point to the great success of Japanese corpora-
tions and suggest that managers of U.S. firms can
learn from their Japanese counterparts (e.g. Gib-
ney, 1992; Thurow, 1991; Duffy, 1988; Dore,
1987; Hasegawa, 1986; Lawrence & Dyer,
1983; Vogel, 1979; Cole, 1979; Yang, 1977).
The objective of this study is to provide evi-
dence useful for addressing descriptive and eva-
luative questions about control systems at the
profit center organization level, which is often
where a Iirm’s competitive advantage is won or
lost (Porter, 1980). To a large extent, this
research was exploratory because little prior
evidence has been reported about the features
of Japanese firms’ control systems at managerial
levels. Considerable research (e.g. Young, 1992;
Sakurai, 1990; Cusumano, 1985) has focused on
Japanese control innovations at the shop floor
level of the organization (e.g. just-in-time sys-
tems, kanban systems, total quality control),
and a few studies (Bailes & Asada, 1991; Shields
et al ., 1991; Tai, 1990; Anyane-Ntow, 1987;
Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Daley et al ., 1985;
Pucik & Hatvany, 1983) have specifically com-
pared Japanese and U.S. firms’ practices in stra-
tegic planning, budgeting, performance
evaluation, and cost accounting systems. How-
ever, we are aware of no research that has
addressed the transferability of management
controls placed on profit center managers
with the level of specificity of the current study.
This study involved collecting data from sam-
ples of profit center managers in one U.S. Iirm
(which must go unnamed) and one Japanese
firm (Toshiba). These firms were matched on
size and industry. They were selected because
both are prominent within their countries and
representative of the local management prac-
tices. The paper documents similarities and dif-
ferences between what can be called the firms’
“control strategies”: the types of control tools
used and the importance placed on each type
(Merchant, 1985a). The findings show that over-
all, Japanese managers are subject to tighter con-
trols than their U.S. counterparts. But when
faced with controls of equal tightness, they are
less likely to manipulate performance measures
and to discard their good investment ideas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section discusses the notion
of national culture and its potential effects on
the functioning of alternate controls. This dis-
cussion is used as the basis for deriving four
hypotheses regarding differences between the
use and effects of controls in U.S. vs Japanese
firms. Then the data collection procedures are
discussed and the results are presented. The
final section provides a discussion and conclud-
ing comments.
NATIONAL CULTURE AND PROFIT
CENTER-LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEMS
A control system can be defined to include
all devices that help ensure the proper beha-
vior of people in the organization (Merchant,
1985a). Using a combination of unstructured
interviews and a questionnaire survey of 54
profit center managers from a large, diversified
U.S. manufacturer, Merchant (1985b, 1990) stu-
died the uses and effects of controls on profit
center managers’ discretionary program expen-
ditures. Such expenditures, for example, for
new product development, employee develop
ment, and basic research, are important to
study because they are exactly the types of
expenditures said to be adversely affected by
systems that cause U.S. managers to be exces-
sively short-term oriented (myopic).’ The
’ In a third study conducted at the profit center level of analysis, Merchant (1989) focused on the design and use of
incentive compensation contracts. Using interviews with (coincidentally) 54 profit center managers from 12 diverse,
unrelated corporations, he identified some important tradeoffs in the design of incentive contracts for profit center
managers, including those between short- and long-run incentives, implicit and explicit promises, and monetary and
non-monetary rewards. While the use of incentive contracts is of interest, the scope of this study was limited only to
the set of controls examined in Merchant (1985b, 1990). It should be noted, however, that all fhms link all of the controls
studied here to one or more forms of rewards and punishments.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION 177
expenditures are investments in the future;
they produce little or no profits in the current
measurement period (quarter or year).
In his U.S. study, Merchant found that profit
center managers’ discretionary program spend-
ing decisions were affected by a broad set of
controls, the most Important of which can be
classified into five categories: net income tar-
gets, expense targets, headcount constraints,
procedural controls (requirements for
approvals), and directives given by higher man-
agement typically in formal meetings. He also
found that the various types of controls tended
to be used to reinforce each other, so the
measures of the impacts of each of the types
of controls could be aggregated to provide
an indication of overall control system
“tightness”.*
Given the continued trend towards globallza-
tion, an obvious follow-on question to Mer-
chant’s findings is: Should we expect the
control systems used in non-U.S. firms, and
their effects, to be different from those used
in U.S. lirms? Answers to these questions are
important, as they can indicate the degree to
which firms can profitably emulate the control
systems of their successful foreign competitors
as well as export their own controls to overseas
operations. Yet direct evidence on these ques-
tions has not yet been reported. In the case of
Japan and the U.S., a study by Snodgrass and
Grant (1986) hypothesized that individuals ln
Japanese organizations experience less explicit
(formal) control than do their U.S. counter-
parts, but the empirical results falled to support
this hypothesis. Further, the effects of the con-
trols were not explored.
There is accumulating evidence that suggests
the existence of a link between national cul-
tural variables and profit center-level control
system choices. A number of authors have con-
cluded that people from different nations have
diverse work-related cultures (Adler et al .,
1986; Laurent, 1983; Hofstede, 1980, 1991)
as well as different attitudes towards, or reac-
tions to, the same set of controls (Chow et al .,
1991, 1994; Kreder & Zeller, 1988; Blrnberg &
Snodgrass, 1988; Lincoln et al ., 1978; Horovltz,
1980). These Iindings, combined with knowl-
edge about the significantly different histories
and cultures of the U.S. and Japan (e.g.
McMlllan, 1984), suggest that U.S. and Japa-
nese Iirms’ control system choices should
not necessarily be identical, or even similar.
Controls that are effective ln one cultural set-
ting might not be effective, and might even be
dysfunctional, in another, significantly differ-
ent cultural setting.
Numerous approaches to the study of
national culture have been proposed (e.g.
Adler et al ., 1986; Schein, 1985; Frost et al .,
1985; Triandls, 1984; Brislin, 1983; Child,
1981; Hofstede, 1980, 1991). We organize our
discussion around Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cul-
tural taxonomy because it is well supported
emplrlcally and because it is arguably the most
widely cited and employed in buslness and
accounting research (e.g. Gudykunst & Tlng-
Toomey, 1988; Harrison, 1992; Jaeger, 1983;
Kreacic & Marsh, 1986; Ronen & Shenkar,
* To the extent that controls are aimed at infhtencing behavior, the ultimate measure of a control system’s tightness should
be the extent of its behavioral effects. Such effects probably would vary with both the number of different controls used
and their stringency. Merchant (1985b, 1990) only examined a ftxed set of control system elements. As such, his Iindings
can be viewed as being focused on the stringency aspect of these controls, as manifested in their impacts on the fhm’s
resource allocation decisions. To preserve comparability between the Japanese and U.S. data, Merchant’s (1985b, 1990)
approach was followed in the current study. Accordingly, our tindings ate silent on the effects of varying the number of
control elements used.
178 C. W. CHOW et al.
1985; Soeters & Schreuder, 1988; Triandis,
1984).
Using a survey of some 116,000 individuals
from 72 countries, Hofstede (1980) identified
four important dimensions of work-related
national culture and suggested (1983, 1984,
1991) that specific relationships exist between
these cuIturaI dimensions and individuals’ pre-
ferences and actions in an employment setting.
Hofstede’s four cuhural dimensions are as
follows:
1. I ndi vi dual i sm us Col l ecti vi sm relates to
people’s selfconcept: “I” or “we”. Hofstede
suggested that people from a collectivistic cuI-
ture are motivated by group interests and
emphasize the maintenance of interpersonal
harmony, while people from an individualistic
culture tend to place their self-interests ahead
of those of the group.
2. Large us Smal l Power Di stance relates to
people’s acceptance that power in institutions
and organizations is distributed unequally. Hof-
stede suggested that individuals high on power
distance prefer, or at least have greater accep
tance of, centralization of decision-making
authority.
3. Hi gh us Low Uncertai nty Avoi dance
refers to the degree to which the members of
a society feel comfortable with uncertainty and
ambiguity. Hofstede suggested that people high
in uncertainty avoidance prefer to reduce
uncertainty or ambiguity by relying on written
or unwritten rules of behavior, formalization of
organizational structure, and standardization of
procedures.
4. Mascul i ni ty us Femi ni ni ty reflects prefer-
ences for achievement and material success as
opposed to emphases on relationships and the
quality of life. Hofstede suggested that people
high on masculinity tend to prefer basing
rewards on performance, whereas those low
on this dimension (i.e. high on femininity) pre-
fer to base reward allocations more highly on
needs.
In Hofstede’s (1980) study, workers from
Japan, the U.S., and other countries had the
following scores on the four cultural dimen-
sions:
Mean for:
39
J apan U.S. countri es
Individualism 46 91 51
Power Distance 54 40 51
Uncertainty Avoidance 92 46 64
MascuIinity 95 62 51
Thus, Hofstede’s results suggest sharp differ-
ences between the U.S. and Japanese cuI-
tures. U.S. culture is much more
individualistic than that of the Japanese, but
Japanese culture is higher on the other three
cuIturaI dimensions, especially uncertainty
avoidance.
Numerous other researchers (e.g. Harris &
Moran, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1984; Mitchell,
1974; Sampson, 1977; Spence, 1985) also have
isolated individualism as a predominant trait of
U.S. nationals and the self-interest motive as
being the cornerstone of American worldview
and management theories. On the other hand,
students of Japanese cuhure have noted the
Japanese tendency to place the interests of
the collective over those of the self (Befu,
1980; Kamata, 1982; Morsbach, 1980; Ouchi,
1981; Reischauer, 1977; Smith, 1983). These
conclusions were supported by the finding of
a recent study by Wolff et al . (1992) that
employee identification with company values
was significantly higher in Japan than the U.S.
Measured on a scale of 100, Japanese workers
scored 85, 66% higher than the U.S. workers’
score of 56. The Japanese score, which the
authors (p. 147) called “astounding”, was the
highest rating in the 33 industrial countries
surveyed; the U.S. was in the middle of the
pack. Together with Hofstede, these studies
provide a basis for predicting systematic differ-
ences in the use and effects of controls in the
U.S. and Japan.
To the extent that U.S. nationals are more
likely to emphasize their individual interests
over those of the firm, firms with predomi-
nantly U.S. rather than Japanese employees
should be less able to rely on employees’ self
motive in achieving its objectives. These firms
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION 179
should have more to gain from instituting a
tight management control system. Thus, we
predict that, overall, U.S. profit center man-
agers are subject to tighter controls than are
their Japanese counterparts:
Hl: Overall, the controls imposed on U.S.
profit center managers are tighter than
those imposed on their Japanese coun-
terparts.
While this holistic hypothesis is consistent
with the divergence between Japanese and
U.S. cultures on the (perhaps dominant) indi-
vidualism dimension, the other cultural dimen-
sions identified by Hofstede also have
implications for the use of controls. Since
the current study does not examine the use
of incentive awards, the masculinity dimen-
sion of culture will be ignored because its
control system implications relate primarily
to preferences regarding rewards. Of the
remaining two dimensions, Hofstede sug-
gested a positive relationship between uncer-
tainty avoidance and preferences/tolerances
for rules and standardized procedures. Since
the Japanese are much higher in uncertainty
avoidance, they can be expected to rely more
heavily on procedural controls because such
controls would be perceived as being more
desirable (or at least less undesirable) by
those whose behaviors are being controlled.
The higher power distance of the Japanese,
meanwhile, implies that they are more open
to receiving directives from their superiors.
These two predictions are summarized in the
following two hypotheses:
HZ: Compared to their U.S. cotmterparts,
Japanese profit center managers are sub
ject to tighter procedural controls.
H3: Compared to their U.S. counterparts,
Japanese profit center managers are sub
ject to tighter controls through direc-
tives given by superiors at meetings.
An issue raised by the preceding analysis is:
How can Japanese profit center managers be
subject to looser controls overall, yet also
face tighter controls through procedures and
directives? Reconciling this apparent inconsis
tency requires recognizing that different types
of controls function as a package. Controls can
serve as complements or substitutes for one
another, and they also may differ in both mag-
nitude and area of impact.3 While summing the
effects of different controls is one way to mea-
sure their overall tightness, it is important to
recognize that different mixes of controls can
provide the same overall tightness (level of
behavioral assurance).* Thus, it is possible for
overall control tightness to be higher for one
national group while at the same time some
individual controls have the opposite direc-
tional relationship. This would be so especially
if different controls have unequal constraining
or motivating effects on behavior (e.g. one con-
trol may have many times the effect of
another), and each national group emphasizes
those controls that are most desirable or accep
table to its members.
Beyond these control tightness issues, the
Japan-U.S. cultural divergence also has implica-
tions for the effects of controls. Merchant
(1990) found that pressure to meet financial
3 Analogous to looser overall controls coupled with greater tightness for some subparts is a garment that has a loose fit
overall, but is tight in some areas (e.g., the waist). The view that the various parts of a control system should be
approached as an interrelated package is not new. Many writers (e.g., Flamhohz, et al., 1985; Hayes, 1977; IChandwaIla,
1972; Otley, 1980; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978) have expressed a slmiIar position. However, extant research stiIl is
predominantly focused on smaIl subsets of controls in isoknion from the rest of the control system.
’ To the extent that different controls may reinforce each other, a linear aggregation approach probably cannot fuRy
capture the effects of a set of controls. We adopted the summation approach due to lack of guidance from the Literature
about the nature and magnitudes of such intetacdve/synetglstic effects. Identliying and calibrating such effects is a fruittul
direction for future research.
180 C. W. CHOW et al.
targets significantly increased the U.S. man-
agers’ tendency to engage in two types of dys-
functional activities - manipulation of
performance measures and overemphasizing
projects with short-term payoffs. The other cul-
tural dimensions are silent on this issue, but the
lower individualism (i.e. higher collectivism) of
the Japanese suggests that when faced with the
same degree of control tightness, Japanese
profit center managers would not engage in
dysfunctional activities, such as excessively
short-term oriented behavior or manipulation
of performance measures, to the same extent
as their U.S. counterparts. This prediction is
based on Hofstede’s (1980) suggestion, and
the findings of empirical research (e.g. Bond
et al., 1982; Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis,
1986) that people higher in collectivism are
more willing to subjugate their personal inter-
ests to those of the collective. Thus:
H4: Controlling for the degree of control
system tightness, the extent of dysfunc-
tional behavior is lower among Japanese
than U.S. profit center managers.
METHOD
Sample
Data from the U.S. firm came from Mer-
chant’s (1985b, 1990) sample of 54 first-level
profit center managers. Toshiba was selected
as the best Japanese match, in terms of size
and industry, to the U.S. firm. Both are among
the 50 largest industrial firms in the world;
both have many profit centers; the core busi-
nesses of both firms are electronics-related, but
both firms are somewhat diversified; both firms
are considered to be well managed and leaders
in their industries; the firms’ management
styles are considered to be representative of
those predominating in their country; and
neither firm was involved in any unusual activ-
ities at the time of the study, such as the
restructuring that has been taking place at Mat-
sushita (Ono & Williams, 1992). The Japanese
researcher on the team approached Toshiba’s
top management, and consent was given for
the firm’s participation in the study.
To ensure comparability between the two
national samples, the Toshiba sample, like its
U.S. counterpart, was limited to: (1) the lowest
level of profit center managers (i.e. the man-
agers had functional, not profit center, man-
agers, reporting to them); (2) profit centers
which included both manufacturing and mar-
keting functions (i.e. no “pseudo” profit cen-
ters were included); and (3) profit centers run
by managers based in the corporation’s home
country, so as not to dilute the effects of
national culture. Following Merchant’s
(1985b, 1990) procedure, the survey was dis-
tributed with a cover letter from corporate
management. Both strict confidentiality and
anonymity were guaranteed, and the survey
included a pre-stamped return envelope
addressed to the Japanese member of the
research team. Surveys were distributed to all
37 of Toshiba’s division managers. All
responded, yielding a 100% response rate as
compared to 95% for the U.S. sample. How-
ever, only 28 of the Japanese responses were
usable because nine of the respondents indi-
cated that they had profit center managers
reporting to them.
Descriptive data suggested that the two
national samples were comparable on some
key characteristics. The profit centers in both
firms were large; the mean (standard deviation)
number of employees for the Japanese profit
centers was 1570 0.10) Japan-U.S. difference in any of the
matching variables.
Table 4 presents the results of comparing
short-term emphasis and manipulation of per-
formance measures for each matched sample.
For all three matched samples, both dysfunc-
tional effects scores were significantly lower
for the Japanese managers. Thus, H4 was sup
ported: Japanese managers who faced the same
levels of control tightness as their U.S. counter-
parts did not engage in dysfunctional activities
to the same extent as the latter.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Given the current trend towards globaliza-
tion of business, the transferability of manage-
ment practices across national boundaries has
become an issue of increasing importance. This
study sought to shed light on this issue by
means of a cross-cultural comparison. The
tightness and effects of five organizational con-
trols were compared between profit center
managers from a Japanese and a U.S. manufac-
turing firm matched on both size and industry.
The taxonomy of national culture developed by
Hofstede (1980), supplemented by knowledge
of other studies on Japanese and U.S. culture,
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION
187
provided the basis for predicting systematic
differences between the two national samples.
We predicted (Hl) that, relative to their U.S.
counterparts, Japanese managers would be sub
ject to looser controls overall. This prediction
was based on the premise that Japanese
nationals are much higher in collectivism,
which in turn provides greater assurance to
their employers that they would place the col-
lective interest of their firm ahead of their per-
sonal interests. Contrary to this prediction, our
data suggested that Japanese managers are sub
ject to significantly tighter controls than their
U.S. counterparts.
We also predicted that because Japanese cul-
ture is higher in uncertainty avoidance and
power distance, Japanese managers would be
subject to tighter procedural controls and con-
trols through directives, typically given in
meetings with superiors (H2 and H3). Both of
these predictions were supported.
The contrary Gnding of the use of relatively
tight controls in a culture high in collectivism
seems interesting and important, but we do not
yet have a complete understanding of its causes
and implications. This finding might be related
to a similar apparent contradiction described
by McGraw (1986), who noted that the high
emphasis on “consensual” decision making in
Japan would seem to imply high decision mak-
ing participation, yet data suggest that “the
Japanese system of relationships and hierar-
chies tends to channel vital decisions into a
few hands” (p. 375). McGraw speculated that
the Japanese tendency toward centralization-
may be derived from the Tokugawa period in
Japan with its systematic stifling of dissent.
Our overall control-tightness finding may
have a similar historical cause as that noted
by McGraw, or it may be due to any of many
possible unmeasured variables, such as the ease
with which these forms of controls can be used
in Japan. For example, high use of directives
from upper management and procedural con-
trols may be linked to the Japanese firms’ life-
time employment policies which may limit
employees’ abilities to leave their firm even
when faced with these relatively stifling forms
of controls.
Our final hypothesis addressed the interac-
tion between controls and national culture in
producing dysfunctional behavioral effects. We
predicted that when faced with the same con-
trol tightness as their U.S. counterparts, the
more collectivistic Japanese managers would
not be as short-term oriented or as prone to
manipulate performance measures as the U.S.
managers. This prediction was supported.8
Relating to the effects of controls, one unex-
pected finding was that while the Japanese
managers are subjected to tighter controls
than their U.S. counterparts, they are encour-
aged to make all of the types of discretionary
investments we listed, while the U.S. managers
are discouraged from making all of these
investments except short-term cost reductions
(see Table 1, Panel B). Culture would seem
* An alternate interpretation of our finding relating to H4 is that relative to their U.S. counterparts, the Japanese profit
center managers may have been less willing to disclose their participation ln dysfunctional behaviors even anonymously. If
such “social desirability” bias did affect the Japanese managers’ responses, this still would suggest a greater perceived
social cost to such behaviors, and would imply a great reluctance among Japanese managers to engage ln them. On the
other hand, Japanese managers’ ability to engage in such behaviors may be restricted due to their iirm’s other controls
(e.g., centralixed accounting for revenues and expenses). Our data did not permit us to differentiate among these alternate
explanations, and we acknowledge this as a limitation that needs to be overcome by future studies.
188 C. W. CHOW et al.
certain to play a role in the explanation of this organizational and aggregation level of this
Ii.nding.9 study tend to change slowly.
As a whole, our results support the conten-
tion that differences in national culture do
affect individuals’ preferences for and reac-
tions to controls at the profit center level. For
purposes of designing controls in a cross-
national setting, these lindings suggest the
need to identify both the key dimensions on
which national cultures differ and how these
cultural differences influence individuals’ reac-
tions to controls. In the specific case of trans-
ferring control systems between Japan and the
U.S., our findings suggest that both the compo-
sition and tightness of the system may need to
be modified to fit the other nation’s culture.
It must be emphasized, however, that this
study was subject to several significant limita-
tions. Overcoming these limitations is a worth-
while direction for future research. First, our
data were collected from only one firm from
each country, and these findings certainly
require validation by other studies of other
firms and larger sample sizes. Firms tend to
have their own corporate cultures (e.g. Hof-
stede, 1991; Schein, 1985), so no firm provides
a perfect representation of central national cul-
tural tendencies, and the findings of the current
study may have been confounded by this
omitted variable.
Third, while the set of controls studied was
broad, it still did not capture all the aspects and
attributes of the companies’ control systems.
Other aspects of the control system (e.g. the
selection and sociallzatlon process, nature and
size of performance-based incentives, the
degree of difficulty and extent of participation
allowed ln setting performance targets) also are
likely to play significant roles in motivating
employees and constrain@ their behavior.
Inclusion of these additional variables can shar-
pen the findings, in part by capturing their
interaction with the controls included in this
study. Another reason for expanding the set
of control system features is that different cul-
tures may use different mixes of control system
subparts.
Second, the data from the U.S. and Japan
were collected several years apart, and control
practices and the economic environment may
have changed in the interim. This temporal
separation admittedly is a concern, but we
believe that its effect was probably minimal
because the data were collected during similar
recessionary periods in each country. Another
consideration is that control systems at the
Fourth, the current study has examined only
two potential effects of controls, and both
were dysfunctional (discouragement of new
ideas and manipulation of performance mea-
sures). Controls can be expected to have other
behavioral consequences that have major impli-
cations for the organization’s short-term and
long-term success, such as job effort, coopera-
tiveness, truthfulness of communications with
colleagues, job tension, and turnover. Expand-
ing the set of dependent variables to include
other consequences - both positive and nega-
tive - could provide additional insights.
Fifth, our study has focused on Japanese and
U.S. managers in their homecountry settings. If
national culture does have a major impact on
people’s preferences for, and reactions to, con-
trols, then we might expect Japanese (U.S.) man-
agers working in U.S. (Iapanese) settings to
exhibit behaviors similar to those of their fellow
nationals in their respective homecountries.
y To develop a fuller understanding about this and our other tindings, including those that were contrary to our expecta-
tions, followup interviews and discussions of our findings were conducted with three of the Toshiba profit center
managers in our sample. (We were unable to get permission for a more broad-based followup such as was feasible for
Merchant (1985b. 1990).) Unfortunately, after a wait of over three years and a number of enquiries, we still have not heard
from the fum regarding our request to incorporate materials from these interviews. We attribute the lack of action from
Toshiba to personnel reassignments within the company and the company’s management having been preoccupied with
substantial restructuring subsequent to our data collection, rather than concern over the sensitivity of the interview
contents.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DATA MANIPULATION 189
Studies which examine such mixes between
lndivlduals’ national cultures and employment
settings can provide further insights into the
role of national culture in controls.
Sixth, further work to refine cultural con-
cepts and measures of controls would provide
sharper predictions and tests. For example,
Hofstede (1991) acknowledged that his ideas
may be biased due to their being based on
Western conceptions of culture. The risk of
bias may be small because, for example, the
Chinese CulturaI Connection (1987) has found
a hlgh degree of empirical convergence
between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and
dimensions identified with a “Chinese Value
Survey” (CVS) lnstrument based on Chinese
cultural concepts. Hofstede’s dimensions of
power distance, individualism and masculinity
were all highly correlated with cultural dimen-
sions identified by the CVS. The Chinese value
study, however, identified a fifth dimension,
labelled Confucian Dynamism. Hofstede
(1991) suggests that this addltional dimension
and his uncertainty avoidance dimension are
perhaps less universal than the other three of
his dimensions. We did not extend our discus-
sion to include the Confucian Dynamism con-
cept because we were unable to discern clear-
cut implications for control systems, but tests
of potential relationships might provide inter-
esting Iindlngs.
Studies of cultural effects are complex under-
takings in poorly charted waters. As is apparent
from our finding regarding overall control tight-
ness that was contrary to our prediction, we
still have much to learn about the relationships
between national culture and controls. The
relationships are probably more complex than
that implied by our univarlate and linear aggre-
gation approach. Just as the parts of a control
system operate as a package, each individual
simultaneously embodies all the dimensions of
national culture. Furthermore, just as controls
have the potential to complement or substitute
for one another, multiple cultural dimensions
may affect individuals’ preferences for, and/or
reactions to a given control ln interactive ways.
For example, ln an uncertain environment, one
way to insulate lndivldual managers’ measured
performance from the effects of noncontrolla-
ble factors is to evaluate managers relative to
one another (i.e. relative performance evalua-
tlon) (Chow & Haddad, 1991; Maher, 1987).
Because of their higher uncertainty avoid-
ance, the Japanese can be expected to have a
higher preference for this evaluation approach.
Yet relative performance evaluation also entails
explicit interpersonal comparisons and overt
competition, both of which are inconsistent
with the preference of high collectivism indivi-
duals to avoid interpersonal conflict and to pre-
serve interpersonal harmony. Thus, the net
preference for and reactions to relative perfor-
mance evaluation will depend on the relative
strengths of the effects of each of these cultural
dimensions. While our findings about proce-
dural controls and controls through directives
suggest that univarlate approaches can provide
insights into some relationships, it is almost
certain that more complex relationships exist.
Much room exists for future research to
explore how the various cultural dimensions
interactively affect individuals’ preferences for
and reactions to various forms and mixes of
controls.
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