The identity of those behind the bomb blasts that shook Mumbai remains unclear. Some suspect the Pakistan-based terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba or the banned Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), or a combination of both. Police have already detained scores of suspected SIMI activists.
Established in 1977 and banned in 2001, SIMI's vision of Islam derives from the voluminous writings of the Islamist ideologue, Sayyed Abul Ala Mau-dudi, founder of the Jama'at-i Islami.
For Maududi, as for SIMI, the mission of Prophet Muhammad is seen principally as having been the struggle to establish true mono-theism or 'tauhid'.
Nationalism is seen as a false idol, and one devised by the non-Muslim 'enemies of the faith' to divide the Muslims and thereby weaken them.
All non-Muslims are branded as 'kafirs', and no distinction is made among them. Because the 'enemies of God' are expected to show stiff resistance to Islam, violent jehad is to be waged.
This understanding of Islam and SIMI's methods of realising its vision of the Islamic polity make no room for the particular context in which it operates, where Muslims are a relatively small and insecure minority.
As Shahid Badr Falahi, one-time president of SIMI, put it, "The Qur'an itself says that kafirs will naturally oppose Muslims. If through any of our actions the kafirs are agitated this itself is a proof that what we are doing is right".
SIMI was floated by the Jama'at-i Islami Hind. Although it was intended to work among Muslim students to create among them what it saw as 'Islamic consciousness' and to engage in peaceful missionary work among non-Muslims, a succession of events occurred that forced it to take an increasingly hardline position.
Less than two years after SIMI was established, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Khomeini toppled the Shah of Iran and in Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq set about imposing Islamic criminal laws by force.
SIMI voiced its opposition to the Soviet invasion, welcomed the Iranian revolution, seeing it as the first step in the eventual global revival of Islam, and wholeheartedly supported 'Islamisation' policy.
This growing radicalisation of SIMI was not looked upon favourably by top leaders of the Jama'at. In 1982, SIMI separated from the Jama'at, which then revived its own students' wing, the Students Islamic Organisation.
SIMI's evolution from the 1980s onwards was dictated almost entirely by events taking place in India and in the wider world, these being interpreted as attacks directed against Islam and Muslims by 'enemies' of the faith.
Inevitably, then, SIMI was driven to an increasing radicalism that won it support among a small number of Muslims in India who saw themselves as victims of both Hindu chauvinism and the Indian state.
Although a forceful champion of what it called 'Islamic Revolution' ever since its inception, SIMI witnessed a further radicalisation from the 1990s. By 2000, the organisation was proclaiming the need for Muslims to engage in armed jehad in India.
The radicalisation of SIMI since the 1990s must be seen in the context of, and as a response to, the growth of Hindu militancy, particularly in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where it had a presence. The destruction of the Babri masjid in 1992 and subsequent massacres of Muslims proved to be a watershed.
SIMI stressed that the time had now come for Muslims to wage jehad against the Indian state. Falahi asserted that Muslims and Islam were now being targeted by Hindu militants in league with agencies of the state.
By early 1991, SIMI had begun mobilising Muslims and censuring Muslim leaders who advised restraint or dialogue. In February 1991, SIMI organised 'Babri Masjid Day' all over India, holding demonstrations against efforts of Hindu militants to destroy the disputed mosque.
SIMI leaders issued appeals to the Muslims to 'stop thinking in defensive terms'. Its rhetorical opposition to the campaign led by Hindu groups to destroy the mosque increased SIMI's popularity. It emerged as a force to be reckoned with.
In September 2001, it organised a conference at Mumbai attended by some 25,000 students. There it was stressed that the time had come for Muslims to launch jehad. Till SIMI was finally banned in 2001 it carried on with this confrontationist posture.
Whether or not SIMI was behind the blasts will be known only after a fair and impartial investigation. Yet, the fact remains that groups like SIMI, although representing a tiny fringe of the varied landscape of Islam in India, pose a grave threat not only to the country but to Indian Muslims as well.
In a sense of response to growing Hindu fascism and anti-Muslim pogroms, SIMI-style radical Islamism helps feed Hindutva forces, leading to further communal polarisation.
In the wake of the Mumbai blasts and the allegations of SIMI involvement, many Indian Muslims are now wakening up to the need to denounce not just Hindutva chauvinism but similar Muslim groups, such as SIMI, that speak the language of conflict, hatred, violence and revenge.
A mass struggle against both forms of terrorism, Muslim and Hindu, and insisting that the state take vigorous action against both, is the only way to ensure that the recent events in Mumbai are not repeated.
The writer works on issues of interfaith dialogue.
Established in 1977 and banned in 2001, SIMI's vision of Islam derives from the voluminous writings of the Islamist ideologue, Sayyed Abul Ala Mau-dudi, founder of the Jama'at-i Islami.
For Maududi, as for SIMI, the mission of Prophet Muhammad is seen principally as having been the struggle to establish true mono-theism or 'tauhid'.
Nationalism is seen as a false idol, and one devised by the non-Muslim 'enemies of the faith' to divide the Muslims and thereby weaken them.
All non-Muslims are branded as 'kafirs', and no distinction is made among them. Because the 'enemies of God' are expected to show stiff resistance to Islam, violent jehad is to be waged.
This understanding of Islam and SIMI's methods of realising its vision of the Islamic polity make no room for the particular context in which it operates, where Muslims are a relatively small and insecure minority.
As Shahid Badr Falahi, one-time president of SIMI, put it, "The Qur'an itself says that kafirs will naturally oppose Muslims. If through any of our actions the kafirs are agitated this itself is a proof that what we are doing is right".
SIMI was floated by the Jama'at-i Islami Hind. Although it was intended to work among Muslim students to create among them what it saw as 'Islamic consciousness' and to engage in peaceful missionary work among non-Muslims, a succession of events occurred that forced it to take an increasingly hardline position.
Less than two years after SIMI was established, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Khomeini toppled the Shah of Iran and in Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq set about imposing Islamic criminal laws by force.
SIMI voiced its opposition to the Soviet invasion, welcomed the Iranian revolution, seeing it as the first step in the eventual global revival of Islam, and wholeheartedly supported 'Islamisation' policy.
This growing radicalisation of SIMI was not looked upon favourably by top leaders of the Jama'at. In 1982, SIMI separated from the Jama'at, which then revived its own students' wing, the Students Islamic Organisation.
SIMI's evolution from the 1980s onwards was dictated almost entirely by events taking place in India and in the wider world, these being interpreted as attacks directed against Islam and Muslims by 'enemies' of the faith.
Inevitably, then, SIMI was driven to an increasing radicalism that won it support among a small number of Muslims in India who saw themselves as victims of both Hindu chauvinism and the Indian state.
Although a forceful champion of what it called 'Islamic Revolution' ever since its inception, SIMI witnessed a further radicalisation from the 1990s. By 2000, the organisation was proclaiming the need for Muslims to engage in armed jehad in India.
The radicalisation of SIMI since the 1990s must be seen in the context of, and as a response to, the growth of Hindu militancy, particularly in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where it had a presence. The destruction of the Babri masjid in 1992 and subsequent massacres of Muslims proved to be a watershed.
SIMI stressed that the time had now come for Muslims to wage jehad against the Indian state. Falahi asserted that Muslims and Islam were now being targeted by Hindu militants in league with agencies of the state.
By early 1991, SIMI had begun mobilising Muslims and censuring Muslim leaders who advised restraint or dialogue. In February 1991, SIMI organised 'Babri Masjid Day' all over India, holding demonstrations against efforts of Hindu militants to destroy the disputed mosque.
SIMI leaders issued appeals to the Muslims to 'stop thinking in defensive terms'. Its rhetorical opposition to the campaign led by Hindu groups to destroy the mosque increased SIMI's popularity. It emerged as a force to be reckoned with.
In September 2001, it organised a conference at Mumbai attended by some 25,000 students. There it was stressed that the time had come for Muslims to launch jehad. Till SIMI was finally banned in 2001 it carried on with this confrontationist posture.
Whether or not SIMI was behind the blasts will be known only after a fair and impartial investigation. Yet, the fact remains that groups like SIMI, although representing a tiny fringe of the varied landscape of Islam in India, pose a grave threat not only to the country but to Indian Muslims as well.
In a sense of response to growing Hindu fascism and anti-Muslim pogroms, SIMI-style radical Islamism helps feed Hindutva forces, leading to further communal polarisation.
In the wake of the Mumbai blasts and the allegations of SIMI involvement, many Indian Muslims are now wakening up to the need to denounce not just Hindutva chauvinism but similar Muslim groups, such as SIMI, that speak the language of conflict, hatred, violence and revenge.
A mass struggle against both forms of terrorism, Muslim and Hindu, and insisting that the state take vigorous action against both, is the only way to ensure that the recent events in Mumbai are not repeated.
The writer works on issues of interfaith dialogue.