Description
We report the results of an experiment on the in¯uence of performance separability and contract type on the eort
levels of subjects working in an environment characterized by team eects. We demonstrate that the principal can achieve
improvements in productivity through the choice of incentive scheme and/or by increasing the degree of performance
separability through monitoring activities. We consider competitive, individual, and cooperative incentive schemes and
two levels of performance separability. Under both the competitive and individual schemes, eort levels increase as the
degree of performance separability increases.
doc_180998032.pdf
We report the results of an experiment on the in¯uence of performance separability and contract type on the eort
levels of subjects working in an environment characterized by team eects. We demonstrate that the principal can achieve
improvements in productivity through the choice of incentive scheme and/or by increasing the degree of performance
separability through monitoring activities. We consider competitive, individual, and cooperative incentive schemes and
two levels of performance separability. Under both the competitive and individual schemes, eort levels increase as the
degree of performance separability increases.
doc_180998032.pdf