Description
The United States Air Force (USAF) acknowledges that the current and future operating environments are extremely complex, and that these environments will continue evolving. In this environment no single nation can address every challenge and priority alone. With this in mind, the USAF must actively partner with the global community of airmen to further United States (US) and partner nation mutual interests in air, space, and cyberspace.
i
GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP
STRATEGY
US AIR FORCE
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You can’t have Global
Vigilance, Reach, and
Power for America
without Global
Partnerships.”
1
We are pleased to provide the 2011 Air Force Global Partnership Strategy. Te
purpose of this strategy is to guide our Air Force on future securit cooperation eforts
aimed at nurturing and deepening existing partnerships and creating new ones to counter
violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional
securit, and shape the future force.
Since the publication of our last Air Force Global Partnership Strategy in 2008, our Air
Force has had to adapt to a rapidly changing strategic environment. Te impacts of the
global economic crisis, violent extremism, shifing regional balances of power, and the
proliferation of advanced technologies will characterize the future securit environment,
making it unlikely for any one nation to address ever global challenge and priorit alone.
With this guidance, we are increasing our emphasis on developing access and relationships
with international partners while forging coalitions to meet both current and emerging
global strategic challenges. Successful partnership development optimizes interoperabilit,
integration, and interdependence between coalition forces while providing our partner
nations the capabilit and capacit to resolve national securit challenges on their own
merit.
Tis new strategy charts our future path by establishing an ends, ways, and means
approach to Air Force securit cooperation and ensuring we are supporting the Combatant
Commands’ Campaign Plans. It is key to Air Force implementation of the National
Securit Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Militar Strategy, as well as
the Secretar of Defense’s Guidance for Employment of the Force and Defense Planning
and Programming Guidance.
Tis is our guidance for the development of plans and programs to build global partnerships
in support of national securit objectives. Building these relationships will help ensure
successful collaboration and underpin the valuable Air Force contribution to ensuring
United States securit in the years to come. We can’t have Global Vigilance, Reach, and
Power for America without Global Partnerships.
NORTON A. SCHWARTZ
General, USAF
Chief of Staf
MICHAEL B. DONLEY
Secretar of the Air Force
3
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:
APPENDIX B:
APPENDIX C:
APPENDIX D:
APPENDIX E:
APPENDIX F:
APPENDIX G:
APPENDIX H:
TABLE of CONTENTS
Introduction…..........................................…................................................5
Purpose…..........................................…................................................9
Strategic Environment …..................…................................................11
Scope ….......................................................…................................................15
Conclusion …...........................................…................................................23
USAF Securit Cooperation Ends..............................26
USAF Securit Cooperation Ways..............................27
USAF Securit Cooperation Means...........................29
USAF Securit Cooperation Stakeholders..............34
Acronyms........................................................................36
Lexicon........................................................................38
USAF Organizational Roles/Responsibilities........44
Source Document Listing............................................48
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INTRODUCTION I
6
Te United States Air Force (USAF) acknowledges that the current and future operating environments
are extremely complex, and that these environments will continue evolving. In this environment
no single nation can address ever challenge and priorit alone. With this in mind, the USAF must
actively partner with the global communit of airmen to further United States (US) and partner
nation mutual interests in air, space, and cyberspace. Tese partnerships could act as a force
multiplier in future crises. By relying on multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of
our actions will surely be greater than if we act unilaterally. In addition, the USAF acknowledges
that it must not limit itself to the relationships of the past and must broaden its scope to include
partnerships for new situations and circumstances. Tis includes expanding the scope of the securit
cooperation (SC) focus to include building the securit capabilities of at-risk and underdeveloped
partner nations so that these partners are able to defend themselves against the threats of today
and tomorrow.
Te 2010 National Securit Strategy (NSS) and the 2011 National Militar Strategy (NMS) advocate a
comprehensive approach to US international relations in the pursuit of national securit objectives.
Militar-to-militar cooperation, now and in the future, is an essential element of this approach
and serves as a method to share the obligations of securit and stabilit as the US militar seeks to
achieve the NMS objectives:
1. Counter Violent Extremism
2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
3. Strengthen International and Regional Securit
4. Shape the Future Force
For its part, the USAF ofers a service-wide strategy detailing the avenues for developing partner
nation relationships, securing access, and improving partner nation capabilities and capacit in air,
space, and cyberspace.
Te NMS identi?es as an enduring national interest, “An international order advanced by US
leadership that promotes peace, securit, and opportunit through stronger cooperation to meet
global challenges.” Guided by this statement, the overall goal of the Air Force (AF) Global Partnership
Strategy (AFGPS) is to outline an approach to support Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)
and Combatant Commander (CCDR) objectives. To this end, a strategy-driven approach is necessar
to establish, improve, and sustain air, space, and cyberspace capacit and capabilities; build partner
relationships; and establish or sustain access with global partners. In this context, capacit refers to
adding to an existing capabilit and capabilit refers to adding a new function or skill.
Wereas the GEF provides guidance and priorities to planning and executing activities of the
Department of Defense, the AFGPS provides a link between national-level strategy and the USAF
planning establishment, and applies to all members of the USAF Total Force – Regular Air Force,
Guard, Reserve, and Department of the AF Civilians – conducting or supporting SC activities for
the Combatant Commands and other governmental agencies. Tese SC activities, which include
all militar and defense related activities with a foreign partner, can range fom eforts generating
goodwill and access to assisting partner nations in building their capabilities to defend themselves.
Speci?cally, the USAF seeks to:
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1. Employ USAF securit cooperation activities in support of coalition eforts to counter
violent extremism.
2. Collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression.
3. Strengthen international and regional securit.
4. Shape the future coalition Air Force.
Te USAF ways and means employed to achieve these ends ?ow fom and through the Service’s core
functions. By employing this construct we ensure a direct linkage of USAF’s capabilities, embodied
within the service’s core functions, to those that we develop with our partners.
Te Deput Under Secretar of the Air Force, International Afairs, sponsors this strategy and
assists with development of Air, Space, and Cyber Countr Plans, Countr Team Engagement Plans,
the USAF Campaign Support Plan (CSP), and CCDR Teater Campaign Plans (TCP). Component
planners provide input and coordination on these documents, which ensures USAF total force and
component activities support GEF and CCDR objectives.
Tis document supersedes the United States Air Force Global Partnership Strategy dated 18
December 2008 and a biennial review will be conducted to ensure compliance with current NSS,
Ofce of the Secretar of Defense (OSD) Guidance, and CCDR requirements.
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PURPOSE II
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Te purpose of the AFGPS is to bridge the gap between broader Department of Defense (DoD)
objectives, USAF service core functions, and USAF operational capabilities by providing a service-
level SC strategy to the Headquarters Air Force, CCDRs, Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Core
Function Lead Integrators (CFLIs), and USAF components. Wile both shaping and being shaped
by the AF Strategic Planning System (AFSPS), this document provides an Airman’s SC outlook. It
is intended to in?uence development of the full range of SC planning documents by presenting a
summar of available/potential USAF SC ways and means to CCDRs, Components, and US Embassy
Countr Teams. Supplementing the high-level overview provided by this AFGPS are three classi?ed
Domain Engagement Strategies (DESs), created to consolidate detailed countr speci?c capabilit
development roadmaps and timelines into one area. Tese DESs will identif future global trends,
discuss potential methods for mitigating adverse trends, and provide a comprehensive listing
of available programs/activities for component planner consideration in determining how to
meet countr speci?c SC objectives. As with any USAF activit, SC has a strategy component, an
operational planning component, and a resourcing/programming component. Te AFGPS provides
a SC famework to the overall strategy development process, informing the Building Partnerships
(BP) CFLI and aiding in the development of the associated BP Core Function Master Plan (CFMP).
At the same time, the AFGPS in?uences the AFSPS by providing strategic SC concepts to non-SC-
focused strategic and doctrine formulation eforts.
Te Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy (AF/A5X) provides oversight, policy,
and leadership for USAF operational-level planning in support of SC and the BP core function.
Operational planning for SC is primarily done by the geographic USAF Components, with reach
back assistance fom HQ USAF and functional Major Commands. As USAF moves forward to
develop a requirements process for SC, it is especially important to ensure all USAF SC activities are
documented in Component CSPs, which will then ?ow into the USAF CSP. In the future, all USAF SC
activit must directly support a countr-speci?c objective de?ned in a CCDR TCP or the USAF CSP.
Te AFGPS is formed or informed by an array of national strategic documents, but is primarily
guided by the NMS, the GEF, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Te JSCP tasks the
USAF to develop a CSP and the CCDRs to develop region speci?c planning documents which are
synchronized with the appropriate US Embassies and various SC eforts. For its part, the USAF
uses SC activities to help partner nations establish, improve, or sustain air, space, and cyberspace
capacit and capabilities; build partner relationships; and establish or sustain access. Tese activities
serve as key enablers for the USAF by fostering enduring international relationships, with both
established partner nations and developing/at-risk nations, while developing partners with the
interoperable capabilities necessar for successful joint and coalition operations.
As the 21st centur international environment continues evolving, the United States must work
diligently to advance its national securit interests by expanding its spheres of mutual cooperation
in key locales. To accomplish this, our national securit, national defense, and USAF strategies must
be synchronized and focused on achieving our national objectives.
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STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT
III
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As discussed in other AF and national strategy documents (e.g., the USAF Strategic Environmental
Assessment, the NSS, and the NMS) and in the environmental assumptions identi?ed within the
GEF, the global securit environment is in a state of dramatic change, propelled by the forces of
globalization, technology, and connectivit. In the near future, physical pressures (e.g., population,
resources, energy, climate, and environment) will combine with rapid social, cultural, technological,
and geopolitical change to create greater uncertaint. Tis uncertaint is exacerbated by the
unprecedented speed and scale of change, as well as the unpredictable and complex relationships
between the trends themselves. Globalization and growing economic interdependence, while
creating new levels of wealth and opportunit, also create a web of interrelated vulnerabilities that
can efectively spread risks beyond national borders.
Over the next twent years, the world is projected to become more populated and urbanized. Profound
cultural and demographic tensions (the youth bulge), rising demands for resources, widespread
underemployment, refugees, and rapid urbanization could reshape both individual countries and
entire regions. Most of the anticipated population growth is expected to occur in developing regions
of the world like Afica and Asia. At the same time, populations in more developed areas of the
globe are projected to decline and age. Tese population and urbanization trends may increase
water scarcit, especially in rapidly developing and underdeveloped regions of the world. Tis water
scarcit may contribute to changes in human migration paterns, driving social, economic, and
health related impacts that may present signi?cant governance challenges to the afected states.
Tese changes in human migration paterns may also introduce previously isolated diseases to the
global communit, increasing the risk of pandemic disease outbreaks. Additionally, the uncertain
impact of global climate change combined with increased population centers in or near coastal
environments may challenge the abilit of weak or developing states to respond efectively to
natural disasters.
Wile global and regional powers continue to rise, the inabilit of many of these states to police
themselves efectively or work with their neighbors to ensure regional stabilit could test both
our international partners’ resilience and United States capacit to in?uence global afairs. Asia
is expected to have two rising global powers. Te Middle East will continue to have a number of
states competing for enhanced regional in?uence, while at the same time dealing with radicalized
extremist pressures. Europe, beset by high social costs and the need to reset and retrench their
economies, may see continued declines in North Atlantic Teat Organization (NATO) nation defense
spending while maintaining their high levels of development aid and democracy building support.
Finally, in response to the world’s demand for new technologies, Afica and South America could
experience an increase in both global and regional in?uence should they undertake large scale
mining of rare-earth minerals traditionally found on their continents. Te dynamics of these regions
will continue to signi?cantly impact stabilit at both the regional and global levels.
On the economic font, the United States will remain the largest and most competitive economy
for the foreseeable future. At the same time, a steadily growing national debt and continued rapid
?uctuations in energy sector pricing could contribute to increased risk to our national securit.
Asia could dominate the regional share of global wealth as the decades-long economic growth
experienced by key regional players continues. Tis anticipated economic growth may facilitate
both continued militar modernization eforts and the expansion of regional interests and in?uence
around the globe. As evolving regional powers in Asia become more prosperous and militarily
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capable, many traditional United States partners in Europe are reducing defense spending as part
of broader austerit measures driven by economic realities. Additionally, the increasing impact
of resource scarcit on a nation’s economic independence and well-being could contribute to an
increase in associated territorial disputes.
Te shared areas of sea, air, and space, known as the global commons, will continue to become more
accessible to developing nations, contributing to an increasingly contested domain in the coming
years. Challenges include the growing importance of cyberspace, the potential for a navigable
Arctic, increasing reliance on alternative energy sources, and a congested space environment.
Growing and assertive states are developing anti-access and area-denial capabilities and strategies
to constrain United States and international feedom of action while seeking greater in?uence on
the international stage. Operational areas like space, cyberspace, and our electronic infastructure
provide a double-edged sword by simultaneously enhancing our national capabilities while
exposing a vulnerabilit to our enemies. Some states are already conducting or condoning cyber
atacks, foreshadowing the growing threat in this domain. Te cyber threat is enhanced by a lack
of international norms, geographic boundaries, difcult determining atribution, low barriers to
entr, and the relative ease of developing potent capabilities.
State-sponsored groups and non-state actors are extending their reach through the acquisition
of advanced technologies that were once the domain of states, complicating deterrence and
accountabilit eforts. Tey are expected to continue using technology to coordinate and operate
globally in order to spread extremist ideologies and threaten the United States and our allies.
Nations with weak, failing, or corrupt governments will continue as actual or potential safe havens
for an expanding array of non-state actors, breeding con?ict and endangering stabilit. Terrorist
organizations, criminal networks, and international piracy will present unparalleled levels of
violence and lawlessness on a global scale, challenging nations’ abilities to respond. It should then
come as no surprise that the most immediate and extreme danger, as recognized in both the 2010
NMS and Nuclear Posture Review, is nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation.
Te securit of the United States is increasingly bound to the securit of the broader international
communit. As a result, the AFGPS is focused on developing and building the capabilit and capacit
of our partner nations to withstand internal threats and external aggressions while also improving
their capacit to proactively meet national and regional challenges such as those posed by weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), natural disasters, regional instabilit, rogue states, and violent non-
state actors. Equally important to capacit and capabilit building, planners must consider building
relationships that promote speci?c US securit interests and provide US forces with peacetime and
contingency access within host nations. Tese relationships enable the achievement of strategic end
states through a variet of means enumerated later in this document. Cultivating these partnerships
broadens US access in times of need, strengthens national and regional efectiveness, and increases
combined US-partner efectiveness through specialization and shared expertise. Operating in the
international context, particularly in partnership with foreign governments, institutions, and
airmen, is an inherently cross-cultural endeavor. Accomodating this new realit will require the
USAF to account for the impact of varing levels of SC activities on future resource decisions in an
increasingly resource constrained environment. Any operational risk assessments must be made in
the context of the broader national securit spectrum of activities.
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SCOPE IV
16
To confont current and future SC challenges in air, space, and cyberspace while also supporting
all the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), the USAF employs an ends, ways, and means
construct to align the four USAF ends with the means used to achieve those ends. Tis strategy-
to-task methodology streamlines the process of determining the most appropriate engagement
activities to pursue based on a speci?c partner nation’s current capabilities and future requirements.
Ends: Te USAF’s SC ends are the desired outcomes/objectives and are derived fom the NMS (Refer to
Appendix A for further explanation of USAF SC ends). All USAF SC activities must support achieving
at least one of these four strategic ends:
1. Employ USAF securit cooperation activities in support of coalition eforts to counter violent
extremism.
2. Collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression.
3. Strengthen international and regional securit.
4. Shape the future coalition Air Force.
Ways: Te USAF SC ways are the methods
1
of employing militar capabilities, embodied in the USAF
service core functions, to achieve the ends (Refer to Appendix B for further explanation of USAF SC
ways). Te USAF SC ways are:
1. Establishing, sustaining, or enhancing USAF securit cooperation capacit and capabilit.
2. Establishing, sustaining, or expanding mutually bene?cial international partnerships.
3. Collaborating with partners to develop or enhance their securit capacit and capabilities.
4. Collaborating with partners to develop interoperable coalition capabilities.
Means: Te USAF SC means are the forces and resources
2
employed to achieve the ends. Tey are
the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
(DOTMLPF) militar capabilities employed to engage with our partner nations (Refer to Appendix
C for further explanation of USAF SC means).
Te USAF is organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish speci?c functions and possesses unique
capabilities that can mitigate some of the global challenges we face while we operate with our Joint
partners to meet our national securit objectives. Te USAF helps to achieve these national objectives
by employing the means of this strategy in coordination with the other services and Combatant
Commands. Tese means, which equate to the service’s SC “forces and resources,” were designed
with a global perspective in mind and to operate appropriately by, with, and through the other
Services, the Interagency (DoD, Department of State (DoS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
etc.), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and our international partners. By synchronizing
our engagement eforts with these various players to improve partner nations’ abilit to achieve
and sustain internal securit, we will enhance regional stabilit and reduce the requirement for a
US contingency response. Te USAF SC means are grouped into the following categories:
1
AFDD 2 – Operations and Organization (April 2007), pg. 6
2
AFDD 2 – Operations and Organization (April 2007), pg. 6
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1. Education and Taining
2. Global Force Posture
3. US Securit Cooperation Personnel
4. Personnel Exchanges
5. Exercises
6. Equipping Activities
7. Technology Tansfer and Disclosure
8. Information Sharing
9. Cooperative Relationships and Agreements
10. Partner Air Force Engagements
11. Humanitarian Initiatives
Wile continuing to organize, train, and equip our forces for combat operations, the USAF must
maintain the ?exibilit to implement appropriate changes within our DOTMLPF construct to
meet our SC ends. Te ?exibilit required to meet these strategic challenges will depend on USAF
capabilities resident within air, space, and cyberspace.
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Air Domain
Air domain capabilities cover the entire spectrum of the aviation enterprise (de?ned as the
sum total of all air domain resources, processes, and cultures) to include personnel, equipment,
infastructure, operations, sustainment, and air-mindedness. Tese capabilities are packaged in
various combinations, enabling the USAF to perform its designated functions. Tose functions
with applicabilit to SC within the air domain are: Command and Control (C2); Air Superiorit;
Global Precision Atack; Rapid Global Mobilit; Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR); Special Operations; Personnel Recover; Agile Combat Support (ACS); and
Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO).
3
Air domain capabilities in at-risk and developing partner nations may require a much greater
emphasis on developing a basic aviation enterprise infastructure vice implementing more advanced
capabilit packages. In addition, the dual-use nature of aviation infastructure capabilities (both
militar and civilian use) requires that all aviation enterprise initiatives are worked in conjunction
with the “whole-of-government” team within the partner nation. In these instances, the USAF Air
Advisor becomes a critical part of implementing air domain capabilities.
An example of a capabilit package, Airspace Control, is an essential element of any nation’s
sovereignt. Te need for situational awareness and airspace securit is a key element of air
sovereignt and territorial protection. Tis is achievable through the integration of militar air
surveillance, air trafc control/weather radars, communications, and national air policing elements.
Te USAF can assist in this endeavor by providing the training, equipment, and follow-on mentorship
necessar to strengthen the air defenses and capabilities of partner nations. Tis abilit, when
synchronized with information fusion centers (C2), airborne interdiction assets (Air Superiorit),
and precision strike capabilities (Global Precision Atack), is a key component in diminishing the
potential impact of terrorist organizations and international criminal networks.
Rapid Global Mobilit is an important enabling capabilit requiring adequate air?eld infastructure
as well as interoperable airlif, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation capabilities. Our and our
partner nations’ collective abilit to respond to time-critical humanitarian crises, natural disasters,
and contingency operations requires appropriate aircraf with the necessar access to partner nation
air?elds with sufcient runway length; ramp load-bearing capacit; and cargo, fuel, and casualt
handling facilities. As instances of regional instabilit and localized crises increase, there will be an
associated increase in the demand for air mobilit capabilities.
Global Integrated ISR is another vital capabilit supporting a partner nation’s organic abilit to
maintain situational awareness of activities afecting its national securit interests. As we seek
to expand partner nations’ organic ISR capabilities, we must be actively engaged to ensure those
capabilities ?t their needs, are interoperable with US systems, and complement US capacit by
providing timely and unique assessments during combined operations in support of mutual
national objectives.
3
United States Air Force Posture Statement 2011, 17 February 2011
19
Te abilit to execute limited scope and highly specialized combat operations can provide a decisive
advantage for a partner nation. Surgical missions with small teams of highly trained personnel
(Special Operations) allow partner nations to beter control domestic securit challenges while
minimizing the collateral damage that ofen accompanies kinetic engagements. At the same time,
the capabilit to retrieve personnel trapped in enemy held or denied territor (Personnel Recover)
provides an important safet net for partner nation personnel performing duties in support of
national securit objectives.
ACS provides the end-to-end support structure allowing the operational components of the Air
Domain to execute their missions successfully. ACS is the abilit to ?eld, protect, and sustain air,
space, and cyber forces across the full range of militar operations to achieve Joint efects. ACS
is the foundational, crosscuting, and linking AF system of support that enables AF operations
and the capabilities that distinguish air, space, and cyberspace power—speed, ?exibilit and global
perspective. Examples of ACS elements include air trafc control, air?eld operations, weather, civil
engineering, health services, logistics, securit forces, and maintenance. A rapidly evolving SC
component of health services, Global Health Engagement (GHE), is how the AF Medical Service
(AFMS) establishes, sustains, and expands mutually bene?cial global partnerships. Te success
of GHE in establishing US access and in?uence with partner nations by building their health
capabilities can serve as a model for success within the other ACS elements. Without the various
and specialized resources provided by the ACS communit, sustained and successful air domain
operations would not be possible.
NDO is the bedrock of strategic deterrence and stabilit. NDO mission sets ensure the safet,
securit, and reliabilit of nuclear weapons and associated materiel; deters adversaries fom
pursuing actions that threaten US national securit; and it provides nuclear strike options for the
President should deterrence fail. Extending deterrence to our global partners also assures those
partners of US national resolve to protect our mutual interests. Trough these assurances, NDO
supports non-proliferation objectives because allies and partners who have the potential to develop
their own nuclear weapons do not do so as they bene?t fom the US extended deterrence. Further,
potential adversaries who seek to obtain nuclear weapons know they cannot prevail in the face of
compelling US capabilities. In order to ensure success in its #1 priorit, the Air Force will “Continue
To Strengthen the Nuclear Enterprise” by ?elding capable nuclear forces; resilient command and
control capabilities; a robust physical infastructure; a safe, secure and efective weapons stockpile;
and the expertise and manufacturing base that make NDO credible.
Tese SC focused components of the USAF Air Domain service core functions play a key role in
enhancing a partner nation’s independent aviation enterprise development (AED). Te full spectrum
of air domain capabilities and detailed planning factors that support resolving or mitigating
geopolitical strategic challenges are addressed in the USAF Air Domain Engagement Strategy.
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Space Domain
Te United States considers fee access to and unobstructed use of space (Space Superiorit
4
) vital
to its national securit interests. Te forward deployed assets operating in this globally-focused
domain, both the on-orbit and ground-based components, are extremely sophisticated and require
large investments of intellectual and ?nancial capital in the areas of research, development,
acquisition, training, and operations. Maintaining the health of our space industrial base is a goal
of our long-term space doctrine as more nations around the world begin developing advanced space
capabilities. For these reasons, the USAF is building relationships with key international partners,
speci?cally focused on minimizing costs, maximizing capabilities, promoting competition, and
using the space domain responsibly. In the foreseeable future, it is vitally important to leverage
unique partner nation space capabilities by encouraging interoperabilit with US space systems,
capabilities, and services to perform the space-based missions protecting our national securit.
In addition, the USAF needs to include the space domain in its strategy and its plans as it partners
with at-risk and developing nations. Wile these nations will not be the same tpe of space partners
as our peer and near-peer allies, they may be users of selected space capabilities like Positioning,
Navigation, and Tming (PNT), communications, and mapping. As such, interfacing and working
with these at-risk and developing nations in the space domain must be a part of our comprehensive
space strategy.
Wile building these partnerships, the USAF should focus its eforts on enhancing several
signi?cant space capabilities instrumental to addressing future international challenges. Te
?rst of these capabilities, PNT, is a key enabler to Precision Atack and Rapid Global Mobilit
operations. In the coming years, PNT will play an expanding role in an array of overseas missions
fom precision employment of combat forces to humanitarian airlif operations. At the same time,
USAF partnering eforts will continue to play a vital role as we continue to evolve our Missile
Warning and Defense capabilities. As the ballistic missile threat fom rogue nations and potential
non-state actors continues to increase, our abilit to operate forward deployed components of
our missile warning and defense systems will hinge on the relationships established with our
international partners in the afected regions. Key to maintaining these constellations of space
assets is the abilit to place them in-orbit reliably, efciently, and cost efectively. International
spacelif partnering opportunities are expected to expand over the next twent years, continuing to
increase in importance as more nations enter the space domain. Wile these three space capabilit
areas directly support operational activities, other capabilities provide critical situational
awareness products used by decision makers during operational planning and execution eforts.
Geting these products to the right place at the right time requires robust communications, a focus
area we are actively pursuing with our international partners.
4
United States Air Force Posture Statement 2011, 17 February 2011
21
Another Space Force Enhancement (SFE) capabilit that is vital is ISR fom space. Wile not all
countries will possess this capabilit, we must leverage the maximum bene?t fom other countries’
assets to provide ?exibilit and global coverage at minimal cost to the US. Similarly, we must build
the mechanisms to ensure information derived fom US space-based assets is made available to
coalition partners when appropriate and necessar.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is enabled by our abilit to identif and track all man-made
objects in Earth’s orbit. Tis is accomplished by a global network of optical and radar sensors, along
with their associated command and control, that detect, track, identif, and catalog all of these
objects in order to anticipate potential threats to our on-orbit space assets and identif changes
to an adversar’s space order of batle. Tis ground- and space-based sensor network relies heavily
on an array of partnership agreements with regional allies developed over a long period of time.
Without these partnership agreements, our space sight picture would be greatly diminished,
increasing the risk to our overall national securit. Te development of SSA requires ISR in and
through a variet of domains (including space). Te development of partner ISR capabilities
and information sharing agreements is vital to the formulation of a true sight picture for space.
Conversely, our space-based environmental monitoring capabilities have been enhanced through
close coordination and collaboration with key international partners. Wether developing new
sensors or improving the sharing of collected space and terrestrial-weather data, the exponential
improvement in our environmental monitoring capabilit is tied directly to the contributions of our
international partners.
Te execution of these and other space capabilities, along with building and enhancing the
international partnerships associated with USAF space operations, are accomplished in collaboration
with OSD, DoS, Joint Staf (JS), CCDRs, Intelligence Communit, and other US Government agencies.
Tese interagency and inter-departmental relationships, as well as the associated capabilities we
share with our partners and allies, directly contribute to successfully shaping and evolving the
operational space environment. Te full spectrum of space domain capabilities and detailed planning
factors that support resolving or mitigating geopolitical strategic challenges are addressed in the
USAF Space Domain Engagement Strategy.
22
5
United States Air Force Posture Statement 2011, 17 February 2011
Cyberspace
Cyberspace is quickly becoming the new “militar high ground” and the United States considers
feedom of action in cyberspace (Cyberspace Superiorit
5
) vital to its national securit interests.
US national power and securit depend on both feedom of access to, and operations within and
through this domain. Potential adversaries, including non-state actors, understand this realit and
continue to seek cyberspace capabilities and to use cyberspace to their advantage.
Te nature of cyberspace enables operations that are global in nature and nearly instantaneous
in efect. Unlike conventional domains, the low cost of entr to cyberspace means that virtually
any nation, organization, or even individual can acquire, operate, and use the capabilities that
cyberspace provides. Tis, coupled with the rapid pace of cyberspace development, presents unique
challenges and opportunities. Cyberspace capabilities are essential to successful network-centric
coalitions and enable interoperabilit and unit of efort across a spectrum of operations. Trough
cyberspace cooperation and partnerships, the United States seeks to enhance both our and our
partners’ securit through interoperabilit, shared investment, and by leveraging unique allied
capabilities. In addition, the USAF will also partner with at-risk and developing nations and will
assist them in the development of basic cyberspace capabilities as detailed in the GCC TCPs and
in support of de?ned GEF end states. As such, cyberspace cooperation re?ects and reinforces the
broader political and militar cooperation between the United States and its international partners.
Te US militar’s reliance on an advanced and feely accessible information technology (IT) backbone
to perform its war?ghting missions presents our adversaries with an exposed vulnerabilit. Our
abilit to shape the cyberspace environment will be crucial to ensuring uninterrupted access for us
and our partners while denying access to any current and future adversaries if necessar.
To efectively counter enemy operations in cyberspace and assure our own mission success, the
United States must work closely with our international partners to enable collective self-defense and
deterrence. Working with allies and international partners we will improve cyberspace capabilities
such as situational awareness, threat assessment, digital network intelligence, active network defense,
and cross domain securit. By synchronizing and integrating global network securit eforts with our
international partners, we not only leverage their established capabilities and ingenuit, but also
signi?cantly increase the number of “eyes” monitoring the network at any one time. Tese cyberspace
SC eforts should cover all aspects of cyberspace operations including initial and recurring training,
information sharing, and advanced cyberspace capabilit development eforts. Tis level of cyberspace
cooperation with partner nations and coalition allies takes on an increased level of importance when
viewed against the speed and anonymit with which our adversaries can currently operate.
Continuous integration of coalition partners across the spectrum of cyberspace reduces seams across
coalitions and increases the potential for operational success. Active engagement with partner nations
focused on cyberspace technology development helps reduce USAF funding outlays by sharing
the research and development costs across international partners. Te full spectrum of cyberspace
capabilities and detailed planning factors that support resolving or mitigating geopolitical strategic
challenges are addressed in the USAF Cyberspace Domain Engagement Strategy.
23
CONCLUSION V
24
Tis AFGPS provides a high level overview of USAF SC objectives (ends) and their relationship
to both national level strategy documents and countr speci?c engagement plans. It is intended
to in?uence development of the USAF CSP and CCDR TCPs while also educating the general
USAF population on basic USAF SC concepts and capabilities. New to this revision is the explicit
expansion of USAF SC eforts to include building the securit capacit and capabilities of at-risk
and developing partner nations. Also new is the addition of three classi?ed DESs that assist CCDRs,
Components, and US Embassy Countr Teams resolve or mitigate the strategic challenges they
face within their area of responsibilit (AOR) or host nation. Tese supplemental strategies will
provide the detailed, countr speci?c recommendations they need to help determine capabilit
development and resourcing eforts across air, space, and cyberspace supporting CCDR engagement
plans and the four USAF SC ends.
25
APPENDICES
26
APPENDIX A
USAF Securit Cooperation Ends
Te NSS, National Defense Strategy (NDS), and NMS provide the USAF with overarching national
guidance. OSD has also published re?ned guidance in the form of the GEF and the Defense Planning
and Programming Guidance (DPPG). Tese guidance documents provide the foundation upon which
the USAF SC ends were developed. Tese ends apply to all USAF SC activities, including the building,
sustaining, and expanding of relationships with partner AFs whose requirements span the spectrum of
operational needs and resource capabilities. Partnering with more capable nations to provide assistance
to less capable nations must be given serious consideration when appropriate. Te following four ends
were created to support CCDRs and national strategy and policy:
1. Employ USAF securit cooperation activities in support of coalition eforts to counter
violent extremism.
Tere is no more vital national interest than the securit of the American people, our territor, and our
way of life. In order to counter the threats to this securit, the USAF will strengthen and expand our
network of international partnerships by pursuing an integrated and synchronized global SC strategy
in-line with US national securit, CCDR TCP, and coalition partner securit objectives.
2. Collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression.
Preventing con?icts is as important as winning them, with both options requiring advanced planning and
extensive preparation. Establishing and promoting appropriate USAF to partner nation AF relationships
is a key element in developing the air, space, and cyberspace capabilities required to deter and defeat both
internal and external aggression. US partners must have or desire to develop the indigenous capabilit,
capacit, and will to employ their own air, space, and/or cyberspace resources safely, efectively, and
efciently.
3. Strengthen international and regional securit.
Afer a partner nation is able to provide for its own securit, it is then more willing to look externally
at supporting coalition operations and ensuring regional stabilit. To maximize their efectiveness
during these operations, it is important to ensure that partner nations are interoperable, integrated, or
interdependent with the USAF through common concepts of operations, including intelligence, training,
medical, logistics, securit, maintenance, sustainment, and procurement practices. An additional bene?t
to supporting regional securit activities is its help in strengthening partner nation economies by
ensuring uninterrupted access to the global commons for their goods and services.
4. Shape the future coalition Air Force.
Familiarit, common shared experience, and multi-faceted international SC training will play vital roles in
future interactions across the global communit of airmen. Te USAF will focus on educating its Airmen,
fom the basic trainee to the senior AF commander, on the various skills required for international
relationship building while simultaneously in?uencing our coalition partners through the use of targeted
language, region, and culture preparation and personnel exchanges. Simultaneously, as the USAF continues
to develop new weapon system hardware, alternative energy capabilities, and operational concepts, we
will continue to look for opportunities to enhance coalition partners’ interoperabilit and integration.
27
APPENDIX B
USAF Securit Cooperation Ways
Ways are the methods by which objectives are achieved; that is, the efects that must be created to achieve
the desired ends. Te following four USAF ways were created to identif the methods and process needed
to support CCDR and national strategy and policy:
1. Establishing, sustaining, or enhancing USAF securit cooperation capacit and capabilit.
Tained personnel are an essential component of US SC eforts with partner nations. We must train our
Airmen to ?ght today as well as adapt to the environment in anticipation of future challenges. Our
Airmen must receive the proper training, fom appropriately stafed and equipped training cadres, to be
experts in their ?elds as well as competent advisors and mentors. To manage this force properly, the USAF
must identif critical skill sets like language, region and culture expertise and track quali?ed personnel
throughout the Total Force. Achieving this ensures the USAF is postured to have the wide range of skills
necessar, in sufcient numbers and prepared to most efectively plan, assess, train, advise, and assist, to
meet the complexities of future international engagements.
2. Establishing, sustaining, or expanding mutually bene?cial international partnerships.
Promoting appropriate civil-civil, civil-militar, and militar-militar relationships with partner nations
is a key element in developing mutually bene?cial international partnerships while reinforcing securit
assurance guarantees, promoting crisis stabilit and providing US forces with operational access with
host nation support. Ensuring these US partners expand their legitimacy among the populace enhances
these mutually bene?cial relationships by strengthening the linkage between the US and partner nation
government and partner nation government and its people. Te USAF may build, sustain, and expand
relationships with partner nations across the spectrum of resource capabilities in order to assist them in
developing sustainable aviation enterprises that enhance their national defense while also contributing
to their economic development. For those partner nations who are at-risk and underdeveloped, the USAF
must assist them in developing and building their aviation enterprises and perhaps, civil infastructure, so
that these nations are beter able to prevent festering problems fom turning into crises. Partnering with
more capable nations to provide assistance to less capable nations must be given serious consideration
when appropriate. At times, developing partnerships with fiendly nations may include coordination
with key allies and strong partners.
3. Collaborating with partners to develop or enhance their securit capacit and capabilities.
Support the development of the capacit and capabilit of US partners and their will to employ
their own air, space, and/or cyberspace resources safely, efectively, and efciently. Tis includes the
development of supporting institutions. Supporting these eforts is accomplished through a variet of
collaborative engagements including equipment procurements, joint exercises, mobile training teams,
formal educational opportunities, and Air Advisor engagements aimed at assisting partner nations to
build their aviation enterprise. Because each partner AF is a unique case, both US and foreign-made
equipment should be considered for meeting these requirements. Cost, interoperabilit with neighboring
nations, and availabilit of experienced maintainers and operators are all major considerations. Also
inherent in equipment selection is the scope, scale, and timefame of the engagement. Wile readily
available and sustainable foreign-made solutions may enable the partner AF to rapidly meet immediate
mission needs, transitioning to US-made equipment brings with it increased interoperabilit as well as
additional training and engagement opportunities.
28
4. Collaborating with partners to develop interoperable coalition capabilities.
Once a partner nation possesses the capabilit to provide for their own internal securit, they tpically
strive to expand their capabilities to enhance support to coalition operations in regional and/or global
securit environments. Activities within this line of operation may reduce the operational burden on,
and risk to, US militar forces. With this in mind, it is important to ensure that partner nations are
interoperable, integrated, or interdependent with the USAF through common concepts of operations;
command and control; tactics, techniques, & procedures (TTPs); intelligence; training; medical; securit;
sustainment; alternative energy; and/or procurement practices to enhance their efectiveness in coalition
operations. Tis includes common understanding and appreciation of language, region, and culture to
include foreign and English language training where appropriate.
29
APPENDIX C
USAF Securit Cooperation Means
Te following listing of means, though not all inclusive or exhaustive, provides a solid cross-section of
SC activities available for use in developing relationships with partner nations. Te partner nation must
have, or be able to develop within the planning timefame, the ?scal base, infastructure, human capital,
etc. that allow a nation to develop and sustain SC capabilities. Te USAF Headquarters, MAJCOMs,
Component Headquarters, and a variet of other agencies supporting the CCDRs and US Embassy Countr
Teams employ these means. Te speci?c means utilized, on a nation-by-nation basis, are included in the
applicable CCDR TCP, Countr Plans, and Component CSPs (for eventual roll-up into the USAF CSP). An
expanded version of the means re?ected below will form the foundation of a SC requirements process,
providing a usable demand signal to the BP CFLI and the AFSPS.
1. Education & Taining
Developing capabilities within partner AFs that are interoperable, integrated, and in some cases
interdependent, demands AF-to-AF and multinational professional militar education and training. Te
USAF educates and trains more than 11,800 members of partner AFs each year through developmental
education, professional militar education, and language, medical, command and control, securit,
logistics, maintenance and ?ying training courses. Te USAF also serves as the executive agent for
Defense Institute for Medical Operations (DIMO) and the Defense Language Institute English Language
Center (DLI-ELC).
Aviation Leadership Program (ALP)
Defense Institute for Medical Operations (DIMO)
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLI-ELC)
Extended Taining Services Specialist (ETSS)
Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Taining (ENJJPT)
Foreign and English Language Taining
Gulf Air Warfare Center
Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA)
International Intelligence Applications Ofcer Course
International Militar Education and Taining (IMET)
International Ofcer’s School
Mobile Taining Teams (MTT)
Personnel Recover Capabilit Development and Employment
Securit Force Assistance Development and Employment
USAF School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM)
USAFE Air Ground Operations School (USAFE AGOS)
2. Global Force Posture
Te US establishes bases, OCONUS force structure, and pre-positioned equipment/materiel to provide a
forward presence, deterrence, capacit to respond to crises, enhance operational access, and to facilitate
SC. Furthermore, agreements with allies and partners set the terms regarding the US militar’s presence
as agreed to with the host government. Forces stationed in Forward Operating Locations will train
and operate with international partners and allies on a daily basis. Tis physical immersion and daily
30
interaction helps build capabilit for current and future coalition operations through various methods
including exercises, familiarization visits, of-station training deployments, and traveling contact teams.
Also important for partnership development is the abilit to provide partner nations with locations in
the United States to bed-down aircraf and train their airmen. By living in the United States and working
side-by-side with USAF Airmen, partner AF airmen gain a unique insight into the American life and
culture while also forming life-long relationships.
Foreign Partner CONUS Bed-downs
Forward Stationed Forces
Operational Access agreements
3. US Securit Cooperation Personnel
Te proper development and utilization of USAF Airmen through a combination of education, training,
and dut opportunities is foundational to our ongoing SC eforts. Te USAF provides Airmen deliberately
organized, trained, equipped, and educated to assess worldwide irregular challenges and employ tailored
capabilities as part of a whole-of-nation efort to enable partner nations, in particular at-risk nations,
to defend and govern themselves or to conduct operations in support of US national securit interests.
All aspects of the training pipeline need to be synchronized to ensure a steady educational development
process that provides individuals with the required SC skills prior to reporting to their dut assignments.
Assigned Personnel to US Embassies (Air Ataches and Securit Assistance Ofcers (SAOs))
Air Advisor Academy
Air Advisor Programs
CNAF/AFFOR Countr Desk Ofcers and Planners
Cross-Cultural Competence Familiarization for All Airmen (PME & EST)
International Afairs Career Field (IACF)
International Afairs Specialist (IAS)
International Health Specialist (IHS)
International Professional Militar Education Atendance (IPME)
Language, Region, and Culture (LRC) Advanced Taining (LEAP & GOPAC)
4. Personnel Exchanges
Exchanges between the USAF and our allies and foreign partners serve as force multipliers by promoting
mutual understanding and trust, enhancing interoperabilit, strengthening AF-to-AF ties, and developing
long-term personal and professional relationships. Te Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP),
which oversees our international exchange eforts, is divided into ?ve exchange areas.
Administrative and Professional Exchange Program (APEP)
Defense Intelligence Personnel Exchange Program (DIPEP)
Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP)
Militar Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP)
Subject Mater Expert Exchanges (SMEE)
5. Exercises
Te USAF cultivates alliances and partnerships through bilateral and multinational exercises and
competitions with over 60 countries annually. Tese exercises and competitions help re?ne concepts of
31
operation and build pro?ciency, ensuring partner nations have experienced AFs capable of conducting
self-defense missions and participating efectively in multinational and coalition operations.
Combined Force Exercises (CFE)
Competitions
Large Force Exercises (LFE)
Medical Readiness Taining Exercise (MEDRETE)
Regional Taining Centers
Seminars
Wargaming
Medical Evacuation/Patient Movement
6. Equipping Activities
Developing partnership capabilit and capacit through the development of consistent construction and
facilit/land management standards and the procurement of systems, sensors, support, and training is
a key element of developing global partnerships. Tese standards and systems, while providing partner
nations an inherently interoperable capabilit with both USAF and coalition forces, ofen form the
centerpiece for our relationships and facilitate a beter understanding of US training and operational
methods. Refer to DoD 5105.38M Chapters 1 & 11 for a complete listing of Securit Assistance Programs.
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Foreign Militar Sales (FMS)
Joint Co-Development and Production Eforts
Medical Equipment Donation
7. Technology Tansfer and Disclosure
Te authorit to disclose classi?ed and controlled unclassi?ed information to partner nations and
international organizations is closely aligned with the recipient’s abilit to safeguard technology, goods,
services, and munitions fom transfer to nations and individuals whose interests are contrar to the United
States. Technology transfer and disclosure decisions occur in nearly all partner nation engagement
opportunities. Te USAF is commited to promoting interoperabilit and building close relationships
with coalition partners by ?nding a balance between sharing and protecting information and technology.
8. Information Sharing
Information sharing cooperation, with the accompanying information protection, is integral to building
global partnerships. International relationships provide a means of unique access to data the United
States might otherwise be unable to obtain while expanding the opportunit to in?uence development
of common regional assessments. Information sharing cooperation activities require synchronization
and coordination through the joint and interagency process since they ofen represent the initial contact
between the United States and a partner nation that leads to a broader more comprehensive relationship.
Alternative Energy Technology
Health Surveillance
Information and Data Exchange Programs
Telehealth
32
9. Cooperative Relationships and Agreements
Developing cooperative relationships and programs with both our interagency counterparts and partner
AFs is essential to ensuring the United States and its partners have the most integrated and efective
capabilities and programs available. Tese eforts bene?t both the United States and our international
partners by cultivating mutually bene?cial relationships through the use of: 1) cooperative agreements,
2) the disclosure of appropriate levels of information consistent with US national securit interests, and
3) leveraging signi?cant science and technology investments made by other governments.
Air and Space Interoperabilit Council (ASIC)
Alternative Energy Research and Development
Coalition Warfare Program (CWP)
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA)
En-route Access
Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT)
Interagency Cooperation Frameworks
International Agreements (e.g., Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA))
International Armaments Cooperation Forums
International Cooperative Research and Development Program (ICR&D)
International Space Cooperative Forums
Logistics Support
Medical Inter?y
Over?ight Rights
World Meteorological Organization
10. Partner Air Force Engagements
Striving to improve communication and militar interoperabilit between USAF and partner nation AFs
is central to US SC eforts. Bilateral and multilateral meetings between senior AF ofcials are critical to
building personal relationships and enhancing global partnerships, leading to increased interoperabilit
and capacit while building trust and con?dence between senior leaders. Direct and ongoing interactions
between partner nations and selected state National Guard entities demonstrate the unique civilian-
militar relationship of the National Guard while fostering interoperabilit between USAF and partner
nation AFs.
Air Chief Conferences
Air Senior National Representative Program
Capabilit Brie?ngs to Partners
Chief of Staf Counterpart Program
CMSAF Visits
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
International Air and Tade Shows
Operator Engagement Talks
Senior Leader Contacts
State Partnership Program
Partner Air Force Capabilit Assessments
Global Health Engagement
33
11. Humanitarian Initiatives
Delivering aid and support to nations during times of crisis or natural disaster is fundamental to the
American vision of international relations. Providing medical support, either on a preventative basis or
immediately afer a major event, helps build good will while ensuring our medical professionals maintain
their training and readiness. Additionally, by building partner capacit, we help our partner nations
build their infastructure and capabilit to provide for their people. Tis helps promote the legitimacy
of the government and increases the stabilit of that government, increasing both local and regional
stabilit. Providing airfames, supplies, and trained professionals during times of natural or man-made
disasters will continue to remain a core competency of the USAF.
Disaster Response
Expeditionar Medical Support (EMEDS)
Humanitarian Assistance
Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP/DENCAP)
Stabilit Operations
Medical Stabilit Operations
Global Health Engagement
34
APPENDIX D
USAF Securit Cooperation Stakeholders
SAF/IA
SAF/IAG – Strategy, Operations, Resources Directorate
SAF/IAGI - SAF/IA Support, Knowledge Base, TSCMIS
SAF/IAGR - Budgetar Support for SAF/IA and FMS / DCS
SAF/IAGS - Pol-Mil Policy and Analysis; AFGPS; CSP support
BP Capabilit Portfolio Management, Strat Comm
SAF/IAP – Policy Directorate
SAF/IAPA – IAS, IACF, Ataché Program, MPEP
SAF/IAPD – Foreign Disclosure & Technology Tansfer & Disclosure
SAF/IAPQ - International Armaments Cooperation
SAF/IAPS - Space / Cyberspace agreements / Programs
SAF/IAPX - FMS / DCS; Education & Taining; Exercise Coordination
SAF/IAR – Regional Afairs Directorate
SAF/IARA - AFRICOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARC - CENTCOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARE - EUCOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARL - NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARP - PACIFIC Countr Directors
SAF/IARW - Weapons Division
HQ Air Force
SAF/AQ - Capabilities to support FMS/DCS cooperative programs Global and Regional
Air Chief Conferences, CSAF Counterpart Visits
SAF/FM - Support for Securit Assistance Afairs
SAF/GC - Legal Counsel supporting International programs / agreements
SAF/IE - Energy Initiatives
SAF/LL - Coordinates messages to Congress in support of acquisition of required capabilities
SAF/PA - Strategic Comm plans in support of international programs
POLAD - Foreign policy counsel to senior staf on international programs and engagements
AF/SG - Global Health Engagements with Partner Nations
AF/A1 - AF/A1DG - AF Senior Language Authorit responsiblefor Language, region, and culture policy,
Defense Language Institute, English Language Taining (DLIELC)
AF/A2 - ISR and information sharing agreements
AF/A3O-AT - Operational Taining
AF/A3O-AY – Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Commitee
AF/A3O-Q - IW / FID / LAAR / LIMA / CRG / SFA / BP FCB, JIEDDO liaison
SAF/CIO & A6 - Network integration in support of national and international partners.
Supports SAF/IA in International AF initiatives involving Cyberspace
AF/A4/7 – Provides ACS in support of air operations. Exercises, Wargames and Seminars
AF/A5XC - CONOPS
AF/A5XS - International Exercises Seminars and Wargaming
AF/A5XX – AF Global Posture, Operator Engagement Talks, Campaign Support Plan, ASIC
AF/A8 - Support for Securit Cooperation (Ttle X) activities in the Core Function Master Plan
AF/A9 - Assessments; Lessons Learned Analytical expertise
AF/A10 - Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration
35
MAJCOMs/Components
General Component Contributions to Securit Cooperation:
Service lead to support CCDR objectives
Senior Leader Contacts
USAF Presence
Strategic Communication / Public Afairs
Foreign Militar Sales Support
International Air and Tade Shows
Education / Taining
Intelligence Sharing
Stabilit, Securit, Taining & Reconstruction Teams
State Partnership Program
Ofce of Defense Cooperation
Defense Ataché Ofce
Securit Assistance Ofce
USAFE/A5I
PACAF/A5I
AFCENT/A5
AFNORTH/A5I
AFSOUTH/A5I
AFAFRICA/A5X
AFMC/A5S
AFGSC/A5PT
AFSPC/A8I – Basing and International Afairs
AFCLC – Air Force Culture and Language Center
LeMay Doctrine Center
ACC/A5S – Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine
ACC/IA – International Afairs
ACC/IAS – Securit Cooperation
AMC/A8XA – International Afairs
AETC/IA – Taining for Partner Nations
AFRC/FGX – Securit Cooperation and Exercises
NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM Desk
CENTCOM/SOCOM Desk
EUCOM/AFRICOM Desk
PACOM/STRATCOM Desk
NGB/J53IA – State Partnership Program Ofce
NGB/A3X – Building Partnership Cell
AFSAT – Taining for Partner Nations
AFSAC – Support for the Foreign Militar Sales / Direct Commercial Sales Processes
AFSOC/A8X – Strategic Planning
Air Universit
Defense Language Institute – English Language Center
United States Air Force Academy
36
APPENDIX E
Acronyms
AA – Air Advisor
ACS – Agile Combat Support
ACSA – Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreements
AECA – Arms Export Control Act
AED – Aviation Enterprise Development
AETC – Air Education and Taining Command
AF – Air Force
AFCLC – Air Force Culture and Language Center
AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document
AFFOR – Air Force Forces
AFGPS – Air Force Global Partnership Strategy
AFMS – Air Force Medical Service
AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
AFSAC – Air Force Securit Assistance Center
AFSAT – Air Force Securit Assistance Taining
AFSPS – Air Force Strategic Planning System
ALP – Aviation Leadership Program
ANG – Air National Guard
AOR – Area of Responsibilit
APEP – Administrative and Professional
Exchange Program
ASIC – Air and Space Interoperabilit Council
BP – Building Partnerships
BPC – Building Partner Capacit
BP FCB – Building Partnerships Functional
Capabilit Board
C2 – Command and Control
CAA – Combat Aviation Advisors
CCDR – Combatant Commander
CFE – Combined Force Exercise
CFLI – Core Function Lead Integrator
CFMP – Core Function Master Plan
CIO – Chief Information Ofcer
CMSAF – Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force
CNAF – Component Numbered Air Force
CONOPS – Concept of Operations
CONUS – Continental United States
CRADA – Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements
CRG – Contingency Response Group
CSP – Campaign Support Plan
CWP – Coalition Warfare Program
DCS – Direct Commercial Sales
DENCAP – Dental Civic Action Program
DES – Domain Engagement Strategy
DIILS – Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies
DIMO – Defense Institute for Medical Operations
DIPEP – Defense Intelligence Personnel
Exchange Program
DLI-ELC – Defense Language Institute - English
Language Center
DoD – Department of Defense
DoDD – Department of Defense Directive
DoDI – Department of Defense Instruction
DoS – Department of State
DOTMLPF – Doctrine, Organization, Taining,
Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities
DPEP – Defense Personnel Exchange Program
DPPG – Defense Planning & Programming
Guidance
EDA – Excess Defense Articles
EMEDS – Expeditionar Medical Support
ESEP – Engineer and Scientist Exchange
Program
EST – Expeditionar Skills Taining
ETSS – Extended Taining Services Specialist
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration
FCT – Foreign Comparative Testing
FID – Foreign Internal Defense
FMS – Foreign Militar Sales
37
GCC – Geographic Combatant Commands
GEF – Guidance for Employment of the Force
GHE – Global Health Engagement
GOPAC – General Ofcer Pre-Deployment
Acculturation Course
GPF – General Purpose Forces
HAF – Headquarters Air Force
HA – Humanitarian Assistance
HCA – Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HN – Host Nation
IAAFA – Inter-American Air Force Academy
IAC – International Armaments Cooperation
IACF – International Afairs Career Field
IAS – International Afairs Specialist
ICR&D – International Cooperative Research and
Development
IHS – International Health Specialist
IMET – International Militar Education and
Taining
IPME – International Professional Militar
Education
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
IT – Information Technology
IW – Irregular Warfare
JCA – Joint Capabilit Area
JFHQ – Joint Force Headquarters
JIEDDO – Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization
JS – Joint Staf
JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LAAR – Light Atack Armed Reconnaissance
Aircraf
LEAP – Language Enabled Airmen Program
LFE – Large Force Exercise
LIMA – Light Mobilit Aircraf
LRC – Language, Region, and Culture
MAJCOM – Major Command
MAP – Militar Assistance Program
MEDCAP – Medical Civic Action Program
MEDRETE – Medical Readiness Taining Exercise
MHS – Militar Health System
MPEP – Militar Personnel Exchange Program
MSO – Medical Stabilit Operations
MTT – Mobile Taining Teams
NATO – North Atlantic Teat Organization
NDO – Nuclear Deterrence Operations
NDS – National Defense Strategy
NGB – National Guard Bureau
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NMS – National Militar Strategy
NSS – National Securit Strategy
OCONUS – Outside CONUS
OSD – Ofce of the Secretar of Defense
PFP – Planning Force Proposals
PME – Professional Militar Education
PNT – Positioning, Navigation, and Tming
POLAD – Foreign Policy Advisor
POM – Program Objective Memorandum
SAF – Secretar of the Air Force
SAO – Securit Assistance Ofce
SCF – Service Core Function
SFA – Securit Force Assistance
SMEE – Subject Mater Expert Exchange
SOF – Special Operations Forces
SPF – State Partnership Framework
SPP – State Partnership Program
SSA – Space Situational Awareness
SSTR – Stabilization, Securit,
Tansition, and Reconstruction
Strat Comm – Strategic Communications
TCP – Teater Campaign Plan
TSCMIS – Teater Securit Cooperation
Management Information System
US – United States
USAF – United States Air Force
USAFSAM – USAF School of Aerospace Medicine
WMD – Weapon of Mass Destruction
38
APPENDIX F
Lexicon
Air Advisor (AA). An Airman specially trained and educated to apply aviation expertise to assess,
train/educate, advise, and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation
resources to meet their national needs in support of US interests. (USAF Air Advisor Academy Charter)
Air Advisor Programs. Te AF presents two tpes of forces to conduct Advisor activities: 1) General
Purpose Force (GPF) Air Advisors and 2) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Combat Aviation Advisors (CAA).
Currently, the USAF continues to develop a GPF Air Advisor program to help build global air, space,
and cyberspace partnerships in support of combatant commanders’ SC and irregular warfare activities.
GPF Air Advisors will be prepared both to operate independently and in concert with other Services (in
permissive environments) and to augment AFSOF CAA and other SOF forces (in uncertain and hostile
environments). Te Air Advisor Academy has been chartered to provide an enduring capabilit to
educate and train GPF Airmen in this endeavor. AFSOF’s CAA unit (6th Special Operations Squadron) has
extensive knowledge, experience, ?eld-craf skills, and technical excellence in air combat, intelligence,
medical support, logistics, and operations. Te 6 SOS normally focuses on partner nations at the greatest
risk in three interrelated mission areas (foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition
support) and operate in non-permissive or high risk environments to meet GCC objectives. Te GPF Air
Advisor and the CAA programs allow Airmen to support IW, BP/Building Partnership Capacit (BPC),
and Securit Force Assistance activities across the full spectrum of operational environments.
Air and Space Interoperabilit Council (ASIC). An international standards organization between
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States to ensure these nations’ AFs are
able to ?ght side-by-side as Airmen in Joint and Combined operations.
Aviation Enterprise Development. De?nes the plans, programs, and activities undertaken to develop
the system of systems necessar for a nation to optimize employment of national aviation resources. Te
total aviation resource capacit and capabilit of a nation is de?ned by the sum total of all air domain
resources including humans, aircraf, processes and infastructure in both the civilian and militar/
securit sectors. Modern standards that function to provide efcient, safe and efective employment of
national aviation resources calls for infastructure development that considers the civilian aviation sector
and the militar/securit aviation sector of a nation as mutually supportive systems of an integrated air
domain in developing nations. (Air Advisor Working Group)
Aviation Foreign Internal Defense. DoD programs for assessing, training, advising, and assisting
host nation (HN) aviation forces in the sustained use of airpower to help their governments deal with
internal threats. (AFDD 3-22)
Building Partner Capacit. Te abilit to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with
the development of their capabilities and capacities – for mutual bene?t – to address US national or
shared global securit interests. Tis de?nition is derived fom the Ter III JCA of “building the capabilities
and capacities of partners and institutions. Also called BPC.” (Deput Under Secretar of Defense Policy
Memorandum, Joint Capabilit Areas)
Campaign Support Plans (CSP). GEF-directed plans developed by the Services and DoD Agencies
that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of global and theater campaign plans and
39
on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the campaign end-states of the GEF and Uni?ed
Combatant Commander Campaign Plans and/or DoD Component programs in support of broader Ttle
10 responsibilities. (DoDD 5132.03)
Capabilit Portfolio. A collection of grouped capabilities as de?ned by Joint Capabilit Areas (JCAs)
and the associated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities (DOTMLPF) programs, initiatives, and activities. (DoDD 7045.20, p. 8)
Civil-Militar Operations. Te activities of a commander that establish, maintain, in?uence or exploit
relations between militar forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and
authorities, and the civilian populace in a fiendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate
militar operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-militar operations may
include performance by militar forces of activities and functions normally the responsibilit of the
local, regional, or national government. Tese activities may also occur, if directed, in the absence of
other militar operations. Civil-militar operations may be performed by designated civil afairs, by other
militar forces, or by a combination of civil afairs and other forces. (JP 1-02)
Combat Aviation Advisor (CAA). CAAs have extensive knowledge, experience, ?eld-craf skills, and
technical excellence in air combat, intelligence, medical support, logistics, and operations. Te 6 SOS
normally focuses on partner nations at the greatest risk in three interrelated mission areas (foreign
internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition support) and are capable of conducting operations
in a full range of environments under austere conditions.
Combatant Command. A uni?ed or speci?ed command with a broad continuing mission under a single
commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretar of Defense and with
the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf. Combatant commands tpically
have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)
Combatant Commander (CCDR). A commander of one of the uni?ed or speci?ed combatant
commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)
Component Command. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally, a
joint force is organized with a combination of service and functional components. (JP 1-02)
Core Function Lead Integrators (CFLIs). CSAF-designated leaders who act as the principal
integrators for their assigned Service Core Functions (SCF) and the corresponding Core Function Master
Plans (CFMP). CFLIs guide SCF maturation and SCF-related investments by establishing SCF strategy and
by planning over a 20-year period.
Core Function Master Plans (CFMPs). Developed by the CFLIs designated by the CSAF, CFMPs
align strategy, operating concepts, and capabilit development by SCF, to provide 20-year constructs
for enhancing Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power across the range of militar operations.
Tese constructs include major investment plans in the form of Planning Force Proposals (PFPs). Along
with other external products, the USAF Strategic Environmental Assessment, the AF Strategic Plan, and
the Annual Planning and Programming Guidance provide the strategic context for CFMP production.
CFLIs must coordinate CFMPs with all HAF 2-leter organizations and ofces of central responsibilit
prior to submission, and will consider all signi?cant related perspectives across the AF, including the
perspectives of regional AF commands. CFLIs update CFMPs ever year.
40
Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the militar forces or elements thereof guide their actions
in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)
Domain Engagement Strategy. Classi?ed documents covering Air, Space, and Cyberspace capabilities
and programs in support of the AFGPS. Provides detailed guidance for MAJCOM planners and countr
team members to use in determining what means are available to help mitigate speci?c future trends in
any given countr.
Electronic Infastructure. A nation’s electronic backbone. Tis infastructure includes everthing
fom the power generating stations, through the national electrical distribution grid, to the individual
computers and electronic devices in homes and ofces.
Ends. Organizational objectives that if accomplished create, or contribute to, the achievement of the
desired end state at the level of strategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. (Arthur
F. Lykke Jr., ed., Militar Strategy: Teor and Application (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1998)
End State. Te set of required conditions that de?nes achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP
1-02; JP 3-0)
Engagement. Engagements directly between AFs as well as at the regional level are critically important.
Engagements between United States and partner nation senior AF leaders and airmen are essential to
expand the cooperation and interoperabilit necessar to work together in a coalition environment. Also
known as Peacetime Engagement. (AFGPS)
Environmental Monitoring. Environmental monitoring includes the characterization, analysis, and
prediction of space weather (e.g., solar conditions), terrestrial weather near important ground nodes,
and natural phenomena (e.g., interplanetar objects, such as meteoroids and asteroids) in space. Tis
environmental information must be accurate and timely to protect space systems and support space control
planning and execution. Environmental Monitoring provides data on meteorological, oceanographic,
and space environmental factors that might afect militar and civil operations.
Exercise. A militar maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and
execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a multinational, joint, or
single-Service exercise, depending on participating organizations. (JP 1-02)
Foreign Militar Sales (FMS). Tat portion of US securit assistance authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. Tis
assistance difers fom the Militar Assistance Program (MAP) and the International Militar Education
and Taining (IMET) Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and
services transferred.
Global Commons. Shared areas of sea, air, and space along with globally connected domains such as
cyberspace. (2011 NMS)
Global Health Engagement (GHE). GHE is one of the means used to partner with other nations to
achieve SC and to build partnerships and partner capacit objectives through health-related activities
and exchanges. GHE activities allow the militar health services and partner nation armed forces, or
41
foreign civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and con?dence, share information, coordinate
mutual activities, and maintain in?uence and achieve interoperabilit. GHE uses the full spectrum of
health capabilities and disciplines in Mil-Mil, Mil-Civ and multilateral activities to build partner capacit,
support SC, and achieve CCDR objectives. (DoDD 3000.07; AFPD 10-42; AFI 44-162)
Humanitarian Assistance (HA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or
manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that
might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of propert. Humanitarian
assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. Te assistance provided is designed to
supplement or complement the eforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the
primar responsibilit for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 3-57)
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). Assistance to the local populace provided by
predominantly US forces in conjunction with militar operations and exercises. Tis assistance is
speci?cally authorized by Ttle 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities.
(JP 3-29)
International Health Specialist (HIS). Cadre of AFMS professionals with cross-cultural skills,
knowledge of militar and civilian health disciplines, understanding of regional and global geopolitical
militar afairs, and familiarit with the interagency process to ensure continued success of USAF
expeditionar operations.
International Militar Education and Taining (IMET). Provides training to selected foreign
militar- and defense-associated civilian personnel on a grant basis. IMET is authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). An activit that synchronizes and integrates
the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in
direct support of current and future operations. Tis is an integrated intelligence and operations function.
See also intelligence; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance visualization; reconnaissance;
surveillance. (JP 2-01)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Information Sharing. Concentrates on
identifing speci?c intelligence or information sharing requirements and collaboration opportunities
that bene?t the United States and our partners, as appropriate. (GEF)
Interoperabilit with US Forces/Support to US Capabilities. Developing operational and
technical capabilities; doctrine; and tactics, techniques and procedures with partner nations so that the
US partner forces can operate efectively and interchangeably in designated combined operations. (GEF)
Joint Capabilit Area (JCA). Collections of similar DoD capabilities functionally grouped to support
capabilit analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capabilit portfolio management,
and capabilities-based force development and operational planning.
(DoDD 7045.20, p. 8)
Means. Te tools and resources used to execute the strategy to achieve the desired ends. Wen Airmen
think about means, they should think in terms of people, processes, platforms, systems, and capabilities
needed to accomplish the mission. (AFDD 2)
42
Medical Stabilit Operations (MSO). Te Militar Health System (MHS) must be prepared to support
stabilit operations throughout all phases of con?ict and across the range of militar operations. MSO
includes: supporting eforts to establish or restore medical support necessar to sustain the population
until local civil services are restored; assessments of the civilian medical and public health systems such
as infastructure, medical staf, training and education, medical logistics, public health programs, and
promoting and enhancing the host nation medical infastructure. (DoDI 6000.16)
Operational Capacit and Capabilit Building. Providing the necessar training and equipment
required to develop and improve operational capacit, capabilit and performance of partner militar
forces. (GEF)
Positioning, Navigation, and Tming (PNT). A system of satellites, computers, and receivers/
transmiters that provide highly accurate 3-D position, velocit, and timing information. PNT allows the
determination of the latitude and longitude of a receiver on Earth by calculating the time diference for
signals fom diferent satellites to reach the receiver. Once a location is identi?ed, the system enables
accurate navigation fom one point to another. PNT also provides a highly accurate timing signal used by
many space and terrestrially based receivers for scheduling and synchronization of multiple applications.
Securit Assistance. Tat group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and the AECA of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes, by which the United States
provides defense articles, militar training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit or
cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (AFMAN 16-101, JP 1-02)
Securit Cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense
relationships that promote speci?c US securit interests, develop allied and fiendly militar capabilities
for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency
access to a HN. (JP 3-22, JP 1-02)
Securit Force Assistance (SFA). Te Department of Defense activities that contribute to uni?ed
action by the US Government to support the development of the capacit and capabilit of foreign
securit forces and their supporting institutions. (DoDI 5000.68, JP 1-02, JP 3-22)
Service Core Functions (SCFs). SCFs are functional areas that delineate the appropriate and assigned
core duties, missions, and tasks of the AF as an organization, responsibilit for which is assigned to CFLIs,
who act as the principal integrators for their assigned SCFs and the corresponding CFMPs. SCFs express
the ways in which the AF is particularly and appropriately suited to contribute to national securit. Wile
SCFs do not necessarily express ever aspect of what the AF contributes to the nation, they are an integral
aspect of the AFSPS, and provide the famework for AF organizing, training, and equipping eforts.
Stabilit Operations. An overarching term encompassing various militar missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power
to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services,
emergency infastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stabilit operations are a core US
militar mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with pro?ciency equivalent
to combat operations. (DoDI 3000.05)
State Partnership Framework (SPF). A broad concept of faming a US State’s contributions to
international engagement activities as a sub-national actor. In addition to national and federal functions
43
and resources, it incorporates all segments of a State’s resources (citizens, local and state government,
militia, private sector, etc.) in supporting and implementing international engagement activities with
Partner Nations.
State Partnership Program (SPP). An enduring relationship between US States and designated
Partner Nations through the National Guard for the purpose of building relationships and partnership
capacit to directly support the Combatant Command and Chiefs of Mission’s countr and regional
engagement plan objectives. Te Program’s goals re?ect an evolving international afairs mission for
the National Guard using the unique civil-militar nature of the Guard to interact with both active and
reserve forces of foreign countries designed to achieve Strategic Partnership Framework objectives.
Strategic Communication. Te process of informing and appropriately in?uencing key audiences by
synchronizing and integrating communication eforts to deliver truthful, credible, accurate, and timely
information. (AFDD 3-61 IC1)
Teater Campaign Plans (TCP). Plans developed by Geographic CCDRs that focus on the command’s
steady-state activities, which include operations, SC, and other activities designed to achieve theater
strategic ends. It is incumbent upon geographic combatant commanders to ensure any supporting
campaign plans address objectives in the GEF global planning efort and their respective theater
campaign plans. Contingency plans for responding to crisis scenarios are treated as branch plans to the
campaign plan. (DoDD 5132.03)
Ways. Te methods by which objectives are achieved; that is, the efects that must be created to achieve
the desired ends. It is important to keep in mind that ways to achieve ends at one level may become ends
for levels below. (AFDD 2)
44
APPENDIX G
USAF Organizational Roles and Responsibilities
A. USAF Major Commands/USAF Components
1. Organize, train, and equip USAF units to support global partnership activities.
2. Review on-going and new international activities on a regular basis to ensure activities
continue to support CCDR objectives and USAF strategy.
3. Provide input to the USAF Global Partnership Strategy and Campaign Support Plan.
4. Coordinate international activities with SAF/IA to ensure activities are properly tracked,
recorded, analyzed, and reported.
5. Participate in strategic exercises, wargames, and simulations involving partnership
activities in support of CCDR objectives.
6. Coordinate, provide forces, and conduct partnership activities in direct support of the
CCDR objectives.
7. Develop supporting plans for regional SC strategies/plans, as required.
8. Function as Core Function Lead Integrators (CFLI) of USAF Service Core Functions. As
the BP CFLI, AETC authors the BP Core Function Master Plan (CFMP), which uses relevant USAF
and national strategic guidance, including this AFGPS, to guide planning and programming
eforts for BP across the USAF.
9. Responsible for meeting all Ttle 10 requirements for the Airmen in their AORs.
10. Work with CCDRs to develop CCDR Teater SC and similar plans, ensuring that USAF assess,
train, advise, and assist capabilities are incorporated into these plans as needed.
B. Core Function Lead Integrators (CFLIs)
1. CSAF-designated leaders who act as the principal integrators for their assigned Service Core
Functions (SCFs) and the corresponding CFMPs. CFLIs guide SCF maturation and SCF-related
investments by establishing SCF strategy and by planning over a 20-year period.
2. As the BP CFLI, the AETC/CC authors the BP CFMP, which guides USAF-wide BP planning
and programming eforts in alignment with relevant USAF and national strategic guidance.
Te AFGPS provides SC famework inputs to the overall strategy development process. Tose
inputs will inform the BP CFLI and aid in the development of the BP CFMP.
C. Air National Guard
1. Coordinates international activities with respective Air Components to ensure these activities
are properly veted, analyzed, tracked, reported and are in compliance with their respective
Teater Campaign Plans.
2. Conducts State Partnership Program activities in support of the CCDR, and in
coordination with the National Guard Bureau (NGB/J53IA), the various states’ Joint Force
Headquarters (JFHQs), and SAF/IA.
D. Headquarters Air Force (HAF)
Secretariat (SAF)
1. Deput Under Secretar of the Air Force, International Afairs (SAF/IA)
a) Serves as the lead HAF agent for building global partnerships and is the Building
Partnership Capabilit Portfolio Manager.
b) Coordinates development of the USAF Global Partnership Strategy and oversees
its execution in support of the CCDRs and in coordination with other HAF
45
organizations, MAJCOMs and USAF Components (Regular Air Force and Air
Reserve Component).
c) In conjunction with A5X, coordinates partnership activit inputs fom the HAF,
MAJCOMs, USAF Components (Regular Air Force and Air Reserve Component) for
inclusion into the USAF CSP.
d) In conjunction with A3/5, coordinates with sister Services and interagency
components in support of global partnership eforts.
e) Manages the International Afairs Specialist Program and the civilian International
Afairs Career Field.
f) Develops disclosure and technology transfer guidance and policy.
g) Provides overall USAF International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) policy,
guidance, and oversight for implementation of IAC programs and projects and
develops, negotiates, and concludes IAC agreements for the USAF.
h) Manages international training and education (including Aviation Leadership
Program).
i) Provides oversight of FMS/DCS.
j) Provides political-militar analysis to senior leaders.
k) Manages the USAF Ataché program.
l) Manages the Militar Personnel, Engineer and Scientist, and Administration
Professional Exchange Programs.
m) Provides comparative weapons analysis.
n) Coordinates USAF presence at international air and trade shows.
o) Coordinates partner AF presence at bilateral and multilateral exercises.
p) Coordinates USAF participation in regional training.
q) Manages and co-chairs the Air Senior National Representative Program.
r) Leads USAF-partner AF reviews.
s) Coordinates partner nation requirements for mobile training teams.
t) Coordinates partner nation requirements for Extended Taining Services Specialist
Teams.
u) Coordinates partner nation bed downs and training activities within CONUS.
v) Provides expertise and insight in the development of strategic international
communications plans and public afairs.
w) Develops, in coordination with DSCA and AETC, training to educate Airmen on SC.
2. Assistant Secretar of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ)
a) In coordination with SAF/IA, develops USAF capabilities to support FMS/DCS
program strategies, requirements, and Cooperative Agreements.
b) As required, develops processes to acquire and sustain capabilities and resources in
support of partner nations.
c) Identi?es acquisition opportunities for international cooperation to SAF/IA.
d) Provides programmatic subject mater expertise for cooperative international space
technology programs and for disclosure, export control, armaments cooperation,
and regional afairs activities.
e) Coordinates programmatic changes in cooperative acquisition programs to SAF/IA.
3. Assistant Secretar of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Logistics (SAF/IE)
a) Provides guidance, direction, and oversight of all maters related to energy, to
reduce USAF energy demand, increase USAF energy supply, change Air
Force energy culture, and make energy a consideration in all we do.
4. Public Afairs (SAF/PA)
a) Develops and coordinates strategic communication plans in support of international
programs.
46
b) Coordinates with CCDRs, MAJCOMs, USAF components, HAF, and other
appropriate agencies to conduct media engagement, public outreach, and visual
information programs in support of international programs.
5. Assistant Secretar of the Air Force, Financial Management and Comptroller (SAF/FM)
a) Provides guidance & direction on ?nancial maters relating to Securit Assistance.
b) Coordinates on transfers of defense articles, services, training, and economic
assistance to allied and fiendly countries.
c) Serves as USAF representative for NATO, dedicated, and cooperative program
?nancial issues.
6. General Counsel (SAF/GC)
a) Provides expert legal advice in support of international programs and agreements.
7. Legislative Liaison (SAF/LL)
a) Coordinates messages and activities with Congress in support of partner nation
acquisition of required capabilities.
8. Information Dominance and Chief Information Ofcer (SAF/CIO & A6)
a) Provides a war?ghting integration famework that will enable global partners to
understand the integration of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities to deliver the
appropriate efects.
b) Provides the capabilities integration famework so national and international
partners will understand the overlap between cyberspace and other capabilities.
c) Supports SAF/IA in international USAF initiatives involving cyberspace operations
and forces including training and force development.
Air Staf (A-Staf)
1. Assistant Vice Chief of Staf (AF/CVA)
a) Conducts Foreign Air Ataché accreditation.
b) Implements CSAF Counterpart program.
c) Facilitates and implements Global Air Chiefs’ Conference.
d) Facilitates and implements Regional Air Chiefs’ Conferences.
2. Air Force Surgeon General (AF/SG)
a) Serves as the lead HAF agent for global health engagement and health-related SC
programs.
b) Manages international competency training and education for AFMS members.
c) Provides guidance, direction, and oversight of all maters related to AFMS global
health engagement and health-related SC programs.
3. Deput Chief of Staf, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1)
a) Supports plans to organize, train, and equip USAF personnel to support theater
campaign plans. Manages the USAF Language, Region and Culture (LRC) Program.
b) Tacks USAF personnel capacit and pro?ciency in assess, train, advise, and assist
activities, including foreign language, regional expertise, and experience/expertise.
c) Develops, in coordination with AETC and SAF/IA, methods to implement
appropriate Language, Region and Culture training.
4. Deput Chief of Staf, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) (AF/A2)
a) Implements ISR and information sharing agreements.
b) Oversees, coordinates, and reviews policy under which the USAF negotiates,
concludes, maintains, and reports international ISR agreements.
c) Coordinates international ISR agreements with the Defense Intelligence Agency.
d) Supports Operator Engagement Talks regarding ISR maters.
e) Provides assistance on countr assessments.
47
5. Deput Chief of Staf, Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5)
a) Develops the GEF-directed USAF CSP, summarizing the speci?c securit
cooperation activities of the entire USAF in support of CCDR TCPs and Countr Plans.
b) Coordinates with SAF/IA, sister Services, and interagency components on
partnership activities.
c) Facilitates and conducts Operator Engagement Talks.
d) Develops and executes, in coordination with SAF/IA, partner nation participation
in exercises, wargames, and BPC seminars.
e) Develops Concepts of Operations for USAF participation in Stabilization, Securit,
Tansition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
f) Manages the International Standardization Ofce supporting the NATO
Standardization Agency and the Air and Space Interoperabilit Council.
g) Updates and is responsible for Te Air Force Irregular Warfare (IW) Strategy and
ensuring its agreement with the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy. (SAF/IA is
responsible for the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy and ensuring its
congruence with the AF IW Strategy).
h) Provides the representative to the BP Joint Functional Capabilities Board.
i) Coordinates the SAF/IA periodical review and adjustment of personnel training
processes, procedures, and methodologies to optimize existing AF capacit to train
international partners, as authorized by applicable statutes.
j) Provides the representative to the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Commitee.
6. Deput Chief of Staf, Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support (AF/A4/7)
a) Provides capabilities to support ACS.
b) Supports Operator Engagement Talks.
c) Supports USAF participation in exercises, wargames, and BPC Seminars.
d) Participates in applicable Air and Space Interoperabilit Councils, NATO
Standardization Agreements, International Professional Forums and engages in
Teater Securit Cooperation and Coalition partnering; providing strategic mission
support integration and functional subject mater expertise.
7. Deput Chief of Staf, Strategic Plans and Programs (AF/A8)
a) Ensures partnership activities receive appropriate consideration in budget and
program objective memorandum (POM) discussions.
b) Coordinates programmatic changes that are in support of partners with SAF/IA.
c) Ensures partnership activities are properly represented in USAF strategies, plans,
and programs through oversight of Core Function Master Plans (e.g., Building
Partnerships).
8. Deput Chief of Staf, Studies & Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned (AF/A9)
a) Provides assistance for assessments.
b) Compiles periodic lessons learned of partnership activities.
c) Provides analytical expertise.
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APPENDIX H
Source Document Listing
1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Februar 2010)
2. National Securit Strategy (May 2010)
3. National Defense Strategy (June 2008)
4. National Militar Strategy (Februar 2011)
5. Guidance for Employment of the Force (9 April 2011)
6. Joint Publication 5-0 – Joint Operation Planning (11 August 2011)
7. 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (October 2008)
8. USAF Strategic Planning 2010-2030 – Strategic Environmental Assessment (11 March 2011)
9. 2011 United States Air Force Posture Statement (17 Februar 2011)
10. Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command – AFDD 1 (17 November 2003)
11. Operations and Organization – AFDD 2 (3 April 2007)
12. Air Warfare – AFDD 3-1 (22 Januar 2000)
13. Cyberspace Operations – AFDD 3-12 (15 July 2010)
14. Space Operations – AFDD 3-14 (27 November 2006)
15. Combat Support – AFDD 4-0 (23 March 2005)
16. AFI 16-110 – USAF Participation in International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) Programs
(November 2003)
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doc_687371304.pdf
The United States Air Force (USAF) acknowledges that the current and future operating environments are extremely complex, and that these environments will continue evolving. In this environment no single nation can address every challenge and priority alone. With this in mind, the USAF must actively partner with the global community of airmen to further United States (US) and partner nation mutual interests in air, space, and cyberspace.
i
GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP
STRATEGY
US AIR FORCE
White
PantoneBlackC
PantoneReflexBlueC
Pantone 116C
Pantone 165C
Pantone 422C
Pantone 471C
Pantone 551C
You can’t have Global
Vigilance, Reach, and
Power for America
without Global
Partnerships.”
1
We are pleased to provide the 2011 Air Force Global Partnership Strategy. Te
purpose of this strategy is to guide our Air Force on future securit cooperation eforts
aimed at nurturing and deepening existing partnerships and creating new ones to counter
violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional
securit, and shape the future force.
Since the publication of our last Air Force Global Partnership Strategy in 2008, our Air
Force has had to adapt to a rapidly changing strategic environment. Te impacts of the
global economic crisis, violent extremism, shifing regional balances of power, and the
proliferation of advanced technologies will characterize the future securit environment,
making it unlikely for any one nation to address ever global challenge and priorit alone.
With this guidance, we are increasing our emphasis on developing access and relationships
with international partners while forging coalitions to meet both current and emerging
global strategic challenges. Successful partnership development optimizes interoperabilit,
integration, and interdependence between coalition forces while providing our partner
nations the capabilit and capacit to resolve national securit challenges on their own
merit.
Tis new strategy charts our future path by establishing an ends, ways, and means
approach to Air Force securit cooperation and ensuring we are supporting the Combatant
Commands’ Campaign Plans. It is key to Air Force implementation of the National
Securit Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Militar Strategy, as well as
the Secretar of Defense’s Guidance for Employment of the Force and Defense Planning
and Programming Guidance.
Tis is our guidance for the development of plans and programs to build global partnerships
in support of national securit objectives. Building these relationships will help ensure
successful collaboration and underpin the valuable Air Force contribution to ensuring
United States securit in the years to come. We can’t have Global Vigilance, Reach, and
Power for America without Global Partnerships.
NORTON A. SCHWARTZ
General, USAF
Chief of Staf
MICHAEL B. DONLEY
Secretar of the Air Force
3
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:
APPENDIX B:
APPENDIX C:
APPENDIX D:
APPENDIX E:
APPENDIX F:
APPENDIX G:
APPENDIX H:
TABLE of CONTENTS
Introduction…..........................................…................................................5
Purpose…..........................................…................................................9
Strategic Environment …..................…................................................11
Scope ….......................................................…................................................15
Conclusion …...........................................…................................................23
USAF Securit Cooperation Ends..............................26
USAF Securit Cooperation Ways..............................27
USAF Securit Cooperation Means...........................29
USAF Securit Cooperation Stakeholders..............34
Acronyms........................................................................36
Lexicon........................................................................38
USAF Organizational Roles/Responsibilities........44
Source Document Listing............................................48
5
INTRODUCTION I
6
Te United States Air Force (USAF) acknowledges that the current and future operating environments
are extremely complex, and that these environments will continue evolving. In this environment
no single nation can address ever challenge and priorit alone. With this in mind, the USAF must
actively partner with the global communit of airmen to further United States (US) and partner
nation mutual interests in air, space, and cyberspace. Tese partnerships could act as a force
multiplier in future crises. By relying on multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of
our actions will surely be greater than if we act unilaterally. In addition, the USAF acknowledges
that it must not limit itself to the relationships of the past and must broaden its scope to include
partnerships for new situations and circumstances. Tis includes expanding the scope of the securit
cooperation (SC) focus to include building the securit capabilities of at-risk and underdeveloped
partner nations so that these partners are able to defend themselves against the threats of today
and tomorrow.
Te 2010 National Securit Strategy (NSS) and the 2011 National Militar Strategy (NMS) advocate a
comprehensive approach to US international relations in the pursuit of national securit objectives.
Militar-to-militar cooperation, now and in the future, is an essential element of this approach
and serves as a method to share the obligations of securit and stabilit as the US militar seeks to
achieve the NMS objectives:
1. Counter Violent Extremism
2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
3. Strengthen International and Regional Securit
4. Shape the Future Force
For its part, the USAF ofers a service-wide strategy detailing the avenues for developing partner
nation relationships, securing access, and improving partner nation capabilities and capacit in air,
space, and cyberspace.
Te NMS identi?es as an enduring national interest, “An international order advanced by US
leadership that promotes peace, securit, and opportunit through stronger cooperation to meet
global challenges.” Guided by this statement, the overall goal of the Air Force (AF) Global Partnership
Strategy (AFGPS) is to outline an approach to support Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)
and Combatant Commander (CCDR) objectives. To this end, a strategy-driven approach is necessar
to establish, improve, and sustain air, space, and cyberspace capacit and capabilities; build partner
relationships; and establish or sustain access with global partners. In this context, capacit refers to
adding to an existing capabilit and capabilit refers to adding a new function or skill.
Wereas the GEF provides guidance and priorities to planning and executing activities of the
Department of Defense, the AFGPS provides a link between national-level strategy and the USAF
planning establishment, and applies to all members of the USAF Total Force – Regular Air Force,
Guard, Reserve, and Department of the AF Civilians – conducting or supporting SC activities for
the Combatant Commands and other governmental agencies. Tese SC activities, which include
all militar and defense related activities with a foreign partner, can range fom eforts generating
goodwill and access to assisting partner nations in building their capabilities to defend themselves.
Speci?cally, the USAF seeks to:
7
1. Employ USAF securit cooperation activities in support of coalition eforts to counter
violent extremism.
2. Collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression.
3. Strengthen international and regional securit.
4. Shape the future coalition Air Force.
Te USAF ways and means employed to achieve these ends ?ow fom and through the Service’s core
functions. By employing this construct we ensure a direct linkage of USAF’s capabilities, embodied
within the service’s core functions, to those that we develop with our partners.
Te Deput Under Secretar of the Air Force, International Afairs, sponsors this strategy and
assists with development of Air, Space, and Cyber Countr Plans, Countr Team Engagement Plans,
the USAF Campaign Support Plan (CSP), and CCDR Teater Campaign Plans (TCP). Component
planners provide input and coordination on these documents, which ensures USAF total force and
component activities support GEF and CCDR objectives.
Tis document supersedes the United States Air Force Global Partnership Strategy dated 18
December 2008 and a biennial review will be conducted to ensure compliance with current NSS,
Ofce of the Secretar of Defense (OSD) Guidance, and CCDR requirements.
9
PURPOSE II
10
Te purpose of the AFGPS is to bridge the gap between broader Department of Defense (DoD)
objectives, USAF service core functions, and USAF operational capabilities by providing a service-
level SC strategy to the Headquarters Air Force, CCDRs, Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Core
Function Lead Integrators (CFLIs), and USAF components. Wile both shaping and being shaped
by the AF Strategic Planning System (AFSPS), this document provides an Airman’s SC outlook. It
is intended to in?uence development of the full range of SC planning documents by presenting a
summar of available/potential USAF SC ways and means to CCDRs, Components, and US Embassy
Countr Teams. Supplementing the high-level overview provided by this AFGPS are three classi?ed
Domain Engagement Strategies (DESs), created to consolidate detailed countr speci?c capabilit
development roadmaps and timelines into one area. Tese DESs will identif future global trends,
discuss potential methods for mitigating adverse trends, and provide a comprehensive listing
of available programs/activities for component planner consideration in determining how to
meet countr speci?c SC objectives. As with any USAF activit, SC has a strategy component, an
operational planning component, and a resourcing/programming component. Te AFGPS provides
a SC famework to the overall strategy development process, informing the Building Partnerships
(BP) CFLI and aiding in the development of the associated BP Core Function Master Plan (CFMP).
At the same time, the AFGPS in?uences the AFSPS by providing strategic SC concepts to non-SC-
focused strategic and doctrine formulation eforts.
Te Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy (AF/A5X) provides oversight, policy,
and leadership for USAF operational-level planning in support of SC and the BP core function.
Operational planning for SC is primarily done by the geographic USAF Components, with reach
back assistance fom HQ USAF and functional Major Commands. As USAF moves forward to
develop a requirements process for SC, it is especially important to ensure all USAF SC activities are
documented in Component CSPs, which will then ?ow into the USAF CSP. In the future, all USAF SC
activit must directly support a countr-speci?c objective de?ned in a CCDR TCP or the USAF CSP.
Te AFGPS is formed or informed by an array of national strategic documents, but is primarily
guided by the NMS, the GEF, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Te JSCP tasks the
USAF to develop a CSP and the CCDRs to develop region speci?c planning documents which are
synchronized with the appropriate US Embassies and various SC eforts. For its part, the USAF
uses SC activities to help partner nations establish, improve, or sustain air, space, and cyberspace
capacit and capabilities; build partner relationships; and establish or sustain access. Tese activities
serve as key enablers for the USAF by fostering enduring international relationships, with both
established partner nations and developing/at-risk nations, while developing partners with the
interoperable capabilities necessar for successful joint and coalition operations.
As the 21st centur international environment continues evolving, the United States must work
diligently to advance its national securit interests by expanding its spheres of mutual cooperation
in key locales. To accomplish this, our national securit, national defense, and USAF strategies must
be synchronized and focused on achieving our national objectives.
11
STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT
III
12
As discussed in other AF and national strategy documents (e.g., the USAF Strategic Environmental
Assessment, the NSS, and the NMS) and in the environmental assumptions identi?ed within the
GEF, the global securit environment is in a state of dramatic change, propelled by the forces of
globalization, technology, and connectivit. In the near future, physical pressures (e.g., population,
resources, energy, climate, and environment) will combine with rapid social, cultural, technological,
and geopolitical change to create greater uncertaint. Tis uncertaint is exacerbated by the
unprecedented speed and scale of change, as well as the unpredictable and complex relationships
between the trends themselves. Globalization and growing economic interdependence, while
creating new levels of wealth and opportunit, also create a web of interrelated vulnerabilities that
can efectively spread risks beyond national borders.
Over the next twent years, the world is projected to become more populated and urbanized. Profound
cultural and demographic tensions (the youth bulge), rising demands for resources, widespread
underemployment, refugees, and rapid urbanization could reshape both individual countries and
entire regions. Most of the anticipated population growth is expected to occur in developing regions
of the world like Afica and Asia. At the same time, populations in more developed areas of the
globe are projected to decline and age. Tese population and urbanization trends may increase
water scarcit, especially in rapidly developing and underdeveloped regions of the world. Tis water
scarcit may contribute to changes in human migration paterns, driving social, economic, and
health related impacts that may present signi?cant governance challenges to the afected states.
Tese changes in human migration paterns may also introduce previously isolated diseases to the
global communit, increasing the risk of pandemic disease outbreaks. Additionally, the uncertain
impact of global climate change combined with increased population centers in or near coastal
environments may challenge the abilit of weak or developing states to respond efectively to
natural disasters.
Wile global and regional powers continue to rise, the inabilit of many of these states to police
themselves efectively or work with their neighbors to ensure regional stabilit could test both
our international partners’ resilience and United States capacit to in?uence global afairs. Asia
is expected to have two rising global powers. Te Middle East will continue to have a number of
states competing for enhanced regional in?uence, while at the same time dealing with radicalized
extremist pressures. Europe, beset by high social costs and the need to reset and retrench their
economies, may see continued declines in North Atlantic Teat Organization (NATO) nation defense
spending while maintaining their high levels of development aid and democracy building support.
Finally, in response to the world’s demand for new technologies, Afica and South America could
experience an increase in both global and regional in?uence should they undertake large scale
mining of rare-earth minerals traditionally found on their continents. Te dynamics of these regions
will continue to signi?cantly impact stabilit at both the regional and global levels.
On the economic font, the United States will remain the largest and most competitive economy
for the foreseeable future. At the same time, a steadily growing national debt and continued rapid
?uctuations in energy sector pricing could contribute to increased risk to our national securit.
Asia could dominate the regional share of global wealth as the decades-long economic growth
experienced by key regional players continues. Tis anticipated economic growth may facilitate
both continued militar modernization eforts and the expansion of regional interests and in?uence
around the globe. As evolving regional powers in Asia become more prosperous and militarily
13
capable, many traditional United States partners in Europe are reducing defense spending as part
of broader austerit measures driven by economic realities. Additionally, the increasing impact
of resource scarcit on a nation’s economic independence and well-being could contribute to an
increase in associated territorial disputes.
Te shared areas of sea, air, and space, known as the global commons, will continue to become more
accessible to developing nations, contributing to an increasingly contested domain in the coming
years. Challenges include the growing importance of cyberspace, the potential for a navigable
Arctic, increasing reliance on alternative energy sources, and a congested space environment.
Growing and assertive states are developing anti-access and area-denial capabilities and strategies
to constrain United States and international feedom of action while seeking greater in?uence on
the international stage. Operational areas like space, cyberspace, and our electronic infastructure
provide a double-edged sword by simultaneously enhancing our national capabilities while
exposing a vulnerabilit to our enemies. Some states are already conducting or condoning cyber
atacks, foreshadowing the growing threat in this domain. Te cyber threat is enhanced by a lack
of international norms, geographic boundaries, difcult determining atribution, low barriers to
entr, and the relative ease of developing potent capabilities.
State-sponsored groups and non-state actors are extending their reach through the acquisition
of advanced technologies that were once the domain of states, complicating deterrence and
accountabilit eforts. Tey are expected to continue using technology to coordinate and operate
globally in order to spread extremist ideologies and threaten the United States and our allies.
Nations with weak, failing, or corrupt governments will continue as actual or potential safe havens
for an expanding array of non-state actors, breeding con?ict and endangering stabilit. Terrorist
organizations, criminal networks, and international piracy will present unparalleled levels of
violence and lawlessness on a global scale, challenging nations’ abilities to respond. It should then
come as no surprise that the most immediate and extreme danger, as recognized in both the 2010
NMS and Nuclear Posture Review, is nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation.
Te securit of the United States is increasingly bound to the securit of the broader international
communit. As a result, the AFGPS is focused on developing and building the capabilit and capacit
of our partner nations to withstand internal threats and external aggressions while also improving
their capacit to proactively meet national and regional challenges such as those posed by weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), natural disasters, regional instabilit, rogue states, and violent non-
state actors. Equally important to capacit and capabilit building, planners must consider building
relationships that promote speci?c US securit interests and provide US forces with peacetime and
contingency access within host nations. Tese relationships enable the achievement of strategic end
states through a variet of means enumerated later in this document. Cultivating these partnerships
broadens US access in times of need, strengthens national and regional efectiveness, and increases
combined US-partner efectiveness through specialization and shared expertise. Operating in the
international context, particularly in partnership with foreign governments, institutions, and
airmen, is an inherently cross-cultural endeavor. Accomodating this new realit will require the
USAF to account for the impact of varing levels of SC activities on future resource decisions in an
increasingly resource constrained environment. Any operational risk assessments must be made in
the context of the broader national securit spectrum of activities.
15
SCOPE IV
16
To confont current and future SC challenges in air, space, and cyberspace while also supporting
all the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), the USAF employs an ends, ways, and means
construct to align the four USAF ends with the means used to achieve those ends. Tis strategy-
to-task methodology streamlines the process of determining the most appropriate engagement
activities to pursue based on a speci?c partner nation’s current capabilities and future requirements.
Ends: Te USAF’s SC ends are the desired outcomes/objectives and are derived fom the NMS (Refer to
Appendix A for further explanation of USAF SC ends). All USAF SC activities must support achieving
at least one of these four strategic ends:
1. Employ USAF securit cooperation activities in support of coalition eforts to counter violent
extremism.
2. Collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression.
3. Strengthen international and regional securit.
4. Shape the future coalition Air Force.
Ways: Te USAF SC ways are the methods
1
of employing militar capabilities, embodied in the USAF
service core functions, to achieve the ends (Refer to Appendix B for further explanation of USAF SC
ways). Te USAF SC ways are:
1. Establishing, sustaining, or enhancing USAF securit cooperation capacit and capabilit.
2. Establishing, sustaining, or expanding mutually bene?cial international partnerships.
3. Collaborating with partners to develop or enhance their securit capacit and capabilities.
4. Collaborating with partners to develop interoperable coalition capabilities.
Means: Te USAF SC means are the forces and resources
2
employed to achieve the ends. Tey are
the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
(DOTMLPF) militar capabilities employed to engage with our partner nations (Refer to Appendix
C for further explanation of USAF SC means).
Te USAF is organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish speci?c functions and possesses unique
capabilities that can mitigate some of the global challenges we face while we operate with our Joint
partners to meet our national securit objectives. Te USAF helps to achieve these national objectives
by employing the means of this strategy in coordination with the other services and Combatant
Commands. Tese means, which equate to the service’s SC “forces and resources,” were designed
with a global perspective in mind and to operate appropriately by, with, and through the other
Services, the Interagency (DoD, Department of State (DoS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
etc.), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and our international partners. By synchronizing
our engagement eforts with these various players to improve partner nations’ abilit to achieve
and sustain internal securit, we will enhance regional stabilit and reduce the requirement for a
US contingency response. Te USAF SC means are grouped into the following categories:
1
AFDD 2 – Operations and Organization (April 2007), pg. 6
2
AFDD 2 – Operations and Organization (April 2007), pg. 6
17
1. Education and Taining
2. Global Force Posture
3. US Securit Cooperation Personnel
4. Personnel Exchanges
5. Exercises
6. Equipping Activities
7. Technology Tansfer and Disclosure
8. Information Sharing
9. Cooperative Relationships and Agreements
10. Partner Air Force Engagements
11. Humanitarian Initiatives
Wile continuing to organize, train, and equip our forces for combat operations, the USAF must
maintain the ?exibilit to implement appropriate changes within our DOTMLPF construct to
meet our SC ends. Te ?exibilit required to meet these strategic challenges will depend on USAF
capabilities resident within air, space, and cyberspace.
18
Air Domain
Air domain capabilities cover the entire spectrum of the aviation enterprise (de?ned as the
sum total of all air domain resources, processes, and cultures) to include personnel, equipment,
infastructure, operations, sustainment, and air-mindedness. Tese capabilities are packaged in
various combinations, enabling the USAF to perform its designated functions. Tose functions
with applicabilit to SC within the air domain are: Command and Control (C2); Air Superiorit;
Global Precision Atack; Rapid Global Mobilit; Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR); Special Operations; Personnel Recover; Agile Combat Support (ACS); and
Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO).
3
Air domain capabilities in at-risk and developing partner nations may require a much greater
emphasis on developing a basic aviation enterprise infastructure vice implementing more advanced
capabilit packages. In addition, the dual-use nature of aviation infastructure capabilities (both
militar and civilian use) requires that all aviation enterprise initiatives are worked in conjunction
with the “whole-of-government” team within the partner nation. In these instances, the USAF Air
Advisor becomes a critical part of implementing air domain capabilities.
An example of a capabilit package, Airspace Control, is an essential element of any nation’s
sovereignt. Te need for situational awareness and airspace securit is a key element of air
sovereignt and territorial protection. Tis is achievable through the integration of militar air
surveillance, air trafc control/weather radars, communications, and national air policing elements.
Te USAF can assist in this endeavor by providing the training, equipment, and follow-on mentorship
necessar to strengthen the air defenses and capabilities of partner nations. Tis abilit, when
synchronized with information fusion centers (C2), airborne interdiction assets (Air Superiorit),
and precision strike capabilities (Global Precision Atack), is a key component in diminishing the
potential impact of terrorist organizations and international criminal networks.
Rapid Global Mobilit is an important enabling capabilit requiring adequate air?eld infastructure
as well as interoperable airlif, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation capabilities. Our and our
partner nations’ collective abilit to respond to time-critical humanitarian crises, natural disasters,
and contingency operations requires appropriate aircraf with the necessar access to partner nation
air?elds with sufcient runway length; ramp load-bearing capacit; and cargo, fuel, and casualt
handling facilities. As instances of regional instabilit and localized crises increase, there will be an
associated increase in the demand for air mobilit capabilities.
Global Integrated ISR is another vital capabilit supporting a partner nation’s organic abilit to
maintain situational awareness of activities afecting its national securit interests. As we seek
to expand partner nations’ organic ISR capabilities, we must be actively engaged to ensure those
capabilities ?t their needs, are interoperable with US systems, and complement US capacit by
providing timely and unique assessments during combined operations in support of mutual
national objectives.
3
United States Air Force Posture Statement 2011, 17 February 2011
19
Te abilit to execute limited scope and highly specialized combat operations can provide a decisive
advantage for a partner nation. Surgical missions with small teams of highly trained personnel
(Special Operations) allow partner nations to beter control domestic securit challenges while
minimizing the collateral damage that ofen accompanies kinetic engagements. At the same time,
the capabilit to retrieve personnel trapped in enemy held or denied territor (Personnel Recover)
provides an important safet net for partner nation personnel performing duties in support of
national securit objectives.
ACS provides the end-to-end support structure allowing the operational components of the Air
Domain to execute their missions successfully. ACS is the abilit to ?eld, protect, and sustain air,
space, and cyber forces across the full range of militar operations to achieve Joint efects. ACS
is the foundational, crosscuting, and linking AF system of support that enables AF operations
and the capabilities that distinguish air, space, and cyberspace power—speed, ?exibilit and global
perspective. Examples of ACS elements include air trafc control, air?eld operations, weather, civil
engineering, health services, logistics, securit forces, and maintenance. A rapidly evolving SC
component of health services, Global Health Engagement (GHE), is how the AF Medical Service
(AFMS) establishes, sustains, and expands mutually bene?cial global partnerships. Te success
of GHE in establishing US access and in?uence with partner nations by building their health
capabilities can serve as a model for success within the other ACS elements. Without the various
and specialized resources provided by the ACS communit, sustained and successful air domain
operations would not be possible.
NDO is the bedrock of strategic deterrence and stabilit. NDO mission sets ensure the safet,
securit, and reliabilit of nuclear weapons and associated materiel; deters adversaries fom
pursuing actions that threaten US national securit; and it provides nuclear strike options for the
President should deterrence fail. Extending deterrence to our global partners also assures those
partners of US national resolve to protect our mutual interests. Trough these assurances, NDO
supports non-proliferation objectives because allies and partners who have the potential to develop
their own nuclear weapons do not do so as they bene?t fom the US extended deterrence. Further,
potential adversaries who seek to obtain nuclear weapons know they cannot prevail in the face of
compelling US capabilities. In order to ensure success in its #1 priorit, the Air Force will “Continue
To Strengthen the Nuclear Enterprise” by ?elding capable nuclear forces; resilient command and
control capabilities; a robust physical infastructure; a safe, secure and efective weapons stockpile;
and the expertise and manufacturing base that make NDO credible.
Tese SC focused components of the USAF Air Domain service core functions play a key role in
enhancing a partner nation’s independent aviation enterprise development (AED). Te full spectrum
of air domain capabilities and detailed planning factors that support resolving or mitigating
geopolitical strategic challenges are addressed in the USAF Air Domain Engagement Strategy.
20
Space Domain
Te United States considers fee access to and unobstructed use of space (Space Superiorit
4
) vital
to its national securit interests. Te forward deployed assets operating in this globally-focused
domain, both the on-orbit and ground-based components, are extremely sophisticated and require
large investments of intellectual and ?nancial capital in the areas of research, development,
acquisition, training, and operations. Maintaining the health of our space industrial base is a goal
of our long-term space doctrine as more nations around the world begin developing advanced space
capabilities. For these reasons, the USAF is building relationships with key international partners,
speci?cally focused on minimizing costs, maximizing capabilities, promoting competition, and
using the space domain responsibly. In the foreseeable future, it is vitally important to leverage
unique partner nation space capabilities by encouraging interoperabilit with US space systems,
capabilities, and services to perform the space-based missions protecting our national securit.
In addition, the USAF needs to include the space domain in its strategy and its plans as it partners
with at-risk and developing nations. Wile these nations will not be the same tpe of space partners
as our peer and near-peer allies, they may be users of selected space capabilities like Positioning,
Navigation, and Tming (PNT), communications, and mapping. As such, interfacing and working
with these at-risk and developing nations in the space domain must be a part of our comprehensive
space strategy.
Wile building these partnerships, the USAF should focus its eforts on enhancing several
signi?cant space capabilities instrumental to addressing future international challenges. Te
?rst of these capabilities, PNT, is a key enabler to Precision Atack and Rapid Global Mobilit
operations. In the coming years, PNT will play an expanding role in an array of overseas missions
fom precision employment of combat forces to humanitarian airlif operations. At the same time,
USAF partnering eforts will continue to play a vital role as we continue to evolve our Missile
Warning and Defense capabilities. As the ballistic missile threat fom rogue nations and potential
non-state actors continues to increase, our abilit to operate forward deployed components of
our missile warning and defense systems will hinge on the relationships established with our
international partners in the afected regions. Key to maintaining these constellations of space
assets is the abilit to place them in-orbit reliably, efciently, and cost efectively. International
spacelif partnering opportunities are expected to expand over the next twent years, continuing to
increase in importance as more nations enter the space domain. Wile these three space capabilit
areas directly support operational activities, other capabilities provide critical situational
awareness products used by decision makers during operational planning and execution eforts.
Geting these products to the right place at the right time requires robust communications, a focus
area we are actively pursuing with our international partners.
4
United States Air Force Posture Statement 2011, 17 February 2011
21
Another Space Force Enhancement (SFE) capabilit that is vital is ISR fom space. Wile not all
countries will possess this capabilit, we must leverage the maximum bene?t fom other countries’
assets to provide ?exibilit and global coverage at minimal cost to the US. Similarly, we must build
the mechanisms to ensure information derived fom US space-based assets is made available to
coalition partners when appropriate and necessar.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is enabled by our abilit to identif and track all man-made
objects in Earth’s orbit. Tis is accomplished by a global network of optical and radar sensors, along
with their associated command and control, that detect, track, identif, and catalog all of these
objects in order to anticipate potential threats to our on-orbit space assets and identif changes
to an adversar’s space order of batle. Tis ground- and space-based sensor network relies heavily
on an array of partnership agreements with regional allies developed over a long period of time.
Without these partnership agreements, our space sight picture would be greatly diminished,
increasing the risk to our overall national securit. Te development of SSA requires ISR in and
through a variet of domains (including space). Te development of partner ISR capabilities
and information sharing agreements is vital to the formulation of a true sight picture for space.
Conversely, our space-based environmental monitoring capabilities have been enhanced through
close coordination and collaboration with key international partners. Wether developing new
sensors or improving the sharing of collected space and terrestrial-weather data, the exponential
improvement in our environmental monitoring capabilit is tied directly to the contributions of our
international partners.
Te execution of these and other space capabilities, along with building and enhancing the
international partnerships associated with USAF space operations, are accomplished in collaboration
with OSD, DoS, Joint Staf (JS), CCDRs, Intelligence Communit, and other US Government agencies.
Tese interagency and inter-departmental relationships, as well as the associated capabilities we
share with our partners and allies, directly contribute to successfully shaping and evolving the
operational space environment. Te full spectrum of space domain capabilities and detailed planning
factors that support resolving or mitigating geopolitical strategic challenges are addressed in the
USAF Space Domain Engagement Strategy.
22
5
United States Air Force Posture Statement 2011, 17 February 2011
Cyberspace
Cyberspace is quickly becoming the new “militar high ground” and the United States considers
feedom of action in cyberspace (Cyberspace Superiorit
5
) vital to its national securit interests.
US national power and securit depend on both feedom of access to, and operations within and
through this domain. Potential adversaries, including non-state actors, understand this realit and
continue to seek cyberspace capabilities and to use cyberspace to their advantage.
Te nature of cyberspace enables operations that are global in nature and nearly instantaneous
in efect. Unlike conventional domains, the low cost of entr to cyberspace means that virtually
any nation, organization, or even individual can acquire, operate, and use the capabilities that
cyberspace provides. Tis, coupled with the rapid pace of cyberspace development, presents unique
challenges and opportunities. Cyberspace capabilities are essential to successful network-centric
coalitions and enable interoperabilit and unit of efort across a spectrum of operations. Trough
cyberspace cooperation and partnerships, the United States seeks to enhance both our and our
partners’ securit through interoperabilit, shared investment, and by leveraging unique allied
capabilities. In addition, the USAF will also partner with at-risk and developing nations and will
assist them in the development of basic cyberspace capabilities as detailed in the GCC TCPs and
in support of de?ned GEF end states. As such, cyberspace cooperation re?ects and reinforces the
broader political and militar cooperation between the United States and its international partners.
Te US militar’s reliance on an advanced and feely accessible information technology (IT) backbone
to perform its war?ghting missions presents our adversaries with an exposed vulnerabilit. Our
abilit to shape the cyberspace environment will be crucial to ensuring uninterrupted access for us
and our partners while denying access to any current and future adversaries if necessar.
To efectively counter enemy operations in cyberspace and assure our own mission success, the
United States must work closely with our international partners to enable collective self-defense and
deterrence. Working with allies and international partners we will improve cyberspace capabilities
such as situational awareness, threat assessment, digital network intelligence, active network defense,
and cross domain securit. By synchronizing and integrating global network securit eforts with our
international partners, we not only leverage their established capabilities and ingenuit, but also
signi?cantly increase the number of “eyes” monitoring the network at any one time. Tese cyberspace
SC eforts should cover all aspects of cyberspace operations including initial and recurring training,
information sharing, and advanced cyberspace capabilit development eforts. Tis level of cyberspace
cooperation with partner nations and coalition allies takes on an increased level of importance when
viewed against the speed and anonymit with which our adversaries can currently operate.
Continuous integration of coalition partners across the spectrum of cyberspace reduces seams across
coalitions and increases the potential for operational success. Active engagement with partner nations
focused on cyberspace technology development helps reduce USAF funding outlays by sharing
the research and development costs across international partners. Te full spectrum of cyberspace
capabilities and detailed planning factors that support resolving or mitigating geopolitical strategic
challenges are addressed in the USAF Cyberspace Domain Engagement Strategy.
23
CONCLUSION V
24
Tis AFGPS provides a high level overview of USAF SC objectives (ends) and their relationship
to both national level strategy documents and countr speci?c engagement plans. It is intended
to in?uence development of the USAF CSP and CCDR TCPs while also educating the general
USAF population on basic USAF SC concepts and capabilities. New to this revision is the explicit
expansion of USAF SC eforts to include building the securit capacit and capabilities of at-risk
and developing partner nations. Also new is the addition of three classi?ed DESs that assist CCDRs,
Components, and US Embassy Countr Teams resolve or mitigate the strategic challenges they
face within their area of responsibilit (AOR) or host nation. Tese supplemental strategies will
provide the detailed, countr speci?c recommendations they need to help determine capabilit
development and resourcing eforts across air, space, and cyberspace supporting CCDR engagement
plans and the four USAF SC ends.
25
APPENDICES
26
APPENDIX A
USAF Securit Cooperation Ends
Te NSS, National Defense Strategy (NDS), and NMS provide the USAF with overarching national
guidance. OSD has also published re?ned guidance in the form of the GEF and the Defense Planning
and Programming Guidance (DPPG). Tese guidance documents provide the foundation upon which
the USAF SC ends were developed. Tese ends apply to all USAF SC activities, including the building,
sustaining, and expanding of relationships with partner AFs whose requirements span the spectrum of
operational needs and resource capabilities. Partnering with more capable nations to provide assistance
to less capable nations must be given serious consideration when appropriate. Te following four ends
were created to support CCDRs and national strategy and policy:
1. Employ USAF securit cooperation activities in support of coalition eforts to counter
violent extremism.
Tere is no more vital national interest than the securit of the American people, our territor, and our
way of life. In order to counter the threats to this securit, the USAF will strengthen and expand our
network of international partnerships by pursuing an integrated and synchronized global SC strategy
in-line with US national securit, CCDR TCP, and coalition partner securit objectives.
2. Collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression.
Preventing con?icts is as important as winning them, with both options requiring advanced planning and
extensive preparation. Establishing and promoting appropriate USAF to partner nation AF relationships
is a key element in developing the air, space, and cyberspace capabilities required to deter and defeat both
internal and external aggression. US partners must have or desire to develop the indigenous capabilit,
capacit, and will to employ their own air, space, and/or cyberspace resources safely, efectively, and
efciently.
3. Strengthen international and regional securit.
Afer a partner nation is able to provide for its own securit, it is then more willing to look externally
at supporting coalition operations and ensuring regional stabilit. To maximize their efectiveness
during these operations, it is important to ensure that partner nations are interoperable, integrated, or
interdependent with the USAF through common concepts of operations, including intelligence, training,
medical, logistics, securit, maintenance, sustainment, and procurement practices. An additional bene?t
to supporting regional securit activities is its help in strengthening partner nation economies by
ensuring uninterrupted access to the global commons for their goods and services.
4. Shape the future coalition Air Force.
Familiarit, common shared experience, and multi-faceted international SC training will play vital roles in
future interactions across the global communit of airmen. Te USAF will focus on educating its Airmen,
fom the basic trainee to the senior AF commander, on the various skills required for international
relationship building while simultaneously in?uencing our coalition partners through the use of targeted
language, region, and culture preparation and personnel exchanges. Simultaneously, as the USAF continues
to develop new weapon system hardware, alternative energy capabilities, and operational concepts, we
will continue to look for opportunities to enhance coalition partners’ interoperabilit and integration.
27
APPENDIX B
USAF Securit Cooperation Ways
Ways are the methods by which objectives are achieved; that is, the efects that must be created to achieve
the desired ends. Te following four USAF ways were created to identif the methods and process needed
to support CCDR and national strategy and policy:
1. Establishing, sustaining, or enhancing USAF securit cooperation capacit and capabilit.
Tained personnel are an essential component of US SC eforts with partner nations. We must train our
Airmen to ?ght today as well as adapt to the environment in anticipation of future challenges. Our
Airmen must receive the proper training, fom appropriately stafed and equipped training cadres, to be
experts in their ?elds as well as competent advisors and mentors. To manage this force properly, the USAF
must identif critical skill sets like language, region and culture expertise and track quali?ed personnel
throughout the Total Force. Achieving this ensures the USAF is postured to have the wide range of skills
necessar, in sufcient numbers and prepared to most efectively plan, assess, train, advise, and assist, to
meet the complexities of future international engagements.
2. Establishing, sustaining, or expanding mutually bene?cial international partnerships.
Promoting appropriate civil-civil, civil-militar, and militar-militar relationships with partner nations
is a key element in developing mutually bene?cial international partnerships while reinforcing securit
assurance guarantees, promoting crisis stabilit and providing US forces with operational access with
host nation support. Ensuring these US partners expand their legitimacy among the populace enhances
these mutually bene?cial relationships by strengthening the linkage between the US and partner nation
government and partner nation government and its people. Te USAF may build, sustain, and expand
relationships with partner nations across the spectrum of resource capabilities in order to assist them in
developing sustainable aviation enterprises that enhance their national defense while also contributing
to their economic development. For those partner nations who are at-risk and underdeveloped, the USAF
must assist them in developing and building their aviation enterprises and perhaps, civil infastructure, so
that these nations are beter able to prevent festering problems fom turning into crises. Partnering with
more capable nations to provide assistance to less capable nations must be given serious consideration
when appropriate. At times, developing partnerships with fiendly nations may include coordination
with key allies and strong partners.
3. Collaborating with partners to develop or enhance their securit capacit and capabilities.
Support the development of the capacit and capabilit of US partners and their will to employ
their own air, space, and/or cyberspace resources safely, efectively, and efciently. Tis includes the
development of supporting institutions. Supporting these eforts is accomplished through a variet of
collaborative engagements including equipment procurements, joint exercises, mobile training teams,
formal educational opportunities, and Air Advisor engagements aimed at assisting partner nations to
build their aviation enterprise. Because each partner AF is a unique case, both US and foreign-made
equipment should be considered for meeting these requirements. Cost, interoperabilit with neighboring
nations, and availabilit of experienced maintainers and operators are all major considerations. Also
inherent in equipment selection is the scope, scale, and timefame of the engagement. Wile readily
available and sustainable foreign-made solutions may enable the partner AF to rapidly meet immediate
mission needs, transitioning to US-made equipment brings with it increased interoperabilit as well as
additional training and engagement opportunities.
28
4. Collaborating with partners to develop interoperable coalition capabilities.
Once a partner nation possesses the capabilit to provide for their own internal securit, they tpically
strive to expand their capabilities to enhance support to coalition operations in regional and/or global
securit environments. Activities within this line of operation may reduce the operational burden on,
and risk to, US militar forces. With this in mind, it is important to ensure that partner nations are
interoperable, integrated, or interdependent with the USAF through common concepts of operations;
command and control; tactics, techniques, & procedures (TTPs); intelligence; training; medical; securit;
sustainment; alternative energy; and/or procurement practices to enhance their efectiveness in coalition
operations. Tis includes common understanding and appreciation of language, region, and culture to
include foreign and English language training where appropriate.
29
APPENDIX C
USAF Securit Cooperation Means
Te following listing of means, though not all inclusive or exhaustive, provides a solid cross-section of
SC activities available for use in developing relationships with partner nations. Te partner nation must
have, or be able to develop within the planning timefame, the ?scal base, infastructure, human capital,
etc. that allow a nation to develop and sustain SC capabilities. Te USAF Headquarters, MAJCOMs,
Component Headquarters, and a variet of other agencies supporting the CCDRs and US Embassy Countr
Teams employ these means. Te speci?c means utilized, on a nation-by-nation basis, are included in the
applicable CCDR TCP, Countr Plans, and Component CSPs (for eventual roll-up into the USAF CSP). An
expanded version of the means re?ected below will form the foundation of a SC requirements process,
providing a usable demand signal to the BP CFLI and the AFSPS.
1. Education & Taining
Developing capabilities within partner AFs that are interoperable, integrated, and in some cases
interdependent, demands AF-to-AF and multinational professional militar education and training. Te
USAF educates and trains more than 11,800 members of partner AFs each year through developmental
education, professional militar education, and language, medical, command and control, securit,
logistics, maintenance and ?ying training courses. Te USAF also serves as the executive agent for
Defense Institute for Medical Operations (DIMO) and the Defense Language Institute English Language
Center (DLI-ELC).
Aviation Leadership Program (ALP)
Defense Institute for Medical Operations (DIMO)
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLI-ELC)
Extended Taining Services Specialist (ETSS)
Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Taining (ENJJPT)
Foreign and English Language Taining
Gulf Air Warfare Center
Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA)
International Intelligence Applications Ofcer Course
International Militar Education and Taining (IMET)
International Ofcer’s School
Mobile Taining Teams (MTT)
Personnel Recover Capabilit Development and Employment
Securit Force Assistance Development and Employment
USAF School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM)
USAFE Air Ground Operations School (USAFE AGOS)
2. Global Force Posture
Te US establishes bases, OCONUS force structure, and pre-positioned equipment/materiel to provide a
forward presence, deterrence, capacit to respond to crises, enhance operational access, and to facilitate
SC. Furthermore, agreements with allies and partners set the terms regarding the US militar’s presence
as agreed to with the host government. Forces stationed in Forward Operating Locations will train
and operate with international partners and allies on a daily basis. Tis physical immersion and daily
30
interaction helps build capabilit for current and future coalition operations through various methods
including exercises, familiarization visits, of-station training deployments, and traveling contact teams.
Also important for partnership development is the abilit to provide partner nations with locations in
the United States to bed-down aircraf and train their airmen. By living in the United States and working
side-by-side with USAF Airmen, partner AF airmen gain a unique insight into the American life and
culture while also forming life-long relationships.
Foreign Partner CONUS Bed-downs
Forward Stationed Forces
Operational Access agreements
3. US Securit Cooperation Personnel
Te proper development and utilization of USAF Airmen through a combination of education, training,
and dut opportunities is foundational to our ongoing SC eforts. Te USAF provides Airmen deliberately
organized, trained, equipped, and educated to assess worldwide irregular challenges and employ tailored
capabilities as part of a whole-of-nation efort to enable partner nations, in particular at-risk nations,
to defend and govern themselves or to conduct operations in support of US national securit interests.
All aspects of the training pipeline need to be synchronized to ensure a steady educational development
process that provides individuals with the required SC skills prior to reporting to their dut assignments.
Assigned Personnel to US Embassies (Air Ataches and Securit Assistance Ofcers (SAOs))
Air Advisor Academy
Air Advisor Programs
CNAF/AFFOR Countr Desk Ofcers and Planners
Cross-Cultural Competence Familiarization for All Airmen (PME & EST)
International Afairs Career Field (IACF)
International Afairs Specialist (IAS)
International Health Specialist (IHS)
International Professional Militar Education Atendance (IPME)
Language, Region, and Culture (LRC) Advanced Taining (LEAP & GOPAC)
4. Personnel Exchanges
Exchanges between the USAF and our allies and foreign partners serve as force multipliers by promoting
mutual understanding and trust, enhancing interoperabilit, strengthening AF-to-AF ties, and developing
long-term personal and professional relationships. Te Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP),
which oversees our international exchange eforts, is divided into ?ve exchange areas.
Administrative and Professional Exchange Program (APEP)
Defense Intelligence Personnel Exchange Program (DIPEP)
Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP)
Militar Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP)
Subject Mater Expert Exchanges (SMEE)
5. Exercises
Te USAF cultivates alliances and partnerships through bilateral and multinational exercises and
competitions with over 60 countries annually. Tese exercises and competitions help re?ne concepts of
31
operation and build pro?ciency, ensuring partner nations have experienced AFs capable of conducting
self-defense missions and participating efectively in multinational and coalition operations.
Combined Force Exercises (CFE)
Competitions
Large Force Exercises (LFE)
Medical Readiness Taining Exercise (MEDRETE)
Regional Taining Centers
Seminars
Wargaming
Medical Evacuation/Patient Movement
6. Equipping Activities
Developing partnership capabilit and capacit through the development of consistent construction and
facilit/land management standards and the procurement of systems, sensors, support, and training is
a key element of developing global partnerships. Tese standards and systems, while providing partner
nations an inherently interoperable capabilit with both USAF and coalition forces, ofen form the
centerpiece for our relationships and facilitate a beter understanding of US training and operational
methods. Refer to DoD 5105.38M Chapters 1 & 11 for a complete listing of Securit Assistance Programs.
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Foreign Militar Sales (FMS)
Joint Co-Development and Production Eforts
Medical Equipment Donation
7. Technology Tansfer and Disclosure
Te authorit to disclose classi?ed and controlled unclassi?ed information to partner nations and
international organizations is closely aligned with the recipient’s abilit to safeguard technology, goods,
services, and munitions fom transfer to nations and individuals whose interests are contrar to the United
States. Technology transfer and disclosure decisions occur in nearly all partner nation engagement
opportunities. Te USAF is commited to promoting interoperabilit and building close relationships
with coalition partners by ?nding a balance between sharing and protecting information and technology.
8. Information Sharing
Information sharing cooperation, with the accompanying information protection, is integral to building
global partnerships. International relationships provide a means of unique access to data the United
States might otherwise be unable to obtain while expanding the opportunit to in?uence development
of common regional assessments. Information sharing cooperation activities require synchronization
and coordination through the joint and interagency process since they ofen represent the initial contact
between the United States and a partner nation that leads to a broader more comprehensive relationship.
Alternative Energy Technology
Health Surveillance
Information and Data Exchange Programs
Telehealth
32
9. Cooperative Relationships and Agreements
Developing cooperative relationships and programs with both our interagency counterparts and partner
AFs is essential to ensuring the United States and its partners have the most integrated and efective
capabilities and programs available. Tese eforts bene?t both the United States and our international
partners by cultivating mutually bene?cial relationships through the use of: 1) cooperative agreements,
2) the disclosure of appropriate levels of information consistent with US national securit interests, and
3) leveraging signi?cant science and technology investments made by other governments.
Air and Space Interoperabilit Council (ASIC)
Alternative Energy Research and Development
Coalition Warfare Program (CWP)
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA)
En-route Access
Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT)
Interagency Cooperation Frameworks
International Agreements (e.g., Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA))
International Armaments Cooperation Forums
International Cooperative Research and Development Program (ICR&D)
International Space Cooperative Forums
Logistics Support
Medical Inter?y
Over?ight Rights
World Meteorological Organization
10. Partner Air Force Engagements
Striving to improve communication and militar interoperabilit between USAF and partner nation AFs
is central to US SC eforts. Bilateral and multilateral meetings between senior AF ofcials are critical to
building personal relationships and enhancing global partnerships, leading to increased interoperabilit
and capacit while building trust and con?dence between senior leaders. Direct and ongoing interactions
between partner nations and selected state National Guard entities demonstrate the unique civilian-
militar relationship of the National Guard while fostering interoperabilit between USAF and partner
nation AFs.
Air Chief Conferences
Air Senior National Representative Program
Capabilit Brie?ngs to Partners
Chief of Staf Counterpart Program
CMSAF Visits
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
International Air and Tade Shows
Operator Engagement Talks
Senior Leader Contacts
State Partnership Program
Partner Air Force Capabilit Assessments
Global Health Engagement
33
11. Humanitarian Initiatives
Delivering aid and support to nations during times of crisis or natural disaster is fundamental to the
American vision of international relations. Providing medical support, either on a preventative basis or
immediately afer a major event, helps build good will while ensuring our medical professionals maintain
their training and readiness. Additionally, by building partner capacit, we help our partner nations
build their infastructure and capabilit to provide for their people. Tis helps promote the legitimacy
of the government and increases the stabilit of that government, increasing both local and regional
stabilit. Providing airfames, supplies, and trained professionals during times of natural or man-made
disasters will continue to remain a core competency of the USAF.
Disaster Response
Expeditionar Medical Support (EMEDS)
Humanitarian Assistance
Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP/DENCAP)
Stabilit Operations
Medical Stabilit Operations
Global Health Engagement
34
APPENDIX D
USAF Securit Cooperation Stakeholders
SAF/IA
SAF/IAG – Strategy, Operations, Resources Directorate
SAF/IAGI - SAF/IA Support, Knowledge Base, TSCMIS
SAF/IAGR - Budgetar Support for SAF/IA and FMS / DCS
SAF/IAGS - Pol-Mil Policy and Analysis; AFGPS; CSP support
BP Capabilit Portfolio Management, Strat Comm
SAF/IAP – Policy Directorate
SAF/IAPA – IAS, IACF, Ataché Program, MPEP
SAF/IAPD – Foreign Disclosure & Technology Tansfer & Disclosure
SAF/IAPQ - International Armaments Cooperation
SAF/IAPS - Space / Cyberspace agreements / Programs
SAF/IAPX - FMS / DCS; Education & Taining; Exercise Coordination
SAF/IAR – Regional Afairs Directorate
SAF/IARA - AFRICOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARC - CENTCOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARE - EUCOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARL - NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM Countr Directors
SAF/IARP - PACIFIC Countr Directors
SAF/IARW - Weapons Division
HQ Air Force
SAF/AQ - Capabilities to support FMS/DCS cooperative programs Global and Regional
Air Chief Conferences, CSAF Counterpart Visits
SAF/FM - Support for Securit Assistance Afairs
SAF/GC - Legal Counsel supporting International programs / agreements
SAF/IE - Energy Initiatives
SAF/LL - Coordinates messages to Congress in support of acquisition of required capabilities
SAF/PA - Strategic Comm plans in support of international programs
POLAD - Foreign policy counsel to senior staf on international programs and engagements
AF/SG - Global Health Engagements with Partner Nations
AF/A1 - AF/A1DG - AF Senior Language Authorit responsiblefor Language, region, and culture policy,
Defense Language Institute, English Language Taining (DLIELC)
AF/A2 - ISR and information sharing agreements
AF/A3O-AT - Operational Taining
AF/A3O-AY – Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Commitee
AF/A3O-Q - IW / FID / LAAR / LIMA / CRG / SFA / BP FCB, JIEDDO liaison
SAF/CIO & A6 - Network integration in support of national and international partners.
Supports SAF/IA in International AF initiatives involving Cyberspace
AF/A4/7 – Provides ACS in support of air operations. Exercises, Wargames and Seminars
AF/A5XC - CONOPS
AF/A5XS - International Exercises Seminars and Wargaming
AF/A5XX – AF Global Posture, Operator Engagement Talks, Campaign Support Plan, ASIC
AF/A8 - Support for Securit Cooperation (Ttle X) activities in the Core Function Master Plan
AF/A9 - Assessments; Lessons Learned Analytical expertise
AF/A10 - Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration
35
MAJCOMs/Components
General Component Contributions to Securit Cooperation:
Service lead to support CCDR objectives
Senior Leader Contacts
USAF Presence
Strategic Communication / Public Afairs
Foreign Militar Sales Support
International Air and Tade Shows
Education / Taining
Intelligence Sharing
Stabilit, Securit, Taining & Reconstruction Teams
State Partnership Program
Ofce of Defense Cooperation
Defense Ataché Ofce
Securit Assistance Ofce
USAFE/A5I
PACAF/A5I
AFCENT/A5
AFNORTH/A5I
AFSOUTH/A5I
AFAFRICA/A5X
AFMC/A5S
AFGSC/A5PT
AFSPC/A8I – Basing and International Afairs
AFCLC – Air Force Culture and Language Center
LeMay Doctrine Center
ACC/A5S – Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine
ACC/IA – International Afairs
ACC/IAS – Securit Cooperation
AMC/A8XA – International Afairs
AETC/IA – Taining for Partner Nations
AFRC/FGX – Securit Cooperation and Exercises
NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM Desk
CENTCOM/SOCOM Desk
EUCOM/AFRICOM Desk
PACOM/STRATCOM Desk
NGB/J53IA – State Partnership Program Ofce
NGB/A3X – Building Partnership Cell
AFSAT – Taining for Partner Nations
AFSAC – Support for the Foreign Militar Sales / Direct Commercial Sales Processes
AFSOC/A8X – Strategic Planning
Air Universit
Defense Language Institute – English Language Center
United States Air Force Academy
36
APPENDIX E
Acronyms
AA – Air Advisor
ACS – Agile Combat Support
ACSA – Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreements
AECA – Arms Export Control Act
AED – Aviation Enterprise Development
AETC – Air Education and Taining Command
AF – Air Force
AFCLC – Air Force Culture and Language Center
AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document
AFFOR – Air Force Forces
AFGPS – Air Force Global Partnership Strategy
AFMS – Air Force Medical Service
AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
AFSAC – Air Force Securit Assistance Center
AFSAT – Air Force Securit Assistance Taining
AFSPS – Air Force Strategic Planning System
ALP – Aviation Leadership Program
ANG – Air National Guard
AOR – Area of Responsibilit
APEP – Administrative and Professional
Exchange Program
ASIC – Air and Space Interoperabilit Council
BP – Building Partnerships
BPC – Building Partner Capacit
BP FCB – Building Partnerships Functional
Capabilit Board
C2 – Command and Control
CAA – Combat Aviation Advisors
CCDR – Combatant Commander
CFE – Combined Force Exercise
CFLI – Core Function Lead Integrator
CFMP – Core Function Master Plan
CIO – Chief Information Ofcer
CMSAF – Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force
CNAF – Component Numbered Air Force
CONOPS – Concept of Operations
CONUS – Continental United States
CRADA – Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements
CRG – Contingency Response Group
CSP – Campaign Support Plan
CWP – Coalition Warfare Program
DCS – Direct Commercial Sales
DENCAP – Dental Civic Action Program
DES – Domain Engagement Strategy
DIILS – Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies
DIMO – Defense Institute for Medical Operations
DIPEP – Defense Intelligence Personnel
Exchange Program
DLI-ELC – Defense Language Institute - English
Language Center
DoD – Department of Defense
DoDD – Department of Defense Directive
DoDI – Department of Defense Instruction
DoS – Department of State
DOTMLPF – Doctrine, Organization, Taining,
Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities
DPEP – Defense Personnel Exchange Program
DPPG – Defense Planning & Programming
Guidance
EDA – Excess Defense Articles
EMEDS – Expeditionar Medical Support
ESEP – Engineer and Scientist Exchange
Program
EST – Expeditionar Skills Taining
ETSS – Extended Taining Services Specialist
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration
FCT – Foreign Comparative Testing
FID – Foreign Internal Defense
FMS – Foreign Militar Sales
37
GCC – Geographic Combatant Commands
GEF – Guidance for Employment of the Force
GHE – Global Health Engagement
GOPAC – General Ofcer Pre-Deployment
Acculturation Course
GPF – General Purpose Forces
HAF – Headquarters Air Force
HA – Humanitarian Assistance
HCA – Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HN – Host Nation
IAAFA – Inter-American Air Force Academy
IAC – International Armaments Cooperation
IACF – International Afairs Career Field
IAS – International Afairs Specialist
ICR&D – International Cooperative Research and
Development
IHS – International Health Specialist
IMET – International Militar Education and
Taining
IPME – International Professional Militar
Education
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
IT – Information Technology
IW – Irregular Warfare
JCA – Joint Capabilit Area
JFHQ – Joint Force Headquarters
JIEDDO – Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization
JS – Joint Staf
JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LAAR – Light Atack Armed Reconnaissance
Aircraf
LEAP – Language Enabled Airmen Program
LFE – Large Force Exercise
LIMA – Light Mobilit Aircraf
LRC – Language, Region, and Culture
MAJCOM – Major Command
MAP – Militar Assistance Program
MEDCAP – Medical Civic Action Program
MEDRETE – Medical Readiness Taining Exercise
MHS – Militar Health System
MPEP – Militar Personnel Exchange Program
MSO – Medical Stabilit Operations
MTT – Mobile Taining Teams
NATO – North Atlantic Teat Organization
NDO – Nuclear Deterrence Operations
NDS – National Defense Strategy
NGB – National Guard Bureau
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NMS – National Militar Strategy
NSS – National Securit Strategy
OCONUS – Outside CONUS
OSD – Ofce of the Secretar of Defense
PFP – Planning Force Proposals
PME – Professional Militar Education
PNT – Positioning, Navigation, and Tming
POLAD – Foreign Policy Advisor
POM – Program Objective Memorandum
SAF – Secretar of the Air Force
SAO – Securit Assistance Ofce
SCF – Service Core Function
SFA – Securit Force Assistance
SMEE – Subject Mater Expert Exchange
SOF – Special Operations Forces
SPF – State Partnership Framework
SPP – State Partnership Program
SSA – Space Situational Awareness
SSTR – Stabilization, Securit,
Tansition, and Reconstruction
Strat Comm – Strategic Communications
TCP – Teater Campaign Plan
TSCMIS – Teater Securit Cooperation
Management Information System
US – United States
USAF – United States Air Force
USAFSAM – USAF School of Aerospace Medicine
WMD – Weapon of Mass Destruction
38
APPENDIX F
Lexicon
Air Advisor (AA). An Airman specially trained and educated to apply aviation expertise to assess,
train/educate, advise, and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation
resources to meet their national needs in support of US interests. (USAF Air Advisor Academy Charter)
Air Advisor Programs. Te AF presents two tpes of forces to conduct Advisor activities: 1) General
Purpose Force (GPF) Air Advisors and 2) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Combat Aviation Advisors (CAA).
Currently, the USAF continues to develop a GPF Air Advisor program to help build global air, space,
and cyberspace partnerships in support of combatant commanders’ SC and irregular warfare activities.
GPF Air Advisors will be prepared both to operate independently and in concert with other Services (in
permissive environments) and to augment AFSOF CAA and other SOF forces (in uncertain and hostile
environments). Te Air Advisor Academy has been chartered to provide an enduring capabilit to
educate and train GPF Airmen in this endeavor. AFSOF’s CAA unit (6th Special Operations Squadron) has
extensive knowledge, experience, ?eld-craf skills, and technical excellence in air combat, intelligence,
medical support, logistics, and operations. Te 6 SOS normally focuses on partner nations at the greatest
risk in three interrelated mission areas (foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition
support) and operate in non-permissive or high risk environments to meet GCC objectives. Te GPF Air
Advisor and the CAA programs allow Airmen to support IW, BP/Building Partnership Capacit (BPC),
and Securit Force Assistance activities across the full spectrum of operational environments.
Air and Space Interoperabilit Council (ASIC). An international standards organization between
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States to ensure these nations’ AFs are
able to ?ght side-by-side as Airmen in Joint and Combined operations.
Aviation Enterprise Development. De?nes the plans, programs, and activities undertaken to develop
the system of systems necessar for a nation to optimize employment of national aviation resources. Te
total aviation resource capacit and capabilit of a nation is de?ned by the sum total of all air domain
resources including humans, aircraf, processes and infastructure in both the civilian and militar/
securit sectors. Modern standards that function to provide efcient, safe and efective employment of
national aviation resources calls for infastructure development that considers the civilian aviation sector
and the militar/securit aviation sector of a nation as mutually supportive systems of an integrated air
domain in developing nations. (Air Advisor Working Group)
Aviation Foreign Internal Defense. DoD programs for assessing, training, advising, and assisting
host nation (HN) aviation forces in the sustained use of airpower to help their governments deal with
internal threats. (AFDD 3-22)
Building Partner Capacit. Te abilit to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with
the development of their capabilities and capacities – for mutual bene?t – to address US national or
shared global securit interests. Tis de?nition is derived fom the Ter III JCA of “building the capabilities
and capacities of partners and institutions. Also called BPC.” (Deput Under Secretar of Defense Policy
Memorandum, Joint Capabilit Areas)
Campaign Support Plans (CSP). GEF-directed plans developed by the Services and DoD Agencies
that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of global and theater campaign plans and
39
on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the campaign end-states of the GEF and Uni?ed
Combatant Commander Campaign Plans and/or DoD Component programs in support of broader Ttle
10 responsibilities. (DoDD 5132.03)
Capabilit Portfolio. A collection of grouped capabilities as de?ned by Joint Capabilit Areas (JCAs)
and the associated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities (DOTMLPF) programs, initiatives, and activities. (DoDD 7045.20, p. 8)
Civil-Militar Operations. Te activities of a commander that establish, maintain, in?uence or exploit
relations between militar forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and
authorities, and the civilian populace in a fiendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate
militar operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-militar operations may
include performance by militar forces of activities and functions normally the responsibilit of the
local, regional, or national government. Tese activities may also occur, if directed, in the absence of
other militar operations. Civil-militar operations may be performed by designated civil afairs, by other
militar forces, or by a combination of civil afairs and other forces. (JP 1-02)
Combat Aviation Advisor (CAA). CAAs have extensive knowledge, experience, ?eld-craf skills, and
technical excellence in air combat, intelligence, medical support, logistics, and operations. Te 6 SOS
normally focuses on partner nations at the greatest risk in three interrelated mission areas (foreign
internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition support) and are capable of conducting operations
in a full range of environments under austere conditions.
Combatant Command. A uni?ed or speci?ed command with a broad continuing mission under a single
commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretar of Defense and with
the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf. Combatant commands tpically
have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)
Combatant Commander (CCDR). A commander of one of the uni?ed or speci?ed combatant
commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)
Component Command. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally, a
joint force is organized with a combination of service and functional components. (JP 1-02)
Core Function Lead Integrators (CFLIs). CSAF-designated leaders who act as the principal
integrators for their assigned Service Core Functions (SCF) and the corresponding Core Function Master
Plans (CFMP). CFLIs guide SCF maturation and SCF-related investments by establishing SCF strategy and
by planning over a 20-year period.
Core Function Master Plans (CFMPs). Developed by the CFLIs designated by the CSAF, CFMPs
align strategy, operating concepts, and capabilit development by SCF, to provide 20-year constructs
for enhancing Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power across the range of militar operations.
Tese constructs include major investment plans in the form of Planning Force Proposals (PFPs). Along
with other external products, the USAF Strategic Environmental Assessment, the AF Strategic Plan, and
the Annual Planning and Programming Guidance provide the strategic context for CFMP production.
CFLIs must coordinate CFMPs with all HAF 2-leter organizations and ofces of central responsibilit
prior to submission, and will consider all signi?cant related perspectives across the AF, including the
perspectives of regional AF commands. CFLIs update CFMPs ever year.
40
Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the militar forces or elements thereof guide their actions
in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)
Domain Engagement Strategy. Classi?ed documents covering Air, Space, and Cyberspace capabilities
and programs in support of the AFGPS. Provides detailed guidance for MAJCOM planners and countr
team members to use in determining what means are available to help mitigate speci?c future trends in
any given countr.
Electronic Infastructure. A nation’s electronic backbone. Tis infastructure includes everthing
fom the power generating stations, through the national electrical distribution grid, to the individual
computers and electronic devices in homes and ofces.
Ends. Organizational objectives that if accomplished create, or contribute to, the achievement of the
desired end state at the level of strategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. (Arthur
F. Lykke Jr., ed., Militar Strategy: Teor and Application (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1998)
End State. Te set of required conditions that de?nes achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP
1-02; JP 3-0)
Engagement. Engagements directly between AFs as well as at the regional level are critically important.
Engagements between United States and partner nation senior AF leaders and airmen are essential to
expand the cooperation and interoperabilit necessar to work together in a coalition environment. Also
known as Peacetime Engagement. (AFGPS)
Environmental Monitoring. Environmental monitoring includes the characterization, analysis, and
prediction of space weather (e.g., solar conditions), terrestrial weather near important ground nodes,
and natural phenomena (e.g., interplanetar objects, such as meteoroids and asteroids) in space. Tis
environmental information must be accurate and timely to protect space systems and support space control
planning and execution. Environmental Monitoring provides data on meteorological, oceanographic,
and space environmental factors that might afect militar and civil operations.
Exercise. A militar maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and
execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a multinational, joint, or
single-Service exercise, depending on participating organizations. (JP 1-02)
Foreign Militar Sales (FMS). Tat portion of US securit assistance authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. Tis
assistance difers fom the Militar Assistance Program (MAP) and the International Militar Education
and Taining (IMET) Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and
services transferred.
Global Commons. Shared areas of sea, air, and space along with globally connected domains such as
cyberspace. (2011 NMS)
Global Health Engagement (GHE). GHE is one of the means used to partner with other nations to
achieve SC and to build partnerships and partner capacit objectives through health-related activities
and exchanges. GHE activities allow the militar health services and partner nation armed forces, or
41
foreign civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and con?dence, share information, coordinate
mutual activities, and maintain in?uence and achieve interoperabilit. GHE uses the full spectrum of
health capabilities and disciplines in Mil-Mil, Mil-Civ and multilateral activities to build partner capacit,
support SC, and achieve CCDR objectives. (DoDD 3000.07; AFPD 10-42; AFI 44-162)
Humanitarian Assistance (HA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or
manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that
might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of propert. Humanitarian
assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. Te assistance provided is designed to
supplement or complement the eforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the
primar responsibilit for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 3-57)
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). Assistance to the local populace provided by
predominantly US forces in conjunction with militar operations and exercises. Tis assistance is
speci?cally authorized by Ttle 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities.
(JP 3-29)
International Health Specialist (HIS). Cadre of AFMS professionals with cross-cultural skills,
knowledge of militar and civilian health disciplines, understanding of regional and global geopolitical
militar afairs, and familiarit with the interagency process to ensure continued success of USAF
expeditionar operations.
International Militar Education and Taining (IMET). Provides training to selected foreign
militar- and defense-associated civilian personnel on a grant basis. IMET is authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). An activit that synchronizes and integrates
the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in
direct support of current and future operations. Tis is an integrated intelligence and operations function.
See also intelligence; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance visualization; reconnaissance;
surveillance. (JP 2-01)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Information Sharing. Concentrates on
identifing speci?c intelligence or information sharing requirements and collaboration opportunities
that bene?t the United States and our partners, as appropriate. (GEF)
Interoperabilit with US Forces/Support to US Capabilities. Developing operational and
technical capabilities; doctrine; and tactics, techniques and procedures with partner nations so that the
US partner forces can operate efectively and interchangeably in designated combined operations. (GEF)
Joint Capabilit Area (JCA). Collections of similar DoD capabilities functionally grouped to support
capabilit analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capabilit portfolio management,
and capabilities-based force development and operational planning.
(DoDD 7045.20, p. 8)
Means. Te tools and resources used to execute the strategy to achieve the desired ends. Wen Airmen
think about means, they should think in terms of people, processes, platforms, systems, and capabilities
needed to accomplish the mission. (AFDD 2)
42
Medical Stabilit Operations (MSO). Te Militar Health System (MHS) must be prepared to support
stabilit operations throughout all phases of con?ict and across the range of militar operations. MSO
includes: supporting eforts to establish or restore medical support necessar to sustain the population
until local civil services are restored; assessments of the civilian medical and public health systems such
as infastructure, medical staf, training and education, medical logistics, public health programs, and
promoting and enhancing the host nation medical infastructure. (DoDI 6000.16)
Operational Capacit and Capabilit Building. Providing the necessar training and equipment
required to develop and improve operational capacit, capabilit and performance of partner militar
forces. (GEF)
Positioning, Navigation, and Tming (PNT). A system of satellites, computers, and receivers/
transmiters that provide highly accurate 3-D position, velocit, and timing information. PNT allows the
determination of the latitude and longitude of a receiver on Earth by calculating the time diference for
signals fom diferent satellites to reach the receiver. Once a location is identi?ed, the system enables
accurate navigation fom one point to another. PNT also provides a highly accurate timing signal used by
many space and terrestrially based receivers for scheduling and synchronization of multiple applications.
Securit Assistance. Tat group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and the AECA of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes, by which the United States
provides defense articles, militar training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit or
cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (AFMAN 16-101, JP 1-02)
Securit Cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense
relationships that promote speci?c US securit interests, develop allied and fiendly militar capabilities
for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency
access to a HN. (JP 3-22, JP 1-02)
Securit Force Assistance (SFA). Te Department of Defense activities that contribute to uni?ed
action by the US Government to support the development of the capacit and capabilit of foreign
securit forces and their supporting institutions. (DoDI 5000.68, JP 1-02, JP 3-22)
Service Core Functions (SCFs). SCFs are functional areas that delineate the appropriate and assigned
core duties, missions, and tasks of the AF as an organization, responsibilit for which is assigned to CFLIs,
who act as the principal integrators for their assigned SCFs and the corresponding CFMPs. SCFs express
the ways in which the AF is particularly and appropriately suited to contribute to national securit. Wile
SCFs do not necessarily express ever aspect of what the AF contributes to the nation, they are an integral
aspect of the AFSPS, and provide the famework for AF organizing, training, and equipping eforts.
Stabilit Operations. An overarching term encompassing various militar missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power
to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services,
emergency infastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stabilit operations are a core US
militar mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with pro?ciency equivalent
to combat operations. (DoDI 3000.05)
State Partnership Framework (SPF). A broad concept of faming a US State’s contributions to
international engagement activities as a sub-national actor. In addition to national and federal functions
43
and resources, it incorporates all segments of a State’s resources (citizens, local and state government,
militia, private sector, etc.) in supporting and implementing international engagement activities with
Partner Nations.
State Partnership Program (SPP). An enduring relationship between US States and designated
Partner Nations through the National Guard for the purpose of building relationships and partnership
capacit to directly support the Combatant Command and Chiefs of Mission’s countr and regional
engagement plan objectives. Te Program’s goals re?ect an evolving international afairs mission for
the National Guard using the unique civil-militar nature of the Guard to interact with both active and
reserve forces of foreign countries designed to achieve Strategic Partnership Framework objectives.
Strategic Communication. Te process of informing and appropriately in?uencing key audiences by
synchronizing and integrating communication eforts to deliver truthful, credible, accurate, and timely
information. (AFDD 3-61 IC1)
Teater Campaign Plans (TCP). Plans developed by Geographic CCDRs that focus on the command’s
steady-state activities, which include operations, SC, and other activities designed to achieve theater
strategic ends. It is incumbent upon geographic combatant commanders to ensure any supporting
campaign plans address objectives in the GEF global planning efort and their respective theater
campaign plans. Contingency plans for responding to crisis scenarios are treated as branch plans to the
campaign plan. (DoDD 5132.03)
Ways. Te methods by which objectives are achieved; that is, the efects that must be created to achieve
the desired ends. It is important to keep in mind that ways to achieve ends at one level may become ends
for levels below. (AFDD 2)
44
APPENDIX G
USAF Organizational Roles and Responsibilities
A. USAF Major Commands/USAF Components
1. Organize, train, and equip USAF units to support global partnership activities.
2. Review on-going and new international activities on a regular basis to ensure activities
continue to support CCDR objectives and USAF strategy.
3. Provide input to the USAF Global Partnership Strategy and Campaign Support Plan.
4. Coordinate international activities with SAF/IA to ensure activities are properly tracked,
recorded, analyzed, and reported.
5. Participate in strategic exercises, wargames, and simulations involving partnership
activities in support of CCDR objectives.
6. Coordinate, provide forces, and conduct partnership activities in direct support of the
CCDR objectives.
7. Develop supporting plans for regional SC strategies/plans, as required.
8. Function as Core Function Lead Integrators (CFLI) of USAF Service Core Functions. As
the BP CFLI, AETC authors the BP Core Function Master Plan (CFMP), which uses relevant USAF
and national strategic guidance, including this AFGPS, to guide planning and programming
eforts for BP across the USAF.
9. Responsible for meeting all Ttle 10 requirements for the Airmen in their AORs.
10. Work with CCDRs to develop CCDR Teater SC and similar plans, ensuring that USAF assess,
train, advise, and assist capabilities are incorporated into these plans as needed.
B. Core Function Lead Integrators (CFLIs)
1. CSAF-designated leaders who act as the principal integrators for their assigned Service Core
Functions (SCFs) and the corresponding CFMPs. CFLIs guide SCF maturation and SCF-related
investments by establishing SCF strategy and by planning over a 20-year period.
2. As the BP CFLI, the AETC/CC authors the BP CFMP, which guides USAF-wide BP planning
and programming eforts in alignment with relevant USAF and national strategic guidance.
Te AFGPS provides SC famework inputs to the overall strategy development process. Tose
inputs will inform the BP CFLI and aid in the development of the BP CFMP.
C. Air National Guard
1. Coordinates international activities with respective Air Components to ensure these activities
are properly veted, analyzed, tracked, reported and are in compliance with their respective
Teater Campaign Plans.
2. Conducts State Partnership Program activities in support of the CCDR, and in
coordination with the National Guard Bureau (NGB/J53IA), the various states’ Joint Force
Headquarters (JFHQs), and SAF/IA.
D. Headquarters Air Force (HAF)
Secretariat (SAF)
1. Deput Under Secretar of the Air Force, International Afairs (SAF/IA)
a) Serves as the lead HAF agent for building global partnerships and is the Building
Partnership Capabilit Portfolio Manager.
b) Coordinates development of the USAF Global Partnership Strategy and oversees
its execution in support of the CCDRs and in coordination with other HAF
45
organizations, MAJCOMs and USAF Components (Regular Air Force and Air
Reserve Component).
c) In conjunction with A5X, coordinates partnership activit inputs fom the HAF,
MAJCOMs, USAF Components (Regular Air Force and Air Reserve Component) for
inclusion into the USAF CSP.
d) In conjunction with A3/5, coordinates with sister Services and interagency
components in support of global partnership eforts.
e) Manages the International Afairs Specialist Program and the civilian International
Afairs Career Field.
f) Develops disclosure and technology transfer guidance and policy.
g) Provides overall USAF International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) policy,
guidance, and oversight for implementation of IAC programs and projects and
develops, negotiates, and concludes IAC agreements for the USAF.
h) Manages international training and education (including Aviation Leadership
Program).
i) Provides oversight of FMS/DCS.
j) Provides political-militar analysis to senior leaders.
k) Manages the USAF Ataché program.
l) Manages the Militar Personnel, Engineer and Scientist, and Administration
Professional Exchange Programs.
m) Provides comparative weapons analysis.
n) Coordinates USAF presence at international air and trade shows.
o) Coordinates partner AF presence at bilateral and multilateral exercises.
p) Coordinates USAF participation in regional training.
q) Manages and co-chairs the Air Senior National Representative Program.
r) Leads USAF-partner AF reviews.
s) Coordinates partner nation requirements for mobile training teams.
t) Coordinates partner nation requirements for Extended Taining Services Specialist
Teams.
u) Coordinates partner nation bed downs and training activities within CONUS.
v) Provides expertise and insight in the development of strategic international
communications plans and public afairs.
w) Develops, in coordination with DSCA and AETC, training to educate Airmen on SC.
2. Assistant Secretar of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ)
a) In coordination with SAF/IA, develops USAF capabilities to support FMS/DCS
program strategies, requirements, and Cooperative Agreements.
b) As required, develops processes to acquire and sustain capabilities and resources in
support of partner nations.
c) Identi?es acquisition opportunities for international cooperation to SAF/IA.
d) Provides programmatic subject mater expertise for cooperative international space
technology programs and for disclosure, export control, armaments cooperation,
and regional afairs activities.
e) Coordinates programmatic changes in cooperative acquisition programs to SAF/IA.
3. Assistant Secretar of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Logistics (SAF/IE)
a) Provides guidance, direction, and oversight of all maters related to energy, to
reduce USAF energy demand, increase USAF energy supply, change Air
Force energy culture, and make energy a consideration in all we do.
4. Public Afairs (SAF/PA)
a) Develops and coordinates strategic communication plans in support of international
programs.
46
b) Coordinates with CCDRs, MAJCOMs, USAF components, HAF, and other
appropriate agencies to conduct media engagement, public outreach, and visual
information programs in support of international programs.
5. Assistant Secretar of the Air Force, Financial Management and Comptroller (SAF/FM)
a) Provides guidance & direction on ?nancial maters relating to Securit Assistance.
b) Coordinates on transfers of defense articles, services, training, and economic
assistance to allied and fiendly countries.
c) Serves as USAF representative for NATO, dedicated, and cooperative program
?nancial issues.
6. General Counsel (SAF/GC)
a) Provides expert legal advice in support of international programs and agreements.
7. Legislative Liaison (SAF/LL)
a) Coordinates messages and activities with Congress in support of partner nation
acquisition of required capabilities.
8. Information Dominance and Chief Information Ofcer (SAF/CIO & A6)
a) Provides a war?ghting integration famework that will enable global partners to
understand the integration of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities to deliver the
appropriate efects.
b) Provides the capabilities integration famework so national and international
partners will understand the overlap between cyberspace and other capabilities.
c) Supports SAF/IA in international USAF initiatives involving cyberspace operations
and forces including training and force development.
Air Staf (A-Staf)
1. Assistant Vice Chief of Staf (AF/CVA)
a) Conducts Foreign Air Ataché accreditation.
b) Implements CSAF Counterpart program.
c) Facilitates and implements Global Air Chiefs’ Conference.
d) Facilitates and implements Regional Air Chiefs’ Conferences.
2. Air Force Surgeon General (AF/SG)
a) Serves as the lead HAF agent for global health engagement and health-related SC
programs.
b) Manages international competency training and education for AFMS members.
c) Provides guidance, direction, and oversight of all maters related to AFMS global
health engagement and health-related SC programs.
3. Deput Chief of Staf, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1)
a) Supports plans to organize, train, and equip USAF personnel to support theater
campaign plans. Manages the USAF Language, Region and Culture (LRC) Program.
b) Tacks USAF personnel capacit and pro?ciency in assess, train, advise, and assist
activities, including foreign language, regional expertise, and experience/expertise.
c) Develops, in coordination with AETC and SAF/IA, methods to implement
appropriate Language, Region and Culture training.
4. Deput Chief of Staf, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) (AF/A2)
a) Implements ISR and information sharing agreements.
b) Oversees, coordinates, and reviews policy under which the USAF negotiates,
concludes, maintains, and reports international ISR agreements.
c) Coordinates international ISR agreements with the Defense Intelligence Agency.
d) Supports Operator Engagement Talks regarding ISR maters.
e) Provides assistance on countr assessments.
47
5. Deput Chief of Staf, Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5)
a) Develops the GEF-directed USAF CSP, summarizing the speci?c securit
cooperation activities of the entire USAF in support of CCDR TCPs and Countr Plans.
b) Coordinates with SAF/IA, sister Services, and interagency components on
partnership activities.
c) Facilitates and conducts Operator Engagement Talks.
d) Develops and executes, in coordination with SAF/IA, partner nation participation
in exercises, wargames, and BPC seminars.
e) Develops Concepts of Operations for USAF participation in Stabilization, Securit,
Tansition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
f) Manages the International Standardization Ofce supporting the NATO
Standardization Agency and the Air and Space Interoperabilit Council.
g) Updates and is responsible for Te Air Force Irregular Warfare (IW) Strategy and
ensuring its agreement with the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy. (SAF/IA is
responsible for the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy and ensuring its
congruence with the AF IW Strategy).
h) Provides the representative to the BP Joint Functional Capabilities Board.
i) Coordinates the SAF/IA periodical review and adjustment of personnel training
processes, procedures, and methodologies to optimize existing AF capacit to train
international partners, as authorized by applicable statutes.
j) Provides the representative to the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Commitee.
6. Deput Chief of Staf, Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support (AF/A4/7)
a) Provides capabilities to support ACS.
b) Supports Operator Engagement Talks.
c) Supports USAF participation in exercises, wargames, and BPC Seminars.
d) Participates in applicable Air and Space Interoperabilit Councils, NATO
Standardization Agreements, International Professional Forums and engages in
Teater Securit Cooperation and Coalition partnering; providing strategic mission
support integration and functional subject mater expertise.
7. Deput Chief of Staf, Strategic Plans and Programs (AF/A8)
a) Ensures partnership activities receive appropriate consideration in budget and
program objective memorandum (POM) discussions.
b) Coordinates programmatic changes that are in support of partners with SAF/IA.
c) Ensures partnership activities are properly represented in USAF strategies, plans,
and programs through oversight of Core Function Master Plans (e.g., Building
Partnerships).
8. Deput Chief of Staf, Studies & Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned (AF/A9)
a) Provides assistance for assessments.
b) Compiles periodic lessons learned of partnership activities.
c) Provides analytical expertise.
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APPENDIX H
Source Document Listing
1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Februar 2010)
2. National Securit Strategy (May 2010)
3. National Defense Strategy (June 2008)
4. National Militar Strategy (Februar 2011)
5. Guidance for Employment of the Force (9 April 2011)
6. Joint Publication 5-0 – Joint Operation Planning (11 August 2011)
7. 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (October 2008)
8. USAF Strategic Planning 2010-2030 – Strategic Environmental Assessment (11 March 2011)
9. 2011 United States Air Force Posture Statement (17 Februar 2011)
10. Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command – AFDD 1 (17 November 2003)
11. Operations and Organization – AFDD 2 (3 April 2007)
12. Air Warfare – AFDD 3-1 (22 Januar 2000)
13. Cyberspace Operations – AFDD 3-12 (15 July 2010)
14. Space Operations – AFDD 3-14 (27 November 2006)
15. Combat Support – AFDD 4-0 (23 March 2005)
16. AFI 16-110 – USAF Participation in International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) Programs
(November 2003)
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