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Strategy Research Project
THE ARMY G-1: THE ARMY’S NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES PROVIDER
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAWRENCE WARK United States Army
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USAWC CLASS OF 2008
This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
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Strategy Research Project
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Army G-1: The Army’s National Human Resources Provider
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Lawrence Wark
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U.S. Army War College ,122 Forbes Ave.,Carlisle,PA,17013-5220
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
THE ARMY G-1: THE ARMY’S NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES PROVIDER
by
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Wark United States Army
Colonel Julie Manta Project Adviser
This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT AUTHOR: TITLE: FORMAT: DATE: KEY TERMS: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Wark The Army G-1: The Army’s National Human Resources Provider Strategy Research Project 13 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 7,95 PAGES: 46
Transformation, ASCC, HR Systems
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
The Army G-1 and the Human Resources Command (HRC) serve as the Army’s National Human Resources Provider (NHRP) and the key “top of the system” management, policy formulation, and process leader of the Army’s Human Resources (HR) system. Army wide-transformation efforts and persistent conflict since 9/11 made the NHRP’s roles and responsibilities critical in developing, managing and executing Army wide HR programs, systems and processes required to support Army Soldiers and commanders in a brigade-centric Army. Many successful HR system changes such as Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) and automated systems like Common Operating Picture Synchronizer (COPS) significantly enhance HR support linkages from brigade to theater to NHRP level. As the NHRP implements transformed HR structures and systems, opportunity exists to examine, assess and refine the effectiveness of the NHRP to provide HR support in the Contemporary Operating Environment. As the Army’s senior HR decision maker, the Army G-1 is ensuring Army HR elements are synchronizing their efforts to benefit Soldiers and commanders at all levels.
THE ARMY G-1: THE ARMY’S NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES PROVIDER
We have an opportunity to integrate HR support into the operational force and improve the level of personnel support we provide our Army, both in garrison and when deployed. Let’s embrace this change and meet the challenges of an Army at War and in Transformation. 1 —Lt. Gen. Michael D. Rochelle Deputy Chief of Staff/G-1 Army-wide transformation and persistent combat operations since 9/11required the Army’s Human Resources community to examine how it would provide accurate, relevant, and timely personnel support and services to Soldiers. While the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) 2 poses unique challenges for the Army’s Human Resources (HR) system, the Army’s National Human Resources Provider (NHRP) reacted by modifying HR processes and procedures, adjusting personnel support structure, and addressing cultural demands within the HR system. 3 The Army’s NHRP is the key “top of the system” 4 management, policy formulation, and process leader of the Army HR system and consists of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, the combined Army G-1staff and the Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC). In addition to defining the NHRP’s role in the transformed HR system, the conditions creating the current HR transformation, and describing the HR processes linking the NHRP to Army units, this paper recommends options to strengthen the NHRP’s role in supporting HR processes and to further enhance the Army’s HR support to Soldiers and commanders in the COE. Army Transformation efforts and the need to support forces in the COE indicate the Army will continue to experience a period of persistent change where operational lessons learned will be continually applied to and derived from the COE. The COE
significantly impacts the need for and the pace of all elements of Army transformation, which includes HR transformation. The COE has allowed the Army to redefine itself, and is “shedding inefficient processes and procedures designed for peacetime and reexamining institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies and procedures.” 5 HR transformation continues to develop within these conditions. The Army’s HR operations have changed to support transformation and to improve the delivery of HR support in the deployed theater of operations. Prior to the current transformation effort, theater HR operations involved planning and integrating HR support and the command and control of HR units. The elimination of Standard Requirement’s Code 6 (SRC) 12 HR command and control capability above companylevel, and the introduction of BDE/BCT S-1--centric Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) facilitate responsive personnel support at battalion and brigade level through an organic and professional S-1 staff with policy execution authority and direct connectivity to HRC, an element of the NHRP. NHRP Elements The mission, roles and responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 (Army G-1) and HRC within the Army’s HR system as well as the expectations and roles of the NHRP provide the focus for this research. Field Manual (FM) 1-0, Human Resources Support, describes the Army G-1 as the “senior Army HR decision maker… (who) develops policy and ensures HR support is synchronized between various personnel staff elements and field operating agencies.” 7 The Army G-1’s mission is “to develop, manage and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs, and policies for the entire Army team.” Meanwhile, the Army
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G-1’s vision emphasizes that the HR enterprise is a team of HR professionals supporting the Army in an “era of persistent conflict”; who will “ensure HR readiness of the Total Army across the full spectrum of operations.” 8 Likewise, Headquarters, Department of the Army assigns the Army G-1 the following responsibilities: • Ensure the current and future personnel readiness of the Army through the development and integration of policies and programs. • Develop policy and provide guidance for responsive, flexible and effective HR support to the Army. • Develop detailed HR programs, budgets and activities for execution of responsibilities in the HR life-cycle. • • Direct the operations of the Army’s military personnel commands. Maintain manning support of operations and contingency plans. 9
As a result, the Army G-1’s mission, roles and responsibilities establish the G-1 as the leader of the Army’s HR system. And, as the principle leader of the NHRP, the G-1 develops policies, programs, budgets and provides direction for executing Army HR support. A key part of the G-1’s roles and responsibilities also requires the NHRP to link to personnel staff sections (S-1/G-1 sections), units and commands in order to ensure the necessary delivery of HR support and services to commanders and Soldiers. Army HRC is a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Army G-1 with the mission to execute the full spectrum of HR programs, services, and systems to support the readiness and well-being of the Army personnel and organizations worldwide. 10 The HRC commander serves as the Army G-1’s functional proponent for personnel management and personnel systems and supports the G-1 in managing Army
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personnel serving on active duty. Additionally, HRC roles and responsibilities include: developing and integrating HR information systems; validating manning requirements for the active Army; assigning Soldiers based on requirements and priorities; assessing, evaluating and responding to deployment requirements; and, providing standardized and quality HR support and services to Soldiers. As such, HRC is the “executer” of the NHRP in support of the policy, programs, guidance and direction provided by the Army G-1. As a result, it is essential HRC remain closely linked to the HR professionals in personnel sections and organizations who provide HR support to Soldiers and organizations. 11 The principal organizations leading theater-level HR support within a forward deployed area of operations are the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) G-1 and the Human Resources Sustainment Center (HRSC), an SRC12 element of the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). These elements are the key components of the “top of the HR system” in the deployed AOR. Current HR doctrine in FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, identifies and separates areas of execution for these elements by core competency, and documents how they complement each other since they were designed to work together to coordinate and integrate theater HR support. 12 However, a major HR support role to be addressed in this paper is the linkage between the ASCC G-1 and the HRSC in theater to the NHRP and determining the best means of maximizing effects of their linkage. The Case for Changing Human Resources Support Prior to 11 September 2001, the Army was a Division-centric force configured as a result of the Cold War with Divisions forward-stationed overseas and CONUS-based
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(Continental United States) and dependent upon strategic lift to move massed formations to execute conventional warfare. In addition, the Army’s HR systems were labor intensive because HR organizations possessed little automation connectivity to the “top of the system”. Personnel services and support organizations such as Personnel Services Battalions (PSBs) provided services to Soldiers and commanders both deployed and at home station. Brigade and battalion personnel (S-1) sections had little to no direct access to the “top of the system” (the NHRP) and a brigade or battalion S-1 primarily served as a unit Adjutant 13 rather than as an HR professional. The NHRP disseminated policy guidance through a series of regulations and Department of the Army pamphlets, which often became outdated before the next printing. At this time, the NHRP executed such critical HR functions as manning and personnel readiness management through Army personnel organizations, Army Corps and Division G-1s, and installation military HR offices. Several conditions and developments in capability and doctrine make the case for a strong NHRP role in the Army’s HR system. As such, the description of six conditions will demonstrate the requirement for a strong NHRP to support a deployed Army: • • Transformation of the Army to a modular, brigade/BCT-centric design. Removal of Personnel Services Battalions (PSBs), Personnel Groups, and Personnel Commands (PERSCOMs) from the Army’s structure. • Predominance of outdated, redundant, noncompatible, unlinked and stovepiped HR systems. • • Development of the Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) initiative. Personnel readiness stress on the force in support of GWOT.
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Transformation to a Modular, Brigade-centric Army The Army’s transformation to a brigade-centric organizational structure required the HR community to transform to provide more flexible and deployable structures with sufficient internal capabilities to support assigned and attached Soldiers. FM 1 describes the transformation as follows: The Army is restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-based force – the modular force…The major combat and support capabilities a brigade needs for most operations are organic to its structure. This modular organization simplifies providing force packages to meet operational requirements. 14 The HR community’s response to modular transformation became known as Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) which included the development of internal HR capability sufficient to provide support for the brigade and its attachments, as well as organizational changes to supporting Army HR organizations and added additional automation capability. Brigades could no longer depend on separate, external HR organizations for most of their normal HR requirements. Additionally, the plug-andplay nature of the modular force requires the brigade HR element to interface with higher echelon HR providers. Because combat brigades must be prepared to deploy and fight under the command and control of any operational headquarters, they must have an element of independence in their organizational structure. “Our modular conversion of active and reserve components is designed to create brigade-based modules able to “plug into” joint and coalition task forces in expeditionary and campaign settings.” 15 Therefore, brigade modules must be self sustaining and able to link to Army support capabilities especially when there is no other intermediate modular headquarters deployed.
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Personnel Command and Control Structures and HR Restructuring The Army was working on eliminating of personnel support organizations and their command and control structures prior to the decision to transform the Army to a modular design. The decision to remove the personnel organizations providing most of the personnel (now called HR) support in the deployed environment created significant challenges for the HR system. Previously, personnel units (PSBs) operated the HR system supporting divisions and corps troops and reported to a personnel commander (PERSCOM) executing HR operations at the theater/Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) level, which linked directly to the NHRP for execution and guidance. The HR system required personnel organizations to operate personnel automation systems and input manual transactions. Eliminating these organizations created a void in the HR system and the need to seek new delivery methods for HR support from unit to the NHRP level. Need for HR Systems to Support Transformation The Army currently uses hundreds of distinct, stove-piped automated HR systems. The Army designed most of these systems over time; especially the older systems, to respond to a single need and accomplish one or several limited personnel support tasks. As a result, most HR systems are labor intensive and expensive to maintain, update, and improve because they are not integrated to a common data base, and use dated computer programs. Many of these systems serve redundant purposes, do not effectively update or manage Soldiers permanent records, and are stove-piped within each Army component; Active, Reserve, and National Guard. 16
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Dated and labor intensive HR systems are not only inefficient, but make it difficult to manage the HR system at each level, especially at the “top of the system” NHRP level. The myriad of systems requires users to input data in multiple systems to provide the required information for different HR processes. As a result, HR specialists involved in extreme operational tempo and wartime conditions have difficulty submitting timely HR data, resulting in inaccuracies in the HR system overall. Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) The Army G-1 developed the PSDR concept during the fall of 2004 in response to the Army’s modular unit transformation and to provide HR support to the modular, brigade-centric Army. The PSDR concept emphasized the need to embed HR capabilities and responsibilities within the Army’s modular units rather than maintaining area support personnel services organizations. 17 An intent of the PSDR concept was to flatten the Army’s HR system, by empowering S-1 sections at brigade and battalion level to provide most of the required HR support for unit Soldiers, and linking S-1 sections to the top of the system. The initial PSDR White Paper highlighted this intent as follows: The PSDR vision is a streamlined personnel system provided through trained HR professionals, empowered with discrete operating capabilities connecting the warfighter, power projection base, and HRC. PSDR enables the decentralized delivery of personnel services as close as possible to Soldiers and commanders…while retaining central management at HRC through clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. 18 What this means for the Army’s NHRP is that core HR functions or competencies previously performed by personnel organizations such as processing Soldiers’ promotion recommendations and performance evaluations would now be performed
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directly by a Soldier’s unit, thereby improving HR system responsiveness to Soldiers and their commanders. Figure 1 depicts the migration of HR core competencies.
Figure 1. Core Competency Migration under PSDR 19 In addition the PSDR concept attempts to increase responsiveness and HR system efficiency. PSDR established a direct pipeline to the brigade from HRC for the manning of the brigade and the delivery of personnel services. 20 Personnel Stress on the Force in Support of GWOT The personnel stress on the Army since 9-11 poses many challenges for the Army’s HR system. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) 21 which redeploys brigades with a year or less in CONUS between deployments requires detailed coordination at the NHRP level to ensure combat formations deploy with sufficient Soldiers to execute wartime missions. In addition, the national decision to maintain an All Volunteer Army during a time of war has meant the Army must increase recruiting 9
and retention actions and may be temporarily short of certain specialties and grades. As a result, this impacts the recruiting and accessions systems to provide sufficient entrylevel Soldiers to fill units. At the same time, the Army requires more Soldiers to fill expanded modular unit structures and support the losses of GWOT. The conditions described, especially the Army’s new modular structure, have created what is known as a persistent negative operating strength deviation in the active force. 22 (See Figure 2) This means even with STOP LOSS initiatives, which preclude Soldiers from leaving when their enlistment is complete, the Army falls short of required Soldiers (faces) to fill authorized positions (spaces) to support its mission. Even the Grow the Army (GTA) initiative, which recognizes a permanent need for more ground forces, adds to the stress of the HR system as the Army increases demand for Soldiers during competitive recruiting conditions. The continued management of personnel shortages in a resource-constrained environment suggests a greater need for centralized management at the top of the HR system. As a result, the NHRP’s active participation in achieving brigade readiness is essential as they deploy for GWOT operations.
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Figure 2. Manning Stress on the Force: Negative strength Deviation to FY09 23 The previous subjects described existing conditions and initiatives which established favorable conditions for the emergence of a strong NHRP linked throughout the HR system supporting the deployed operational Army. The next section will address initiatives and actions demonstrating the NHRP’s ongoing emergence within the HR system. The Progress of Change - Strengthening the NHRP Links The Army G-1 calls the current period of HR transformation the “most significant change in our business we have seen in our careers” 24 . Significant advances have occurred in the means of delivering HR support to the Army’s deployed operational forces and progress in implementing HR transformation continues.
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HR Transformation is a multi-component approach to the Army’s personnel services approach and information technology design objectives... HR Transformation is focused on the strategic objectives of (1) reshaping HR processes, (2) using technology to apply a relevant, reliable, and achievable multi-component HR system, (3) realigning Army HR structures, and (4) delivering and executing HR service functions as close to the Soldier as possible (to include Soldier self service) in support of a transformed, brigade-centric tactical Army. 25 HR transformation clarifies and expands the role of the NHRP in the integration and delivery of efficient, effective HR support. More specifically, these changes impacted the personnel sections (S-1) in battalions and brigades, and the SRC 12 HR structures which deliver selected postal, R5 26 and casualty support in the deployed Area of responsibility (AOR). As automated HR systems streamline HR processes, the NHRP’s role is strengthened and the need for redundant HR organizations is reduced. 27 Ongoing improvements in the delivery of HR support will empower the HR system by providing direct support to Soldiers and commanders. Such improvements will link operational units to the NHRP at the top of the HR system, and include the following seven HR initiatives: • • • • • • • Centrally-controlled PSDR conversion. Supporting policy changes. Development of integrated HR automated systems. Brigade-centric Personnel Readiness Management (PRM). Army HRC reorganization. HR training orientation in S-1-centric operations. Widely-disseminated Army Manning Guidance. 28
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Centrally-controlled PSDR Conversion The NHRP’s leadership was critical in the rapid, integrated implementation of PSDR and exceeded Army leaders’ expectations for implementing of a major systemic change of HR support. 29 Central control of the process by elements of the NHRP guided and integrated the process across both the ARSTAFF (Army Staff) and subordinate Army Commands (ACOM), enabling the entire active Army to fully convert in slightly more than two years. The Army’s VCSA was so convinced of the value and importance of the PSDR concept to the success of Army transformation and deploying units, he sent the following direction to the Army Staff: As the Army reorganizes to create modular, brigade-based forces, we must ensure that we adequately resource unit HR structures and those charged with supporting theater-level operations. Transformation of the HR community under PSDR meets this requirement…this is an unprogrammed initiative that requires out of cycle funding through FY07. I expect your full support to…ensure fielding commences in FY06 per the G-3’s approved schedule. 30 Planning and coordination by the NHRP for the PSDR implementation was made possible only through detailed and deliberate planning which integrated Army Campaign Plan (ACP) requirements, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) deployment requirements, and the movement of brigades directed by the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Study (IGPBS). Within six months of converting to PSDR, the majority of brigades deployed and successfully provided HR support to their Soldiers and commanders under wartime conditions. Feedback from operational commanders whose brigades have converted to PSDR has been very favorable. 31 By fielding trained and resourced S-1 sections in all battalions and brigades, the Army HR system becomes flatter by linking units to the NHRP directly and enabling the NHRP to support brigade-based HR operations every day. Flattened HR processes are 13
demonstrated in the performance of Essential Personnel Services (EPS), one of the principle HR core competencies described in HR doctrine. EPS under PSDR links actions from the final recommender or approver in the Soldier’s organization to the NHRP, normally HRC. PSDR removes the middle layers of control and action previously executed by personnel service units. Figure 3 demonstrates these linkages for the active component, and while reserve component processes are somewhat different, the resulting PSDR flattening is no less significant.
Figure 3. The flattened EPS Path Created under PSDR – NHRP linkage Supporting Policy Changes Often significant transformational efforts encounter bureaucratic policies and procedures which can slow the pace of change. Certainly, the HR system has a plethora of policies and has been accused, on occasion, of bureaucratic tendencies which result from the large number of guiding regulations and processes which are very
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difficult to keep updated and current. Additionally, many processes and regulatory guidance were established over time to improve control of the HR system due to the impact that personnel information has on Soldier’s careers and lives. Therefore, it was critical during this period to identify policies hindering transformation and modify them quickly to support the transformed delivery of HR support. The NHRP led the effort to modify and adjust policy during this process. While policy modification work remains, the NHRP has committed to actively updating HR processes to better support transformation. Three key examples include the distribution of DEERS-Rapid Common Access Card (CAC) machines 32 , granting accesses to HR systems by brigade and battalion S-1 sections and developing an interactive and responsive Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG). 33 For example, the NHRP demonstrated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) a need for DEERS-Rapid equipment at the brigade-level so S-1 sections could produce CAC for Soldiers. Initially, OSD was reluctant to allow S-1 sections to access the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) due to security concerns about sensitive personnel data. However, the NHRP’s coordination and reassurances enabled S-1 sections to obtain this important HR capability. The NHRP was also instrumental in pushing HR system access to brigade S-1 sections in order to perform the tasks required by HR transformation and PSDR. Decentralized access to some of the older HR stove-piped systems can pose risks to the system infrastructure, but the NHRP recognized the importance of S-1 access and funded the effort. Several policies required republication to allow decentralized access.
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Additionally, the NHRP streamlined the procedures for reviewing and granting system accesses, improving the linkage from top to bottom of the HR system. The Army G-1’s Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG) is the best example of proactive policy interaction between the NHRP and Army units. The PPG focuses on HR policies relating to support of contingency operations conducted as part of GWOT, and expanded to cover other associated HR policies. While the PPG has a heavy reserve component influence because it prescribes HR actions necessary for mobilizing personnel, it also includes many active component deployment procedures. As a web-based interactive document on the Army G-1 website, the PPG incorporates personnel policy changes submitted by the ARSTAFF, ACOMs, Office of the Chief Army Reserve and the National Guard Bureau. As a result, deployed units can see current policy modifications, clarifications and tactics, techniques, and procedures emerging from recent policy changes. The Army G-1’s latest initiative is a deliberate HR bottom-up review of the PPG, so deployed units and headquarters can provide feedback. Because the PPG contains current policy changes and required HR processes, the PPG is more current than corresponding regulations. 34 This Army G-1 effort represents the most active policy linkage between the NHRP and the deployed force. Development of Integrated HR Automated Systems The Army’s development and use of integrated, web-based automated HR systems increases the relevance and linkages of the NHRP and the lowest level HR provider – the battalion S-1 section. For example, such recently fielded systems as Common Operating Picture Synchronizer (COPS) 35 and Personnel Assets Visibility
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Report (PAVR) 36 interface with the “corporate” database and use current top of the system HR data to reflect personnel readiness and Soldier status so HR professionals and commanders at various levels receive the same readiness and Soldier status information. As a result, COPS not only links the NHRP to S-1 sections but links other strength managers performing PRM both deployed and at home station. The importance of COPS is seen when HR professionals update the TAPDB, and all command levels see the same PRM data. This capability also enables the unit S-1 sections to see timely justification for management decisions made by the NHRP, thus creating a level of synergy not previously experienced. Figure 4 graphically shows COPS.
Figure 4. Common Operating Picture Synchronizer (COPS) 37
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The Personnel Assets Visibility Report (PAVR) module of eMILPO is another HR system which assists the PRM function and strengthens the linkage of the NHRP to units and commanders. 38 Similarly, system enablers such as Forms Content Manager (FCM) 39 , and Defense Casualty Information System – Casualty Reporting (DCIPS-CR) streamline processes within the HR system because they are web-based systems which are integrated at the NHRP level and directly link the NHRP to Army units. While the systems described have improved the NHRP capability in managing HR support, none will enable the NHRP more than the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) 40 when fielded in October 2008. DIMHRS subsumes redundant systems and creates one HR data base for the three Army components, enabling deployed S-1 sections to support attached and mobilized Soldiers, no matter their component. Additionally, the assignment of “super users” to the brigade S-1 section allows the brigade to manage roles and permissions and provide HR support to task organized subunits to receive HR support from the brigade S-1 section which is not currently possible. DIMHRS represents a significant change for the HR system, marked by increased capability at the lower levels of the system and greater visibility at the top of the system by increasing the efficacy of the NHRP. DIMHRS is so critical to the Army, it is a requirement in the Army Campaign Plan, where the G-1 is tasked to: “Implement enterprise network-centric HR system and revise supporting policies to deliver responsive personnel and pay service support.” 41 Figure 5 provides more DIMHRS information.
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Figure 5. DIMHRS capabilities. 42 Brigade Personnel Readiness Management (PRM) Brigade PRM is another example of HR transformation linking the NHRP to the lowest level HR elements - brigade S-1 sections. Brigade PRM is a departure from historical personnel readiness paradigm and represents a bold move to directly support the modular brigade-centric Army. Brigade PRM manages strength distribution direct from HRC. HRC mans each brigade and brigade equivalent, which is made possible by the PSDR-enhanced capabilities of the S-1 section, and increased access to HR automated systems, such as COPS. Brigade S-1s coordinate directly with HRC to man the brigade. G-1s serving at echelons-above-brigade monitor the brigade PRM process through COPS, EDAS, TOPMIS and the PAVR/DRRS-A and make distribution recommendations or personnel fill exceptions as required to satisfy echelon-above-
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brigade commander readiness guidance. This process is executed both at home station and while deployed. Additionally, the replacement system for active component brigades and BCTs is executed directly from HRC to the unit, using a dynamic and predictive model developed by HRC to predict deployed losses and assign corresponding replacements to the brigade. As a result, Brigade PRM is the most effective way to account for and manage Soldiers during this high OPTEMPO period. Brigade PRM prohibits mid-level HR managers from redirecting Soldiers intended to fill vacancies in brigades. Brigade PRM gives the NHRP the best visibility and the most capable means of impacting the manning of deploying brigades while managing scarce resources. Figure 6 provides additional information on brigade PRM.
Figure 6. The Brigade PRM Process. 43
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Reorganization of Human Resources Command (HRC) The reorganization of HRC to improve support to the operational Army and integrate HR support to the active Army and the Army Reserve is a major impact by the NHRP on the HR system. The integration of HRC-Alexandria, VA and HRC-St Louis, MO to one location at Ft Knox, KY will create efficiencies that will be felt by the deployed, operational forces. Part of HRC’s reorganization establishes a single point-ofentry in the G-3 section which will ease the burden on brigade S-1s and Division G-1s who are supporting multi-component forces in the AOR, such that any S-1 or G-1 request for information or assistance will be directed to one office for action. Additionally, the integration of readiness functions in both the enlisted and officer personnel management divisions will streamline the manning process and provide better joint visibility between the top of the system and the strength managers in brigades. Ultimately, the possible integration of both the officer and enlisted personnel management divisions would further streamline HR support and focus PRM efforts on the linkage between HRC and the brigade. Reorientation of HR Institutional Training Institutional HR training has changed over the last two years to better support HR transformation and to focus on S-1 operations. Recognizing the shift of focus under PSDR, the AG School has adapted training to focus on preparing Soldiers, NCOs and officers for service in battalion and brigade S-1 sections. 44 The refocusing of institutional HR training is critical to the success of brigadecentric HR operations and is one of the underpinnings of HR transformation. AG officers, to include warrant officers and FA 43 officers fill critical HR positions in battalion
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and brigade organizations, and must be trained to serve as the HR professional for that unit. It is that training which makes the change in the coding of the S-1 positions a benefit to the force. 45 A 2d order effect for NHRP influence is the placement of a trained HR professional at the tip of the spear, enabling more effective communication between units through the battalion S-1 section and the NHRP and better execution of decentralized HR operations in support of operational forces. Widely Disseminated Army Manning Guidance The DMPM publishes Army Manning Guidance annually which provides the active component “clear and definitive guidance on priority of Army manning, while operating in an environment of significant personnel shortages and changing requirements.” 46 The dissemination of the manning guidance enables commanders to clearly understand the manning process in support of the COE, the challenges associated with managing shortages, and the priority of fill. This is critically important for decentralized manning operations as directed by HR transformation in support of the brigade-centric modular Army. Similarly, the Army Manning Guidance allows brigade S-1s to predict readiness levels in relation to impending deployment and reassures commanders used to an Army where units were fully manned most of the time – universal personnel readiness. The FY07 guidance focuses on the linkage of manning to support the ARFORGEN deployment cycle and demonstrates the control of scarce personnel resources at the “top of the system”. 47 In addition, the Army Manning Guidance provides an excellent example of a strong NHRP influence on unit level operations and its linkage to HR professionals. And
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because the Army Manning Guidance enables brigade S-1s to understand the manning cycle and plan accordingly to support commanders, it also provides expectation management and enables the entire active Army HR manning system to remain in synch. The preceding examples indicate that the NHRP and the HR system have made progress integrating the delivery of HR support for the modular, brigade-centric Army. The NHRP has led initiatives which are improving the delivery of HR support. Work remains to strengthen the system overall and the NHRP will continue to have a significant leadership role within the system. The next section of this paper will address several HR areas that can still be addressed and improved to better support the Army, especially during deployed operations. Continuing the Momentum: Expanding the Impact of the NHRP The dedicated hard work of HR professionals and leaders has created a momentum of change that is improving the HR support delivered to the modular Army. Operational commanders repeatedly praise the PSDR initiative for placing enhanced capabilities within battalion and brigade structures and improving the HR system’s support to units. PSDR training and fielding continues in the three components and the first group of transformed SRC 12 HR organizations are currently deployed and providing postal, R5 and casualty support in the COE. Lessons learned are flowing into the NHRP, Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the Soldier Support Institute (SSI) and the AG School which will offer opportunities to improve the structure, capabilities, and roles of these SRC 12 organizations.
23
However, despite current successes, the role of the NHRP in facilitating HR support at the theater-level is one of the areas under review. The remainder of the paper addresses several issues identified in the COE and proposes several ways and means the NHRP can continue to lead the HR system and deliver integrated, responsive HR support to deployed forces. The areas of focus include the following: • • Establishing better linkages to deployed theater-level G-1s. Reviewing SRC 12 structure, capabilities and linkages within the sustainment system. • • • • Improving NHRP and other HR leader communications. Establishing single point of entry in the NHRP. Continuing emphasis on HR institutional training. Maintaining a strategic concept development and integration capability in the NHRP. • Determining the best NHRP forward presence in the AOR. 48
Establishing Better Linkages to Deployed Theater-level G-1s The ability of the NHRP to effect and improve the delivery of HR support in the deployed AOR starts with the establishment and maintenance of strong linkages with deployed theater-level G-1s. The NHRP needs to leverage these linkages to ensure deployed G-1s are resourced to manage HR requirements and to execute HR core competencies. The COE poses unique challenges for the NHRP to build strong linkages, especially at the theater/AOR level. Currently several headquarters can act as either the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) or an Army Force command (ARFOR).
24
The command and control structure in the COE establishes ARCENT, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and the Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan (currently CJTF-82) as competing ASCC and ARFOR headquarters which can sometimes work divergent actions and priorities within one Combatant Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). The NHRP’s awareness of this command and control challenge will ensure actions received from the AOR are coordinated with the affected headquarters. Additionally, the ASCC can adopt an active coordinating role to further empower the HR system in the AOR and facilitate better-coordinated support throughout the CENTCOM AOR. 49 ASCC and ARFOR G-1s must deploy and execute their mission with personnel shortages due to structural flaws in allocations and staffing decisions. Currently, over 40 personnel augment the ARCENT (FWD) G-1 section beyond the thirteen allocated to the Operational Command Post of the ASCC. The individual augmentation and troop diversion required to fill the augmentation requirements hinders the delivery of other HR support. The NHRP could assist the augmentation challenges of ASCC and ARFOR headquarters by building TDA-based, deployable cells into the NHRP structure which are prepared to deploy and augment ASCC and ARFOR staffs for operational support. The members of these cells reside in the NHRP structure and conduct day-to-day support in CONUS until needed to deploy. This capability would allow the augmentation of various G-1 staffs forward without removing capability from other operational HR elements. These cells could be a mix of military, DA civilian and contractor personnel, just as they are in Army Material Command augmentation elements called forward to assist the execution of logistics tasks. The augmentation cells would serve two
25
purposes: improving the capability of the deployed G-1 staff sections while at the same time improving the linkage back to the NHRP where the augmentation cells normally operate. The NHRP could improve the linkage with supported theater-level G-1 staffs by placing NHRP LNOs at key locations in the AOR with G-1 staffs, to include ARCENT, MNC-I and the Afghanistan CJTF. These LNOs would assist in the coordination of HR support and would serve to inform the G-1 sections of impending NHRP actions and vice versa. The Army G-3 maintains a similar LNO with the ARCENT (FWD) staff at Camp Arifjan, which improves communication between the Army G-3 and CFLCC/ARCENT. Review SRC 12 Structure, Capabilities, and Linkages Lessons learned and individual observations about the first deployment of the transformed SRC 12 HR structures have identified points for consideration about the structure, capabilities and linkages of the deployed SRC 12 elements in the AOR. The NHRP benefits from and leverages these elements based on linkages from the NHRP to these units, especially the Human Resources Sustainment Center (HRSC). The HRSC is a key technical link between the theater-level sustainment elements, sustainment headquarters, ASCC headquarters and the NHRP. 50 The ability of the HRSC, as currently structured, to support the ASCC G-1, TSC, various ARFOR headquarters and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (ESC) in the deployed AOR should be reviewed, and as required, the structure could be adapted. The NHRP should support the SSI and AG School as required to consider the following SRC 12 issues and support resulting Force Design Update (FDU) actions:
26
•
The issue of “micro-modularity of HR platoons, teams, and cells which make them too small to mange in the deployment and TRO cycles.
•
The potential need to establish an HR battalion-level command and control structure to execute the Theater Gateway (TG) R5 Center mission.
•
The potential need to establish an HR battalion-level command and control structure to execute the overall Theater Opening (TO) HR task set which includes the TG R5 Center and Military Mail Terminal (MMT) missions.
•
The potential need to establish limited area HR support capability to provide S1-like EPS support for “orphans” on the battlefield who do not have a battalion or brigade S-1 section available. This capability could be built into HR Company structure in the form of HR platoons as presented in FDU 05-01. 51
•
The integration of TTPs developed for the HR Operations Cells of the Sustainment Brigade SPO in institutional training and follow-on doctrine by the 8th HRSC and MNC-I.
The NHRP should take the lead in ensuring HR Operations Cells of Sustainment Brigades and ESCs are filled as a priority and that these key cells remain viable and resourced sufficiently to accomplish their mission. Improving NHRP Communications The ability of the NHRP to effectively communicate with HR providers in the deployed theater is critical to maximizing the HR system’s effectiveness. Regular, interactive communication between the NHRP and deployed S-1s, G-1s and SRC 12 unit leaders enhances the ability of deployed HR elements to proactively support Soldiers and commanders and allows the NHRP to ensure theater needs are
27
anticipated and coordinated prior to execution. The communication between the theater and the NHRP is especially important following the flattening of the HR system, where brigade S-1s must interact regularly with the NHRP in order to maintain the personnel readiness of their brigades. The NHRP could adopt several practices to improve communications with the deployed theater. Regularly scheduled Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTC) between the leaders of the NHRP and HR leaders in the theater to foster two-way communication, inform both ends of the HR system of pending issues in a timely manner, and foster more coordinated integration of pending actions and issues. For example, the Army Material Command (AMC) Commander, General Griffin, conducts weekly VTCs with forward deployed AMC elements and leaders which links the commander with the needs of the supported warfighters. GEN Griffin believes that “(he) must be linked and understand what the warfighter needs to maximize support.” 52 The NHRP could establish a mentor relationship between leaders in the NHRP and HR leaders forward. For example, the Army G-1 and Commander, HRC could mentor the ASCC G-1, MNC-I C-1, and CJTF-82 C-1 while the TAG mentors the Director, HRSC. The mentoring relationship could establish two-way communication and better link the top of the HR system in CONUS with the top of the system in theater. HR leaders in the deployed theater could also establish a formal means of communicating internally on a regular basis. The ARCENT G-1, ARCENT (FWD) G-1, MNC-I C-1, CJTF-82 C-1, 8th HRSC Director, and G-1s could conduct a weekly SVTC to ensure AOR-wide HR operations are coordinated and lessons learned are shared internally prior to the SVTC with the NHRP. This process would allow for faster
28
resolution of HR policy and issues by ensuring that senior HR leaders throughout the system are informed of “the hot” issues. Establish a Single Point- of-Entry at the NHRP The establishment of a single point-of-entry into the NHRP would ease the ability of deployed HR elements to benefit from the capabilities of the NHRP. Brigade-centric HR support exacerbates the need for this capability, as more HR leaders who are less familiar with the composition and capabilities of the NHRP become more dependent on it for support. The single point-of-entry could consist of an element in existing Army G-1 and HRC structure or a new element. The single point-of-entry would serve as the conduit for deployed HR providers to request information or support for a particular action or trend from the NHRP. A single point-of-entry, with sufficient senior leader emphasis, would speed action by the various NHRP elements on time sensitive issues for deployed Soldiers and commanders. Linking the forward LNOs of the NHRP discussed earlier to the single point-of-entry would multiply the impact of both initiatives. Continued Emphasis on HR Institutional Training NHRP support for ongoing initiatives of the AG School for improving the institutional training of HR providers and other participants in the HR system will continue to improve the overall HR system. The AG School’s continued emphasis on S-1 and G-1-centric HR support for the modular Army will strengthen the abilities of company grade officers, junior warrant officers and mid-level NCOs who must operate and implement PSDR. The continued involvement of the HRC Commander, TAG, Director, DMPM and their CSMs via VTCs with various courses at the AG School has a
29
profound impact on the HR students and reinforces the link between the HR provider to the S-1 sections and SRC 12 units. In addition, below are several institutional training initiatives to emphasize: • Focus on integration of the SSI and AG School on planned DIMHRS training to ensure effective training at the institutional training base, to include the establishment of a robust DIMHRS training facility. • Focus on expanding HR capabilities training to Sustainment leaders who will command and lead HR SRC 12 elements which make up HR companies and serve in Sustainment Brigades. • Coordinated consideration of the institutional training impact of any new HR system, policy, or program and coordination between the NHRP developing these changes and the school. Strategic Thinking Capability in the NHRP PSDR was rapidly developed, piloted, documented and approved due to the capacity of a small core of individuals in the NHRP and the AG School to think strategically and to develop future solutions for potential challenges. Today, the challenges of manning the Army in an environment of constrained resources, providing HR support in the AOR, while fielding DIMHRS and growing the Army creates an incredible day-to-day strain on both the NHRP and HR elements on the operational Army. However, there is still an urgent need for a “strategic thinking” capability in the NHRP. It is feasible for an element in G-1 and HRC to be charged with thinking about future HR system challenges and proactively develop means to effectively address
30
those challenges. This capability must be “close” to the senior leadership and have the ability to coordinate across the breadth of the NHRP. Additionally, the close working relationships forged during development of the PSDR initiative between G-1, HRC, Installation Management Command (IMCOM) HR, SSI and the AG School, and FORSCOM must continue to remain strong and active. The ability of the NHRP to rapidly bring HR elements together to examine an issue across the DOTMLPF construct creates the ability to rapidly, thoroughly and proactively coordinate and field solutions to HR challenges. The importance of these relationships can not be overemphasized. NHRP Forward Presence The majority of this paper discusses the role of the NHRP in supporting deployed operations, the conditions currently influencing that support and some potential opportunities to strengthen that role. One potential opportunity is to create a forward deployed element from the NHRP and identify its composition, role and reporting relationship. The discussion about a forward presence in the AOR centers on the HRSC addressed earlier. It is important to remember that this is the first deployment of the transformed SRC 12 organizations as currently structured. In addition, this is the first deployment of the transformed modular sustainment command and control headquarters, the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) and the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and the first execution of the Modular Force Logistics Concept (MFLC) developed by CASCOM, which includes the employment of SRC 12 HR organizations as elements of the TSC and Sustainment Brigades. Additionally,
31
several conditions in the AOR are hindering analysis about the effectiveness for both the MFLC and the transformed SRC 12 elements. First, both the MFLC and much of the doctrine found in FMI 1-0.02, Theater-level HR Support, depend on the establishment of a Single Logistics Command and Control (SLC2) element, the TSC. This has not occurred in the AOR and is impacting several of the underlying constructs associated with this initial SRC 12 deployment. As discussed earlier, the NHRP is closely linked to deployed elements for Personnel Readiness Management (PRM) through PSDR initiatives as well as brigade PRM. COPS and PAVR/DRSS-A provide coordinating information used by the NHRP to man deployed forces and to maintain the personnel readiness of deployed forces. The NHRP is linked virtually to the deployed theater through these systems for PRM. As a result, the benefit of actual NHRP’s forward presence is through the execution of HR services and personnel support core competencies of postal operations, R5 operations and casualty operations: the core missions executed by the deployed SRC 12 HR elements under the command and control of HR companies, Sustainment Brigades and ultimately, ESCs and the TSC. Three courses of action for establishing a NHRP forward presence in the deployed AOR are offered: COA 1: Retaining the status quo until further data is available once the conditions predicated for MFLC (SLC2) are realized. This COA strengthens the communication/virtual linkage of the NHRP to the ASCC G-1 and the HRSC Director but does not change the C2 relationship of HR elements on the ground. COA 2: Making the HRSC an element of HRC and serving as the forward element of the NHRP to coordinate postal, R5 and casualty operations for the NHRP as an
32
interface with the TSC and the ASCC G-1. HR companies remain under the C2 of Sustainment Brigades. COA 3: Creating an HR brigade structure with the HRSC forming the core of the brigade headquarters with commensurate HR sustainment battalions to perform the postal, R5 and casualty missions in the various AORs. The HR brigade could be a subordinate element of HRC and therefore represent a forward deployed element of the NHRP. All SRC 12 HR structures would be under the C2 of the HR brigade which would parallel the relationship of the Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) and Army Sustainment Command, a subordinate headquarters of Army Material Command (AMC). Since the NHRP can increase its role without additional structure and an actual forward presence, at this time the most feasible COA is to maintain the status quo because there is no compelling evidence to indicate that the structural modifications required to make COA 2 or 3 feasible would dramatically improve postal, R5 or casualty operations in the theater. 53 Conclusion This paper presents the conditions which have given rise to a more robust NHRP influence on the HR system, an influence which has made the system more effective in providing support to Soldiers and commanders both at home station and deployed. The HR system has responded well to the requirement to change in order to support the transforming, modular, brigade-centric Army. The NHRP has been deeply involved in leading the transformation of the HR system and has developed several holistic and cultural changes which are better
33
serving the Army, its Soldiers and commanders. The notion of building the NHRP is passé – the NHRP exists in force and is influencing and supporting deployed HR operations currently. While there is the potential to continue to develop and expand the role of the NHRP, the fundamental leadership of the HR system exists and is critical to day-to-day HR operations. At the conclusion of the initial concept brief for this project held at Ft Jackson, South Carolina on 3 May 2007, the leader of the NHRP, LTG Michael Rochelle, DCS, G-1 made the following observation: “We must not lose sight of the most important element of this entire effort – the brigade S-1. The focus of our efforts must develop and strengthen the abilities of these HR leaders.”
Endnotes
In a memorandum to the HR community, the G-1 seeks support for PSDR and HR transformation from the community. PSDR is an important element of the thriving linkage of the National HR Provider to operational elements of the Army, and is a critical linkage to continued HR success. LTG Michael D. Rochelle, Deputy Chief of Staff Army, G-1, “Personnel Services Delivery Redesign,” memorandum for the Army HR Community, Washington, D.C., 29 November 2006. FM 1 describes the COE as follows: “The strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements demand that today’s Army forces conduct operations of a type, tempo and duration that differ significantly from those of the past.” U.S. Department of the Army, The Army, Field Manual 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2005), 4-1. For this paper, the HR system is the entire HR enterprise which consists of HR professionals, providers, S-1 and G-1 staff sections and SRC12 HR organizations which produce policy, guidance, programs, doctrine, structure and procedures for the execution of the HR core competencies (as described in FM 1-0) and those elements which execute the core competencies. The system includes the enabling automation systems and supporting data backbone which allow the rapid processing of personnel data. The HR system applies across all components of the Army, but is executed in slightly different patterns and with different enablers in each component. The HR system crosses the entire DOTMLPF construct. U.S. Department of the Army, Human Resources Support, Field Manual 1-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 21 February 2007), 1-2 - 1-5. The term “top of the system” emerged during the development of modular transformation among Army planners and force managers to describe the Department of the Army-level of any system within the Army. The HR “top of the system” normally describes the Army G-1, Army G-1
4 3 2 1
34
staff, and Army Human Resources Command. Generally, the term also describes the element of the G-1 or HRC which is responsible for policy development or implementation guidance for any specific HR action or process. The HR “top of the system” is synonymous with the NHRP.
5
Field Manual 1, 4-1.
Standard Requirement’s Code (SRC) 12 is the Army Force Management code for AG TOE organizations controlled, developed and managed by the Adjutant General School of the Soldier Support Institute (SSI), an element of TRADOC. Legacy SRC 12 structures included the Personnel Detachments, Personnel Services Battalion, and PERSCOM structures eliminated by the inventory by senior Army leader decisions and, in the case of Personnel Detachments, the implementation of PSDR. The transformed SRC 12 structures include the Human Resource Sustainment Center (HRSC), HR Company headquarters, Military Mail Terminal teams, Theater Gateway R5 teams, various Plans and Operations teams, postal, R5 (Reception, Replacement, Return-to-duty, Rest and recreation, and Redeployment) and casualty platoons and teams. Additionally, FM 1-0 establishes that the mission of the G-1 is to: “develop, manage, and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs, and policies across all Army components for the entire Army team.”, Field Manual 1-0, 3-15. U.S. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Army G-1 Home Page, available from www.armyg1.army.mil; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008. U.S. Department of the Army, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Order Number 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 9 July 2002), 20. U.S. Department of the Army, Establishment of the United States Army Human Resources Command (HRC), General Order Number 7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 September 2003), 2.
11 10 9 8 7
6
Ibid.
Planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing the theater HR support mission is a combined effort for the Army/ASCC G-1 and the HRSC. FMI 1-0.02, Theater-level Human Resources Support provides more detailed descriptions of the roles, responsibilities and interactions of the Army/ASCC G-1and the HRSC through a dedicated chapter. The interaction of these two entities is an area of HR transformation currently under study by both SSI and CASCOM, as well as the NHRP. LTC Lawrence J. Wark, Expanding the National HR Provider Role in Transformed Theater HR Support, Army White Paper (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. War College, September 2007), 1. The term adjutant comes from the Latin Adjutare, which means to assist the commander. Adjutant duties focus on the administrative duties required to support the commander of an organization brigade and below, where the commander is not a general officer authorized an aide. Adjutants typically manage commander correspondence, the commander’s schedule, and serve as an aide to the commander. While the term Adjutant and S-1 are often used interchangeably, an S-1 is a personnel officer whose focus is the HR management and support of an organization.
13
12
35
14
Field Manual 1, 4-7.
U.S. Department of the Army, 2007 Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 February 2007), A-2. The following quote supports the annotated paragraphs: “The Army’s personnel systems architecture is not fully integrated; has myriad legacy systems that are costly to maintain; inadequately supported; and operate numerous manpower-intensive functional processes. Many of these systems are stove-piped and cumbersome, produce marginal results, have limited or no records keeping capability, require intensive interface resolution, and are not consistent across all components. Many of the supporting processes are manual or semiautomated with unnecessary steps that can and should be eliminated.” Field Manual 1-0, 2-1. A similar concept was delivered to the CSA by then G-1, LTG Maude entitled “Personnel Transformation/Redesign Briefing to CSA”, Slide 7 highlights the ideas which would ultimately provide the underpinnings for the PSDR concept, empowering S-1/G-1 sections as the principle providers to personnel services support and linking those organizations directly to the NHRP. LTG Timothy Maude, “Personnel Transformation/Redesign Briefing to CSA,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C., 4 February 2001. LTC Lawrence Wark, Delivering Personnel Support to a Transformed Army, Army White Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2004), 2. LTC Lawrence Wark, “Theater Human Resources Orientation,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 20 June 2007. The following quote highlights the intent of the PSDR transformation in the HR system and highlights the importance of the linkage between S-1 sections and the NHRP: “HR support is transitioning from a centralized, stove-pipe support philosophy, where AG force structure provided the majority of support, to a decentralized support structure. This transition places the majority of HR support closer to Soldiers and embeds required capabilities in all battalion and brigade/BCT S-1 sections. This transition links the “top of the HR system” directly to the battalion and brigade/BCT S-1 sections…HR support remains focused on the core competencies; it is the manner and location of delivery which changes…Battalion and brigade/BCT S-1 sections are the focal point for the execution of the majority of the HR core competencies for their units.” Field Manual 1-0, 2-2. “OPTEMPO” refers to Operational Tempo of a force or operation. Tempo is the “rate of military action or relative speed and rhythm of military operations,” adding operational to that indicates the rate at which individuals or organizations are required to perform military actions. For equipment, OPTEMPO describes the rate of annual operation and the associated costs. For Soldiers and organizations, OPTEMPO describes the deployment rate for those individuals or organizations. U.S. Department of the Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, Field Manual 102 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 21 September 2004), 1-186. Operating Strength Deviation compares the number of Soldiers actually serving at a given time (faces) with the authorized and recognized requirements (spaces) to be filled. The calculation of OSD includes requirements in the operating force, requirements in the generating force and Soldiers temporarily not serving in either. If there are more Soldiers than requirements, a positive strength deviation exists, and if there are fewer Soldiers than
22 21 20 19 18 17 16
15
36
requirements, a negative operating strength deviation exists, as it does today. The negative OSD means that there are authorized requirements for Soldiers that are not filled, creating a burden in a unit. COL Louis O. Henkel, “Manning the Force,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 31 July 2007.
24 23
Rochelle, 1. Field Manual 1-0, 2-1.
25
R5 (Reception, Replacement, Return-to-duty, Rest and recuperation, and Redeployment) operations include the management and execution of HR activities involved in tracking and ensuring the personnel accountability of Soldiers moving into, through or out of a theater. The 5 “R”s describe the major activities that cause Soldiers and reportable (as determined by DoD and DA) civilian personnel to enter, depart, or transit a deployed AOR. The principle function of R5 operations is the planning, coordination and execution of personnel accountability within activities and centers that process transiting Soldiers from designated points of origin (APOE/SPOE) to location of assignment. Field Manual 1-0, 5-1. The following quote supports the assertions made in this paragraph: “The transformed capabilities of HR systems increase the capacity and efficiency of the HR system and also provide opportunities for the NHRP to directly influence and support theater-level HR operations. Actions that maximize the NHRP linkage also increase the combined capabilities of the theater HR system and enhance limited force structure that is available.” LTC Lawrence J. Wark, Expanding the National HR Provider Role in Transformed Theater HR Support, 1. Two additional NHRP accomplishments have been removed from this paper due to length considerations: Rapid development and distribution of transformational HR doctrine and the Assignment and fill of operational brigade and battalion S-1 positions with HR officers. The rapid doctrinal development is described as follows: The National HR Provider worked closely with the Adjutant General School to rapidly develop supporting doctrine for HR transformation and distribute it to the field to the transformed S-1 sections, SRC 12 structures as well as Commanders who assume new roles under HR transformation, especially under PSDR. Realizing the criticality of quickly disseminating doctrine to assist newly reorganized and forming HR elements, the entire HR system came together to collect inputs and develop not only the keystone document, FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, but also two Interim Field Manuals (FMI) specifically addressing S-1 operations and theater-level HR support. Both FMI 1-0.01, S-1 Operations and FMI 1-0.02, Theater-level HR Support were developed in close coordination with the National HR Provider, as well as with the field at large. HRC played a critical role, especially in developing chapters addressing postal, casualty and personnel readiness chapters. The rapid fielding of the transformational HR doctrine put the HR system ahead of many other elements of the sustainment warfighting function who have not yet released supporting transformational doctrine. The doctrine allows new organizations to better train and prepare for deployment, as well as assisting HR professionals explain new HR responsibilities and roles to commanders and staffs. The assignment of HR officers to S-1 positions is described as follows: A significant impact of Force Design Update (FDU) 05-02, the formal structuring of PSDR, was the recoding of all battalion S-1 positions to AG. This recognized the critical role of the battalion S-1 in delivering transformed HR support and the importance in placing a trained HR officer in that position. This move has 2d order effects for the National HR
28 27
26
37
Provider. Brigade and BCT S-1 positions had been coded FA43 since FY2000, but PSDR mandated a priority fill of FA43 officers to S-1 positions, resulting in increase fill rates. The assignment of these officers to both battalion and brigade S-1 positions places a trained HR officer at the key unit-level HR positions. The HR officer assigned as the S-1 allows the National HR Provider to better communicate requirements, expectations and policy to commanders at the battalion and brigade level, those commanders who are the focus of the transformed Army and current contingency operations. A trained, AG officer assigned as a battalion S-1 is better prepared to supervise the execution of decentralized HR tasks and ensure HR automated systems are properly employed and updated. Additionally, trained HR officers will provide better advice to brigade commanders now required to make more HR decisions. The assignment of HR officers to battalion and brigade S-1 positions establishes a stronger, more effective linkage from the unit to the National HR Provider. Current HRC focus on filling these positions as a priority must continue to better support the operational Army, especially as ARFORGEN manning is executed during the deployment cycle. PSDR implementation was a fast-tracked transformational effort within the Army. The initial White Paper was developed in August 2004, the concept was piloted within three months, resources were confirmed and then obtained through the direction of the VCSA allowing Armywide implementation to begin in November 2005, with conversion of ALL operational active battalions and brigades by February 2008. The fielding was fully funded and resourced through the incredible efforts of members of the Army G-1, G-3 and HRC and the streamlined program processes evolved in support of GWOT. The author attended at least five Senior-leader sessions (COLs, GOs, and civilian SES) where leaders stated that they did not believe that the stated timeline was feasible or attainable. The implementation process did, therefore, exceed the expectations of Army leaders. It is important to note that many of the senior leaders who were skeptical were themselves responsible for the rapid implementation of PSDR due to their exceptional efforts in support of the program. GEN Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, “Personnel Services Delivery Redesign,” memorandum for the Army Staff, Washington, D.C., 24 October 2005. Feedback provided by MG Sean Byrne, Commanding General, Human Resources Command, at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, during remarks to HR students based on statements made to him by operational commanders. 7 December 2007. Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) is the system which manipulates the personnel data stored in a DoD database which records personal data on Soldiers and their dependents and is used to produce identification and Common Access Cards (CAC) for Soldiers and dependents. A fourth example removed from this paper due to length considerations is the modification of the noncommissioned officer semi-centralized promotion system processing. The modification of the semi-centralized noncommissioned officer promotion system (SGT, SSG) is another example of policy change to support transformation and recognition of the increasing capability of HR systems and infrastructure. The previous system for semicentralized promotion required an intensive manpower-driven process at the unit and PSB level to compile and process Promotion Point Worksheets, DA form 3355. The system was labor intensive and often required thousands of corrections at HRC level annually. PSDR analysis indicated that the process must be modified to be executed at the brigade level. The Army G-1 Directorate of Military Personnel Management (DMPM) developed an automated form which
33 32 31 30 29
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allows Soldiers personally to enter key data points which dramatically streamlines the S-1 processes. This use of both rapid policy modification and technological solutions to enable policy challenges reflects a clear example of NHRP influence on the HR system. LTC Twanda Young, Policy Planner, Military Mobilization Branch, DMPM, Army G-1, telephone interview by author, 12 December 2007. COPS is a COGNOS-based, read-only system which uses current Soldier and unit status data from the Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) and Unit Identification Code (UIC), compares it to authorization data provided from the Army G-3 TAADS system and the authorizations guidance generated by Army G-1 in the PMAD to reflect unit strength. This system’s utility is that TAPDB data is updated by the unit and HRC and allows all levels of command to see the same data. This capability ensures that assignment managers and distributors at HRC see the same “truth” units see in their S-1 section, enabling timely “top of the system” management decisions to be understood in the brigade S-1 section, thus creating a level of synergy not previously experienced. LTC Lawrence Wark, “Personnel Readiness Management,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 20 June 2007. Personnel Asset Visibility Report (PAVR) supports personnel data preparation for the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army (DRRS-A) process again allows commanders and HR providers at various levels to plug into readiness data and see the same information, better supporting manning decisions by the NHRP. Like COPS, PAVR takes data from the corporate data base, which reflects current status at the time of submission. Like COPS, the PAVR module is a capability developed, fielded and refined by the NHRP to better execute Personnel Readiness Management in the operational Army. LTC Michelle Mason, “USR,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 31 January 2007.
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Wark, “Personnel Readiness Management,” 20 June 2007.
The following quote defines PAVR functionality and usefulness as a key personnel readiness enabler developed and fielded by the NHRP, significantly improving Personnel Readiness Management throughout the operational Army: “The PAVR tool is designed to assist unit S-1s, commanders, and unit status report (USR) personnel with personnel readiness information. PAVR will enable the S-1 to use eMILPO data managed throughout the month to directly support preparation of the personnel portion of the USR. The Army will benefit with accurate, individual-Soldier data, which is synchronized with unit readiness reporting. This is key for accurate comparisons of DRRS-A and eMILPO readiness data. Operational and sustainment decisions are made by senior leaders based on comparisons of these data.”, Mason, “USR,” 31 January 2007. Forms Content Manager (FCM) is a system which has significantly streamlined processes. In conjunction with secure digital signature capability, FCM allows the paperless preparation of personnel actions and submission digitally. For example, this process allows evaluations to be processed at the unit and then submitted to the NHRP in a paper-less process. Additionally, deployed units can process actions while deployed and forward completed actions directly to the NHRP. FCM not only makes EPS more effective, it dramatically shortens the time required to process actions and return completed actions to the initiating headquarters or even Soldier. LTC Lawrence Wark, “Essential Personnel Services,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 18 June 2007.
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DIMHRS is a congressionally mandated, joint, personnel and pay system which is part of the DoD Enterprise Resource Planning process intended to support multi-component, multiservice task force operations. One time data entry automatically triggers corresponding pay and personnel transactions with no manual reconciliation process required. DIMHRS is a COTS system based on PeopleSoft products which will subsume 81 different legacy systems and databases and incorporates increased Soldier self-service capabilities. COL Patrick Devine, “Army DIMHRS Executive Overview - PSDR,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, January 2007. GEN Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, “Army Campaign Plan, Change 5 (U),” memorandum for the Army, Washington D.C., 5 April 2007. Colonel Patrick Devine, “Army DIMHRS Executive Overview - PSDR,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, January 2007.
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Wark, “Personnel Readiness Management,” 20 June 2007.
The HRMQC has served as the catalyst for change at the AG School: The Human Resource Management Qualification Course (HRMQC), which is Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Phase II for FA 43 officers, has been the catalyst for some of this change. HRMQC has doubled in length from two weeks to four, moved from HRC to Ft Jackson, included hands-on HR automated systems training and focused on transformational HR topics at the brigade and BCT-level – focusing on the duties and responsibilities of the S-1 section. Although intended for new FA 43 officers who are senior captains or majors, the course attracts HR professionals from all levels and the three components. Instruction developed for this course is being tailored for other HR courses, emphasizing the S-1 focus of HR support to the operational Army. Force Design Update 05-02, approved in February 2006, directed all S-1s in operational battalions be recoded to BR 42B Adjutant General Corps (AG) officers. The intent of this decision by the VCSA was to place an HR expert in each battalion in order to properly execute the PSDR initiative and maximize support for the battalion. The onus of this decision was transferred to the AG School to effectively train these young AG officers to be, in fact, HR professionals. BG Gina Farrisee, Director of Military Personnel Management, “HQDA Active Component Manning Guidance for Fiscal Year 2007,” memorandum for the Combatant Commanders, Washington D.C., 1 March 2007. The following quote from the FY 2007 Army Manning Guidance explains the linkage of manning guidance to the deployment schedule executed in support of the GWOT IAW ARFORGEN: “The FY07 Manning Guidance signifies a move toward a phased readiness strategy necessary to support ARFORGEN. This is accomplished by linking personnel fill with the Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE)/Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) and deployment dates. The ARFORGEN process creates operational readiness cycles where individual units increase their readiness over time, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy.” Farrisee, 1 March 2007. Another recommended area of focus not included in this paper due to length considerations is the creation of a NHRP Assessment and Assistance Program that serves to identify systemic problems and gaps, conducts analysis of the HR system, provides potential
48 47 46 45
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solutions to proponent executive agents for resolution, and integrates policy, publications, doctrine, and HR training. The role of this capability would be to assess and assist HR organizations and commanders, integrate efforts across the HR system, collaborate with all involved stakeholders and facilitate necessary changes to policies, procedures, doctrine and structure. The organization’s mission would be to evaluate the effectiveness of military personnel management and improve the quality of personnel service and support provided to Soldiers and commanders at all levels and across all components in both the operational and institutional Army. Also included in this organization is the capability to establish an HR Knowledge Management center with the mission to build and provide a single source, collaborative and integrated approach to the creation, capture, organization, access, use and reuse of HR intellectual capitol and well-being information in order to facilitate the HR community’s ability to achieve integrated mission support. COL Robert Whaley, “National Human Resource Provider Assessment and Assistance Program Concept Brief,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Alexandria, Army Human Resources Command, December 2007. Various CFLCC, 1st TSC, ARCENT leaders, interview by author, 4-5 November 2007, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The following quote describes the role of the HRSC in the deployed AOR in integrating, coordinating and providing technical guidance for the execution of several HR core competencies: “The HRSC mission is to provide theater-level support to the Army/ASCC G-1 and TSC Commander. The HRSC is the key linkage between the Army/ASCC G-1, who provides the policy, direction, plans, and guidance for HR support and the TSC which executes theater HR support for postal, casualty, R5 and PASR infrastructure support. The HRSC has a defined role in supporting both of these elements to ensure that the theater HR support plan is developed, supportable, and executed by SRC 12 elements subordinate to the TSC. The HRSC is the key technical link to HR organizations (HR companies, platoons and teams) executing postal, R5, and casualty functions. Command and control for these HR elements is provided by sustainment organizations.” Wark, Expanding the National HR Provider Role in Transformed Theater HR Support, 3. FDU 05-01 was submitted by the AG School in 2004, just prior to the introduction of the PSDR concept. The FDU developed the concept of HR Companies with HR platoons to replace the PSBs and Personnel Detachments which were leaving the force structure. The HR Platoon retained similar capability for area personnel support as the legacy Personnel Detachment. FDU 05-01 was never approved, as FDU 05-02 was introduced by the AG School as part of the personnel transformation process which formalized PSDR – and superseded FDU 05-01. The HR Platoon has been considered as a possible area support HR structure available to provide HR services and support to operational units without an attached or assigned command relationship to a brigade S-1 section or a Special Troops Battalion (STB) S-1 section, such as theater-level temporary joint commands with large Army presence like MNF-I. BG James Hodges, Commanding General, Army Material Command (FWD)(SWA), interview by author, 5 November 2007, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
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Additional discussion for the recommended NHRP forward presence decision is listed here: The second rotation of the HRSC and the TSC and ESC command and control elements will occur prior to any possible modification of the SRC elements on the ground, and the second rotation more closely represents the original conceptualization of Modular Force Logistical support to the AOR, which should be given an opportunity to succeed. The Army will also be fielding DIMHRS during this timeframe which will add significant stress to deployed HR operations without the complication of major changes in HR structure and command relationships.
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doc_422523351.pdf
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Strategy Research Project
THE ARMY G-1: THE ARMY’S NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES PROVIDER
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAWRENCE WARK United States Army
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
THE ARMY G-1: THE ARMY’S NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES PROVIDER
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Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Wark United States Army
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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT AUTHOR: TITLE: FORMAT: DATE: KEY TERMS: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Wark The Army G-1: The Army’s National Human Resources Provider Strategy Research Project 13 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 7,95 PAGES: 46
Transformation, ASCC, HR Systems
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
The Army G-1 and the Human Resources Command (HRC) serve as the Army’s National Human Resources Provider (NHRP) and the key “top of the system” management, policy formulation, and process leader of the Army’s Human Resources (HR) system. Army wide-transformation efforts and persistent conflict since 9/11 made the NHRP’s roles and responsibilities critical in developing, managing and executing Army wide HR programs, systems and processes required to support Army Soldiers and commanders in a brigade-centric Army. Many successful HR system changes such as Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) and automated systems like Common Operating Picture Synchronizer (COPS) significantly enhance HR support linkages from brigade to theater to NHRP level. As the NHRP implements transformed HR structures and systems, opportunity exists to examine, assess and refine the effectiveness of the NHRP to provide HR support in the Contemporary Operating Environment. As the Army’s senior HR decision maker, the Army G-1 is ensuring Army HR elements are synchronizing their efforts to benefit Soldiers and commanders at all levels.
THE ARMY G-1: THE ARMY’S NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES PROVIDER
We have an opportunity to integrate HR support into the operational force and improve the level of personnel support we provide our Army, both in garrison and when deployed. Let’s embrace this change and meet the challenges of an Army at War and in Transformation. 1 —Lt. Gen. Michael D. Rochelle Deputy Chief of Staff/G-1 Army-wide transformation and persistent combat operations since 9/11required the Army’s Human Resources community to examine how it would provide accurate, relevant, and timely personnel support and services to Soldiers. While the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) 2 poses unique challenges for the Army’s Human Resources (HR) system, the Army’s National Human Resources Provider (NHRP) reacted by modifying HR processes and procedures, adjusting personnel support structure, and addressing cultural demands within the HR system. 3 The Army’s NHRP is the key “top of the system” 4 management, policy formulation, and process leader of the Army HR system and consists of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, the combined Army G-1staff and the Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC). In addition to defining the NHRP’s role in the transformed HR system, the conditions creating the current HR transformation, and describing the HR processes linking the NHRP to Army units, this paper recommends options to strengthen the NHRP’s role in supporting HR processes and to further enhance the Army’s HR support to Soldiers and commanders in the COE. Army Transformation efforts and the need to support forces in the COE indicate the Army will continue to experience a period of persistent change where operational lessons learned will be continually applied to and derived from the COE. The COE
significantly impacts the need for and the pace of all elements of Army transformation, which includes HR transformation. The COE has allowed the Army to redefine itself, and is “shedding inefficient processes and procedures designed for peacetime and reexamining institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies and procedures.” 5 HR transformation continues to develop within these conditions. The Army’s HR operations have changed to support transformation and to improve the delivery of HR support in the deployed theater of operations. Prior to the current transformation effort, theater HR operations involved planning and integrating HR support and the command and control of HR units. The elimination of Standard Requirement’s Code 6 (SRC) 12 HR command and control capability above companylevel, and the introduction of BDE/BCT S-1--centric Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) facilitate responsive personnel support at battalion and brigade level through an organic and professional S-1 staff with policy execution authority and direct connectivity to HRC, an element of the NHRP. NHRP Elements The mission, roles and responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 (Army G-1) and HRC within the Army’s HR system as well as the expectations and roles of the NHRP provide the focus for this research. Field Manual (FM) 1-0, Human Resources Support, describes the Army G-1 as the “senior Army HR decision maker… (who) develops policy and ensures HR support is synchronized between various personnel staff elements and field operating agencies.” 7 The Army G-1’s mission is “to develop, manage and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs, and policies for the entire Army team.” Meanwhile, the Army
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G-1’s vision emphasizes that the HR enterprise is a team of HR professionals supporting the Army in an “era of persistent conflict”; who will “ensure HR readiness of the Total Army across the full spectrum of operations.” 8 Likewise, Headquarters, Department of the Army assigns the Army G-1 the following responsibilities: • Ensure the current and future personnel readiness of the Army through the development and integration of policies and programs. • Develop policy and provide guidance for responsive, flexible and effective HR support to the Army. • Develop detailed HR programs, budgets and activities for execution of responsibilities in the HR life-cycle. • • Direct the operations of the Army’s military personnel commands. Maintain manning support of operations and contingency plans. 9
As a result, the Army G-1’s mission, roles and responsibilities establish the G-1 as the leader of the Army’s HR system. And, as the principle leader of the NHRP, the G-1 develops policies, programs, budgets and provides direction for executing Army HR support. A key part of the G-1’s roles and responsibilities also requires the NHRP to link to personnel staff sections (S-1/G-1 sections), units and commands in order to ensure the necessary delivery of HR support and services to commanders and Soldiers. Army HRC is a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Army G-1 with the mission to execute the full spectrum of HR programs, services, and systems to support the readiness and well-being of the Army personnel and organizations worldwide. 10 The HRC commander serves as the Army G-1’s functional proponent for personnel management and personnel systems and supports the G-1 in managing Army
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personnel serving on active duty. Additionally, HRC roles and responsibilities include: developing and integrating HR information systems; validating manning requirements for the active Army; assigning Soldiers based on requirements and priorities; assessing, evaluating and responding to deployment requirements; and, providing standardized and quality HR support and services to Soldiers. As such, HRC is the “executer” of the NHRP in support of the policy, programs, guidance and direction provided by the Army G-1. As a result, it is essential HRC remain closely linked to the HR professionals in personnel sections and organizations who provide HR support to Soldiers and organizations. 11 The principal organizations leading theater-level HR support within a forward deployed area of operations are the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) G-1 and the Human Resources Sustainment Center (HRSC), an SRC12 element of the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). These elements are the key components of the “top of the HR system” in the deployed AOR. Current HR doctrine in FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, identifies and separates areas of execution for these elements by core competency, and documents how they complement each other since they were designed to work together to coordinate and integrate theater HR support. 12 However, a major HR support role to be addressed in this paper is the linkage between the ASCC G-1 and the HRSC in theater to the NHRP and determining the best means of maximizing effects of their linkage. The Case for Changing Human Resources Support Prior to 11 September 2001, the Army was a Division-centric force configured as a result of the Cold War with Divisions forward-stationed overseas and CONUS-based
4
(Continental United States) and dependent upon strategic lift to move massed formations to execute conventional warfare. In addition, the Army’s HR systems were labor intensive because HR organizations possessed little automation connectivity to the “top of the system”. Personnel services and support organizations such as Personnel Services Battalions (PSBs) provided services to Soldiers and commanders both deployed and at home station. Brigade and battalion personnel (S-1) sections had little to no direct access to the “top of the system” (the NHRP) and a brigade or battalion S-1 primarily served as a unit Adjutant 13 rather than as an HR professional. The NHRP disseminated policy guidance through a series of regulations and Department of the Army pamphlets, which often became outdated before the next printing. At this time, the NHRP executed such critical HR functions as manning and personnel readiness management through Army personnel organizations, Army Corps and Division G-1s, and installation military HR offices. Several conditions and developments in capability and doctrine make the case for a strong NHRP role in the Army’s HR system. As such, the description of six conditions will demonstrate the requirement for a strong NHRP to support a deployed Army: • • Transformation of the Army to a modular, brigade/BCT-centric design. Removal of Personnel Services Battalions (PSBs), Personnel Groups, and Personnel Commands (PERSCOMs) from the Army’s structure. • Predominance of outdated, redundant, noncompatible, unlinked and stovepiped HR systems. • • Development of the Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) initiative. Personnel readiness stress on the force in support of GWOT.
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Transformation to a Modular, Brigade-centric Army The Army’s transformation to a brigade-centric organizational structure required the HR community to transform to provide more flexible and deployable structures with sufficient internal capabilities to support assigned and attached Soldiers. FM 1 describes the transformation as follows: The Army is restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-based force – the modular force…The major combat and support capabilities a brigade needs for most operations are organic to its structure. This modular organization simplifies providing force packages to meet operational requirements. 14 The HR community’s response to modular transformation became known as Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) which included the development of internal HR capability sufficient to provide support for the brigade and its attachments, as well as organizational changes to supporting Army HR organizations and added additional automation capability. Brigades could no longer depend on separate, external HR organizations for most of their normal HR requirements. Additionally, the plug-andplay nature of the modular force requires the brigade HR element to interface with higher echelon HR providers. Because combat brigades must be prepared to deploy and fight under the command and control of any operational headquarters, they must have an element of independence in their organizational structure. “Our modular conversion of active and reserve components is designed to create brigade-based modules able to “plug into” joint and coalition task forces in expeditionary and campaign settings.” 15 Therefore, brigade modules must be self sustaining and able to link to Army support capabilities especially when there is no other intermediate modular headquarters deployed.
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Personnel Command and Control Structures and HR Restructuring The Army was working on eliminating of personnel support organizations and their command and control structures prior to the decision to transform the Army to a modular design. The decision to remove the personnel organizations providing most of the personnel (now called HR) support in the deployed environment created significant challenges for the HR system. Previously, personnel units (PSBs) operated the HR system supporting divisions and corps troops and reported to a personnel commander (PERSCOM) executing HR operations at the theater/Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) level, which linked directly to the NHRP for execution and guidance. The HR system required personnel organizations to operate personnel automation systems and input manual transactions. Eliminating these organizations created a void in the HR system and the need to seek new delivery methods for HR support from unit to the NHRP level. Need for HR Systems to Support Transformation The Army currently uses hundreds of distinct, stove-piped automated HR systems. The Army designed most of these systems over time; especially the older systems, to respond to a single need and accomplish one or several limited personnel support tasks. As a result, most HR systems are labor intensive and expensive to maintain, update, and improve because they are not integrated to a common data base, and use dated computer programs. Many of these systems serve redundant purposes, do not effectively update or manage Soldiers permanent records, and are stove-piped within each Army component; Active, Reserve, and National Guard. 16
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Dated and labor intensive HR systems are not only inefficient, but make it difficult to manage the HR system at each level, especially at the “top of the system” NHRP level. The myriad of systems requires users to input data in multiple systems to provide the required information for different HR processes. As a result, HR specialists involved in extreme operational tempo and wartime conditions have difficulty submitting timely HR data, resulting in inaccuracies in the HR system overall. Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) The Army G-1 developed the PSDR concept during the fall of 2004 in response to the Army’s modular unit transformation and to provide HR support to the modular, brigade-centric Army. The PSDR concept emphasized the need to embed HR capabilities and responsibilities within the Army’s modular units rather than maintaining area support personnel services organizations. 17 An intent of the PSDR concept was to flatten the Army’s HR system, by empowering S-1 sections at brigade and battalion level to provide most of the required HR support for unit Soldiers, and linking S-1 sections to the top of the system. The initial PSDR White Paper highlighted this intent as follows: The PSDR vision is a streamlined personnel system provided through trained HR professionals, empowered with discrete operating capabilities connecting the warfighter, power projection base, and HRC. PSDR enables the decentralized delivery of personnel services as close as possible to Soldiers and commanders…while retaining central management at HRC through clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. 18 What this means for the Army’s NHRP is that core HR functions or competencies previously performed by personnel organizations such as processing Soldiers’ promotion recommendations and performance evaluations would now be performed
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directly by a Soldier’s unit, thereby improving HR system responsiveness to Soldiers and their commanders. Figure 1 depicts the migration of HR core competencies.
Figure 1. Core Competency Migration under PSDR 19 In addition the PSDR concept attempts to increase responsiveness and HR system efficiency. PSDR established a direct pipeline to the brigade from HRC for the manning of the brigade and the delivery of personnel services. 20 Personnel Stress on the Force in Support of GWOT The personnel stress on the Army since 9-11 poses many challenges for the Army’s HR system. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) 21 which redeploys brigades with a year or less in CONUS between deployments requires detailed coordination at the NHRP level to ensure combat formations deploy with sufficient Soldiers to execute wartime missions. In addition, the national decision to maintain an All Volunteer Army during a time of war has meant the Army must increase recruiting 9
and retention actions and may be temporarily short of certain specialties and grades. As a result, this impacts the recruiting and accessions systems to provide sufficient entrylevel Soldiers to fill units. At the same time, the Army requires more Soldiers to fill expanded modular unit structures and support the losses of GWOT. The conditions described, especially the Army’s new modular structure, have created what is known as a persistent negative operating strength deviation in the active force. 22 (See Figure 2) This means even with STOP LOSS initiatives, which preclude Soldiers from leaving when their enlistment is complete, the Army falls short of required Soldiers (faces) to fill authorized positions (spaces) to support its mission. Even the Grow the Army (GTA) initiative, which recognizes a permanent need for more ground forces, adds to the stress of the HR system as the Army increases demand for Soldiers during competitive recruiting conditions. The continued management of personnel shortages in a resource-constrained environment suggests a greater need for centralized management at the top of the HR system. As a result, the NHRP’s active participation in achieving brigade readiness is essential as they deploy for GWOT operations.
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Figure 2. Manning Stress on the Force: Negative strength Deviation to FY09 23 The previous subjects described existing conditions and initiatives which established favorable conditions for the emergence of a strong NHRP linked throughout the HR system supporting the deployed operational Army. The next section will address initiatives and actions demonstrating the NHRP’s ongoing emergence within the HR system. The Progress of Change - Strengthening the NHRP Links The Army G-1 calls the current period of HR transformation the “most significant change in our business we have seen in our careers” 24 . Significant advances have occurred in the means of delivering HR support to the Army’s deployed operational forces and progress in implementing HR transformation continues.
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HR Transformation is a multi-component approach to the Army’s personnel services approach and information technology design objectives... HR Transformation is focused on the strategic objectives of (1) reshaping HR processes, (2) using technology to apply a relevant, reliable, and achievable multi-component HR system, (3) realigning Army HR structures, and (4) delivering and executing HR service functions as close to the Soldier as possible (to include Soldier self service) in support of a transformed, brigade-centric tactical Army. 25 HR transformation clarifies and expands the role of the NHRP in the integration and delivery of efficient, effective HR support. More specifically, these changes impacted the personnel sections (S-1) in battalions and brigades, and the SRC 12 HR structures which deliver selected postal, R5 26 and casualty support in the deployed Area of responsibility (AOR). As automated HR systems streamline HR processes, the NHRP’s role is strengthened and the need for redundant HR organizations is reduced. 27 Ongoing improvements in the delivery of HR support will empower the HR system by providing direct support to Soldiers and commanders. Such improvements will link operational units to the NHRP at the top of the HR system, and include the following seven HR initiatives: • • • • • • • Centrally-controlled PSDR conversion. Supporting policy changes. Development of integrated HR automated systems. Brigade-centric Personnel Readiness Management (PRM). Army HRC reorganization. HR training orientation in S-1-centric operations. Widely-disseminated Army Manning Guidance. 28
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Centrally-controlled PSDR Conversion The NHRP’s leadership was critical in the rapid, integrated implementation of PSDR and exceeded Army leaders’ expectations for implementing of a major systemic change of HR support. 29 Central control of the process by elements of the NHRP guided and integrated the process across both the ARSTAFF (Army Staff) and subordinate Army Commands (ACOM), enabling the entire active Army to fully convert in slightly more than two years. The Army’s VCSA was so convinced of the value and importance of the PSDR concept to the success of Army transformation and deploying units, he sent the following direction to the Army Staff: As the Army reorganizes to create modular, brigade-based forces, we must ensure that we adequately resource unit HR structures and those charged with supporting theater-level operations. Transformation of the HR community under PSDR meets this requirement…this is an unprogrammed initiative that requires out of cycle funding through FY07. I expect your full support to…ensure fielding commences in FY06 per the G-3’s approved schedule. 30 Planning and coordination by the NHRP for the PSDR implementation was made possible only through detailed and deliberate planning which integrated Army Campaign Plan (ACP) requirements, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) deployment requirements, and the movement of brigades directed by the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Study (IGPBS). Within six months of converting to PSDR, the majority of brigades deployed and successfully provided HR support to their Soldiers and commanders under wartime conditions. Feedback from operational commanders whose brigades have converted to PSDR has been very favorable. 31 By fielding trained and resourced S-1 sections in all battalions and brigades, the Army HR system becomes flatter by linking units to the NHRP directly and enabling the NHRP to support brigade-based HR operations every day. Flattened HR processes are 13
demonstrated in the performance of Essential Personnel Services (EPS), one of the principle HR core competencies described in HR doctrine. EPS under PSDR links actions from the final recommender or approver in the Soldier’s organization to the NHRP, normally HRC. PSDR removes the middle layers of control and action previously executed by personnel service units. Figure 3 demonstrates these linkages for the active component, and while reserve component processes are somewhat different, the resulting PSDR flattening is no less significant.
Figure 3. The flattened EPS Path Created under PSDR – NHRP linkage Supporting Policy Changes Often significant transformational efforts encounter bureaucratic policies and procedures which can slow the pace of change. Certainly, the HR system has a plethora of policies and has been accused, on occasion, of bureaucratic tendencies which result from the large number of guiding regulations and processes which are very
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difficult to keep updated and current. Additionally, many processes and regulatory guidance were established over time to improve control of the HR system due to the impact that personnel information has on Soldier’s careers and lives. Therefore, it was critical during this period to identify policies hindering transformation and modify them quickly to support the transformed delivery of HR support. The NHRP led the effort to modify and adjust policy during this process. While policy modification work remains, the NHRP has committed to actively updating HR processes to better support transformation. Three key examples include the distribution of DEERS-Rapid Common Access Card (CAC) machines 32 , granting accesses to HR systems by brigade and battalion S-1 sections and developing an interactive and responsive Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG). 33 For example, the NHRP demonstrated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) a need for DEERS-Rapid equipment at the brigade-level so S-1 sections could produce CAC for Soldiers. Initially, OSD was reluctant to allow S-1 sections to access the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) due to security concerns about sensitive personnel data. However, the NHRP’s coordination and reassurances enabled S-1 sections to obtain this important HR capability. The NHRP was also instrumental in pushing HR system access to brigade S-1 sections in order to perform the tasks required by HR transformation and PSDR. Decentralized access to some of the older HR stove-piped systems can pose risks to the system infrastructure, but the NHRP recognized the importance of S-1 access and funded the effort. Several policies required republication to allow decentralized access.
15
Additionally, the NHRP streamlined the procedures for reviewing and granting system accesses, improving the linkage from top to bottom of the HR system. The Army G-1’s Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG) is the best example of proactive policy interaction between the NHRP and Army units. The PPG focuses on HR policies relating to support of contingency operations conducted as part of GWOT, and expanded to cover other associated HR policies. While the PPG has a heavy reserve component influence because it prescribes HR actions necessary for mobilizing personnel, it also includes many active component deployment procedures. As a web-based interactive document on the Army G-1 website, the PPG incorporates personnel policy changes submitted by the ARSTAFF, ACOMs, Office of the Chief Army Reserve and the National Guard Bureau. As a result, deployed units can see current policy modifications, clarifications and tactics, techniques, and procedures emerging from recent policy changes. The Army G-1’s latest initiative is a deliberate HR bottom-up review of the PPG, so deployed units and headquarters can provide feedback. Because the PPG contains current policy changes and required HR processes, the PPG is more current than corresponding regulations. 34 This Army G-1 effort represents the most active policy linkage between the NHRP and the deployed force. Development of Integrated HR Automated Systems The Army’s development and use of integrated, web-based automated HR systems increases the relevance and linkages of the NHRP and the lowest level HR provider – the battalion S-1 section. For example, such recently fielded systems as Common Operating Picture Synchronizer (COPS) 35 and Personnel Assets Visibility
16
Report (PAVR) 36 interface with the “corporate” database and use current top of the system HR data to reflect personnel readiness and Soldier status so HR professionals and commanders at various levels receive the same readiness and Soldier status information. As a result, COPS not only links the NHRP to S-1 sections but links other strength managers performing PRM both deployed and at home station. The importance of COPS is seen when HR professionals update the TAPDB, and all command levels see the same PRM data. This capability also enables the unit S-1 sections to see timely justification for management decisions made by the NHRP, thus creating a level of synergy not previously experienced. Figure 4 graphically shows COPS.
Figure 4. Common Operating Picture Synchronizer (COPS) 37
17
The Personnel Assets Visibility Report (PAVR) module of eMILPO is another HR system which assists the PRM function and strengthens the linkage of the NHRP to units and commanders. 38 Similarly, system enablers such as Forms Content Manager (FCM) 39 , and Defense Casualty Information System – Casualty Reporting (DCIPS-CR) streamline processes within the HR system because they are web-based systems which are integrated at the NHRP level and directly link the NHRP to Army units. While the systems described have improved the NHRP capability in managing HR support, none will enable the NHRP more than the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) 40 when fielded in October 2008. DIMHRS subsumes redundant systems and creates one HR data base for the three Army components, enabling deployed S-1 sections to support attached and mobilized Soldiers, no matter their component. Additionally, the assignment of “super users” to the brigade S-1 section allows the brigade to manage roles and permissions and provide HR support to task organized subunits to receive HR support from the brigade S-1 section which is not currently possible. DIMHRS represents a significant change for the HR system, marked by increased capability at the lower levels of the system and greater visibility at the top of the system by increasing the efficacy of the NHRP. DIMHRS is so critical to the Army, it is a requirement in the Army Campaign Plan, where the G-1 is tasked to: “Implement enterprise network-centric HR system and revise supporting policies to deliver responsive personnel and pay service support.” 41 Figure 5 provides more DIMHRS information.
18
Figure 5. DIMHRS capabilities. 42 Brigade Personnel Readiness Management (PRM) Brigade PRM is another example of HR transformation linking the NHRP to the lowest level HR elements - brigade S-1 sections. Brigade PRM is a departure from historical personnel readiness paradigm and represents a bold move to directly support the modular brigade-centric Army. Brigade PRM manages strength distribution direct from HRC. HRC mans each brigade and brigade equivalent, which is made possible by the PSDR-enhanced capabilities of the S-1 section, and increased access to HR automated systems, such as COPS. Brigade S-1s coordinate directly with HRC to man the brigade. G-1s serving at echelons-above-brigade monitor the brigade PRM process through COPS, EDAS, TOPMIS and the PAVR/DRRS-A and make distribution recommendations or personnel fill exceptions as required to satisfy echelon-above-
19
brigade commander readiness guidance. This process is executed both at home station and while deployed. Additionally, the replacement system for active component brigades and BCTs is executed directly from HRC to the unit, using a dynamic and predictive model developed by HRC to predict deployed losses and assign corresponding replacements to the brigade. As a result, Brigade PRM is the most effective way to account for and manage Soldiers during this high OPTEMPO period. Brigade PRM prohibits mid-level HR managers from redirecting Soldiers intended to fill vacancies in brigades. Brigade PRM gives the NHRP the best visibility and the most capable means of impacting the manning of deploying brigades while managing scarce resources. Figure 6 provides additional information on brigade PRM.
Figure 6. The Brigade PRM Process. 43
20
Reorganization of Human Resources Command (HRC) The reorganization of HRC to improve support to the operational Army and integrate HR support to the active Army and the Army Reserve is a major impact by the NHRP on the HR system. The integration of HRC-Alexandria, VA and HRC-St Louis, MO to one location at Ft Knox, KY will create efficiencies that will be felt by the deployed, operational forces. Part of HRC’s reorganization establishes a single point-ofentry in the G-3 section which will ease the burden on brigade S-1s and Division G-1s who are supporting multi-component forces in the AOR, such that any S-1 or G-1 request for information or assistance will be directed to one office for action. Additionally, the integration of readiness functions in both the enlisted and officer personnel management divisions will streamline the manning process and provide better joint visibility between the top of the system and the strength managers in brigades. Ultimately, the possible integration of both the officer and enlisted personnel management divisions would further streamline HR support and focus PRM efforts on the linkage between HRC and the brigade. Reorientation of HR Institutional Training Institutional HR training has changed over the last two years to better support HR transformation and to focus on S-1 operations. Recognizing the shift of focus under PSDR, the AG School has adapted training to focus on preparing Soldiers, NCOs and officers for service in battalion and brigade S-1 sections. 44 The refocusing of institutional HR training is critical to the success of brigadecentric HR operations and is one of the underpinnings of HR transformation. AG officers, to include warrant officers and FA 43 officers fill critical HR positions in battalion
21
and brigade organizations, and must be trained to serve as the HR professional for that unit. It is that training which makes the change in the coding of the S-1 positions a benefit to the force. 45 A 2d order effect for NHRP influence is the placement of a trained HR professional at the tip of the spear, enabling more effective communication between units through the battalion S-1 section and the NHRP and better execution of decentralized HR operations in support of operational forces. Widely Disseminated Army Manning Guidance The DMPM publishes Army Manning Guidance annually which provides the active component “clear and definitive guidance on priority of Army manning, while operating in an environment of significant personnel shortages and changing requirements.” 46 The dissemination of the manning guidance enables commanders to clearly understand the manning process in support of the COE, the challenges associated with managing shortages, and the priority of fill. This is critically important for decentralized manning operations as directed by HR transformation in support of the brigade-centric modular Army. Similarly, the Army Manning Guidance allows brigade S-1s to predict readiness levels in relation to impending deployment and reassures commanders used to an Army where units were fully manned most of the time – universal personnel readiness. The FY07 guidance focuses on the linkage of manning to support the ARFORGEN deployment cycle and demonstrates the control of scarce personnel resources at the “top of the system”. 47 In addition, the Army Manning Guidance provides an excellent example of a strong NHRP influence on unit level operations and its linkage to HR professionals. And
22
because the Army Manning Guidance enables brigade S-1s to understand the manning cycle and plan accordingly to support commanders, it also provides expectation management and enables the entire active Army HR manning system to remain in synch. The preceding examples indicate that the NHRP and the HR system have made progress integrating the delivery of HR support for the modular, brigade-centric Army. The NHRP has led initiatives which are improving the delivery of HR support. Work remains to strengthen the system overall and the NHRP will continue to have a significant leadership role within the system. The next section of this paper will address several HR areas that can still be addressed and improved to better support the Army, especially during deployed operations. Continuing the Momentum: Expanding the Impact of the NHRP The dedicated hard work of HR professionals and leaders has created a momentum of change that is improving the HR support delivered to the modular Army. Operational commanders repeatedly praise the PSDR initiative for placing enhanced capabilities within battalion and brigade structures and improving the HR system’s support to units. PSDR training and fielding continues in the three components and the first group of transformed SRC 12 HR organizations are currently deployed and providing postal, R5 and casualty support in the COE. Lessons learned are flowing into the NHRP, Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the Soldier Support Institute (SSI) and the AG School which will offer opportunities to improve the structure, capabilities, and roles of these SRC 12 organizations.
23
However, despite current successes, the role of the NHRP in facilitating HR support at the theater-level is one of the areas under review. The remainder of the paper addresses several issues identified in the COE and proposes several ways and means the NHRP can continue to lead the HR system and deliver integrated, responsive HR support to deployed forces. The areas of focus include the following: • • Establishing better linkages to deployed theater-level G-1s. Reviewing SRC 12 structure, capabilities and linkages within the sustainment system. • • • • Improving NHRP and other HR leader communications. Establishing single point of entry in the NHRP. Continuing emphasis on HR institutional training. Maintaining a strategic concept development and integration capability in the NHRP. • Determining the best NHRP forward presence in the AOR. 48
Establishing Better Linkages to Deployed Theater-level G-1s The ability of the NHRP to effect and improve the delivery of HR support in the deployed AOR starts with the establishment and maintenance of strong linkages with deployed theater-level G-1s. The NHRP needs to leverage these linkages to ensure deployed G-1s are resourced to manage HR requirements and to execute HR core competencies. The COE poses unique challenges for the NHRP to build strong linkages, especially at the theater/AOR level. Currently several headquarters can act as either the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) or an Army Force command (ARFOR).
24
The command and control structure in the COE establishes ARCENT, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and the Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan (currently CJTF-82) as competing ASCC and ARFOR headquarters which can sometimes work divergent actions and priorities within one Combatant Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). The NHRP’s awareness of this command and control challenge will ensure actions received from the AOR are coordinated with the affected headquarters. Additionally, the ASCC can adopt an active coordinating role to further empower the HR system in the AOR and facilitate better-coordinated support throughout the CENTCOM AOR. 49 ASCC and ARFOR G-1s must deploy and execute their mission with personnel shortages due to structural flaws in allocations and staffing decisions. Currently, over 40 personnel augment the ARCENT (FWD) G-1 section beyond the thirteen allocated to the Operational Command Post of the ASCC. The individual augmentation and troop diversion required to fill the augmentation requirements hinders the delivery of other HR support. The NHRP could assist the augmentation challenges of ASCC and ARFOR headquarters by building TDA-based, deployable cells into the NHRP structure which are prepared to deploy and augment ASCC and ARFOR staffs for operational support. The members of these cells reside in the NHRP structure and conduct day-to-day support in CONUS until needed to deploy. This capability would allow the augmentation of various G-1 staffs forward without removing capability from other operational HR elements. These cells could be a mix of military, DA civilian and contractor personnel, just as they are in Army Material Command augmentation elements called forward to assist the execution of logistics tasks. The augmentation cells would serve two
25
purposes: improving the capability of the deployed G-1 staff sections while at the same time improving the linkage back to the NHRP where the augmentation cells normally operate. The NHRP could improve the linkage with supported theater-level G-1 staffs by placing NHRP LNOs at key locations in the AOR with G-1 staffs, to include ARCENT, MNC-I and the Afghanistan CJTF. These LNOs would assist in the coordination of HR support and would serve to inform the G-1 sections of impending NHRP actions and vice versa. The Army G-3 maintains a similar LNO with the ARCENT (FWD) staff at Camp Arifjan, which improves communication between the Army G-3 and CFLCC/ARCENT. Review SRC 12 Structure, Capabilities, and Linkages Lessons learned and individual observations about the first deployment of the transformed SRC 12 HR structures have identified points for consideration about the structure, capabilities and linkages of the deployed SRC 12 elements in the AOR. The NHRP benefits from and leverages these elements based on linkages from the NHRP to these units, especially the Human Resources Sustainment Center (HRSC). The HRSC is a key technical link between the theater-level sustainment elements, sustainment headquarters, ASCC headquarters and the NHRP. 50 The ability of the HRSC, as currently structured, to support the ASCC G-1, TSC, various ARFOR headquarters and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (ESC) in the deployed AOR should be reviewed, and as required, the structure could be adapted. The NHRP should support the SSI and AG School as required to consider the following SRC 12 issues and support resulting Force Design Update (FDU) actions:
26
•
The issue of “micro-modularity of HR platoons, teams, and cells which make them too small to mange in the deployment and TRO cycles.
•
The potential need to establish an HR battalion-level command and control structure to execute the Theater Gateway (TG) R5 Center mission.
•
The potential need to establish an HR battalion-level command and control structure to execute the overall Theater Opening (TO) HR task set which includes the TG R5 Center and Military Mail Terminal (MMT) missions.
•
The potential need to establish limited area HR support capability to provide S1-like EPS support for “orphans” on the battlefield who do not have a battalion or brigade S-1 section available. This capability could be built into HR Company structure in the form of HR platoons as presented in FDU 05-01. 51
•
The integration of TTPs developed for the HR Operations Cells of the Sustainment Brigade SPO in institutional training and follow-on doctrine by the 8th HRSC and MNC-I.
The NHRP should take the lead in ensuring HR Operations Cells of Sustainment Brigades and ESCs are filled as a priority and that these key cells remain viable and resourced sufficiently to accomplish their mission. Improving NHRP Communications The ability of the NHRP to effectively communicate with HR providers in the deployed theater is critical to maximizing the HR system’s effectiveness. Regular, interactive communication between the NHRP and deployed S-1s, G-1s and SRC 12 unit leaders enhances the ability of deployed HR elements to proactively support Soldiers and commanders and allows the NHRP to ensure theater needs are
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anticipated and coordinated prior to execution. The communication between the theater and the NHRP is especially important following the flattening of the HR system, where brigade S-1s must interact regularly with the NHRP in order to maintain the personnel readiness of their brigades. The NHRP could adopt several practices to improve communications with the deployed theater. Regularly scheduled Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTC) between the leaders of the NHRP and HR leaders in the theater to foster two-way communication, inform both ends of the HR system of pending issues in a timely manner, and foster more coordinated integration of pending actions and issues. For example, the Army Material Command (AMC) Commander, General Griffin, conducts weekly VTCs with forward deployed AMC elements and leaders which links the commander with the needs of the supported warfighters. GEN Griffin believes that “(he) must be linked and understand what the warfighter needs to maximize support.” 52 The NHRP could establish a mentor relationship between leaders in the NHRP and HR leaders forward. For example, the Army G-1 and Commander, HRC could mentor the ASCC G-1, MNC-I C-1, and CJTF-82 C-1 while the TAG mentors the Director, HRSC. The mentoring relationship could establish two-way communication and better link the top of the HR system in CONUS with the top of the system in theater. HR leaders in the deployed theater could also establish a formal means of communicating internally on a regular basis. The ARCENT G-1, ARCENT (FWD) G-1, MNC-I C-1, CJTF-82 C-1, 8th HRSC Director, and G-1s could conduct a weekly SVTC to ensure AOR-wide HR operations are coordinated and lessons learned are shared internally prior to the SVTC with the NHRP. This process would allow for faster
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resolution of HR policy and issues by ensuring that senior HR leaders throughout the system are informed of “the hot” issues. Establish a Single Point- of-Entry at the NHRP The establishment of a single point-of-entry into the NHRP would ease the ability of deployed HR elements to benefit from the capabilities of the NHRP. Brigade-centric HR support exacerbates the need for this capability, as more HR leaders who are less familiar with the composition and capabilities of the NHRP become more dependent on it for support. The single point-of-entry could consist of an element in existing Army G-1 and HRC structure or a new element. The single point-of-entry would serve as the conduit for deployed HR providers to request information or support for a particular action or trend from the NHRP. A single point-of-entry, with sufficient senior leader emphasis, would speed action by the various NHRP elements on time sensitive issues for deployed Soldiers and commanders. Linking the forward LNOs of the NHRP discussed earlier to the single point-of-entry would multiply the impact of both initiatives. Continued Emphasis on HR Institutional Training NHRP support for ongoing initiatives of the AG School for improving the institutional training of HR providers and other participants in the HR system will continue to improve the overall HR system. The AG School’s continued emphasis on S-1 and G-1-centric HR support for the modular Army will strengthen the abilities of company grade officers, junior warrant officers and mid-level NCOs who must operate and implement PSDR. The continued involvement of the HRC Commander, TAG, Director, DMPM and their CSMs via VTCs with various courses at the AG School has a
29
profound impact on the HR students and reinforces the link between the HR provider to the S-1 sections and SRC 12 units. In addition, below are several institutional training initiatives to emphasize: • Focus on integration of the SSI and AG School on planned DIMHRS training to ensure effective training at the institutional training base, to include the establishment of a robust DIMHRS training facility. • Focus on expanding HR capabilities training to Sustainment leaders who will command and lead HR SRC 12 elements which make up HR companies and serve in Sustainment Brigades. • Coordinated consideration of the institutional training impact of any new HR system, policy, or program and coordination between the NHRP developing these changes and the school. Strategic Thinking Capability in the NHRP PSDR was rapidly developed, piloted, documented and approved due to the capacity of a small core of individuals in the NHRP and the AG School to think strategically and to develop future solutions for potential challenges. Today, the challenges of manning the Army in an environment of constrained resources, providing HR support in the AOR, while fielding DIMHRS and growing the Army creates an incredible day-to-day strain on both the NHRP and HR elements on the operational Army. However, there is still an urgent need for a “strategic thinking” capability in the NHRP. It is feasible for an element in G-1 and HRC to be charged with thinking about future HR system challenges and proactively develop means to effectively address
30
those challenges. This capability must be “close” to the senior leadership and have the ability to coordinate across the breadth of the NHRP. Additionally, the close working relationships forged during development of the PSDR initiative between G-1, HRC, Installation Management Command (IMCOM) HR, SSI and the AG School, and FORSCOM must continue to remain strong and active. The ability of the NHRP to rapidly bring HR elements together to examine an issue across the DOTMLPF construct creates the ability to rapidly, thoroughly and proactively coordinate and field solutions to HR challenges. The importance of these relationships can not be overemphasized. NHRP Forward Presence The majority of this paper discusses the role of the NHRP in supporting deployed operations, the conditions currently influencing that support and some potential opportunities to strengthen that role. One potential opportunity is to create a forward deployed element from the NHRP and identify its composition, role and reporting relationship. The discussion about a forward presence in the AOR centers on the HRSC addressed earlier. It is important to remember that this is the first deployment of the transformed SRC 12 organizations as currently structured. In addition, this is the first deployment of the transformed modular sustainment command and control headquarters, the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) and the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and the first execution of the Modular Force Logistics Concept (MFLC) developed by CASCOM, which includes the employment of SRC 12 HR organizations as elements of the TSC and Sustainment Brigades. Additionally,
31
several conditions in the AOR are hindering analysis about the effectiveness for both the MFLC and the transformed SRC 12 elements. First, both the MFLC and much of the doctrine found in FMI 1-0.02, Theater-level HR Support, depend on the establishment of a Single Logistics Command and Control (SLC2) element, the TSC. This has not occurred in the AOR and is impacting several of the underlying constructs associated with this initial SRC 12 deployment. As discussed earlier, the NHRP is closely linked to deployed elements for Personnel Readiness Management (PRM) through PSDR initiatives as well as brigade PRM. COPS and PAVR/DRSS-A provide coordinating information used by the NHRP to man deployed forces and to maintain the personnel readiness of deployed forces. The NHRP is linked virtually to the deployed theater through these systems for PRM. As a result, the benefit of actual NHRP’s forward presence is through the execution of HR services and personnel support core competencies of postal operations, R5 operations and casualty operations: the core missions executed by the deployed SRC 12 HR elements under the command and control of HR companies, Sustainment Brigades and ultimately, ESCs and the TSC. Three courses of action for establishing a NHRP forward presence in the deployed AOR are offered: COA 1: Retaining the status quo until further data is available once the conditions predicated for MFLC (SLC2) are realized. This COA strengthens the communication/virtual linkage of the NHRP to the ASCC G-1 and the HRSC Director but does not change the C2 relationship of HR elements on the ground. COA 2: Making the HRSC an element of HRC and serving as the forward element of the NHRP to coordinate postal, R5 and casualty operations for the NHRP as an
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interface with the TSC and the ASCC G-1. HR companies remain under the C2 of Sustainment Brigades. COA 3: Creating an HR brigade structure with the HRSC forming the core of the brigade headquarters with commensurate HR sustainment battalions to perform the postal, R5 and casualty missions in the various AORs. The HR brigade could be a subordinate element of HRC and therefore represent a forward deployed element of the NHRP. All SRC 12 HR structures would be under the C2 of the HR brigade which would parallel the relationship of the Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) and Army Sustainment Command, a subordinate headquarters of Army Material Command (AMC). Since the NHRP can increase its role without additional structure and an actual forward presence, at this time the most feasible COA is to maintain the status quo because there is no compelling evidence to indicate that the structural modifications required to make COA 2 or 3 feasible would dramatically improve postal, R5 or casualty operations in the theater. 53 Conclusion This paper presents the conditions which have given rise to a more robust NHRP influence on the HR system, an influence which has made the system more effective in providing support to Soldiers and commanders both at home station and deployed. The HR system has responded well to the requirement to change in order to support the transforming, modular, brigade-centric Army. The NHRP has been deeply involved in leading the transformation of the HR system and has developed several holistic and cultural changes which are better
33
serving the Army, its Soldiers and commanders. The notion of building the NHRP is passé – the NHRP exists in force and is influencing and supporting deployed HR operations currently. While there is the potential to continue to develop and expand the role of the NHRP, the fundamental leadership of the HR system exists and is critical to day-to-day HR operations. At the conclusion of the initial concept brief for this project held at Ft Jackson, South Carolina on 3 May 2007, the leader of the NHRP, LTG Michael Rochelle, DCS, G-1 made the following observation: “We must not lose sight of the most important element of this entire effort – the brigade S-1. The focus of our efforts must develop and strengthen the abilities of these HR leaders.”
Endnotes
In a memorandum to the HR community, the G-1 seeks support for PSDR and HR transformation from the community. PSDR is an important element of the thriving linkage of the National HR Provider to operational elements of the Army, and is a critical linkage to continued HR success. LTG Michael D. Rochelle, Deputy Chief of Staff Army, G-1, “Personnel Services Delivery Redesign,” memorandum for the Army HR Community, Washington, D.C., 29 November 2006. FM 1 describes the COE as follows: “The strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements demand that today’s Army forces conduct operations of a type, tempo and duration that differ significantly from those of the past.” U.S. Department of the Army, The Army, Field Manual 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2005), 4-1. For this paper, the HR system is the entire HR enterprise which consists of HR professionals, providers, S-1 and G-1 staff sections and SRC12 HR organizations which produce policy, guidance, programs, doctrine, structure and procedures for the execution of the HR core competencies (as described in FM 1-0) and those elements which execute the core competencies. The system includes the enabling automation systems and supporting data backbone which allow the rapid processing of personnel data. The HR system applies across all components of the Army, but is executed in slightly different patterns and with different enablers in each component. The HR system crosses the entire DOTMLPF construct. U.S. Department of the Army, Human Resources Support, Field Manual 1-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 21 February 2007), 1-2 - 1-5. The term “top of the system” emerged during the development of modular transformation among Army planners and force managers to describe the Department of the Army-level of any system within the Army. The HR “top of the system” normally describes the Army G-1, Army G-1
4 3 2 1
34
staff, and Army Human Resources Command. Generally, the term also describes the element of the G-1 or HRC which is responsible for policy development or implementation guidance for any specific HR action or process. The HR “top of the system” is synonymous with the NHRP.
5
Field Manual 1, 4-1.
Standard Requirement’s Code (SRC) 12 is the Army Force Management code for AG TOE organizations controlled, developed and managed by the Adjutant General School of the Soldier Support Institute (SSI), an element of TRADOC. Legacy SRC 12 structures included the Personnel Detachments, Personnel Services Battalion, and PERSCOM structures eliminated by the inventory by senior Army leader decisions and, in the case of Personnel Detachments, the implementation of PSDR. The transformed SRC 12 structures include the Human Resource Sustainment Center (HRSC), HR Company headquarters, Military Mail Terminal teams, Theater Gateway R5 teams, various Plans and Operations teams, postal, R5 (Reception, Replacement, Return-to-duty, Rest and recreation, and Redeployment) and casualty platoons and teams. Additionally, FM 1-0 establishes that the mission of the G-1 is to: “develop, manage, and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs, and policies across all Army components for the entire Army team.”, Field Manual 1-0, 3-15. U.S. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Army G-1 Home Page, available from www.armyg1.army.mil; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008. U.S. Department of the Army, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Order Number 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 9 July 2002), 20. U.S. Department of the Army, Establishment of the United States Army Human Resources Command (HRC), General Order Number 7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 September 2003), 2.
11 10 9 8 7
6
Ibid.
Planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing the theater HR support mission is a combined effort for the Army/ASCC G-1 and the HRSC. FMI 1-0.02, Theater-level Human Resources Support provides more detailed descriptions of the roles, responsibilities and interactions of the Army/ASCC G-1and the HRSC through a dedicated chapter. The interaction of these two entities is an area of HR transformation currently under study by both SSI and CASCOM, as well as the NHRP. LTC Lawrence J. Wark, Expanding the National HR Provider Role in Transformed Theater HR Support, Army White Paper (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. War College, September 2007), 1. The term adjutant comes from the Latin Adjutare, which means to assist the commander. Adjutant duties focus on the administrative duties required to support the commander of an organization brigade and below, where the commander is not a general officer authorized an aide. Adjutants typically manage commander correspondence, the commander’s schedule, and serve as an aide to the commander. While the term Adjutant and S-1 are often used interchangeably, an S-1 is a personnel officer whose focus is the HR management and support of an organization.
13
12
35
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Field Manual 1, 4-7.
U.S. Department of the Army, 2007 Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 February 2007), A-2. The following quote supports the annotated paragraphs: “The Army’s personnel systems architecture is not fully integrated; has myriad legacy systems that are costly to maintain; inadequately supported; and operate numerous manpower-intensive functional processes. Many of these systems are stove-piped and cumbersome, produce marginal results, have limited or no records keeping capability, require intensive interface resolution, and are not consistent across all components. Many of the supporting processes are manual or semiautomated with unnecessary steps that can and should be eliminated.” Field Manual 1-0, 2-1. A similar concept was delivered to the CSA by then G-1, LTG Maude entitled “Personnel Transformation/Redesign Briefing to CSA”, Slide 7 highlights the ideas which would ultimately provide the underpinnings for the PSDR concept, empowering S-1/G-1 sections as the principle providers to personnel services support and linking those organizations directly to the NHRP. LTG Timothy Maude, “Personnel Transformation/Redesign Briefing to CSA,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C., 4 February 2001. LTC Lawrence Wark, Delivering Personnel Support to a Transformed Army, Army White Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2004), 2. LTC Lawrence Wark, “Theater Human Resources Orientation,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 20 June 2007. The following quote highlights the intent of the PSDR transformation in the HR system and highlights the importance of the linkage between S-1 sections and the NHRP: “HR support is transitioning from a centralized, stove-pipe support philosophy, where AG force structure provided the majority of support, to a decentralized support structure. This transition places the majority of HR support closer to Soldiers and embeds required capabilities in all battalion and brigade/BCT S-1 sections. This transition links the “top of the HR system” directly to the battalion and brigade/BCT S-1 sections…HR support remains focused on the core competencies; it is the manner and location of delivery which changes…Battalion and brigade/BCT S-1 sections are the focal point for the execution of the majority of the HR core competencies for their units.” Field Manual 1-0, 2-2. “OPTEMPO” refers to Operational Tempo of a force or operation. Tempo is the “rate of military action or relative speed and rhythm of military operations,” adding operational to that indicates the rate at which individuals or organizations are required to perform military actions. For equipment, OPTEMPO describes the rate of annual operation and the associated costs. For Soldiers and organizations, OPTEMPO describes the deployment rate for those individuals or organizations. U.S. Department of the Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, Field Manual 102 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 21 September 2004), 1-186. Operating Strength Deviation compares the number of Soldiers actually serving at a given time (faces) with the authorized and recognized requirements (spaces) to be filled. The calculation of OSD includes requirements in the operating force, requirements in the generating force and Soldiers temporarily not serving in either. If there are more Soldiers than requirements, a positive strength deviation exists, and if there are fewer Soldiers than
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requirements, a negative operating strength deviation exists, as it does today. The negative OSD means that there are authorized requirements for Soldiers that are not filled, creating a burden in a unit. COL Louis O. Henkel, “Manning the Force,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 31 July 2007.
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Rochelle, 1. Field Manual 1-0, 2-1.
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R5 (Reception, Replacement, Return-to-duty, Rest and recuperation, and Redeployment) operations include the management and execution of HR activities involved in tracking and ensuring the personnel accountability of Soldiers moving into, through or out of a theater. The 5 “R”s describe the major activities that cause Soldiers and reportable (as determined by DoD and DA) civilian personnel to enter, depart, or transit a deployed AOR. The principle function of R5 operations is the planning, coordination and execution of personnel accountability within activities and centers that process transiting Soldiers from designated points of origin (APOE/SPOE) to location of assignment. Field Manual 1-0, 5-1. The following quote supports the assertions made in this paragraph: “The transformed capabilities of HR systems increase the capacity and efficiency of the HR system and also provide opportunities for the NHRP to directly influence and support theater-level HR operations. Actions that maximize the NHRP linkage also increase the combined capabilities of the theater HR system and enhance limited force structure that is available.” LTC Lawrence J. Wark, Expanding the National HR Provider Role in Transformed Theater HR Support, 1. Two additional NHRP accomplishments have been removed from this paper due to length considerations: Rapid development and distribution of transformational HR doctrine and the Assignment and fill of operational brigade and battalion S-1 positions with HR officers. The rapid doctrinal development is described as follows: The National HR Provider worked closely with the Adjutant General School to rapidly develop supporting doctrine for HR transformation and distribute it to the field to the transformed S-1 sections, SRC 12 structures as well as Commanders who assume new roles under HR transformation, especially under PSDR. Realizing the criticality of quickly disseminating doctrine to assist newly reorganized and forming HR elements, the entire HR system came together to collect inputs and develop not only the keystone document, FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, but also two Interim Field Manuals (FMI) specifically addressing S-1 operations and theater-level HR support. Both FMI 1-0.01, S-1 Operations and FMI 1-0.02, Theater-level HR Support were developed in close coordination with the National HR Provider, as well as with the field at large. HRC played a critical role, especially in developing chapters addressing postal, casualty and personnel readiness chapters. The rapid fielding of the transformational HR doctrine put the HR system ahead of many other elements of the sustainment warfighting function who have not yet released supporting transformational doctrine. The doctrine allows new organizations to better train and prepare for deployment, as well as assisting HR professionals explain new HR responsibilities and roles to commanders and staffs. The assignment of HR officers to S-1 positions is described as follows: A significant impact of Force Design Update (FDU) 05-02, the formal structuring of PSDR, was the recoding of all battalion S-1 positions to AG. This recognized the critical role of the battalion S-1 in delivering transformed HR support and the importance in placing a trained HR officer in that position. This move has 2d order effects for the National HR
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Provider. Brigade and BCT S-1 positions had been coded FA43 since FY2000, but PSDR mandated a priority fill of FA43 officers to S-1 positions, resulting in increase fill rates. The assignment of these officers to both battalion and brigade S-1 positions places a trained HR officer at the key unit-level HR positions. The HR officer assigned as the S-1 allows the National HR Provider to better communicate requirements, expectations and policy to commanders at the battalion and brigade level, those commanders who are the focus of the transformed Army and current contingency operations. A trained, AG officer assigned as a battalion S-1 is better prepared to supervise the execution of decentralized HR tasks and ensure HR automated systems are properly employed and updated. Additionally, trained HR officers will provide better advice to brigade commanders now required to make more HR decisions. The assignment of HR officers to battalion and brigade S-1 positions establishes a stronger, more effective linkage from the unit to the National HR Provider. Current HRC focus on filling these positions as a priority must continue to better support the operational Army, especially as ARFORGEN manning is executed during the deployment cycle. PSDR implementation was a fast-tracked transformational effort within the Army. The initial White Paper was developed in August 2004, the concept was piloted within three months, resources were confirmed and then obtained through the direction of the VCSA allowing Armywide implementation to begin in November 2005, with conversion of ALL operational active battalions and brigades by February 2008. The fielding was fully funded and resourced through the incredible efforts of members of the Army G-1, G-3 and HRC and the streamlined program processes evolved in support of GWOT. The author attended at least five Senior-leader sessions (COLs, GOs, and civilian SES) where leaders stated that they did not believe that the stated timeline was feasible or attainable. The implementation process did, therefore, exceed the expectations of Army leaders. It is important to note that many of the senior leaders who were skeptical were themselves responsible for the rapid implementation of PSDR due to their exceptional efforts in support of the program. GEN Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, “Personnel Services Delivery Redesign,” memorandum for the Army Staff, Washington, D.C., 24 October 2005. Feedback provided by MG Sean Byrne, Commanding General, Human Resources Command, at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, during remarks to HR students based on statements made to him by operational commanders. 7 December 2007. Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) is the system which manipulates the personnel data stored in a DoD database which records personal data on Soldiers and their dependents and is used to produce identification and Common Access Cards (CAC) for Soldiers and dependents. A fourth example removed from this paper due to length considerations is the modification of the noncommissioned officer semi-centralized promotion system processing. The modification of the semi-centralized noncommissioned officer promotion system (SGT, SSG) is another example of policy change to support transformation and recognition of the increasing capability of HR systems and infrastructure. The previous system for semicentralized promotion required an intensive manpower-driven process at the unit and PSB level to compile and process Promotion Point Worksheets, DA form 3355. The system was labor intensive and often required thousands of corrections at HRC level annually. PSDR analysis indicated that the process must be modified to be executed at the brigade level. The Army G-1 Directorate of Military Personnel Management (DMPM) developed an automated form which
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allows Soldiers personally to enter key data points which dramatically streamlines the S-1 processes. This use of both rapid policy modification and technological solutions to enable policy challenges reflects a clear example of NHRP influence on the HR system. LTC Twanda Young, Policy Planner, Military Mobilization Branch, DMPM, Army G-1, telephone interview by author, 12 December 2007. COPS is a COGNOS-based, read-only system which uses current Soldier and unit status data from the Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) and Unit Identification Code (UIC), compares it to authorization data provided from the Army G-3 TAADS system and the authorizations guidance generated by Army G-1 in the PMAD to reflect unit strength. This system’s utility is that TAPDB data is updated by the unit and HRC and allows all levels of command to see the same data. This capability ensures that assignment managers and distributors at HRC see the same “truth” units see in their S-1 section, enabling timely “top of the system” management decisions to be understood in the brigade S-1 section, thus creating a level of synergy not previously experienced. LTC Lawrence Wark, “Personnel Readiness Management,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 20 June 2007. Personnel Asset Visibility Report (PAVR) supports personnel data preparation for the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army (DRRS-A) process again allows commanders and HR providers at various levels to plug into readiness data and see the same information, better supporting manning decisions by the NHRP. Like COPS, PAVR takes data from the corporate data base, which reflects current status at the time of submission. Like COPS, the PAVR module is a capability developed, fielded and refined by the NHRP to better execute Personnel Readiness Management in the operational Army. LTC Michelle Mason, “USR,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 31 January 2007.
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Wark, “Personnel Readiness Management,” 20 June 2007.
The following quote defines PAVR functionality and usefulness as a key personnel readiness enabler developed and fielded by the NHRP, significantly improving Personnel Readiness Management throughout the operational Army: “The PAVR tool is designed to assist unit S-1s, commanders, and unit status report (USR) personnel with personnel readiness information. PAVR will enable the S-1 to use eMILPO data managed throughout the month to directly support preparation of the personnel portion of the USR. The Army will benefit with accurate, individual-Soldier data, which is synchronized with unit readiness reporting. This is key for accurate comparisons of DRRS-A and eMILPO readiness data. Operational and sustainment decisions are made by senior leaders based on comparisons of these data.”, Mason, “USR,” 31 January 2007. Forms Content Manager (FCM) is a system which has significantly streamlined processes. In conjunction with secure digital signature capability, FCM allows the paperless preparation of personnel actions and submission digitally. For example, this process allows evaluations to be processed at the unit and then submitted to the NHRP in a paper-less process. Additionally, deployed units can process actions while deployed and forward completed actions directly to the NHRP. FCM not only makes EPS more effective, it dramatically shortens the time required to process actions and return completed actions to the initiating headquarters or even Soldier. LTC Lawrence Wark, “Essential Personnel Services,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, 18 June 2007.
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DIMHRS is a congressionally mandated, joint, personnel and pay system which is part of the DoD Enterprise Resource Planning process intended to support multi-component, multiservice task force operations. One time data entry automatically triggers corresponding pay and personnel transactions with no manual reconciliation process required. DIMHRS is a COTS system based on PeopleSoft products which will subsume 81 different legacy systems and databases and incorporates increased Soldier self-service capabilities. COL Patrick Devine, “Army DIMHRS Executive Overview - PSDR,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, Soldier Support Institute, January 2007. GEN Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, “Army Campaign Plan, Change 5 (U),” memorandum for the Army, Washington D.C., 5 April 2007. Colonel Patrick Devine, “Army DIMHRS Executive Overview - PSDR,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, January 2007.
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Wark, “Personnel Readiness Management,” 20 June 2007.
The HRMQC has served as the catalyst for change at the AG School: The Human Resource Management Qualification Course (HRMQC), which is Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Phase II for FA 43 officers, has been the catalyst for some of this change. HRMQC has doubled in length from two weeks to four, moved from HRC to Ft Jackson, included hands-on HR automated systems training and focused on transformational HR topics at the brigade and BCT-level – focusing on the duties and responsibilities of the S-1 section. Although intended for new FA 43 officers who are senior captains or majors, the course attracts HR professionals from all levels and the three components. Instruction developed for this course is being tailored for other HR courses, emphasizing the S-1 focus of HR support to the operational Army. Force Design Update 05-02, approved in February 2006, directed all S-1s in operational battalions be recoded to BR 42B Adjutant General Corps (AG) officers. The intent of this decision by the VCSA was to place an HR expert in each battalion in order to properly execute the PSDR initiative and maximize support for the battalion. The onus of this decision was transferred to the AG School to effectively train these young AG officers to be, in fact, HR professionals. BG Gina Farrisee, Director of Military Personnel Management, “HQDA Active Component Manning Guidance for Fiscal Year 2007,” memorandum for the Combatant Commanders, Washington D.C., 1 March 2007. The following quote from the FY 2007 Army Manning Guidance explains the linkage of manning guidance to the deployment schedule executed in support of the GWOT IAW ARFORGEN: “The FY07 Manning Guidance signifies a move toward a phased readiness strategy necessary to support ARFORGEN. This is accomplished by linking personnel fill with the Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE)/Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) and deployment dates. The ARFORGEN process creates operational readiness cycles where individual units increase their readiness over time, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy.” Farrisee, 1 March 2007. Another recommended area of focus not included in this paper due to length considerations is the creation of a NHRP Assessment and Assistance Program that serves to identify systemic problems and gaps, conducts analysis of the HR system, provides potential
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solutions to proponent executive agents for resolution, and integrates policy, publications, doctrine, and HR training. The role of this capability would be to assess and assist HR organizations and commanders, integrate efforts across the HR system, collaborate with all involved stakeholders and facilitate necessary changes to policies, procedures, doctrine and structure. The organization’s mission would be to evaluate the effectiveness of military personnel management and improve the quality of personnel service and support provided to Soldiers and commanders at all levels and across all components in both the operational and institutional Army. Also included in this organization is the capability to establish an HR Knowledge Management center with the mission to build and provide a single source, collaborative and integrated approach to the creation, capture, organization, access, use and reuse of HR intellectual capitol and well-being information in order to facilitate the HR community’s ability to achieve integrated mission support. COL Robert Whaley, “National Human Resource Provider Assessment and Assistance Program Concept Brief,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Alexandria, Army Human Resources Command, December 2007. Various CFLCC, 1st TSC, ARCENT leaders, interview by author, 4-5 November 2007, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The following quote describes the role of the HRSC in the deployed AOR in integrating, coordinating and providing technical guidance for the execution of several HR core competencies: “The HRSC mission is to provide theater-level support to the Army/ASCC G-1 and TSC Commander. The HRSC is the key linkage between the Army/ASCC G-1, who provides the policy, direction, plans, and guidance for HR support and the TSC which executes theater HR support for postal, casualty, R5 and PASR infrastructure support. The HRSC has a defined role in supporting both of these elements to ensure that the theater HR support plan is developed, supportable, and executed by SRC 12 elements subordinate to the TSC. The HRSC is the key technical link to HR organizations (HR companies, platoons and teams) executing postal, R5, and casualty functions. Command and control for these HR elements is provided by sustainment organizations.” Wark, Expanding the National HR Provider Role in Transformed Theater HR Support, 3. FDU 05-01 was submitted by the AG School in 2004, just prior to the introduction of the PSDR concept. The FDU developed the concept of HR Companies with HR platoons to replace the PSBs and Personnel Detachments which were leaving the force structure. The HR Platoon retained similar capability for area personnel support as the legacy Personnel Detachment. FDU 05-01 was never approved, as FDU 05-02 was introduced by the AG School as part of the personnel transformation process which formalized PSDR – and superseded FDU 05-01. The HR Platoon has been considered as a possible area support HR structure available to provide HR services and support to operational units without an attached or assigned command relationship to a brigade S-1 section or a Special Troops Battalion (STB) S-1 section, such as theater-level temporary joint commands with large Army presence like MNF-I. BG James Hodges, Commanding General, Army Material Command (FWD)(SWA), interview by author, 5 November 2007, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
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Additional discussion for the recommended NHRP forward presence decision is listed here: The second rotation of the HRSC and the TSC and ESC command and control elements will occur prior to any possible modification of the SRC elements on the ground, and the second rotation more closely represents the original conceptualization of Modular Force Logistical support to the AOR, which should be given an opportunity to succeed. The Army will also be fielding DIMHRS during this timeframe which will add significant stress to deployed HR operations without the complication of major changes in HR structure and command relationships.
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doc_422523351.pdf