Description
Over the years several, sometimes conflicting, theories attempting to explain the development of professions have
emerged. The ‘‘functionalist’’ and ‘‘interactionist’’ theories have since lost the spotlight to a more critical approach
based on the Weberian concept of closure. Limitations in the concept and practice of this neo-Weberain concept have
led to suggestions that research into the sociology of professions, should also include historical analyses of professionalism
that capture historical specificities with the aim of generating theory that sees beyond ‘‘just massive historical
variation’’ [Collins, R. (1990). Changing conceptions in the sociology of the profession. In R. Torstendahl, &
M. Burrage, The formation of professions: Knowledge, state and strategy. London: Sage Publications]. Such research
should also investigate the structural conditions under which the professionalisation process takes place [Johnson, T.
(1977). The profession in the class structure. In R. Scase, Industrial society: Class, cleavage and control. London:
George Allen and Unwin.]. In order to achieve this, there is the need to critically study the relationship of the State and
the profession [Klegon, D. (1978). The sociology of professions: an emerging perspective. Sociology of Work and
Occupations, 5, 3, 259–283.] and to document more extensively, the process, rather than the product, of closure [Chua,
W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1993). Rethinking the profession-state dynamic: the case of the Victorian Charter Attempt,
1885–1906, Accounting, Organizations and Society, pp. 128–691; Chua, W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1998). The dynamics of
‘‘closure’’ amidst the construction of market, profession, empire and nationhood: an historical analysis of an Australian
Accounting Association.
Professional accounting development in Nigeria: threats from
the inside and outside
Chibuike U. Uche
Department of Banking and Finance, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria
Abstract
Over the years several, sometimes con?icting, theories attempting to explain the development of professions have
emerged. The ‘‘functionalist’’ and ‘‘interactionist’’ theories have since lost the spotlight to a more critical approach
based on the Weberian concept of closure. Limitations in the concept and practice of this neo-Weberain concept have
led to suggestions that research into the sociology of professions, should also include historical analyses of pro-
fessionalism that capture historical speci?cities with the aim of generating theory that sees beyond ‘‘just massive his-
torical variation’’ [Collins, R. (1990). Changing conceptions in the sociology of the profession. In R. Torstendahl, &
M. Burrage, The formation of professions: Knowledge, state and strategy. London: Sage Publications]. Such research
should also investigate the structural conditions under which the professionalisation process takes place [Johnson, T.
(1977). The profession in the class structure. In R. Scase, Industrial society: Class, cleavage and control. London:
George Allen and Unwin.]. In order to achieve this, there is the need to critically study the relationship of the State and
the profession [Klegon, D. (1978). The sociology of professions: an emerging perspective. Sociology of Work and
Occupations, 5, 3, 259–283.] and to document more extensively, the process, rather than the product, of closure [Chua,
W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1993). Rethinking the profession-state dynamic: the case of the Victorian Charter Attempt,
1885–1906, Accounting, Organizations and Society, pp. 128–691; Chua, W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1998). The dynamics of
‘‘closure’’ amidst the construction of market, profession, empire and nationhood: an historical analysis of an Aus-
tralian Accounting Association. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23 (2), 155–187; Ramirez, C. (2001). Under-
standing social closure in its cultural context: accounting practitioners in France (1920–1939), Accounting,
Organizations and Society.]. Such is the approach of this article, which focuses on the development of the accounting
professions in Nigeria. It critically examines the profession/ State dynamics that have helped shape the outcome of
the various episodes in the history of the accounting profession in Nigeria. An important in?uence in this dynamics
is the nature of government in place (i.e. military or civilian). # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
0361-3682/02/$ - see front matter # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PI I : S0361- 3682( 01) 00007- 1
Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
www.elsevier.com/locate/aos
.
1. Introduction
There is now a fairly widespread view that pro-
fessional associations are primarily, but not
exclusively, political bodies whose purpose is to
de?ne, organise, secure and advance the interest of
their members (Willmott, 1986, p. 556). Perhaps
the most important factor in the determination of
the ability of professions to achieve their objec-
tives is the in?uence of the State.
1
The reaction of
the State to the objective of professions could
depend on factors such as: the type of government
in place (i.e. democratic or military), public
expectations, developmental requirements of the
State, knowledge base of the profession, social
relationships and professional lobbying. Despite
such advances in our study and knowledge of the
accounting professions, there has been very little
research along these lines in developing countries
like Nigeria. This is in part because of the relative
youth of the Nigerian accountancy profession.
For instance, the ?rst registered professional
accounting body in Nigeria — the Association of
Accountants in Nigeria — was incorporated in
1960. This body transformed itself into the Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN)
and was granted Government recognition in
1965.
2
Although ICAN has commissioned or sup-
ported some of its past presidents and members, to
research into the history of the accounting profes-
sion in Nigeria, many of their reports have tended
to follow the o?cial or partisan line. Their works
almost always stress the technical qualities of
accounting while underplaying the social and
political formation of its practices and standards
(cf. Ani, 1990; Anibaba, 1990a, b; Coker, 1990;
Oni, 1991; Williams, 1990; Wallace, 1992).
The present analysis, by contrast, takes the view
that the development of the accounting profession
cannot be adequately understood independent of
its political and social environment.
3
The analysis
below traces the development of the accounting
profession in Nigeria and critically examines the
various attempts to prevent the proliferation of
professional bodies. It also examines the varied
threats to the jurisdiction of the accountant by
other professional bodies in the country. The ana-
lysis is divided into 6 sections: Section two exam-
ines the various theories that have in the past been
used to explain the development of professions.
Section three examines the dynamics of the rela-
tionship between the State and the profession with
emphasis on explaining how the structure of the
government (democratic or military) could in?u-
ence this dynamics. Section four traces the origins
of ICAN, while Section ?ve critically analyses the
various attempts by rival accountancy bodies to
end the ICAN monopoly of regulating the
accounting profession. The sixth section examines
the underlying processes and forces that impacted
on the promulgation of the Companies and Allied
Matters Decree (CAMD) of 1990. Of particular
interest are the provisions a?ecting ICAN. The
section further examines other threats to the terri-
torial jurisdiction of ICAN. The ?nal section con-
cludes the paper.
2. Theories of professional development
Over the years, several, sometimes con?icting,
theories attempting to explain the development of
professions have emerged. Prior to the 1960s, for
instance, the ‘‘functionalist’’ theory of professions
dominated the literature (Macdonald, 1995, p. 2).
The functionalist theorists argue that professions
can only emerge when a group of people are found
1
‘‘The state is de?ned here as the total domain of o?cial
public action rather than as government in the narrower sense.
Its agencies therefore include government departments and
their subsidiary o?shoots, commissions and review bodies
established by government, and the judicial system. Such
agencies can have direct bearing upon professional control
through legislation, court decisions, the threat of government
actions contained in critical ?ndings by public commissions,
and by having professionals in their employment. They may
also have an indirect e?ect through the funding of professional
training and of public schemes which generate a demand for
professional services’’ (Child & Fulk, 1982, p. 172).
2
Compare with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
England and Wales (1880) and the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland (1853).
3
One of the determinants of the role of the State in the
State/ profession dynamics, in a developing country like
Nigeria, is the nature of government in place (democratic or
military).
472 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
to be practising a de?nite technique founded upon
specialised training.
4
They are seen as coming
together as a group in order to mutually guarantee
their competence and to maintain a high standard
of professional character and honourable practice
(Carr Saunders, 1928, p. 9). Some scholars also
emphasised the sel?essness, philanthropic and
altruistic nature of professions (Barber, 1963b,
p. 670). In other words, ‘‘functionalists’’ saw the
profession as an occupation, which is pursued lar-
gely for others and not merely for oneself (Cf.
Barber, 1963a, p. 125). Functionalist theorists,
therefore, emphasised the belief that professionals
acquired the recognition of the society because of
the specialised skills they possessed and the close
solidarity of its members (Goode, 1957, pp. 194–
195; Halmos, 1970, pp. 22–25; Hughes, 1963, pp.
655–657). They were not self-centred bodies and
were seen to act in the interest of the general
community (Marshall, 1939, p. 33–332). It was
perhaps because of this characteristic that some
sociologists of functionalist mode saw profes-
sionals as being a key ingredient in the stabilisa-
tion of society and maintenance of world order
5
.
Although some of these functionalists were aware
of the complexity of social organisations and the
possibility that the acquisition of skills may not be
the only determining factor in deciding members
of any given profession, they did not consider it
material. This was explained thus:
Those associations which date from the ?rst
half of the last century were in their early
days sometimes truly exclusive in the sense
that they sought to exclude would be mem-
bers for reasons not strictly relevant to pro-
fessional competence. Various devices were
employed. But the exclusiveness of these
bodies has been exaggerated. The member, it
is true, desired to be recognised as forming
the elite among the practitioners, and in gen-
eral they justi?ed their claim to be so regar-
ded. Later the attitude of members of these
older associations underwent a change. They
came to desire that all professionals should
possess at least the minimum quali?cations
admitting to the association. This has been
the aim of the more recently formed associa-
tions from the beginning. With a few unim-
portant exemptions, professional associations
can now be said to be exclusive only in the
sense that they exclude the unquali?ed (Carr-
Saunders, 1928, pp. 8–9).
With time, however, this view began to change
and more scholars started assigning more weight
to the complexity of social organisations and the
possibility that competence and community ser-
vice may not be the only explanatory variables for
the emergence of professions. This was the origin
of the ‘‘interactionist’’ theory of professions. Peo-
ple began to pay more attention to the process,
rather than the product of professionalising (Tim-
perley & Osbaldeston, 1975, pp. 607–609). One of
the pioneers of the interactionist theorists exam-
ined the history, complexity and forces that have
4
‘‘It is often contended that the chief di?erence between a
professional and a non professional occupation lies in the ele-
ment of superior skill. The performance of a professional ser-
vice presumably involves a series of usually complicated
operations, mastery of which requires lengthy training. The
models referred to in this connection are the performances of a
surgeon, a concert pianist or a research physicist. However,
some non-professional occupations actually involve a higher
order of skill than many professional ones. For example, tool
and dye making, diamond-cutting, monument- engraving or
cabinet making involve more intricate operations than school
teaching, nursing or social work. Therefore, to focus on the
element of skill per se in describing the professions is to miss
the kernel of their uniqueness. The crucial distinction is this:
the skills that charaterize a profession ?ow from and are sup-
ported by a fund of knowledge that has been organised into an
internally consistent system, called a body of theory’’ (Green-
wood, 1957, p.46).
5
It has for instance been suggested that ‘‘professions inherit,
preserve and pass on a tradition. . . they engender modes of life,
habits of thought and standards of judgement which render
them centres of resistance to crude forces which threaten steady
and peaceful evolution. . . The family, the church and the uni-
versities, certain associations of intellectuals, and above all, the
great professions stand like rocks against which the waves
raised by these forces beat in vain‘ (Carr-Saunders & Wilson,
1933, p. 497). It was also argued that: ‘‘Our professional insti-
tutions are. . . an important stabilising factor in our whole
society and through their international associations, they pro-
vide an important channel of communication with the intellec-
tual leaders of other countries, thereby helping to maintain
world order’’ (Lynn, 1963, p. 653).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 473
helped create various sub professions within the
main medical profession:
It is characteristic of the growth of specialties
that early in their development they carve out
for themselves and proclaim unique missions.
They issue a statement of the contribution
that the specialty, and it alone, can make in a
total scheme of values and, frequently, with it
an argument to show why it is peculiarly ?t-
ted for this task. The statement of mission
tends to take a rhetorical form, probably
because it arises in the context of a battle for
recognition and institutional status. Thus,
when surgical specialties such as urology and
prostology, were struggling to obtain iden-
tities, independent of general surgery, they
developed the argument that the particular
anatomical areas in which they were inter-
ested required special attention and that only
physicians with their particular background
were competent to give it. Anaesthesiologists
developed a similar argument. This kind of
claim separates a given area out of the general
stream of medicine, gives it special emphasis
and a new dignity, and, more important for
our purposes, separates the specialty group
from other physicians. Insofar as they claim
an area for themselves, they aim to exclude
others from it. It is theirs alone (Bucher &
Strauss, 1961, p. 326).
Based on such assertions, more scholars started
to move from a normative view of professions, i.e.
what a profession should be, to a positive view of
the professions i.e. what the professions actually
are (Roth, 1974, p. 17). Interactionists, thus, argue
that professions mainly strive to protect their
group’s interests, which sometimes con?ict with
the interest of the wider society. The only way
such groups could gain legitimacy was by convin-
cing the wider society that they could o?er some
kind of special skill (Boreham, 1983, p. 694). By
examining how beliefs and methods relevant for
pursuing and securing the claim of professional
competence and recognition are constructed and
projected, these interactionists had, as in the case
of the medical profession, exposed the presence of
competing interests within these professional
organisations (Wilmott, 1986, p. 557). Some
interactionists have also challenged even the claim
of homogeneity within professions (Smith, 1958,
p. 410). Along these lines, it has been suggested
that:
The assumption of relative homogeneity
within the profession is not entirely useful:
there are many identities, many values and
many interests. These amount not merely to
di?erentiation or simple variation. They tend
to become patterned and shared; coalitions
develop and ?ourish-and in opposition to
some others. We shall call these groupings
which emerge within a profession ‘‘seg-
ments.’’ (Specialties might be thought of as
major segments, except that a close look at a
specialty betrays its claim to unity, revealing
that specialties, too, usually contain seg-
ments, and if they ever did have common
de?nitions along all lines of professional
identity, it was probably at a very special, and
early, period in their development) (Bucher &
Strauss, 1961, pp. 325–326).
Interactionists have, however, been criticised on
grounds that they are indi?erent to evidence and
proof. Although their claims are usually plausible,
it is not always evident that they are backed by
empirical evidence (Saks, 1983, p. 5). Further-
more, although interactionist scholars acknowl-
edge the entwinement of politics in the
professionalisation process, they generally fail to
explore the structural conditions under which
various professional groups were liable to be suc-
cessful (Willmott, 1986, p. 557). There is, thus, the
need for more emphasis on the process of pro-
fessionalisation (Boreham, 1983, p. 685). In the
attempt to enhance our understanding of the pro-
cess and functioning of professions, some scholars
have devised a more critical approach rooted in
neo Weberian principles.
Scholars of the neo-Weberian mode attempt to
apply the Weberian concept of social closure to
the development of professions. This notion of
social closure broadly de?nes a situation where an
474 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
interest group seeks to regulate market conditions
in their favour by restricting access to speci?c
opportunities to group members. This is usually
done in the face of actual or potential competition
from outsiders (Parkin, 1979, p. 44). In other
words, it is a process by which social collectivities
attempt to maximise their reward by restricting
access to certain economic and social opportu-
nities to members (Johnson, 1977, p.112). These
neo-Weberian scholars mainly focus on the var-
ious barriers that professions have erected in order
to ensure social closure.
6
Many neo-Weberians
have, however, been accused of failing to empiri-
cally substantiate their claims. Their studies,
therefore o?er few improvements over those of the
interactionists. Neo-Weberian sociologists have,
for instance, tended not to study closure rules and
to historically track their di?erential signi?cance
through time (Chua & Poullaos, 1998, p. 157;
Murphy, 1984, pp. 550–552). This tendency may
have been aided by the prevalent feeling of anti-
professionalism among the rank and ?le of sociol-
ogists belonging to this school. It has for instance
been argued that it is common for sociologists of
this neo-Weberian mode to distort and exaggerate
the dangers of professional imperialism as part of
a wider e?ort to demystify the activities of mono-
polistic professional groups (Strong, 1979, p. 201).
It has thus been asserted that:
A satisfactory analysis of the wider sources of
power underpinning professionalism is,
therefore, still being awaited from the neo-
Weberian school. At present sociologists
working within this perspective appear not to
have greatly advanced on the interactionist
view that professionalisation is primarily a
function of the bargaining skills of occupational
groups seeking the status of a profession. In
sum, then, the neo-Weberian sociologists of
the professions have yet to exploit fully the
potential of the approach. The structural
conditions under which professionalisation
occurs clearly require more stringent exam-
ination. Proponents of this school also have
not taken enough care in ensuring that their
accounts of the current nature and role of
professions in society are empirically sustain-
able. Far too often, therefore, what amount
to thinly veiled attacks on professions and
professionals have been presented without
adequate supporting evidence (Saks, 1983,
pp. 10–11).
Because of such problems, it has thus been sug-
gested that future research into the sociology of
professions should also include the historical ana-
lyses of professionalism that capture historical
speci?cities with the aim of generating theory
that sees beyond ‘‘just massive historical varia-
tion’’ (Collins, 1990, p. 21). Such research should
also investigate the structural conditions under
which the professionalisation process takes place
(Johnson, 1977, p. 106). In order to achieve this,
there is the need to critically study the relationship
of the State and the profession (Klegon, 1978,
p. 273) and to document more extensively, the
process, rather than the product, of closure (cf.:
Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Ramirez, forth-
coming).
3. The profession and the State
The relationship of the State and the profession
is usually dynamic and complex. In some cases,
laws have been put in place to bring the profession
under the control of the State (Wallace, 1992,
p. 34). Such professions, thus, ultimately depend
on the power of the State to protect their domain
of ‘‘expertise’’ (Larson, 1977, p. xii). It has been
pointed out that:
The state has been the most important friend
of the professions (in order to domesticise
them, of course) in some societies and it has
been abhorred by them in others, at certain
times. Knowledge has always been used by
both state and industry in general terms, and
the groups which has had the problem-sol-
ving capacities or, at least, have managed to
give the impression that they have these have
6
Such barriers include examination, apprenticeship and
entry quali?cation rules.
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 475
been asked, implored or ordered to help.
Sometimes a group has diligently managed to
manoeuvre strategically in this situation in
order to establish itself in a very privileged
position, while another group has not been
able to do so (Torstendahl, 1990, p. 5).
On the relationship of the accounting profession
and the state, speci?cally, it has also been sug-
gested that:
A . . .signi?cant condition for the develop-
ment of accounting practice and organisation
has been the emergence of the modern
state. . . Unfortunately, most of the literature
on the work of professionals has neglected the
role of the state or has regarded it as a neutral
in?uence (Willmott, 1986, p. 563).
The role of the State is even more prominent in
a developing country like Nigeria without a well-
developed political culture and with an unenviable
history of constant military interruptions in the
administration of the State.
7
Since the country
gained political independence from the UK in
1960, it has witnessed at least six di?erent military
governments. At independence, the reins of power
was handed over to a democratically elected gov-
ernment headed by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. He
was killed in a military coup de´ tat in January
1966. His Government was also overthrown and
Major General Aguiyi Ironsi took over as the
Head of State and Commander in Chief of the
Nigerian Armed forces. His reign was much
shorter than that of his predecessor. He was killed
and his government overthrown in another mili-
tary coup in July 1966. He was succeeded by
General Yakubu Gowon who ruled Nigeria from
1967 to 1975. Although his period in o?ce repre-
sents the longest period of continuity in Nigeria,
there was some period of instability and uncer-
tainty during the time. The Nigerian civil war
(1967–1970) was fought during this time.
8
General
Gowon’s Government was overthrown in July
1975 and General Murtala Mohammed became
the new military Head of State. General Moham-
med was killed in an abortive coup in February
1976. He was succeeded by General Olusegun
Obasanjo who served under him as the Chief of
Sta? Supreme Headquarters (Vice President).
General Obasanjo handed over power to the
democratically elected government of Alhaji
Shehu Shagari in October 1979. Shagari was
overthrown in December 1983 and Major General
Mohammadu Buhari became the new military
leader. In August 1985, Buhari was overthrown by
General Ibrahim Babangida who was his Chief of
Army Sta?. In June 1993, General Babangida
annulled the presidential election his government
staged in its bid to return the country to civilian
rule. International and domestic pressures, how-
ever, forced him to ‘‘step aside’’ in August 1993.
9
He appointed Chief Ernest Shonekan, a civilian,
to replace him as the Head of the new interim
Government. Within 3 months, this interim Gov-
ernment was overthrown and General Sani Aba-
cha became the new military leader of Nigeria.
General Abacha died in o?ce in June 1998. He
was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubarkar.
In May 1999, General Abubarkar handed over
7
In general, there are four degrees of political cultures: (I)
minimal political culture; (ii) low political cultures; (iii) devel-
oped political culture and (iv) mature political culture. In
countries with minimal political culture, the government, can
be easily toppled by the use or threatened use of force. The
armed forces in such places sometime press to supplant the
democratic order. O?cers assume governmental positions in
the apparent presumption that they will continue in o?ce for
an inde?nite period. Such systems generally present few deter-
rents to the use of force. In countries with low political cul-
tures, the displacement of democracy is likely to be temporary.
In some cases, the military go into coalition with civilians in
order to enhance their legitimacy. In developed political struc-
tures, there are accepted procedures for the transfer of political
power and legitimacy for holders of public o?ces. Total sup-
plantment of partial displacement of the government by the
armed forces either alone or in coalition with civilians is di?-
cult to accomplish. The armed forces may however be in the
position to exert strong behind the scene pressures, which could
be equated to blackmail. Finally, in mature political structures,
the overthrow of democratic rule is impossible. The military
may be able to in?uence, but not blackmail, the democratic
government. (Finer, 1988, pp. 77–126). Nigeria can reasonably
be classi?ed as a country with low political culture.
8
For a detailed History of the Nigerian Civil War, see Jorre
(1972).
9
For a detailed review of the annulment, see Babatope
(1995).
476 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
power to the democratically elected Government
headed by General Olusegun Obasanjo.
10
From the above, it is clear that Nigeria has
witnessed frequent violent changes in the attempt
of various parties to control the apparatus of the
State. This in itself makes the State unstable and
less accountable.
11
Unlike in well-established civi-
lian structures where there are rules governing the
methodology and timing of change in the control
of the apparatus of State, such rules rarely exist in
military take-overs. One of the main character-
istics of successful coups is surprise and secrecy. In
other words, the timing of military coups and the
life span of military administrations are unpre-
dictable. Furthermore, because military Govern-
ments are seen, even in Nigeria, as an anathema,
they are always regarded as transition govern-
ments (Azinge, 1994, p. ix). Military leaders
always claim that they are corrective regimes and
not politicians.
12
The major di?erence between
them and the politicians is their ability to ‘get
things done’.
13
This is usually possible because of
the hierarchical nature of the armed forces. It is
not surprising that most military regimes are
intolerant of any checks on their powers. For
instance, military decrees are rarely subject to
court modi?cations. In fact, the courts were
brought under the absolute control of military
decrees. According to a former Justice of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria:
By the promulgation of the Constitution
(Supremacy and enforcement of Powers)
Decree No. 28 of 1970, courts of this country
were brought under the absolute control of
military Decrees. Successive Military Gov-
ernments, in 1984, and now Decree No. 107
of 1993, have adopted this same position. The
resulting position in these Decrees is that no
court in Nigeria has jurisdiction to question
the vires of the Military Government to pro-
mulgate a decree, or the validity of the decree,
or to declare any decree null and void.
14
The process of Decree promulgation is further
evidence of the concentration of power in military
governments. This is so because making laws for
the country is now the responsibility of a handful
of people who are members of the ruling council.
According to Decree Number 107 of 1993:
The power vested in the National Assembly
or the Federal Military Government, as the
case may be. . . shall vest in the Provisional
Ruling Council.
15
The Decree further states that:
[t]he power of the Federal Military Govern-
ment to make laws shall be exercised by
means of Decrees signed by the Head of
State.
16
This has been interpreted by the courts to mean
that the Head of State alone can make laws with-
out consulting with members of the highest mili-
tary body in the land.
17
According to a former
Supreme Court Justice:
10
For a detailed political history of Nigeria, see Balewa
(1994).
11
A former Minister of Defence of Nigeria once lamented
that the country: was ‘‘caught in a cycle of instability which
reaches a peak every 10 years when a coup is bound to take
place. . . There was a coup in January 1966, an unsuccessful
attempt in February 1976, and the latest abortive plot which
was scheduled for the end of 1985 or early 1986. . . Seven coups
in 20 years in this country are just too many for the stability
and orderly progress of society’ (quoted in Peters, 1997, p. 10).
12
According to one of the leaders of the ?rst military coup
in Nigeria: ‘‘Our enemies are the political pro?teers, the
swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and
demand ten per cent; those that seek to keep the country divi-
ded permanently so that they can remain in o?ce as ministers
or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make
the country look big for nothing before international circles;
those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian
political calendar back by their words and deeds’’ (Quoted in
Okoye, 1990, p. 9).
13
Military Organisations possess a hierarchical command
structure which makes it easier for the military to implement
policies which the civilians could not (Onyejekwe, 1981, p. 24).
14
Quoted in Ogowewo (2000, p. 152).
15
Section 10 (2).
16
Section 3 (I).
17
In Nigeria, for instance, this body has, at various times,
been known as: the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC),
Supreme Military Council (SMC) and the Provisional Ruling
Council (PRC).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 477
This provision is short, terse and seems to me
complete and self explanatory. It has not
prescribed any procedure. It merely says how
the making of laws shall be exercised. What-
ever procedure was adopted by the Federal
Military Government in the exercise of its law
making powers, it appears would satisfy the
constitutional requirement. It may prescribe
no procedure as in the instant case. . .I ?nd
nothing in the provisions of the 1979 Con-
stitution as amended or in any other decree in
support of the contention that the participa-
tion of members of the Provisional Ruling
Council is a necessary pre-condition in the
procedure in the promulgation of a Decree.
18
Given the power of the State and the supreme
powers usually conferred on military rulers, the
dynamics in the relationship between the State and
the profession in developing countries like Nigeria
are usually less systematic. Given the existence of
few checks and balances in the system, any party
that is able to in?uence the top military class may
well be in a position to de?ne the history of the
entire profession. In other words, interest groups’
lobbying for regulatory bene?t is easier under such
military Governments mainly because legislative
initiative during such periods is concentrated in a
few individuals (Ogowewo, 1996, p. 18). It is
therefore not surprising (as will be seen later) that
the major gains as well as crises that the account-
ing profession has witnessed have taken place
under such military regimes. The remaining sec-
tions of this paper show how the relationships
between the profession and the State have in?u-
enced the outcome of the various episodes in the
history of the accounting profession in Nigeria.
4. The origins of ICAN
In general, the accounting profession and the
State in Nigeria have always been entwined.
Before Nigeria gained political independence in
1960, there was no registered body for profes-
sional accountants in the country. The develop-
ment of the accounting profession in Nigeria
became feasible only with the movement towards
political independence in the country. Along these
lines, it has been asserted that:
The development of the accountancy profes-
sion in Nigeria became a feasible venture at
the Constitutional Conference held in Lon-
don in May and June 1957 to draft the Con-
stitution of an independent Nigeria.
Paragraph 44, Item 20, of the Report of that
Conference (Cmnd. 207) provided that rules
could be created which would allow certain
professions to be designated (i.e., practised),
and provided for the registration and dis-
ciplinary control of members of the profes-
sions so designated. It was agreed at the
conference that auditors and accountants be
added to the initial draft list of professions.
The enabling law- Concurrent Legislative List
(Designated Professions) Orders, 1955 to
1957- to recognise accountancy and auditing
as designated professions was passed in 1957.
The e?ect of these Orders was that the quali-
?cations, registration and disciplinary control
of members of the professions so designated
became a matter for federal government
legislation. Consequently, no designated
profession could self-regulate without the
agreement of the federal government
(Wallace, 1992, p. 34).
Comparatively, however, the accounting profes-
sion lagged behind most other professions in
Nigeria. It was, for instance, observed that:
Although clergymen, lawyers and doctors
have been recognised as professionals in
Lagos as far back as the later part of the
nineteenth century. . .. Accountants were not
so recognised because the handful of this
group of skilled practitioners at that time,
were either civil servants or employees of the
foreign trading companies based in Lagos
(Anibaba, 1990b, pp. 3–4).
Furthermore, the handful of accountants in the
country at the time were foreigners and it was not
18
Quoted in Ogowewo (2000, p. 142).
478 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
until 1950 that Mr. Akintola Williams became the
?rst Nigerian to qualify as a chartered accountant
when he was admitted into the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of England and Wales
(ICAEW). By 1960 there were 15 Nigerian mem-
bers of ICAEW, one Nigerian member of the
Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accoun-
tants (now the Chartered Institute of Public
Finance and Accountancy) and 24 Nigerian mem-
bers of the Association of Certi?ed and Corporate
Accountants (now the Chartered Association of
Certi?ed Accountants).
Based on the above numbers, it is not surprising
that it was the Nigerian members of the ACCA
that ?rst moved to set up a professional accoun-
tancy body in Nigeria in 1957. In that same year,
they applied to form a local branch of the ACCA.
This plan was endorsed by the ACCA in London
in 1960. By that time however, the idea had been
overtaken by events. Nigerian members of ACCA
saw clear advantages in the newer idea of forming
a local accountancy body that would bring all
Nigerians with overseas accountancy quali?ca-
tions of equivalent standards together. This shift
has been explained in the following terms:
The social status of the ACCA quali?cation
in Nigeria was (as in the UK itself) inferior to
that of the three UK chartered accountancy
bodies. By Independence, no member of the
ACCA had attained a status comparable to
that achieved by the fewer Nigerians with UK
chartered accountancy quali?cations. So,
when a suggestion was made to form an
independent local association of accountants
which would bring all Nigerians with overseas
accountancy quali?cations of equivalent
standards together, the Nigerian members of
the local branch of the ACCA gladly
embraced the idea (Wallace, 1992, p. 35).
In other words, the ACCA members, who were
in the majority, embraced the idea of a central
accounting association in Nigeria mainly because
it had the potential of eroding the stigma of infer-
iority of their original quali?cation. Indeed, the
idea of establishing an umbrella association for all
Nigerian accountants emerged in1959 at a party in
honour of Mr. Keeling, a full time borough treas-
urer in Worthing, England and a member of the
British Council delegation then visiting Nigeria to
advise on the setting up of public libraries. During
the party, Mr. Keeling took the host aside and
said:
Look Mr Coker, there are at least twenty-?ve
of you, why not start an Association of
Accountants, you never know, it may one day
develop into an institute (Coker, 1990, p. 23).
This advice was taken and in November 1960
the Association of Accountants in Nigeria was
incorporated under the companies ordinance then
in existence.
19
The quali?cation for membership of
the Association was membership of any of the
following accounting bodies then existing in the
UK: the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
England and Wales; The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland; The Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of Ireland; the Association of
Certi?ed and Corporate Accountants (now the
Chartered Association of Certi?ed Accountants);
the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and
Accountants (now the Chartered Institute of Pub-
lic Finance and Accountancy) and; the Institute of
Cost and Works Accountants (now the Chartered
Institute of Management Accountants).
The Association soon recognised the importance
of the State in its bid to gain monopoly over the
regulation of the accounting profession in Nigeria.
As already mentioned, it was then no longer pos-
sible to regulate accounting practice without the
agreement of the federal government. In 1963, the
Council of the Association decided to explore the
19
The objectives of the association included, among others,
to: provide a central organisation for accountants and auditors
in Nigeria and generally to do such things as may from time to
time, be necessary to maintain a strict standard of professional
ethics amongst its members and to advance the interest of the
accountancy profession in Nigeria; promote generally, a higher
sense of the importance of systematic and modern accounting
and to encourage greater e?ciency therein and; to provide for
the training, examination and local quali?cation of students in
accountancy (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria,
1985, p. 10).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 479
possibility of obtaining a Government charter for
the Association with the aim of achieving its
monopoly objective. This in itself caused serious
rancour among the members of the association.
Some people found it di?cult to comprehend how
members of the various professional bodies, with
all their di?erences, could be brought under one
umbrella and thus possess similar rights and pri-
vileges. According to Anibaba (1990b, p. 49):
The rancour among members of the Associa-
tion of Accountants in Nigeria in connection
with the provisions of the Draft Bill of the
Act is better imagined than recorded. . .Su?ce
it to note that it almost broke up the Asso-
ciation but for the wisdom of the pioneers of
the profession in Nigeria. Even the name of
the proposed Institute was a source of dis-
agreement. . .. There was also the strong view
of some members that only those quali?ed as
Chartered Accountants in the United King-
dom should be allowed to describe themselves
as chartered accountants in Nigeria.
Despite this, the wider interest of obtaining a
charter that would help the body to regulate the
accounting professions prevailed. All parties,
therefore, compromised in order to ensure that the
charter was granted by the Government. It was
perhaps because of such a compromise that the
1965 ICAN Act did not contain any provisions as
to which foreign accounting bodies should be
recognised by ICAN, especially for direct mem-
bership. Under the Act, ICAN was allowed to
make such decisions from time to time.
20
This
certainly did not solve the problem. It only post-
poned the date when a decision had to be taken on
the issue. In the meantime, the monopoly of reg-
ulating the accounting profession had been
secured by ICAN.
The ICAN Act of 1965 also empowered it to
determine the standards for persons wishing to
become members of the accountancy profession
and to maintain the register of persons entitled to
practice as accountant and auditors.
21
The impli-
cation of this was that ICAN had acquired a
monopoly over the practice and regulation of
accounting.
Apart from the internal disagreements, there
was also opposition from the outside. Up until the
enactment of the ICAN Act, no organisation had
the duty of regulating the accounting and auditing
profession. Under the Companies Ordinance of
1922 anybody could act as an auditor to a com-
pany. The only exception was that o?cers and
directors of a company were usually prohibited
from auditing that company. There were also no
restrictions with respect to the practice of
accounting. It was this lack of regulation that
resulted in people having no formal quali?cations
and or links with recognised foreign accountancy
bodies setting up practices as accountants. This
group resisted the legislation of the ICAN Decree
and the attendant monopoly it o?ered the body
with respect to the determination of who could
practice accounting. Their resistance attracted
Government sympathy. Indeed some regional
governments genuinely felt that such uncerti?-
cated accounting practitioners immensely con-
tributed to the economic development of their
region. In this respect, a September 1964 letter
from the Ministry of Finance of Northern Nigeria
in Kaduna to the Federal Ministry of Education
in Lagos, on the ICAN bill, asserted thus:
In the North, it has not been the practice for
businessmen and traders, particularly those
with small operations, to maintain ?nancial
record books and accounts. The regional tax
authorities have encouraged (as had the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry) such persons to
initiate the practice of having someone pre-
pare for them books and accounts even if such
preparation consists only of a very simple
20
See Section 8 (b) of the 1965 ICAN Act.
21
Speci?cally, the enabling Decree charged the body with
the following functions: ‘‘(a) determining what standard of
knowledge and skill are to be obtained by persons seeking to
become members of the accountancy profession and raising
these standards from time to time as circumstance may permit;
(b) securing in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the
establishment and maintenance of registers of fellows, associ-
ates and registered accountants entitled to practise as accoun-
tants and auditors and the publication from time to time of lists
of those persons; and (c) performing through the council under
this Act the functions conferred on it by this Act’’ (Section 1 of
the 1965 ICAN Act).
480 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
statement of the ?nance of the business or
trading operation. This is because the cost
involved is much and there was lack of quali-
?ed accountants and bookkeepers in the
North. Services of persons who had a fair
knowledge of arithmetic but a very limited
knowledge of book-keeping and accountancy,
have been sought in the preparation of such a
simple set of books. While it is true that
because of this practice a number of thor-
oughly unsatisfactory book-keeping and
accounting records have been submitted to
Revenue in support of a statement of income
for tax purposes, it is also true that Revenue
had been able to secure in many instances a
more satisfactory statement of the ?nancial
condition of a trade or business than had
previously been the case (quoted in Anibaba,
1990b, p. 50).
The promoters of the ICAN Act had to com-
promise. There were provisions in the 1965 ICAN
Act to accommodate some of the people who
were, prior to the enactment of the ICAN Act,
practising accounting in the country but who were
not a?liated to any of the recognised international
accountancy bodies. Such persons were classi?ed
as ‘‘Registered Accountants’’ under the ICAN
Act.
22
According to a past President of the Insti-
tute:
We ran into some vested interests and upon
Government insistence, we had to concede
some recognition to individuals who had
established practice as accountants and who
were auditing the accounts of various small
?rms. This was the origin of ‘‘REGISTERED
ACCOUNTANTS.’’ We thought that since
their number was small and certain to reduce
over the years, it was better to accommodate
them so as to be able to oversee their activ-
ities (Coker, 1990, p. 24).
In other words, ICAN consented to the idea of
registered accountants in the hope that this cate-
gory could easily be phased out.
23
As will be seen
later, however, the recognition of registered
accountants did very little to placate all the parties
that were against the monopoly ICAN enjoyed
over accounting and auditing functions in Nigeria.
5. Attempts at proliferation
The importance of the State in the development
of the accounting profession in Nigeria is perhaps
best brought out by the various attempts by non-
ICAN accounting groups to get recognition. Such
groups, some of which are as old as ICAN, reg-
ularly urged the Government to intervene in order
to break the monopoly of ICAN. Perhaps because
of its history, disenchantment as to the very nature
and structure of ICAN dates back to its founda-
tion. Threats to the monopoly enjoyed by ICAN
came from the inside and outside. As has already
been mentioned, not all persons who were quali-
?ed to be members of ICAN were willing to join
the body initially. Once the ICAN Act was passed
into law in 1965, the battleground shifted from the
outside to the inside. This was so because, under
22
The 1965 ICAN Act de?ned a registered accountant as ‘‘a
member of the institute who is not a fellow or an associate
member’’ (Section 19). It further asserts that ‘‘. . .a person shall
be entitled to be registered as a registered accountant if he
satis?es the council that immediately before the appointed day
he had had not less than ?ve years of experience as an inspector
or auditor of company a?airs under the provisions of the
Companies Act. (3) An application for registration shall, in
addition to evidence of quali?cation, satisfy the council- (a)
that he is of good character, (b) that he has attained the age of
twenty one years, and (c) that he has not been convicted in
Nigeria or elsewhere of an o?ence involving fraud or dis-
honesty. (4) The council may in its sole discretion provisionally
accept a quali?cation produced in respect of an application for
registration under this section, or direct that the application be
renewed within such period as may be speci?ed in the direction.
(5) Any entry directed to be made in the register under subsec-
tion (4) shall show the registration is provisional, and no entry
so made shall be converted to full registration without the
consent of the council signi?ed in writing in that behalf. (6) The
council shall from time to time publish in the Federal Gazette
particulars of quali?cations for the time being accepted as
aforesaid’’ (Section 8).
23
In 1972, the provision allowing for the recognition of
registered accountants was abolished [see Section 1 a (iii) of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants Amendment Decree of
1972]. This e?ectively represented the beginning of the phasing
out process.
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 481
the ICAN Act of 1965, only ICAN members could
be appointed as auditors in Nigeria. Under this
scenario, even those that opposed the idea of peo-
ple with various international accounting quali?-
cation consolidating into a single body, had little
choice but to join ICAN. This was especially so
where such persons had any intentions of practis-
ing as auditors in the country. At its ?rst annual
general meeting in 1966, the controversial issue of
uniform recognition of divergent accountancy
bodies came up again. According to a Past Pre-
sident of ICAN:
. . .no sooner was the present Institute incor-
porated in 1965 than some members of the
Institute started to advocate the exclusion of
those quali?cations that do not confer on
their holders the right of ‘‘public’’ practice in
the home country. The ‘‘showdown’’ came at
the ?rst annual general meeting of the Insti-
tute held in June 1966, when, against the
proposals of the Council, the majority of the
members present voted for the exclusion of
members of the Institute of Cost and Works
Accountants and the Institute of Municipal
Treasurers and Accountants, on the ground
that they are not entitled to public practice as
accountants. Since then Council started the
battle for the re-uni?cation of the profession
in the country, in the ?rm belief that the
exclusion of these two quali?cations which
enjoy international recognition can only lead
to disintegration which is not in the best
interest of the profession in Nigeria (Anibaba,
1985, p. 19).
It was not until 1973 that the decision to exclude
members of the Institute of Cost and Works
Accountants and the Institute of Municipal
Treasurers and Accountants, from ICAN mem-
bership was reversed.
24
This revision was perhaps
possible because of the existence of an external
threat to the monopoly of ICAN.
Shortly after ICAN was recognised by the Gov-
ernment, some Nigerians that were not quali?ed
for membership of the Institute under ICAN rules
but were members of some unrecognised account-
ing bodies in the UK started to agitate for mem-
bership of ICAN. These bodies were: the
Association of International Accountants (AIA);
The Society of Company and Commercial
Accountants and; the British Association of
Accountants and Auditors. The most vocal of
these groups was the Association of International
Accountants. Some of their members subsequently
formed the Nigeria Society of International
Accountant (SIA). Their protests culminated in a
petition to the then Federal Military Government.
In the petition, dated 3 May, 1972, the Institute
called on the Government to amend the 1965
ICAN Act in order to force ICAN to admit their
members as ICAN members. ICAN replied urging
the Government not to grant this request. Among
other things ICAN asserted that:
It is a well known fact that neither the Fed-
eral Government of Nigeria nor the United
Kingdom Government recognises the Asso-
ciation of International Accountants (to
which members of the Nigerian Society of
International Accountants belong) as quali?-
cation for professional appointment. The
body is not listed as one of the recognised
bodies of the Accountants whose members
could be appointed as company auditors
under the Companies Act 1948 and 1967 of
the United Kingdom, the country where the
body is established. Apart from the Govern-
ments mentioned above, public corporations,
companies and other ?nancial organisations
do not seem to recognise ‘International
Accountant’ quali?cation as being suitable
for a professional appointment. This can be
deduced from the particulars of numerous
advertisements for accountancy positions in
commerce and industry, both here in Nigeria
24
This was made possible partly by the promulgation of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Decree
Number 30 of 1972. According to the explanatory note of the
decree, a person: ‘‘with a quali?cation granted outside Nigeria
and for the time being acceptable to the Institute could be
enrolled as a chartered accountant even though that person
may not by law be entitled to practice accountancy in the
country granting the quali?cation’’. The fact that the ICAN
leadership in?uenced this amendment is not in doubt.
482 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
and in the UK. . . While the Institute has
given concessions in certain conditions for
enrolment of students and members in view
of the present condition of the country, it is
not in the interest of the nation to lower
standard to such a level that the accountancy
quali?cation obtainable in Nigeria should be
considered inferior to that of any other
country (quoted in Anibaba, 1990b, pp. 149–
50).
The Federal military Government subsequently
decided against the petition. ICAN continued to
maintain its monopoly. Despite this victory ICAN
recognised that the Nigerian Society of Interna-
tional Accountants represented a real threat to its
monopoly of regulating the accounting profession
in Nigeria. ICAN, therefore, became receptive to
dialogue with the SIA with a view to reducing
their di?erences. According to a former president
of ICAN:
The Association of International Accoun-
tants on 12th October, 1972 sent its syllabus
and past examination question papers to the
Council of ICAN for assessment and evalua-
tion with a view of obtaining automatic
membership. . .. After an exhaustive examina-
tion of AIA’S syllabus, past examination
papers and their own existing method of
training by the Education and Membership
Committees of ICAN, it was found that- (a)
the syllabus and the course contents of the
AIA had no depth (b) the standard of exam-
ination papers was far too low, and was not
comparable with those set by ICAN or any of
the bodies recognised for direct admission by
ICAN. The ?nal examination of the AIA was
found to be just about the standard of the
intermediate examination of ICAN (c) as
regards professional training the AIA vir-
tually had none. The above apart, further
enquiries revealed that a substantial number
of the membership of the AIA did not even sit
for the examination of that body. They were
just awarded the diploma for having had
‘‘considerable experience’’ in the work of
accountancy nature (Ani, 1977, p. 16).
Given the ?ndings of the ICAN committees, the
Council of ICAN still refused to grant direct
membership of ICAN to holders of the AIA certi-
?cate. The ICAN Council, however, decided to
exempt members of AIA, who quali?ed through
examination, from the intermediate examination
of the ICAN. In other words, they were eligible to
sit for the ?nal examination of ICAN. Further-
more, such persons were further granted a shorter
practical training period in order to qualify as
ICAN members. This ICAN decision was duly
communicated to the Council of AIA and indeed
some of their members subsequently applied for,
and were granted, exemption from the inter-
mediate stage of ICAN (Ibid.).
The matter however, was not laid to rest. In July
1975, a new military government came to power in
Nigeria. Colonel Ahmadu Ali was appointed the
Federal Commissioner for Education. This was
the supervisory ministry of ICAN. Colonel Ali
was a ‘‘great friend’’ of Mike Odedina, the then
President of SIA (Ani, 1990, p. 33). It was perhaps
because of this relationship that AIA launched a
massive campaign to get the Government to
reopen the issue. In the main, the body requested
the Government to excise the regulatory function
imposed on ICAN by the 1965 ICAN Act and vest
it in the Federal Ministry of Education. This
would have helped facilitate the recognition of
SIA by the Federal Government.
Colonel Ahmadu Ali, perhaps because of his
personal relationship with Odedina, supported the
above proposal. He however, needed approval
from the Federal Executive Council in order to
implement it. Once ICAN was informed of Ali’s
intentions, it employed the press in order to fore-
stall Colonel Ali. According to the then ICAN
President:
My task as the President was to forestall Ali’s
move and this was done beautifully. I had
employed the services of Gbolabo Ogun-
sanwo as ICAN’s public relations consultant
and his task was to mobilise the press and
electronic media on behalf of the Institute. A
press conference was to be held a day before
the meeting of the Federal Executive Council
and my researched paper was to be advertised
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 483
in all the dailies so that it could appear along
with the brie?ng of the press conference on
the day of the Federal Executive Council
Meeting. One way or the other, we were to
ensure that every member of the FEC saw the
newspaper before attending the meeting. . .I
was later told that Ali’s paper at FEC did not
take o? the ground as members were dubious
of the quali?cations and integrity of AIA. I
was told also that FEC asked one of its
members to enquire whether what I had
written was correct. And this member went to
no other person to make his enquiry than D
O Da?none [an ICAN member] and of course
my assessment of AIA was correct (Ani, 1990,
pp. 33–34).
Such tactics, by ICAN, gives credence to the
view that professional associations are primarily,
though not exclusively, political bodies whose
purpose is to secure and advance the interest of
their members (Willmott, 1986, p. 556). The tac-
tics certainly worked as the bid, by the SIA, for
Government recognition again failed. This was
perhaps the last major move by the SIA to seek
Government recognition. In January 1979, mem-
bers of SIA spearheaded the formation of a wider
accounting body named the Association of
National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN). SIA
subsequently became redundant and ANAN
became the umbrella body for agitating an end to
the ICAN monopoly.
The return to civilian rule in 1979 created an
opportunity for ANAN to ?ght for recognition
through the legislature. In 1980, ANAN members
sponsored a bill on the ?oor of the Federal House
of Representatives for the recognition of ANAN.
An ANAN supporter in the National Assembly
listed the general considerations and objectives of
the ANAN Bill as follows: to end the ICAN
monopoly of the accountancy profession which
was claimed to be a hindrance to the nation’s
economy, particularly small scale businesses and
rural semi-urban economies; because of the cult-
like nature of the ICAN, and its monopolistic
behaviour, auditing of public accounts by ICAN
auditors is subjected to unchallenged dishonest
manipulation and selective inclusion. This is so
mainly because there is no competing body to
cross audit; the ICAN manpower production
capacity is grossly too slow to meet the present
need in Nigeria of professional accountants. This
resulted in the importation of less well quali?ed
accountants from Philippines, Sri-Lanka, Paki-
stan, India, etc; and the qualifying examination of
all the three stages of the ICAN examination are
internal and subjective. This was seen as so since
they are set, examined, supervised and marked by
ICAN o?cials without any input from external
independent assessors.
25
Although most of the above claims were frivo-
lous, a few were indeed sensitive. One such claim
was the inability of ICAN to produce enough
accountants to satisfy the needs of the nation.
Between 1965 and 1980, only 180 persons passed
the ICAN ?nal examination.
26
Since then, the
number of persons qualifying has, on average,
been on the increase. For instance, only one per-
son quali?ed in 1972. By 1979, the number had
risen to 25. It was perhaps criticisms from ANAN
that sensitised ICAN to the need to increase the
number of chartered accountants in Nigeria. This
led to a rethink of the training system of ICAN
and the introduction of the accelerated training
scheme by ICAN.
27
This was approved by the
25
National House of Representatives Debates (September 8,
1981, pp. 4–5).
26
Please note that ICAN started conducting exams in 1971.
According to a former President of ICAN: ‘‘At the ?rst exam-
ination, we only had three passes, two in intermediates and one
in ?nal part 1. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Eng-
land and Wales advised us not to be bewildered, they told us
that the ?rst examination of Ghana, also moderated by them,
recorded no passes at all’’ (Owoseni, 1990, p. 31).
27
In a letter published in an ANAN newsletter, it was
claimed that ‘‘any body who has been following ICANs activity
closely from its inception will surely agree with me that it has
failed the nation in meeting the objectives for which it was
incorporated. They are now beginning to raise useful sugges-
tions about making their graduates undergo practical training,
an idea they stole from ANAN programmes. This and other
observations has shown that ICAN has been panicking and
trying to improve overnight ever since the ?rst move to incor-
porate ANAN was made. This goes to con?rm the old saying
that ‘competition is the mother of inventio’ meaning that the
existence of another legal accountancy body side by side with
ICAN will achieve a lot in improving the general standard of
the profession in the country’’ (Oko, 1981, p. 37).
484 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
ICAN Council in 1977. The aim and operating
mechanism of the programme has been explained
thus:
In order to further accelerate the production
of quali?ed accountants, a Training Pro-
gramme was devised whereby the Uni-
versities, and Colleges of Technology were to
undertake the theoretical academic part of
the student’s education with the Institute
being responsible for the professional aspect.
On the successful completion of the theore-
tical courses with the Institutions of Higher
Learning, the students are attached to
Recognised Training Centres (RTCs). These
are speci?cally selected after a thorough
inspection, to provide the practical training
under close supervision by the Institute. On
completion of the one year of attachment, the
students are required to take only the Profes-
sional Examination II of the Institute. After
one further year’s practical attachment with
the RTC (making 2 years altogether) a stu-
dent who has passed the Professional Exam-
ination II is eligible for full membership of
the Institute.
28
Although the Accelerated Training Scheme was
approved by the ICAN Council in 1977, it only
commenced in 1982. This was after the ANAN
Bill had been debated in the House of Repre-
sentatives. At the time the ICAN Council
approved the accelerated training scheme, how-
ever, the Government endorsed it and this helped
to reduce the pressure on ICAN at the time. Bri-
gadier Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, the then Chief of
Sta?, Supreme Headquarters (Vice President), in
the military junta, conveyed this Government
view:
I must say that your Institute has on occa-
sions been criticised for the slow rate of pro-
ducing chartered accountants through your
examinations. One would have liked to hear a
much more encouraging report. As you are
all aware, our economy has been growing
very rapidly in the last few years and the role
of quali?ed accountants in the development
and sustenance of the economy of this great
country cannot be over-emphasised. I am
delighted, however, to learn that in its e?orts
to increase the number of quali?ed accoun-
tants in the country, the council of your
Institute has approved a new training pro-
gramme in which the Universities and Col-
leges of Technology will do the academic part
of the training while the Institute takes care
of the professional aspect and that arrange-
ments for the take-o? of the accelerated
training programme had reached an advanced
stage. The Federal Military Government will
watch with keen interest, the progress and
successful implementation of the programme
(Yar’Adua, 1977, p. 12).
Unfortunately for ICAN, the Accelerated
Training Scheme was yet to commence when the
ANAN Bill was introduced at the National
Assembly in 1980. The promoters of the ANAN
Bill thus, did not hesitate to highlight the inability
of ICAN to satisfy the national need for accoun-
tants. Along these lines, one of the promoters of
the bill asserted that:
ICAN. . . qualify Accountants at the rate of
twelve per annum. They put Accountants on
their register at the rate of twelve persons,
twelve Nigerians, from all parts of Nigeria
per annum. For how long are we going to
allow them to continue to do this? We are
28
Olukoya (1990, p. 19). In detail, the objectives of the new
programme were as follows: O(a) streamlining the core of pro-
fessional subjects and expansion of core of supportive subjects
to include pure and applied economics, management, sociol-
ogy, law, mathematics, and human relations; (b) streamlining
the training system so as to ensure adequate supervision
thereby introducing Recognised Training Centres; (c) making
more e?ective use of the facilities provided in the universities
and colleges of technology. Upgrading the syllabus of the uni-
versities and colleges of technology so as to enable graduates
take only the ?nal examination of the Institute instead of two
or three examinations as was presently done; (d) achieving
greater interaction with universities by formation of Joint Con-
sultative Committee (JCC) with Universities; (e) reducing period
the graduates would train to become Chartered Accountants from
3 years to 2 years [and]; (f) producing 500 Chartered Accountants
annually as from 1985’’ (Ani, 1990, p. 34).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 485
now throwing out young men and women
from the di?erent Universities in this country.
They come out as quali?ed Accountants with
B.Sc in Accountancy from various Uni-
versities in this country and these young men
and women are being quali?ed at the rate of
twelve per annum. Are we going to allow
that?
29
Some supporters of the ANAN Bill even sug-
gested that the poor pass rate recorded in ICAN
examinations had to do with the poor calibre of
their students. Registering ANAN, such persons
argued will lead to improved standards. Along
these lines, it was asserted that:
The Committee on Education has carefully
considered raising the standard of accoun-
tancy in this country. From the records sub-
mitted by the ICAN, it is clear that out of
9180 people enrolled, only 194 are able to
pass Part II examination. And out of 4483
who took the examination, only 1000 passed
it. 3000 failed. The Committee on Education
believes that it is poor standard of recruit-
ment. Therefore we have to establish a spe-
ci?c standard. For instance, in the case of
ANAN, you will see that out of the 335
registered members, 215 are graduates.
Whereas in the case of ICAN, out of the 195
members, less than 5 percent are graduates.
This means anti-intellectual association. The
word ambiguity does not arise because any
University person understands that a uni-
versity degree is not equivalent to Institute of
Book-keepers, London Chamber of Com-
merce. From records we have seen that very
many of the so-called professional accoun-
tants in the ICAN passed through mushroom
institutions like the Institute of Accountancy
and all that. This country wants to raise the
standard of Accountancy.
30
The suggestion that ANAN will be in a better
position, than ICAN, to improve standards, was
rather farfetched. This is so especially given the
fact that several of the ANAN members had pre-
viously tried unsuccessfully to join ICAN.
31
During the debate, the House of Representa-
tives became the venue of an intense lobby to
either retain or break the monopoly of ICAN.
32
Both bodies accused each other of trying to
in?uence the legislative process through unfair
means. In this regard, an ANAN member sug-
gested that:
It is noteworthy that throughout the occa-
sions ANAN Bill, 1981 was tabled in the
House of Representatives for discussions
ICAN o?cials and executives with their hired
mercenaries of non-accountants were all
parading around the corners of the public
gallery, moping and causing unnecessary
commotions that disrupted the activities of
the honourable members (Njoku, 1981, p.
14).
29
National House of Representatives Debates (September 2
1981, p. 4).
30
National House of Representatives Debates (September 8
1981, p. 5). It was also argued that the ANAN Bill is ‘‘going to
raise the standard of Accountancy in this country, in that the
Bill stipulates that in the ?rst instance, a prospective Accoun-
tant must have a University Degree in Accountancy or its
equivalent, and thereafter, he must go into the College of
Accountancy for one year. This makes it four years of full time
training in Accountancy, and thereafter to attach himself or
herself to an established Accountant for a period of two years,
which makes it six years’ training. I put it to you that after
training for six years you cannot say that the standard is low. If
anything, the standard that this bill intends to set is going to be
much higher than what the present ICAN people have’’
(National House of Representatives Debates (September 2
1981, pp. 4–5).
31
ANAN once published its admission requirement as fol-
lows: ‘‘To all those who have not had a formal training in
Accountancy and all those rejected by ICAN’’ (Quoted in
ICAN, 1981, p. 2).
32
According to Alhaji Yanusa Kaltungo, a member of the
Federal House of Representatives: ‘‘there has been a lot of
lobbying going on from both sides, and a lot of blackmail of
individuals including myself is being carried on by the members
of the organisations, but I do not think blackmail is going to
hamper the National Assembly from doing its work. I think we
should allow the ANAN Bill to be debated fully and let the
people with upper hand take the day’’ (National House of
Representative Debate, September 3 1981, p. 9).
486 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
Unfortunately for ICAN the bill was passed by
the House of Representatives. ICAN explicitly
acknowledged that it lobbied the members of the
House of Representatives to reject the bill. After
its passing in the House, ICAN blamed corruption
among the members of the House of Representa-
tives for the result. In this regard, the then Pre-
sident of ICAN noted that:
I found myself spending days outside the
assembly chambers in the National Hall at
Tafawa Balewa Square, lobbying legislators
and praying and hoping that they would not
vote for mediocrity. In the end, I was dis-
appointed but not surprised when inspite of
all our e?orts, the House of Representatives
passed the ANAN Bill! This was because it
soon dawned on me, in the course of visits to
the House, that we and the legislators were
not, at all, on the same wave length and that
the only language the so called ‘‘honourable
members’’ understood or cared to understand
was that of Naira and Kobo [money] (Ade-
bayo, 1990, p. 38).
Once the ANAN Bill was passed by the House
of Representatives, the battle shifted to the Senate.
After giving the Bill a second reading in Septem-
ber 1983, the Senate referred it to the Committees
on Education, Industry and Finance for further
hearings and discussions.
33
In e?ect, this meant
that the Bill had been sidelined. The Bill was still
with these Committees when the military over-
threw the then civilian Government on 31st
December 1983. This brought an end to the
ANAN debate and represented temporary relief
for ICAN and a set back for ANAN. The earlier
analysis reiterates the view that professional
associations are, at least in some respects, political
organisations, which aim to advance the interest
of its members. For such professional associa-
tions to be successful, they often need the support
of the State (Larson, 1977, p. xii; Torstendahl,
1990, p. 5). From the experience of Nigeria, this
support is not guaranteed but depends on factors
such as: political connections, personal friend-
ships, lobbying and the developmental needs of
the State. The next section further substantiates
this view.
6. The Companies and Allied Matters Decree of
1990
The impact of the power structure of military
governments in Nigeria on the development of the
accounting profession in Nigeria was perhaps best
felt during the period leading up to the promulga-
tion of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree
in Nigeria. In 1987 the Federal Military Govern-
ment, then headed by General Ibrahim Baban-
gida, deemed it necessary to review the 1968
Companies Act and thus set up a consultative
committee on the issue. ANAN members immedi-
ately saw this as an opportunity to resuscitate
their demand for the recognition of a second
accountancy body in Nigeria. Again, their argu-
ment was partly based on the fact that ICAN was
incapable of producing enough accountants to
service the needs of a developing country like
Nigeria.
34
ICAN immediately countered the
ANAN memorandum to the committee. Accord-
ing to the then President of ICAN:
We put up a very powerful memorandum and
debate and succeeded in securing the support
of all other members of the Assembly to reject
the obnoxious suggestions contained in their
[ANAN] memorandum which were calculated
33
Odumeru (1997, p. 1).
34
Along these lines, it has been asserted that ‘‘One of the
problems identi?ed in the 4th National Development Plan is
lack of adequately trained manpower in every ?eld. In her
recent statement published in the New Nigerian issue of 28/7/
81, the Minister of National Planning, Chief (Mrs.) Ebun
Oyagbola revealed ‘that Nigerian requires additional accoun-
tants of 5600 to supplement her manpower need for the fourth
plan.’ It will not go without asking how the number could be
attained having regard to ICAN’s monopolistic and share
envious spirit in its life. With these restrictive measures, ICAN
(sic) has no concern and foresightedness in the National objec-
tive. It is not committed to the manpower problems of this
country’’ (Njoku, 1981, p. 14).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 487
to proliferate and dilute the profession
(Williams, 1990, p. 47).
35
When the Companies and Allied Matters Decree
was ?nally signed into Law by the Military Gov-
ernment, the provisions contained therein with
respect to the accounting profession and the
maintenance of the ICAN monopoly were di?er-
ent. To the amazement of ICAN, the Decree lay
the foundation for the recognition of a second
professional body for accountants. For instance,
Section 2 (c) of the Decree, which dealt with
membership of the Corporate A?airs Commis-
sion, stated that the representative of the accoun-
tancy profession in the body shall be appointed by
the Minister after necessary consultation with the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and
any similar body. There was also a similar provi-
sion in Section 358 (1), which dealt with the qua-
li?cation of auditors.
36
This meant that there was
a possibility that in the future the Government
could register other accounting bodies, thus end-
ing the monopoly of ICAN.
Incidentally, the pressure for change in the
monopoly and scope of the activities of ICAN did
not only come from ANAN. In fact, Section 358
(C) went on to disqualify the following category
of persons from being appointed auditors of
companies:
a person or ?rm who or which o?ers to the
company professional advice in a consultancy
capacity in respect of secretarial, taxation or
?nancial management.
This indeed was a major threat to the accoun-
tancy profession as these auxiliary services are
sometimes more pro?table than auditing and
accounting assignments. The Decree also ques-
tioned the technical jurisdiction of the work of the
accountants and brought accountants in con?ict
with lawyers. Section 359 (2) made it mandatory
for the Auditors Report to be counter signed by a
Legal Practitioner.
37
It was under the above circumstances that a
former President of ICAN asserted that:
It is a matter of regret that not withstanding
the e?orts of ICAN delegates and the support
for its case at the ?oor of the Assembly, what
came out of the Decree Number 1 of 1990 on
Companies and Allied matters di?ered sig-
ni?cantly in all matters a?ecting accounting
profession from what was contained in the
?nal recommendation to the government by
the Consultative Assembly. The Institute is
?ghting hard to expunge from the new decree,
certain obnoxious clauses which were never
discussed at the Consultative Assembly stage
but subsequently found themselves into the
Body of the Decree. Until it is amended, the
Decree No. 1 of 1990 Companies and Allied
Matters will stand out as the greatest threat
to the foundation and future well-being of our
profession in Nigeria (Williams, 1990, p. 47).
In April 1990, the ICAN President led a power-
ful team, which included sixteen past presidents of
the Institute to visit General Ibrahim Babangida,
the then military ruler, in order to protest against
some of the provisions of the 1990 Companies
Decree. In her speech, the then ICAN President
argued that there was no need for the proliferation
of accounting bodies in Nigeria at a time when
accountancy bodies in some other countries were
making e?orts to come together under one
umbrella:
35
According to ICAN: ‘‘One is tempted to ask: what is the
real objective of the ‘ANAN’ members? The short answer is to
mass-produce half-educated ‘accountants’ with very super?cial
accounting and business knowledge, who at best will be no
more than glori?ed Book-keepers. The e?ect would be that the
con?dence, which both the Federal and state governments,
multinational corporations, the various chambers of commerce,
prestigious ?nancial institutions such as the banks, insurance
companies, Nigerian Stock Exchanges, stock brokers, merchant
bankers, Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission etc.
have in the professional integrity of a Chartered Accountant,
would have been destroyed’’ (ICAN, 1980, pp. 2).
36
‘‘A person shall not be quali?ed for appointment as an
auditor of a company for the purpose of this Act unless he is a
member of a body of accountants in Nigeria established from
time to time by an Act or Decree’’.
37
This particular provision will be discussed later in the
paper.
488 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
The integration of the accountancy profession
in Nigeria is a signi?cant and unique experi-
ence, with kudos to the foresight of our
founding fathers, when it is considered that
only recently have accountancy bodies in the
United Kingdom, Canada and other coun-
tries commenced e?orts to come together
under one umbrella and speak with one voi-
ce. . .We therefore appeal to the Government
to assist the Accountancy profession by not
giving encouragement, whether deliberate or
inadvertent to any group of persons or laws
that will fuel divisiveness within the accoun-
tancy profession as exempli?ed by the recent
Companies and Allied Matters Decree of
1990 (Kuforiji-Olubi, 1990, pp. 27–28).
This represented an additional argument for the
continuation of its monopoly over accounting
regulation in Nigeria. Previously, ICAN’s ?ght for
the retention of its monopoly was hinged on the
assertion that its members possessed superior
technical skills. In his reply, President Babangida
promised to look into their concerns. This promise
culminated in the promulgation of the Companies
and Allied Matter (Amendment) Decree Number
32 of 1990. Speci?cally, the provision disqualify-
ing auditors from acting as consultants to their
clients and those which gave room for the possible
recognition of a second professional accounting
body in Nigeria were removed.
38
Unfortunately, for ICAN, its victory did not live
long. On 25 August 1993, a day before President
Babangida stepped down, he quietly signed the
Decree recognising the Association of National
Accountants of Nigeria. The Decree empowered
the body with the general duty of advancing and
regulating the accountancy profession.
39
These
duties are similar to the statutory duties prescribed
for ICAN. This was possible because of the cen-
tralised nature of power under military regimes.
As already mentioned, although there was always
a ruling council, there was nothing that prevented
the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces from promulgating Decrees with-
out consultation with his colleagues in the ruling
council. General Babangida was particularly
prone to do so. He was so powerful that he once
changed the composition of the ruling council
without consultation. His Government was also
perceived to be corrupt. It has, for instance, been
noted that:
Apart from. . .his manipulative tendencies
which earned him the nickname ‘‘Mar-
adonna’’, the other major criticism of General
Babangida has to do with the high level of
corruption that came to be associated with his
regime. In fact, corruption assumed new
heights under him and came to be analogous
with the term ‘settlement’ (Peters, 1997, pp.
213–4).
40
38
This amendment attracted criticisms from some sections.
It has for instance, been asserted that: ‘‘The original section 358
(1) & (2) aroused the hope that the Association of National
Account[ants] could one day become statutorily competent to
certify accountants. Sadly, it seems we would continue in the
situation where persons who may have similar quantitative and
qualitative quali?cation as those certi?ed under the ICAN Act
are denied the professional recognition so necessary to the
practice of their vocation. The situation does not advance the
cause of corporation accounting or accounting generally, it
only helps to create an arti?cial scarcity of professional
accountants to the detriment of national economic goals’’
(Sasegbon, 1991, p. 577).
39
Speci?cally, ANAN is charged with the duty of: ‘‘(a)
advancing the science of accountancy (in this Decree referred to
as ‘the Profession’); (b) determining the standards of knowl-
edge and skill, to be attained by persons seeking to become
registered members of the profession and reviewing those stan-
dards, from time to time as circumstance may require; (c) pro-
moting the highest standard of competence, practice and
conduct among the members of the profession; (d) securing, in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the establish-
ment and maintenance of register of members of the profession
and the publication, from time to time, of lists of these persons;
(e) doing such things as may advance and promote the
advancement of the profession of accountancy in both the
public and private sector of the economy; and (f) performing
through the Council established under section 3 of this Decree,
the functions conferred on it by this Decree’’ (Section 1 of the
1993 ANAN Decree).
40
This was the term used to describe the way General
Babangida used money and patronage to buy the loyalty of his
critics and opponents and to silence them.
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 489
So far, ICAN has tried without success to get
the Government to abrogate this law.
Another major threat to the accounting profes-
sion in Nigeria came from lawyers. As has already
been mentioned, section 359 (2) of the 1990 Com-
panies and Allied Matters Decree made it manda-
tory for the Auditors Report to be countersigned
by a Legal Practitioner. This section of the decree
is rooted in the hearings of the Law Reform
Commission. In those hearings, some people
expressed reservations on the absence of checks on
the wide-ranging powers of the auditors under the
1968 Companies Act:
Although section 142 and Schedule 8 of the
1968 Companies Act address the issue of
Company accounts, the implementation of
these provisions is entirely left to the discre-
tion of the Auditor to say whether or not the
accounts show a true and fair view of the
operations of the company at a given
date. . .
41
The perceived need for some type of control on
the activities of accountants was perhaps based on
the belief, among some lawyers, that accountants
were extensively involved in corrupt practices.
42
But even if the above belief was true, some
accountants felt that the solution clearly did not
lie with lawyers. They are neither trained nor
equipped to validate the work of accountants.
Along these lines, it has been rightly pointed out
that an:
apparent inconsistency is the fact that the
Decree does not state what role the lawyer
who is expected to countersign the auditor’s
report should play in the actual examination.
Since it is assumed that the lawyer is not to
participate in the actual work of examining
the books and records of accounts, he has no
‘‘locus standi’’ to attest to something he has
not examined, or has no technical training
and pro?ciency in (ICAN, 1990, p. 4).
An extension of this view that there was no logic
and essence in the provisions of Section 359 (2) of
the Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 1990
is that it led to the production of meaningless ver-
i?cation statements by lawyers. One such report
read:
I, Dr. Jacob Ogbonnaya Ibik, Solicitor and
Advocate of the Supreme Court of Nigeria,
Legal Practitioner of 52 Owerri Road Asata
Enugu, hereby certify that I have examined
the Financial Statements of the Nigerian
Cement Company PLC (RC 1209) for the
Year ended 31
st
December 1990 and further
certify that the said Financial Statements are
in accordance with the Auditors Report as
required by the Companies and Allied Mat-
ters Decree 1990.
43
Matters were made worse by the fact that
although section 368 of Companies and Allied
Matters Decree of 1990 imposed civil liability on
negligent auditors, such statutory liability did not
extend to countersigning legal practitioners (Ogo-
wewo, 1996, p. 18). There has been widespread
speculation that this provision was a part of a
strategy by the Attorney General to favour his
41
Quoted in Sasegbon (1991, pp. 583–4).
42
Section 359 (2) of the CAMD ‘‘had its roots in one of the
dinner parties organised by the Institute of Chartered Accoun-
tants of Nigeria (ICAN) in which the Justice Minister publicly
declared after the foods and wines were served that from his
observation Accountants seemed to produce di?erent sets of
reports for di?erent purposes such as the Inland Revenue,
banks and creditors. It was party time and no body took up the
Minister on his words even though all Accountants who atten-
ded the party knew that that statement contained serious
untruth’’. nterestingly, the author went on to assert that: ‘‘Even
where this is done it is all a matter of timing di?erence and in
the long run all accounts are prepared to re?ect the substance
of the business. It is all a matter of ‘window dressing’. No
business man wears rags to seek loans from his Bank Manager
but he would be unreasonable if he were not to be scantily
dressed to the tax o?ce lest the tax man takes his pound of
?esh in one fell swoop’’ (Adeniyi, 1991, p. 29).
43
The Nigerian Cement Company PLC Annual Accounts
(1990, p. 13).
490 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
fellow lawyers.
44
Despite the protests of ICAN
and the promise of President Babangida, no
amendment to this provision was contained in the
?rst amendment to the 1990 CAM Decree. It was
however in 1991, when the then Attorney General
of the Federation, Prince Bola Ajibola, was nomi-
nated by the Nigerian Government for appoint-
ment as a judge of the International Court of
Justice, that the amendment was e?ected. This was
done, perhaps because Prince Ajibola felt that
controversy at home could hinder his chances of
getting United Nations approval for his position
in the International Court.
45
Lawyers, unhappy with the abrogation, accused
accountants of being professional politicians who
claim speciality in all ?elds:
it is nowadays very di?cult to ascertain the
exact delimitations of the nature and scope of
the functions of an ‘‘accountant.’’ We have
here, an amorphous commercial all-rounder
who considers that he can, and in fact, does
contrive to do all things. It may be that such a
trend has no unsettling e?ect on that trade as it
might on other professions (where professional-
ism is treasured), but it is, in our thinking, a
dangerous trend, not to the legal profession,
but to the country and the business world as a
whole. Something has to be done before we are
all destroyed in the tentacles of an ubiquitous
cartel — the dangerous commercial all-
rounder. The self-appointed Jack of all trades
and master of all? (Sasegbon, 1991, p. 586).
Incidentally, ICAN sees nothing wrong in its
members claiming expertise in virtually all ?elds of
human endeavour. Indeed the body sometime
prides itself for being able to produce experts in
most ?elds. Along these lines, a recent editorial of
The Accountant, the o?cial journal of ICAN, call-
ing on its members to join politics, asserted that:
Chartered Accountants should not be con-
tended in playing second ?ddle in politics. Go
into the forefront of the political arena and
get things moving. By virtue of the multi-
plicity of their training in various subjects
spanning over all ?elds of human endeavour,
Chartered Accountants are Jacks of all trades
and MASTERS OF ALL (ICAN, 1991, p. 2).
Unfortunately for ICAN, its self-styled de?nition
as an all encompassing profession is not accepted
by all. Such a group also run the risk of loosing
jurisdiction over some aspects of their practice to
more focused professional groups. Along these
lines, the Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria
(CITN) was formed by a combination of some
ICAN members and non-ICAN members. In 1992,
under the military regime of General Ibrahim
Babangida, the government recognised the body.
The main objective of the body is to regulate the
practice of taxation in Nigeria.
46
Recently, the
44
Lawyers have tried, most unconvincingly, to defend the
provisions of section 359 of the CAM Decree of 1990. Along
these lines, it has been asserted that: ‘For who but a lawyer
could say whether an account had been drawn up and whether
an authentic report had been made in accordance with law?
Who, but a Lawyer, could really say with certainty that an
account had been done up, and a ?nancial statement properly
prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act so as to
give a true and fair view of the state of a?airs and pro?t and
loss of the Company as required by schedule 6? If it were left to
the accountant alone, he would be right to apply his profes-
sional skill and prudence [on] an account or report which
though technically perfect, is nevertheless illegal for non-com-
pliance with obligatory statutory formats, procedures and
guidelines. In the end, he may only have succeeded in drawing
up another ‘cryptograph’ which will not help the ordinary per-
son and thereby defeat the intendment of the Act. Here then is
the job to be done. It requires inter-disciplinary input, but
which way does the scale of greater responsibility really tilt,
having regard to the intendment of the law? The real task is in
our opinion, in ensuring that the report is one made in com-
pliance with the Act’’ (Sasegbon, 1991, p. 585).
45
This amendment was contained in section 4 of the Compa-
nies and Allied Matters Amendment Decree Number 46 of 1991.
46
Speci?cally, the body is charged with the general duty of:
‘‘(a) determining, what standards of knowledge and skill are to
be attained by persons seeking to become registered members
of the taxation profession. . .and reviewing those standards
from time to time as circumstances may require; (b) securing in
accordance with the provisions of this decree the establishment
and maintenance of register of fellows, associates, graduates
and student members of the Institute and the publication, from
time to time, of lists of those persons; (c) regulating and con-
trolling the practice of the profession in all its rami?cations;
and (d) maintaining, in accordance with the Decree, of dis-
cipline within the profession’’ (section 1 of the Chartered Insti-
tute of Taxation of Nigeria Decree, 1992).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 491
body gave notice that it will soon start to exercise
its duty of regulating the practice of taxation in
Nigeria. In a widely advertised press release, the
body asserted that:
The Council of the Institute has set June 30th
1999 as last day of the direct admission into
associate membership of the Institute. Those
who have the requisite educational quali?ca-
tions and have acquired relevant tax experi-
ence, are eligible to apply for direct admission
to membership up to June 30 1999. Pro-
spective applicants are reminded that as from
July 1, 1999, their brains will be taxed before
they can be considered for membership as
associates. In addition, only members holding
current practising licence of the Institute can
practice taxation in Nigeria. Any body who
practices taxation without complying with
these rules will be committing an o?ence
punishable under Decree 76 of 1992.
47
Prior to the establishment of the body, such
taxation practices were dominated by ICAN
members. ICAN members are alarmed by this loss
of jurisdiction. To further complicate matters,
many of these ICAN members have taken advan-
tage of the exemptions to join the Institute of
Taxation. Despite this, ICAN clearly recognises
this as a threat to its area of professional jurisdic-
tion. In a recent Circular, which addressed the
notice given by the Institute of Taxation, the
ICAN President asserted that:
In the last few weeks, Chartered Institute of
Taxation of Nigeria had caused to be pub-
lished in various national dailies a deadline
indicating 30
th
June, 1999 for all Chartered
Accountants who are not their members to
cease to have the right to practice taxation or
have direct admission to their institute. I have
received many enquiries and complaints from
very many of our members who are con-
cerned about the development. This is to
inform you that your Council have been
deliberating on this matter for quite a while
and most seriously in the last few weeks.
Strategies have been put in place to ensure
that the matter is resolved as quickly as pos-
sible to ensure that the place of chartered
accountants as tax experts is maintained and
the status of their certi?cates is not devalued.
It is my hope that very shortly, I would be
able to inform you of the successful resolu-
tion of the matter. Let me assure all our
members that your Council is very active
in pursuing matters that a?ect the welfare of
members of the Institute and this particular
issue is a very important one among others.
48
Finding a solution to this problem, however,
may not be easy. This case is rather complex, as
many of the members of CITN are ICAN mem-
bers. Indeed CITN rules made it possible for all
ICAN members with a minimum of 1 year post
quali?cation experience to join without examina-
tion. All those who failed to take advantage of this
exemption will in future take examinations. Given
the above scenario, it is di?cult to see how ICAN
can put up a united front against CITN. Dual
membership of both bodies leads to a con?ict of
interest, which will complicate the jurisdictional
struggle.
From the above, it is evident that the State has
been the most in?uential factor in the develop-
ment of the accounting profession in Nigeria.
ICAN recognises this and has used various overt
and covert means in seeking the support of the
State in order to maintain its monopoly over the
regulation of accounting in Nigeria. The Institute
has, for instance, increased the production of
accountants in order to satisfy the developmental
needs of the State. It has also explicitly lobbied the
State in order to prevent the recognition of rival
professional accounting associations by the State.
Unfortunately for ICAN, the lobby weapon is also
available to its rivals. This perhaps explains the
recognition of ANAN by the State in 1993. The
current status of the professional accounting
regulation arena in Nigeria has therefore been a
47
New Nigerian, 8 June, 1999, p. 21.
48
Circular from ICAN President to all ICAN members
dated 26 August, 1999.
492 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
product of the diverse interests that impact on the
dynamics between the State and the institutions of
the profession.
7. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has attempted to
highlight some of the factors that have in?uenced
the development of the accounting profession in
Nigeria. It shows how the type of government in
place (military or democratic), societal expecta-
tions, interest groups and government actions
have impacted on the development of the accoun-
tancy profession. For instance, accusations that
ICAN was incapable of producing enough
accountants to serve the nation was partly
responsible for its introduction of the Accelerated
Training Programme which reduced the training
period for accountants and increased their rate of
quali?cation. Despite this, such criticisms helped
to provide some credibility to the rival ANAN and
may have contributed to its recognition by the
Government. It is perhaps because of this ANAN
threat that ICAN has now become more sensitive
and proactive towards the accounting needs of the
nation. In 1989, for instance, ICAN introduced
the Accounting Technicians Scheme (ATS), which
is aimed at producing a second tier of accounting
professionals.
49
The objective of the ATS Scheme is:
to provide a nationally recognised quali?ca-
tion for middle cadre accounting sta?
employed in the various sectors of the econ-
omy. The Scheme will also help in the devel-
opment of a standard curriculum for the
education and training of the accounting
technician. The Institute hopes that the
scheme will remove the frustration of students
who are unable to satisfy the registration
requirements for ICAN full professional
examination by providing them with a
worthwhile quali?cation. More importantly,
it will provide that level of intermediate
accounting manpower that is so much needed
in industry, commerce and the public sector
(Olukoya, 1990, p. 20).
Such a scheme, at the very least, will help to put
ICAN in a position where it will be better able to
satisfy public expectations with respect to its role
in providing accountancy services to the generality
of the country. The Accounting Technicians Scheme
also provides an opportunity for non-quali?ed
accountants who have in the past provided valu-
able services to small enterprises in the country to
improve their accounting skills and to be brought
under the rules of ICAN. Evidence in this paper,
however, shows that it is not only public needs
and expectations as well as professional compe-
tence that impact on the dynamics of the State–
profession relationship. Pressure group lobby, the
type of government in existence (military or demo-
cratic), and personal relationships are also impor-
tant variables in the State–profession dynamics.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Anthony Hopwood, Carlos
Ramirez, Lucie Chaumeton, Francis Okwedy,
Tunde Ogowewo and Thomas Ahrens for their
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All
errors and omissions, however, remain mine. I am
also grateful to the Association of Commonwealth
Universities (UK) for awarding me a Titular
(Worshipful Company of Chartered Accountants)
Fellowship to ?nance this research. The Depart-
ments of Accounting and Finance and Economic
History at the London School of Economics and
Political Science also provided academic hospital-
ity during various stages of this research. Finally, I
am grateful to Richard Macve for providing aca-
demic support.
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doc_414015511.pdf
Over the years several, sometimes conflicting, theories attempting to explain the development of professions have
emerged. The ‘‘functionalist’’ and ‘‘interactionist’’ theories have since lost the spotlight to a more critical approach
based on the Weberian concept of closure. Limitations in the concept and practice of this neo-Weberain concept have
led to suggestions that research into the sociology of professions, should also include historical analyses of professionalism
that capture historical specificities with the aim of generating theory that sees beyond ‘‘just massive historical
variation’’ [Collins, R. (1990). Changing conceptions in the sociology of the profession. In R. Torstendahl, &
M. Burrage, The formation of professions: Knowledge, state and strategy. London: Sage Publications]. Such research
should also investigate the structural conditions under which the professionalisation process takes place [Johnson, T.
(1977). The profession in the class structure. In R. Scase, Industrial society: Class, cleavage and control. London:
George Allen and Unwin.]. In order to achieve this, there is the need to critically study the relationship of the State and
the profession [Klegon, D. (1978). The sociology of professions: an emerging perspective. Sociology of Work and
Occupations, 5, 3, 259–283.] and to document more extensively, the process, rather than the product, of closure [Chua,
W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1993). Rethinking the profession-state dynamic: the case of the Victorian Charter Attempt,
1885–1906, Accounting, Organizations and Society, pp. 128–691; Chua, W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1998). The dynamics of
‘‘closure’’ amidst the construction of market, profession, empire and nationhood: an historical analysis of an Australian
Accounting Association.
Professional accounting development in Nigeria: threats from
the inside and outside
Chibuike U. Uche
Department of Banking and Finance, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria
Abstract
Over the years several, sometimes con?icting, theories attempting to explain the development of professions have
emerged. The ‘‘functionalist’’ and ‘‘interactionist’’ theories have since lost the spotlight to a more critical approach
based on the Weberian concept of closure. Limitations in the concept and practice of this neo-Weberain concept have
led to suggestions that research into the sociology of professions, should also include historical analyses of pro-
fessionalism that capture historical speci?cities with the aim of generating theory that sees beyond ‘‘just massive his-
torical variation’’ [Collins, R. (1990). Changing conceptions in the sociology of the profession. In R. Torstendahl, &
M. Burrage, The formation of professions: Knowledge, state and strategy. London: Sage Publications]. Such research
should also investigate the structural conditions under which the professionalisation process takes place [Johnson, T.
(1977). The profession in the class structure. In R. Scase, Industrial society: Class, cleavage and control. London:
George Allen and Unwin.]. In order to achieve this, there is the need to critically study the relationship of the State and
the profession [Klegon, D. (1978). The sociology of professions: an emerging perspective. Sociology of Work and
Occupations, 5, 3, 259–283.] and to document more extensively, the process, rather than the product, of closure [Chua,
W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1993). Rethinking the profession-state dynamic: the case of the Victorian Charter Attempt,
1885–1906, Accounting, Organizations and Society, pp. 128–691; Chua, W. F., & Paullaos, C. (1998). The dynamics of
‘‘closure’’ amidst the construction of market, profession, empire and nationhood: an historical analysis of an Aus-
tralian Accounting Association. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23 (2), 155–187; Ramirez, C. (2001). Under-
standing social closure in its cultural context: accounting practitioners in France (1920–1939), Accounting,
Organizations and Society.]. Such is the approach of this article, which focuses on the development of the accounting
professions in Nigeria. It critically examines the profession/ State dynamics that have helped shape the outcome of
the various episodes in the history of the accounting profession in Nigeria. An important in?uence in this dynamics
is the nature of government in place (i.e. military or civilian). # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
0361-3682/02/$ - see front matter # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PI I : S0361- 3682( 01) 00007- 1
Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
www.elsevier.com/locate/aos
.
1. Introduction
There is now a fairly widespread view that pro-
fessional associations are primarily, but not
exclusively, political bodies whose purpose is to
de?ne, organise, secure and advance the interest of
their members (Willmott, 1986, p. 556). Perhaps
the most important factor in the determination of
the ability of professions to achieve their objec-
tives is the in?uence of the State.
1
The reaction of
the State to the objective of professions could
depend on factors such as: the type of government
in place (i.e. democratic or military), public
expectations, developmental requirements of the
State, knowledge base of the profession, social
relationships and professional lobbying. Despite
such advances in our study and knowledge of the
accounting professions, there has been very little
research along these lines in developing countries
like Nigeria. This is in part because of the relative
youth of the Nigerian accountancy profession.
For instance, the ?rst registered professional
accounting body in Nigeria — the Association of
Accountants in Nigeria — was incorporated in
1960. This body transformed itself into the Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN)
and was granted Government recognition in
1965.
2
Although ICAN has commissioned or sup-
ported some of its past presidents and members, to
research into the history of the accounting profes-
sion in Nigeria, many of their reports have tended
to follow the o?cial or partisan line. Their works
almost always stress the technical qualities of
accounting while underplaying the social and
political formation of its practices and standards
(cf. Ani, 1990; Anibaba, 1990a, b; Coker, 1990;
Oni, 1991; Williams, 1990; Wallace, 1992).
The present analysis, by contrast, takes the view
that the development of the accounting profession
cannot be adequately understood independent of
its political and social environment.
3
The analysis
below traces the development of the accounting
profession in Nigeria and critically examines the
various attempts to prevent the proliferation of
professional bodies. It also examines the varied
threats to the jurisdiction of the accountant by
other professional bodies in the country. The ana-
lysis is divided into 6 sections: Section two exam-
ines the various theories that have in the past been
used to explain the development of professions.
Section three examines the dynamics of the rela-
tionship between the State and the profession with
emphasis on explaining how the structure of the
government (democratic or military) could in?u-
ence this dynamics. Section four traces the origins
of ICAN, while Section ?ve critically analyses the
various attempts by rival accountancy bodies to
end the ICAN monopoly of regulating the
accounting profession. The sixth section examines
the underlying processes and forces that impacted
on the promulgation of the Companies and Allied
Matters Decree (CAMD) of 1990. Of particular
interest are the provisions a?ecting ICAN. The
section further examines other threats to the terri-
torial jurisdiction of ICAN. The ?nal section con-
cludes the paper.
2. Theories of professional development
Over the years, several, sometimes con?icting,
theories attempting to explain the development of
professions have emerged. Prior to the 1960s, for
instance, the ‘‘functionalist’’ theory of professions
dominated the literature (Macdonald, 1995, p. 2).
The functionalist theorists argue that professions
can only emerge when a group of people are found
1
‘‘The state is de?ned here as the total domain of o?cial
public action rather than as government in the narrower sense.
Its agencies therefore include government departments and
their subsidiary o?shoots, commissions and review bodies
established by government, and the judicial system. Such
agencies can have direct bearing upon professional control
through legislation, court decisions, the threat of government
actions contained in critical ?ndings by public commissions,
and by having professionals in their employment. They may
also have an indirect e?ect through the funding of professional
training and of public schemes which generate a demand for
professional services’’ (Child & Fulk, 1982, p. 172).
2
Compare with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
England and Wales (1880) and the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland (1853).
3
One of the determinants of the role of the State in the
State/ profession dynamics, in a developing country like
Nigeria, is the nature of government in place (democratic or
military).
472 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
to be practising a de?nite technique founded upon
specialised training.
4
They are seen as coming
together as a group in order to mutually guarantee
their competence and to maintain a high standard
of professional character and honourable practice
(Carr Saunders, 1928, p. 9). Some scholars also
emphasised the sel?essness, philanthropic and
altruistic nature of professions (Barber, 1963b,
p. 670). In other words, ‘‘functionalists’’ saw the
profession as an occupation, which is pursued lar-
gely for others and not merely for oneself (Cf.
Barber, 1963a, p. 125). Functionalist theorists,
therefore, emphasised the belief that professionals
acquired the recognition of the society because of
the specialised skills they possessed and the close
solidarity of its members (Goode, 1957, pp. 194–
195; Halmos, 1970, pp. 22–25; Hughes, 1963, pp.
655–657). They were not self-centred bodies and
were seen to act in the interest of the general
community (Marshall, 1939, p. 33–332). It was
perhaps because of this characteristic that some
sociologists of functionalist mode saw profes-
sionals as being a key ingredient in the stabilisa-
tion of society and maintenance of world order
5
.
Although some of these functionalists were aware
of the complexity of social organisations and the
possibility that the acquisition of skills may not be
the only determining factor in deciding members
of any given profession, they did not consider it
material. This was explained thus:
Those associations which date from the ?rst
half of the last century were in their early
days sometimes truly exclusive in the sense
that they sought to exclude would be mem-
bers for reasons not strictly relevant to pro-
fessional competence. Various devices were
employed. But the exclusiveness of these
bodies has been exaggerated. The member, it
is true, desired to be recognised as forming
the elite among the practitioners, and in gen-
eral they justi?ed their claim to be so regar-
ded. Later the attitude of members of these
older associations underwent a change. They
came to desire that all professionals should
possess at least the minimum quali?cations
admitting to the association. This has been
the aim of the more recently formed associa-
tions from the beginning. With a few unim-
portant exemptions, professional associations
can now be said to be exclusive only in the
sense that they exclude the unquali?ed (Carr-
Saunders, 1928, pp. 8–9).
With time, however, this view began to change
and more scholars started assigning more weight
to the complexity of social organisations and the
possibility that competence and community ser-
vice may not be the only explanatory variables for
the emergence of professions. This was the origin
of the ‘‘interactionist’’ theory of professions. Peo-
ple began to pay more attention to the process,
rather than the product of professionalising (Tim-
perley & Osbaldeston, 1975, pp. 607–609). One of
the pioneers of the interactionist theorists exam-
ined the history, complexity and forces that have
4
‘‘It is often contended that the chief di?erence between a
professional and a non professional occupation lies in the ele-
ment of superior skill. The performance of a professional ser-
vice presumably involves a series of usually complicated
operations, mastery of which requires lengthy training. The
models referred to in this connection are the performances of a
surgeon, a concert pianist or a research physicist. However,
some non-professional occupations actually involve a higher
order of skill than many professional ones. For example, tool
and dye making, diamond-cutting, monument- engraving or
cabinet making involve more intricate operations than school
teaching, nursing or social work. Therefore, to focus on the
element of skill per se in describing the professions is to miss
the kernel of their uniqueness. The crucial distinction is this:
the skills that charaterize a profession ?ow from and are sup-
ported by a fund of knowledge that has been organised into an
internally consistent system, called a body of theory’’ (Green-
wood, 1957, p.46).
5
It has for instance been suggested that ‘‘professions inherit,
preserve and pass on a tradition. . . they engender modes of life,
habits of thought and standards of judgement which render
them centres of resistance to crude forces which threaten steady
and peaceful evolution. . . The family, the church and the uni-
versities, certain associations of intellectuals, and above all, the
great professions stand like rocks against which the waves
raised by these forces beat in vain‘ (Carr-Saunders & Wilson,
1933, p. 497). It was also argued that: ‘‘Our professional insti-
tutions are. . . an important stabilising factor in our whole
society and through their international associations, they pro-
vide an important channel of communication with the intellec-
tual leaders of other countries, thereby helping to maintain
world order’’ (Lynn, 1963, p. 653).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 473
helped create various sub professions within the
main medical profession:
It is characteristic of the growth of specialties
that early in their development they carve out
for themselves and proclaim unique missions.
They issue a statement of the contribution
that the specialty, and it alone, can make in a
total scheme of values and, frequently, with it
an argument to show why it is peculiarly ?t-
ted for this task. The statement of mission
tends to take a rhetorical form, probably
because it arises in the context of a battle for
recognition and institutional status. Thus,
when surgical specialties such as urology and
prostology, were struggling to obtain iden-
tities, independent of general surgery, they
developed the argument that the particular
anatomical areas in which they were inter-
ested required special attention and that only
physicians with their particular background
were competent to give it. Anaesthesiologists
developed a similar argument. This kind of
claim separates a given area out of the general
stream of medicine, gives it special emphasis
and a new dignity, and, more important for
our purposes, separates the specialty group
from other physicians. Insofar as they claim
an area for themselves, they aim to exclude
others from it. It is theirs alone (Bucher &
Strauss, 1961, p. 326).
Based on such assertions, more scholars started
to move from a normative view of professions, i.e.
what a profession should be, to a positive view of
the professions i.e. what the professions actually
are (Roth, 1974, p. 17). Interactionists, thus, argue
that professions mainly strive to protect their
group’s interests, which sometimes con?ict with
the interest of the wider society. The only way
such groups could gain legitimacy was by convin-
cing the wider society that they could o?er some
kind of special skill (Boreham, 1983, p. 694). By
examining how beliefs and methods relevant for
pursuing and securing the claim of professional
competence and recognition are constructed and
projected, these interactionists had, as in the case
of the medical profession, exposed the presence of
competing interests within these professional
organisations (Wilmott, 1986, p. 557). Some
interactionists have also challenged even the claim
of homogeneity within professions (Smith, 1958,
p. 410). Along these lines, it has been suggested
that:
The assumption of relative homogeneity
within the profession is not entirely useful:
there are many identities, many values and
many interests. These amount not merely to
di?erentiation or simple variation. They tend
to become patterned and shared; coalitions
develop and ?ourish-and in opposition to
some others. We shall call these groupings
which emerge within a profession ‘‘seg-
ments.’’ (Specialties might be thought of as
major segments, except that a close look at a
specialty betrays its claim to unity, revealing
that specialties, too, usually contain seg-
ments, and if they ever did have common
de?nitions along all lines of professional
identity, it was probably at a very special, and
early, period in their development) (Bucher &
Strauss, 1961, pp. 325–326).
Interactionists have, however, been criticised on
grounds that they are indi?erent to evidence and
proof. Although their claims are usually plausible,
it is not always evident that they are backed by
empirical evidence (Saks, 1983, p. 5). Further-
more, although interactionist scholars acknowl-
edge the entwinement of politics in the
professionalisation process, they generally fail to
explore the structural conditions under which
various professional groups were liable to be suc-
cessful (Willmott, 1986, p. 557). There is, thus, the
need for more emphasis on the process of pro-
fessionalisation (Boreham, 1983, p. 685). In the
attempt to enhance our understanding of the pro-
cess and functioning of professions, some scholars
have devised a more critical approach rooted in
neo Weberian principles.
Scholars of the neo-Weberian mode attempt to
apply the Weberian concept of social closure to
the development of professions. This notion of
social closure broadly de?nes a situation where an
474 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
interest group seeks to regulate market conditions
in their favour by restricting access to speci?c
opportunities to group members. This is usually
done in the face of actual or potential competition
from outsiders (Parkin, 1979, p. 44). In other
words, it is a process by which social collectivities
attempt to maximise their reward by restricting
access to certain economic and social opportu-
nities to members (Johnson, 1977, p.112). These
neo-Weberian scholars mainly focus on the var-
ious barriers that professions have erected in order
to ensure social closure.
6
Many neo-Weberians
have, however, been accused of failing to empiri-
cally substantiate their claims. Their studies,
therefore o?er few improvements over those of the
interactionists. Neo-Weberian sociologists have,
for instance, tended not to study closure rules and
to historically track their di?erential signi?cance
through time (Chua & Poullaos, 1998, p. 157;
Murphy, 1984, pp. 550–552). This tendency may
have been aided by the prevalent feeling of anti-
professionalism among the rank and ?le of sociol-
ogists belonging to this school. It has for instance
been argued that it is common for sociologists of
this neo-Weberian mode to distort and exaggerate
the dangers of professional imperialism as part of
a wider e?ort to demystify the activities of mono-
polistic professional groups (Strong, 1979, p. 201).
It has thus been asserted that:
A satisfactory analysis of the wider sources of
power underpinning professionalism is,
therefore, still being awaited from the neo-
Weberian school. At present sociologists
working within this perspective appear not to
have greatly advanced on the interactionist
view that professionalisation is primarily a
function of the bargaining skills of occupational
groups seeking the status of a profession. In
sum, then, the neo-Weberian sociologists of
the professions have yet to exploit fully the
potential of the approach. The structural
conditions under which professionalisation
occurs clearly require more stringent exam-
ination. Proponents of this school also have
not taken enough care in ensuring that their
accounts of the current nature and role of
professions in society are empirically sustain-
able. Far too often, therefore, what amount
to thinly veiled attacks on professions and
professionals have been presented without
adequate supporting evidence (Saks, 1983,
pp. 10–11).
Because of such problems, it has thus been sug-
gested that future research into the sociology of
professions should also include the historical ana-
lyses of professionalism that capture historical
speci?cities with the aim of generating theory
that sees beyond ‘‘just massive historical varia-
tion’’ (Collins, 1990, p. 21). Such research should
also investigate the structural conditions under
which the professionalisation process takes place
(Johnson, 1977, p. 106). In order to achieve this,
there is the need to critically study the relationship
of the State and the profession (Klegon, 1978,
p. 273) and to document more extensively, the
process, rather than the product, of closure (cf.:
Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Ramirez, forth-
coming).
3. The profession and the State
The relationship of the State and the profession
is usually dynamic and complex. In some cases,
laws have been put in place to bring the profession
under the control of the State (Wallace, 1992,
p. 34). Such professions, thus, ultimately depend
on the power of the State to protect their domain
of ‘‘expertise’’ (Larson, 1977, p. xii). It has been
pointed out that:
The state has been the most important friend
of the professions (in order to domesticise
them, of course) in some societies and it has
been abhorred by them in others, at certain
times. Knowledge has always been used by
both state and industry in general terms, and
the groups which has had the problem-sol-
ving capacities or, at least, have managed to
give the impression that they have these have
6
Such barriers include examination, apprenticeship and
entry quali?cation rules.
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 475
been asked, implored or ordered to help.
Sometimes a group has diligently managed to
manoeuvre strategically in this situation in
order to establish itself in a very privileged
position, while another group has not been
able to do so (Torstendahl, 1990, p. 5).
On the relationship of the accounting profession
and the state, speci?cally, it has also been sug-
gested that:
A . . .signi?cant condition for the develop-
ment of accounting practice and organisation
has been the emergence of the modern
state. . . Unfortunately, most of the literature
on the work of professionals has neglected the
role of the state or has regarded it as a neutral
in?uence (Willmott, 1986, p. 563).
The role of the State is even more prominent in
a developing country like Nigeria without a well-
developed political culture and with an unenviable
history of constant military interruptions in the
administration of the State.
7
Since the country
gained political independence from the UK in
1960, it has witnessed at least six di?erent military
governments. At independence, the reins of power
was handed over to a democratically elected gov-
ernment headed by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. He
was killed in a military coup de´ tat in January
1966. His Government was also overthrown and
Major General Aguiyi Ironsi took over as the
Head of State and Commander in Chief of the
Nigerian Armed forces. His reign was much
shorter than that of his predecessor. He was killed
and his government overthrown in another mili-
tary coup in July 1966. He was succeeded by
General Yakubu Gowon who ruled Nigeria from
1967 to 1975. Although his period in o?ce repre-
sents the longest period of continuity in Nigeria,
there was some period of instability and uncer-
tainty during the time. The Nigerian civil war
(1967–1970) was fought during this time.
8
General
Gowon’s Government was overthrown in July
1975 and General Murtala Mohammed became
the new military Head of State. General Moham-
med was killed in an abortive coup in February
1976. He was succeeded by General Olusegun
Obasanjo who served under him as the Chief of
Sta? Supreme Headquarters (Vice President).
General Obasanjo handed over power to the
democratically elected government of Alhaji
Shehu Shagari in October 1979. Shagari was
overthrown in December 1983 and Major General
Mohammadu Buhari became the new military
leader. In August 1985, Buhari was overthrown by
General Ibrahim Babangida who was his Chief of
Army Sta?. In June 1993, General Babangida
annulled the presidential election his government
staged in its bid to return the country to civilian
rule. International and domestic pressures, how-
ever, forced him to ‘‘step aside’’ in August 1993.
9
He appointed Chief Ernest Shonekan, a civilian,
to replace him as the Head of the new interim
Government. Within 3 months, this interim Gov-
ernment was overthrown and General Sani Aba-
cha became the new military leader of Nigeria.
General Abacha died in o?ce in June 1998. He
was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubarkar.
In May 1999, General Abubarkar handed over
7
In general, there are four degrees of political cultures: (I)
minimal political culture; (ii) low political cultures; (iii) devel-
oped political culture and (iv) mature political culture. In
countries with minimal political culture, the government, can
be easily toppled by the use or threatened use of force. The
armed forces in such places sometime press to supplant the
democratic order. O?cers assume governmental positions in
the apparent presumption that they will continue in o?ce for
an inde?nite period. Such systems generally present few deter-
rents to the use of force. In countries with low political cul-
tures, the displacement of democracy is likely to be temporary.
In some cases, the military go into coalition with civilians in
order to enhance their legitimacy. In developed political struc-
tures, there are accepted procedures for the transfer of political
power and legitimacy for holders of public o?ces. Total sup-
plantment of partial displacement of the government by the
armed forces either alone or in coalition with civilians is di?-
cult to accomplish. The armed forces may however be in the
position to exert strong behind the scene pressures, which could
be equated to blackmail. Finally, in mature political structures,
the overthrow of democratic rule is impossible. The military
may be able to in?uence, but not blackmail, the democratic
government. (Finer, 1988, pp. 77–126). Nigeria can reasonably
be classi?ed as a country with low political culture.
8
For a detailed History of the Nigerian Civil War, see Jorre
(1972).
9
For a detailed review of the annulment, see Babatope
(1995).
476 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
power to the democratically elected Government
headed by General Olusegun Obasanjo.
10
From the above, it is clear that Nigeria has
witnessed frequent violent changes in the attempt
of various parties to control the apparatus of the
State. This in itself makes the State unstable and
less accountable.
11
Unlike in well-established civi-
lian structures where there are rules governing the
methodology and timing of change in the control
of the apparatus of State, such rules rarely exist in
military take-overs. One of the main character-
istics of successful coups is surprise and secrecy. In
other words, the timing of military coups and the
life span of military administrations are unpre-
dictable. Furthermore, because military Govern-
ments are seen, even in Nigeria, as an anathema,
they are always regarded as transition govern-
ments (Azinge, 1994, p. ix). Military leaders
always claim that they are corrective regimes and
not politicians.
12
The major di?erence between
them and the politicians is their ability to ‘get
things done’.
13
This is usually possible because of
the hierarchical nature of the armed forces. It is
not surprising that most military regimes are
intolerant of any checks on their powers. For
instance, military decrees are rarely subject to
court modi?cations. In fact, the courts were
brought under the absolute control of military
decrees. According to a former Justice of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria:
By the promulgation of the Constitution
(Supremacy and enforcement of Powers)
Decree No. 28 of 1970, courts of this country
were brought under the absolute control of
military Decrees. Successive Military Gov-
ernments, in 1984, and now Decree No. 107
of 1993, have adopted this same position. The
resulting position in these Decrees is that no
court in Nigeria has jurisdiction to question
the vires of the Military Government to pro-
mulgate a decree, or the validity of the decree,
or to declare any decree null and void.
14
The process of Decree promulgation is further
evidence of the concentration of power in military
governments. This is so because making laws for
the country is now the responsibility of a handful
of people who are members of the ruling council.
According to Decree Number 107 of 1993:
The power vested in the National Assembly
or the Federal Military Government, as the
case may be. . . shall vest in the Provisional
Ruling Council.
15
The Decree further states that:
[t]he power of the Federal Military Govern-
ment to make laws shall be exercised by
means of Decrees signed by the Head of
State.
16
This has been interpreted by the courts to mean
that the Head of State alone can make laws with-
out consulting with members of the highest mili-
tary body in the land.
17
According to a former
Supreme Court Justice:
10
For a detailed political history of Nigeria, see Balewa
(1994).
11
A former Minister of Defence of Nigeria once lamented
that the country: was ‘‘caught in a cycle of instability which
reaches a peak every 10 years when a coup is bound to take
place. . . There was a coup in January 1966, an unsuccessful
attempt in February 1976, and the latest abortive plot which
was scheduled for the end of 1985 or early 1986. . . Seven coups
in 20 years in this country are just too many for the stability
and orderly progress of society’ (quoted in Peters, 1997, p. 10).
12
According to one of the leaders of the ?rst military coup
in Nigeria: ‘‘Our enemies are the political pro?teers, the
swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and
demand ten per cent; those that seek to keep the country divi-
ded permanently so that they can remain in o?ce as ministers
or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make
the country look big for nothing before international circles;
those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian
political calendar back by their words and deeds’’ (Quoted in
Okoye, 1990, p. 9).
13
Military Organisations possess a hierarchical command
structure which makes it easier for the military to implement
policies which the civilians could not (Onyejekwe, 1981, p. 24).
14
Quoted in Ogowewo (2000, p. 152).
15
Section 10 (2).
16
Section 3 (I).
17
In Nigeria, for instance, this body has, at various times,
been known as: the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC),
Supreme Military Council (SMC) and the Provisional Ruling
Council (PRC).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 477
This provision is short, terse and seems to me
complete and self explanatory. It has not
prescribed any procedure. It merely says how
the making of laws shall be exercised. What-
ever procedure was adopted by the Federal
Military Government in the exercise of its law
making powers, it appears would satisfy the
constitutional requirement. It may prescribe
no procedure as in the instant case. . .I ?nd
nothing in the provisions of the 1979 Con-
stitution as amended or in any other decree in
support of the contention that the participa-
tion of members of the Provisional Ruling
Council is a necessary pre-condition in the
procedure in the promulgation of a Decree.
18
Given the power of the State and the supreme
powers usually conferred on military rulers, the
dynamics in the relationship between the State and
the profession in developing countries like Nigeria
are usually less systematic. Given the existence of
few checks and balances in the system, any party
that is able to in?uence the top military class may
well be in a position to de?ne the history of the
entire profession. In other words, interest groups’
lobbying for regulatory bene?t is easier under such
military Governments mainly because legislative
initiative during such periods is concentrated in a
few individuals (Ogowewo, 1996, p. 18). It is
therefore not surprising (as will be seen later) that
the major gains as well as crises that the account-
ing profession has witnessed have taken place
under such military regimes. The remaining sec-
tions of this paper show how the relationships
between the profession and the State have in?u-
enced the outcome of the various episodes in the
history of the accounting profession in Nigeria.
4. The origins of ICAN
In general, the accounting profession and the
State in Nigeria have always been entwined.
Before Nigeria gained political independence in
1960, there was no registered body for profes-
sional accountants in the country. The develop-
ment of the accounting profession in Nigeria
became feasible only with the movement towards
political independence in the country. Along these
lines, it has been asserted that:
The development of the accountancy profes-
sion in Nigeria became a feasible venture at
the Constitutional Conference held in Lon-
don in May and June 1957 to draft the Con-
stitution of an independent Nigeria.
Paragraph 44, Item 20, of the Report of that
Conference (Cmnd. 207) provided that rules
could be created which would allow certain
professions to be designated (i.e., practised),
and provided for the registration and dis-
ciplinary control of members of the profes-
sions so designated. It was agreed at the
conference that auditors and accountants be
added to the initial draft list of professions.
The enabling law- Concurrent Legislative List
(Designated Professions) Orders, 1955 to
1957- to recognise accountancy and auditing
as designated professions was passed in 1957.
The e?ect of these Orders was that the quali-
?cations, registration and disciplinary control
of members of the professions so designated
became a matter for federal government
legislation. Consequently, no designated
profession could self-regulate without the
agreement of the federal government
(Wallace, 1992, p. 34).
Comparatively, however, the accounting profes-
sion lagged behind most other professions in
Nigeria. It was, for instance, observed that:
Although clergymen, lawyers and doctors
have been recognised as professionals in
Lagos as far back as the later part of the
nineteenth century. . .. Accountants were not
so recognised because the handful of this
group of skilled practitioners at that time,
were either civil servants or employees of the
foreign trading companies based in Lagos
(Anibaba, 1990b, pp. 3–4).
Furthermore, the handful of accountants in the
country at the time were foreigners and it was not
18
Quoted in Ogowewo (2000, p. 142).
478 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
until 1950 that Mr. Akintola Williams became the
?rst Nigerian to qualify as a chartered accountant
when he was admitted into the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of England and Wales
(ICAEW). By 1960 there were 15 Nigerian mem-
bers of ICAEW, one Nigerian member of the
Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accoun-
tants (now the Chartered Institute of Public
Finance and Accountancy) and 24 Nigerian mem-
bers of the Association of Certi?ed and Corporate
Accountants (now the Chartered Association of
Certi?ed Accountants).
Based on the above numbers, it is not surprising
that it was the Nigerian members of the ACCA
that ?rst moved to set up a professional accoun-
tancy body in Nigeria in 1957. In that same year,
they applied to form a local branch of the ACCA.
This plan was endorsed by the ACCA in London
in 1960. By that time however, the idea had been
overtaken by events. Nigerian members of ACCA
saw clear advantages in the newer idea of forming
a local accountancy body that would bring all
Nigerians with overseas accountancy quali?ca-
tions of equivalent standards together. This shift
has been explained in the following terms:
The social status of the ACCA quali?cation
in Nigeria was (as in the UK itself) inferior to
that of the three UK chartered accountancy
bodies. By Independence, no member of the
ACCA had attained a status comparable to
that achieved by the fewer Nigerians with UK
chartered accountancy quali?cations. So,
when a suggestion was made to form an
independent local association of accountants
which would bring all Nigerians with overseas
accountancy quali?cations of equivalent
standards together, the Nigerian members of
the local branch of the ACCA gladly
embraced the idea (Wallace, 1992, p. 35).
In other words, the ACCA members, who were
in the majority, embraced the idea of a central
accounting association in Nigeria mainly because
it had the potential of eroding the stigma of infer-
iority of their original quali?cation. Indeed, the
idea of establishing an umbrella association for all
Nigerian accountants emerged in1959 at a party in
honour of Mr. Keeling, a full time borough treas-
urer in Worthing, England and a member of the
British Council delegation then visiting Nigeria to
advise on the setting up of public libraries. During
the party, Mr. Keeling took the host aside and
said:
Look Mr Coker, there are at least twenty-?ve
of you, why not start an Association of
Accountants, you never know, it may one day
develop into an institute (Coker, 1990, p. 23).
This advice was taken and in November 1960
the Association of Accountants in Nigeria was
incorporated under the companies ordinance then
in existence.
19
The quali?cation for membership of
the Association was membership of any of the
following accounting bodies then existing in the
UK: the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
England and Wales; The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland; The Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of Ireland; the Association of
Certi?ed and Corporate Accountants (now the
Chartered Association of Certi?ed Accountants);
the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and
Accountants (now the Chartered Institute of Pub-
lic Finance and Accountancy) and; the Institute of
Cost and Works Accountants (now the Chartered
Institute of Management Accountants).
The Association soon recognised the importance
of the State in its bid to gain monopoly over the
regulation of the accounting profession in Nigeria.
As already mentioned, it was then no longer pos-
sible to regulate accounting practice without the
agreement of the federal government. In 1963, the
Council of the Association decided to explore the
19
The objectives of the association included, among others,
to: provide a central organisation for accountants and auditors
in Nigeria and generally to do such things as may from time to
time, be necessary to maintain a strict standard of professional
ethics amongst its members and to advance the interest of the
accountancy profession in Nigeria; promote generally, a higher
sense of the importance of systematic and modern accounting
and to encourage greater e?ciency therein and; to provide for
the training, examination and local quali?cation of students in
accountancy (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria,
1985, p. 10).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 479
possibility of obtaining a Government charter for
the Association with the aim of achieving its
monopoly objective. This in itself caused serious
rancour among the members of the association.
Some people found it di?cult to comprehend how
members of the various professional bodies, with
all their di?erences, could be brought under one
umbrella and thus possess similar rights and pri-
vileges. According to Anibaba (1990b, p. 49):
The rancour among members of the Associa-
tion of Accountants in Nigeria in connection
with the provisions of the Draft Bill of the
Act is better imagined than recorded. . .Su?ce
it to note that it almost broke up the Asso-
ciation but for the wisdom of the pioneers of
the profession in Nigeria. Even the name of
the proposed Institute was a source of dis-
agreement. . .. There was also the strong view
of some members that only those quali?ed as
Chartered Accountants in the United King-
dom should be allowed to describe themselves
as chartered accountants in Nigeria.
Despite this, the wider interest of obtaining a
charter that would help the body to regulate the
accounting professions prevailed. All parties,
therefore, compromised in order to ensure that the
charter was granted by the Government. It was
perhaps because of such a compromise that the
1965 ICAN Act did not contain any provisions as
to which foreign accounting bodies should be
recognised by ICAN, especially for direct mem-
bership. Under the Act, ICAN was allowed to
make such decisions from time to time.
20
This
certainly did not solve the problem. It only post-
poned the date when a decision had to be taken on
the issue. In the meantime, the monopoly of reg-
ulating the accounting profession had been
secured by ICAN.
The ICAN Act of 1965 also empowered it to
determine the standards for persons wishing to
become members of the accountancy profession
and to maintain the register of persons entitled to
practice as accountant and auditors.
21
The impli-
cation of this was that ICAN had acquired a
monopoly over the practice and regulation of
accounting.
Apart from the internal disagreements, there
was also opposition from the outside. Up until the
enactment of the ICAN Act, no organisation had
the duty of regulating the accounting and auditing
profession. Under the Companies Ordinance of
1922 anybody could act as an auditor to a com-
pany. The only exception was that o?cers and
directors of a company were usually prohibited
from auditing that company. There were also no
restrictions with respect to the practice of
accounting. It was this lack of regulation that
resulted in people having no formal quali?cations
and or links with recognised foreign accountancy
bodies setting up practices as accountants. This
group resisted the legislation of the ICAN Decree
and the attendant monopoly it o?ered the body
with respect to the determination of who could
practice accounting. Their resistance attracted
Government sympathy. Indeed some regional
governments genuinely felt that such uncerti?-
cated accounting practitioners immensely con-
tributed to the economic development of their
region. In this respect, a September 1964 letter
from the Ministry of Finance of Northern Nigeria
in Kaduna to the Federal Ministry of Education
in Lagos, on the ICAN bill, asserted thus:
In the North, it has not been the practice for
businessmen and traders, particularly those
with small operations, to maintain ?nancial
record books and accounts. The regional tax
authorities have encouraged (as had the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry) such persons to
initiate the practice of having someone pre-
pare for them books and accounts even if such
preparation consists only of a very simple
20
See Section 8 (b) of the 1965 ICAN Act.
21
Speci?cally, the enabling Decree charged the body with
the following functions: ‘‘(a) determining what standard of
knowledge and skill are to be obtained by persons seeking to
become members of the accountancy profession and raising
these standards from time to time as circumstance may permit;
(b) securing in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the
establishment and maintenance of registers of fellows, associ-
ates and registered accountants entitled to practise as accoun-
tants and auditors and the publication from time to time of lists
of those persons; and (c) performing through the council under
this Act the functions conferred on it by this Act’’ (Section 1 of
the 1965 ICAN Act).
480 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
statement of the ?nance of the business or
trading operation. This is because the cost
involved is much and there was lack of quali-
?ed accountants and bookkeepers in the
North. Services of persons who had a fair
knowledge of arithmetic but a very limited
knowledge of book-keeping and accountancy,
have been sought in the preparation of such a
simple set of books. While it is true that
because of this practice a number of thor-
oughly unsatisfactory book-keeping and
accounting records have been submitted to
Revenue in support of a statement of income
for tax purposes, it is also true that Revenue
had been able to secure in many instances a
more satisfactory statement of the ?nancial
condition of a trade or business than had
previously been the case (quoted in Anibaba,
1990b, p. 50).
The promoters of the ICAN Act had to com-
promise. There were provisions in the 1965 ICAN
Act to accommodate some of the people who
were, prior to the enactment of the ICAN Act,
practising accounting in the country but who were
not a?liated to any of the recognised international
accountancy bodies. Such persons were classi?ed
as ‘‘Registered Accountants’’ under the ICAN
Act.
22
According to a past President of the Insti-
tute:
We ran into some vested interests and upon
Government insistence, we had to concede
some recognition to individuals who had
established practice as accountants and who
were auditing the accounts of various small
?rms. This was the origin of ‘‘REGISTERED
ACCOUNTANTS.’’ We thought that since
their number was small and certain to reduce
over the years, it was better to accommodate
them so as to be able to oversee their activ-
ities (Coker, 1990, p. 24).
In other words, ICAN consented to the idea of
registered accountants in the hope that this cate-
gory could easily be phased out.
23
As will be seen
later, however, the recognition of registered
accountants did very little to placate all the parties
that were against the monopoly ICAN enjoyed
over accounting and auditing functions in Nigeria.
5. Attempts at proliferation
The importance of the State in the development
of the accounting profession in Nigeria is perhaps
best brought out by the various attempts by non-
ICAN accounting groups to get recognition. Such
groups, some of which are as old as ICAN, reg-
ularly urged the Government to intervene in order
to break the monopoly of ICAN. Perhaps because
of its history, disenchantment as to the very nature
and structure of ICAN dates back to its founda-
tion. Threats to the monopoly enjoyed by ICAN
came from the inside and outside. As has already
been mentioned, not all persons who were quali-
?ed to be members of ICAN were willing to join
the body initially. Once the ICAN Act was passed
into law in 1965, the battleground shifted from the
outside to the inside. This was so because, under
22
The 1965 ICAN Act de?ned a registered accountant as ‘‘a
member of the institute who is not a fellow or an associate
member’’ (Section 19). It further asserts that ‘‘. . .a person shall
be entitled to be registered as a registered accountant if he
satis?es the council that immediately before the appointed day
he had had not less than ?ve years of experience as an inspector
or auditor of company a?airs under the provisions of the
Companies Act. (3) An application for registration shall, in
addition to evidence of quali?cation, satisfy the council- (a)
that he is of good character, (b) that he has attained the age of
twenty one years, and (c) that he has not been convicted in
Nigeria or elsewhere of an o?ence involving fraud or dis-
honesty. (4) The council may in its sole discretion provisionally
accept a quali?cation produced in respect of an application for
registration under this section, or direct that the application be
renewed within such period as may be speci?ed in the direction.
(5) Any entry directed to be made in the register under subsec-
tion (4) shall show the registration is provisional, and no entry
so made shall be converted to full registration without the
consent of the council signi?ed in writing in that behalf. (6) The
council shall from time to time publish in the Federal Gazette
particulars of quali?cations for the time being accepted as
aforesaid’’ (Section 8).
23
In 1972, the provision allowing for the recognition of
registered accountants was abolished [see Section 1 a (iii) of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants Amendment Decree of
1972]. This e?ectively represented the beginning of the phasing
out process.
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 481
the ICAN Act of 1965, only ICAN members could
be appointed as auditors in Nigeria. Under this
scenario, even those that opposed the idea of peo-
ple with various international accounting quali?-
cation consolidating into a single body, had little
choice but to join ICAN. This was especially so
where such persons had any intentions of practis-
ing as auditors in the country. At its ?rst annual
general meeting in 1966, the controversial issue of
uniform recognition of divergent accountancy
bodies came up again. According to a Past Pre-
sident of ICAN:
. . .no sooner was the present Institute incor-
porated in 1965 than some members of the
Institute started to advocate the exclusion of
those quali?cations that do not confer on
their holders the right of ‘‘public’’ practice in
the home country. The ‘‘showdown’’ came at
the ?rst annual general meeting of the Insti-
tute held in June 1966, when, against the
proposals of the Council, the majority of the
members present voted for the exclusion of
members of the Institute of Cost and Works
Accountants and the Institute of Municipal
Treasurers and Accountants, on the ground
that they are not entitled to public practice as
accountants. Since then Council started the
battle for the re-uni?cation of the profession
in the country, in the ?rm belief that the
exclusion of these two quali?cations which
enjoy international recognition can only lead
to disintegration which is not in the best
interest of the profession in Nigeria (Anibaba,
1985, p. 19).
It was not until 1973 that the decision to exclude
members of the Institute of Cost and Works
Accountants and the Institute of Municipal
Treasurers and Accountants, from ICAN mem-
bership was reversed.
24
This revision was perhaps
possible because of the existence of an external
threat to the monopoly of ICAN.
Shortly after ICAN was recognised by the Gov-
ernment, some Nigerians that were not quali?ed
for membership of the Institute under ICAN rules
but were members of some unrecognised account-
ing bodies in the UK started to agitate for mem-
bership of ICAN. These bodies were: the
Association of International Accountants (AIA);
The Society of Company and Commercial
Accountants and; the British Association of
Accountants and Auditors. The most vocal of
these groups was the Association of International
Accountants. Some of their members subsequently
formed the Nigeria Society of International
Accountant (SIA). Their protests culminated in a
petition to the then Federal Military Government.
In the petition, dated 3 May, 1972, the Institute
called on the Government to amend the 1965
ICAN Act in order to force ICAN to admit their
members as ICAN members. ICAN replied urging
the Government not to grant this request. Among
other things ICAN asserted that:
It is a well known fact that neither the Fed-
eral Government of Nigeria nor the United
Kingdom Government recognises the Asso-
ciation of International Accountants (to
which members of the Nigerian Society of
International Accountants belong) as quali?-
cation for professional appointment. The
body is not listed as one of the recognised
bodies of the Accountants whose members
could be appointed as company auditors
under the Companies Act 1948 and 1967 of
the United Kingdom, the country where the
body is established. Apart from the Govern-
ments mentioned above, public corporations,
companies and other ?nancial organisations
do not seem to recognise ‘International
Accountant’ quali?cation as being suitable
for a professional appointment. This can be
deduced from the particulars of numerous
advertisements for accountancy positions in
commerce and industry, both here in Nigeria
24
This was made possible partly by the promulgation of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Decree
Number 30 of 1972. According to the explanatory note of the
decree, a person: ‘‘with a quali?cation granted outside Nigeria
and for the time being acceptable to the Institute could be
enrolled as a chartered accountant even though that person
may not by law be entitled to practice accountancy in the
country granting the quali?cation’’. The fact that the ICAN
leadership in?uenced this amendment is not in doubt.
482 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
and in the UK. . . While the Institute has
given concessions in certain conditions for
enrolment of students and members in view
of the present condition of the country, it is
not in the interest of the nation to lower
standard to such a level that the accountancy
quali?cation obtainable in Nigeria should be
considered inferior to that of any other
country (quoted in Anibaba, 1990b, pp. 149–
50).
The Federal military Government subsequently
decided against the petition. ICAN continued to
maintain its monopoly. Despite this victory ICAN
recognised that the Nigerian Society of Interna-
tional Accountants represented a real threat to its
monopoly of regulating the accounting profession
in Nigeria. ICAN, therefore, became receptive to
dialogue with the SIA with a view to reducing
their di?erences. According to a former president
of ICAN:
The Association of International Accoun-
tants on 12th October, 1972 sent its syllabus
and past examination question papers to the
Council of ICAN for assessment and evalua-
tion with a view of obtaining automatic
membership. . .. After an exhaustive examina-
tion of AIA’S syllabus, past examination
papers and their own existing method of
training by the Education and Membership
Committees of ICAN, it was found that- (a)
the syllabus and the course contents of the
AIA had no depth (b) the standard of exam-
ination papers was far too low, and was not
comparable with those set by ICAN or any of
the bodies recognised for direct admission by
ICAN. The ?nal examination of the AIA was
found to be just about the standard of the
intermediate examination of ICAN (c) as
regards professional training the AIA vir-
tually had none. The above apart, further
enquiries revealed that a substantial number
of the membership of the AIA did not even sit
for the examination of that body. They were
just awarded the diploma for having had
‘‘considerable experience’’ in the work of
accountancy nature (Ani, 1977, p. 16).
Given the ?ndings of the ICAN committees, the
Council of ICAN still refused to grant direct
membership of ICAN to holders of the AIA certi-
?cate. The ICAN Council, however, decided to
exempt members of AIA, who quali?ed through
examination, from the intermediate examination
of the ICAN. In other words, they were eligible to
sit for the ?nal examination of ICAN. Further-
more, such persons were further granted a shorter
practical training period in order to qualify as
ICAN members. This ICAN decision was duly
communicated to the Council of AIA and indeed
some of their members subsequently applied for,
and were granted, exemption from the inter-
mediate stage of ICAN (Ibid.).
The matter however, was not laid to rest. In July
1975, a new military government came to power in
Nigeria. Colonel Ahmadu Ali was appointed the
Federal Commissioner for Education. This was
the supervisory ministry of ICAN. Colonel Ali
was a ‘‘great friend’’ of Mike Odedina, the then
President of SIA (Ani, 1990, p. 33). It was perhaps
because of this relationship that AIA launched a
massive campaign to get the Government to
reopen the issue. In the main, the body requested
the Government to excise the regulatory function
imposed on ICAN by the 1965 ICAN Act and vest
it in the Federal Ministry of Education. This
would have helped facilitate the recognition of
SIA by the Federal Government.
Colonel Ahmadu Ali, perhaps because of his
personal relationship with Odedina, supported the
above proposal. He however, needed approval
from the Federal Executive Council in order to
implement it. Once ICAN was informed of Ali’s
intentions, it employed the press in order to fore-
stall Colonel Ali. According to the then ICAN
President:
My task as the President was to forestall Ali’s
move and this was done beautifully. I had
employed the services of Gbolabo Ogun-
sanwo as ICAN’s public relations consultant
and his task was to mobilise the press and
electronic media on behalf of the Institute. A
press conference was to be held a day before
the meeting of the Federal Executive Council
and my researched paper was to be advertised
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 483
in all the dailies so that it could appear along
with the brie?ng of the press conference on
the day of the Federal Executive Council
Meeting. One way or the other, we were to
ensure that every member of the FEC saw the
newspaper before attending the meeting. . .I
was later told that Ali’s paper at FEC did not
take o? the ground as members were dubious
of the quali?cations and integrity of AIA. I
was told also that FEC asked one of its
members to enquire whether what I had
written was correct. And this member went to
no other person to make his enquiry than D
O Da?none [an ICAN member] and of course
my assessment of AIA was correct (Ani, 1990,
pp. 33–34).
Such tactics, by ICAN, gives credence to the
view that professional associations are primarily,
though not exclusively, political bodies whose
purpose is to secure and advance the interest of
their members (Willmott, 1986, p. 556). The tac-
tics certainly worked as the bid, by the SIA, for
Government recognition again failed. This was
perhaps the last major move by the SIA to seek
Government recognition. In January 1979, mem-
bers of SIA spearheaded the formation of a wider
accounting body named the Association of
National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN). SIA
subsequently became redundant and ANAN
became the umbrella body for agitating an end to
the ICAN monopoly.
The return to civilian rule in 1979 created an
opportunity for ANAN to ?ght for recognition
through the legislature. In 1980, ANAN members
sponsored a bill on the ?oor of the Federal House
of Representatives for the recognition of ANAN.
An ANAN supporter in the National Assembly
listed the general considerations and objectives of
the ANAN Bill as follows: to end the ICAN
monopoly of the accountancy profession which
was claimed to be a hindrance to the nation’s
economy, particularly small scale businesses and
rural semi-urban economies; because of the cult-
like nature of the ICAN, and its monopolistic
behaviour, auditing of public accounts by ICAN
auditors is subjected to unchallenged dishonest
manipulation and selective inclusion. This is so
mainly because there is no competing body to
cross audit; the ICAN manpower production
capacity is grossly too slow to meet the present
need in Nigeria of professional accountants. This
resulted in the importation of less well quali?ed
accountants from Philippines, Sri-Lanka, Paki-
stan, India, etc; and the qualifying examination of
all the three stages of the ICAN examination are
internal and subjective. This was seen as so since
they are set, examined, supervised and marked by
ICAN o?cials without any input from external
independent assessors.
25
Although most of the above claims were frivo-
lous, a few were indeed sensitive. One such claim
was the inability of ICAN to produce enough
accountants to satisfy the needs of the nation.
Between 1965 and 1980, only 180 persons passed
the ICAN ?nal examination.
26
Since then, the
number of persons qualifying has, on average,
been on the increase. For instance, only one per-
son quali?ed in 1972. By 1979, the number had
risen to 25. It was perhaps criticisms from ANAN
that sensitised ICAN to the need to increase the
number of chartered accountants in Nigeria. This
led to a rethink of the training system of ICAN
and the introduction of the accelerated training
scheme by ICAN.
27
This was approved by the
25
National House of Representatives Debates (September 8,
1981, pp. 4–5).
26
Please note that ICAN started conducting exams in 1971.
According to a former President of ICAN: ‘‘At the ?rst exam-
ination, we only had three passes, two in intermediates and one
in ?nal part 1. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Eng-
land and Wales advised us not to be bewildered, they told us
that the ?rst examination of Ghana, also moderated by them,
recorded no passes at all’’ (Owoseni, 1990, p. 31).
27
In a letter published in an ANAN newsletter, it was
claimed that ‘‘any body who has been following ICANs activity
closely from its inception will surely agree with me that it has
failed the nation in meeting the objectives for which it was
incorporated. They are now beginning to raise useful sugges-
tions about making their graduates undergo practical training,
an idea they stole from ANAN programmes. This and other
observations has shown that ICAN has been panicking and
trying to improve overnight ever since the ?rst move to incor-
porate ANAN was made. This goes to con?rm the old saying
that ‘competition is the mother of inventio’ meaning that the
existence of another legal accountancy body side by side with
ICAN will achieve a lot in improving the general standard of
the profession in the country’’ (Oko, 1981, p. 37).
484 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
ICAN Council in 1977. The aim and operating
mechanism of the programme has been explained
thus:
In order to further accelerate the production
of quali?ed accountants, a Training Pro-
gramme was devised whereby the Uni-
versities, and Colleges of Technology were to
undertake the theoretical academic part of
the student’s education with the Institute
being responsible for the professional aspect.
On the successful completion of the theore-
tical courses with the Institutions of Higher
Learning, the students are attached to
Recognised Training Centres (RTCs). These
are speci?cally selected after a thorough
inspection, to provide the practical training
under close supervision by the Institute. On
completion of the one year of attachment, the
students are required to take only the Profes-
sional Examination II of the Institute. After
one further year’s practical attachment with
the RTC (making 2 years altogether) a stu-
dent who has passed the Professional Exam-
ination II is eligible for full membership of
the Institute.
28
Although the Accelerated Training Scheme was
approved by the ICAN Council in 1977, it only
commenced in 1982. This was after the ANAN
Bill had been debated in the House of Repre-
sentatives. At the time the ICAN Council
approved the accelerated training scheme, how-
ever, the Government endorsed it and this helped
to reduce the pressure on ICAN at the time. Bri-
gadier Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, the then Chief of
Sta?, Supreme Headquarters (Vice President), in
the military junta, conveyed this Government
view:
I must say that your Institute has on occa-
sions been criticised for the slow rate of pro-
ducing chartered accountants through your
examinations. One would have liked to hear a
much more encouraging report. As you are
all aware, our economy has been growing
very rapidly in the last few years and the role
of quali?ed accountants in the development
and sustenance of the economy of this great
country cannot be over-emphasised. I am
delighted, however, to learn that in its e?orts
to increase the number of quali?ed accoun-
tants in the country, the council of your
Institute has approved a new training pro-
gramme in which the Universities and Col-
leges of Technology will do the academic part
of the training while the Institute takes care
of the professional aspect and that arrange-
ments for the take-o? of the accelerated
training programme had reached an advanced
stage. The Federal Military Government will
watch with keen interest, the progress and
successful implementation of the programme
(Yar’Adua, 1977, p. 12).
Unfortunately for ICAN, the Accelerated
Training Scheme was yet to commence when the
ANAN Bill was introduced at the National
Assembly in 1980. The promoters of the ANAN
Bill thus, did not hesitate to highlight the inability
of ICAN to satisfy the national need for accoun-
tants. Along these lines, one of the promoters of
the bill asserted that:
ICAN. . . qualify Accountants at the rate of
twelve per annum. They put Accountants on
their register at the rate of twelve persons,
twelve Nigerians, from all parts of Nigeria
per annum. For how long are we going to
allow them to continue to do this? We are
28
Olukoya (1990, p. 19). In detail, the objectives of the new
programme were as follows: O(a) streamlining the core of pro-
fessional subjects and expansion of core of supportive subjects
to include pure and applied economics, management, sociol-
ogy, law, mathematics, and human relations; (b) streamlining
the training system so as to ensure adequate supervision
thereby introducing Recognised Training Centres; (c) making
more e?ective use of the facilities provided in the universities
and colleges of technology. Upgrading the syllabus of the uni-
versities and colleges of technology so as to enable graduates
take only the ?nal examination of the Institute instead of two
or three examinations as was presently done; (d) achieving
greater interaction with universities by formation of Joint Con-
sultative Committee (JCC) with Universities; (e) reducing period
the graduates would train to become Chartered Accountants from
3 years to 2 years [and]; (f) producing 500 Chartered Accountants
annually as from 1985’’ (Ani, 1990, p. 34).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 485
now throwing out young men and women
from the di?erent Universities in this country.
They come out as quali?ed Accountants with
B.Sc in Accountancy from various Uni-
versities in this country and these young men
and women are being quali?ed at the rate of
twelve per annum. Are we going to allow
that?
29
Some supporters of the ANAN Bill even sug-
gested that the poor pass rate recorded in ICAN
examinations had to do with the poor calibre of
their students. Registering ANAN, such persons
argued will lead to improved standards. Along
these lines, it was asserted that:
The Committee on Education has carefully
considered raising the standard of accoun-
tancy in this country. From the records sub-
mitted by the ICAN, it is clear that out of
9180 people enrolled, only 194 are able to
pass Part II examination. And out of 4483
who took the examination, only 1000 passed
it. 3000 failed. The Committee on Education
believes that it is poor standard of recruit-
ment. Therefore we have to establish a spe-
ci?c standard. For instance, in the case of
ANAN, you will see that out of the 335
registered members, 215 are graduates.
Whereas in the case of ICAN, out of the 195
members, less than 5 percent are graduates.
This means anti-intellectual association. The
word ambiguity does not arise because any
University person understands that a uni-
versity degree is not equivalent to Institute of
Book-keepers, London Chamber of Com-
merce. From records we have seen that very
many of the so-called professional accoun-
tants in the ICAN passed through mushroom
institutions like the Institute of Accountancy
and all that. This country wants to raise the
standard of Accountancy.
30
The suggestion that ANAN will be in a better
position, than ICAN, to improve standards, was
rather farfetched. This is so especially given the
fact that several of the ANAN members had pre-
viously tried unsuccessfully to join ICAN.
31
During the debate, the House of Representa-
tives became the venue of an intense lobby to
either retain or break the monopoly of ICAN.
32
Both bodies accused each other of trying to
in?uence the legislative process through unfair
means. In this regard, an ANAN member sug-
gested that:
It is noteworthy that throughout the occa-
sions ANAN Bill, 1981 was tabled in the
House of Representatives for discussions
ICAN o?cials and executives with their hired
mercenaries of non-accountants were all
parading around the corners of the public
gallery, moping and causing unnecessary
commotions that disrupted the activities of
the honourable members (Njoku, 1981, p.
14).
29
National House of Representatives Debates (September 2
1981, p. 4).
30
National House of Representatives Debates (September 8
1981, p. 5). It was also argued that the ANAN Bill is ‘‘going to
raise the standard of Accountancy in this country, in that the
Bill stipulates that in the ?rst instance, a prospective Accoun-
tant must have a University Degree in Accountancy or its
equivalent, and thereafter, he must go into the College of
Accountancy for one year. This makes it four years of full time
training in Accountancy, and thereafter to attach himself or
herself to an established Accountant for a period of two years,
which makes it six years’ training. I put it to you that after
training for six years you cannot say that the standard is low. If
anything, the standard that this bill intends to set is going to be
much higher than what the present ICAN people have’’
(National House of Representatives Debates (September 2
1981, pp. 4–5).
31
ANAN once published its admission requirement as fol-
lows: ‘‘To all those who have not had a formal training in
Accountancy and all those rejected by ICAN’’ (Quoted in
ICAN, 1981, p. 2).
32
According to Alhaji Yanusa Kaltungo, a member of the
Federal House of Representatives: ‘‘there has been a lot of
lobbying going on from both sides, and a lot of blackmail of
individuals including myself is being carried on by the members
of the organisations, but I do not think blackmail is going to
hamper the National Assembly from doing its work. I think we
should allow the ANAN Bill to be debated fully and let the
people with upper hand take the day’’ (National House of
Representative Debate, September 3 1981, p. 9).
486 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
Unfortunately for ICAN the bill was passed by
the House of Representatives. ICAN explicitly
acknowledged that it lobbied the members of the
House of Representatives to reject the bill. After
its passing in the House, ICAN blamed corruption
among the members of the House of Representa-
tives for the result. In this regard, the then Pre-
sident of ICAN noted that:
I found myself spending days outside the
assembly chambers in the National Hall at
Tafawa Balewa Square, lobbying legislators
and praying and hoping that they would not
vote for mediocrity. In the end, I was dis-
appointed but not surprised when inspite of
all our e?orts, the House of Representatives
passed the ANAN Bill! This was because it
soon dawned on me, in the course of visits to
the House, that we and the legislators were
not, at all, on the same wave length and that
the only language the so called ‘‘honourable
members’’ understood or cared to understand
was that of Naira and Kobo [money] (Ade-
bayo, 1990, p. 38).
Once the ANAN Bill was passed by the House
of Representatives, the battle shifted to the Senate.
After giving the Bill a second reading in Septem-
ber 1983, the Senate referred it to the Committees
on Education, Industry and Finance for further
hearings and discussions.
33
In e?ect, this meant
that the Bill had been sidelined. The Bill was still
with these Committees when the military over-
threw the then civilian Government on 31st
December 1983. This brought an end to the
ANAN debate and represented temporary relief
for ICAN and a set back for ANAN. The earlier
analysis reiterates the view that professional
associations are, at least in some respects, political
organisations, which aim to advance the interest
of its members. For such professional associa-
tions to be successful, they often need the support
of the State (Larson, 1977, p. xii; Torstendahl,
1990, p. 5). From the experience of Nigeria, this
support is not guaranteed but depends on factors
such as: political connections, personal friend-
ships, lobbying and the developmental needs of
the State. The next section further substantiates
this view.
6. The Companies and Allied Matters Decree of
1990
The impact of the power structure of military
governments in Nigeria on the development of the
accounting profession in Nigeria was perhaps best
felt during the period leading up to the promulga-
tion of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree
in Nigeria. In 1987 the Federal Military Govern-
ment, then headed by General Ibrahim Baban-
gida, deemed it necessary to review the 1968
Companies Act and thus set up a consultative
committee on the issue. ANAN members immedi-
ately saw this as an opportunity to resuscitate
their demand for the recognition of a second
accountancy body in Nigeria. Again, their argu-
ment was partly based on the fact that ICAN was
incapable of producing enough accountants to
service the needs of a developing country like
Nigeria.
34
ICAN immediately countered the
ANAN memorandum to the committee. Accord-
ing to the then President of ICAN:
We put up a very powerful memorandum and
debate and succeeded in securing the support
of all other members of the Assembly to reject
the obnoxious suggestions contained in their
[ANAN] memorandum which were calculated
33
Odumeru (1997, p. 1).
34
Along these lines, it has been asserted that ‘‘One of the
problems identi?ed in the 4th National Development Plan is
lack of adequately trained manpower in every ?eld. In her
recent statement published in the New Nigerian issue of 28/7/
81, the Minister of National Planning, Chief (Mrs.) Ebun
Oyagbola revealed ‘that Nigerian requires additional accoun-
tants of 5600 to supplement her manpower need for the fourth
plan.’ It will not go without asking how the number could be
attained having regard to ICAN’s monopolistic and share
envious spirit in its life. With these restrictive measures, ICAN
(sic) has no concern and foresightedness in the National objec-
tive. It is not committed to the manpower problems of this
country’’ (Njoku, 1981, p. 14).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 487
to proliferate and dilute the profession
(Williams, 1990, p. 47).
35
When the Companies and Allied Matters Decree
was ?nally signed into Law by the Military Gov-
ernment, the provisions contained therein with
respect to the accounting profession and the
maintenance of the ICAN monopoly were di?er-
ent. To the amazement of ICAN, the Decree lay
the foundation for the recognition of a second
professional body for accountants. For instance,
Section 2 (c) of the Decree, which dealt with
membership of the Corporate A?airs Commis-
sion, stated that the representative of the accoun-
tancy profession in the body shall be appointed by
the Minister after necessary consultation with the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and
any similar body. There was also a similar provi-
sion in Section 358 (1), which dealt with the qua-
li?cation of auditors.
36
This meant that there was
a possibility that in the future the Government
could register other accounting bodies, thus end-
ing the monopoly of ICAN.
Incidentally, the pressure for change in the
monopoly and scope of the activities of ICAN did
not only come from ANAN. In fact, Section 358
(C) went on to disqualify the following category
of persons from being appointed auditors of
companies:
a person or ?rm who or which o?ers to the
company professional advice in a consultancy
capacity in respect of secretarial, taxation or
?nancial management.
This indeed was a major threat to the accoun-
tancy profession as these auxiliary services are
sometimes more pro?table than auditing and
accounting assignments. The Decree also ques-
tioned the technical jurisdiction of the work of the
accountants and brought accountants in con?ict
with lawyers. Section 359 (2) made it mandatory
for the Auditors Report to be counter signed by a
Legal Practitioner.
37
It was under the above circumstances that a
former President of ICAN asserted that:
It is a matter of regret that not withstanding
the e?orts of ICAN delegates and the support
for its case at the ?oor of the Assembly, what
came out of the Decree Number 1 of 1990 on
Companies and Allied matters di?ered sig-
ni?cantly in all matters a?ecting accounting
profession from what was contained in the
?nal recommendation to the government by
the Consultative Assembly. The Institute is
?ghting hard to expunge from the new decree,
certain obnoxious clauses which were never
discussed at the Consultative Assembly stage
but subsequently found themselves into the
Body of the Decree. Until it is amended, the
Decree No. 1 of 1990 Companies and Allied
Matters will stand out as the greatest threat
to the foundation and future well-being of our
profession in Nigeria (Williams, 1990, p. 47).
In April 1990, the ICAN President led a power-
ful team, which included sixteen past presidents of
the Institute to visit General Ibrahim Babangida,
the then military ruler, in order to protest against
some of the provisions of the 1990 Companies
Decree. In her speech, the then ICAN President
argued that there was no need for the proliferation
of accounting bodies in Nigeria at a time when
accountancy bodies in some other countries were
making e?orts to come together under one
umbrella:
35
According to ICAN: ‘‘One is tempted to ask: what is the
real objective of the ‘ANAN’ members? The short answer is to
mass-produce half-educated ‘accountants’ with very super?cial
accounting and business knowledge, who at best will be no
more than glori?ed Book-keepers. The e?ect would be that the
con?dence, which both the Federal and state governments,
multinational corporations, the various chambers of commerce,
prestigious ?nancial institutions such as the banks, insurance
companies, Nigerian Stock Exchanges, stock brokers, merchant
bankers, Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission etc.
have in the professional integrity of a Chartered Accountant,
would have been destroyed’’ (ICAN, 1980, pp. 2).
36
‘‘A person shall not be quali?ed for appointment as an
auditor of a company for the purpose of this Act unless he is a
member of a body of accountants in Nigeria established from
time to time by an Act or Decree’’.
37
This particular provision will be discussed later in the
paper.
488 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
The integration of the accountancy profession
in Nigeria is a signi?cant and unique experi-
ence, with kudos to the foresight of our
founding fathers, when it is considered that
only recently have accountancy bodies in the
United Kingdom, Canada and other coun-
tries commenced e?orts to come together
under one umbrella and speak with one voi-
ce. . .We therefore appeal to the Government
to assist the Accountancy profession by not
giving encouragement, whether deliberate or
inadvertent to any group of persons or laws
that will fuel divisiveness within the accoun-
tancy profession as exempli?ed by the recent
Companies and Allied Matters Decree of
1990 (Kuforiji-Olubi, 1990, pp. 27–28).
This represented an additional argument for the
continuation of its monopoly over accounting
regulation in Nigeria. Previously, ICAN’s ?ght for
the retention of its monopoly was hinged on the
assertion that its members possessed superior
technical skills. In his reply, President Babangida
promised to look into their concerns. This promise
culminated in the promulgation of the Companies
and Allied Matter (Amendment) Decree Number
32 of 1990. Speci?cally, the provision disqualify-
ing auditors from acting as consultants to their
clients and those which gave room for the possible
recognition of a second professional accounting
body in Nigeria were removed.
38
Unfortunately, for ICAN, its victory did not live
long. On 25 August 1993, a day before President
Babangida stepped down, he quietly signed the
Decree recognising the Association of National
Accountants of Nigeria. The Decree empowered
the body with the general duty of advancing and
regulating the accountancy profession.
39
These
duties are similar to the statutory duties prescribed
for ICAN. This was possible because of the cen-
tralised nature of power under military regimes.
As already mentioned, although there was always
a ruling council, there was nothing that prevented
the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces from promulgating Decrees with-
out consultation with his colleagues in the ruling
council. General Babangida was particularly
prone to do so. He was so powerful that he once
changed the composition of the ruling council
without consultation. His Government was also
perceived to be corrupt. It has, for instance, been
noted that:
Apart from. . .his manipulative tendencies
which earned him the nickname ‘‘Mar-
adonna’’, the other major criticism of General
Babangida has to do with the high level of
corruption that came to be associated with his
regime. In fact, corruption assumed new
heights under him and came to be analogous
with the term ‘settlement’ (Peters, 1997, pp.
213–4).
40
38
This amendment attracted criticisms from some sections.
It has for instance, been asserted that: ‘‘The original section 358
(1) & (2) aroused the hope that the Association of National
Account[ants] could one day become statutorily competent to
certify accountants. Sadly, it seems we would continue in the
situation where persons who may have similar quantitative and
qualitative quali?cation as those certi?ed under the ICAN Act
are denied the professional recognition so necessary to the
practice of their vocation. The situation does not advance the
cause of corporation accounting or accounting generally, it
only helps to create an arti?cial scarcity of professional
accountants to the detriment of national economic goals’’
(Sasegbon, 1991, p. 577).
39
Speci?cally, ANAN is charged with the duty of: ‘‘(a)
advancing the science of accountancy (in this Decree referred to
as ‘the Profession’); (b) determining the standards of knowl-
edge and skill, to be attained by persons seeking to become
registered members of the profession and reviewing those stan-
dards, from time to time as circumstance may require; (c) pro-
moting the highest standard of competence, practice and
conduct among the members of the profession; (d) securing, in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the establish-
ment and maintenance of register of members of the profession
and the publication, from time to time, of lists of these persons;
(e) doing such things as may advance and promote the
advancement of the profession of accountancy in both the
public and private sector of the economy; and (f) performing
through the Council established under section 3 of this Decree,
the functions conferred on it by this Decree’’ (Section 1 of the
1993 ANAN Decree).
40
This was the term used to describe the way General
Babangida used money and patronage to buy the loyalty of his
critics and opponents and to silence them.
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 489
So far, ICAN has tried without success to get
the Government to abrogate this law.
Another major threat to the accounting profes-
sion in Nigeria came from lawyers. As has already
been mentioned, section 359 (2) of the 1990 Com-
panies and Allied Matters Decree made it manda-
tory for the Auditors Report to be countersigned
by a Legal Practitioner. This section of the decree
is rooted in the hearings of the Law Reform
Commission. In those hearings, some people
expressed reservations on the absence of checks on
the wide-ranging powers of the auditors under the
1968 Companies Act:
Although section 142 and Schedule 8 of the
1968 Companies Act address the issue of
Company accounts, the implementation of
these provisions is entirely left to the discre-
tion of the Auditor to say whether or not the
accounts show a true and fair view of the
operations of the company at a given
date. . .
41
The perceived need for some type of control on
the activities of accountants was perhaps based on
the belief, among some lawyers, that accountants
were extensively involved in corrupt practices.
42
But even if the above belief was true, some
accountants felt that the solution clearly did not
lie with lawyers. They are neither trained nor
equipped to validate the work of accountants.
Along these lines, it has been rightly pointed out
that an:
apparent inconsistency is the fact that the
Decree does not state what role the lawyer
who is expected to countersign the auditor’s
report should play in the actual examination.
Since it is assumed that the lawyer is not to
participate in the actual work of examining
the books and records of accounts, he has no
‘‘locus standi’’ to attest to something he has
not examined, or has no technical training
and pro?ciency in (ICAN, 1990, p. 4).
An extension of this view that there was no logic
and essence in the provisions of Section 359 (2) of
the Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 1990
is that it led to the production of meaningless ver-
i?cation statements by lawyers. One such report
read:
I, Dr. Jacob Ogbonnaya Ibik, Solicitor and
Advocate of the Supreme Court of Nigeria,
Legal Practitioner of 52 Owerri Road Asata
Enugu, hereby certify that I have examined
the Financial Statements of the Nigerian
Cement Company PLC (RC 1209) for the
Year ended 31
st
December 1990 and further
certify that the said Financial Statements are
in accordance with the Auditors Report as
required by the Companies and Allied Mat-
ters Decree 1990.
43
Matters were made worse by the fact that
although section 368 of Companies and Allied
Matters Decree of 1990 imposed civil liability on
negligent auditors, such statutory liability did not
extend to countersigning legal practitioners (Ogo-
wewo, 1996, p. 18). There has been widespread
speculation that this provision was a part of a
strategy by the Attorney General to favour his
41
Quoted in Sasegbon (1991, pp. 583–4).
42
Section 359 (2) of the CAMD ‘‘had its roots in one of the
dinner parties organised by the Institute of Chartered Accoun-
tants of Nigeria (ICAN) in which the Justice Minister publicly
declared after the foods and wines were served that from his
observation Accountants seemed to produce di?erent sets of
reports for di?erent purposes such as the Inland Revenue,
banks and creditors. It was party time and no body took up the
Minister on his words even though all Accountants who atten-
ded the party knew that that statement contained serious
untruth’’. nterestingly, the author went on to assert that: ‘‘Even
where this is done it is all a matter of timing di?erence and in
the long run all accounts are prepared to re?ect the substance
of the business. It is all a matter of ‘window dressing’. No
business man wears rags to seek loans from his Bank Manager
but he would be unreasonable if he were not to be scantily
dressed to the tax o?ce lest the tax man takes his pound of
?esh in one fell swoop’’ (Adeniyi, 1991, p. 29).
43
The Nigerian Cement Company PLC Annual Accounts
(1990, p. 13).
490 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
fellow lawyers.
44
Despite the protests of ICAN
and the promise of President Babangida, no
amendment to this provision was contained in the
?rst amendment to the 1990 CAM Decree. It was
however in 1991, when the then Attorney General
of the Federation, Prince Bola Ajibola, was nomi-
nated by the Nigerian Government for appoint-
ment as a judge of the International Court of
Justice, that the amendment was e?ected. This was
done, perhaps because Prince Ajibola felt that
controversy at home could hinder his chances of
getting United Nations approval for his position
in the International Court.
45
Lawyers, unhappy with the abrogation, accused
accountants of being professional politicians who
claim speciality in all ?elds:
it is nowadays very di?cult to ascertain the
exact delimitations of the nature and scope of
the functions of an ‘‘accountant.’’ We have
here, an amorphous commercial all-rounder
who considers that he can, and in fact, does
contrive to do all things. It may be that such a
trend has no unsettling e?ect on that trade as it
might on other professions (where professional-
ism is treasured), but it is, in our thinking, a
dangerous trend, not to the legal profession,
but to the country and the business world as a
whole. Something has to be done before we are
all destroyed in the tentacles of an ubiquitous
cartel — the dangerous commercial all-
rounder. The self-appointed Jack of all trades
and master of all? (Sasegbon, 1991, p. 586).
Incidentally, ICAN sees nothing wrong in its
members claiming expertise in virtually all ?elds of
human endeavour. Indeed the body sometime
prides itself for being able to produce experts in
most ?elds. Along these lines, a recent editorial of
The Accountant, the o?cial journal of ICAN, call-
ing on its members to join politics, asserted that:
Chartered Accountants should not be con-
tended in playing second ?ddle in politics. Go
into the forefront of the political arena and
get things moving. By virtue of the multi-
plicity of their training in various subjects
spanning over all ?elds of human endeavour,
Chartered Accountants are Jacks of all trades
and MASTERS OF ALL (ICAN, 1991, p. 2).
Unfortunately for ICAN, its self-styled de?nition
as an all encompassing profession is not accepted
by all. Such a group also run the risk of loosing
jurisdiction over some aspects of their practice to
more focused professional groups. Along these
lines, the Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria
(CITN) was formed by a combination of some
ICAN members and non-ICAN members. In 1992,
under the military regime of General Ibrahim
Babangida, the government recognised the body.
The main objective of the body is to regulate the
practice of taxation in Nigeria.
46
Recently, the
44
Lawyers have tried, most unconvincingly, to defend the
provisions of section 359 of the CAM Decree of 1990. Along
these lines, it has been asserted that: ‘For who but a lawyer
could say whether an account had been drawn up and whether
an authentic report had been made in accordance with law?
Who, but a Lawyer, could really say with certainty that an
account had been done up, and a ?nancial statement properly
prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act so as to
give a true and fair view of the state of a?airs and pro?t and
loss of the Company as required by schedule 6? If it were left to
the accountant alone, he would be right to apply his profes-
sional skill and prudence [on] an account or report which
though technically perfect, is nevertheless illegal for non-com-
pliance with obligatory statutory formats, procedures and
guidelines. In the end, he may only have succeeded in drawing
up another ‘cryptograph’ which will not help the ordinary per-
son and thereby defeat the intendment of the Act. Here then is
the job to be done. It requires inter-disciplinary input, but
which way does the scale of greater responsibility really tilt,
having regard to the intendment of the law? The real task is in
our opinion, in ensuring that the report is one made in com-
pliance with the Act’’ (Sasegbon, 1991, p. 585).
45
This amendment was contained in section 4 of the Compa-
nies and Allied Matters Amendment Decree Number 46 of 1991.
46
Speci?cally, the body is charged with the general duty of:
‘‘(a) determining, what standards of knowledge and skill are to
be attained by persons seeking to become registered members
of the taxation profession. . .and reviewing those standards
from time to time as circumstances may require; (b) securing in
accordance with the provisions of this decree the establishment
and maintenance of register of fellows, associates, graduates
and student members of the Institute and the publication, from
time to time, of lists of those persons; (c) regulating and con-
trolling the practice of the profession in all its rami?cations;
and (d) maintaining, in accordance with the Decree, of dis-
cipline within the profession’’ (section 1 of the Chartered Insti-
tute of Taxation of Nigeria Decree, 1992).
C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496 491
body gave notice that it will soon start to exercise
its duty of regulating the practice of taxation in
Nigeria. In a widely advertised press release, the
body asserted that:
The Council of the Institute has set June 30th
1999 as last day of the direct admission into
associate membership of the Institute. Those
who have the requisite educational quali?ca-
tions and have acquired relevant tax experi-
ence, are eligible to apply for direct admission
to membership up to June 30 1999. Pro-
spective applicants are reminded that as from
July 1, 1999, their brains will be taxed before
they can be considered for membership as
associates. In addition, only members holding
current practising licence of the Institute can
practice taxation in Nigeria. Any body who
practices taxation without complying with
these rules will be committing an o?ence
punishable under Decree 76 of 1992.
47
Prior to the establishment of the body, such
taxation practices were dominated by ICAN
members. ICAN members are alarmed by this loss
of jurisdiction. To further complicate matters,
many of these ICAN members have taken advan-
tage of the exemptions to join the Institute of
Taxation. Despite this, ICAN clearly recognises
this as a threat to its area of professional jurisdic-
tion. In a recent Circular, which addressed the
notice given by the Institute of Taxation, the
ICAN President asserted that:
In the last few weeks, Chartered Institute of
Taxation of Nigeria had caused to be pub-
lished in various national dailies a deadline
indicating 30
th
June, 1999 for all Chartered
Accountants who are not their members to
cease to have the right to practice taxation or
have direct admission to their institute. I have
received many enquiries and complaints from
very many of our members who are con-
cerned about the development. This is to
inform you that your Council have been
deliberating on this matter for quite a while
and most seriously in the last few weeks.
Strategies have been put in place to ensure
that the matter is resolved as quickly as pos-
sible to ensure that the place of chartered
accountants as tax experts is maintained and
the status of their certi?cates is not devalued.
It is my hope that very shortly, I would be
able to inform you of the successful resolu-
tion of the matter. Let me assure all our
members that your Council is very active
in pursuing matters that a?ect the welfare of
members of the Institute and this particular
issue is a very important one among others.
48
Finding a solution to this problem, however,
may not be easy. This case is rather complex, as
many of the members of CITN are ICAN mem-
bers. Indeed CITN rules made it possible for all
ICAN members with a minimum of 1 year post
quali?cation experience to join without examina-
tion. All those who failed to take advantage of this
exemption will in future take examinations. Given
the above scenario, it is di?cult to see how ICAN
can put up a united front against CITN. Dual
membership of both bodies leads to a con?ict of
interest, which will complicate the jurisdictional
struggle.
From the above, it is evident that the State has
been the most in?uential factor in the develop-
ment of the accounting profession in Nigeria.
ICAN recognises this and has used various overt
and covert means in seeking the support of the
State in order to maintain its monopoly over the
regulation of accounting in Nigeria. The Institute
has, for instance, increased the production of
accountants in order to satisfy the developmental
needs of the State. It has also explicitly lobbied the
State in order to prevent the recognition of rival
professional accounting associations by the State.
Unfortunately for ICAN, the lobby weapon is also
available to its rivals. This perhaps explains the
recognition of ANAN by the State in 1993. The
current status of the professional accounting
regulation arena in Nigeria has therefore been a
47
New Nigerian, 8 June, 1999, p. 21.
48
Circular from ICAN President to all ICAN members
dated 26 August, 1999.
492 C.U. Uche / Accounting, Organizations and Society 27 (2002) 471–496
product of the diverse interests that impact on the
dynamics between the State and the institutions of
the profession.
7. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has attempted to
highlight some of the factors that have in?uenced
the development of the accounting profession in
Nigeria. It shows how the type of government in
place (military or democratic), societal expecta-
tions, interest groups and government actions
have impacted on the development of the accoun-
tancy profession. For instance, accusations that
ICAN was incapable of producing enough
accountants to serve the nation was partly
responsible for its introduction of the Accelerated
Training Programme which reduced the training
period for accountants and increased their rate of
quali?cation. Despite this, such criticisms helped
to provide some credibility to the rival ANAN and
may have contributed to its recognition by the
Government. It is perhaps because of this ANAN
threat that ICAN has now become more sensitive
and proactive towards the accounting needs of the
nation. In 1989, for instance, ICAN introduced
the Accounting Technicians Scheme (ATS), which
is aimed at producing a second tier of accounting
professionals.
49
The objective of the ATS Scheme is:
to provide a nationally recognised quali?ca-
tion for middle cadre accounting sta?
employed in the various sectors of the econ-
omy. The Scheme will also help in the devel-
opment of a standard curriculum for the
education and training of the accounting
technician. The Institute hopes that the
scheme will remove the frustration of students
who are unable to satisfy the registration
requirements for ICAN full professional
examination by providing them with a
worthwhile quali?cation. More importantly,
it will provide that level of intermediate
accounting manpower that is so much needed
in industry, commerce and the public sector
(Olukoya, 1990, p. 20).
Such a scheme, at the very least, will help to put
ICAN in a position where it will be better able to
satisfy public expectations with respect to its role
in providing accountancy services to the generality
of the country. The Accounting Technicians Scheme
also provides an opportunity for non-quali?ed
accountants who have in the past provided valu-
able services to small enterprises in the country to
improve their accounting skills and to be brought
under the rules of ICAN. Evidence in this paper,
however, shows that it is not only public needs
and expectations as well as professional compe-
tence that impact on the dynamics of the State–
profession relationship. Pressure group lobby, the
type of government in existence (military or demo-
cratic), and personal relationships are also impor-
tant variables in the State–profession dynamics.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Anthony Hopwood, Carlos
Ramirez, Lucie Chaumeton, Francis Okwedy,
Tunde Ogowewo and Thomas Ahrens for their
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All
errors and omissions, however, remain mine. I am
also grateful to the Association of Commonwealth
Universities (UK) for awarding me a Titular
(Worshipful Company of Chartered Accountants)
Fellowship to ?nance this research. The Depart-
ments of Accounting and Finance and Economic
History at the London School of Economics and
Political Science also provided academic hospital-
ity during various stages of this research. Finally, I
am grateful to Richard Macve for providing aca-
demic support.
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