Description
Risky framing effects refer to changes in risk preferences as a result of how choices are verbally presented,
such as in terms of gains or losses. Prior research on framing has produced mixed results, with
only some showing reliable framing effects. We argue that this is because different framing studies have
created different levels of between-alternative conflict. Two studies were conducted to examine how
different levels of between-alternative conflict and the inclusion of a no-choice option influence framing
effects using both between- and within-individuals experimental designs. These studies found that high
levels of between-alternative conflict were associated with framing effects, and that high levels of
between-alternative conflict were moderated by including the no-choice option in the choice set. Taken
together, these two studies demonstrated that the inclusion of a no-choice option provides an alternative
way of resolving difficult choices regarding decision frames that are not available when individuals are
forced to choose. It is concluded that between-alternative conflict makes people influenced by decision
frames and determines the appearance of the framing effect.
The moderating effect of a no-choice option on risky framing effect
Hui-Hsiung Huang
a, b
, Hung-Jen Su
a
, Chia-Jung Chang
c, *
a
Department of Business Administration, National Chung Cheng University, Minhsiung Township, Chiayi City, Taiwan
b
Department of Hotel and Restaurant Management, Chia Nan University of Pharmacy and Science, Tainan City, Taiwan
c
Undergraduate Program of Business Administration, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei City, Taiwan
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 11 April 2013
Accepted 27 July 2013
Available online 9 March 2015
Keywords:
A no-choice option
Between-alternative con?ict
Risky framing effect
a b s t r a c t
Risky framing effects refer to changes in risk preferences as a result of how choices are verbally pre-
sented, such as in terms of gains or losses. Prior research on framing has produced mixed results, with
only some showing reliable framing effects. We argue that this is because different framing studies have
created different levels of between-alternative con?ict. Two studies were conducted to examine how
different levels of between-alternative con?ict and the inclusion of a no-choice option in?uence framing
effects using both between- and within-individuals experimental designs. These studies found that high
levels of between-alternative con?ict were associated with framing effects, and that high levels of
between-alternative con?ict were moderated by including the no-choice option in the choice set. Taken
together, these two studies demonstrated that the inclusion of a no-choice option provides an alternative
way of resolving dif?cult choices regarding decision frames that are not available when individuals are
forced to choose. It is concluded that between-alternative con?ict makes people in?uenced by decision
frames and determines the appearance of the framing effect.
© 2015 College of Management, National Cheng Kung University. Production and hosting by Elsevier
Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the classical studies by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
framing effects, de?ned as the tendency for people to avoid (pur-
sue) risk when a choice is framed in terms of gains (losses), have
received much research attention in areas including psychology
and decision making, and have been extended to a wide variety of
tasks and procedures (Bloom?eld, 2006; Gamliel, 2007; Hannah &
Cafferty, 2006; Igou & Bless, 2007; Kim, Zhang, & Li, 2008; Kugler,
Connolly, & Ord o~ nez, 2012; Kühberger, 1995, 1998; Levin,
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Schneider, 1992; Wang, 1996).
Converging evidence demonstrates that the occurrence of framing
effects depends on the nature of the task characteristics, as well as
the content and context variables inherent in choice problems,
which themselves may involve distinct psychological mechanisms
(Cheng, Yen, Chuang, & Chang, 2013; Kim, Kim, & Marshall, 2014).
Many researchers have noted the erratic nature of framing ef-
fects and explored different factors that may determine their
occurrence. Empirical studies have shown that the psychological
mechanisms of framing effects are sensitive to various cognitive
variables, including the amount of information available to the
decision maker (Igou & Bless, 2007; Levin, Johnson, Russo, &
Deldin, 1985; Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000; Levin et al., 1998;
Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011). It is therefore important to know
the antecedent conditions that determine the appearance and
disappearance of framing effects (Wang, 1996).
Based on a data pool of 136 empirical papers, the factors that
contribute to the framing effects have been classi?ed by Kühberger
(1998) into three feature categories: risk, task, and participant
characteristics. Even recent studies on risky choice framing effects
still focus solely on these three feature categories (Bloom?eld,
2006; Igou & Bless, 2007; Kim et al., 2008; Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). In terms of the risk category,
Kühberger (1998) mentioned that no previous study has investi-
gated the effect on risky choice framing effects of a no-choice op-
tion. A no-choice option is one in which people need not make
decisions right away and may collect more information or look for
new alternatives. Dhar and Simonson (2003) state that people are
not forced to make a choice fromall sets presented to themin many
real-world situations: they often exercise their option not choose at
* Corresponding author. Undergraduate Program of Business Administration,
National Taiwan Normal University, No. 31, Shida Rd, Da-an District, Taipei City,
10645, Taiwan.
E-mail address: [email protected] (C.-J. Chang).
Peer review under responsibility of College of Management, National Cheng
Kung University.
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Asia Paci?c Management Review
j ournal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ apmrvhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apmrv.2014.12.001
1029-3132/© 2015 College of Management, National Cheng Kung University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23
all, or to defer making a choice. Thus, a forced choice does not
re?ect reality and overestimates the relative preference of such
options because people sometimes defer making a choice, espe-
cially in high con?ict situations and where people are trying to
avoid a dif?cult trade-off (Tversky &Sha?r, 1992). Taken together, it
is necessary to investigate how a no-choice option affects decision
frames.
However, one question arises: if a no-choice option affects
framing, then what mechanism in?uences the relationship be-
tween the no-choice option and framing effect? Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) mentioned that “it was easy to see that the
two problems were effectively identical” (p. 453). Combined with
Luce, Jia, and Fischer (2003) study, they de?ned that between-
alternative con?ict, which was operationalized by the presence of
equally attractive or unattractive features across two options, may
be induced if equal attractiveness exists in the riskless and risky
options. That is, between-alternative con?ict may be the possible
mechanism underlying the impact of the no-choice option on risky
framing effect. Thus, this study examines the theoretical link of
between-alternative con?ict in terms of the inclusion of the no-
choice option and framing effects. Experimental results are pre-
sented and concluding remarks are provided together with impli-
cations and directions for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Risky framing effects and between-alternative con?ict
Risky framing effects, which are more widely studied by
different domains, such as economics, sociology, and consumer
behavior (Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998), refer to howpeoples'
preferences among options are dependent on how those options
are described. A preference reversal phenomenal was ?rst observed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), where the majority of in-
dividuals given a positively framed version of a task selected the
option with a certain outcome, whereas the majority of individuals
who were given a negatively framed version selected the more
risky option. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explained framing ef-
fects as follows: “Because of imperfections of human perception
and decision, changes of perspective often reverse the relative
apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options” (p.
453). In other words, framing effects are like perceptual illusions
more than computational errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984;
Okder, 2012). It was also implied that individuals would easily
confuse choices between the riskless and risky options even if they
were aware of the equal expected value of these two options, as
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) said, “it was easy to see that the two
problems were effectively identical” (p. 453).
To investigate what prompted the individuals to choose the
reverse answers across frames, Frisch's (1993) study based on
perceptual illusions asked individuals to write down possible
reasons for their choices that might provide a natural way to un-
derstand risky framing effect (Sha?r, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993).
First, individuals were asked to determine whether the two ver-
sions of the framing effect should be treated the same, and if not,
why. The individuals who treated the two versions differently
were further classi?ed into four groups as follows: SAME (in-
dividuals treated the problems differently but judged them to be
the same); OBJDIF (individuals treated the problems differently
and stated that there was an objective difference); SUBJDIF (in-
dividuals treated the problems differently and stated that there
was a subjective difference); and NONE (individuals did not pro-
vide any justi?cation for their responses). Based on the classi?-
cations made by those individuals, an obvious high between-
alternative con?ict, which is induced by the equal attractiveness,
exists in the riskless and risky options, and could easily be dis-
cerned for the SAME group. Furthermore, in Frisch's (1993)
Experiment 1 (Asian disease problems), 69% of the individuals
who experienced high decision con?ict were classi?ed into the
SAME group. Among those who were classi?ed into the SAME
group in Experiment 2, 47% of them showed evidence of a framing
effect, but 0.1). This result showed the importance of
the risky frames on decision making and corresponded to those
found in previous studies such as Levin et al. (2002), who presented
that the risky choice framing effect was reliable. Finally, in order to
clarify the mechanism of between-alternative con?ict, we further
tested if those who were under high between-alternative con?ict
Table 1
Asian disease problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Imagine that the United States is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Scienti?c estimates of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
1. Positive frame:
Programs A: If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved.
Programs B: If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that all 600
people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you choose?
Program A Program B ( No-Choice option: I would collect more
information and look for new alternatives)
After making your choice, please answer the ?owing questions rated from
1 ¼ strongly agree, 7 ¼ strongly disagree.
Do you agree both programs have equally likable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally dislikable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally favorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unfavorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally attractive degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unattractive degree to you?
2 Negative frame:
Programs A: If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die.
Programs B: If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will
die and 2/3 probability that all 600 will die.
Which of the two programs would you choose?
Program A Program B ( No-Choice option: I would collect more
information and look for new alternatives)
After making your choice, please answer the ?owing questions rated from
1 ¼ strongly agree, 7 ¼ strongly disagree.
Do you agree both programs have equally likable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally dislikable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally favorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unfavorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally attractive degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unattractive degree to you?
Table 2
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 1 (between-individuals
design).
Control group: with forced
choice option
Experimental group: with
no-choice option
Positive frame Negative frame Positive frame Negative frame
Riskless 30 (17/13)
a
12 (3/9) 20 (4/16) 15 (1/14)
Risky 20 (4/16) 38 (25/13) 17 (2/15) 19 (3/16)
No-choice d d 13 (12/1) 16 (14/0)
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a
midpoint split).
H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 20
showed the framing effect. The results showed that there was a
signi?cant framing effect found in the forced-choice group (c
2
(1) ¼ 10.131, p < 0.01), but no effect in the no-choice group. These
results are not only consistent with previous studies (Dhar, 1997;
Dhar & Simonson, 2003; Luce, 1998; Tversky & Sha?r, 1992), but
also provided a new perspective of the no-choice option on risky
framing effect.
In the within-individuals experimental design, the design of
counterbalance showed no order effect in both conditions (F < 0.98,
p > 0.1 for both). The moderating effect of the no-choice option on
decision frames was signi?cant (c
2
(1) ¼ 6.218, p < 0.05). More
clearly, participants with forced options showed signi?cant risky
framing effect (c
2
(1) ¼28.359, p < 0.01), whereas participants with
the no-choice option revealed an insigni?cant risky framing effect
(c
2
(1) ¼ 1.080, p > 0.1). H1 was also supported. In order to un-
derstand the mechanism of between-alternative con?ict on
framing effect, the results showed that eight (28.6%) participants
with high between-alternative con?ict changed their preference
(from riskless option to the no-choice option) in positive frames
and 26 (65.0%) participants with high between-alternative con?ict
changed their preference (from risky option to the no-choice op-
tion) in negative frames. All of the results supported our hypothesis
that between-alternative con?ict might cause the appearance of
risky framing effect.
4. Study 2
In order to recon?rm the moderating strength of the no-choice
option as well as the existence of between-alternative con?ict in
the framing effect, Study 2, with the manipulation of between-
alternative con?ict, was conducted. The purpose of this manipu-
lation was to increase the degree of decision con?ict and evaluate
whether those exposed to a higher level of between-alternative
con?ict would opt for more no-choice options.
Therefore, Study 2 was designed to examine whether: (1) the
framing effect was observed with forced options, and whether
framing would be negated when a no-choice option was added;
and (2) a difference or change in preference would be observed
between two choice scenarios that were rated as generating high
con?ict (near relations' lives) versus low con?ict (plants lives)
conditions, which were selected from preliminary data.
1
4.1. Participants, procedure and design
First, 240 participants recruited froma large southern university
in return for course credit, including 138 males and 102 females
with an average age of 20.2 years, were randomly and equally
assigned to a 2 (frame: gain vs. loss) Â 2 (con?ict: high vs. low) Â 2
(forced choice option vs. no-choice option) between-individuals
experimental design. Second, 120 undergraduates recruited from
a large southern Taiwan university in return for course credit,
including 68 males and 52 females with an average age of
19.1 years, were randomly and equally assigned to a 2 (frame: gain
vs. loss) Â 2 (with forced choice option vs. with no-choice
option) Â 2 (con?ict: high vs. low) within-individuals experi-
mental design with the same counterbalance as Study 1 (no order
effects in both conditions: Fs < 1.07, p > 0.1). All of the manipula-
tions, procedure, and measurements are similar to Study 1 except
for the contexts of two scenarios. At the beginning of the study,
participants were assured of anonymity and advised of their right
to withdraw at any time; then they were also asked to read the
scenario carefully before making their preferred decisions. After
respondents carefully read and made their decisions, the numbers
and proportions of the options in each group were collected and
analyzed.
4.2. Decision con?ict
Both manipulations (near relations' lives and plants' lives) of the
decision con?ict were similar to the version of the Asian disease
problemprovided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The difference
was that participants were told that six of their near relations were
infected with an unusual Asian disease in near relations' lives
scenarios, and six potted plants were infected with an unusual
Asian disease in plants' lives scenarios. In addition, the manipula-
tion checks of decision con?ict were the same as preliminary (rated
from 1 ¼ very low/weak/easy to 7 ¼ very high/strong/dif?cult).
4.3. Results and discussion
As expected, the participants felt it was signi?cantly more
con?icting to make a choice in near relations' lives scenarios than to
make a choice in plants' lives scenarios (M ¼ 6.22 vs. M ¼ 3.50;
t ¼ 18.85, p < 0.01).
The data shown in Table 4 were tested by a hierarchical log-
linear analysis, and as predicted, the outcome showed that the
interaction effect among con?ict, no-choice, and the framing effect
was signi?cant (c
2
(1) ¼ 7.777, p < 0.01). In addition, the results of
planned contrasts revealed that risky framing effect was observed
in the high con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 14.237, p < 0.01), but not in the
low con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 0.199, p > 0.1). More speci?cally, par-
ticipants with forced choice showed a risky framing effect in the
high con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 86.741, p < 0.01), but did not in other
groups. These results were consistent with the results of Study 1
and strengthened our argument that the individuals who were
really affected by the framing effect were those who were under a
higher level of decision con?ict.
As shown in Table 5, the interaction effect of con?ict and the no-
choice option on decision frames was signi?cant (c
2
(1) ¼ 4.417,
p < 0.05) in the within-individuals experimental design. The results
of planned contrasts showed that risky framing effect was observed
in the high con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 4.417, p < 0.05), but not in the
low con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 0.080, p > 0.1). However, participants
with forced choice showed a risky framing effect in the high con?ict
group (c
2
(1) ¼ 68.385, p < 0.01), but did not in other groups. In
order to understand the mechanismof between-alternative con?ict
on framing effect, the results revealed that 60.0% (60.0%) of par-
ticipants under the high con?ict group changed their preference in
positive (negative) frames, whereas 10.0% (13.3%) of participants in
the low con?ict group changed their preference in positive (nega-
tive) frames. All of the results demonstrated our inference that
Table 3
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 1 (within-individuals design).
Positive frame Negative frame
Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option
Riskless 28 (16/12)
a
19 (8/11) 10 (2/8) 9 (1/8)
Risky 22 (6/16) 20 (4/16) 40 (30/10) 14 (4/10)
No-choice d 11 (10/1) d 27 (26/1)
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a
midpoint split).
1
According to prior studies, ?ve scenarios (near relations' lives, human lives,
money, paintings, and plants) were selected to make comparisons of the level of
decision con?ict (rated from 1 ¼ very low/weak/easy to 7 ¼ very high/strong/
dif?cult) by 30 participants. The results showed that the difference of the level of
decision con?ict between near relations' lives and plants was largest (M ¼ 6.31 vs.
M ¼ 3.16; t ¼ 22.72, p < 0.01). Thus, near relations' lives and plants' lives were
selected.
H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 21
between-alternative con?ict might cause the appearance of risky
framing effect again.
5. General discussion
The previous literature has focused to a great extent on the
positive or negative frames and how different frames affect an in-
dividual's choices. However, in this article, we provide conceptual
and empirical evidence of how a no-choice option can eliminate
framing effects in a risky choice. Taken together, the two experi-
ments demonstrate that the inclusion of a no-choice option pro-
vides an alternative way of resolving dif?cult choices in terms of
decision frames that are not available when consumers are forced
to choose.
By focusing on between-alternative con?ict, Studies 1 and 2
were conducted to evaluate the likely theoretical, underlying
mechanisms associated with risky framing effect. It also provides a
different perspective that has been neglected in previous studies of
the risky framing effect. Unlike Tversky and Kahneman's study
(1981), which proposes that the framing effect may be a result of
imperfections in terms of human perception, our research in-
dicates that between-alternative con?ict makes people in?uenced
by decision frames, and also determines the appearance or
disappearance of the framing effect. For example, Wang (1996)
found when consumers faced different scenarios, bidirectional
(choose riskless outcome in gain frames and risky outcome in loss
frames) or unidirectional effects [choose riskless (or risky) in both
gain and loss frames] of risky frames might occur. According to our
?ndings of Study 2, the possible reasons why consumers show the
different responses on decision frames may result from the
different level of between-alternative con?ict. The more between-
alternative con?ict is perceived, the more risky framing effect will
be revealed.
Furthermore, Dhar and Simonson (2003) mentioned that people
do not need to make a choice from the sets presented to them in
many real-world situationsdthey also have the option not to
choose at all, or to defer their choice. In our daily lives, even when
having decided to buy one product, we may often search for more
information (e.g., comparing the price or the after-sales service
with other stores) and make ?nal decisions later. Therefore, a no-
choice option may more accurately re?ect reality and not over-
estimate the relative share of such options, because people some-
times defer making choices in high con?ict situations when they
try to avoid a dif?cult trade-off (Tversky & Sha?r, 1992).
For example, in a risky framing choice where people are asked to
select the funds with different levels of risk or choose automobiles
based on country-of-origin information (Levin, Jasper, & Gaeth,
1996), salespeople should not force people to make a decision.
Instead, they should allow customers to have more time and in-
formation to think their options over. In other words, salespeople
should offer a no-choice option when a customer faces a decision
con?ict. If salespeople force people to make a decision and there-
fore purchase the product, people might either leave the store with
a negative emotion (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 2003;
Luce, 1998) or later come to regret their decisions (Anderson, 2003;
Cooke, Meyvis, & Schwartz, 2001; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002;
Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). Therefore, the strategy of giving a no-
choice option within the retailing setting could prove bene?cial
not only to people (who avoid framing bias, regret, and negative
emotions) but also to stores (by lowering the number of returned
goods and by inducing positive affect toward the stores).
6. Limitations and future research
This research only focuses on the risky choice framing, even
though Levin et al. (1998) distinguish frames into three types:
risky choice, attribute, and goal framing. Therefore, further
research may choose to investigate the effect of a no-choice option
on framing effects with other frames and real decision contexts.
For example, the no-choice option could be added to the attribute
frame, which connects with advertising and persuasion effects as a
moderator to provide a better understanding of the different
framing effects.
Con?icts of interest
All contributing authors declare no con?icts of interest.
Table 5
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 2 (within-individuals design).
High con?ict Low con?ict
Positive frame Negative frame Positive frame Negative frame
Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option
Riskless 23(18/5)
a
4(0/4) 6(1/5) 3(0/3) 16(5/11) 13(2/11) 12(0/12) 10(0/10)
Risky 7(0/7) 5(0/5) 24(19/5) 5(1/4) 14(1/13) 12(0/12) 18(4/14) 14(0/14)
No-choice d 21 d 22 d 5 d 6
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a midpoint split).
Table 4
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 2 (between-individuals design).
High con?ict Low con?ict
Positive frame Negative frame Positive frame Negative frame
Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option
Riskless 24 (17/7)
a
8 (1/7) 5 (1/4) 5 (1/4) 17 (6/11) 13 (2/11) 12 (1/11) 10 (0/10)
Risky 6 (1/5) 5 (0/5) 25 (21/4) 7 (2/5) 13 (1/12) 12 (1/11) 18 (3/15) 15 (1/14)
No-choice d 17 d 18 d 5 d 5
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a midpoint split).
H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 22
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the ?nancial support
provided by the National Science Council in Taiwan under the
NSC98-2410-H194-010. The authors would like to thank two
anonymous referees for suggestions that improved this manuscript.
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H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 23
doc_816800329.pdf
Risky framing effects refer to changes in risk preferences as a result of how choices are verbally presented,
such as in terms of gains or losses. Prior research on framing has produced mixed results, with
only some showing reliable framing effects. We argue that this is because different framing studies have
created different levels of between-alternative conflict. Two studies were conducted to examine how
different levels of between-alternative conflict and the inclusion of a no-choice option influence framing
effects using both between- and within-individuals experimental designs. These studies found that high
levels of between-alternative conflict were associated with framing effects, and that high levels of
between-alternative conflict were moderated by including the no-choice option in the choice set. Taken
together, these two studies demonstrated that the inclusion of a no-choice option provides an alternative
way of resolving difficult choices regarding decision frames that are not available when individuals are
forced to choose. It is concluded that between-alternative conflict makes people influenced by decision
frames and determines the appearance of the framing effect.
The moderating effect of a no-choice option on risky framing effect
Hui-Hsiung Huang
a, b
, Hung-Jen Su
a
, Chia-Jung Chang
c, *
a
Department of Business Administration, National Chung Cheng University, Minhsiung Township, Chiayi City, Taiwan
b
Department of Hotel and Restaurant Management, Chia Nan University of Pharmacy and Science, Tainan City, Taiwan
c
Undergraduate Program of Business Administration, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei City, Taiwan
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 11 April 2013
Accepted 27 July 2013
Available online 9 March 2015
Keywords:
A no-choice option
Between-alternative con?ict
Risky framing effect
a b s t r a c t
Risky framing effects refer to changes in risk preferences as a result of how choices are verbally pre-
sented, such as in terms of gains or losses. Prior research on framing has produced mixed results, with
only some showing reliable framing effects. We argue that this is because different framing studies have
created different levels of between-alternative con?ict. Two studies were conducted to examine how
different levels of between-alternative con?ict and the inclusion of a no-choice option in?uence framing
effects using both between- and within-individuals experimental designs. These studies found that high
levels of between-alternative con?ict were associated with framing effects, and that high levels of
between-alternative con?ict were moderated by including the no-choice option in the choice set. Taken
together, these two studies demonstrated that the inclusion of a no-choice option provides an alternative
way of resolving dif?cult choices regarding decision frames that are not available when individuals are
forced to choose. It is concluded that between-alternative con?ict makes people in?uenced by decision
frames and determines the appearance of the framing effect.
© 2015 College of Management, National Cheng Kung University. Production and hosting by Elsevier
Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the classical studies by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
framing effects, de?ned as the tendency for people to avoid (pur-
sue) risk when a choice is framed in terms of gains (losses), have
received much research attention in areas including psychology
and decision making, and have been extended to a wide variety of
tasks and procedures (Bloom?eld, 2006; Gamliel, 2007; Hannah &
Cafferty, 2006; Igou & Bless, 2007; Kim, Zhang, & Li, 2008; Kugler,
Connolly, & Ord o~ nez, 2012; Kühberger, 1995, 1998; Levin,
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Schneider, 1992; Wang, 1996).
Converging evidence demonstrates that the occurrence of framing
effects depends on the nature of the task characteristics, as well as
the content and context variables inherent in choice problems,
which themselves may involve distinct psychological mechanisms
(Cheng, Yen, Chuang, & Chang, 2013; Kim, Kim, & Marshall, 2014).
Many researchers have noted the erratic nature of framing ef-
fects and explored different factors that may determine their
occurrence. Empirical studies have shown that the psychological
mechanisms of framing effects are sensitive to various cognitive
variables, including the amount of information available to the
decision maker (Igou & Bless, 2007; Levin, Johnson, Russo, &
Deldin, 1985; Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000; Levin et al., 1998;
Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011). It is therefore important to know
the antecedent conditions that determine the appearance and
disappearance of framing effects (Wang, 1996).
Based on a data pool of 136 empirical papers, the factors that
contribute to the framing effects have been classi?ed by Kühberger
(1998) into three feature categories: risk, task, and participant
characteristics. Even recent studies on risky choice framing effects
still focus solely on these three feature categories (Bloom?eld,
2006; Igou & Bless, 2007; Kim et al., 2008; Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). In terms of the risk category,
Kühberger (1998) mentioned that no previous study has investi-
gated the effect on risky choice framing effects of a no-choice op-
tion. A no-choice option is one in which people need not make
decisions right away and may collect more information or look for
new alternatives. Dhar and Simonson (2003) state that people are
not forced to make a choice fromall sets presented to themin many
real-world situations: they often exercise their option not choose at
* Corresponding author. Undergraduate Program of Business Administration,
National Taiwan Normal University, No. 31, Shida Rd, Da-an District, Taipei City,
10645, Taiwan.
E-mail address: [email protected] (C.-J. Chang).
Peer review under responsibility of College of Management, National Cheng
Kung University.
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1029-3132/© 2015 College of Management, National Cheng Kung University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23
all, or to defer making a choice. Thus, a forced choice does not
re?ect reality and overestimates the relative preference of such
options because people sometimes defer making a choice, espe-
cially in high con?ict situations and where people are trying to
avoid a dif?cult trade-off (Tversky &Sha?r, 1992). Taken together, it
is necessary to investigate how a no-choice option affects decision
frames.
However, one question arises: if a no-choice option affects
framing, then what mechanism in?uences the relationship be-
tween the no-choice option and framing effect? Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) mentioned that “it was easy to see that the
two problems were effectively identical” (p. 453). Combined with
Luce, Jia, and Fischer (2003) study, they de?ned that between-
alternative con?ict, which was operationalized by the presence of
equally attractive or unattractive features across two options, may
be induced if equal attractiveness exists in the riskless and risky
options. That is, between-alternative con?ict may be the possible
mechanism underlying the impact of the no-choice option on risky
framing effect. Thus, this study examines the theoretical link of
between-alternative con?ict in terms of the inclusion of the no-
choice option and framing effects. Experimental results are pre-
sented and concluding remarks are provided together with impli-
cations and directions for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Risky framing effects and between-alternative con?ict
Risky framing effects, which are more widely studied by
different domains, such as economics, sociology, and consumer
behavior (Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998), refer to howpeoples'
preferences among options are dependent on how those options
are described. A preference reversal phenomenal was ?rst observed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), where the majority of in-
dividuals given a positively framed version of a task selected the
option with a certain outcome, whereas the majority of individuals
who were given a negatively framed version selected the more
risky option. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explained framing ef-
fects as follows: “Because of imperfections of human perception
and decision, changes of perspective often reverse the relative
apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options” (p.
453). In other words, framing effects are like perceptual illusions
more than computational errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984;
Okder, 2012). It was also implied that individuals would easily
confuse choices between the riskless and risky options even if they
were aware of the equal expected value of these two options, as
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) said, “it was easy to see that the two
problems were effectively identical” (p. 453).
To investigate what prompted the individuals to choose the
reverse answers across frames, Frisch's (1993) study based on
perceptual illusions asked individuals to write down possible
reasons for their choices that might provide a natural way to un-
derstand risky framing effect (Sha?r, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993).
First, individuals were asked to determine whether the two ver-
sions of the framing effect should be treated the same, and if not,
why. The individuals who treated the two versions differently
were further classi?ed into four groups as follows: SAME (in-
dividuals treated the problems differently but judged them to be
the same); OBJDIF (individuals treated the problems differently
and stated that there was an objective difference); SUBJDIF (in-
dividuals treated the problems differently and stated that there
was a subjective difference); and NONE (individuals did not pro-
vide any justi?cation for their responses). Based on the classi?-
cations made by those individuals, an obvious high between-
alternative con?ict, which is induced by the equal attractiveness,
exists in the riskless and risky options, and could easily be dis-
cerned for the SAME group. Furthermore, in Frisch's (1993)
Experiment 1 (Asian disease problems), 69% of the individuals
who experienced high decision con?ict were classi?ed into the
SAME group. Among those who were classi?ed into the SAME
group in Experiment 2, 47% of them showed evidence of a framing
effect, but 0.1). This result showed the importance of
the risky frames on decision making and corresponded to those
found in previous studies such as Levin et al. (2002), who presented
that the risky choice framing effect was reliable. Finally, in order to
clarify the mechanism of between-alternative con?ict, we further
tested if those who were under high between-alternative con?ict
Table 1
Asian disease problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Imagine that the United States is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Scienti?c estimates of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
1. Positive frame:
Programs A: If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved.
Programs B: If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that all 600
people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you choose?
Program A Program B ( No-Choice option: I would collect more
information and look for new alternatives)
After making your choice, please answer the ?owing questions rated from
1 ¼ strongly agree, 7 ¼ strongly disagree.
Do you agree both programs have equally likable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally dislikable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally favorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unfavorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally attractive degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unattractive degree to you?
2 Negative frame:
Programs A: If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die.
Programs B: If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will
die and 2/3 probability that all 600 will die.
Which of the two programs would you choose?
Program A Program B ( No-Choice option: I would collect more
information and look for new alternatives)
After making your choice, please answer the ?owing questions rated from
1 ¼ strongly agree, 7 ¼ strongly disagree.
Do you agree both programs have equally likable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally dislikable level to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally favorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unfavorable degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally attractive degree to you?
Do you agree both programs have equally unattractive degree to you?
Table 2
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 1 (between-individuals
design).
Control group: with forced
choice option
Experimental group: with
no-choice option
Positive frame Negative frame Positive frame Negative frame
Riskless 30 (17/13)
a
12 (3/9) 20 (4/16) 15 (1/14)
Risky 20 (4/16) 38 (25/13) 17 (2/15) 19 (3/16)
No-choice d d 13 (12/1) 16 (14/0)
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a
midpoint split).
H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 20
showed the framing effect. The results showed that there was a
signi?cant framing effect found in the forced-choice group (c
2
(1) ¼ 10.131, p < 0.01), but no effect in the no-choice group. These
results are not only consistent with previous studies (Dhar, 1997;
Dhar & Simonson, 2003; Luce, 1998; Tversky & Sha?r, 1992), but
also provided a new perspective of the no-choice option on risky
framing effect.
In the within-individuals experimental design, the design of
counterbalance showed no order effect in both conditions (F < 0.98,
p > 0.1 for both). The moderating effect of the no-choice option on
decision frames was signi?cant (c
2
(1) ¼ 6.218, p < 0.05). More
clearly, participants with forced options showed signi?cant risky
framing effect (c
2
(1) ¼28.359, p < 0.01), whereas participants with
the no-choice option revealed an insigni?cant risky framing effect
(c
2
(1) ¼ 1.080, p > 0.1). H1 was also supported. In order to un-
derstand the mechanism of between-alternative con?ict on
framing effect, the results showed that eight (28.6%) participants
with high between-alternative con?ict changed their preference
(from riskless option to the no-choice option) in positive frames
and 26 (65.0%) participants with high between-alternative con?ict
changed their preference (from risky option to the no-choice op-
tion) in negative frames. All of the results supported our hypothesis
that between-alternative con?ict might cause the appearance of
risky framing effect.
4. Study 2
In order to recon?rm the moderating strength of the no-choice
option as well as the existence of between-alternative con?ict in
the framing effect, Study 2, with the manipulation of between-
alternative con?ict, was conducted. The purpose of this manipu-
lation was to increase the degree of decision con?ict and evaluate
whether those exposed to a higher level of between-alternative
con?ict would opt for more no-choice options.
Therefore, Study 2 was designed to examine whether: (1) the
framing effect was observed with forced options, and whether
framing would be negated when a no-choice option was added;
and (2) a difference or change in preference would be observed
between two choice scenarios that were rated as generating high
con?ict (near relations' lives) versus low con?ict (plants lives)
conditions, which were selected from preliminary data.
1
4.1. Participants, procedure and design
First, 240 participants recruited froma large southern university
in return for course credit, including 138 males and 102 females
with an average age of 20.2 years, were randomly and equally
assigned to a 2 (frame: gain vs. loss) Â 2 (con?ict: high vs. low) Â 2
(forced choice option vs. no-choice option) between-individuals
experimental design. Second, 120 undergraduates recruited from
a large southern Taiwan university in return for course credit,
including 68 males and 52 females with an average age of
19.1 years, were randomly and equally assigned to a 2 (frame: gain
vs. loss) Â 2 (with forced choice option vs. with no-choice
option) Â 2 (con?ict: high vs. low) within-individuals experi-
mental design with the same counterbalance as Study 1 (no order
effects in both conditions: Fs < 1.07, p > 0.1). All of the manipula-
tions, procedure, and measurements are similar to Study 1 except
for the contexts of two scenarios. At the beginning of the study,
participants were assured of anonymity and advised of their right
to withdraw at any time; then they were also asked to read the
scenario carefully before making their preferred decisions. After
respondents carefully read and made their decisions, the numbers
and proportions of the options in each group were collected and
analyzed.
4.2. Decision con?ict
Both manipulations (near relations' lives and plants' lives) of the
decision con?ict were similar to the version of the Asian disease
problemprovided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The difference
was that participants were told that six of their near relations were
infected with an unusual Asian disease in near relations' lives
scenarios, and six potted plants were infected with an unusual
Asian disease in plants' lives scenarios. In addition, the manipula-
tion checks of decision con?ict were the same as preliminary (rated
from 1 ¼ very low/weak/easy to 7 ¼ very high/strong/dif?cult).
4.3. Results and discussion
As expected, the participants felt it was signi?cantly more
con?icting to make a choice in near relations' lives scenarios than to
make a choice in plants' lives scenarios (M ¼ 6.22 vs. M ¼ 3.50;
t ¼ 18.85, p < 0.01).
The data shown in Table 4 were tested by a hierarchical log-
linear analysis, and as predicted, the outcome showed that the
interaction effect among con?ict, no-choice, and the framing effect
was signi?cant (c
2
(1) ¼ 7.777, p < 0.01). In addition, the results of
planned contrasts revealed that risky framing effect was observed
in the high con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 14.237, p < 0.01), but not in the
low con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 0.199, p > 0.1). More speci?cally, par-
ticipants with forced choice showed a risky framing effect in the
high con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 86.741, p < 0.01), but did not in other
groups. These results were consistent with the results of Study 1
and strengthened our argument that the individuals who were
really affected by the framing effect were those who were under a
higher level of decision con?ict.
As shown in Table 5, the interaction effect of con?ict and the no-
choice option on decision frames was signi?cant (c
2
(1) ¼ 4.417,
p < 0.05) in the within-individuals experimental design. The results
of planned contrasts showed that risky framing effect was observed
in the high con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 4.417, p < 0.05), but not in the
low con?ict group (c
2
(1) ¼ 0.080, p > 0.1). However, participants
with forced choice showed a risky framing effect in the high con?ict
group (c
2
(1) ¼ 68.385, p < 0.01), but did not in other groups. In
order to understand the mechanismof between-alternative con?ict
on framing effect, the results revealed that 60.0% (60.0%) of par-
ticipants under the high con?ict group changed their preference in
positive (negative) frames, whereas 10.0% (13.3%) of participants in
the low con?ict group changed their preference in positive (nega-
tive) frames. All of the results demonstrated our inference that
Table 3
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 1 (within-individuals design).
Positive frame Negative frame
Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option
Riskless 28 (16/12)
a
19 (8/11) 10 (2/8) 9 (1/8)
Risky 22 (6/16) 20 (4/16) 40 (30/10) 14 (4/10)
No-choice d 11 (10/1) d 27 (26/1)
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a
midpoint split).
1
According to prior studies, ?ve scenarios (near relations' lives, human lives,
money, paintings, and plants) were selected to make comparisons of the level of
decision con?ict (rated from 1 ¼ very low/weak/easy to 7 ¼ very high/strong/
dif?cult) by 30 participants. The results showed that the difference of the level of
decision con?ict between near relations' lives and plants was largest (M ¼ 6.31 vs.
M ¼ 3.16; t ¼ 22.72, p < 0.01). Thus, near relations' lives and plants' lives were
selected.
H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 21
between-alternative con?ict might cause the appearance of risky
framing effect again.
5. General discussion
The previous literature has focused to a great extent on the
positive or negative frames and how different frames affect an in-
dividual's choices. However, in this article, we provide conceptual
and empirical evidence of how a no-choice option can eliminate
framing effects in a risky choice. Taken together, the two experi-
ments demonstrate that the inclusion of a no-choice option pro-
vides an alternative way of resolving dif?cult choices in terms of
decision frames that are not available when consumers are forced
to choose.
By focusing on between-alternative con?ict, Studies 1 and 2
were conducted to evaluate the likely theoretical, underlying
mechanisms associated with risky framing effect. It also provides a
different perspective that has been neglected in previous studies of
the risky framing effect. Unlike Tversky and Kahneman's study
(1981), which proposes that the framing effect may be a result of
imperfections in terms of human perception, our research in-
dicates that between-alternative con?ict makes people in?uenced
by decision frames, and also determines the appearance or
disappearance of the framing effect. For example, Wang (1996)
found when consumers faced different scenarios, bidirectional
(choose riskless outcome in gain frames and risky outcome in loss
frames) or unidirectional effects [choose riskless (or risky) in both
gain and loss frames] of risky frames might occur. According to our
?ndings of Study 2, the possible reasons why consumers show the
different responses on decision frames may result from the
different level of between-alternative con?ict. The more between-
alternative con?ict is perceived, the more risky framing effect will
be revealed.
Furthermore, Dhar and Simonson (2003) mentioned that people
do not need to make a choice from the sets presented to them in
many real-world situationsdthey also have the option not to
choose at all, or to defer their choice. In our daily lives, even when
having decided to buy one product, we may often search for more
information (e.g., comparing the price or the after-sales service
with other stores) and make ?nal decisions later. Therefore, a no-
choice option may more accurately re?ect reality and not over-
estimate the relative share of such options, because people some-
times defer making choices in high con?ict situations when they
try to avoid a dif?cult trade-off (Tversky & Sha?r, 1992).
For example, in a risky framing choice where people are asked to
select the funds with different levels of risk or choose automobiles
based on country-of-origin information (Levin, Jasper, & Gaeth,
1996), salespeople should not force people to make a decision.
Instead, they should allow customers to have more time and in-
formation to think their options over. In other words, salespeople
should offer a no-choice option when a customer faces a decision
con?ict. If salespeople force people to make a decision and there-
fore purchase the product, people might either leave the store with
a negative emotion (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 2003;
Luce, 1998) or later come to regret their decisions (Anderson, 2003;
Cooke, Meyvis, & Schwartz, 2001; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002;
Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). Therefore, the strategy of giving a no-
choice option within the retailing setting could prove bene?cial
not only to people (who avoid framing bias, regret, and negative
emotions) but also to stores (by lowering the number of returned
goods and by inducing positive affect toward the stores).
6. Limitations and future research
This research only focuses on the risky choice framing, even
though Levin et al. (1998) distinguish frames into three types:
risky choice, attribute, and goal framing. Therefore, further
research may choose to investigate the effect of a no-choice option
on framing effects with other frames and real decision contexts.
For example, the no-choice option could be added to the attribute
frame, which connects with advertising and persuasion effects as a
moderator to provide a better understanding of the different
framing effects.
Con?icts of interest
All contributing authors declare no con?icts of interest.
Table 5
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 2 (within-individuals design).
High con?ict Low con?ict
Positive frame Negative frame Positive frame Negative frame
Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option
Riskless 23(18/5)
a
4(0/4) 6(1/5) 3(0/3) 16(5/11) 13(2/11) 12(0/12) 10(0/10)
Risky 7(0/7) 5(0/5) 24(19/5) 5(1/4) 14(1/13) 12(0/12) 18(4/14) 14(0/14)
No-choice d 21 d 22 d 5 d 6
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a midpoint split).
Table 4
The numbers and proportions of each option in Study 2 (between-individuals design).
High con?ict Low con?ict
Positive frame Negative frame Positive frame Negative frame
Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option Forced option No-choice option
Riskless 24 (17/7)
a
8 (1/7) 5 (1/4) 5 (1/4) 17 (6/11) 13 (2/11) 12 (1/11) 10 (0/10)
Risky 6 (1/5) 5 (0/5) 25 (21/4) 7 (2/5) 13 (1/12) 12 (1/11) 18 (3/15) 15 (1/14)
No-choice d 17 d 18 d 5 d 5
a
Indicating number of participants (with/without con?ict group determined by a midpoint split).
H.-H. Huang et al. / Asia Paci?c Management Review 20 (2015) 18e23 22
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the ?nancial support
provided by the National Science Council in Taiwan under the
NSC98-2410-H194-010. The authors would like to thank two
anonymous referees for suggestions that improved this manuscript.
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