Description
In this detail, interpret managing transition in an artistic company with entrepreneurial management.
Managing Transition in an Artistic Company With
Entrepreneurial Management
Thomas Paris, Fr´ed´eric Leroy
To cite this version:
Thomas Paris, Fr´ed´eric Leroy. Managing Transition in an Artistic Company With En-
trepreneurial Management: A Case Study of Groupe Bernard Loiseau. International Jour-
nal of Arts Management, HEC Montr´eal. Chair in Arts Management, 2014, 16 (2), pp.42-54.
HAL Id: halshs-00973150https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00973150
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1
Managing Transition in an Artistic Company With Entrepreneurial Management: A
Case Study of Groupe Bernard Loiseau
Thomas Paris, Frédéric Leroy
Although entrepreneurship plays an important role in the dynamics of the arts sector
(Hagoort, 2003; Henry, 2007), little has been written on the subject. The artists, or the
producers, often have to develop their own structure to realize a personal vision or an art
project. Moreover, the characteristics of artistic companies and institutions are such that the
leader’s personality plays an influential role: It has a more marked impact on production in
the arts sector than in other sectors. Therefore the question of leadership in artistic companies
and institutions is an important one (Lapierre, 2001).
The personalization of artistic organizations makes succession a key issue. What
happens to an organization when its founder leaves? How does it evolve, and under what
conditions? To what degree can and should the organization’s artistic production continue to
be influenced by the founder?
The issue of succession helps define the category of creative industries (Caves, 2000),
as it is a fixture of the various sectors grouped together within the category. It also applies in
sectors that may appear very different, whether or not they fall into the arts domain strictly
speaking. In fashion, publishing, architecture, the theatre and haute cuisine, the departure of
the founder-creator often poses a serious challenge (Landry, 2011). How can an organization
carry on without the person responsible for both its impetus and its image?
This issue, which employees of creative companies confront on a regular basis, entails
some basic theoretical questions. Although Lapierre (2001) suggests a division of labour
between leadership and management in a creative organization, studies on the management of
creative organizations are divided into those that focus on the leadership and those that centre
on the organization itself. In the leadership approach a person’s ability to convey a vision is
key, while the organizational approach is concerned with management, structure and the
various tools that are used. It is the eternal debate about creativity: Does it originate in the
individual or in the system? (Lampel, Lant and Shamsie, 2000).
The question of succession allows us to break down the dividing line, in that it raises
the issue of the respective roles of the leader and the organization. Once the founder-creator is
gone, what is the company left with?
To answer this question, we chose the case of one of France’s emblematic hotel and
restaurant businesses, built around a gourmet restaurant. The firm was suddenly confronted
with the issue of succession when its chef, Bernard Loiseau, committed suicide while still
heavily involved in every aspect of the business. Loiseau was the firm’s founder, charismatic
leader and chief spokesman. A longitudinal study of the company, conducted by means of
interviews over several periods between 2006 and 2012, sheds light on how the questions of
succession and creative style were addressed within this organization and are addressed
within artistic organizations in general.
We begin the article with a review of the literature. Although little has been written
about the question of style or a stylistic framework for succession within artistic and creative
organizations, we examine the streams of research that deal with similar subjects: succession
in family-owned businesses and organizational identity. We then present our case study,
highlighting key events in the succession process at Groupe Bernard Loiseau. We conclude by
discussing the question of style and succession within artistic and creative organizations.
2
Succession in Artistic and Creative Organizations: A Paradoxical Dearth of Research
Strong personalization is a characteristic of artistic and creative organizations, be they
companies built around the work of a single creator (Svejenova, Planellas and Vives, 2010),
companies with different creators (Catmull, 2008) or major institutions. Some of the company
profiles published in the International Journal of Arts Management cover a period in the life
of an organization when a particular leader is dominant (Cardinal and Lapierre, 2003, 2004,
2007; Cameron and Lapierre, 2007; Vigneault and Lapierre, 2008). Strong personalization
can be linked to the overwhelming influence of the author of a contribution, to a romantic
vision (Becker, 1982) or to the importance of the notion of leadership in the arts sector
(Lapierre, 2001).
Paradoxically, the weight of individuals in the research on artistic and creative
management is accompanied by a lack of research on the issue of succession. However,
succession has been the subject of numerous studies in the field of entrepreneurship,
particularly in family-owned firms where it has been identified as critical. For example, Le
Breton-Miller, Miller and Steier (2004) note that less than 10% of all family-owned
companies survive past the third generation, while Brockhaus (2004) points out that
succession management plays a key role in the life of family-owned firms and should be
analyzed from the angle of the family, management and property ownership in order to elicit
the perspectives of the various stakeholders.
Studies on transfer and succession in family-owned businesses highlight the key
success factors in these processes. Le Breton-Miller, Miller and Steier (2004) describe the
predecessor (relationship with the successor, motives, personality, needs), the successor
(motives, talents, development, career, external experiences, education and training) and basic
rules with respect to planning, shared vision and family harmony. Cabrera-Suárez, De Saá-
Pérez and García-Almeida (2001) show that one of the challenges in the process is the
successor’s ability to acquire the knowledge and skills of the predecessor in order to sustain
and develop the company’s performance.
Hofer and Charan (1984) propose a conceptual model for the transition from a one-
person entrepreneurial type of management to a functional type of management. They show
that this kind of transition is particularly difficult. Other studies have focused on the different
factors that are likely to influence the succession process. Handler and Kram (1988) and
Handler (1994) describe some of the factors at play when there is resistance to succession.
These can pertain to the founder (attachment, reluctance to delegate or to retire) or can be
inter-individual (family conflicts interfering with the business), organizational, or
environmental (culture and structure of the organization, degree of environmental stability).
The founder tends to exert a particular influence on the succession process.
Wasserman (2003) demonstrates that the succession of the first generation is linked to the
founder’s attachment to the firm. Davis and Harveston (1999) observe the importance of the
“generational shadow,” particularly that of the founder. Finally, Miller, Steier and Le Breton-
Miller (2003) discuss the weight of the past, suggesting that problems can result from the
development of a poor relationship between the organization’s past and its present situation.
All of these observations, based on a variety of family-owned businesses, seem to be
reflected in artistic and creative companies, where strong personalization serves to increase
the influence of the founder. Furthermore, the delicate nature of succession is confirmed
empirically, with this particular phase appearing to be critical in many cases (Paris, 2010). Yet
this aspect of artistic and creative organizations has not received the attention it warrants.
Data Collection and Analysis
3
This investigation was based on a longitudinal study carried out from an inductive
perspective. The researchers contacted the directors of the company two years after Loiseau’s
death in order to determine how the matter of succession had been handled.
We conducted interviews in four phases. During the initial phase we met with
Dominique, Loiseau’s widow and with the new managing director of Groupe Bernard
Loiseau. We then held two interview and observation sessions at the company’s site in
Saulieu. A year later we conducted six filmed interviews with people we had met previously.
Finally, we returned in order to complete our research by holding informal discussions with
staff members. During each of the last three phases we also made observations, either as
customers (dining room or hotel) or as observers (kitchen).
We carried out interviews with 18 employees in diverse positions. The interviews
were conducted by two researchers and lasted one to two hours. Most of these employees had
known Bernard Loiseau personally and had been witness to the events. The interviews were
partly open-ended and partly structured, based on several guidelines and specific questions on
the following topics: curriculum; role in the organization, before and after Loiseau’s death;
the organization of work before and after Loiseau’s death; the reorganizing process and how it
was carried out; any significant changes since Loiseau’s death as well as any opposition or
resistance to these changes.
We complemented these interviews with a document analysis. We consulted corporate
documents; books and articles in specialty magazines by or about Loiseau as a chef and
features of his cuisine; restaurant guides, particularly the Michelin guide; and articles by
leading writers on gastronomy.
After this phase of formal research, we continued to meet regularly with some
members of the management team, who kept us informed of any changes within the company.
We used short debriefings after each interview to reorient, develop and clarify. We
then spent many hours in discussions with each other, identifying potential interesting themes.
We grouped our interview transcripts and observational notes into two clusters, one for June
2006 and one for March–June 2007. Our analysis followed a two-part structure. We first
triangulated the interviews to reconstruct an objective narration of the events following
Loiseau’s death. We then reread the transcripts and notes individually a number of times and
watched the filmed interviews to identify references to the identity, style and spirit of the
company during each period.
The Case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau
The recent history of the Bernard Loiseau enterprise, an iconic firm in French haute cuisine,
makes it a particularly interesting case study of succession in artistic and creative
organizations. In France, haute cuisine enjoys a status close to that of an art – a culinary art –
and chefs are highly respected. Chefs often consider their creations works of art and their
cuisine is marked by subjectivity. In the case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau, the chef was also
the founder, a charismatic leader and the person responsible for putting the company in the
spotlight. His sudden death raised the issue of succession in a very dramatic way, especially
with regard to artistic organizations. Would the business be able to survive without him?
Under what conditions, and with which creator, manager and stylistic framework?
Bernard Loiseau’s La Côte d’Or
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Loiseau, depressed and overworked, took his own life on 25 February 2003 at his home in
Saulieu. At the time he was chef at one of the 20 or so restaurants that made up the elite of
French gastronomy – those to which the Michelin guide had conferred three stars – as well as
one of the most celebrated chefs in French haute cuisine, its spokesman and recipient of the
most media coverage.
Loiseau assumed the management of the legendary hotel and restaurant La Côte d’Or
in 1975 (he would buy it in 1982), at the age of 24. Prior to that, he had served as an
apprentice at Troisgros in Roanne, one of Michelin’s three-star French restaurants, then as
chef at a restaurant on the fringes of Paris, where he began to be noticed by the media, and,
finally, as head chef at a Parisian restaurant, where he was singled out by the critics as a
future “great.”
La Côte d’Or in Saulieu, in the heart of Burgundy, had long been a prime destination
on the road to the Alps, the south of France and Switzerland. It had acquired an international
reputation under the guidance of Chef Alexandre Dumaine (1895–1974). When it was
awarded a third Michelin star in 1951, it joined the ranks of France’s seven elite
establishments. For many years, the prestige of La Côte d’Or was such that it was a must for
well-known figures from the worlds of politics and show business.
After the departure of Dumaine in 1963, and before Loiseau took over, La Côte d’Or
had more or less sunk into oblivion. Its geographical location had become less attractive now
that there was a highway 25 kilometres away, heading east and south from Paris. Loiseau’s
gamble was high-risk: Make enough people come to Saulieu to obtain three Michelin stars. In
1977, two years after he arrived, Loiseau got his first Michelin star and a rating of 17/20 in
the Gault & Millau guide. In the years that followed he was awarded a second star (1981) and
hired men who would become pillars of La Côte d’Or: Hubert, restaurant manager (recruited
in 1980), Eric, maître d’hôtel (1981), and Patrick, head chef and second-in-command (1982).
After several months of construction in 1990, to provide the restaurant with three
dining rooms and new kitchens, La Côte d’Or was rewarded in March 1991 with three
Michelin stars. The consequences were enormous. La Côte d’Or acquired an international
reputation and drew customers from around the world. The restaurant developed rapidly and
hired new kitchen and dining room personnel in order to ensure impeccable service. The staff
grew from 20 in 1986, to 40 in 1990, to 75 in 2000. Despite its location off the beaten track,
La Côte d’Or became a venue that was well worth the detour. A loyal circle of customers
developed who would return once or twice a year.
In 1998 Groupe Bernard Loiseau went public and raised 13 million francs, which
allowed it add deluxe touches to the hotel (a tower, a spa overlooking a garden and a
swimming pool), and in 2000 La Côte d’Or was listed by Virtuoso, a prestigious and highly
selective network of 350 American tour operators.
This period was also marked by a diversification of activities, with the development of
consulting services on the launching of new restaurants, partnerships (branding) and the
opening of three restaurants in Paris. It was also marked by the polishing of Loiseau’s image
as the ultimate chef, spokesman for French cuisine.
Bernard Loiseau as Chef
Loiseau belonged to the generation of chefs who advanced to the forefront of the nouvelle
cuisine movement in the 1970s. One of the guiding principles of that movement was a
rethinking of traditional dishes to make them lighter and more refined. The idea was to use
less fat in main courses and less sugar in desserts so as to rediscover the natural taste of the
products and better distinguish their flavours. In this cuisine the focus is above all on taste and
5
the achievement of both gustatory force and finesse. This involves a search for impeccable
produce, often local or regional, and simplicity of presentation, each dish having been created
around one main product and two complementary products – never more – so as not to dilute
the original flavours in the palate.
What was important to Loiseau was to restore and enhance the taste of meat, poultry
and fish. This involved new preparation techniques. One of the innovations was to make
strong sauces from the cooking of the product. To bind sauces, he used neither cream nor
flour but vegetable purées (onions, carrots), which serve to thicken while highlighting the
flavour. Loiseau had no compunction about reclaiming and revisiting the great Burgundian
classics. With frogs’ legs, for instance, he kept the original ingredients – garlic and parsley –
but changed the traditional recipe to produce a dish that was lighter and less fatty. The frogs’
legs were simply browned in butter and served with a garlic purée and a parsley coulis.
However, a simple presentation did not imply a simple preparation process. The purée was
made from cloves of garlic blanched several times in different pots of hot water to eliminate
the unpleasant compounds of the garlic, then sweetened with a little milk. The spurs and calf
muscles were removed from the frogs’ legs to make the cooking process more uniform. The
same process is used for Sandre à la peau croustillante et fondue d’échalote sauce vin rouge,
one of Loiseau’s classics. The sauce is made by reducing Syrah red wine. The wine is heated
for several hours without ever coming to a boil, so that the evaporation process is slow and
gradual. Seven litres of wine are cooked for seven hours to yield one litre of wine concentrate,
which is then whipped with butter and seasoned. The shallots are cooked at length in
compote, which makes them a little sweeter and a good complement to the tangy taste of the
wine sauce.
Management of the Establishment
One of the challenges of managing a great restaurant is meeting costs. Staff-related costs
represent between 45% and 60% of expenditures, because a team must be sufficiently large
and specialized to meet the requirements of quality and coordination in the serving of meals.
The use of numerous trainees and apprentices allows the establishment to provide training for
young people and bear the costs of maintaining a large team. The ingredients and raw
materials are another key expense (roughly 30%). The dishes listed on the menu should be
available when customers order them, which means that fresh produce must be on hand and
will be thrown out if not used. The profit margins of top restaurants are quite small (around
5%); to exceed the break-even point one has to have a large number of covers without
compromising the quality of the dishes or the service. Given these circumstances, location,
listings in the best restaurant guides, chefs’ awards and media visibility are all essential for
success.
As the management of a great restaurant is a risky business, always at the limits of
profitability, top restaurants try to develop additional activities, often capitalizing on the
chef’s name. Such activities include consulting, training, derivative products, advertising and
gourmet columns in the media. The addition of a hotel can boost revenues if the costs are well
controlled and the location is attractive; it also allows customers to consume alcohol without
having to drive afterwards.
In 2003 La Côte d’Or was run in a traditional way. The reception desk was responsible
for reservations, for both the hotel and the restaurant, and for greeting guests upon their
arrival and seeing them off after their meal or their stay. It included receptionists and a
doorman in charge of parking cars and handling luggage. The rooms were the responsibility
of the housekeeper and a team of housemaids. In the dining room, the maîtres d’hôtel
6
welcomed the customers, offered them menu advice and took their orders; they were in charge
of the seating plan, the quality of the service and customer relations during the meal. Five
chefs de rang were responsible for five to seven tables each, while waiters brought in the
dishes and the dessert trolley. The waiters served as the link between the kitchen and the
dining room so that the chefs de rang could be present in the dining room at all times. The
dining room was staffed by some 20 people, and everything was done to ensure that diners
had the shortest wait possible between courses and that all those at the same table were served
at the same time.
The sommellerie was responsible for the purchase, storage, sale and serving of
beverages: water, wine and after-dinner liqueurs. The wines represented between 30% and
40% of the restaurant’s turnover but about 80% of its margin. La Côte d’Or’s wine cellar, like
the cellars at any fine-dining restaurant, was stocked with a wide variety of wines.
The kitchen comprised three activities: creation of new dishes, preparation of dishes
and support activities (purchasing, administration, personnel management). The chef was in
charge of creating new dishes, the menu and recruitment. He was also behind the passe, the
table where the plates are arranged and controlled before being taken into the dining room by
the waiters. The chef could be assisted by one or more sous-chefs, with whom he shared
responsibility for administration, management of kitchen staff and creation of new dishes.
Preparation of the dishes was handled by the team, which worked in a pyramidal
structure organized into domains, each directed by a head chef: pantry, fish, meat, fish
courses, meat courses, pastry. The domain chefs were responsible for their domain as well as
for receiving and storing the products that they needed. Each domain chef had several
assistants who carried out one or more tasks (peeling, chopping, cooking). Before the loss of
Loiseau, the kitchen team comprised 22 people managed by Patrick Bertron with the
assistance of two sous-chefs, who were also domain chefs.
The kitchens of top restaurants feature a rapid turnover of assistants and domain chefs
because young chefs go from one establishment to another in order to perfect their craft.
Loiseau’s chef assistants, who were between 18 and 25 years of age, stayed an average of 18
months.
The composition and preparation of dishes were carried out to perfection by Loiseau
and Bertron. Bertron was responsible for teaching skills in the kitchen. He described the
dishes, the spirit in which they were to be created and how they were to be prepared. He
showed the teams how to arrange a plate and put the finishing touches on it. The chefs could
also consult specifications for the composition of the dishes and how to prepare them
(ingredients, measures, cooking time, photos). These specs were also used to describe the
dishes to the waiters so they could give diners proper advice. But it was above all know-how,
experience and philosophy that were key in producing the best possible dishes and that were
transmitted in the kitchen by the chef to his sous-chefs and teams. It entailed education of the
senses – taste, sight, touch, smell and even hearing. All of the senses were mobilized to
determine whether a meat or fish was well cooked or if a sauce had the force required for a
particular dish.
“Old Style” Management
There were several specifics in the way that La Côte d’Or hotel and restaurant were run, all
related to Loiseau’s personality and omnipresence. Onsite from morning to night seven days a
week, with only the occasional few days’ vacation, he greeted guests in the reception area
when they arrived and bade them farewell when they left. Concerned with every detail, he
was available to all members of his staff, ready to guide, motivate or correct. As a boss,
7
Loiseau was very demanding and was apt to fly into a rage if he thought that some aspect of
the service was lacking. At the same time, he was paternalistic in his relationships with his
employees, always prepared to advise and encourage. He showed real affection for his staff,
and that affection was reciprocated.
Loiseau’s omnipresence did not prevent him from assigning important tasks to those
he trusted. This ability to delegate resulted in a keen sense of family shared by all; the staff
felt that the lines of communication were open at all times. The style that Loiseau wished to
convey was that of an inn where guests feel at home and the atmosphere is not stiff and stilted
but warm and relaxed; this was reflected in the way that the establishment was run.
Management remained very informal. The accounts were kept in order but
management was in the “old style,” without rigorous follow-up. The top priority was the
quality of service. In both the kitchen and the hotel, each employee went ahead and made the
purchases related to his or her position without necessarily asking for an estimate and with no
centralized control. No cost was questioned so long as the purchase met high standards of
quality. This autonomy nevertheless went hand in hand with a spirit of economy, as Loiseau
paid close attention to any restaurant expense that did not directly involve what went on the
plate. In the kitchen, the demand for the very best products meant a choice of suppliers
without a call for bids or negotiation of prices. For Loiseau, one could not put a price on
excellence. Likewise, as the quantities purchased were based on a rough estimate of the
number of covers expected, produce that could be used but whose slight deterioration meant
that it no longer met the restaurant’s high standards was often discarded.
The Initial Decisions Post-Bernard Loiseau
After Loiseau’s death, his widow, Dominique Loiseau, believed it was essential to
communicate the fact that the establishment continued to operate, with the same teams, the
same services, the same quality, the same welcome, the same concern with excellence.
Although Loiseau embodied his establishment in the eyes of the public, it was now vital to
focus on the professionalism of the team that kept the business running on a daily basis, to
reassure customers that La Côte d’Or had not depended exclusively on him.
One of the first challenges was to retain a motivated staff. Although many employees
said that they wished to stay on, they had just lost their leader. Other challenges were to
reorganize the way the establishment was run, to compensate for the few departures that did
take place and to adapt to the absence of Loiseau in all the different roles he had played. The
organization was centred on Loiseau and it was inconceivable that he be replaced: No one
would throw himself into the tasks as he had, nor bring together the qualities of creativity,
leadership and communication as he had. It was essential to put into place a more formal
organization but without altering style or quality. Dominique Loiseau hired a general
manager, an outsider to the world of gastronomy, who was put in charge of reorganizing the
staff and adopting more stringent management methods. Loiseau took over some of her
husband’s functions herself, particularly in the areas of public relations and the welcoming of
guests. Patrick Bertron, the sous-chef, was made chef. The other changes in the organization
were oriented towards internal promotion. In the dining room, two chefs de rang who had
been with the firm for over 15 years were promoted to maîtres d’hôtel to replace the maîtres
d’hôtel who had chosen to leave.
The establishment was renamed Relais Bernard Loiseau. Public relations, which
previously had focused on the cuisine, now highlighted the hotel and its services. The menu
was expanded to include less expensive selections in order to build a local clientele. The
immediate result of Loiseau’s death had been a substantial drop in the number of reservations
8
and cash inflow. Some of the less affluent customers, who had come after hearing Loiseau on
the radio, seemed lost. In the short term, it was necessary to trim the sails without
compromising on quality. A reorganization process was launched.
On the financial level, all expenditures were carefully reviewed. Procedures were set
up for ordering, with all purchases now subject to approval through a hierarchy and managers
being asked to find ways of cutting costs. Inventory tracking, personnel management and the
hiring process were also revamped. With the drop in turnover, strong management seemed a
requisite to make the business profitable again. The kitchen was more closely monitored.
Procedures were reinforced, in particular regarding the inventory and the calculation of recipe
costs. Margin rates were set in order to fix a sale price based on the cost of the materials.
Specifications were established for each recipe, indicating in detail the ingredients used and
the quantity.
In fact the way of doing business was overhauled. Loiseau’s management style, which
his team members described as “communicative,” “small-farmer-like,” “craftsman-like,”
“family . . . professional” and “informal,” was replaced by a more structured, formal style. For
management, the real challenge lay in establishing a more rigid management system to sustain
the business without compromising on quality in any way.
The Firm’s Identity
The menu was also changed. At first, in an effort to stabilize the situation, it remained
Loiseau’s menu, changing according to the season. Bertron, backed by Dominique Loiseau,
chose to respect the principles of Bernard Loiseau’s creations, and even reinforce them so as
to convince the staff, customers and restaurant critics that nothing had changed. But the
management, like the new chef, also believed that the establishment should innovate and offer
new dishes – very soon, customers would expect it to be creative. Little by little, the chef,
with the blessing of Dominique Loiseau, entered a creative phase. The menu began to evolve,
eventually comprising traditional fare and a range of new dishes, with a clear distinction
between the two cuisines.
Tensions came to the fore. The changes to the establishment met with resistance and
gave rise to a series of conflicts, both major and minor. The more senior staff members, such
as Hubert, the restaurant manager and Bernard Loiseau’s long-time friend, became keepers of
the flame. Hubert was seen by many as Loiseau’s right-hand man and the embodiment of his
style. He was highly respected and well liked by both staff and customers.
First, the organization was criticized for imposing procedures that threatened the
quality of service and the firm’s traditional style. Some staff members, mostly those in senior
positions, felt that cost control and the adoption of reporting tools were detrimental to quality
and the spirit of conviviality. The new approach was considered too managerial.
But the revolt mostly concerned Bertron’s creations and the changes made to the
menu. Certain dishes were judged incompatible with the Loiseau style and were severely
criticized, particularly by the dining room staff. Tensions mounted between the dining room,
where the staff were mostly long-time employees who had been part of Loiseau’s adventure,
and the kitchen, where only the chef had even known Loiseau, all the other employees having
been there only a year or two as apprentices. In the dining room, the chefs de rang and maîtres
d’hôtel, who advised the customers and took their orders, intimated that they could not sell the
creations of Bertron as well as those of Loiseau. Hubert, a pillar of the firm, engaged the new
chef in bouts of arm-wrestling. A tense situation turned into open conflict.
Behind the conflict, beyond the classic issue of succession, the firm’s identity and
stylistic framework were at stake. When Bertron embarked on his new creative process, he
9
meant to emphasize the “base” invented by Loiseau and introduce more variety in the palate.
His cuisine gradually found its personality, its style, and became more inventive. “In
Loiseau’s cuisine,” explains one of his maîtres d’hôtel, “you started from a particular taste
point and there was only one line of development that reached a crescendo. In Bertron’s
cuisine, there’s always a progression of tastes, but it is more of a spiral. There are more
flavours in the palate, more connections between flavours; they stay longer, or return. With
Loiseau it was more linear. With Bertron it’s a rotation of flavours – there’s a back and forth
. . . a more complex play of flavours.”
New techniques were introduced and there were more products on the plates, including
ingredients that Loiseau had disliked using, such as saffron. In the dining room, some
members of the senior staff let Bertron know that this was inconsistent with the Loiseau style.
“Bertron started to bring in a touch of whimsy,” says a maître d’hôtel, “and we were worried
that he would graduate to a cuisine where you don’t know what you’re eating any more. In the
case of Loiseau, it was the product that was highlighted. We were concerned because it was
not the Loiseau style and we were running the risk of producing the cuisine of the man in the
street.” A sous-chef comments, “It was very hard to convince the waiters to accept innovation.
We made a lobster bouillon with lobster ravioli and stuffed cabbage. We wanted to serve the
bouillon in a teapot. It caused a scandal. They told us, ‘You didn’t work with
Monsieur Loiseau; you don’t know how to work’.”
Management, which believed that the business would survive if it continued to be
creative, did not give in on the question of the Loiseau style. To defuse the situation and give
new impetus to the firm, which was still in shock from the loss of its founder, Dominique
Loiseau chose to turn towards the future, maintain a managerial orientation and support the
creations of Bertron. A decision was taken to part ways with Hubert, one of the historic pillars
of the firm. It was a risky move but the price that had to be paid to ensure a renaissance and
the viability of the firm. The decision came down in January 2005 and served to traumatize
the staff all over again.
Groupe Bernard Loiseau in 2013
By the summer of 2013 the company had survived the critical period following Loiseau’s
death as well as the financial crisis of 2008. In 2013 Relais Bernard Loiseau received three
Michelin stars for the 10th consecutive year since Loiseau’s passing. The financial situation is
healthy. The stormy relationship between the dining room and the kitchen is no more and
Bertron’s cuisine has been accepted by the senior staff. This happened gradually, as the
results improved. Bertron is now established in his role as chef and can offer daring creations
that adhere to the Loiseau style without complying with detailed specifications. Orders are
evenly divided between the Loiseau classics and the Bertron creations.
The work since 2003 has been aimed mainly at consolidating what already existed:
optimization of the infrastructure, maintaining of a warm and hospitable atmosphere true to
the Loiseau style, improved management techniques, more rational operations so as to attain
or increase profitability at all of the group’s establishments, and investment in modernization
and decor to uphold the quality of services and sustain the appeal of the Loiseau brand. At the
same time, careful consideration has been given to the development strategy, which since
2007 has taken the form of different operations. In 2008 a new restaurant, Loiseau des
Vignes, was launched in Beaune, Burgundy, based on an original concept: a wide variety of
wines available by the glass. This restaurant received its first Michelin star in 2010, a year
that made Loiseau des Vignes one of the most profitable restaurants in the group. Two other
restaurants were due to open in 2013, one in Dijon (in Burgundy) and one in Japan.
10
At the same time, the teams are working on partnerships to promote the firm’s image
in France and abroad. The restaurant in Saulieu is the group’s flagship restaurant and its
public relations focus, but it must be supplemented by activities that generate a profit and
enhance the firm’s image. In 2009 partnerships were formed with three leading companies in
Burgundy, each highly respected in its field: Bichot wines, Fallot mustards and Boudier
liqueurs. This does not mean simply selecting high-quality products, affixing the brand name
and retailing them; it involves co-creating with the partners and combining their know-how.
The specialists in the partner firms were closely associated with the chef, sommelier and
pastry chef at Loiseau in developing the three product lines. These partnerships will allow the
company to diversify its sources of revenue (in the form of royalties), still with a small
turnover, and above all enhance the image of the Loiseau brand in France and elsewhere.
The Matter of Succession
The recent history of the Loiseau firm, aside from the dramatic events, highlights the
structural issues affecting artistic and creative organizations in matters of succession. How
does an organization carry on without the person who embodied it, including its production?
We call this the paradox of creative organizations.
The Paradox of Creative Organizations
Immediately after Loiseau’s death the company was in a paradoxical and rather intriguing
position. Staff members felt lost, and seriously questioned the future of the firm without its
owner – the chef who had imprinted his style, the charismatic manager, the person who
brought in the customers and motivated the employees. At the same time, they knew how to
run the business and knew that they were the only ones who could make it run smoothly on a
daily basis. Most of the management team had been by Loiseau’s side for years, some from
the very outset. Although Loiseau had been very “present,” he had also delegated, including
the creative tasks. His head chef, Patrick Bertron, had worked with him for over 20 years and
had helped to create the dishes, testing them and offering ideas. He had become a replica of
Loiseau, to the point where Loiseau had no compunction about saying that Bertron “could do”
Loiseau better than he could himself, such was his knowledge of the techniques, the dishes
and the cuisine. Herein lies the paradox of creative organizations. For the teams there was a
sense of loss and soul-searching about the firm’s ability to survive without its leader, but at
the same time there was a conviction that they were the pillars of the establishment and were
indeed capable of running it. This paradox raises the question of the role of a creator who is
omnipresent yet delegates many of the tasks. What did the organization lose with the loss of
Loiseau? A company’s survival lies in the answer to this question.
Flexibility of the Stylistic Framework
The paradox was eventually resolved. In art and creation, the idea of a stylistic framework is
key. Whether it is called a stylistic framework, or a style or an identity, it involves at least two
points of view, that of the customers, who might have expectations regarding the company,
and that of the staff. Identity is what serves to reassure in times of trouble – for example,
when a charismatic leader, after years of success and being entrusted with charting the course
for the organization, is no longer around. When the absence of the leader, who represented the
11
firm in the eyes of the clientele and instilled confidence in the employees, translates into a
loss of confidence, then anything new is cause for concern.
In a crisis such as that experienced by the Loiseau firm, when the future is uncertain,
adhering to a stylistic framework offers reassurance. The creative industries are characterized
by the nobody knows property (Caves, 2000) that translates uncertainty about the eventual
success of the creations proposed. When faced with uncertainty, one’s proven talents earn the
trust of customers, and this trust is passed on to the staff. Loiseau’s reputation had served as a
form of security for his employees, something that his successor could not provide. The
defiance towards Bertron was therefore structural. The firm’s style was a lifesaver for the
staff: In times of uncertainty they held on to what had made the firm a success and looked to
the past for a framework by which it might evolve. As the leader was no longer there to
provide the framework, it was the style they clung to – in other words, the formalization of
what constituted its principles. But the notion of style clashed with its definition. Where was
the identity of Groupe Bernard Loiseau? In its cuisine? In the supremacy of taste over
everything else? No cream, no butter? No “frills” on the plate? Three flavours in each dish?
Formalization could well lead to very restrictive rules, including the rejection of anything that
had not been created by Loiseau. The firm’s identity would then boil down to its
Jambonnettes de grenouille à la purée d’ail et au jus de persil and Sandre à la peau
croustillante et fondue d’échalotes, sauce au vin rouge – in other words, to the dishes that had
been created by Loiseau. The notion of style can quickly conflict with that of creation.
When the orientation imposed by the new chef had passed the test – the customers
came back, the restaurant kept its Michelin stars, the business was beginning to show a profit
once again – the question of style seemed to no longer exist. It dissolved because the teams
did not need it any more; the new chef was starting to gain legitimacy.
This episode suggests that the notion of style is ambiguous with respect to succession.
It is a constant that customers and staff can turn to in times of uncertainty, but perhaps also
the main loss resulting from the departure of the creator. The company must accept the fact
that style is a personal matter, something on which it cannot capitalize in order to continue to
create. Nevertheless, style took root in the organization – the processes, the know-how, the
teams and the new creations became imbued with it. Although Bertron had his own unique
personality, his cuisine drew on continuity; his personality as a creator developed in the fertile
ground of Loiseau’s cuisine, as did the expertise of the teams. Bertron’s personal style
developed around the supremacy of taste.
Succession in Creative Companies
The case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau confirms the results of research on succession in family-
owned companies. In fact the phenomena of resistance seem to be structural (Handler and
Kram, 1988; Handler, 1994). The influence of the founder (Davis and Harveston, 1999) and
the past (Miller, Steier and Le Breton-Miller, 2003) also appear to be important factors in the
process.
The transition from a one-person entrepreneurial process to a functional type of
management is considered the most sensitive factor (Hofer and Charan, 1984). The way in
which the firm was run during Loiseau’s time typifies the various characteristics of companies
managed in an entrepreneurial manner: highly centralized decision-making, over-dependence
on a single individual for survival and growth, limited repertoire of managerial skills and
training, and a paternalistic atmosphere.
In relation to the literature on succession, the case has two characteristics. The first is
related to the sudden loss. Most of the studies on transfers are concerned with succession
12
linked to the retirement of the founder, whose shadow hangs over the company (Davis and
Harveston, 1999). In this case, the founder’s shadow hung particularly heavily over the
company because he died suddenly.
This is undoubtedly related to the other characteristic: the creative aspect. In artistic
and creative companies, the personality of the founder weighs heavily if the entire
organization has served his vision and if his personality is part of the firm’s product. The
difference between a creative company and others is that its production is the creator himself.
What the Loiseau enterprise produced was “Bernard Loiseau.” This added to the difficulties
of succession and the weight of his personality on the organization.
Cabrera-Suárez, De Saá-Pérez and García-Almeida (2001) show that the successor’s
ability to acquire the knowledge and skills of the predecessor is big part of the challenge in
succession. The result is slightly different in the case of artistic and creative organizations.
The successor must not only possess the skills of a creator but be able to apply them in a way
that affirms his own unique personality and style. Consequently, he has to free himself from
those skills he used when he was working for another creator. Style is an intrinsic skill that
cannot be passed on.
Conclusion
The case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau raises, in a dramatic way, a number of issues that come
up regularly in cultural or creative companies and institutions. Behind the question of
succession lie the respective roles played by the individual – manager or creator – and the
organization. And behind the question of the stylistic framework lies that of the formalization
of activities, particularly creative ones. The Loiseau story illustrates the delicate balance that
creative companies and institutions must strive to maintain – that between the intuition of a
particular individual and the processes that need to be followed.
The Loiseau paradox masks a number of other elements, not least the division of
labour in the creative process. Becker (1974, 1982) shows the extent to which creative activity
is a collective activity. Our case study confirms the previous finding that creative work entails
a division of labour (Paris, 2010). The only task that Bernard Loiseau did not delegate was the
decision whether to include a particular dish on the menu. Such a decision requires the
intuition, vision and subjectivity of the creator. Loiseau was the person who charted the
course for the firm and who was most trusted by staff. After his death, the employees knew
how to run the company but there was no one who could fill his shoes in terms of leadership.
Perhaps the main lessons of this case are the intriguing cohabitation of the rational and
rationalizing aspects of management in creative activities and the need for subjectivity in all
matters pertaining to art.
13
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15
Thomas Paris is a researcher at CNRS (GREG HEC) and an associate professor at HEC
Paris, where he is director of the master’s program Média, Art, Création. His work is
concerned mainly with management, economics and organizational models in the creative
industries (cinema, music, fashion, publishing, architecture, advertising, haute cuisine and
design).
Frédéric Leroy is an associate professor of Strategic Management at HEC Paris. His research
interests cover the areas of Mergers&Acquisitions, organizational learning processes and
organizational knowledge, routine and creativity.
Abstract
The important role of entrepreneurship in the dynamics of the arts sector and the influence of
the leader’s personality make succession a key issue in creative industries. What happens to
an artistic organization when its founder leaves? How does it evolve? Can it adopt a style of
management that is compatible with the founder’s absence? This article focuses on the case of
Groupe Bernard Loiseau, an iconic French company in the culinary arts whose owner and
chef died suddenly. It sheds light on how the question of succession and that of style were
addressed in this organization and how they are addressed in artistic organizations in general.
Keywords
Succession, culinary art, entrepreneurial management, creative industries
16
APPENDIX 1 INTERVIEWEES
Function Position Number of years
with the firm
Administration CEO 18
Managing director 2
Financial officer 1
Accountant 27
Administrative
assistant
9
Restaurant
management
Restaurant manager 4
Reception Head of reception 4
Receptionist 5
Bell captain 16
Hotel Service manager 7
Wines Sommelier 5
Boutique Boutique manager 9
Dining room Maître d’hôtel 20
Maître d’hôtel 23
Chef de rang
(headwaiter)
27
Kitchen Head chef 23
Sous-chef 2
Sous-chef 2
doc_150683366.pdf
In this detail, interpret managing transition in an artistic company with entrepreneurial management.
Managing Transition in an Artistic Company With
Entrepreneurial Management
Thomas Paris, Fr´ed´eric Leroy
To cite this version:
Thomas Paris, Fr´ed´eric Leroy. Managing Transition in an Artistic Company With En-
trepreneurial Management: A Case Study of Groupe Bernard Loiseau. International Jour-
nal of Arts Management, HEC Montr´eal. Chair in Arts Management, 2014, 16 (2), pp.42-54.
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1
Managing Transition in an Artistic Company With Entrepreneurial Management: A
Case Study of Groupe Bernard Loiseau
Thomas Paris, Frédéric Leroy
Although entrepreneurship plays an important role in the dynamics of the arts sector
(Hagoort, 2003; Henry, 2007), little has been written on the subject. The artists, or the
producers, often have to develop their own structure to realize a personal vision or an art
project. Moreover, the characteristics of artistic companies and institutions are such that the
leader’s personality plays an influential role: It has a more marked impact on production in
the arts sector than in other sectors. Therefore the question of leadership in artistic companies
and institutions is an important one (Lapierre, 2001).
The personalization of artistic organizations makes succession a key issue. What
happens to an organization when its founder leaves? How does it evolve, and under what
conditions? To what degree can and should the organization’s artistic production continue to
be influenced by the founder?
The issue of succession helps define the category of creative industries (Caves, 2000),
as it is a fixture of the various sectors grouped together within the category. It also applies in
sectors that may appear very different, whether or not they fall into the arts domain strictly
speaking. In fashion, publishing, architecture, the theatre and haute cuisine, the departure of
the founder-creator often poses a serious challenge (Landry, 2011). How can an organization
carry on without the person responsible for both its impetus and its image?
This issue, which employees of creative companies confront on a regular basis, entails
some basic theoretical questions. Although Lapierre (2001) suggests a division of labour
between leadership and management in a creative organization, studies on the management of
creative organizations are divided into those that focus on the leadership and those that centre
on the organization itself. In the leadership approach a person’s ability to convey a vision is
key, while the organizational approach is concerned with management, structure and the
various tools that are used. It is the eternal debate about creativity: Does it originate in the
individual or in the system? (Lampel, Lant and Shamsie, 2000).
The question of succession allows us to break down the dividing line, in that it raises
the issue of the respective roles of the leader and the organization. Once the founder-creator is
gone, what is the company left with?
To answer this question, we chose the case of one of France’s emblematic hotel and
restaurant businesses, built around a gourmet restaurant. The firm was suddenly confronted
with the issue of succession when its chef, Bernard Loiseau, committed suicide while still
heavily involved in every aspect of the business. Loiseau was the firm’s founder, charismatic
leader and chief spokesman. A longitudinal study of the company, conducted by means of
interviews over several periods between 2006 and 2012, sheds light on how the questions of
succession and creative style were addressed within this organization and are addressed
within artistic organizations in general.
We begin the article with a review of the literature. Although little has been written
about the question of style or a stylistic framework for succession within artistic and creative
organizations, we examine the streams of research that deal with similar subjects: succession
in family-owned businesses and organizational identity. We then present our case study,
highlighting key events in the succession process at Groupe Bernard Loiseau. We conclude by
discussing the question of style and succession within artistic and creative organizations.
2
Succession in Artistic and Creative Organizations: A Paradoxical Dearth of Research
Strong personalization is a characteristic of artistic and creative organizations, be they
companies built around the work of a single creator (Svejenova, Planellas and Vives, 2010),
companies with different creators (Catmull, 2008) or major institutions. Some of the company
profiles published in the International Journal of Arts Management cover a period in the life
of an organization when a particular leader is dominant (Cardinal and Lapierre, 2003, 2004,
2007; Cameron and Lapierre, 2007; Vigneault and Lapierre, 2008). Strong personalization
can be linked to the overwhelming influence of the author of a contribution, to a romantic
vision (Becker, 1982) or to the importance of the notion of leadership in the arts sector
(Lapierre, 2001).
Paradoxically, the weight of individuals in the research on artistic and creative
management is accompanied by a lack of research on the issue of succession. However,
succession has been the subject of numerous studies in the field of entrepreneurship,
particularly in family-owned firms where it has been identified as critical. For example, Le
Breton-Miller, Miller and Steier (2004) note that less than 10% of all family-owned
companies survive past the third generation, while Brockhaus (2004) points out that
succession management plays a key role in the life of family-owned firms and should be
analyzed from the angle of the family, management and property ownership in order to elicit
the perspectives of the various stakeholders.
Studies on transfer and succession in family-owned businesses highlight the key
success factors in these processes. Le Breton-Miller, Miller and Steier (2004) describe the
predecessor (relationship with the successor, motives, personality, needs), the successor
(motives, talents, development, career, external experiences, education and training) and basic
rules with respect to planning, shared vision and family harmony. Cabrera-Suárez, De Saá-
Pérez and García-Almeida (2001) show that one of the challenges in the process is the
successor’s ability to acquire the knowledge and skills of the predecessor in order to sustain
and develop the company’s performance.
Hofer and Charan (1984) propose a conceptual model for the transition from a one-
person entrepreneurial type of management to a functional type of management. They show
that this kind of transition is particularly difficult. Other studies have focused on the different
factors that are likely to influence the succession process. Handler and Kram (1988) and
Handler (1994) describe some of the factors at play when there is resistance to succession.
These can pertain to the founder (attachment, reluctance to delegate or to retire) or can be
inter-individual (family conflicts interfering with the business), organizational, or
environmental (culture and structure of the organization, degree of environmental stability).
The founder tends to exert a particular influence on the succession process.
Wasserman (2003) demonstrates that the succession of the first generation is linked to the
founder’s attachment to the firm. Davis and Harveston (1999) observe the importance of the
“generational shadow,” particularly that of the founder. Finally, Miller, Steier and Le Breton-
Miller (2003) discuss the weight of the past, suggesting that problems can result from the
development of a poor relationship between the organization’s past and its present situation.
All of these observations, based on a variety of family-owned businesses, seem to be
reflected in artistic and creative companies, where strong personalization serves to increase
the influence of the founder. Furthermore, the delicate nature of succession is confirmed
empirically, with this particular phase appearing to be critical in many cases (Paris, 2010). Yet
this aspect of artistic and creative organizations has not received the attention it warrants.
Data Collection and Analysis
3
This investigation was based on a longitudinal study carried out from an inductive
perspective. The researchers contacted the directors of the company two years after Loiseau’s
death in order to determine how the matter of succession had been handled.
We conducted interviews in four phases. During the initial phase we met with
Dominique, Loiseau’s widow and with the new managing director of Groupe Bernard
Loiseau. We then held two interview and observation sessions at the company’s site in
Saulieu. A year later we conducted six filmed interviews with people we had met previously.
Finally, we returned in order to complete our research by holding informal discussions with
staff members. During each of the last three phases we also made observations, either as
customers (dining room or hotel) or as observers (kitchen).
We carried out interviews with 18 employees in diverse positions. The interviews
were conducted by two researchers and lasted one to two hours. Most of these employees had
known Bernard Loiseau personally and had been witness to the events. The interviews were
partly open-ended and partly structured, based on several guidelines and specific questions on
the following topics: curriculum; role in the organization, before and after Loiseau’s death;
the organization of work before and after Loiseau’s death; the reorganizing process and how it
was carried out; any significant changes since Loiseau’s death as well as any opposition or
resistance to these changes.
We complemented these interviews with a document analysis. We consulted corporate
documents; books and articles in specialty magazines by or about Loiseau as a chef and
features of his cuisine; restaurant guides, particularly the Michelin guide; and articles by
leading writers on gastronomy.
After this phase of formal research, we continued to meet regularly with some
members of the management team, who kept us informed of any changes within the company.
We used short debriefings after each interview to reorient, develop and clarify. We
then spent many hours in discussions with each other, identifying potential interesting themes.
We grouped our interview transcripts and observational notes into two clusters, one for June
2006 and one for March–June 2007. Our analysis followed a two-part structure. We first
triangulated the interviews to reconstruct an objective narration of the events following
Loiseau’s death. We then reread the transcripts and notes individually a number of times and
watched the filmed interviews to identify references to the identity, style and spirit of the
company during each period.
The Case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau
The recent history of the Bernard Loiseau enterprise, an iconic firm in French haute cuisine,
makes it a particularly interesting case study of succession in artistic and creative
organizations. In France, haute cuisine enjoys a status close to that of an art – a culinary art –
and chefs are highly respected. Chefs often consider their creations works of art and their
cuisine is marked by subjectivity. In the case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau, the chef was also
the founder, a charismatic leader and the person responsible for putting the company in the
spotlight. His sudden death raised the issue of succession in a very dramatic way, especially
with regard to artistic organizations. Would the business be able to survive without him?
Under what conditions, and with which creator, manager and stylistic framework?
Bernard Loiseau’s La Côte d’Or
4
Loiseau, depressed and overworked, took his own life on 25 February 2003 at his home in
Saulieu. At the time he was chef at one of the 20 or so restaurants that made up the elite of
French gastronomy – those to which the Michelin guide had conferred three stars – as well as
one of the most celebrated chefs in French haute cuisine, its spokesman and recipient of the
most media coverage.
Loiseau assumed the management of the legendary hotel and restaurant La Côte d’Or
in 1975 (he would buy it in 1982), at the age of 24. Prior to that, he had served as an
apprentice at Troisgros in Roanne, one of Michelin’s three-star French restaurants, then as
chef at a restaurant on the fringes of Paris, where he began to be noticed by the media, and,
finally, as head chef at a Parisian restaurant, where he was singled out by the critics as a
future “great.”
La Côte d’Or in Saulieu, in the heart of Burgundy, had long been a prime destination
on the road to the Alps, the south of France and Switzerland. It had acquired an international
reputation under the guidance of Chef Alexandre Dumaine (1895–1974). When it was
awarded a third Michelin star in 1951, it joined the ranks of France’s seven elite
establishments. For many years, the prestige of La Côte d’Or was such that it was a must for
well-known figures from the worlds of politics and show business.
After the departure of Dumaine in 1963, and before Loiseau took over, La Côte d’Or
had more or less sunk into oblivion. Its geographical location had become less attractive now
that there was a highway 25 kilometres away, heading east and south from Paris. Loiseau’s
gamble was high-risk: Make enough people come to Saulieu to obtain three Michelin stars. In
1977, two years after he arrived, Loiseau got his first Michelin star and a rating of 17/20 in
the Gault & Millau guide. In the years that followed he was awarded a second star (1981) and
hired men who would become pillars of La Côte d’Or: Hubert, restaurant manager (recruited
in 1980), Eric, maître d’hôtel (1981), and Patrick, head chef and second-in-command (1982).
After several months of construction in 1990, to provide the restaurant with three
dining rooms and new kitchens, La Côte d’Or was rewarded in March 1991 with three
Michelin stars. The consequences were enormous. La Côte d’Or acquired an international
reputation and drew customers from around the world. The restaurant developed rapidly and
hired new kitchen and dining room personnel in order to ensure impeccable service. The staff
grew from 20 in 1986, to 40 in 1990, to 75 in 2000. Despite its location off the beaten track,
La Côte d’Or became a venue that was well worth the detour. A loyal circle of customers
developed who would return once or twice a year.
In 1998 Groupe Bernard Loiseau went public and raised 13 million francs, which
allowed it add deluxe touches to the hotel (a tower, a spa overlooking a garden and a
swimming pool), and in 2000 La Côte d’Or was listed by Virtuoso, a prestigious and highly
selective network of 350 American tour operators.
This period was also marked by a diversification of activities, with the development of
consulting services on the launching of new restaurants, partnerships (branding) and the
opening of three restaurants in Paris. It was also marked by the polishing of Loiseau’s image
as the ultimate chef, spokesman for French cuisine.
Bernard Loiseau as Chef
Loiseau belonged to the generation of chefs who advanced to the forefront of the nouvelle
cuisine movement in the 1970s. One of the guiding principles of that movement was a
rethinking of traditional dishes to make them lighter and more refined. The idea was to use
less fat in main courses and less sugar in desserts so as to rediscover the natural taste of the
products and better distinguish their flavours. In this cuisine the focus is above all on taste and
5
the achievement of both gustatory force and finesse. This involves a search for impeccable
produce, often local or regional, and simplicity of presentation, each dish having been created
around one main product and two complementary products – never more – so as not to dilute
the original flavours in the palate.
What was important to Loiseau was to restore and enhance the taste of meat, poultry
and fish. This involved new preparation techniques. One of the innovations was to make
strong sauces from the cooking of the product. To bind sauces, he used neither cream nor
flour but vegetable purées (onions, carrots), which serve to thicken while highlighting the
flavour. Loiseau had no compunction about reclaiming and revisiting the great Burgundian
classics. With frogs’ legs, for instance, he kept the original ingredients – garlic and parsley –
but changed the traditional recipe to produce a dish that was lighter and less fatty. The frogs’
legs were simply browned in butter and served with a garlic purée and a parsley coulis.
However, a simple presentation did not imply a simple preparation process. The purée was
made from cloves of garlic blanched several times in different pots of hot water to eliminate
the unpleasant compounds of the garlic, then sweetened with a little milk. The spurs and calf
muscles were removed from the frogs’ legs to make the cooking process more uniform. The
same process is used for Sandre à la peau croustillante et fondue d’échalote sauce vin rouge,
one of Loiseau’s classics. The sauce is made by reducing Syrah red wine. The wine is heated
for several hours without ever coming to a boil, so that the evaporation process is slow and
gradual. Seven litres of wine are cooked for seven hours to yield one litre of wine concentrate,
which is then whipped with butter and seasoned. The shallots are cooked at length in
compote, which makes them a little sweeter and a good complement to the tangy taste of the
wine sauce.
Management of the Establishment
One of the challenges of managing a great restaurant is meeting costs. Staff-related costs
represent between 45% and 60% of expenditures, because a team must be sufficiently large
and specialized to meet the requirements of quality and coordination in the serving of meals.
The use of numerous trainees and apprentices allows the establishment to provide training for
young people and bear the costs of maintaining a large team. The ingredients and raw
materials are another key expense (roughly 30%). The dishes listed on the menu should be
available when customers order them, which means that fresh produce must be on hand and
will be thrown out if not used. The profit margins of top restaurants are quite small (around
5%); to exceed the break-even point one has to have a large number of covers without
compromising the quality of the dishes or the service. Given these circumstances, location,
listings in the best restaurant guides, chefs’ awards and media visibility are all essential for
success.
As the management of a great restaurant is a risky business, always at the limits of
profitability, top restaurants try to develop additional activities, often capitalizing on the
chef’s name. Such activities include consulting, training, derivative products, advertising and
gourmet columns in the media. The addition of a hotel can boost revenues if the costs are well
controlled and the location is attractive; it also allows customers to consume alcohol without
having to drive afterwards.
In 2003 La Côte d’Or was run in a traditional way. The reception desk was responsible
for reservations, for both the hotel and the restaurant, and for greeting guests upon their
arrival and seeing them off after their meal or their stay. It included receptionists and a
doorman in charge of parking cars and handling luggage. The rooms were the responsibility
of the housekeeper and a team of housemaids. In the dining room, the maîtres d’hôtel
6
welcomed the customers, offered them menu advice and took their orders; they were in charge
of the seating plan, the quality of the service and customer relations during the meal. Five
chefs de rang were responsible for five to seven tables each, while waiters brought in the
dishes and the dessert trolley. The waiters served as the link between the kitchen and the
dining room so that the chefs de rang could be present in the dining room at all times. The
dining room was staffed by some 20 people, and everything was done to ensure that diners
had the shortest wait possible between courses and that all those at the same table were served
at the same time.
The sommellerie was responsible for the purchase, storage, sale and serving of
beverages: water, wine and after-dinner liqueurs. The wines represented between 30% and
40% of the restaurant’s turnover but about 80% of its margin. La Côte d’Or’s wine cellar, like
the cellars at any fine-dining restaurant, was stocked with a wide variety of wines.
The kitchen comprised three activities: creation of new dishes, preparation of dishes
and support activities (purchasing, administration, personnel management). The chef was in
charge of creating new dishes, the menu and recruitment. He was also behind the passe, the
table where the plates are arranged and controlled before being taken into the dining room by
the waiters. The chef could be assisted by one or more sous-chefs, with whom he shared
responsibility for administration, management of kitchen staff and creation of new dishes.
Preparation of the dishes was handled by the team, which worked in a pyramidal
structure organized into domains, each directed by a head chef: pantry, fish, meat, fish
courses, meat courses, pastry. The domain chefs were responsible for their domain as well as
for receiving and storing the products that they needed. Each domain chef had several
assistants who carried out one or more tasks (peeling, chopping, cooking). Before the loss of
Loiseau, the kitchen team comprised 22 people managed by Patrick Bertron with the
assistance of two sous-chefs, who were also domain chefs.
The kitchens of top restaurants feature a rapid turnover of assistants and domain chefs
because young chefs go from one establishment to another in order to perfect their craft.
Loiseau’s chef assistants, who were between 18 and 25 years of age, stayed an average of 18
months.
The composition and preparation of dishes were carried out to perfection by Loiseau
and Bertron. Bertron was responsible for teaching skills in the kitchen. He described the
dishes, the spirit in which they were to be created and how they were to be prepared. He
showed the teams how to arrange a plate and put the finishing touches on it. The chefs could
also consult specifications for the composition of the dishes and how to prepare them
(ingredients, measures, cooking time, photos). These specs were also used to describe the
dishes to the waiters so they could give diners proper advice. But it was above all know-how,
experience and philosophy that were key in producing the best possible dishes and that were
transmitted in the kitchen by the chef to his sous-chefs and teams. It entailed education of the
senses – taste, sight, touch, smell and even hearing. All of the senses were mobilized to
determine whether a meat or fish was well cooked or if a sauce had the force required for a
particular dish.
“Old Style” Management
There were several specifics in the way that La Côte d’Or hotel and restaurant were run, all
related to Loiseau’s personality and omnipresence. Onsite from morning to night seven days a
week, with only the occasional few days’ vacation, he greeted guests in the reception area
when they arrived and bade them farewell when they left. Concerned with every detail, he
was available to all members of his staff, ready to guide, motivate or correct. As a boss,
7
Loiseau was very demanding and was apt to fly into a rage if he thought that some aspect of
the service was lacking. At the same time, he was paternalistic in his relationships with his
employees, always prepared to advise and encourage. He showed real affection for his staff,
and that affection was reciprocated.
Loiseau’s omnipresence did not prevent him from assigning important tasks to those
he trusted. This ability to delegate resulted in a keen sense of family shared by all; the staff
felt that the lines of communication were open at all times. The style that Loiseau wished to
convey was that of an inn where guests feel at home and the atmosphere is not stiff and stilted
but warm and relaxed; this was reflected in the way that the establishment was run.
Management remained very informal. The accounts were kept in order but
management was in the “old style,” without rigorous follow-up. The top priority was the
quality of service. In both the kitchen and the hotel, each employee went ahead and made the
purchases related to his or her position without necessarily asking for an estimate and with no
centralized control. No cost was questioned so long as the purchase met high standards of
quality. This autonomy nevertheless went hand in hand with a spirit of economy, as Loiseau
paid close attention to any restaurant expense that did not directly involve what went on the
plate. In the kitchen, the demand for the very best products meant a choice of suppliers
without a call for bids or negotiation of prices. For Loiseau, one could not put a price on
excellence. Likewise, as the quantities purchased were based on a rough estimate of the
number of covers expected, produce that could be used but whose slight deterioration meant
that it no longer met the restaurant’s high standards was often discarded.
The Initial Decisions Post-Bernard Loiseau
After Loiseau’s death, his widow, Dominique Loiseau, believed it was essential to
communicate the fact that the establishment continued to operate, with the same teams, the
same services, the same quality, the same welcome, the same concern with excellence.
Although Loiseau embodied his establishment in the eyes of the public, it was now vital to
focus on the professionalism of the team that kept the business running on a daily basis, to
reassure customers that La Côte d’Or had not depended exclusively on him.
One of the first challenges was to retain a motivated staff. Although many employees
said that they wished to stay on, they had just lost their leader. Other challenges were to
reorganize the way the establishment was run, to compensate for the few departures that did
take place and to adapt to the absence of Loiseau in all the different roles he had played. The
organization was centred on Loiseau and it was inconceivable that he be replaced: No one
would throw himself into the tasks as he had, nor bring together the qualities of creativity,
leadership and communication as he had. It was essential to put into place a more formal
organization but without altering style or quality. Dominique Loiseau hired a general
manager, an outsider to the world of gastronomy, who was put in charge of reorganizing the
staff and adopting more stringent management methods. Loiseau took over some of her
husband’s functions herself, particularly in the areas of public relations and the welcoming of
guests. Patrick Bertron, the sous-chef, was made chef. The other changes in the organization
were oriented towards internal promotion. In the dining room, two chefs de rang who had
been with the firm for over 15 years were promoted to maîtres d’hôtel to replace the maîtres
d’hôtel who had chosen to leave.
The establishment was renamed Relais Bernard Loiseau. Public relations, which
previously had focused on the cuisine, now highlighted the hotel and its services. The menu
was expanded to include less expensive selections in order to build a local clientele. The
immediate result of Loiseau’s death had been a substantial drop in the number of reservations
8
and cash inflow. Some of the less affluent customers, who had come after hearing Loiseau on
the radio, seemed lost. In the short term, it was necessary to trim the sails without
compromising on quality. A reorganization process was launched.
On the financial level, all expenditures were carefully reviewed. Procedures were set
up for ordering, with all purchases now subject to approval through a hierarchy and managers
being asked to find ways of cutting costs. Inventory tracking, personnel management and the
hiring process were also revamped. With the drop in turnover, strong management seemed a
requisite to make the business profitable again. The kitchen was more closely monitored.
Procedures were reinforced, in particular regarding the inventory and the calculation of recipe
costs. Margin rates were set in order to fix a sale price based on the cost of the materials.
Specifications were established for each recipe, indicating in detail the ingredients used and
the quantity.
In fact the way of doing business was overhauled. Loiseau’s management style, which
his team members described as “communicative,” “small-farmer-like,” “craftsman-like,”
“family . . . professional” and “informal,” was replaced by a more structured, formal style. For
management, the real challenge lay in establishing a more rigid management system to sustain
the business without compromising on quality in any way.
The Firm’s Identity
The menu was also changed. At first, in an effort to stabilize the situation, it remained
Loiseau’s menu, changing according to the season. Bertron, backed by Dominique Loiseau,
chose to respect the principles of Bernard Loiseau’s creations, and even reinforce them so as
to convince the staff, customers and restaurant critics that nothing had changed. But the
management, like the new chef, also believed that the establishment should innovate and offer
new dishes – very soon, customers would expect it to be creative. Little by little, the chef,
with the blessing of Dominique Loiseau, entered a creative phase. The menu began to evolve,
eventually comprising traditional fare and a range of new dishes, with a clear distinction
between the two cuisines.
Tensions came to the fore. The changes to the establishment met with resistance and
gave rise to a series of conflicts, both major and minor. The more senior staff members, such
as Hubert, the restaurant manager and Bernard Loiseau’s long-time friend, became keepers of
the flame. Hubert was seen by many as Loiseau’s right-hand man and the embodiment of his
style. He was highly respected and well liked by both staff and customers.
First, the organization was criticized for imposing procedures that threatened the
quality of service and the firm’s traditional style. Some staff members, mostly those in senior
positions, felt that cost control and the adoption of reporting tools were detrimental to quality
and the spirit of conviviality. The new approach was considered too managerial.
But the revolt mostly concerned Bertron’s creations and the changes made to the
menu. Certain dishes were judged incompatible with the Loiseau style and were severely
criticized, particularly by the dining room staff. Tensions mounted between the dining room,
where the staff were mostly long-time employees who had been part of Loiseau’s adventure,
and the kitchen, where only the chef had even known Loiseau, all the other employees having
been there only a year or two as apprentices. In the dining room, the chefs de rang and maîtres
d’hôtel, who advised the customers and took their orders, intimated that they could not sell the
creations of Bertron as well as those of Loiseau. Hubert, a pillar of the firm, engaged the new
chef in bouts of arm-wrestling. A tense situation turned into open conflict.
Behind the conflict, beyond the classic issue of succession, the firm’s identity and
stylistic framework were at stake. When Bertron embarked on his new creative process, he
9
meant to emphasize the “base” invented by Loiseau and introduce more variety in the palate.
His cuisine gradually found its personality, its style, and became more inventive. “In
Loiseau’s cuisine,” explains one of his maîtres d’hôtel, “you started from a particular taste
point and there was only one line of development that reached a crescendo. In Bertron’s
cuisine, there’s always a progression of tastes, but it is more of a spiral. There are more
flavours in the palate, more connections between flavours; they stay longer, or return. With
Loiseau it was more linear. With Bertron it’s a rotation of flavours – there’s a back and forth
. . . a more complex play of flavours.”
New techniques were introduced and there were more products on the plates, including
ingredients that Loiseau had disliked using, such as saffron. In the dining room, some
members of the senior staff let Bertron know that this was inconsistent with the Loiseau style.
“Bertron started to bring in a touch of whimsy,” says a maître d’hôtel, “and we were worried
that he would graduate to a cuisine where you don’t know what you’re eating any more. In the
case of Loiseau, it was the product that was highlighted. We were concerned because it was
not the Loiseau style and we were running the risk of producing the cuisine of the man in the
street.” A sous-chef comments, “It was very hard to convince the waiters to accept innovation.
We made a lobster bouillon with lobster ravioli and stuffed cabbage. We wanted to serve the
bouillon in a teapot. It caused a scandal. They told us, ‘You didn’t work with
Monsieur Loiseau; you don’t know how to work’.”
Management, which believed that the business would survive if it continued to be
creative, did not give in on the question of the Loiseau style. To defuse the situation and give
new impetus to the firm, which was still in shock from the loss of its founder, Dominique
Loiseau chose to turn towards the future, maintain a managerial orientation and support the
creations of Bertron. A decision was taken to part ways with Hubert, one of the historic pillars
of the firm. It was a risky move but the price that had to be paid to ensure a renaissance and
the viability of the firm. The decision came down in January 2005 and served to traumatize
the staff all over again.
Groupe Bernard Loiseau in 2013
By the summer of 2013 the company had survived the critical period following Loiseau’s
death as well as the financial crisis of 2008. In 2013 Relais Bernard Loiseau received three
Michelin stars for the 10th consecutive year since Loiseau’s passing. The financial situation is
healthy. The stormy relationship between the dining room and the kitchen is no more and
Bertron’s cuisine has been accepted by the senior staff. This happened gradually, as the
results improved. Bertron is now established in his role as chef and can offer daring creations
that adhere to the Loiseau style without complying with detailed specifications. Orders are
evenly divided between the Loiseau classics and the Bertron creations.
The work since 2003 has been aimed mainly at consolidating what already existed:
optimization of the infrastructure, maintaining of a warm and hospitable atmosphere true to
the Loiseau style, improved management techniques, more rational operations so as to attain
or increase profitability at all of the group’s establishments, and investment in modernization
and decor to uphold the quality of services and sustain the appeal of the Loiseau brand. At the
same time, careful consideration has been given to the development strategy, which since
2007 has taken the form of different operations. In 2008 a new restaurant, Loiseau des
Vignes, was launched in Beaune, Burgundy, based on an original concept: a wide variety of
wines available by the glass. This restaurant received its first Michelin star in 2010, a year
that made Loiseau des Vignes one of the most profitable restaurants in the group. Two other
restaurants were due to open in 2013, one in Dijon (in Burgundy) and one in Japan.
10
At the same time, the teams are working on partnerships to promote the firm’s image
in France and abroad. The restaurant in Saulieu is the group’s flagship restaurant and its
public relations focus, but it must be supplemented by activities that generate a profit and
enhance the firm’s image. In 2009 partnerships were formed with three leading companies in
Burgundy, each highly respected in its field: Bichot wines, Fallot mustards and Boudier
liqueurs. This does not mean simply selecting high-quality products, affixing the brand name
and retailing them; it involves co-creating with the partners and combining their know-how.
The specialists in the partner firms were closely associated with the chef, sommelier and
pastry chef at Loiseau in developing the three product lines. These partnerships will allow the
company to diversify its sources of revenue (in the form of royalties), still with a small
turnover, and above all enhance the image of the Loiseau brand in France and elsewhere.
The Matter of Succession
The recent history of the Loiseau firm, aside from the dramatic events, highlights the
structural issues affecting artistic and creative organizations in matters of succession. How
does an organization carry on without the person who embodied it, including its production?
We call this the paradox of creative organizations.
The Paradox of Creative Organizations
Immediately after Loiseau’s death the company was in a paradoxical and rather intriguing
position. Staff members felt lost, and seriously questioned the future of the firm without its
owner – the chef who had imprinted his style, the charismatic manager, the person who
brought in the customers and motivated the employees. At the same time, they knew how to
run the business and knew that they were the only ones who could make it run smoothly on a
daily basis. Most of the management team had been by Loiseau’s side for years, some from
the very outset. Although Loiseau had been very “present,” he had also delegated, including
the creative tasks. His head chef, Patrick Bertron, had worked with him for over 20 years and
had helped to create the dishes, testing them and offering ideas. He had become a replica of
Loiseau, to the point where Loiseau had no compunction about saying that Bertron “could do”
Loiseau better than he could himself, such was his knowledge of the techniques, the dishes
and the cuisine. Herein lies the paradox of creative organizations. For the teams there was a
sense of loss and soul-searching about the firm’s ability to survive without its leader, but at
the same time there was a conviction that they were the pillars of the establishment and were
indeed capable of running it. This paradox raises the question of the role of a creator who is
omnipresent yet delegates many of the tasks. What did the organization lose with the loss of
Loiseau? A company’s survival lies in the answer to this question.
Flexibility of the Stylistic Framework
The paradox was eventually resolved. In art and creation, the idea of a stylistic framework is
key. Whether it is called a stylistic framework, or a style or an identity, it involves at least two
points of view, that of the customers, who might have expectations regarding the company,
and that of the staff. Identity is what serves to reassure in times of trouble – for example,
when a charismatic leader, after years of success and being entrusted with charting the course
for the organization, is no longer around. When the absence of the leader, who represented the
11
firm in the eyes of the clientele and instilled confidence in the employees, translates into a
loss of confidence, then anything new is cause for concern.
In a crisis such as that experienced by the Loiseau firm, when the future is uncertain,
adhering to a stylistic framework offers reassurance. The creative industries are characterized
by the nobody knows property (Caves, 2000) that translates uncertainty about the eventual
success of the creations proposed. When faced with uncertainty, one’s proven talents earn the
trust of customers, and this trust is passed on to the staff. Loiseau’s reputation had served as a
form of security for his employees, something that his successor could not provide. The
defiance towards Bertron was therefore structural. The firm’s style was a lifesaver for the
staff: In times of uncertainty they held on to what had made the firm a success and looked to
the past for a framework by which it might evolve. As the leader was no longer there to
provide the framework, it was the style they clung to – in other words, the formalization of
what constituted its principles. But the notion of style clashed with its definition. Where was
the identity of Groupe Bernard Loiseau? In its cuisine? In the supremacy of taste over
everything else? No cream, no butter? No “frills” on the plate? Three flavours in each dish?
Formalization could well lead to very restrictive rules, including the rejection of anything that
had not been created by Loiseau. The firm’s identity would then boil down to its
Jambonnettes de grenouille à la purée d’ail et au jus de persil and Sandre à la peau
croustillante et fondue d’échalotes, sauce au vin rouge – in other words, to the dishes that had
been created by Loiseau. The notion of style can quickly conflict with that of creation.
When the orientation imposed by the new chef had passed the test – the customers
came back, the restaurant kept its Michelin stars, the business was beginning to show a profit
once again – the question of style seemed to no longer exist. It dissolved because the teams
did not need it any more; the new chef was starting to gain legitimacy.
This episode suggests that the notion of style is ambiguous with respect to succession.
It is a constant that customers and staff can turn to in times of uncertainty, but perhaps also
the main loss resulting from the departure of the creator. The company must accept the fact
that style is a personal matter, something on which it cannot capitalize in order to continue to
create. Nevertheless, style took root in the organization – the processes, the know-how, the
teams and the new creations became imbued with it. Although Bertron had his own unique
personality, his cuisine drew on continuity; his personality as a creator developed in the fertile
ground of Loiseau’s cuisine, as did the expertise of the teams. Bertron’s personal style
developed around the supremacy of taste.
Succession in Creative Companies
The case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau confirms the results of research on succession in family-
owned companies. In fact the phenomena of resistance seem to be structural (Handler and
Kram, 1988; Handler, 1994). The influence of the founder (Davis and Harveston, 1999) and
the past (Miller, Steier and Le Breton-Miller, 2003) also appear to be important factors in the
process.
The transition from a one-person entrepreneurial process to a functional type of
management is considered the most sensitive factor (Hofer and Charan, 1984). The way in
which the firm was run during Loiseau’s time typifies the various characteristics of companies
managed in an entrepreneurial manner: highly centralized decision-making, over-dependence
on a single individual for survival and growth, limited repertoire of managerial skills and
training, and a paternalistic atmosphere.
In relation to the literature on succession, the case has two characteristics. The first is
related to the sudden loss. Most of the studies on transfers are concerned with succession
12
linked to the retirement of the founder, whose shadow hangs over the company (Davis and
Harveston, 1999). In this case, the founder’s shadow hung particularly heavily over the
company because he died suddenly.
This is undoubtedly related to the other characteristic: the creative aspect. In artistic
and creative companies, the personality of the founder weighs heavily if the entire
organization has served his vision and if his personality is part of the firm’s product. The
difference between a creative company and others is that its production is the creator himself.
What the Loiseau enterprise produced was “Bernard Loiseau.” This added to the difficulties
of succession and the weight of his personality on the organization.
Cabrera-Suárez, De Saá-Pérez and García-Almeida (2001) show that the successor’s
ability to acquire the knowledge and skills of the predecessor is big part of the challenge in
succession. The result is slightly different in the case of artistic and creative organizations.
The successor must not only possess the skills of a creator but be able to apply them in a way
that affirms his own unique personality and style. Consequently, he has to free himself from
those skills he used when he was working for another creator. Style is an intrinsic skill that
cannot be passed on.
Conclusion
The case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau raises, in a dramatic way, a number of issues that come
up regularly in cultural or creative companies and institutions. Behind the question of
succession lie the respective roles played by the individual – manager or creator – and the
organization. And behind the question of the stylistic framework lies that of the formalization
of activities, particularly creative ones. The Loiseau story illustrates the delicate balance that
creative companies and institutions must strive to maintain – that between the intuition of a
particular individual and the processes that need to be followed.
The Loiseau paradox masks a number of other elements, not least the division of
labour in the creative process. Becker (1974, 1982) shows the extent to which creative activity
is a collective activity. Our case study confirms the previous finding that creative work entails
a division of labour (Paris, 2010). The only task that Bernard Loiseau did not delegate was the
decision whether to include a particular dish on the menu. Such a decision requires the
intuition, vision and subjectivity of the creator. Loiseau was the person who charted the
course for the firm and who was most trusted by staff. After his death, the employees knew
how to run the company but there was no one who could fill his shoes in terms of leadership.
Perhaps the main lessons of this case are the intriguing cohabitation of the rational and
rationalizing aspects of management in creative activities and the need for subjectivity in all
matters pertaining to art.
13
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15
Thomas Paris is a researcher at CNRS (GREG HEC) and an associate professor at HEC
Paris, where he is director of the master’s program Média, Art, Création. His work is
concerned mainly with management, economics and organizational models in the creative
industries (cinema, music, fashion, publishing, architecture, advertising, haute cuisine and
design).
Frédéric Leroy is an associate professor of Strategic Management at HEC Paris. His research
interests cover the areas of Mergers&Acquisitions, organizational learning processes and
organizational knowledge, routine and creativity.
Abstract
The important role of entrepreneurship in the dynamics of the arts sector and the influence of
the leader’s personality make succession a key issue in creative industries. What happens to
an artistic organization when its founder leaves? How does it evolve? Can it adopt a style of
management that is compatible with the founder’s absence? This article focuses on the case of
Groupe Bernard Loiseau, an iconic French company in the culinary arts whose owner and
chef died suddenly. It sheds light on how the question of succession and that of style were
addressed in this organization and how they are addressed in artistic organizations in general.
Keywords
Succession, culinary art, entrepreneurial management, creative industries
16
APPENDIX 1 INTERVIEWEES
Function Position Number of years
with the firm
Administration CEO 18
Managing director 2
Financial officer 1
Accountant 27
Administrative
assistant
9
Restaurant
management
Restaurant manager 4
Reception Head of reception 4
Receptionist 5
Bell captain 16
Hotel Service manager 7
Wines Sommelier 5
Boutique Boutique manager 9
Dining room Maître d’hôtel 20
Maître d’hôtel 23
Chef de rang
(headwaiter)
27
Kitchen Head chef 23
Sous-chef 2
Sous-chef 2
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