Description
Research reports for Conflict: Toward Conceptual Clarity:- Conflict refers to some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one of more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. Conflict can arise between members of the same group, known as intragroup conflict
Research reports for Conflict: toward Conceptual Clarity
T h e mainstream of organizational literature is generally ambiguous i n delineating the concept of ~onflict.This paper distinguishes conflict from competition in the intraorganizational context and presents a behavioral conceptualization of the process of conflict. It is proposed that goal incompatibility, perceived opportunity for interference, and interdependent activities among organizational subunits increase the potential for conflict. This conceptual scheme is then applied t o a situation involving city government officials engaged i n bargaining with a city employee union."
Researchers for decades have sought an adequate definition of conflict and a conceptualization of its development. In an exhaustive review which focused on this state of conceptual disarray, Fink (1968) commented: issues relevant to the analysis of conflict within organizations and will present what is felt to be a more distinct definition of the concept of conflict, along with a framework for analyzing the process leading to conflict among interdependent decisionmaking units.
. . . the existing diversity of empirical and theoretical approaches to the study of social conflict has produced a state of conceptual and terminological confusion, which impedes both comparisons between distinct classes of conflict phenomena and the process of theoretical integration (p. 416).
INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING DEFINITIONS
Rather than repeat Fink's (1968) exhaustive review of the different approaches used to define conflict, we will focus on several While the literature pertaining to conflict specific problems in approaches to the study within and between organizations is a small of conflict in organizations. subset among the studies of social conflict, much of it suffers from the same shortcom- Value Laden Definitions ing as the literature of conflict in general. ~ ~ f i of conflict ~ i to ~ ~on value ~ i tend ~ For example, in a recent Paper O'Connell laden terminology, using such terms, for ex( 1971) reviewed the state of and re- ample, as : "breaches in normally expected search on lateral conflict within organiza- behavior,= ( ~~~l~ and siege], 1966; 21 ) ; tions and concluded that: "a breakdown in standard mechanisms of Definitions of conflict have been either ignored decision-making," (March and Simon, 1958; or stated in exceedingly vague terms. Such 112); "a threat to cooperation," (Marek, vagueness makes comparison of different re- 1966; 64); "opposition processes in any search difficult. Efforts to develop a comprehen- of several forms-competition, status, rivalry, sive typology of lateral conflict, while necessary, bargaining, sabotage, verbal abuse, etc.," cannot be substituted for strivings to develop (wa1ton, 1966; 411); or rigorous conceptual and operational definitions struggles,= ( coser, 1956; 135). ~h~~~ defiof conflict and its associated key variables (p. nitions imply underlying normative v, d1UES
35).
This paper will explore some of the basic toward conflict, whereas a definition should be devoid of value perspective to be useful
* The authors would like to thank L. L. Cummings for analytic purposes. The "value"factorspar- of a for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this On such as ticular conflict paper. the institutional setting, the consequences
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1IENCE QUAKTERLY
of the conflict, the aftermath effects of the conflict, and the point of view of the individual making the vahle jndgnient. These variables, however, should be treated separately from any conceptual definition of the basic behavioral phenomenon. Overly Broad Definitions Much of the literature fails to distinguish between conflict and its antecedent conditions. Pondy (1967) suggests this:
The term "conflict" has been used at one time or another in the literature to describe: ( 1 ) antecedent conditions (for example, scarcity of resources, policy diflerences) of conflictful behavior, ( 2 ) affective states (e.g., stress, tension, hostility, anxiety, etc.) of the individual involved, ( 3 ) cognitive states of individuals, (i.e., their perception or awareness of conflictful situations, and ( 4 ) conflictful behavior, ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression (p.
flict. Mack and Snyder (1957) suggest that this issue has received inadequate attention:
... relatively little elfort has been made to specify analytically dillerent properties of conflict as a generic phenomenon and to differentiate explicitly between conflict and c l o d y related concepts (p. 213).
Confusion Between Conflict and Competition The distinction between concepts of conflict and competition provides a third source of collceptllal ambiguity. Fink (1968) identifies three schools of thought. The first treats conliict as a subset of competition. Lasswell (1931) was an (~nrlyadvocate of this position. Bonlding (1962) supports it:
Competition in its broadest sense exists whtm any potential positions of two behavior units are mutually incompatible. This is a l~roader concept than conflict, . . . whereas all cases of conflict involve competition in the above sense not all cases of competition involve conflict. . . . Conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are azoare of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatil~lewith the wishes of the other. . . . (p. 4 ) .
298).
While Pondy attempts to resolve this dilemma by treating the development of con- flict as a dynamic process, he provides nei- ther a criterion for distinguishing one stage from another, nor a conceptual distinction between latent and manifest conflict. Similarly, Dahrendorf (1959) argues that a broad definition of conflict is appropriate for use at varying levels of analysis. He descril~eshis approach as follows:
I am using the term "conflict" for contests, competitions, disputes, and tensions as well as for manifest clashes between social force.;. All relations between sets of individuals that involve an incompatible diflerence of objective-i.e., in its most general form, a desire on the part of both contestants to obtain what is available only
to one, or only in part-are, in this sense, relations of social conflict (p. 135).
Those who have supported this view, llowever, have failed to specify the behavioral consequences of their distinction and thus make it difficult to specify enipirically testable distinctions between the two conditions. The second school of thought stresses thc extent to which behavior is regulated (Maclc, 1965). Fink summarizes this position by stating that competition:
rules or i~lstitutionali/ecl norms which limit what the competitors can do to each other in the course of striving to reach their respective goals . . . but conflict is unregulated (i.e., involves the violations of the rules) (p. 443).
. . . involves established
Thus, he extends the term to include all types of interaction among units holding different objectives. Several authors, however, have taken issue with the analytic util- ity of such a broad approach. I11 essence, these critics argue for an action centered definition of conflict which distinguishes explicitly between conflict and its underlying antecedents. Coser (1956) especially cites the need to distinguish between the existence of incoinpatible goals and actual con-
As Fink points out, however, thew is no general agreement in this school of thought on the nature or limits of the norms for regulating behavior (MacIver, 1937; Si~nniel, 1955; Levinger, 1957; Dahrendorf, 1959; Anbert, 1963; and Beals and Siegel, 1966). The third school of thought treats competition and conflict as behaviorally distinct
[ n : CONFLICT
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phenomena and is closely related to those arguing lor a narrow definition of conflict (Ross, 1930; RiIacIver, 1937; Simmel, 1955; and Gross, 1966). The key behavioral differ- ence suggested by this group is directly an- alogous to the difference between partici- pants in a race and a fight (Ross, 1930). In the former, which is a characteristic ol com- petition, the participants do nothing to ob- struct the efforts of their opponents, while in the latter, behavior is centered on blocking the efforts of one's opponents to reach their goals. Fink (1968) describes the difference as one of parallel striving (competition) versus niutual interference (conflict) among parties trying to reach a position in which siniultaneous occupancy is not per- ceived to be possible. Since the strategies of the parties will differ in the two situa- tions, this distinction becomes ilnportant in a behavior centered definition of conflict. TVe will develop this distinction morc fully in the conceptual framework that follows. T H E CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
sources lor the mlits involved. The resource attainnicnt stage is that scgncnt of the scquential work-flow process at which the rc- source inpnt into the unit occurs from its cnvironnlent ( Katz and Kahn, 1966). This resource inpnt may be eithcr material or nonm,~terial,as knowledge, and is reqnircd by the unit for its goal attainmcnt. Tlrc som-cc of these inputs is from tlrat portion of the cnvironnicnt which Dill (1958) dcwribed as the task environn~cnt. The units may either share sonie r c \ o ~ ~ r c e s (or be mutually dependent on sonie cornlnon resource allocator) or the resources may be ~wrceivcd to be relatively unlimited. The more dcpentlencc on a conimon source that is perceived, the morc the units will tcsnd to vicw thcir slicccss (goal attainmtmt) as contingent on each other's behavior. Similarly, some evidence suggests that when rcsources are rclativelv unlimited it is less imperative for the units to rationalize their claims for the resources ( Sinion, 1953).
Finally, the i n t c r d e p c n d ~ i l cof activitics ~ annong th? units is important for undcrstandThree criteria arc suggcstcd, therefore, to ing the type of situation that lwds to congnide thc search for a morc precise and 11se- flict as opposed to competition ainong dc- ful definition of conflict: ( 1 ) the d?finition cisioil-nlaking units. Pursuit of goals attcr should bc devoid of value laden pcrspec- thc necessary resources have been acclliircd tivcs; ( 2 ) it should focus on spccific actions is defined as the activity stag(,. Units may and b c conceptually distinct 110th from its 1)e dcpcndcnt upon one anothcr during the anteccdcnt conditions and its conseqnences; activity stag? for schcdl~ling,coinplianc~,or and ( 3 ) thc concept should be distinct from coordination of activitics ( Thompson, 1967 ) . that of competition. I n addition, to 1)c nscinl Intertlcpcndcncc of activity where goals arc as an analytic tool, the conditions neccssm-y incompatible presents occasion for potcmtial for conflict to occur sholild I,? specified. Thv conflict (\Vhitc, 1961; Seiler, 1963; Assacl, following discussion attempts to mcpt these 1969; Walton and Ilutton, 1969). criteria by developing a narrow, action ccnThus, in the nrocess 110th of coml,etition tprcd definition of conflict distinct from and conflict, the goals arc pcrccivcd to 1)c incompati1)lc (Berclson and Stciner, 1964) compctition. and the tinits are striving respectively to atConflict as Distinct from Competition tain these goals. In this context, competition Perception of goal incompati1)ility is a occurs \vhcrc, given incompatible goals, there ncccssary precondition for eithcr conflict or is no interference with onc another's attaincompetition. This implies that goal attain- ment. The essential difference 1,ctwccm comment bj7 one unit is seen to prevent others petition and conflict is in th? realm of intcr - from achieving thcir goals under thc same fcrence, or blocking activitics ( Seiler, 1963). circumstances or with equivalent outcomes. I t is - postulated that in cornpctition, rcsourccs Thns, for example, thc units within the or- may be shared or independent, b11t the ganization strive to attain their rcspc~ctive :~ctiviticsof the ~ m i t sarc not perceived l)y goals at each other's potential expense. thc unit mcm1)ers to 1)c interdependent. A seconcl factor is the availability of rc- Ther?forc, duv to the state of the ~ ~ ~ s o u r c c s
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RESOURCE STAGE Shared or Not ACTIVITY Indep. GOAL
and activities, the units do not perceive the opportunity for interference. The result is the parallel striving of the units toward their respective goals as illustrated in Figure 1. Walker (1970) defines "conflictful behav- ior" as, "Actions by one member which are inconsistent with the goals or objectives of some other member" (p. 18). Using this definition as a starting point, we propose to define "member" (party to conflict) as any decision-making unit (individual or collec- tive) acting interdependently with one or more other decision-making units. Walton and McKersie (1965) have defined the range of interdependence as, "The area within which the parties stand to benefit from continuing their relationship" (p. 11). Thus, an incentive is provided to initiate or continue a relationship. To complete a definition of interdependence that is applicable to a decision-making process, a further limiting condition must be specified for the functional relationships among the parties. Thus, for an interdependent relationship within the area specified by the Walton and McKersie definition, no one party can hold sufficient power unilaterally to dictate the outcome of the interaction (Emerson, 1962; Thompson, 1967). In developing his definition of conflictful behavior, Walker (1970) states that: If two members hold divergent goals (latent conflicts), and if these goals motivate their behavior, then one member will be motivated to behave in a way which is inconsistent with the goals of the other (p. 18). Our conceptual framework, however, replaces "divergent goals" with incompatible
goals, the latter being not simultaneously attainable. So the two concepts are qualitatively different, and incompatibility of goals is treated as a prerequisite for conflict. The existence of incompatible goals motivates conflict but says nothing about perceived ability to engage in it (Walker, 1970). Thus, given incompatibility of goals, a set of variables must be introduced which increase the probability that the parties will engage in conflict. This set of variables is the perceived opportunity for interfering with attainment of one another's goals. The perceived opportunity depends on the re- sources and activities that the paities share (Mack and Snyder, 1957; Goldman, 1962). If, however, both shared resources and interdependent activities are equal to zero, no perceived opportunity for interference will exist. Since incompatibility of goals is a neces- sary antecedent for the development of con- flict, the concept of a goal needs to be made explicit. Boulding (1957) describes goals in terms of topography and speaks of future "positions" that a unit wishes to occupy. Consistent with this approach is the framework used by Simon (1964) in which goals are value premises that serve as inputs to a de- cision of an organizational unit. In this view, a goal can be operationally defined as the criterion decision makers use to order their preferences. What, then, are the underlying causes that lead a unit to select some goals rather than others as premises for decisions? Simon (1964) calls these causal factors motives or motivational forces influencing the choice of goals (positions in Boulding's ( 1957) terms).
Schmidt G Kochan: CONFLICT This general framework provides th? fou11dation for our concept of conflict. The rclationships among thc varial~lcsin the process leading to conflict arc illl~stratcdin Figure 2. own intvrcsts in its relationship with thc others. This advancement must resl~ltfrom detprmincd action, not fortuitous circumstance. Thus, th? concept of conflict incor-
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PERCEIVED GOAL INCOMPATI BI LITY
-
-
MOTIVATIONAL FORCES
CONFLICT
SHARED RESOURCES
L
r
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERFERENCE Ir
.
INTERDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES
FIGURE THE 2.
PROCESS O F CONFLICT
As shown in Figure 2, perceived goal inconpati1)ility and thc perceivcd opportl~nityfor interfercnce imn~cdiatelydetermine conflict. These varia1)lcs arc percpived from the vantage point of interdependent decision-niaking units. Perceived incompatil>ility of goals results from particular motivational forces in a spccific situation. Both the extent to which resources are sharcd and the degree to which the units' activities arc intcrdepcndcllt detc,rminc any one unit's pcrceived opportunity for int~rfcrcncc. This process is consistent with Pondv's (1967) suggestion that the d c v ~ l o p m ~'oft n conflict can 1)eviewed as a dynamic process. Unlike Pondy, howcver, we conceptualize conflict as t h r ovcrt 1,ehavioral outcome of this proccx, that is, the actual interfcrencc, or blocking. Conflict as d?fincd in our schvn~c refers to overt lwhavior arising out of a procvss in which one unit sccl\s the advancement of its
poratcs such protest n~ovcmentsthat inay occnr in formal organizations as promotioil of interests, secession, and seizure of power ( I ~ m m e r s ,1969). Units arc not in conflict when dplil)crate interference is absent, or if thcv havc agreed on thcir final position but cvcnts 1)cyond thcir control prevent or hamper the111 from realizing it. Such cvcnts may arisc 1)ecause of insnflicicmt coordination or soinc. factor other than the intended actions ot any of the lmits. Thc intcrlcrcncc, therc,torc,, mnst 11c deli1)eratc and goal directed 1)y at least one party. Interfcrencc may be passivc or activc,. Passive interfcrcncc may occur, for cxamplc, if th? actions of onc unit arc required 1)y another in its activity stagc but thc first unit docs not cooperate (I-Iickson et al., 1971). This lmit is deliberately intcrfering with thc othcr's goal. The result is d c t r i n ~ ~ n t n l thc to sc,cond ini it and :~clvantageonsto thc first.
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UNlT
AURIINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUAKTEKLP
RESOURCE Shared or Not ACTlVl T Y Interdep. GOAL
Types of Conflict
Thc actual 1,locking behavior which characterizcs conflict can occur at the rcsource attainment stage of the proccss, the stage ot intcrdepcndencc of activitics, or at both stages. Each of thesc possibilities is a particular type or subclass of conflict. An example of Type I involving interference at the point of resource attainm?nt was illustrated in th? Trist and Bamforth (1951) study of the preindustrial coal min- ing operation. This type of conflict is illus- trated in Figure 3. In the Trist and Bamforth study, there was conflict bctwcen the teams in the proccss of fulfilling the team goals of having the maximum number of coal tubs filled. The tubs, in this example, were one of the scarce and neccssary resources for each unit. Thus, the tramrner of each mining team would resort to sharp practices to obtain an adequate supply of tubs so that his team would have sufficient resources to use in their work-flow proccss. Taking extra tubs,
UNlT RESOURCE Shared or Not
however, put onc team ahcad at thc cxpense of the othcrs. In Type 11, the goals are incompatil~lc,thc resources can 1)e cither shared or not, and the activities are interdependent. As illustratcd in Figure 4, the blocking bchavior occurs at the activity stage. An example of conflict 1)ased on 1)locking at the stage of intcrdeppndPnt activity is d?scribcd 1)y Trist and Bamforth (1951) in the 1,onpvall coal mining study. The special- ized task groups ( gummcrs and fillers) had individual goals. The total work activity, however, was ii~terdependcntso that a unit could only do its work if the previous unit finished its work completely. Because 01 tcnsions between the gummcrs and the fillers, a conflict developed. In this case, the gummers interfcrcil with the fillers' ability to ilo thcir job. When they left some 01 the gumming~,the fillers faced increased difficulty and were unable to meet thcir production goal. Type 111 is characterized by incompatible
ACTIVITY Interdep.
GOAL
goals, shcircd rpsourccs, and interdep~ndcnt activities. The blocking in this scheme occurs at the point of resource sharing and at the activity stage as ilh~stratcdin Figure 5.
UNIT RESOURCE
'I'hib'lut, 1969), as well as the worl\ of t h ~ collective barg,~ining thcoriyts (Schclling, 1960; I%ouldil~g, 1962, Stevens, 1963; Walton and llcKcrsie, 1965), rcprcsellt altc~rlrativc
ACTIVITY GOAL
FIGURE CONFLICT: 5. TYPE
I11
In the Dutton and Walton ( 1966) study of interdepartmental conflict, one sees the elfects of units having opposing, narrowly defined goals, intense int~rdependence of activity, and shared resources. The two dcpartments studied wcrc production and sales. The former emphasized efficiency and cost control while the latter focused on scrviccs and building volume. Each unit sought to gain maximum freedom of movement for itself while limiting the freedom of the other. The blocking behavior characteristic 01 conflict became evident. The production dcpartmcnt would claim not to havc material to produce an order t h c r ~ b y thwarting the sales unit's cflorts at service, and sales would withhold vital information lrom thc production unit thcrcby making cost estimates difficult. Three types of conflict based on thc location at which the blocking activity occurs arc thus distinguished. One implication of this typology is that wc may need to devise specific strategies for resolving the different types of conflict. We may first need to determine exactly where the collflict is occurring and then implement strategies to d ~ a with l the specific form of blocking bchavior. For example, Pondy (1970) has developed a model for allocating resources which may serve as a useful strategy for resolving Type I conflicts. On the other hand, the work of the small group decision-making theorists on problem solving tcchnicjucs (Kcllcy and
strategies for resolution which foctls on the activity stage of an interdcpcndent rc~lationship, Type TI conflict.
Potential for Conflict
Potential for conflict d ~ p e n d s tllc extent on to which required resources are shared, the dcgrcc of interdcp(~ndcncc,and p e r c ~ i v ~ d incompatibility of goals. These var~ablesarc spcn as continl~ousrather than catcgoric so any 01 the thrce may range from high to low olr a continuum. Thus the set of variabl~s which are lelt to dctcrnlin~thc potential for conflict can be vicwcd in terms of thrce dimellsional spacc. In Flgure 6, tlw nodal position charactcristics of units with eitlwr high or low potclltial lor conflict are illustrated. The rclatlvc incompatibility of goals is shown along the y axis, degree of shared rcsources along thc x axis, and the interdcpendcnce of activities along the z auis. Thus the arPa designated U would bc expected to havc a high potential for conflict, since units op~ratingin this situation arc ~upectcdto manif~stthe characteristics of 'l'ypc. I11 conflict. Tn this situation, the units would hold highly incompatible goals, bc highly depcndent on shared resources, and have a lligh interdcpcndellce of activities. Tn the area d(,signated J, the 11nits would b(1 cxp~ctedto havc a low potential for conflict due to the low illcompatibility of goals,
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HlCU PO'
Pr\RICI IPT
ERDEPENDENCE
I I
0
0/
/
0 0
I
Low LOW CONFLICT POTENTIAL
J
RESOURCES SHARED
,
X
low shared resources, and independent activities. The line UJ is the potential for conflict vector as it represents the diagonal continuum between the nodal areas of high ( U ) and low ( J ) potential for conflict. This framework has the advantage of allowing researchers to sort out underlying psychological, structural, environmental, or other factors which lead to conflict among interdependent units. Within this scheme, the variables that increase the potential for incompatibility of goals to result in conflict can be treated separately, and so clearer insight is gained for analyzing the consequences of the conflict.
AN APPLICATION OF THE CONFLICT FRAMEWORK
While the framework suggested here has yet to be used for any large scale empirical
analysis, it has proved useful for explaining the development of internal conflict among city government officials engaged in bargaining with a city employee union. The follow- ing discussion is based on two case studies of this situation (Kochan, 1971) and is included to illustrate the utility of the framework. For the officials, collective bargaining is a task for which various decision-making units sharing the authority to make decisions on issues of employment relations must participate. This dispersed nature of the author- ity to negotiate, ratify, and implement an agreement with a union makes these units interdependent. In the case studies, five such units were identified: (1) the city councils, ( 2 ) the mayor, ( 3 ) public commissions (civil service commissions ), ( 4 ) professional negotiators, and (5) department administrators.
Schmidt cL?- Kochcrrn: CONFLICT Each of these is a separate decision-making unit with its own illotivational forces. Previous studies of il~uilicipalgovernment decision making have suggested that govcrnmental officials are influenced by a diversity of motives (Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Hildebrand, 1967). I n the case studies, a number of different motives were identified, including: (1)the desire of both elected and appointed officials to represent the interests of external reference groups and political constituencies in the process of policy making; ( 2 ) the desire of the public commissions to maintain their traditional jurisdiction over personnel issues; and ( 3 ) the desire of the professional negotiators to engage in bilateral negotiations with city unions free from the interference of the elected officials and commission members. I n addition, the negotiators tended to prefer a harder line on the major substantive issue raised by the unions. These diverse forces led various city officials in both cases to hold incompatible goals on issues of policy both for procedural issues and for substantive bargaining. Thus, differ- ent motivational forces led to goal incompat- ibility among these interdependent decision makers, and the first necessary condition for conflict was established. The development of incompatible preferences among management officials is not uncommon in collective bargaining ( Walton and McKersie, 1965; Dunlop, 1967). In most cases, however, organizations ensure that these incompatible preferences do not de- velop into overt conflict. Three conditions enable management officials in private organizations to do so: ( 1) the hierarchical structure of authority in private firms can serve as a device to resolve conflict (Boulding, 1962; Shull, Delbecq, and Cummings, 1970); ( 2 ) specialized departments handle union negotiations and so communications of any internal differences are inhibited (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, 1960); and ( 3 ) the external threat of a strike normally provides the incentive for management officials to reduce their internal differences (Walton and McKersie, 1965). I n short, while similar motivational forces may lead to incompatibility of goals among management officials in the private sector, the structure of their
367
managcmcnt and the bargaining process constrain their ability to engage in overt conflict. NOJICof thcse conditions existed in the city governments studied-the structure of authority was pluralistic (Hildebrand, 1967) rather than hierarchical, a number of points of access to decision makers existed (Tru- man, 1964), and since the right of the em- ployees to strike was absent, it was more difficult for the unions to mount an external threat that the city officials would perceive as credible. I n the absence of these constraints. and because of their interdenendence, the nlanagement officials perceived opportunities to interfere with one another's attainment of goals. Thus the citv officials transformed their incompatible goal preferences into conflict as previously defined. For example, some elected officials and department administrators actively opposed a position taken by the city negotiator in bargaining. Each unit sought to advance its own position to the detriment of the other units. The dissenting units sought to block the negotiator at the activity stage of bargaining by making public pronouncements or holding separate talks with the union. Another decision-making unit, a public con~mission,chose to violate a clause in the final bargaining settlement that had been agreed to by the other city officials. This unit sought to advance its own interests, asserting its disciplinary powers, by disregarding an amnesty clause in the strike-ending agree- ment. Obviously, preceived incompatibility of goals existed between the commission seek:lng to preserve its autonon~yand the other units representing their respective constituencies. To further its own position the commission blocked the other units seeking to make the activity stage of their work
-
peace ful. I n terms of our framework, the management decision-making units were highly interdependent at the activity stage of bargain- ing. Since the structure of authority was such that no one unit could completely control the actions of another in bargaining with the union, the various officials were able to block each other's attainment of goals quite openly. I n summary, the relationship among these
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ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY REFERENCES
Assae17
city government officials could be characterized as one of high interdependence of activity among units with highly incompatible goals. This corresponds to a Type I1 subclass of conflict (see Figure 4). As our conceptual
1969 "Constructive role of interorganizational conflict." Administrative Science Quarterly, 14: 573-582. framework would predict, overt conflict reAubert, Vilhelm 1963 "Competition and dissensus: two sulted. types of conflict." Journal of Conflict This very brief discussion of the relationResolution, VII, 1: 2 6 4 2 . ships among city officials merely provides an Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson example of the applicability of the frame1963 City Politics. New York: Vintage work developed above to an actual situation Books. of conflict. Further empirical research is reand Bernard J. Siegel quired to test the framework's validity more 1966 Divisiveness and Social Conflict: An fully. Anthropological Approach. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. CONCLUSION Berelson, B., and G. Steiner 1964 Human Behavior: An Inventory of This Paper has focused on defining the Scientific Findings. New York: Harprocess of conflict among decision-making court, Brace& World. units within organizations. An attempt was made to limit the concept of conflict narrowly Boulding, Kenneth B. to a specific behavioral process. Thus, a be1962 Conflict and Defense. New York: havioral distinction between conflict and Harper& Row.
competition was made. In addition, a con- Coser> Lewis A.Functions of Social Conflict. 1956 The ceptual model of conflict was derived including the set of variables that increase the Dahrendorf, Ralf Illinois: Free Press. Glencoe, 1959 Class and Class Conflict in Industrial potential for conflict. As with any elementary scheme, this atSociety. Stanford, California: Stanford tempted conceptual clarification of conflict University Press. has many limitations, some of which are Dill, William R. common to the literature discussing goals. 1958 "Environment as an influence on This is a nebulous area at best and is marked managerial autonomy." Administrative by ambiguous measurement and conceptual Science Quarterly, 2: 409443. problems in distinguishing between goals Dunlop> John T. 1967 "The social utility of collective barand behavior. Although we suggest that the gaining." In Lloyd Ulman (ed.), process leading to conflict is dynamic, beChallenges to Collective Bargaining: cause of the constantly changing nature of 168-180. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice goals, no attempt was made to develop this Hall. process. Similarly we do not treat individual Dutton, John M. and Richard E. Walton 1966 "Interdepartmental conflict and codifferences in risk-taking propensity, peroperation: two contrasting studies." ceptual sets, and variance in motivational Human Organization, 25: 207-220. forces which may affect a unit's potential for Richard M. conflict. Finally, further development of this 1962 "Power-dependence relations." Ameriof digerframeworkmight focus on the ent power-dependency relationships among Fink, Clinton Sociological Review, 27: 3 1 4 0 . can F. the interdependent units (Emerson, 1962) 1968 c'Some concepbal difficulties in the theory of social conflict." Journal of and the units' consequent utilities for engagConflict Resolution, XII, 4: 413458. ing in conflict. Goldman, Ralph M. 1962 "Conflict, cooperation and choice: an exploration of conceptual relationThomas A. Kochan and Stuart M . Schmidt ships." In N.F. Washburne (ed.), are both doctoral candidates at the Industrial Decisions, Values and Groups: 410Relations Research Institute at the Univer439. New York: Macmillan. sity of Wisconsin.
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hlarcl-I, J;lrnes G. and Herbert A. Sirrlon 1958 Organizations. New York: Jolrn Wiley. hlarck, J. 1966 "Conflict, a battle of strategies." In J.R. Lawrence (ed.), Operational Iicscarcll and the Social Sciences: 483498. Lontlon: l'avistock. O'
onncll, hlicl-lael 1971 "I~~traorgnnizatio~lal corlflict." University of Wisconsin, unpublisl-rcd paper. Pondy, Louis H. 1967 1970 "Organizational conflict: corlcepts and models." Administrative Sctience Quarterly, 12: 296-320. "Toward a theory of interlli~lresourceallocation." In Rlayer N. ~ a l d(etl.), Power in Organizations: 270-311. Naslrville, Vantlerbilt Tennessee: University Press.
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Principles of Sociology, New York: Century. Schelling, Tllolrlas C. 1960 Tlre Strategy of Collflict.arrlbridge, hl;~ssachusetts: Harvard University Prcss. Seilcr, J.A. 1963 "Diagnosil~g interdepartmental conflict." IIarvartl Busirless l'tcvicw, 41: 121-132. Shull, 1"rcmont A., Jr., Anclre L. Delbecq, and L. L. Curnmirlgs 1970 Orgailizational Decisioll-Rli~kirlg.New York: RfcGmw-Hill. Sirnmcl, Gcorge 1955 (-
ilflict and thc M'cb of Group Aflilintioils. New York: lorce Prcss. Simon, Herbert A. 1953 "Birth of ail organization: the cctonomic coopcration atlministration." Public Atlrninistratioll Review, 13: 227-36. 1964 "On tlrc conccpt of organizatio~ral goal." Administrative Science Quarterly, 9: 1-22. Sliclitcr, Surnnc,r II., James J. lIe:tly, and E. Iiobert Livernash 1960 Thc Impact of Collcctivc Barg;~ining on hla~lagement.Washington, D.C. : Tlre Brookings Institute. Stevens, Carl M. 1963 Strategy arld Collective Ilargaining Negotiation. New York: McGrawHill.
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ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 1966 "Theory of conflict in lateral organizational relationships." In J.R. Lawrence (ed.) , Operational Research and the Social Sciences: 409428. London: Tavistock. Walton, Richard E. and John M. Dutton 1969 "The management of interdepartmental conflict: a model and review." Administrative Science Quarterly, 14: 73-84. Walton, Richard E, and Robert B. McKersie 1965 A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill. White, Harrison 1961 "Management conflict and sociometric structure." American Journal of Sociology, 67: 185-199.
Thompson, James D. 1967 Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill. Trist, E. L., and K. W. Bamforth 1951 "Some social and psychological consequences of the Longwall method of coal-getting." Human Relations, 4: 1-38. Truman, David B. 1964 The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Walker, Orville C., Jr. 1970 An Experimental Investigation of Conflict and Power in Marketing Channels. University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D, thesis. Walton, Richard, E.
References
Constructive Role of Interorganizational Conflict Henry Assael Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, Conflict within and between Organizations. (Dec., 1969), pp. 573-582.
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Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict Resolution Vilhelm Aubert The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Mar., 1963), pp. 26-42.
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Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy William R. Dill Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4. (Mar., 1958), pp. 409-443.
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Power-Dependence Relations Richard M. Emerson American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1. (Feb., 1962), pp. 31-41.
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Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict Clinton F. Fink The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 4, Special Review Issue. (Dec., 1968), pp. 412-460.
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A Strategic Contingencies' Theory of Intraorganizational Power D. J. Hickson; C. R. Hinings; C. A. Lee; R. E. Schneck; J. M. Pennings Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Jun., 1971), pp. 216-229.
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Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organizational Conflicts between Rulers and Ruled Cornelis J. Lammers Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, Conflict within and between Organizations. (Dec., 1969), pp. 558-572.
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Kurt Lewin's Approach to Conflict and Its Resolution: A Review with Some Extensions George Levinger The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Dec., 1957), pp. 329-339.
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The Components of Social Conflict Raymond W. Mack Social Problems, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Spring, 1965), pp. 388-397.
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Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models Louis R. Pondy Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Sep., 1967), pp. 296-320.
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Birth of an Organization: The Economic Cooperation Administration Herbert A. Simon Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1953), pp. 227-236.
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On the Concept of Organizational Goal Herbert A. Simon Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jun., 1964), pp. 1-22.
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The Management of Interdepartmental Conflict: A Model and Review Richard E. Walton; John M. Dutton Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Mar., 1969), pp. 73-84.
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Management Conflict and Sociometric Structure Harrison White The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 67, No. 2. (Sep., 1961), pp. 185-199.
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doc_483480811.docx
Research reports for Conflict: Toward Conceptual Clarity:- Conflict refers to some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one of more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. Conflict can arise between members of the same group, known as intragroup conflict
Research reports for Conflict: toward Conceptual Clarity
T h e mainstream of organizational literature is generally ambiguous i n delineating the concept of ~onflict.This paper distinguishes conflict from competition in the intraorganizational context and presents a behavioral conceptualization of the process of conflict. It is proposed that goal incompatibility, perceived opportunity for interference, and interdependent activities among organizational subunits increase the potential for conflict. This conceptual scheme is then applied t o a situation involving city government officials engaged i n bargaining with a city employee union."
Researchers for decades have sought an adequate definition of conflict and a conceptualization of its development. In an exhaustive review which focused on this state of conceptual disarray, Fink (1968) commented: issues relevant to the analysis of conflict within organizations and will present what is felt to be a more distinct definition of the concept of conflict, along with a framework for analyzing the process leading to conflict among interdependent decisionmaking units.
. . . the existing diversity of empirical and theoretical approaches to the study of social conflict has produced a state of conceptual and terminological confusion, which impedes both comparisons between distinct classes of conflict phenomena and the process of theoretical integration (p. 416).
INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING DEFINITIONS
Rather than repeat Fink's (1968) exhaustive review of the different approaches used to define conflict, we will focus on several While the literature pertaining to conflict specific problems in approaches to the study within and between organizations is a small of conflict in organizations. subset among the studies of social conflict, much of it suffers from the same shortcom- Value Laden Definitions ing as the literature of conflict in general. ~ ~ f i of conflict ~ i to ~ ~on value ~ i tend ~ For example, in a recent Paper O'Connell laden terminology, using such terms, for ex( 1971) reviewed the state of and re- ample, as : "breaches in normally expected search on lateral conflict within organiza- behavior,= ( ~~~l~ and siege], 1966; 21 ) ; tions and concluded that: "a breakdown in standard mechanisms of Definitions of conflict have been either ignored decision-making," (March and Simon, 1958; or stated in exceedingly vague terms. Such 112); "a threat to cooperation," (Marek, vagueness makes comparison of different re- 1966; 64); "opposition processes in any search difficult. Efforts to develop a comprehen- of several forms-competition, status, rivalry, sive typology of lateral conflict, while necessary, bargaining, sabotage, verbal abuse, etc.," cannot be substituted for strivings to develop (wa1ton, 1966; 411); or rigorous conceptual and operational definitions struggles,= ( coser, 1956; 135). ~h~~~ defiof conflict and its associated key variables (p. nitions imply underlying normative v, d1UES
35).
This paper will explore some of the basic toward conflict, whereas a definition should be devoid of value perspective to be useful
* The authors would like to thank L. L. Cummings for analytic purposes. The "value"factorspar- of a for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this On such as ticular conflict paper. the institutional setting, the consequences
359
1IENCE QUAKTERLY
of the conflict, the aftermath effects of the conflict, and the point of view of the individual making the vahle jndgnient. These variables, however, should be treated separately from any conceptual definition of the basic behavioral phenomenon. Overly Broad Definitions Much of the literature fails to distinguish between conflict and its antecedent conditions. Pondy (1967) suggests this:
The term "conflict" has been used at one time or another in the literature to describe: ( 1 ) antecedent conditions (for example, scarcity of resources, policy diflerences) of conflictful behavior, ( 2 ) affective states (e.g., stress, tension, hostility, anxiety, etc.) of the individual involved, ( 3 ) cognitive states of individuals, (i.e., their perception or awareness of conflictful situations, and ( 4 ) conflictful behavior, ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression (p.
flict. Mack and Snyder (1957) suggest that this issue has received inadequate attention:
... relatively little elfort has been made to specify analytically dillerent properties of conflict as a generic phenomenon and to differentiate explicitly between conflict and c l o d y related concepts (p. 213).
Confusion Between Conflict and Competition The distinction between concepts of conflict and competition provides a third source of collceptllal ambiguity. Fink (1968) identifies three schools of thought. The first treats conliict as a subset of competition. Lasswell (1931) was an (~nrlyadvocate of this position. Bonlding (1962) supports it:
Competition in its broadest sense exists whtm any potential positions of two behavior units are mutually incompatible. This is a l~roader concept than conflict, . . . whereas all cases of conflict involve competition in the above sense not all cases of competition involve conflict. . . . Conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are azoare of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatil~lewith the wishes of the other. . . . (p. 4 ) .
298).
While Pondy attempts to resolve this dilemma by treating the development of con- flict as a dynamic process, he provides nei- ther a criterion for distinguishing one stage from another, nor a conceptual distinction between latent and manifest conflict. Similarly, Dahrendorf (1959) argues that a broad definition of conflict is appropriate for use at varying levels of analysis. He descril~eshis approach as follows:
I am using the term "conflict" for contests, competitions, disputes, and tensions as well as for manifest clashes between social force.;. All relations between sets of individuals that involve an incompatible diflerence of objective-i.e., in its most general form, a desire on the part of both contestants to obtain what is available only
to one, or only in part-are, in this sense, relations of social conflict (p. 135).
Those who have supported this view, llowever, have failed to specify the behavioral consequences of their distinction and thus make it difficult to specify enipirically testable distinctions between the two conditions. The second school of thought stresses thc extent to which behavior is regulated (Maclc, 1965). Fink summarizes this position by stating that competition:
rules or i~lstitutionali/ecl norms which limit what the competitors can do to each other in the course of striving to reach their respective goals . . . but conflict is unregulated (i.e., involves the violations of the rules) (p. 443).
. . . involves established
Thus, he extends the term to include all types of interaction among units holding different objectives. Several authors, however, have taken issue with the analytic util- ity of such a broad approach. I11 essence, these critics argue for an action centered definition of conflict which distinguishes explicitly between conflict and its underlying antecedents. Coser (1956) especially cites the need to distinguish between the existence of incoinpatible goals and actual con-
As Fink points out, however, thew is no general agreement in this school of thought on the nature or limits of the norms for regulating behavior (MacIver, 1937; Si~nniel, 1955; Levinger, 1957; Dahrendorf, 1959; Anbert, 1963; and Beals and Siegel, 1966). The third school of thought treats competition and conflict as behaviorally distinct
[ n : CONFLICT
361
phenomena and is closely related to those arguing lor a narrow definition of conflict (Ross, 1930; RiIacIver, 1937; Simmel, 1955; and Gross, 1966). The key behavioral differ- ence suggested by this group is directly an- alogous to the difference between partici- pants in a race and a fight (Ross, 1930). In the former, which is a characteristic ol com- petition, the participants do nothing to ob- struct the efforts of their opponents, while in the latter, behavior is centered on blocking the efforts of one's opponents to reach their goals. Fink (1968) describes the difference as one of parallel striving (competition) versus niutual interference (conflict) among parties trying to reach a position in which siniultaneous occupancy is not per- ceived to be possible. Since the strategies of the parties will differ in the two situa- tions, this distinction becomes ilnportant in a behavior centered definition of conflict. TVe will develop this distinction morc fully in the conceptual framework that follows. T H E CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
sources lor the mlits involved. The resource attainnicnt stage is that scgncnt of the scquential work-flow process at which the rc- source inpnt into the unit occurs from its cnvironnlent ( Katz and Kahn, 1966). This resource inpnt may be eithcr material or nonm,~terial,as knowledge, and is reqnircd by the unit for its goal attainmcnt. Tlrc som-cc of these inputs is from tlrat portion of the cnvironnicnt which Dill (1958) dcwribed as the task environn~cnt. The units may either share sonie r c \ o ~ ~ r c e s (or be mutually dependent on sonie cornlnon resource allocator) or the resources may be ~wrceivcd to be relatively unlimited. The more dcpentlencc on a conimon source that is perceived, the morc the units will tcsnd to vicw thcir slicccss (goal attainmtmt) as contingent on each other's behavior. Similarly, some evidence suggests that when rcsources are rclativelv unlimited it is less imperative for the units to rationalize their claims for the resources ( Sinion, 1953).
Finally, the i n t c r d e p c n d ~ i l cof activitics ~ annong th? units is important for undcrstandThree criteria arc suggcstcd, therefore, to ing the type of situation that lwds to congnide thc search for a morc precise and 11se- flict as opposed to competition ainong dc- ful definition of conflict: ( 1 ) the d?finition cisioil-nlaking units. Pursuit of goals attcr should bc devoid of value laden pcrspec- thc necessary resources have been acclliircd tivcs; ( 2 ) it should focus on spccific actions is defined as the activity stag(,. Units may and b c conceptually distinct 110th from its 1)e dcpcndcnt upon one anothcr during the anteccdcnt conditions and its conseqnences; activity stag? for schcdl~ling,coinplianc~,or and ( 3 ) thc concept should be distinct from coordination of activitics ( Thompson, 1967 ) . that of competition. I n addition, to 1)c nscinl Intertlcpcndcncc of activity where goals arc as an analytic tool, the conditions neccssm-y incompatible presents occasion for potcmtial for conflict to occur sholild I,? specified. Thv conflict (\Vhitc, 1961; Seiler, 1963; Assacl, following discussion attempts to mcpt these 1969; Walton and Ilutton, 1969). criteria by developing a narrow, action ccnThus, in the nrocess 110th of coml,etition tprcd definition of conflict distinct from and conflict, the goals arc pcrccivcd to 1)c incompati1)lc (Berclson and Stciner, 1964) compctition. and the tinits are striving respectively to atConflict as Distinct from Competition tain these goals. In this context, competition Perception of goal incompati1)ility is a occurs \vhcrc, given incompatible goals, there ncccssary precondition for eithcr conflict or is no interference with onc another's attaincompetition. This implies that goal attain- ment. The essential difference 1,ctwccm comment bj7 one unit is seen to prevent others petition and conflict is in th? realm of intcr - from achieving thcir goals under thc same fcrence, or blocking activitics ( Seiler, 1963). circumstances or with equivalent outcomes. I t is - postulated that in cornpctition, rcsourccs Thns, for example, thc units within the or- may be shared or independent, b11t the ganization strive to attain their rcspc~ctive :~ctiviticsof the ~ m i t sarc not perceived l)y goals at each other's potential expense. thc unit mcm1)ers to 1)c interdependent. A seconcl factor is the availability of rc- Ther?forc, duv to the state of the ~ ~ ~ s o u r c c s
362
UNIT
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
RESOURCE STAGE Shared or Not ACTIVITY Indep. GOAL
and activities, the units do not perceive the opportunity for interference. The result is the parallel striving of the units toward their respective goals as illustrated in Figure 1. Walker (1970) defines "conflictful behav- ior" as, "Actions by one member which are inconsistent with the goals or objectives of some other member" (p. 18). Using this definition as a starting point, we propose to define "member" (party to conflict) as any decision-making unit (individual or collec- tive) acting interdependently with one or more other decision-making units. Walton and McKersie (1965) have defined the range of interdependence as, "The area within which the parties stand to benefit from continuing their relationship" (p. 11). Thus, an incentive is provided to initiate or continue a relationship. To complete a definition of interdependence that is applicable to a decision-making process, a further limiting condition must be specified for the functional relationships among the parties. Thus, for an interdependent relationship within the area specified by the Walton and McKersie definition, no one party can hold sufficient power unilaterally to dictate the outcome of the interaction (Emerson, 1962; Thompson, 1967). In developing his definition of conflictful behavior, Walker (1970) states that: If two members hold divergent goals (latent conflicts), and if these goals motivate their behavior, then one member will be motivated to behave in a way which is inconsistent with the goals of the other (p. 18). Our conceptual framework, however, replaces "divergent goals" with incompatible
goals, the latter being not simultaneously attainable. So the two concepts are qualitatively different, and incompatibility of goals is treated as a prerequisite for conflict. The existence of incompatible goals motivates conflict but says nothing about perceived ability to engage in it (Walker, 1970). Thus, given incompatibility of goals, a set of variables must be introduced which increase the probability that the parties will engage in conflict. This set of variables is the perceived opportunity for interfering with attainment of one another's goals. The perceived opportunity depends on the re- sources and activities that the paities share (Mack and Snyder, 1957; Goldman, 1962). If, however, both shared resources and interdependent activities are equal to zero, no perceived opportunity for interference will exist. Since incompatibility of goals is a neces- sary antecedent for the development of con- flict, the concept of a goal needs to be made explicit. Boulding (1957) describes goals in terms of topography and speaks of future "positions" that a unit wishes to occupy. Consistent with this approach is the framework used by Simon (1964) in which goals are value premises that serve as inputs to a de- cision of an organizational unit. In this view, a goal can be operationally defined as the criterion decision makers use to order their preferences. What, then, are the underlying causes that lead a unit to select some goals rather than others as premises for decisions? Simon (1964) calls these causal factors motives or motivational forces influencing the choice of goals (positions in Boulding's ( 1957) terms).
Schmidt G Kochan: CONFLICT This general framework provides th? fou11dation for our concept of conflict. The rclationships among thc varial~lcsin the process leading to conflict arc illl~stratcdin Figure 2. own intvrcsts in its relationship with thc others. This advancement must resl~ltfrom detprmincd action, not fortuitous circumstance. Thus, th? concept of conflict incor-
363
PERCEIVED GOAL INCOMPATI BI LITY
-
-
MOTIVATIONAL FORCES
CONFLICT
SHARED RESOURCES
L
r
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERFERENCE Ir
.
INTERDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES
FIGURE THE 2.
PROCESS O F CONFLICT
As shown in Figure 2, perceived goal inconpati1)ility and thc perceivcd opportl~nityfor interfercnce imn~cdiatelydetermine conflict. These varia1)lcs arc percpived from the vantage point of interdependent decision-niaking units. Perceived incompatil>ility of goals results from particular motivational forces in a spccific situation. Both the extent to which resources are sharcd and the degree to which the units' activities arc intcrdepcndcllt detc,rminc any one unit's pcrceived opportunity for int~rfcrcncc. This process is consistent with Pondv's (1967) suggestion that the d c v ~ l o p m ~'oft n conflict can 1)eviewed as a dynamic process. Unlike Pondy, howcver, we conceptualize conflict as t h r ovcrt 1,ehavioral outcome of this proccx, that is, the actual interfcrencc, or blocking. Conflict as d?fincd in our schvn~c refers to overt lwhavior arising out of a procvss in which one unit sccl\s the advancement of its
poratcs such protest n~ovcmentsthat inay occnr in formal organizations as promotioil of interests, secession, and seizure of power ( I ~ m m e r s ,1969). Units arc not in conflict when dplil)crate interference is absent, or if thcv havc agreed on thcir final position but cvcnts 1)cyond thcir control prevent or hamper the111 from realizing it. Such cvcnts may arisc 1)ecause of insnflicicmt coordination or soinc. factor other than the intended actions ot any of the lmits. Thc intcrlcrcncc, therc,torc,, mnst 11c deli1)eratc and goal directed 1)y at least one party. Interfcrencc may be passivc or activc,. Passive interfcrcncc may occur, for cxamplc, if th? actions of onc unit arc required 1)y another in its activity stagc but thc first unit docs not cooperate (I-Iickson et al., 1971). This lmit is deliberately intcrfering with thc othcr's goal. The result is d c t r i n ~ ~ n t n l thc to sc,cond ini it and :~clvantageonsto thc first.
364
UNlT
AURIINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUAKTEKLP
RESOURCE Shared or Not ACTlVl T Y Interdep. GOAL
Types of Conflict
Thc actual 1,locking behavior which characterizcs conflict can occur at the rcsource attainment stage of the proccss, the stage ot intcrdepcndencc of activitics, or at both stages. Each of thesc possibilities is a particular type or subclass of conflict. An example of Type I involving interference at the point of resource attainm?nt was illustrated in th? Trist and Bamforth (1951) study of the preindustrial coal min- ing operation. This type of conflict is illus- trated in Figure 3. In the Trist and Bamforth study, there was conflict bctwcen the teams in the proccss of fulfilling the team goals of having the maximum number of coal tubs filled. The tubs, in this example, were one of the scarce and neccssary resources for each unit. Thus, the tramrner of each mining team would resort to sharp practices to obtain an adequate supply of tubs so that his team would have sufficient resources to use in their work-flow proccss. Taking extra tubs,
UNlT RESOURCE Shared or Not
however, put onc team ahcad at thc cxpense of the othcrs. In Type 11, the goals are incompatil~lc,thc resources can 1)e cither shared or not, and the activities are interdependent. As illustratcd in Figure 4, the blocking bchavior occurs at the activity stage. An example of conflict 1)ased on 1)locking at the stage of intcrdeppndPnt activity is d?scribcd 1)y Trist and Bamforth (1951) in the 1,onpvall coal mining study. The special- ized task groups ( gummcrs and fillers) had individual goals. The total work activity, however, was ii~terdependcntso that a unit could only do its work if the previous unit finished its work completely. Because 01 tcnsions between the gummcrs and the fillers, a conflict developed. In this case, the gummers interfcrcil with the fillers' ability to ilo thcir job. When they left some 01 the gumming~,the fillers faced increased difficulty and were unable to meet thcir production goal. Type 111 is characterized by incompatible
ACTIVITY Interdep.
GOAL
goals, shcircd rpsourccs, and interdep~ndcnt activities. The blocking in this scheme occurs at the point of resource sharing and at the activity stage as ilh~stratcdin Figure 5.
UNIT RESOURCE
'I'hib'lut, 1969), as well as the worl\ of t h ~ collective barg,~ining thcoriyts (Schclling, 1960; I%ouldil~g, 1962, Stevens, 1963; Walton and llcKcrsie, 1965), rcprcsellt altc~rlrativc
ACTIVITY GOAL
FIGURE CONFLICT: 5. TYPE
I11
In the Dutton and Walton ( 1966) study of interdepartmental conflict, one sees the elfects of units having opposing, narrowly defined goals, intense int~rdependence of activity, and shared resources. The two dcpartments studied wcrc production and sales. The former emphasized efficiency and cost control while the latter focused on scrviccs and building volume. Each unit sought to gain maximum freedom of movement for itself while limiting the freedom of the other. The blocking behavior characteristic 01 conflict became evident. The production dcpartmcnt would claim not to havc material to produce an order t h c r ~ b y thwarting the sales unit's cflorts at service, and sales would withhold vital information lrom thc production unit thcrcby making cost estimates difficult. Three types of conflict based on thc location at which the blocking activity occurs arc thus distinguished. One implication of this typology is that wc may need to devise specific strategies for resolving the different types of conflict. We may first need to determine exactly where the collflict is occurring and then implement strategies to d ~ a with l the specific form of blocking bchavior. For example, Pondy (1970) has developed a model for allocating resources which may serve as a useful strategy for resolving Type I conflicts. On the other hand, the work of the small group decision-making theorists on problem solving tcchnicjucs (Kcllcy and
strategies for resolution which foctls on the activity stage of an interdcpcndent rc~lationship, Type TI conflict.
Potential for Conflict
Potential for conflict d ~ p e n d s tllc extent on to which required resources are shared, the dcgrcc of interdcp(~ndcncc,and p e r c ~ i v ~ d incompatibility of goals. These var~ablesarc spcn as continl~ousrather than catcgoric so any 01 the thrce may range from high to low olr a continuum. Thus the set of variabl~s which are lelt to dctcrnlin~thc potential for conflict can be vicwcd in terms of thrce dimellsional spacc. In Flgure 6, tlw nodal position charactcristics of units with eitlwr high or low potclltial lor conflict are illustrated. The rclatlvc incompatibility of goals is shown along the y axis, degree of shared rcsources along thc x axis, and the interdcpendcnce of activities along the z auis. Thus the arPa designated U would bc expected to havc a high potential for conflict, since units op~ratingin this situation arc ~upectcdto manif~stthe characteristics of 'l'ypc. I11 conflict. Tn this situation, the units would hold highly incompatible goals, bc highly depcndent on shared resources, and have a lligh interdcpcndellce of activities. Tn the area d(,signated J, the 11nits would b(1 cxp~ctedto havc a low potential for conflict due to the low illcompatibility of goals,
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ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
HlCU PO'
Pr\RICI IPT
ERDEPENDENCE
I I
0
0/
/
0 0
I
Low LOW CONFLICT POTENTIAL
J
RESOURCES SHARED
,
X
low shared resources, and independent activities. The line UJ is the potential for conflict vector as it represents the diagonal continuum between the nodal areas of high ( U ) and low ( J ) potential for conflict. This framework has the advantage of allowing researchers to sort out underlying psychological, structural, environmental, or other factors which lead to conflict among interdependent units. Within this scheme, the variables that increase the potential for incompatibility of goals to result in conflict can be treated separately, and so clearer insight is gained for analyzing the consequences of the conflict.
AN APPLICATION OF THE CONFLICT FRAMEWORK
While the framework suggested here has yet to be used for any large scale empirical
analysis, it has proved useful for explaining the development of internal conflict among city government officials engaged in bargaining with a city employee union. The follow- ing discussion is based on two case studies of this situation (Kochan, 1971) and is included to illustrate the utility of the framework. For the officials, collective bargaining is a task for which various decision-making units sharing the authority to make decisions on issues of employment relations must participate. This dispersed nature of the author- ity to negotiate, ratify, and implement an agreement with a union makes these units interdependent. In the case studies, five such units were identified: (1) the city councils, ( 2 ) the mayor, ( 3 ) public commissions (civil service commissions ), ( 4 ) professional negotiators, and (5) department administrators.
Schmidt cL?- Kochcrrn: CONFLICT Each of these is a separate decision-making unit with its own illotivational forces. Previous studies of il~uilicipalgovernment decision making have suggested that govcrnmental officials are influenced by a diversity of motives (Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Hildebrand, 1967). I n the case studies, a number of different motives were identified, including: (1)the desire of both elected and appointed officials to represent the interests of external reference groups and political constituencies in the process of policy making; ( 2 ) the desire of the public commissions to maintain their traditional jurisdiction over personnel issues; and ( 3 ) the desire of the professional negotiators to engage in bilateral negotiations with city unions free from the interference of the elected officials and commission members. I n addition, the negotiators tended to prefer a harder line on the major substantive issue raised by the unions. These diverse forces led various city officials in both cases to hold incompatible goals on issues of policy both for procedural issues and for substantive bargaining. Thus, differ- ent motivational forces led to goal incompat- ibility among these interdependent decision makers, and the first necessary condition for conflict was established. The development of incompatible preferences among management officials is not uncommon in collective bargaining ( Walton and McKersie, 1965; Dunlop, 1967). In most cases, however, organizations ensure that these incompatible preferences do not de- velop into overt conflict. Three conditions enable management officials in private organizations to do so: ( 1) the hierarchical structure of authority in private firms can serve as a device to resolve conflict (Boulding, 1962; Shull, Delbecq, and Cummings, 1970); ( 2 ) specialized departments handle union negotiations and so communications of any internal differences are inhibited (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, 1960); and ( 3 ) the external threat of a strike normally provides the incentive for management officials to reduce their internal differences (Walton and McKersie, 1965). I n short, while similar motivational forces may lead to incompatibility of goals among management officials in the private sector, the structure of their
367
managcmcnt and the bargaining process constrain their ability to engage in overt conflict. NOJICof thcse conditions existed in the city governments studied-the structure of authority was pluralistic (Hildebrand, 1967) rather than hierarchical, a number of points of access to decision makers existed (Tru- man, 1964), and since the right of the em- ployees to strike was absent, it was more difficult for the unions to mount an external threat that the city officials would perceive as credible. I n the absence of these constraints. and because of their interdenendence, the nlanagement officials perceived opportunities to interfere with one another's attainment of goals. Thus the citv officials transformed their incompatible goal preferences into conflict as previously defined. For example, some elected officials and department administrators actively opposed a position taken by the city negotiator in bargaining. Each unit sought to advance its own position to the detriment of the other units. The dissenting units sought to block the negotiator at the activity stage of bargaining by making public pronouncements or holding separate talks with the union. Another decision-making unit, a public con~mission,chose to violate a clause in the final bargaining settlement that had been agreed to by the other city officials. This unit sought to advance its own interests, asserting its disciplinary powers, by disregarding an amnesty clause in the strike-ending agree- ment. Obviously, preceived incompatibility of goals existed between the commission seek:lng to preserve its autonon~yand the other units representing their respective constituencies. To further its own position the commission blocked the other units seeking to make the activity stage of their work
-
peace ful. I n terms of our framework, the management decision-making units were highly interdependent at the activity stage of bargain- ing. Since the structure of authority was such that no one unit could completely control the actions of another in bargaining with the union, the various officials were able to block each other's attainment of goals quite openly. I n summary, the relationship among these
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ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY REFERENCES
Assae17
city government officials could be characterized as one of high interdependence of activity among units with highly incompatible goals. This corresponds to a Type I1 subclass of conflict (see Figure 4). As our conceptual
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