Description
This paper examines tbe rhetorical process by which an ensemble of cakulative practices and techniques
inchtding accounting came to be adopted, developed and justified in the State of Wisconsin at the turn of
the century under the Progressive leadership of Governor Robert M. La Folktte. Toward this end, the
authors use primary and secondary archival materials to explicate three rhetorical strategies
Accounting, Organfzatfonr and Society. Vol. 20, NO. 2/3. pp 147-173, 1995
Copyri&t 0 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd
PrintedinGreat0rIaitLhulights-ed
0361-3682195 S9.50+0.~
03613682(94)00028-X
THE PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES: TRANSFORMING THE
IMMORAL INTO THE MERELY FACTUAL+
MARK A. COVALESKI
University of Wisconsin-Madison
and
MARK W. DIRSMITH
The Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
This paper examines tbe rhetorical process by which an ensemble of cakulative practices and techniques
inchtding accounting came to be adopted, developed and justified in the State of Wisconsin at the turn of
the century under the Progressive leadership of Governor Robert M. La Folktte. Toward this end, the
authors use primary and secondary archival materials to explicate three rhetorical strategies - Shake-
spearean, formalist, and expertise - the governor empioyed. They find that the process of institutiona-
lizing these calculative techniques was and is profoundly political and reflective of the relative power,
both overt and covert, of organ&d interest groups. The paper concludes with implications derived from
the analysis
The tumof-thecentury Governor of Wiscon-
sin, Robert M. La Follette, based much of his
political rhetoric on Shakespeare’s Othello. In
particular, La Follette used Shakespeare’s vil-
lain Iago to personify the “artful”, “cun-
ning”, “sly”, “Crafty”, and “carefully
perfected schemes” with which vested busi-
ness and poIitical interests had subverted the
administration of the state and its public
resources. Noting that even public servants
of noble, free and open, Othello-like inclina-
tions may be seduced and corrupted by evil,
La Follette set out to develop and implement
scientific, rationalistic forms of administrative
practice to govern the State of Wisconsin.
Additionally, La Follette espoused a “cult of
expertise” in which a cadre of professionals,
largely drawn from the University of Wiscon-
sin, would run this calculative machinery. In
essence, under Progressive Party reform
efforts, La Follette strove to scientize the per-
formance of the stewardship function in pre-
serving, using and reporting upon the state’s
resources.’
The authors gratefutty acknowledge funding support from the University of Wiionsin Industrial Research F’mgram. WC
also wish to thank Anthony Hopwcod, Janice Mereba, John Meyer, Sajay Samuel, WilliamJ . Schrader. and the anonymous
revicwm for their useful suggestions.
’ For fkther discussion of the importance of stewardship vis-li-vlr accounting, see Gxnmittee to Prepare a Statement of
Basic Accounting Theory (1966); and Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements (1973). For discussion of the
public sector stewardship responsibility in the attainment of social welfare, see Chen (1975).
147
148
M. A. COVALFSKI and M. W. DIRSMITIi
Assisting in the performance of the stew-
ardship function has, in turn, been espoused
for centuries as one of the most important
roles of accounting, perhaps dating back as
far as 5000 years (see, for example, Littleton
& Zimmerman, 1%2; Goldberg, 1%5; Cusack,
1970). La Follette’s efforts continue to influ-
ence the generation and allocation of Wiscon-
sin’s total budget (Covaleski & Dirsmith,
1988a, b), which for the twentieth century
approximates $50 billion. Moreover, with Wis-
consin serving as the epicenter of Progressive
experimentation, La Follette’s influence
extended to other states and the U.S. federal
government, and has consequently been com-
plicit in the development of trillions of dollars
in this century.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
rhetorical strategies La Follette used to advance
his agenda, which ultimately constituted an
array of such calculative administrative prac-
tices and forms of expertise as accounting
and budgeting systems. This research effort is
harmonic with prior accounting research
which has increasingly focused on probing
the complicity of accounting in constituting
and being constituted by a social reality as
opposed to “rationally” representing a techni-
cal and economic reality (see, for example,
Wildavsky, 1975; Cooper et uZ., 1981; Hop
wood, 1983; Meyer, 1983, 1986). Here, institu-
tional theory (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in
particular has been invoked in this prior
research to explicate the symbolic role played
by accounting information in the budgetary
process, where it has been found that budget-
ing is indeed complicit in shaping the organiza-
tion’s social reality, particularly in expressing
and enforcing the interests of various actors
involved with the budget process.
The insight provided by this prior account-
ing research is, however, limited by the failure
of institutional theory to explain systematically
the role of power and interest-based behavior
in the development of such formal organ&a-
tional practices as accounting. On this point,
DiMaggio & Powell (1983; see also Perrow,
1985; Powell, 1985; DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver,
1991) reasoned that in order to understand
the power and self-interest which reside
wi thi n the vari ous exemplars of formal otga-
nizational structure, one should return to and
examine their origins. Accordingly, they urged
a study of: (1) the power to establish premises
and define the norms and standards of con-
duct that direct behavior, and (2) the power
to delimit models of bureaucratic structure
that go unquestioned for years. More point-
edly, Scott concluded that this focus on the
origins of societal expectations and organiza-
tional practices is particularly important in the
public sector:
[Wlhich cnviromnental agents are able to define the
reigning forms of i & i Mi On~ suuc t ur c w i l l be deter-
mined largely by political contests among competing
interests. Outcomes will not only be influenced by dif-
ferential resources and sanctioning facilities, but will
also be strongly shaped by the agents’ di~Tcrcnt.iai abil-
ity fo lay successful claimto the normative and co@-
tive fifeu of the political processes: those identified by
such concepts as authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty.
Outcomes will also be intluenccd by the structure of the
state itself and its relation to and penantion of society.
Organ&ationaI scholars must bring the state back in as
an important instItutional actor not only ln ita own
right, but rrconccptualia@ political systems in Ways
that revcaI the varied role rhat political and legal SNC-
tllrcs play in shaping the institutionaI frameworks
within which oqaniaations of varying types operate
(1987, p. 509).
This research effort, in turn, probes the
initial social construction of such forms of
“scientific” techniques as accounting practice
at the turn of the century, specifically in the
State of Wisconsin, but also more generally in
American politics. We depart from the institu-
tional theory perspective, however, because of
its inattention to power and interest-based
behavior. In its place, and consistent with a
more general position which recognizes that
metaphors and rhetoric play a pervasive role
in shaping human experience (see, for exam-
ple, Johnson & L&off, 1980), we subject the
initial social construction of “scientific” public
administration in the State of Wisconsin to a
PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 149
form of poIitical-bureaucratic rhetorical analy-
sis (Frug, 1984).*
Here, an initial review of archival material
revealed the strategic importance of tum-of-
the-century Governor Robert M. La FoIlette’s
use of a tripartite rhetorical strategy to estab-
lish and maintain his power base: a Shakespear-
ean voice to establish his morailty stance; a
formalist voice to establish an array of scientiz-
ing, calculative practices; and an expertise
voice to instail the experts needed to run the
calculative machinery. More specifically, we
compare the privileged knowledge La FoIiette
asserted using his rhetorical strategies in order
to gain at least a partial understanding of the
intertwining of “facts”, “theory”, “expertise”,
and “practice” with power and interest-laden
behavior of his time. Accordingly, this study
includes an analysis of such primary archival
material as the memoirs, private letters,
speeches and selected papers and position
statements of Robert M. La Foilette preserved
by the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, the
Wisconsin Congressional Record (e.g. State of
Wisconsin, 1890 to 1900) extensive news
paper coverage, and also secondary autobio-
graphical (La FoIIette, 1913) and biographical
materials (Weinstein, 1968; Burgchardt, 1982).3
We have organized the rest of this paper into
four sections. The first section brieily discusses
three general forms of rhetoric used to express
public sector administration efforts within U.S.
politics. Section two sets forth the three
“voices” of La Foilette subjected to analysis,
while section three examines the political chai-
lenge to Ia Follette’s efforts. Finally, the fourth
section sets forth our interpretations regarding
the social and more specifically rhetorical con-
struction of accounting and accountants in the
public sector.
RHETORIC AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
EFFORTS WITHIN U.S. POLITICS
Robert M. Ia FoIlette was widely considered
to be a preeminent leader in extensive Progres-
sive reform efforts at the turn of the century.
During this era, Progressives sought to estab-
lish a political cuhure wherein societal values
were articulated and then acted upon within
government by identifying relevant “facts”
which would be fed into “scientifically
based” bureaucratic machinery run by “pro-
fessional” administrators (for an allied discus
sion in the business sector, see MiIler &
O’Leary, 1989, esp. pp. 251-256). It is through
this alignment of values and a rational
approach to government that the moral could
be transformed into the factual (Zucker, 1977,
p. 726). But before this could be accomplished,
entrenched political interests, supported by big
business, had to be unseated - a feat accom-
plished by charging these vested interests with
immorality and corruption while extolling the
morality of more accountable, enlightened Pro-
gressives. In turn, these three essential compo-
nents of Progressivism - moraBsm, scientism,
and professionaiism - are found in the three
“voices” used by La Foilette and examined in
the paper - Shakespearean, formalist and
expertise. The purpose of this section is to
explore these three general components of
the Progressive Era in more detail.
‘ For an alternative approach in accounting to performing rhetorical analysis, see Arrington & Francis (19&X9); for a critique
see Moore (1991). Whereas Arrington % Francis adopted a post-structutxlist approach of deconstructing the rhetoric of a
single academic article, we arc employing a more derivative strategic approach (Frug, 19%) for exploring various themes
espoused by La Folkttc across a number of speeches, essays, legislative acts and books as informed by secondary material
(e.g. biographies).
3 For an aiternativc approach to performing historical analyses in accounting, see, for cxampk, Milkr & O’Leary (1987,
19tI9; Wlkr % Rose, 1990; Milkr el al., 1991). Their approach adopts a post-modernist perspective to understanding the
power-knowledge nexus and the development of governability in society (for a comparison of post-sttwtwalist and post-
modernist perspectives, see Aggcr, 1991; Cooper % Burrcll, 1988).
150 M. A. COVALESKI and M. W. DIRSMITH
Moral i sm i n government
Early expressions of Progressive thought
were based upon and yet extended beyond
conceptualizations of morality within orga-
nized religions. More specifically, the underpin-
nings of Progressivism in the late nineteenth
century have been traced to the Social Gospel
movement of this era (Greek, 1992). The social
gospelers sought to restore, if not reverse,
what they thought were the unnecessary con-
sequences of industrialization, urbanization
and the expansion of technology. Their
avowed goal was to “Christianize business,
industry, politics, and the city’s immigrant
populations, all of which [were] regarded as
the major, unregenerated spheres of society”
of which “business was declared to be the
most significant unregenerate institution
within the American social order” (Greek,
1992, pp. 56-58). Thus, the spirit of reform
and conversion, which had a long history
within Christian social thought, was directed
at containing the spread of social and spiritual
evils particularly resident in government and
big business (Mills, 1943). The movement
remained true to the inner-worldly asceticism
of Protestantism and called for a society
founded on love, service and equality instead
of coercion, exploitation and inequality
(Greek, 1992, p. 62). The gospelers believed
that man [sic] “by using his intellect can
remake society, that he can become the crea-
tor of a world organized for man’s advantage”
(Woodrow Wilson, in Waldo, 1948, p. 16) and
that conscious social action would eradicate sin
and hasten the coming of God’s kingdom, and,
consequently, would promote social reforms to
“purify American society” (Woodrow Wilson,
in Waldo, 1948, p. 58).
The term “social” carried particularly posi-
tive connotations for the social gospelers. To
establish the kingdom of God on earth, indivi-
dual salvation was seen as dependent on soci al
salvation and hence, “no individual is soundly
converted until he comprehends his social rela-
tions and strives to fuhhl them” (Gladdens, in
Greek, 1992, p. 41). Here, the social, suggestive
of cooperation and self-sacrifice, was set off
against individualism and the pursuit of self-
interest and thus:
The kingdomof God is not a matter of saving human
atoms, but of saving the social organism. It is not a
matter of getting individuals to heaven, but of tram+
forming the life on cartb into the harmony of heaven
(Rauschenbusch, in Greek, 1992, p. 65).
It is with this emphasis on the social that the
moral dimension of the Progressive interven-
tionist strategy of changing the processes of
government was founded. According to
Hamilton & Sutton (1989) this strategy was
embraced by Progressives as a consequence of
a weak central state, the federalist structure of
autonomous local and state governments,
patronage party politics, and the large role
played by the business community in the poli-
tical arena. After having established the pre-emi-
nence of social salvation, the next step in
legitimating the interventionist strategy was to
displace the importance of natural law, God or
the ethical, responsible behavior of the indivi-
dual, in favor of an experiential grounding in
social groups - increasingly otganizations. In
turn, social reforms comprising the interven-
tionist strategies could express societal values
and goals in a way amenable to their accomp
lishment by bureaucracies. But here, the oper-
ationalization or encoding of societal goals and
values within the formal structure of orga&a-
tions could be accomplished only by such
experts as public administration scientists and
sociologists “who took up the idea of organiza-
tion as a banner” during this era (Hamilton &
Sutton, 1989, p. 13). Consistent with this focus
on organization, Hamilton & Sutton observed
that:
In [the Progressive] period, “organizttion” was not
merely a formal apparatus and ccrminly not onIy a
means to accomplish an cnvisioncd end; instead organi-
zation in the lexicon of American life becomes a goal in
itself, a method developed to ensure fairness and to
preserve what is valued in human Life. In the revision
that occurred in American thought at the turn of the
century, the act of orgvlintion was intrinsically an ethi-
cal act vital to human nahxc and to society (1989, p. 15).
Thus, according to Hamilton & Sutton:
PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 151
The organizational movements in Progressive America
recast the self’s moral duty fromthat of an autonomous
individual to that of a social being, and thus shifted the
basis of morality fromabsohttc conviction to rcfkxive-
ness. with this revision, domination in Amcrian society
became incrusi@y articulated by means of organ&+
tional metaphors. Obcdicncc was to live up to one’s
social responsibiity, and one’s social responsibility
could bc determined by conccptuali&g one’s rclation-
ship with others in a systematic way in tcmls of one’s
otganiaational fit (1989, p. 35).
The movement relied not merely on a rhet+
ric of social morality rooted in organizations,
but also of science. The social gospelers, adopt-
ing such secular values as progress and evolu-
tionism, sought to transform theology into “the
science of redemption [which would] offer
scientific methods for the eradication of sin”
(Rauschenbusch, ln Greek, 1992, p. 65).
Indeed, this interrelation between science
and the social gospel movement is suggested
by Visser ‘T Hooft
I . it is one of the outstanding charactctistics of the
social gospel movement that it believes not only in the
compatibility of science and Christianity, but also in the
indispensability of their mutual intcrpenctxation. This is
a conviction that often leads to a further belief that
through the contribution of modem science humanity
is being enabled to understand Christianity and Christ
himself much better than any prccediug generation (in
Greek, 1992, p. 65).
In turn, the social gospel movement contrib-
uted to the demand for “facts” in order to
identify the nature, extent and pervasiveness
of social problems, and thus to convince the
public of the legitimacy of their critique and
objectives. In doing so, they promoted the reli-
ance on science. They also contributed to the
legitimization of experts as the secular minis-
ters who would help the gospelers learn “the
laws of nature [and] . . . the divine methods”
to help them ln their redemptive tasks (Strong,
1902, p. 104).
Indeed this religious ethos, which inter-
sected and combined with the political con-
cerns of the Progressives, led Hofstatder
(1955, p. 320) to remark that “the key words
of Progressivism were terms like patriotism,
citizen, democracy, law, character, con-
science, soul, morals, service, duty, shame, dis-
grace, sin, and selfishness” - a series of
descriptors which melds both the political
and the religious/moral. These common politi-
cal and moral concerns of the religious and the
political channeled their respective energies
towards the common goal of an ideal democ-
racy populated by an informed and sovereign
citizenry, and guided by conscious and redemp
tive human action, wherein business and poli-
tics were harnessed in the service of society
(Waldo, 1948; Kolko, 1963; Wiebe, 1%7).
It was not merely enough, however, for Pro-
gressives to claim the immorality of vested
political and business interests, and the moral-
ity of its own ranks (Miller & O’Leary, 1989, pp.
251-256); the movement also wanted to
invoke its interventionist strategy through a
series of social reforms to change the face of
government (Hamilton & Sutton, 1989). These
reforms essentially involved installing within a
government bureaucratic machinery informed
by science and run by professionals.
Scientism and professionalism in
government bureaucracy
The reform efforts undertaken ln the Pro-
gressive movement were ln part symbolic
events whose political rhetoric implicitly sup
ported the bureaucratic form of organization,
which Frug (1984; see also March & Olsen,
1983, who offer a similar framework) identi-
fied as being the primary form of organized
power in America. One form of political rheto-
ric - which Frug (1984) labeled the “formalist
model” - depicts bureaucratic organizations
as rationalized, disciplined mechanisms for
impartially achieving the goals of the citizenry
(see also the “orthodox administration” voice
of March & Olsen, 1983). The formalist model
first begins with identifying the values of
society and then speaks in terms of administra-
tive structures and procedures for facilitating
efficiency and effectiveness within bureaucra-
cies, and invokes the overall guidelines and
values of rationality, neutrality, objectivity,
economy and control in order to serve the
152 hf. A. COVALJiSKI and M. W. DIRSMM’Ii
values of society. According to Hamilton % Sut-
ton (1989), this form of rhetoric sought to
make government a more scientifically based,
calculative, knowable, predictable practice
(see also Miller & O’Leary, 1987,1989) by cate-
gorizing and procedumhzing relationships
within a bureaucratic grid, and establishing
the accountability of organizational roles
within that grid. Invoking such rhetorical
descriptors as “instrumental rationality”,
“technocratic efficiency”, “neutrality” and
“objectivity”, bureaucracies, the techniques
they employ and the power they wield are
portrayed as benign because they are but objec-
tive machines for accomplishing the will of
their constituents. Within the formalist model,
the “hard” inside of objectivity, rationality, effi-
ciency, etc., is contained by and directed at
serving the “soft” outside of the subjective
values of society. It is through the claim of
objectivity that the formalist model seeks to
legitimate the bureaucratic order’s worthiness
to be recognized. In fact, objectivity is so
prized in the formalist model that it must avoid
any taint of its antithesis, subjectivity.
But here, a paradox of bureaucratic action
qua scientific calculative practice arises: if
the impersonal, bureaucratic machinery of
rationality is allowed to proceed unchecked,
then it would become an “iron cage” (for a
related treatment of this concept in institu-
tional theory, see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
in the exercise of bureaucratic power and
human domination. In turn, if objectivity is
left unchecked, it would limit individuality
and human self-expression, thus becoming
insensitive to the very human beings the
bureaucracy is to serve. Consequently, some
modicum of subjectivity must be admitted
into the bureaucracy in the form of administra-
tor discretion. Once admitted, however, sub
jectivity, if similarly unchecked, threatens to
overturn objectivity - a danger which can
only be combatted by adding more discretion,
more subjectivity to those administering the
machine.
In contrast, Frug (1984) asserts that a second
form of political rhetoric - the “expertise
model” - was developed, in part, by such
Progressives as Woodrow Wilson, in response
to the charge that bureaucracies were only
ineffectively controlled by external constitu-
ents, and were in fact subject to enormous
discretion and power of internal bureaucrats
(see also March & Olsen’s, 1983, “realpolitik”
voice). This form of political rhetoric holds that
bureaucratic structures and claims to neutral-
ity, objectivity and rationality all represent dan-
gerous illusions and threats to the governed
unless they are contained by the values, beliefs
and goals of the populace and its various con-
stituent groups. Because of this discretion, the
interpretation of bureaucracy shifts from view-
ing it as a machine within the strict formalist
model to viewing it as a “social system” and a
“natural community”. Also, because this discre-
tion is inherent and necessary to the effective
functioning of the bureaucratic machinery, a
cadre of experts, including accounting pro
fessionals, must be charged with operating it.
This reliance on experts, in turn, makes possi-
ble the exercise of discretion and expression of
human creativity, and thus permits requisite
flexibility so as to serve external constituents
more faithfully, all the while being constrained
in the exercise of power by the experts’ own
professionalism and reliance on an impersonal,
objectified, external system of knowledge, lar-
gely derived from scientific endeavor (Abbott,
1988). In turn, the external and impersonal
qualities of the applied knowledge is necessary
to remove any bias that may result if decision
making were to become overly personal and
subjective by allowing the judgment of the
expert to be safely objectified. Thus, within
the expertise model, the “soft” inside of the
subjectivity of experts is contained by the
“hard” outside of a scientifically derived sys-
tem of objective knowledge. If the exercise of
discretion and expertise becomes overly threa-
tening, it is supplemented by Increasing objec-
tivity, such as through its implementation of
more formal administrative models, or by add-
ing another layer of experts, or “super
experts”, who are more closely associated
with the external profession and hence closer
PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 153
to the objectified body of knowledge, and who
may also have developed the formal models
used by the bureaucratic administration. In
contrast with the formalist voice’s modus oper-
andi, the expertise model uses its claims of
expertise and professionalism established
externally to legitimate the bureaucratic
order’s worthiness to be recognized.
Thus, both the formalist and expertise mod-
els make roomfor both objectivity and subjec-
tivity, and a line is drawn between the two. The
rhetoric of objectivity counters a fear of admin-
istrative-bureaucratic domination; it also over-
comes a human fear of subjectivity exemplified
by face-to-face confrontation and interest-laden
behavior, and replaces it with either rationa-
lized and proceduralized (as opposed to indivi-
dualized) decisions, or a confrontation
between abstractions - that is, competing
forms of knowledge systems (the expertise
model) or competing forms of structure (the
formalist model). The rhetoric of subjectivity
in bureaucratic afTairs, in turn, ensures that a
place has been made for considering human
values, beliefs and goals to be served by either
the bureaucratic structure or the expert. Frug
argued that those who espouse either the form-
alist or expertise model must continually strive
to combine and yet separate the realms of
objectivity, and subjectivity by somehow draw-
ing a line of demarcation between the two, a
line which gnaws at each model by reasons of
its arbitrary existence.
Frug also concluded that the interpenetra-
tion of the formalist and expertise models has
a much darker side. He reasoned that theorists,
or in our case a politician, who combined the
two forms of rhetoric possesses a potentially
powerful tool of deception:
Theorists [e.g. La Folktte] can reassure themselves [and
the voters of Wisconsin] about the existence of objcc-
tivity and subjectivity by deferring the needed clement
to some model not then under examination. When they
find that the concept of cxpcrtisc is too manipulabk to
ensure objectivity, they can assume that the objectivity
necessary to curb managerial power can be found else-
where
This paper examines tbe rhetorical process by which an ensemble of cakulative practices and techniques
inchtding accounting came to be adopted, developed and justified in the State of Wisconsin at the turn of
the century under the Progressive leadership of Governor Robert M. La Folktte. Toward this end, the
authors use primary and secondary archival materials to explicate three rhetorical strategies
Accounting, Organfzatfonr and Society. Vol. 20, NO. 2/3. pp 147-173, 1995
Copyri&t 0 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd
PrintedinGreat0rIaitLhulights-ed
0361-3682195 S9.50+0.~
03613682(94)00028-X
THE PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES: TRANSFORMING THE
IMMORAL INTO THE MERELY FACTUAL+
MARK A. COVALESKI
University of Wisconsin-Madison
and
MARK W. DIRSMITH
The Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
This paper examines tbe rhetorical process by which an ensemble of cakulative practices and techniques
inchtding accounting came to be adopted, developed and justified in the State of Wisconsin at the turn of
the century under the Progressive leadership of Governor Robert M. La Folktte. Toward this end, the
authors use primary and secondary archival materials to explicate three rhetorical strategies - Shake-
spearean, formalist, and expertise - the governor empioyed. They find that the process of institutiona-
lizing these calculative techniques was and is profoundly political and reflective of the relative power,
both overt and covert, of organ&d interest groups. The paper concludes with implications derived from
the analysis
The tumof-thecentury Governor of Wiscon-
sin, Robert M. La Follette, based much of his
political rhetoric on Shakespeare’s Othello. In
particular, La Follette used Shakespeare’s vil-
lain Iago to personify the “artful”, “cun-
ning”, “sly”, “Crafty”, and “carefully
perfected schemes” with which vested busi-
ness and poIitical interests had subverted the
administration of the state and its public
resources. Noting that even public servants
of noble, free and open, Othello-like inclina-
tions may be seduced and corrupted by evil,
La Follette set out to develop and implement
scientific, rationalistic forms of administrative
practice to govern the State of Wisconsin.
Additionally, La Follette espoused a “cult of
expertise” in which a cadre of professionals,
largely drawn from the University of Wiscon-
sin, would run this calculative machinery. In
essence, under Progressive Party reform
efforts, La Follette strove to scientize the per-
formance of the stewardship function in pre-
serving, using and reporting upon the state’s
resources.’
The authors gratefutty acknowledge funding support from the University of Wiionsin Industrial Research F’mgram. WC
also wish to thank Anthony Hopwcod, Janice Mereba, John Meyer, Sajay Samuel, WilliamJ . Schrader. and the anonymous
revicwm for their useful suggestions.
’ For fkther discussion of the importance of stewardship vis-li-vlr accounting, see Gxnmittee to Prepare a Statement of
Basic Accounting Theory (1966); and Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements (1973). For discussion of the
public sector stewardship responsibility in the attainment of social welfare, see Chen (1975).
147
148
M. A. COVALFSKI and M. W. DIRSMITIi
Assisting in the performance of the stew-
ardship function has, in turn, been espoused
for centuries as one of the most important
roles of accounting, perhaps dating back as
far as 5000 years (see, for example, Littleton
& Zimmerman, 1%2; Goldberg, 1%5; Cusack,
1970). La Follette’s efforts continue to influ-
ence the generation and allocation of Wiscon-
sin’s total budget (Covaleski & Dirsmith,
1988a, b), which for the twentieth century
approximates $50 billion. Moreover, with Wis-
consin serving as the epicenter of Progressive
experimentation, La Follette’s influence
extended to other states and the U.S. federal
government, and has consequently been com-
plicit in the development of trillions of dollars
in this century.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
rhetorical strategies La Follette used to advance
his agenda, which ultimately constituted an
array of such calculative administrative prac-
tices and forms of expertise as accounting
and budgeting systems. This research effort is
harmonic with prior accounting research
which has increasingly focused on probing
the complicity of accounting in constituting
and being constituted by a social reality as
opposed to “rationally” representing a techni-
cal and economic reality (see, for example,
Wildavsky, 1975; Cooper et uZ., 1981; Hop
wood, 1983; Meyer, 1983, 1986). Here, institu-
tional theory (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in
particular has been invoked in this prior
research to explicate the symbolic role played
by accounting information in the budgetary
process, where it has been found that budget-
ing is indeed complicit in shaping the organiza-
tion’s social reality, particularly in expressing
and enforcing the interests of various actors
involved with the budget process.
The insight provided by this prior account-
ing research is, however, limited by the failure
of institutional theory to explain systematically
the role of power and interest-based behavior
in the development of such formal organ&a-
tional practices as accounting. On this point,
DiMaggio & Powell (1983; see also Perrow,
1985; Powell, 1985; DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver,
1991) reasoned that in order to understand
the power and self-interest which reside
wi thi n the vari ous exemplars of formal otga-
nizational structure, one should return to and
examine their origins. Accordingly, they urged
a study of: (1) the power to establish premises
and define the norms and standards of con-
duct that direct behavior, and (2) the power
to delimit models of bureaucratic structure
that go unquestioned for years. More point-
edly, Scott concluded that this focus on the
origins of societal expectations and organiza-
tional practices is particularly important in the
public sector:
[Wlhich cnviromnental agents are able to define the
reigning forms of i & i Mi On~ suuc t ur c w i l l be deter-
mined largely by political contests among competing
interests. Outcomes will not only be influenced by dif-
ferential resources and sanctioning facilities, but will
also be strongly shaped by the agents’ di~Tcrcnt.iai abil-
ity fo lay successful claimto the normative and co@-
tive fifeu of the political processes: those identified by
such concepts as authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty.
Outcomes will also be intluenccd by the structure of the
state itself and its relation to and penantion of society.
Organ&ationaI scholars must bring the state back in as
an important instItutional actor not only ln ita own
right, but rrconccptualia@ political systems in Ways
that revcaI the varied role rhat political and legal SNC-
tllrcs play in shaping the institutionaI frameworks
within which oqaniaations of varying types operate
(1987, p. 509).
This research effort, in turn, probes the
initial social construction of such forms of
“scientific” techniques as accounting practice
at the turn of the century, specifically in the
State of Wisconsin, but also more generally in
American politics. We depart from the institu-
tional theory perspective, however, because of
its inattention to power and interest-based
behavior. In its place, and consistent with a
more general position which recognizes that
metaphors and rhetoric play a pervasive role
in shaping human experience (see, for exam-
ple, Johnson & L&off, 1980), we subject the
initial social construction of “scientific” public
administration in the State of Wisconsin to a
PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 149
form of poIitical-bureaucratic rhetorical analy-
sis (Frug, 1984).*
Here, an initial review of archival material
revealed the strategic importance of tum-of-
the-century Governor Robert M. La FoIlette’s
use of a tripartite rhetorical strategy to estab-
lish and maintain his power base: a Shakespear-
ean voice to establish his morailty stance; a
formalist voice to establish an array of scientiz-
ing, calculative practices; and an expertise
voice to instail the experts needed to run the
calculative machinery. More specifically, we
compare the privileged knowledge La FoIiette
asserted using his rhetorical strategies in order
to gain at least a partial understanding of the
intertwining of “facts”, “theory”, “expertise”,
and “practice” with power and interest-laden
behavior of his time. Accordingly, this study
includes an analysis of such primary archival
material as the memoirs, private letters,
speeches and selected papers and position
statements of Robert M. La Foilette preserved
by the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, the
Wisconsin Congressional Record (e.g. State of
Wisconsin, 1890 to 1900) extensive news
paper coverage, and also secondary autobio-
graphical (La FoIIette, 1913) and biographical
materials (Weinstein, 1968; Burgchardt, 1982).3
We have organized the rest of this paper into
four sections. The first section brieily discusses
three general forms of rhetoric used to express
public sector administration efforts within U.S.
politics. Section two sets forth the three
“voices” of La Foilette subjected to analysis,
while section three examines the political chai-
lenge to Ia Follette’s efforts. Finally, the fourth
section sets forth our interpretations regarding
the social and more specifically rhetorical con-
struction of accounting and accountants in the
public sector.
RHETORIC AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
EFFORTS WITHIN U.S. POLITICS
Robert M. Ia FoIlette was widely considered
to be a preeminent leader in extensive Progres-
sive reform efforts at the turn of the century.
During this era, Progressives sought to estab-
lish a political cuhure wherein societal values
were articulated and then acted upon within
government by identifying relevant “facts”
which would be fed into “scientifically
based” bureaucratic machinery run by “pro-
fessional” administrators (for an allied discus
sion in the business sector, see MiIler &
O’Leary, 1989, esp. pp. 251-256). It is through
this alignment of values and a rational
approach to government that the moral could
be transformed into the factual (Zucker, 1977,
p. 726). But before this could be accomplished,
entrenched political interests, supported by big
business, had to be unseated - a feat accom-
plished by charging these vested interests with
immorality and corruption while extolling the
morality of more accountable, enlightened Pro-
gressives. In turn, these three essential compo-
nents of Progressivism - moraBsm, scientism,
and professionaiism - are found in the three
“voices” used by La Foilette and examined in
the paper - Shakespearean, formalist and
expertise. The purpose of this section is to
explore these three general components of
the Progressive Era in more detail.
‘ For an alternative approach in accounting to performing rhetorical analysis, see Arrington & Francis (19&X9); for a critique
see Moore (1991). Whereas Arrington % Francis adopted a post-structutxlist approach of deconstructing the rhetoric of a
single academic article, we arc employing a more derivative strategic approach (Frug, 19%) for exploring various themes
espoused by La Folkttc across a number of speeches, essays, legislative acts and books as informed by secondary material
(e.g. biographies).
3 For an aiternativc approach to performing historical analyses in accounting, see, for cxampk, Milkr & O’Leary (1987,
19tI9; Wlkr % Rose, 1990; Milkr el al., 1991). Their approach adopts a post-modernist perspective to understanding the
power-knowledge nexus and the development of governability in society (for a comparison of post-sttwtwalist and post-
modernist perspectives, see Aggcr, 1991; Cooper % Burrcll, 1988).
150 M. A. COVALESKI and M. W. DIRSMITH
Moral i sm i n government
Early expressions of Progressive thought
were based upon and yet extended beyond
conceptualizations of morality within orga-
nized religions. More specifically, the underpin-
nings of Progressivism in the late nineteenth
century have been traced to the Social Gospel
movement of this era (Greek, 1992). The social
gospelers sought to restore, if not reverse,
what they thought were the unnecessary con-
sequences of industrialization, urbanization
and the expansion of technology. Their
avowed goal was to “Christianize business,
industry, politics, and the city’s immigrant
populations, all of which [were] regarded as
the major, unregenerated spheres of society”
of which “business was declared to be the
most significant unregenerate institution
within the American social order” (Greek,
1992, pp. 56-58). Thus, the spirit of reform
and conversion, which had a long history
within Christian social thought, was directed
at containing the spread of social and spiritual
evils particularly resident in government and
big business (Mills, 1943). The movement
remained true to the inner-worldly asceticism
of Protestantism and called for a society
founded on love, service and equality instead
of coercion, exploitation and inequality
(Greek, 1992, p. 62). The gospelers believed
that man [sic] “by using his intellect can
remake society, that he can become the crea-
tor of a world organized for man’s advantage”
(Woodrow Wilson, in Waldo, 1948, p. 16) and
that conscious social action would eradicate sin
and hasten the coming of God’s kingdom, and,
consequently, would promote social reforms to
“purify American society” (Woodrow Wilson,
in Waldo, 1948, p. 58).
The term “social” carried particularly posi-
tive connotations for the social gospelers. To
establish the kingdom of God on earth, indivi-
dual salvation was seen as dependent on soci al
salvation and hence, “no individual is soundly
converted until he comprehends his social rela-
tions and strives to fuhhl them” (Gladdens, in
Greek, 1992, p. 41). Here, the social, suggestive
of cooperation and self-sacrifice, was set off
against individualism and the pursuit of self-
interest and thus:
The kingdomof God is not a matter of saving human
atoms, but of saving the social organism. It is not a
matter of getting individuals to heaven, but of tram+
forming the life on cartb into the harmony of heaven
(Rauschenbusch, in Greek, 1992, p. 65).
It is with this emphasis on the social that the
moral dimension of the Progressive interven-
tionist strategy of changing the processes of
government was founded. According to
Hamilton & Sutton (1989) this strategy was
embraced by Progressives as a consequence of
a weak central state, the federalist structure of
autonomous local and state governments,
patronage party politics, and the large role
played by the business community in the poli-
tical arena. After having established the pre-emi-
nence of social salvation, the next step in
legitimating the interventionist strategy was to
displace the importance of natural law, God or
the ethical, responsible behavior of the indivi-
dual, in favor of an experiential grounding in
social groups - increasingly otganizations. In
turn, social reforms comprising the interven-
tionist strategies could express societal values
and goals in a way amenable to their accomp
lishment by bureaucracies. But here, the oper-
ationalization or encoding of societal goals and
values within the formal structure of orga&a-
tions could be accomplished only by such
experts as public administration scientists and
sociologists “who took up the idea of organiza-
tion as a banner” during this era (Hamilton &
Sutton, 1989, p. 13). Consistent with this focus
on organization, Hamilton & Sutton observed
that:
In [the Progressive] period, “organizttion” was not
merely a formal apparatus and ccrminly not onIy a
means to accomplish an cnvisioncd end; instead organi-
zation in the lexicon of American life becomes a goal in
itself, a method developed to ensure fairness and to
preserve what is valued in human Life. In the revision
that occurred in American thought at the turn of the
century, the act of orgvlintion was intrinsically an ethi-
cal act vital to human nahxc and to society (1989, p. 15).
Thus, according to Hamilton & Sutton:
PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 151
The organizational movements in Progressive America
recast the self’s moral duty fromthat of an autonomous
individual to that of a social being, and thus shifted the
basis of morality fromabsohttc conviction to rcfkxive-
ness. with this revision, domination in Amcrian society
became incrusi@y articulated by means of organ&+
tional metaphors. Obcdicncc was to live up to one’s
social responsibiity, and one’s social responsibility
could bc determined by conccptuali&g one’s rclation-
ship with others in a systematic way in tcmls of one’s
otganiaational fit (1989, p. 35).
The movement relied not merely on a rhet+
ric of social morality rooted in organizations,
but also of science. The social gospelers, adopt-
ing such secular values as progress and evolu-
tionism, sought to transform theology into “the
science of redemption [which would] offer
scientific methods for the eradication of sin”
(Rauschenbusch, ln Greek, 1992, p. 65).
Indeed, this interrelation between science
and the social gospel movement is suggested
by Visser ‘T Hooft
I . it is one of the outstanding charactctistics of the
social gospel movement that it believes not only in the
compatibility of science and Christianity, but also in the
indispensability of their mutual intcrpenctxation. This is
a conviction that often leads to a further belief that
through the contribution of modem science humanity
is being enabled to understand Christianity and Christ
himself much better than any prccediug generation (in
Greek, 1992, p. 65).
In turn, the social gospel movement contrib-
uted to the demand for “facts” in order to
identify the nature, extent and pervasiveness
of social problems, and thus to convince the
public of the legitimacy of their critique and
objectives. In doing so, they promoted the reli-
ance on science. They also contributed to the
legitimization of experts as the secular minis-
ters who would help the gospelers learn “the
laws of nature [and] . . . the divine methods”
to help them ln their redemptive tasks (Strong,
1902, p. 104).
Indeed this religious ethos, which inter-
sected and combined with the political con-
cerns of the Progressives, led Hofstatder
(1955, p. 320) to remark that “the key words
of Progressivism were terms like patriotism,
citizen, democracy, law, character, con-
science, soul, morals, service, duty, shame, dis-
grace, sin, and selfishness” - a series of
descriptors which melds both the political
and the religious/moral. These common politi-
cal and moral concerns of the religious and the
political channeled their respective energies
towards the common goal of an ideal democ-
racy populated by an informed and sovereign
citizenry, and guided by conscious and redemp
tive human action, wherein business and poli-
tics were harnessed in the service of society
(Waldo, 1948; Kolko, 1963; Wiebe, 1%7).
It was not merely enough, however, for Pro-
gressives to claim the immorality of vested
political and business interests, and the moral-
ity of its own ranks (Miller & O’Leary, 1989, pp.
251-256); the movement also wanted to
invoke its interventionist strategy through a
series of social reforms to change the face of
government (Hamilton & Sutton, 1989). These
reforms essentially involved installing within a
government bureaucratic machinery informed
by science and run by professionals.
Scientism and professionalism in
government bureaucracy
The reform efforts undertaken ln the Pro-
gressive movement were ln part symbolic
events whose political rhetoric implicitly sup
ported the bureaucratic form of organization,
which Frug (1984; see also March & Olsen,
1983, who offer a similar framework) identi-
fied as being the primary form of organized
power in America. One form of political rheto-
ric - which Frug (1984) labeled the “formalist
model” - depicts bureaucratic organizations
as rationalized, disciplined mechanisms for
impartially achieving the goals of the citizenry
(see also the “orthodox administration” voice
of March & Olsen, 1983). The formalist model
first begins with identifying the values of
society and then speaks in terms of administra-
tive structures and procedures for facilitating
efficiency and effectiveness within bureaucra-
cies, and invokes the overall guidelines and
values of rationality, neutrality, objectivity,
economy and control in order to serve the
152 hf. A. COVALJiSKI and M. W. DIRSMM’Ii
values of society. According to Hamilton % Sut-
ton (1989), this form of rhetoric sought to
make government a more scientifically based,
calculative, knowable, predictable practice
(see also Miller & O’Leary, 1987,1989) by cate-
gorizing and procedumhzing relationships
within a bureaucratic grid, and establishing
the accountability of organizational roles
within that grid. Invoking such rhetorical
descriptors as “instrumental rationality”,
“technocratic efficiency”, “neutrality” and
“objectivity”, bureaucracies, the techniques
they employ and the power they wield are
portrayed as benign because they are but objec-
tive machines for accomplishing the will of
their constituents. Within the formalist model,
the “hard” inside of objectivity, rationality, effi-
ciency, etc., is contained by and directed at
serving the “soft” outside of the subjective
values of society. It is through the claim of
objectivity that the formalist model seeks to
legitimate the bureaucratic order’s worthiness
to be recognized. In fact, objectivity is so
prized in the formalist model that it must avoid
any taint of its antithesis, subjectivity.
But here, a paradox of bureaucratic action
qua scientific calculative practice arises: if
the impersonal, bureaucratic machinery of
rationality is allowed to proceed unchecked,
then it would become an “iron cage” (for a
related treatment of this concept in institu-
tional theory, see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
in the exercise of bureaucratic power and
human domination. In turn, if objectivity is
left unchecked, it would limit individuality
and human self-expression, thus becoming
insensitive to the very human beings the
bureaucracy is to serve. Consequently, some
modicum of subjectivity must be admitted
into the bureaucracy in the form of administra-
tor discretion. Once admitted, however, sub
jectivity, if similarly unchecked, threatens to
overturn objectivity - a danger which can
only be combatted by adding more discretion,
more subjectivity to those administering the
machine.
In contrast, Frug (1984) asserts that a second
form of political rhetoric - the “expertise
model” - was developed, in part, by such
Progressives as Woodrow Wilson, in response
to the charge that bureaucracies were only
ineffectively controlled by external constitu-
ents, and were in fact subject to enormous
discretion and power of internal bureaucrats
(see also March & Olsen’s, 1983, “realpolitik”
voice). This form of political rhetoric holds that
bureaucratic structures and claims to neutral-
ity, objectivity and rationality all represent dan-
gerous illusions and threats to the governed
unless they are contained by the values, beliefs
and goals of the populace and its various con-
stituent groups. Because of this discretion, the
interpretation of bureaucracy shifts from view-
ing it as a machine within the strict formalist
model to viewing it as a “social system” and a
“natural community”. Also, because this discre-
tion is inherent and necessary to the effective
functioning of the bureaucratic machinery, a
cadre of experts, including accounting pro
fessionals, must be charged with operating it.
This reliance on experts, in turn, makes possi-
ble the exercise of discretion and expression of
human creativity, and thus permits requisite
flexibility so as to serve external constituents
more faithfully, all the while being constrained
in the exercise of power by the experts’ own
professionalism and reliance on an impersonal,
objectified, external system of knowledge, lar-
gely derived from scientific endeavor (Abbott,
1988). In turn, the external and impersonal
qualities of the applied knowledge is necessary
to remove any bias that may result if decision
making were to become overly personal and
subjective by allowing the judgment of the
expert to be safely objectified. Thus, within
the expertise model, the “soft” inside of the
subjectivity of experts is contained by the
“hard” outside of a scientifically derived sys-
tem of objective knowledge. If the exercise of
discretion and expertise becomes overly threa-
tening, it is supplemented by Increasing objec-
tivity, such as through its implementation of
more formal administrative models, or by add-
ing another layer of experts, or “super
experts”, who are more closely associated
with the external profession and hence closer
PRESERVATION AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 153
to the objectified body of knowledge, and who
may also have developed the formal models
used by the bureaucratic administration. In
contrast with the formalist voice’s modus oper-
andi, the expertise model uses its claims of
expertise and professionalism established
externally to legitimate the bureaucratic
order’s worthiness to be recognized.
Thus, both the formalist and expertise mod-
els make roomfor both objectivity and subjec-
tivity, and a line is drawn between the two. The
rhetoric of objectivity counters a fear of admin-
istrative-bureaucratic domination; it also over-
comes a human fear of subjectivity exemplified
by face-to-face confrontation and interest-laden
behavior, and replaces it with either rationa-
lized and proceduralized (as opposed to indivi-
dualized) decisions, or a confrontation
between abstractions - that is, competing
forms of knowledge systems (the expertise
model) or competing forms of structure (the
formalist model). The rhetoric of subjectivity
in bureaucratic afTairs, in turn, ensures that a
place has been made for considering human
values, beliefs and goals to be served by either
the bureaucratic structure or the expert. Frug
argued that those who espouse either the form-
alist or expertise model must continually strive
to combine and yet separate the realms of
objectivity, and subjectivity by somehow draw-
ing a line of demarcation between the two, a
line which gnaws at each model by reasons of
its arbitrary existence.
Frug also concluded that the interpenetra-
tion of the formalist and expertise models has
a much darker side. He reasoned that theorists,
or in our case a politician, who combined the
two forms of rhetoric possesses a potentially
powerful tool of deception:
Theorists [e.g. La Folktte] can reassure themselves [and
the voters of Wisconsin] about the existence of objcc-
tivity and subjectivity by deferring the needed clement
to some model not then under examination. When they
find that the concept of cxpcrtisc is too manipulabk to
ensure objectivity, they can assume that the objectivity
necessary to curb managerial power can be found else-
where