UdayGupta13
Uday Gupta
Classical Indian Philosophy accepts perception (pratyakṣa), or perceptual experience, as the primary means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Perception (pratyakṣa) is etymologically rooted in the sense-faculty or the sense-organ (akṣa) and can be translated as sensory awareness, while pramāṇa, on the other hand, is derived from knowledge (pramā) and, literally means ‘the instrument in the act of knowing’. However, the standard interpretation of perception accepted by classical Indian philosophers, barring the Buddhists and the Vedāntins, is that it is a cognition arising within the self—the knowing subject—from mental operations following a sense-object contact. It, therefore, is neither an instrument in the act of knowing, nor a mere sensory awareness.
The etymology of perception in Sanskrit underlines a major and, perhaps the most controversial, issue in classical Indian epistemology, viz. is the sensory core all there is to the content of a perceptual experience? Put differently, it is asked whether the content of a perceptual experience is restricted to being unconceptualized (nirvikalpaka), or can any part of it be conceptualized (savikalpaka) as well? The Naiyāyikas generally take perception to be a two-staged process: first there arises a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception of the object and then a conceptual (savikalpaka) perception, both being valid cognitions. For Buddhists, non-conceptual perceptions alone are valid, while Grammarians (Śābdikas) deny their validity altogether. Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā agree with the Nyāya position. These two realist schools, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, contest the Grammarian as well as the Buddhist positions. Advaita Vedānta position on perception seems to agree, in spirit, with the Buddhists, but their reasons for supporting non-conceptual perceptions alone as ultimately valid (paramārthika satta) are very different.
The etymology of perception in Sanskrit underlines a major and, perhaps the most controversial, issue in classical Indian epistemology, viz. is the sensory core all there is to the content of a perceptual experience? Put differently, it is asked whether the content of a perceptual experience is restricted to being unconceptualized (nirvikalpaka), or can any part of it be conceptualized (savikalpaka) as well? The Naiyāyikas generally take perception to be a two-staged process: first there arises a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception of the object and then a conceptual (savikalpaka) perception, both being valid cognitions. For Buddhists, non-conceptual perceptions alone are valid, while Grammarians (Śābdikas) deny their validity altogether. Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā agree with the Nyāya position. These two realist schools, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, contest the Grammarian as well as the Buddhist positions. Advaita Vedānta position on perception seems to agree, in spirit, with the Buddhists, but their reasons for supporting non-conceptual perceptions alone as ultimately valid (paramārthika satta) are very different.