Description
During the first half of 2012, military officers deposed the Malian president in
Bamako, Tuareg rebels declared the independent state of Azawad of northern
Mali, and Islamist extremists subsequently imposed sharia law in the region.
Now, nearly one year later, national, regional, and international actors have
begun crisis management in earnest. France’s armed intervention to expel
Islamist fighters from northern Mali in January 2013 and the seizure of an
Algerian gas field by Islamic militants have focused international attention on
the crisis in Mali and the broader Sahel-Sahara region and created an urgent
need for action that was previously lacking.
This issue brief examines the roots of the current crisis in Mali, which
include poor governance, a constitutional crisis, and growing criminality in
the north. It then outlines the responses to date: from the creation of new
institutions by Interim President Dioncounda Traoré and the adoption of a
roadmap for transition to the mediation process led by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international strategy
for military intervention. Ultimately, the slow response to the crisis
throughout 2012 enabled Islamist fighters in the north to consolidate their
control, boost recruitment, and prepare for a drawn-out insurgency in the case
of a future defeat.
Mali and the Sahel-Sahara:
From Crisis Management to
Sustainable Strategy
FEBRUARY 201 3
Executive Summary
During the first half of 2012, military officers deposed the Malian president in
Bamako, Tuareg rebels declared the independent state of Azawad of northern
Mali, and Islamist extremists subsequently imposed sharia law in the region.
Now, nearly one year later, national, regional, and international actors have
begun crisis management in earnest. France’s armed intervention to expel
Islamist fighters from northern Mali in January 2013 and the seizure of an
Algerian gas field by Islamic militants have focused international attention on
the crisis in Mali and the broader Sahel-Sahara region and created an urgent
need for action that was previously lacking.
This issue brief examines the roots of the current crisis in Mali, which
include poor governance, a constitutional crisis, and growing criminality in
the north. It then outlines the responses to date: from the creation of new
institutions by Interim President Dioncounda Traoré and the adoption of a
roadmap for transition to the mediation process led by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international strategy
for military intervention. Ultimately, the slow response to the crisis
throughout 2012 enabled Islamist fighters in the north to consolidate their
control, boost recruitment, and prepare for a drawn-out insurgency in the case
of a future defeat.
Despite some early victories for the French and Malian troops in January and
February this year, military intervention will not address the root causes of the
acute insecurity that the people of Mali face. Indeed, this recent crisis is only
the tip of the iceberg in Mali and in the Sahel-Sahara region as a whole. Given
persistent underdevelopment, recurring humanitarian crises, and entrenched
terrorist and organized criminal networks in the region, short-term crisis
management is unlikely to be sufficient. A more comprehensive approach is
needed—one that addresses the structural causes of the conflict in Mali,
accounts for the multidimensional nature of the cross-border threats in the
region, and invests in the institutions and popular participation needed for
long-term peace, stability, and development.
The integrated regional strategy currently being developed for the Sahel by
the United Nations is a step in the right direction in this regard. Nonetheless,
amid a multiplicity of actors and strategies seeking to resolve the current crisis,
the governments in the region must ultimately take responsibility for a long-
term and coherent response. While the interim authorities in Mali need to lead
the way in their own country, the international community’s support remains
essential and regional powers also have a significant role to play.
This issue brief was drafted by
Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie, Research
Fellow at the International Peace
Institute (IPI), and Chris Perry,
Senior Policy Analyst at IPI. It
analyzes the recent crisis in Mali and
the Sahel-Sahara region, exploring
the roots of the current conflict and
responses from national, regional,
and international actors to date. It
then turns to the long-term
challenges that the region faces
before outlining paths toward a
more comprehensive approach to
achieving peace, stability, and
development in the region.
In addition to desk research, the
brief draws from a roundtable
discussion held at IPI on September
7, 2012, entitled “Peace and Security
Threats in the Sahel-Sahara Region:
Assessing the Response, Devising
the Way Forward,” organized in
conjunction with the African Union
and the Permanent Mission of
Luxembourg to the United Nations.
The views expressed in this publica-
tion represent those of the authors
and not necessarily those of IPI. IPI
welcomes consideration of a wide
range of perspectives in the pursuit
of a well informed debate on critical
policies and issues in international
affairs.
IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its
many donors for their generous
support. In particular, IPI would like
to thank the Permanent Mission of
Luxembourg to the United Nations
for making this publication possible.
2
Introduction
The political and security crisis that erupted in Mali
in 2012 captured the world’s attention. In January,
the national army engaged in fierce clashes with the
opposition National Movement for the Liberation
of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg rebel movement
formed in November in the north of the country. In
March, a military coup overthrew then president
Amadou Toumani Touré in the south, and by April,
rebels had proclaimed an independent state of
Azawad. The sudden southward push of Islamist
groups at the close of 2012 led to France’s military
intervention in January 2013 and an acceleration of
peacemaking efforts.
While facts on the ground seem to change daily,
the underlying factors that threaten peace and
human security in the Sahel region are not new.
This narrow, semi-arid band that crosses the
continent below the Sahara desert and above the
southern savannas from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Red Sea has long faced an array of interlinked
environmental, developmental, security, and
governance challenges. These factors, combined
with a population comprised of a mix of sedentary
and nomadic people scattered over a vast area of
ungoverned spaces, have created what has been
described as “a volatile cocktail of underdevelop-
ment and insecurity.”
1
Long-term socioeconomic challenges in the Sahel
include rapid population growth, endemic
underdevelopment, and persistent poverty coupled
with poor social service delivery and low levels of
education. Harsh environmental conditions like
sporadic rainfall, periodic drought and flooding,
unpredictable local harvests, and resulting high
food prices worsen the situation. Indeed, once
periodic food crises have now morphed into near-
yearly occurrences with severe humanitarian
consequences. In 2012, the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) estimated that more than 16 million
people were at risk of severe food insecurity, of
which 1 million children were at risk of dying of
severe acute malnutrition.
2
The region is further destabilized by political and
security challenges caused by weak governance and
security structures, radical Islamism, and
religiously driven violence—all exacerbated by the
consequences of the 2011 Libyan crisis and growing
transnational criminality. According to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM),
more than 200,000 registered returnees had crossed
the Libyan borders into Niger, Chad, Mali, and
Mauritania by the end of 2011.
3
Governments in the
affected countries estimate that there may have
been up to 400,000 registered and unregistered
returnees. Included in this mix were economic
migrants as well as armed Tuareg and Toubou ex-
combatants.
Before the fall of Libyan leader Muammar
Gaddafi in October 2011, an estimated 7 to 10
million small arms and light weapons were already
traded in West Africa, rendering countries in the
region prone to instability.
4
More recent evidence
has shown the presence of man-portable air-
defense systems (MANPADS), explosives like
Semtex, and vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft artillery.
These successive flows of arms have plagued the
Sahel with general insecurity, manifested in hijacks
and hostage taking, attacks on civilians, and human
rights abuses conducted by armed and Islamist
groups involved in drug, arms, fuel, and human
trafficking.
In Mali, prior to the French military intervention,
the crisis had already forced about 204,000 people
to leave their homes and become internally
displaced persons, while more than 208,000 others
had sought refuge in neighboring Algeria, Burkina
Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, and Guinea.
5
These
figures have increased since the offensive against
Islamist groups in northern Mali, producing a dire
humanitarian situation and weakening an already
fragile state.
1 Luis Simon, Alexander Mattelaer, and Amelia Hadfield, “A Coherent EU Strategy for the Sahel,” European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies, EU
Doc. EXPO/B/DEVE/FWC/2009-01/Lot5/23, May 2011, p. 19.
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “New Crisis in the Sahel Region,” available at
www.fao.org/crisis/sahel/the-sahel-crisis/2012-crisis-in-the-sahel-region/en/ .
3 UN Security Council, Report of the Joint African Union and United Nations Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region, UN Doc.
S/2012/42, January 17, 2012.
4 Adedeji Ebo and Laura Mazal, “Small Arms Control in West Africa,” West Africa Series No. 1, London: International Alert, 2003.
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Mali Situation Update No. 12,” November 1, 2012, available athttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/50a35d509.pdf .
Because of these factors, the United Nations
Security Council considers the conflict in northern
Mali a threat to international peace and security.
However, the response by regional and interna-
tional bodies has been mixed. An African
Union–United Nations interagency assessment
mission in December 2011 was followed by a report
in early 2012. The report recommended, among
other measures, that the UN “strengthen its security
capacity and presence on the ground [and] develop
integrated programs to fight drug trafficking and
organized crime.” It also suggested that the world
body help develop “an overarching mechanism or
framework” for countries in the region to address
the underlying issues at stake.
6
In addition to
African Union (AU) and UN efforts, national
actors, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), and the European Union (EU)
have also attempted to address the situation in Mali.
Yet, nearly all of this attention has been focused
on the short-term crisis in Mali, with little room for
discussion of the longer-term implications for both
governance and human security. Regardless, the
current multiplicity of actors and response strate-
gies in the crises in both the Sahel and Mali necessi-
tate enhanced coordination and the harmonization
of military and non-military options alike. This
report seeks to bridge this gap. We begin by
examining the current crisis in Mali in detail. We
then pivot to overarching regional concerns that
tend to be lost in crisis-management considera-
tions. Ideally, these two views can be synthesized
toward a comprehensive approach to the region
that deals with acute crises as they arise while
maintaining focus on the long-term challenges to
human security.
The Roots of the Crisis in
Mali
Mali represents an acute combination of the
challenges of poor governance, constitutional crisis,
armed rebellion, and growing criminality,
especially drug trafficking and illicit flows of small
arms and light weapons.
7
These factors in turn led
to Mali’s “twin crises”: a fragile interim government
after a March 2012 military coup and an occupation
by Islamist groups in the north that sought to
impose their strict application of sharia law.
Following the establishment of a multiparty
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 3
6 See note 3.
7 Kwesi Aning and Sarjoh Bah, “ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats,” New York: Center on International Cooperation,
September 2009.
4
democracy two decades ago, Mali was—until
recently—considered a peaceful and stable country.
Regular elections were declared generally free and
fair. Despite socioeconomic challenges, Mali
achieved notable milestones: political space for
freedom of expression with numerous political
parties and civil society organizations; improved
institutions that seemed to strengthen the fledgling
democracy; economic development that witnessed
the emergence of a new generation of entrepre-
neurs; and a flourishing tourist industry that
attracted foreign investment.
8
However, this
democratic and economic growth was interrupted
by the March 2012 military coup that overthrew the
president, Amadou Toumani Touré.
The coup took place only weeks before the
presidential election scheduled for April 29
th
—an
election in which the incumbent had already
announced he would not participate, in order to
cede power peacefully. In reality, many saw
democracy as merely a cover for a corrupt system,
and the coup received little condemnation from
local groups. A poll conducted one month after the
putsch showed that about two-thirds of Bamako
residents supported the junta and its leader, the US-
trained army captain Amadou Sanogo.
9
The junta,
which called itself the National Committee for the
Recovery of Democracy and the Restoration of the
State (CNRDRE), justified its action by citing
public disappointment with a corrupt and weak
government, especially with regard to the
president’s handling of the decades-long recurring
Tuareg rebellion, the most recent manifestation of
which began in January 2012.
Soon after the military coup, and encouraged by
the political vacuum in Bamako, the MNLA took
control of northern Mali. The Tuareg rebel group
proclaimed the independence of Azawad, an area
that forms about 60 percent of Mali's territory and
comprises the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao.
Northern Mali had gone through several rebellions
soon after the country’s independence in 1960. The
most recent northern rebellion ended with the 2006
Algiers Accord brokered by Algeria. This
agreement stipulated the reintegration of Tuareg
rebels into the Malian army and the reduction of
troops in the north. Unfortunately the agreement
was never fully implemented, which is considered
to have made the situation worse and to have
fuelled Tuareg grievances. The January 2012
situation, however, was different in that there was a
strong Islamist current running through the
traditionally nationalist northern rebel groups.
Groups like Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith) had
ties to ideologically motivated external groups such
as Algeria-based al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). Added to that was the proliferation of
heavy weapons after the downfall of Libyan leader
Qaddafi, making for a volatile situation.
10
After a series of successful military victories by
the rebels early in the year, the secular MNLA was
quickly sidelined by local and external Islamist
groups. This was due at least in part to the MNLA’s
lack of legitimacy vis-à-vis local populations. By
mid-July, all major northern towns were under
Islamist control and in the process of implementing
a strict interpretation of sharia law. Serious human
rights violations were reported, with cases of
arbitrary arrests, torture, public flogging and
amputations, sexual and gender-based violence,
summary executions, and the use children in
armed groups. Ansar Dine also destroyed a number
of ancient holy sites in Timbuktu, some of which
were listed as United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
World Heritage Sites.
In addition to Ansar Dine and AQIM (which is
also active in northeastern Mauritania, Niger,
northern Nigeria, and southwestern Algeria
11
), a
third Islamist group operating in northern Mali is
the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO), an offshoot of AQIM. The recruitment
of militants from neighboring countries like Libya,
Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia and the likely
existence of dormant Islamist cells in the region
have helped to internationalize the crisis, as has the
alleged presence of Boko Haram. Since launching
sectarian violence in 2009 in northern Nigeria,
Boko Haram has carried out terrorist attacks and
killed hundreds of people, posing a growing threat
8 Bruce Whitehouse, “What went wrong in Mali?,” London Review of Books 34, No. 16 (August 30, 2012): 17.
9 Ibid.
10 See note 3.
11 Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Sahel Working Group: Co-Chair’s Summary,” Algiers, November 16-17, 2011, available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/184042.pdf .
to Nigerian national security. These developments
have helped to highlight the emergence of terrorism
as a serious threat in the West African Sahel-Sahara
region, which needs to be taken into account when
addressing insecurity in Mali and the region.
Adding to growing security threats in Mali is a
flourishing criminal ecosystem, which at times
earns the tacit support, and even participation, of
Islamist groups. Weak security structures, limited
state control over territory, and the previous
administration’s rampant corruption and collusion
with criminal networks facilitated the development
of an underground economy based on a range of
licit and illicit goods. Exploiting largely porous
national borders and building on old social and
commercial networks established by nomadic
families and communities across the Sahel-Sahara
region, armed groups utilize trade routes from the
old salt caravans to move various supplies including
food, petrol, cigarettes, arms, and cocaine.
12
In fact, West Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region
have become major transit hubs for the cocaine
trade from South America to Europe and beyond.
13
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) estimates that since 2006, twenty to
forty tons of cocaine per year have been trafficked
through West Africa to Europe.
14
This amounts to a
minimum value of about $1 billion per year.
15
In
Mali, MUJAO in particular was identified as being
involved in illegal activities and using religion only
as a cover for drug and cigarette trafficking. Other
criminal activities that generate cash flows include
human trafficking (in particular, trafficking of
migrants trying to reach Europe through the
desert) and hostage taking and the payment of
ransoms. These large flows of foreign currencies,
especially euros, illustrate the growing economic
power of Islamist and criminal groups across the
Sahel-Sahara region.
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising
that a coup, an attempted secession, and an Islamist
insurgency would derail Mali’s budding democracy.
However, largely due to the complicated and
multifaceted nature of the crisis, the international
community was slow to respond.
Crisis Management by
National Actors
Much as there was opposition to what the public
largely perceived as the creation of a “fictitious,”
self-proclaimed state of Azawad, Malians repeat-
edly denied predictions that their country would
turn into a new Afghanistan or another Somalia.
Malians and regional observers instead expressed
concern that, though the issue could reach the
international stage, little in the way of a concrete
solution or plan would be offered. Until France’s
military action to stop the Islamist push toward
Bamako in January 2013, the slow response to the
crisis seemed to give the northern Islamists time to
consolidate their control and recruitment efforts,
and to prepare for a drawn-out insurgency in the
case of future defeat. It also delayed much needed
local capacity-building activities and impeded
humanitarian and development efforts to address
longer-term issues.
In July 2012, Interim President Dioncounda
Traoré announced the creation of new institutions,
including a “High Council of State” and a “National
Committee on Negotiations.” These new institu-
tions are expected to foster dialogue among the
national stakeholders in the transition and with
rebel groups in the north, with a view to seeking a
negotiated solution to the crisis. While these
institutions have yet to be fully implemented,
efforts are underway to bring the major players
together. For instance, a transition roadmap was
endorsed by the Malian parliament in late January
2013, after its adoption by the government. The
roadmap is expected to fully restore constitutional
order and national unity by initiating an inclusive
dialogue, preparing for the re-establishment of the
authority of the state in the north, restructuring the
army under civilian control, and organizing a
democratic and credible electoral process.
Elections are an important element in consoli-
dating state authority in Bamako and across the
country and will formalize the return to constitu-
tional order. Initially anticipated by April 2013, the
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 5
12 Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012.
13 See, for example, James Cockayne and Phil Williams, “The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa,”
New York: International Peace Institute, October 2009.
14 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Regional Programme for West Africa 2010–2014,” New York: United Nations, 2010.
15 Ibid.
post-coup elections are now scheduled to take place
in July, and the government has reaffirmed
budgetary plans for holding elections this year. The
issue of the participation of members of the interim
government in the next elections was discussed
prior to former prime minister Cheick Modibo
Diarra’s forced resignation in December 2012,
when soldiers arrested him, acting under orders
from Captain Amadou Sanogo. Shortly thereafter,
the prime minister announced his government’s
resignation. Despite an ECOWAS decision in July
2012 that rendered members of the transitional
government ineligible to contest the 2013 election,
former prime minister Diarra had announced his
intention to run for president. This had raised
significant questions about his participation in the
interim government and risked jeopardizing the
transition process.
Reconciliation among Malians, both civilians and
those in the military, is another critical step in
moving forward. In the north, where the secular
Tuareg have called for better integration, the
government claims to have implemented affirma-
tive-action and decentralization policies. These
were supposed to have facilitated the participation
of all ethnic groups in the development of their
communities. Nevertheless, the need to address the
long-standing “Tuareg question” remains crucial.
Genuine grievances associated with sociopolitical
marginalization and the failure to implement
successive peace agreements must be dealt with.
Moreover, with the military intervention in the
north and reports emerging of looting and reprisal
attacks by Malian troops and civilians against
Tuareg and Arab communities in the freed cities of
northern Mali, further reconciliation efforts will be
needed.
At the same time, all the communities in the
north continue to be affected by the weak state
structures, poor governance, and organized crime
that existed pre-crisis. These issues need to be
addressed, not only by negotiating with Tuareg
rebels but also in the context of the society at large.
Such reconciliation efforts could also involve the
various civil society groups that have emerged to fill
the void left by the absence of state authority—
including sedentary populations in the north, who
fear exclusion from future negotiations between the
government and the rebels.
Within the army, two key factors contributed to
the military’s failure to counter the Tuareg rebellion
in the north: division and corruption. The signifi-
cant division in the security sector is between the
“red berets,” who support former president
Amadou Toumani Touré and led the military coup
against former president Moussa Traoré in 1992,
and the “green berets,” who orchestrated the March
22
nd
military coup that overthrew then president
Touré. Tension between the two factions further
increased following a failed counter-coup led by the
red-beret paratroopers in April 2012. This left some
twenty people dead, and was followed by a series of
arbitrary arrests, allegations of torture, and regular
clashes between the red berets (and their families)
and the green-beret unit. Likewise, years of corrup-
tion and negligence left the soldiers in the north
weakened by poor training, inadequate equipment,
and low morale.
In the long term, reconciling the divided military
and comprehensively restructuring the army will be
critical to stability. To this end, a military
committee for monitoring and reforming the
defense forces was established in July 2012. Chaired
by ex-junta leader Captain Sanogo, the committee
is charged with preparing a reform program for the
defense and security forces, as well as training
troops and supervising military operations. The
choice of Captain Sanogo to lead national efforts on
security-sector reconciliation can be justified by
political considerations. However, it also raises
questions about the continuing ascendancy of the
military over a weak government and the likelihood
that the army will submit to the civilian authority.
Regional and International
Efforts to Address the Crisis
Regional and international conflict-management
efforts in Mali have followed a two-pronged
approach. The first, and most preferable, is an
ongoing political process to find a negotiated
solution to both the constitutional crisis and the
conflict in the north. Even in light of the recent
military intervention, this process remains
necessary for devising a comprehensive and
sustainable solution to the conflict. The second
prong initially coalesced around plans for a possible
military intervention to neutralize the armed
groups should the first prong falter. The military
option was obviously accelerated (and somewhat
6
supplanted) by the French intervention. It is
important to remember, however, that political
negotiations initiated before the intervention are
ongoing and remain an important and necessary
component for sustainable peace. Likewise,
military preparations that had begun before the
French intervention will play a crucial role as
France seeks to disengage now that the rebels have
been pushed out of the major towns of the north, at
least for the time being.
THE ECOWAS MEDIATION PROCESS
For eight months after the March 2012 military
coup in Mali, regional political efforts to address
the crisis proceeded along two parallel negotiation
tracks led by the ECOWAS-appointed mediator,
President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. First,
negotiations with the coup authors sought to facili-
tate the restoration of constitutional order and
complete the transition process; second, negotia-
tions with actors in the north aimed to address the
crisis there.
Just days after the military coup, ECOWAS
leaders suspended Mali from the regional bloc and
imposed legal, economic, and diplomatic sanctions
on the country. These were followed by additional
AU sanctions imposed against the leaders of the
military junta and all those involved in attempts to
destabilize Mali. Pressure from ECOWAS and the
international community quickly led to the signing
of a framework agreement in early April, which
enjoined the military junta to restore constitutional
order by handing power over to the speaker of the
National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré.
16
However,
suspicions about the continuing interference of the
junta, an attack on the interim president by a
violent mob, and the prime minister’s close links to
the junta leader contributed to weakening the first
post-coup government.
Following further ECOWAS pressure, the interim
government was expanded in August 2012 to
mobilize broader political forces and civil society.
Though radical Islamists in the north were
sidelined, the new cabinet included a minister of
religious affairs—an attempt to account for the rise
of Islam in a traditionally secular society. Five
ministers close to the military junta kept their
posts, as did the then contested prime minister
Modibo Diarra. Despite his initial lack of experi-
ence, the prime minister retained power principally
due to his perceived legitimacy, derived from his
familial legacy. However, the ex-junta leader later
deposed him, and Diango Cissoko was appointed as
the new prime minister in December 2012.
Having facilitated the restoration of constitu-
tional order with the appointment of an interim
government, the mediation role entrusted to
President Compaoré seemed to temporarily lose
momentum with regard to the situation in the
north. Some Malians, particularly those concerned
about regional leaders’ interests, criticized the
process. For the interim government, negotiation
was only possible with the Tuareg rebels on the
basis of respect for Mali’s territorial integrity.
Initially, only the MNLA was recognized as a rebel
group, while AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO were
considered criminal factions. The question of a
specific part of the territory that would be consid-
ered as Tuareg was also omitted, on the grounds
that northern Mali is home to other non-Tuareg
ethnicities.
It had been suggested that serious negotiations
were not possible as long as the Malian government
was unable to exert pressure on the various armed
groups.
17
Nonetheless, the ECOWAS mediator, the
UN Office for West Africa, and Special
Representative of the Secretary-General in West
Africa Said Djinnit began talks with secular MNLA
and the Islamist Ansar Dine in November 2012,
with the support of Algeria and Mauritania. The
two groups were encouraged to disassociate
themselves from terrorists and engage in negotia-
tions with the transitional authorities. Ansar Dine
in turn announced its rejection of terrorism and
organized crime, and its readiness to join the
political dialogue. These efforts led to direct talks
between MNLA, Ansar Dine, and the transitional
government: a preliminary meeting took place in
early December in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
which brought representatives from the three
parties together for the first time.
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 7
16 See, for example, “Statement by H.E. Alassane Ouattara, Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on the Positive Development of
the Political Situation in Mali,” April 6, 2012, available athttp://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=101&lang=en&annee=2012 .
17 Participant remarks during the roundtable discussion “Peace and Security Threats in the Sahel-Sahara Region: Assessing the Response, Devising the Way Forward,”
held at the International Peace Institute in New York on September 7, 2012.
The Malian government, the MNLA, and Ansar
Dine recognized the need to establish an inter-
Malian dialogue framework, involving representa-
tives from the various communities in the north. In
preparation for this dialogue, the parties committed
to ending hostilities, avoiding all forms of abuses
and violence against civilians, facilitating the return
of refugees and internally displaced persons, and
establishing a secure environment devoid of
terrorism and transnational organized crime.
18
Far
from gaining the agreement of all Malian actors,
these initial talks broke down in early January 2013,
after Ansar Dine called off a ceasefire and launched
an attack on the central town of Konna on January
10th. The new split within Ansar Dine between
moderates seeking a political solution and radicals
with strong links to al-Qaida made prospects for a
political resolution look dim. This is especially true
in light of the ongoing military offensive.
Negotiators will now likely need to focus on the
newly formed Islamic Movement for Azawad, which
called for negotiations and asked for autonomy
rather than independence for northern Mali.
19
MILITARY INTERVENTION
In parallel to the ECOWAS negotiation track, a
military strategy was devised. This track, cautiously
agreed on by multiple actors, threatened the
possible deployment of an ECOWAS-led interna-
tional force to resolve the situation in the north if
the rebels did not cede power peacefully. The plan
was soon superseded, however, when the sudden
southward move by Islamists toward Bamako and
the strategic Sévaré military airport precipitated
France’s swift decision to respond to Interim
President Traoré’s call for military assistance.
With the understanding that a peaceful solution
was the ideal and that the use of force should
remain the last resort for dealing with terrorist
groups that are excluded from the political process,
the UN Security Council provided the legal
framework for the planned intervention. Since the
beginning of the Malian crisis in 2012, the Security
Council has adopted three resolutions on the
situation: Resolutions 2056 (July 2012), 2071
(October 2012), and 2085 (December 2012). In
Resolution 2071, the Security Council declared its
readiness to respond to the Malian transitional
authorities’ request for an international military
force to assist the national armed forces in
recovering the occupied territories in the north.
Following the UN Secretariat’s presentation of a
“strategic concept” for resolving the crisis and a
harmonized concept of operations (CONOPs) in
compliance with Security Council Resolution 2071,
the Security Council authorized the deployment of
the proposed African-led International Support
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of
one year in Resolution 2085. The council called on
member states to contribute troops to the interna-
tional force and on regional and international
organizations to provide training, equipment, and
other logistical support.
20
Upon the request of the UN Security Council, the
ECOWAS leaders adopted a harmonized CONOPs
for the deployment of AFISMA.
21
The CONOPs was
developed by the Malian military and ECOWAS
officers and planners, with the assistance of military
experts from the AU, the United Nations, and the
European Union, as well as Algeria, Canada, France,
Germany, Mauritania, Niger, and the United States.
The regional bloc announced the availability of a
3,300 inter-African force ready to intervene as soon
as it would be authorized, with troops coming
mostly from Nigeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso, as
well as other West African countries and some non-
African states.
Despite ECOWAS’s insistence on the urgency of
the planned intervention, some observers and
countries in the Sahel and Sahara considered the
regional bloc inadequate to intervene in northern
Mali. Many of those who would contribute to a
force face their own interrelated challenges
domestically. Niger, for instance, has a similarly
marginalized Tuareg population and a history of
northern rebellions that is intertwined with Mali’s.
Likewise, both Algeria and Mauritania face an
insurgency by AQIM and initially expressed
reservations about a military intervention. Algeria’s
8
18 “Press Communiqué of the ECOWAS Mediator for Mali on the Occasion of the First Meeting Between the Transitional Government, Ansar Dine and MNLA,”
December 4, 2012, available athttp://presidence.bf/pageArticle.php?id=4084&sid=2 .
19 Xan Rice, “Mali Rebel Faction Calls for Peace Talks,” Financial Times, January 24, 2013, available at
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/62d9bf86-661f-11e2-bb67-00144feab49a.html#axzz2JVRgH1Qp .
20 UN Security Council, Resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2085.
21 ECOWAS “Final Communiqué,” Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, November 11, 2012, available at
www.ecowas.int/publications/en/communique_final/session_extra/comfinal11112012.pdf .
fears materialized in January 2013, when al-Qaida-
linked militants seized dozens of hostages at an
internationally managed gas field for four days,
leading to the deaths of thirty-nine hostages and
twenty-nine kidnappers. Though the Algerian
government indicated the attack had been planned
for more than two months, likely for ransom
motives, the kidnappers claimed their action was in
retaliation for the French intervention against
Islamist militants in northern Mali launched five
days prior and in reaction to Algeria granting
France permission to use its airspace.
Due to its military capabilities, intelligence
services, and experience battling Islamist
extremism along its lengthy border, Algeria is one
of the most important actors for any military
operation aimed at neutralizing the Islamist and
criminal groups operating in northern Mali. Before
the French intervention, any military action by
ECOWAS without Algeria’s explicit support was
deemed to carry serious risks of failure and indeed
of escalation, with Algiers possibly playing a proxy
game with any of the myriad groups active in the
region. With the need to include a reluctant Algeria
in a regional strategy, an effective response to the
Malian crisis will probably need to be found with
the inclusion of the Sahel’s “core” countries or in
conjunction with the AU. ECOWAS would
continue to support the restoration of constitu-
tional order, while the AU would handle the
situation in the north.
The AU provides a broader forum than
ECOWAS, bringing together the core countries
from the Sahel that are not ECOWAS members.
The AU can also play a key coordinating role, as it
facilitates the involvement and support of powers
further afield, like South Africa and Egypt, in a
pan-African effort. In addition, the AU serves as a
bridge between the subregional ECOWAS and the
international community. For instance, the AU
endorsed the ECOWAS CONOPs prior to its
submission to the UN Security Council. The AU
Peace and Security Council also requested that the
UN Security Council authorize the planned deploy-
ment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year.
With CONOPS, the AU also submitted a
Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in
Mali to the UN Secretary-General, which backstops
the two-pronged efforts taking place under the
auspices of ECOWAS. The strategic concept was
presented as an important step toward greater
coordination between Mali and the international
community in efforts to restore stability in Mali and
the Sahel-Sahara region as a whole.
22
One critical issue is the funding of a proposed
operation, initially estimated to cost $300–500
million. To this end, the UN Security Council
invited member states to provide financial support
and in-kind contributions to facilitate the deploy-
ment and implementation of its mandate by
AFISMA. The council also planned to consider
options for the provision of voluntary and UN-
funded logistics support packages to the mission. It
further requested the establishment of a trust fund
through which member states could provide
earmarked and non-earmarked financial support to
AFISMA, and it called for the organization of a
donor conference to solicit contributions to the
trust fund.
Organized on the margins of the AU summit in
late January 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the
donor conference concluded with pledges
amounting to $455 million. The AU itself
earmarked $40 million for both AFISMA and the
Malian Defense and Security Forces, and pledges
were made by the European Union, China,
Germany, India, Japan, Sierra Leone, and the US,
among others. Additional contributions were
promised in the form of training, equipment, and
ammunition.
23
With the number of troops raised to
5,700 by ECOWAS leaders and additional troops
pledged by Chad, Burundi, and Tanzania, the initial
mission’s budget has more than doubled and now
stands at $950 million. The AU has asked the UN
Security Council to provide AFISMA with the
necessary support package funded through
assessed contributions, to ensure its reliability and
sustainability.
24
At the EU level, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain,
and France endorsed the ECOWAS CONOPs
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 9
22 African Union, “Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali,” Addis Ababa, October 2012.
23 African Union, “Conclusions of the Donors’ Conference for the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali and the Malian Defense and Security Forces,”
Addis Ababa, January 29, 2013, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-conclusions-donors-conference-29-01-2013.pdf .
24 Remarks by Ambassador António Téte, AU permanent observer to the United Nations, to the UN Security Council debate on the report of the Secretary-General
on the situation in Mali, December 5, 2012, available at www.peaceau.org/en/article/remarks-by-ambassador-antonio-tete-au-permanent-observer-to-the-united-
nations-to-the-security-council-debate-on-the-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in-mali .
10
following its adoption. In December 2012, the EU
approved a Crisis Management Concept for a
fifteen-month military operation, which will see up
to 500 troops sent to Mali for training and reorgan-
ization of the national security and defense forces to
allow for the restoration of the country’s territorial
integrity under civilian authority. Following the
French intervention, European countries—
including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—also
committed to contribute to military efforts by
France and West African countries present in
northern Mali by offering logistical and material
support, as well as financial assistance for the
African-led intervention force being set up.
Moreover, as part of its partnership with the AU,
the EU has replenished its funding allocations for
activities supported under the African Peace
Facility to about $250 million until 2014, of which
more than $150 million have been earmarked for
peace support operations, including the operation
in Mali.
25
For AFISMA, the African Peace Facility
will cover non-military expenditures including
daily allowances and transport costs of the troops
deployed on the ground.
As of late February, close to 5,800 African troops
and nearly 4,000 French troops have been deployed
to Mali.
26
Having retaken the main cities of Gao,
Timbuktu, and Kidal, France anticipates handing
over responsibility to African forces soon. However,
the relative ease with which France, the Malian
army, and African troops retook the north after
nearly a year of occupation has caused concern that
rebels are biding time to launch an insurgency-style
conflict. Additionally, worries about human rights
compliance by various national contingents, the
unpredictability of funding, and the ability to draw
in more diverse troop contributions have all lead
some UN Security Council members, including
France, to suggest the establishment of a UN
peacekeeping force.
27
Regardless of the final composition of the new
peacekeeping force, the critical challenge remains to
create the political conditions necessary for a consol-
idated and sustainable peace. The Malian crisis is
considered by many to be the tip of an iceberg that
carries serious long-term consequences for physical
and human security in other Sahelian countries.
Long-Term Challenges in
the Sahel
The acute crisis in Mali takes place against the
backdrop of a number of long-term challenges.
While Mali presents a situation in urgent need of
attention, these long-term regional challenges
provide an environment ripe for further crisis. In
addressing the situation in Mali, the international
community runs the risk of letting these long-term
challenges fall by the wayside, to the detriment of
long-term stability, peace, and human security.
While the difficulties facing the Sahel present a
complex and intertwined set of circumstances, it is
possible to identify three dominant categories of
challenges:
• chronic underdevelopment due to a combination
of demography, environment, and weak institu-
tions;
• periodic humanitarian crises, such as the one
related to current food insecurity; and
• underlying political and security concerns, such
as terrorism and organized crime.
UNDERDEVELOPMENT
One of the core challenges facing the countries in the
Sahel region is the problem of pervasive underdevel-
opment. The eleven countries that are touched by the
Sahel are faced with a wide variety of socioeconomic
contexts. There are, however, some shared character-
istics. For instance, all of the Sahelian countries
scored in the bottom quarter of the United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development
Index (HDI) and most have done so consistently.
28
Of the bottom ten countries in the HDI, fully one-
third overlap with the Sahel. Likewise, while the
Sahelian countries have made huge strides on some
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
most have a relatively low chance of achieving their
25 African Union and European Union, “Joint Communiqué,” Eighth Meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee of the African Peace Facility, Addis Ababa,
November 28, 2012, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/au.eu.jcc.apf.28.11.2012.pdf .
26 French Ministry of Defense, “Operation Serval: Situation Update on Monday, 25 February 2013,” www.defense.gouv.fr/english/content/view/full/194802 .
27 Louis Charbonneau, “UN Security Council to Discuss Peacekeepers for Mali,” Reuters, January 30, 2013, available at
www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/us-mali-rebels-un-idUSBRE90T1GU20130131 .
28 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index 2012, available athttp://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ .
targets. In fact, of the eleven, only Ethiopia seems
likely to achieve the MDGs, with some countries like
Niger and Chad off track on all but one or two goals.
This is due in large part to failures in areas like
education and maternal and infant health, and to a
lesser extent in food security.
Examining individual indicators adds depth to
this picture. There is only one country in the Sahel
with a life expectancy of more than 60 years—
Sudan. By comparison, the global average is just
below 70 years. In fact, most Sahelian countries
have life expectancies in the low 50s, with Chad
experiencing an astonishingly low 48.9 years.
Further, the countries of the Sahel experience
maternal mortality rates two, three, and even five
times the global average due to the combination of
a low number of skilled birth attendants and a high
proportion of mothers below 18 years of age. Infant
and under-five mortality rates are more than twice
the global average in countries like Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali, and Nigeria. Between 11 and 18 of
every 100 children in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali
don’t live to see their fifth birthdays.
29
While the causes of this are complex, it is possible
to identify some of the key problems. First, weak
institutions and public service provision play a role
in these socioeconomic outcomes. For example,
access to improved sanitation and potable water are
well below the global averages of 60 percent and 86
percent respectively. In Burkina Faso, 11 percent of
the population has access to adequate sanitation; in
Chad and Niger, only 9 percent has such access. In
Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, less than half the
population has access to clean drinking water.
30
This—coupled with lack of access to doctors,
medicine, and medical facilities in many areas—has
clear implications for public health. While HIV
infection rates remain relatively low in many of the
landlocked countries of the Sahel, other diseases
like malaria and tuberculosis are prevalent.
Furthermore, weak state capacity has implica-
tions for the absence of a well-functioning
economy. Basic infrastructure, like roads and
electrical grids, lags in most countries, to the
detriment of manufacturing and trade. Weak rule
of law and sometimes rampant corruption similarly
impede broad-based economic growth in the
region. These factors, coupled with volatile political
institutions, also hinder foreign investment. The
outcome is a high level of unemployment, low
economic growth, and extreme poverty.
Second, demography poses a major challenge for
the region. The Sahel is home to some of the highest
fertility rates in the world despite, or possibly
because of, high infant and child mortality rates.
Home to 115 million people, the Sahel population is
estimated to reach 150 million by 2040.
31
Burkina
Faso, Chad, Mali, and Nigeria all have fertility rates
more than twice the global average, and Niger is the
most fertile country in the world with more than
seven births per woman.
32
As a result, a number of
countries now find themselves in the throws of a
youth bulge.
33
Every single country in the Sahel falls
in this category, and Mali has the sixth largest youth
bulge in the world behind countries like Yemen,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
34
Finally, much of the Sahel is agriculturally
marginal land under intensive subsistence cultiva-
tion. This leaves the region highly susceptible to
unpredictable rainfall shocks. When it comes to
renewable freshwater sources, Burkina Faso and
Sudan each has less than one-tenth the global per
capita average, and Niger and Mauritania have less
than 5 percent. Often, agriculture in the Sahel also
represents an inefficient use of already marginally
productive land. Cultivation is highly labor
intensive and, for a variety of reasons, there doesn’t
seem to be a corollary of the Green Revolution of
the 1960s and 1970s emerging. Few of the Sahelian
countries have major exploitable natural resources
to offset poor agricultural productivity and water
shortages. While there has been some development
in the way of oil and gas exploration, the problem of
logistics remains.
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 11
29 Ibid.
30 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, available athttp://data.worldbank.org/ .
31 Mehdi Taje, “Vulnerabilities and Factors of Insecurity in the Sahel,” Sahel and West Africa Club, August 2010, available at
www.oecd.org/swac/publications/45830109.pdf .
32 World Bank, Indicators 2012.
33 This is a condition that occurs when a disproportionate segment of the population is aged between fifteen and twenty-nine years. Extreme stress cases, where 45
percent of the adult population is in this age range, can experience a number of security and economic threats.
34 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision, April 2012, available athttp://esa.un.org/wpp/ .
FOOD SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN
CRISES
On top of the longer-term development challenge,
there are sporadic and increasingly frequent acute
humanitarian crises, such as the 2011 food crisis. In
2012, the Sahel region was confronted with the third
large-scale humanitarian crisis since 2005, a
phenomenon that has become more frequent over
the last decade. These crises are one of the main
challenges facing the region today. According to the
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, more than
18 million people in the Sahel were directly at risk of
malnutrition in 2012 due to the 2011 drought.
35
In
this context, no country in the region can do without
international emergency aid, which requires the
assistance of the states to ensure its delivery.
Sporadic rainfall, periodic drought, and volatile
food prices have left food systems in the Sahel
vulnerable to crisis. It seems the “hungry season”
that occurs between harvests is becoming longer,
leading to increases in the frequency of these crises.
In addition to these sporadic or yearly crises, there
are also high levels of chronic undernourishment.
While in Niger and Sudan one in five people is
undernourished, in Chad more than a third of the
population is chronically undernourished. Indeed,
even in “good” years, 250,000 children die of severe
acute malnutrition in the region, and in a crisis year
like 2012, 1 million children were at risk.
Complicating crisis response are the thousands of
refugees and IDPs fleeing the security crisis in Mali.
Most of these refugees and IDPs resettle in drought-
affected areas, adding more strain to the local food
situation. Insecurity in northern Mali and northern
Nigeria makes delivery of humanitarian aid
difficult, as does the shortfall of international
assistance. With an estimated need of $1.6 billion in
2012, only 54 percent was met.
POLITICS AND SECURITY
The confluence of underdevelopment and sporadic
crises has led to increasing conflicts over smaller
shares of shrinking resources. Existing ethnic
tensions are being exacerbated in, for instance,
northern Nigeria, Western Sudan, and Mali.
Additionally, many of the countries of the Sahel
face the combination of weak states and vast
stretches of sparsely inhabited territory. This makes
vital basic state functions like the provision of
security in the outer regions and border areas
especially difficult. And though many states in the
region experienced sustained periods of democratic
rule, events over the course of the last few years
have called into question the durability of their
democratic institutions. Chad, Mali, and Niger have
all experienced sporadic separatist fighting. Coups
in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali represent challenges
to democratic continuity. Challenges such as
transnational organized crime and terrorism arise
from many factors, but one of the main factors is
simply the availability of ungoverned territory and
the ease of operation.
The lens of transnational terrorism is currently
focused on the gains made by AQIM and Islamist
affiliates in northern Mali and northern Nigeria.
However, a distinction must be made between acts
that are ideologically driven and those that are
linked to longer-running nationalist grievances.
These are not mutually exclusive and are often
found occupying the same space, but they also
compete for “hearts and minds,” as we are seeing in
northern Mali at the moment. There are a variety of
factors at play that influence local-level support for
these groups: the perceived lack of state legitimacy
from a nationalist standpoint, the inability of the
state to supply basic services, and grievances over
distribution of state resources. In fact, a perceived
lack of legitimacy seems to have bolstered claims by
rebels in some contexts and helped to bring about
coups in others. In cases like the Tuareg rebellions,
a national government’s lack of legitimacy helps the
rebels, but rebels’ interactions with local popula-
tions can also decrease the rebels’ legitimacy,
opening the way for other nonstate actors (such as
AQIM) to fill the gap.
Indeed, the focus on Islamist elements may be
somewhat misplaced in light of the grip that
transnational organized crime has on the region. As
noted in reference to Mali's flourishing criminal
ecosystem above, the permeability of many
Sahelian countries makes it extremely easy to traffic
contraband including drugs, commodities, and
people. Funds from trafficking are in turn used to
finance rebels and terrorists alike.
12
35 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Situation Update: The Sahel Crisis 2012,” October 5, 2012, available at
www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/sahel/docs/SITUATION%20UPDATE%20TCE%2005%20October.pdf .
Toward a Comprehensive
Approach to the Sahel
Crisis
In response to these long-term challenges, those
interested in the region have increasingly called for
a coordinated and comprehensive framework to
address the intertwining threats to the region. This
has manifested itself most prominently in the EU
and UN, at least in part because the donor role
played by these institutions lends itself to coordina-
tion in the development and security sectors.
EUROPEAN UNION
In response to the deteriorating political, security,
humanitarian, and human rights situation in the
region, the EU adopted a comprehensive develop-
ment and security strategy for the Sahel in July
2011.
36
The strategy was prepared in partnership
with the countries concerned. It covers four lines of
action: (1) development, good governance, and
internal conflict resolution; (2) political and
diplomatic activities; (3) security and the rule of
law; and (4) the fight against violent extremism and
radicalization. The strategy is currently being
implemented in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali.
Though the EU has suspended its development
cooperation to Mali, it plans to gradually resume
development assistance soon after the adoption of
the transition roadmap. Meanwhile, humanitarian
assistance and direct aid have been reinforced to
respond to the humanitarian crisis, and the strategy
gives particular consideration to the human rights
situation.
In July 2012, the EU launched a capacity-building
mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel-Niger). The
mission is a training program that assists Nigerien
security forces to improve control of their territory
and fight terrorism and organized crime. The EU
strategy is seen as a useful tool that has facilitated
the EU’s coherence in the Sahel, as well as the
union’s careful articulation of policies under the
framework of the international Support and
Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali.
UNITED NATIONS
Called upon to play a stronger role in the larger
crisis unfolding in the Sahel, the United Nations
responded with the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 2056 in July 2012, which asked the UN
Secretary-General to develop an integrated regional
strategy for the Sahel covering security, governance,
development, human rights, and humanitarian
issues, in consultation with regional organizations
and the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA). The
integrated strategy will seek to coordinate and build
on existing initiatives developed by the United
Nations and regional and subregional organizations.
Such initiatives include efforts to fight the
expansion of cross-border threats such as drug and
arms trafficking, and other transnational criminal
activities. After ECOWAS leaders adopted a declara-
tion on the prevention of drug abuse, illicit drug
trafficking, and organized crime in the region in
December 2008, UNODC developed a regional
program for West Africa, which brings together
UNOWA, the UN Departments of Political Affairs
and Peacekeeping Operations, and the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The
West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) provides
advice, equipment, technical assistance, and special-
ized training to law-enforcement officials at national
and regional levels in West Africa, with a view to
strengthening human and institutional capacity to
combat organized crime and drug trafficking more
effectively. Primarily focusing on postconflict
countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, WACI aims to cover all
fifteen ECOWAS countries, as well as Mauritania. A
useful tool that can address transborder issues of
drug trafficking and money laundering in the Sahel
region, the program needs more attention from
member states to ensure adequate funding.
37
Transborder terrorist activities have also prompted
countries in the region to join efforts in tackling this
security threat. At the policy level, ECOWAS has
prepared a draft counterterrorism strategy and
implementation plan, which aims to give effect to
various regional, continental, and international
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 13
36 European Union External Action Service, “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,” available at www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf .
In addition to the EU, the International Organisation of La Francophonie and the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have joined international efforts
to address the multiple crises in Mali and the Sahel.
37 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “West and Central Africa,” available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/west-and-central-africa.html .
counterterrorism instruments and to provide a
common operational framework for action.
38
The
draft strategy condemns terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations including acts of kidnapping,
hijacking, hostage taking, ransom demands,
bombings, sabotage, and the desecration of religious
and cultural sacred places. However, additional
efforts are required to ensure the adoption and
effective implementation of the proposed strategy.
Under Algerian leadership, Mali, Mauritania, and
Niger have developed joint efforts to combat
terrorism and criminal networks through a joint
operational command (CEMOC) and a “fusion and
liaison unit” (UFL) set up in April 2010. Based in
Algeria, the two bodies are charged with
monitoring, coordination, and analysis of security
in the region, as well as conducting operations to
search, localize, and dismantle terrorist groups. In
Mali, which shares a 5,000-kilometer border with
Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the
previous administration’s lack of military coopera-
tion contributed to weakening counterterrorism
efforts in the region. However, critics have also
blamed Algeria for its lack of action, hindering the
fight against AQIM in the region.
39
Transnational organized crime has spread across
the Sahel-Sahara region due to weak state
structures, particularly at the local level. Thus,
beyond the hard-security approach, a comprehen-
sive solution to tackle transnational criminality in
the Sahel will need to address the challenges to
governance and the rule of law. In Niger, decentral-
ization is considered to have facilitated integration,
specifically of the Tuareg population, which consti-
tuted an important peacebuilding factor. Such
national solutions could be shared as good practices
for fostering public participation and advancing
peace and security in Mali and other countries in
the region. These solutions could also inform the
UN integrated strategy, which is currently being
prepared, and help it to address the challenge of
weak local structures in northern parts of
Mauritania, Chad, the Central African Republic,
and Cameroon, for example. Regional platforms
could be established to share lessons and experi-
ences among countries in the Sahel. This could
reinforce the countries’ capacities to address
challenges relating to local governance, political
parties, civil society participation, strengthening of
the judiciary, and dialogue and reconciliation.
To respond to pressing humanitarian demands,
UN and partner humanitarian agencies have scaled
up their programs and teams on the ground to move
from a traditional development focus to a stronger
humanitarian approach. In addition, support is
being provided to governments in the region that
have developed ambitious plans to respond to food
security and nutrition challenges, such as Niger and
Chad.
40
In April 2012, OCHA appointed a regional
humanitarian coordinator for the Sahel, David
Gressly. The regional humanitarian coordinator
works closely with the UN resident coordinators
and humanitarian coordinators at the country level
to devise and implement a strategic response to the
Sahel crisis. The regional humanitarian coordinator
also has an advocacy role to mobilize funding.
Acknowledging the need to address the underlying
causes of the recurrent crises in the Sahel through
improved coherence between the emergency
humanitarian response and longer-term develop-
ment activities, the regional humanitarian coordi-
nator and development agencies in the region have
developed a UN action plan for building resilience in
the Sahel, under the leadership of the Secretary-
General’s special representative in West Africa and in
close consultation with governments. Aimed at
breaking the cycle of chronic food insecurity,
resilience constitutes an important component of the
UN integrated strategy for the Sahel. The concept
provides an opportunity to do things differently—by
supporting the households and communities most
vulnerable to humanitarian crises so that they can
better absorb shocks and rebuild after a crisis, and by
supporting a longer-term transformation through
broader coverage of basic social services, improved
agricultural productivity, livelihood diversification,
and stronger early-warning and risk-management
systems.
41
For the action plan to succeed, govern-
14
38 ECOWAS, “ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan for Review,” press release, May 6, 2011, available athttp://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=064&lang=en&annee=2011 .
39 Serge Daniel, “Unsupportive Algeria Is a Setback for Terror Hunt,” The Gulf Today, November 27, 2011, available athttp://gulftoday.ae/portal/7290a6aa-db61-4f50-9210-ca05a7bfa5af.aspx .
40 In Niger, the government has launched an ambitious program called the 3N Initiative, Les Nigeriens nourissent les Nigeriens, or Nigerians Feeding Nigerians. In
Chad, the government has committed to raising $400 million for agriculture. IPI roundtable, “Peace and Security Threats.”
41 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Special Humanitarian Bulletin: Sahel Crisis,” Issue 4, September 19, 2012.
ments in the region will need to be firmly engaged,
UN member states will need to provide political and
financial support, and the UN itself will need to work
coherently, avoiding the “silo” approach.
Indeed, one significant challenge facing the UN
in the development of its integrated strategy for the
Sahel is the multiplicity of actors within the UN
system and their difficulty working with each other.
To finalize its Sahel integrated strategy, the UN will
need to overcome the challenge of “making the
whole bigger than the parts.” Since October 9, 2012,
this task falls under the responsibilities of Mr.
Romano Prodi from Italy, whom the Secretary-
General appointed as his special envoy for the
Sahel. Mr. Prodi’s mandate includes, among other
things, the coordination of UN systemwide efforts
to finalize and implement the proposed UN
integrated strategy for the Sahel, which is due to be
presented to the Security Council in March 2013.
The UN alone cannot provide all the support
needed in the region. Neither can it maintain the
integrated strategy as a living document on its own,
nor ensure the region’s ownership. As such,
partnership with regional and subregional organi-
zations covering the Sahel is a fundamental
component of the integrated strategy. This calls for
exchange of information on what is already being
implemented at various levels, to identify and
address the persisting gaps. It also calls for the
involvement of all the countries in the Sahel.
Beyond bringing on board ECOWAS and other
subregional organizations, such as the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), a
larger platform needs to be created to facilitate
direct exchange between people in the region—one
that is not constrained by the institutional
groupings. And beside the programmatic and
bottom-up coordination, the UN special envoy will
need to help harmonize the various mandates and
strategies of special envoys appointed by individual
countries, including France and the United
Kingdom, as well as that of the recently appointed
AU high representative for Mali and the Sahel.
Conclusion
The fact that the Sahel-Sahara region—one that for
so long has undergone slow-motion crises with
little attention—is now finding a more prominent
place on the agenda of the international community
is, on the whole, a positive development. But, the
multiplicity of actors, positions, and strategies
seeking to resolve the crises in both Mali and the
Sahel-Sahara region add new challenges to the
multidimensional nature of the cross-border
threats to peace, stability, and development in the
region. While the French intervention in Mali has
shown some initial success, responsibility for a
long-term solution to the persistent insecurity in
the country and the broader Sahel-Sahara region
ultimately lies with the governments in the region.
The divergence of views among these countries
over the most appropriate approaches demands a
step forward from the interim authorities in Mali,
whose ownership and leadership in addressing the
crisis have been acknowledged, despite their
limited legitimacy, capacity, and resources. At the
same time, because the government is highly
unlikely to succeed if it acts alone, enhanced
support and further mobilization of the interna-
tional community remain essential.
Regional powers can also play an important role
in addressing this crisis. For the leading Sahelian
countries to remain in charge of their own agenda,
they must take up their responsibilities. At the
regional level, a consensus seems to have emerged,
which advocates for a combination of national
efforts to restore constitutional order and facilitate
reconciliation while also pursuing military action
in Mali’s north to enforce peace and tackle the
growing threat of terrorism. While the ongoing
intervention has temporarily weakened the joint
criminal and Islamist threat in Mali, the military
intervention will not address the structural causes
of the conflict in the West African country, nor the
recurring crises in the Sahel and Sahara. The
Malian crisis has helped to shed light on the region’s
multifaceted challenges. However, for countries in
the region and the international community, the
challenge remains to make the quantitative and
qualitative investments that will ensure sustainable
growth, strengthen state institutions, and facilitate
broad popular participation as preconditions for
long-term peace, stability, and development.
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 15
The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,
international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more
than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United
Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the
prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by
strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve
its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing,
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doc_865498563.pdf
During the first half of 2012, military officers deposed the Malian president in
Bamako, Tuareg rebels declared the independent state of Azawad of northern
Mali, and Islamist extremists subsequently imposed sharia law in the region.
Now, nearly one year later, national, regional, and international actors have
begun crisis management in earnest. France’s armed intervention to expel
Islamist fighters from northern Mali in January 2013 and the seizure of an
Algerian gas field by Islamic militants have focused international attention on
the crisis in Mali and the broader Sahel-Sahara region and created an urgent
need for action that was previously lacking.
This issue brief examines the roots of the current crisis in Mali, which
include poor governance, a constitutional crisis, and growing criminality in
the north. It then outlines the responses to date: from the creation of new
institutions by Interim President Dioncounda Traoré and the adoption of a
roadmap for transition to the mediation process led by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international strategy
for military intervention. Ultimately, the slow response to the crisis
throughout 2012 enabled Islamist fighters in the north to consolidate their
control, boost recruitment, and prepare for a drawn-out insurgency in the case
of a future defeat.
Mali and the Sahel-Sahara:
From Crisis Management to
Sustainable Strategy
FEBRUARY 201 3
Executive Summary
During the first half of 2012, military officers deposed the Malian president in
Bamako, Tuareg rebels declared the independent state of Azawad of northern
Mali, and Islamist extremists subsequently imposed sharia law in the region.
Now, nearly one year later, national, regional, and international actors have
begun crisis management in earnest. France’s armed intervention to expel
Islamist fighters from northern Mali in January 2013 and the seizure of an
Algerian gas field by Islamic militants have focused international attention on
the crisis in Mali and the broader Sahel-Sahara region and created an urgent
need for action that was previously lacking.
This issue brief examines the roots of the current crisis in Mali, which
include poor governance, a constitutional crisis, and growing criminality in
the north. It then outlines the responses to date: from the creation of new
institutions by Interim President Dioncounda Traoré and the adoption of a
roadmap for transition to the mediation process led by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international strategy
for military intervention. Ultimately, the slow response to the crisis
throughout 2012 enabled Islamist fighters in the north to consolidate their
control, boost recruitment, and prepare for a drawn-out insurgency in the case
of a future defeat.
Despite some early victories for the French and Malian troops in January and
February this year, military intervention will not address the root causes of the
acute insecurity that the people of Mali face. Indeed, this recent crisis is only
the tip of the iceberg in Mali and in the Sahel-Sahara region as a whole. Given
persistent underdevelopment, recurring humanitarian crises, and entrenched
terrorist and organized criminal networks in the region, short-term crisis
management is unlikely to be sufficient. A more comprehensive approach is
needed—one that addresses the structural causes of the conflict in Mali,
accounts for the multidimensional nature of the cross-border threats in the
region, and invests in the institutions and popular participation needed for
long-term peace, stability, and development.
The integrated regional strategy currently being developed for the Sahel by
the United Nations is a step in the right direction in this regard. Nonetheless,
amid a multiplicity of actors and strategies seeking to resolve the current crisis,
the governments in the region must ultimately take responsibility for a long-
term and coherent response. While the interim authorities in Mali need to lead
the way in their own country, the international community’s support remains
essential and regional powers also have a significant role to play.
This issue brief was drafted by
Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie, Research
Fellow at the International Peace
Institute (IPI), and Chris Perry,
Senior Policy Analyst at IPI. It
analyzes the recent crisis in Mali and
the Sahel-Sahara region, exploring
the roots of the current conflict and
responses from national, regional,
and international actors to date. It
then turns to the long-term
challenges that the region faces
before outlining paths toward a
more comprehensive approach to
achieving peace, stability, and
development in the region.
In addition to desk research, the
brief draws from a roundtable
discussion held at IPI on September
7, 2012, entitled “Peace and Security
Threats in the Sahel-Sahara Region:
Assessing the Response, Devising
the Way Forward,” organized in
conjunction with the African Union
and the Permanent Mission of
Luxembourg to the United Nations.
The views expressed in this publica-
tion represent those of the authors
and not necessarily those of IPI. IPI
welcomes consideration of a wide
range of perspectives in the pursuit
of a well informed debate on critical
policies and issues in international
affairs.
IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its
many donors for their generous
support. In particular, IPI would like
to thank the Permanent Mission of
Luxembourg to the United Nations
for making this publication possible.
2
Introduction
The political and security crisis that erupted in Mali
in 2012 captured the world’s attention. In January,
the national army engaged in fierce clashes with the
opposition National Movement for the Liberation
of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg rebel movement
formed in November in the north of the country. In
March, a military coup overthrew then president
Amadou Toumani Touré in the south, and by April,
rebels had proclaimed an independent state of
Azawad. The sudden southward push of Islamist
groups at the close of 2012 led to France’s military
intervention in January 2013 and an acceleration of
peacemaking efforts.
While facts on the ground seem to change daily,
the underlying factors that threaten peace and
human security in the Sahel region are not new.
This narrow, semi-arid band that crosses the
continent below the Sahara desert and above the
southern savannas from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Red Sea has long faced an array of interlinked
environmental, developmental, security, and
governance challenges. These factors, combined
with a population comprised of a mix of sedentary
and nomadic people scattered over a vast area of
ungoverned spaces, have created what has been
described as “a volatile cocktail of underdevelop-
ment and insecurity.”
1
Long-term socioeconomic challenges in the Sahel
include rapid population growth, endemic
underdevelopment, and persistent poverty coupled
with poor social service delivery and low levels of
education. Harsh environmental conditions like
sporadic rainfall, periodic drought and flooding,
unpredictable local harvests, and resulting high
food prices worsen the situation. Indeed, once
periodic food crises have now morphed into near-
yearly occurrences with severe humanitarian
consequences. In 2012, the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) estimated that more than 16 million
people were at risk of severe food insecurity, of
which 1 million children were at risk of dying of
severe acute malnutrition.
2
The region is further destabilized by political and
security challenges caused by weak governance and
security structures, radical Islamism, and
religiously driven violence—all exacerbated by the
consequences of the 2011 Libyan crisis and growing
transnational criminality. According to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM),
more than 200,000 registered returnees had crossed
the Libyan borders into Niger, Chad, Mali, and
Mauritania by the end of 2011.
3
Governments in the
affected countries estimate that there may have
been up to 400,000 registered and unregistered
returnees. Included in this mix were economic
migrants as well as armed Tuareg and Toubou ex-
combatants.
Before the fall of Libyan leader Muammar
Gaddafi in October 2011, an estimated 7 to 10
million small arms and light weapons were already
traded in West Africa, rendering countries in the
region prone to instability.
4
More recent evidence
has shown the presence of man-portable air-
defense systems (MANPADS), explosives like
Semtex, and vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft artillery.
These successive flows of arms have plagued the
Sahel with general insecurity, manifested in hijacks
and hostage taking, attacks on civilians, and human
rights abuses conducted by armed and Islamist
groups involved in drug, arms, fuel, and human
trafficking.
In Mali, prior to the French military intervention,
the crisis had already forced about 204,000 people
to leave their homes and become internally
displaced persons, while more than 208,000 others
had sought refuge in neighboring Algeria, Burkina
Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, and Guinea.
5
These
figures have increased since the offensive against
Islamist groups in northern Mali, producing a dire
humanitarian situation and weakening an already
fragile state.
1 Luis Simon, Alexander Mattelaer, and Amelia Hadfield, “A Coherent EU Strategy for the Sahel,” European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies, EU
Doc. EXPO/B/DEVE/FWC/2009-01/Lot5/23, May 2011, p. 19.
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “New Crisis in the Sahel Region,” available at
www.fao.org/crisis/sahel/the-sahel-crisis/2012-crisis-in-the-sahel-region/en/ .
3 UN Security Council, Report of the Joint African Union and United Nations Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region, UN Doc.
S/2012/42, January 17, 2012.
4 Adedeji Ebo and Laura Mazal, “Small Arms Control in West Africa,” West Africa Series No. 1, London: International Alert, 2003.
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Mali Situation Update No. 12,” November 1, 2012, available athttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/50a35d509.pdf .
Because of these factors, the United Nations
Security Council considers the conflict in northern
Mali a threat to international peace and security.
However, the response by regional and interna-
tional bodies has been mixed. An African
Union–United Nations interagency assessment
mission in December 2011 was followed by a report
in early 2012. The report recommended, among
other measures, that the UN “strengthen its security
capacity and presence on the ground [and] develop
integrated programs to fight drug trafficking and
organized crime.” It also suggested that the world
body help develop “an overarching mechanism or
framework” for countries in the region to address
the underlying issues at stake.
6
In addition to
African Union (AU) and UN efforts, national
actors, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), and the European Union (EU)
have also attempted to address the situation in Mali.
Yet, nearly all of this attention has been focused
on the short-term crisis in Mali, with little room for
discussion of the longer-term implications for both
governance and human security. Regardless, the
current multiplicity of actors and response strate-
gies in the crises in both the Sahel and Mali necessi-
tate enhanced coordination and the harmonization
of military and non-military options alike. This
report seeks to bridge this gap. We begin by
examining the current crisis in Mali in detail. We
then pivot to overarching regional concerns that
tend to be lost in crisis-management considera-
tions. Ideally, these two views can be synthesized
toward a comprehensive approach to the region
that deals with acute crises as they arise while
maintaining focus on the long-term challenges to
human security.
The Roots of the Crisis in
Mali
Mali represents an acute combination of the
challenges of poor governance, constitutional crisis,
armed rebellion, and growing criminality,
especially drug trafficking and illicit flows of small
arms and light weapons.
7
These factors in turn led
to Mali’s “twin crises”: a fragile interim government
after a March 2012 military coup and an occupation
by Islamist groups in the north that sought to
impose their strict application of sharia law.
Following the establishment of a multiparty
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 3
6 See note 3.
7 Kwesi Aning and Sarjoh Bah, “ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats,” New York: Center on International Cooperation,
September 2009.
4
democracy two decades ago, Mali was—until
recently—considered a peaceful and stable country.
Regular elections were declared generally free and
fair. Despite socioeconomic challenges, Mali
achieved notable milestones: political space for
freedom of expression with numerous political
parties and civil society organizations; improved
institutions that seemed to strengthen the fledgling
democracy; economic development that witnessed
the emergence of a new generation of entrepre-
neurs; and a flourishing tourist industry that
attracted foreign investment.
8
However, this
democratic and economic growth was interrupted
by the March 2012 military coup that overthrew the
president, Amadou Toumani Touré.
The coup took place only weeks before the
presidential election scheduled for April 29
th
—an
election in which the incumbent had already
announced he would not participate, in order to
cede power peacefully. In reality, many saw
democracy as merely a cover for a corrupt system,
and the coup received little condemnation from
local groups. A poll conducted one month after the
putsch showed that about two-thirds of Bamako
residents supported the junta and its leader, the US-
trained army captain Amadou Sanogo.
9
The junta,
which called itself the National Committee for the
Recovery of Democracy and the Restoration of the
State (CNRDRE), justified its action by citing
public disappointment with a corrupt and weak
government, especially with regard to the
president’s handling of the decades-long recurring
Tuareg rebellion, the most recent manifestation of
which began in January 2012.
Soon after the military coup, and encouraged by
the political vacuum in Bamako, the MNLA took
control of northern Mali. The Tuareg rebel group
proclaimed the independence of Azawad, an area
that forms about 60 percent of Mali's territory and
comprises the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao.
Northern Mali had gone through several rebellions
soon after the country’s independence in 1960. The
most recent northern rebellion ended with the 2006
Algiers Accord brokered by Algeria. This
agreement stipulated the reintegration of Tuareg
rebels into the Malian army and the reduction of
troops in the north. Unfortunately the agreement
was never fully implemented, which is considered
to have made the situation worse and to have
fuelled Tuareg grievances. The January 2012
situation, however, was different in that there was a
strong Islamist current running through the
traditionally nationalist northern rebel groups.
Groups like Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith) had
ties to ideologically motivated external groups such
as Algeria-based al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). Added to that was the proliferation of
heavy weapons after the downfall of Libyan leader
Qaddafi, making for a volatile situation.
10
After a series of successful military victories by
the rebels early in the year, the secular MNLA was
quickly sidelined by local and external Islamist
groups. This was due at least in part to the MNLA’s
lack of legitimacy vis-à-vis local populations. By
mid-July, all major northern towns were under
Islamist control and in the process of implementing
a strict interpretation of sharia law. Serious human
rights violations were reported, with cases of
arbitrary arrests, torture, public flogging and
amputations, sexual and gender-based violence,
summary executions, and the use children in
armed groups. Ansar Dine also destroyed a number
of ancient holy sites in Timbuktu, some of which
were listed as United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
World Heritage Sites.
In addition to Ansar Dine and AQIM (which is
also active in northeastern Mauritania, Niger,
northern Nigeria, and southwestern Algeria
11
), a
third Islamist group operating in northern Mali is
the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO), an offshoot of AQIM. The recruitment
of militants from neighboring countries like Libya,
Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia and the likely
existence of dormant Islamist cells in the region
have helped to internationalize the crisis, as has the
alleged presence of Boko Haram. Since launching
sectarian violence in 2009 in northern Nigeria,
Boko Haram has carried out terrorist attacks and
killed hundreds of people, posing a growing threat
8 Bruce Whitehouse, “What went wrong in Mali?,” London Review of Books 34, No. 16 (August 30, 2012): 17.
9 Ibid.
10 See note 3.
11 Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Sahel Working Group: Co-Chair’s Summary,” Algiers, November 16-17, 2011, available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/184042.pdf .
to Nigerian national security. These developments
have helped to highlight the emergence of terrorism
as a serious threat in the West African Sahel-Sahara
region, which needs to be taken into account when
addressing insecurity in Mali and the region.
Adding to growing security threats in Mali is a
flourishing criminal ecosystem, which at times
earns the tacit support, and even participation, of
Islamist groups. Weak security structures, limited
state control over territory, and the previous
administration’s rampant corruption and collusion
with criminal networks facilitated the development
of an underground economy based on a range of
licit and illicit goods. Exploiting largely porous
national borders and building on old social and
commercial networks established by nomadic
families and communities across the Sahel-Sahara
region, armed groups utilize trade routes from the
old salt caravans to move various supplies including
food, petrol, cigarettes, arms, and cocaine.
12
In fact, West Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region
have become major transit hubs for the cocaine
trade from South America to Europe and beyond.
13
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) estimates that since 2006, twenty to
forty tons of cocaine per year have been trafficked
through West Africa to Europe.
14
This amounts to a
minimum value of about $1 billion per year.
15
In
Mali, MUJAO in particular was identified as being
involved in illegal activities and using religion only
as a cover for drug and cigarette trafficking. Other
criminal activities that generate cash flows include
human trafficking (in particular, trafficking of
migrants trying to reach Europe through the
desert) and hostage taking and the payment of
ransoms. These large flows of foreign currencies,
especially euros, illustrate the growing economic
power of Islamist and criminal groups across the
Sahel-Sahara region.
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising
that a coup, an attempted secession, and an Islamist
insurgency would derail Mali’s budding democracy.
However, largely due to the complicated and
multifaceted nature of the crisis, the international
community was slow to respond.
Crisis Management by
National Actors
Much as there was opposition to what the public
largely perceived as the creation of a “fictitious,”
self-proclaimed state of Azawad, Malians repeat-
edly denied predictions that their country would
turn into a new Afghanistan or another Somalia.
Malians and regional observers instead expressed
concern that, though the issue could reach the
international stage, little in the way of a concrete
solution or plan would be offered. Until France’s
military action to stop the Islamist push toward
Bamako in January 2013, the slow response to the
crisis seemed to give the northern Islamists time to
consolidate their control and recruitment efforts,
and to prepare for a drawn-out insurgency in the
case of future defeat. It also delayed much needed
local capacity-building activities and impeded
humanitarian and development efforts to address
longer-term issues.
In July 2012, Interim President Dioncounda
Traoré announced the creation of new institutions,
including a “High Council of State” and a “National
Committee on Negotiations.” These new institu-
tions are expected to foster dialogue among the
national stakeholders in the transition and with
rebel groups in the north, with a view to seeking a
negotiated solution to the crisis. While these
institutions have yet to be fully implemented,
efforts are underway to bring the major players
together. For instance, a transition roadmap was
endorsed by the Malian parliament in late January
2013, after its adoption by the government. The
roadmap is expected to fully restore constitutional
order and national unity by initiating an inclusive
dialogue, preparing for the re-establishment of the
authority of the state in the north, restructuring the
army under civilian control, and organizing a
democratic and credible electoral process.
Elections are an important element in consoli-
dating state authority in Bamako and across the
country and will formalize the return to constitu-
tional order. Initially anticipated by April 2013, the
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 5
12 Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012.
13 See, for example, James Cockayne and Phil Williams, “The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa,”
New York: International Peace Institute, October 2009.
14 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Regional Programme for West Africa 2010–2014,” New York: United Nations, 2010.
15 Ibid.
post-coup elections are now scheduled to take place
in July, and the government has reaffirmed
budgetary plans for holding elections this year. The
issue of the participation of members of the interim
government in the next elections was discussed
prior to former prime minister Cheick Modibo
Diarra’s forced resignation in December 2012,
when soldiers arrested him, acting under orders
from Captain Amadou Sanogo. Shortly thereafter,
the prime minister announced his government’s
resignation. Despite an ECOWAS decision in July
2012 that rendered members of the transitional
government ineligible to contest the 2013 election,
former prime minister Diarra had announced his
intention to run for president. This had raised
significant questions about his participation in the
interim government and risked jeopardizing the
transition process.
Reconciliation among Malians, both civilians and
those in the military, is another critical step in
moving forward. In the north, where the secular
Tuareg have called for better integration, the
government claims to have implemented affirma-
tive-action and decentralization policies. These
were supposed to have facilitated the participation
of all ethnic groups in the development of their
communities. Nevertheless, the need to address the
long-standing “Tuareg question” remains crucial.
Genuine grievances associated with sociopolitical
marginalization and the failure to implement
successive peace agreements must be dealt with.
Moreover, with the military intervention in the
north and reports emerging of looting and reprisal
attacks by Malian troops and civilians against
Tuareg and Arab communities in the freed cities of
northern Mali, further reconciliation efforts will be
needed.
At the same time, all the communities in the
north continue to be affected by the weak state
structures, poor governance, and organized crime
that existed pre-crisis. These issues need to be
addressed, not only by negotiating with Tuareg
rebels but also in the context of the society at large.
Such reconciliation efforts could also involve the
various civil society groups that have emerged to fill
the void left by the absence of state authority—
including sedentary populations in the north, who
fear exclusion from future negotiations between the
government and the rebels.
Within the army, two key factors contributed to
the military’s failure to counter the Tuareg rebellion
in the north: division and corruption. The signifi-
cant division in the security sector is between the
“red berets,” who support former president
Amadou Toumani Touré and led the military coup
against former president Moussa Traoré in 1992,
and the “green berets,” who orchestrated the March
22
nd
military coup that overthrew then president
Touré. Tension between the two factions further
increased following a failed counter-coup led by the
red-beret paratroopers in April 2012. This left some
twenty people dead, and was followed by a series of
arbitrary arrests, allegations of torture, and regular
clashes between the red berets (and their families)
and the green-beret unit. Likewise, years of corrup-
tion and negligence left the soldiers in the north
weakened by poor training, inadequate equipment,
and low morale.
In the long term, reconciling the divided military
and comprehensively restructuring the army will be
critical to stability. To this end, a military
committee for monitoring and reforming the
defense forces was established in July 2012. Chaired
by ex-junta leader Captain Sanogo, the committee
is charged with preparing a reform program for the
defense and security forces, as well as training
troops and supervising military operations. The
choice of Captain Sanogo to lead national efforts on
security-sector reconciliation can be justified by
political considerations. However, it also raises
questions about the continuing ascendancy of the
military over a weak government and the likelihood
that the army will submit to the civilian authority.
Regional and International
Efforts to Address the Crisis
Regional and international conflict-management
efforts in Mali have followed a two-pronged
approach. The first, and most preferable, is an
ongoing political process to find a negotiated
solution to both the constitutional crisis and the
conflict in the north. Even in light of the recent
military intervention, this process remains
necessary for devising a comprehensive and
sustainable solution to the conflict. The second
prong initially coalesced around plans for a possible
military intervention to neutralize the armed
groups should the first prong falter. The military
option was obviously accelerated (and somewhat
6
supplanted) by the French intervention. It is
important to remember, however, that political
negotiations initiated before the intervention are
ongoing and remain an important and necessary
component for sustainable peace. Likewise,
military preparations that had begun before the
French intervention will play a crucial role as
France seeks to disengage now that the rebels have
been pushed out of the major towns of the north, at
least for the time being.
THE ECOWAS MEDIATION PROCESS
For eight months after the March 2012 military
coup in Mali, regional political efforts to address
the crisis proceeded along two parallel negotiation
tracks led by the ECOWAS-appointed mediator,
President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. First,
negotiations with the coup authors sought to facili-
tate the restoration of constitutional order and
complete the transition process; second, negotia-
tions with actors in the north aimed to address the
crisis there.
Just days after the military coup, ECOWAS
leaders suspended Mali from the regional bloc and
imposed legal, economic, and diplomatic sanctions
on the country. These were followed by additional
AU sanctions imposed against the leaders of the
military junta and all those involved in attempts to
destabilize Mali. Pressure from ECOWAS and the
international community quickly led to the signing
of a framework agreement in early April, which
enjoined the military junta to restore constitutional
order by handing power over to the speaker of the
National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré.
16
However,
suspicions about the continuing interference of the
junta, an attack on the interim president by a
violent mob, and the prime minister’s close links to
the junta leader contributed to weakening the first
post-coup government.
Following further ECOWAS pressure, the interim
government was expanded in August 2012 to
mobilize broader political forces and civil society.
Though radical Islamists in the north were
sidelined, the new cabinet included a minister of
religious affairs—an attempt to account for the rise
of Islam in a traditionally secular society. Five
ministers close to the military junta kept their
posts, as did the then contested prime minister
Modibo Diarra. Despite his initial lack of experi-
ence, the prime minister retained power principally
due to his perceived legitimacy, derived from his
familial legacy. However, the ex-junta leader later
deposed him, and Diango Cissoko was appointed as
the new prime minister in December 2012.
Having facilitated the restoration of constitu-
tional order with the appointment of an interim
government, the mediation role entrusted to
President Compaoré seemed to temporarily lose
momentum with regard to the situation in the
north. Some Malians, particularly those concerned
about regional leaders’ interests, criticized the
process. For the interim government, negotiation
was only possible with the Tuareg rebels on the
basis of respect for Mali’s territorial integrity.
Initially, only the MNLA was recognized as a rebel
group, while AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO were
considered criminal factions. The question of a
specific part of the territory that would be consid-
ered as Tuareg was also omitted, on the grounds
that northern Mali is home to other non-Tuareg
ethnicities.
It had been suggested that serious negotiations
were not possible as long as the Malian government
was unable to exert pressure on the various armed
groups.
17
Nonetheless, the ECOWAS mediator, the
UN Office for West Africa, and Special
Representative of the Secretary-General in West
Africa Said Djinnit began talks with secular MNLA
and the Islamist Ansar Dine in November 2012,
with the support of Algeria and Mauritania. The
two groups were encouraged to disassociate
themselves from terrorists and engage in negotia-
tions with the transitional authorities. Ansar Dine
in turn announced its rejection of terrorism and
organized crime, and its readiness to join the
political dialogue. These efforts led to direct talks
between MNLA, Ansar Dine, and the transitional
government: a preliminary meeting took place in
early December in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
which brought representatives from the three
parties together for the first time.
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 7
16 See, for example, “Statement by H.E. Alassane Ouattara, Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on the Positive Development of
the Political Situation in Mali,” April 6, 2012, available athttp://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=101&lang=en&annee=2012 .
17 Participant remarks during the roundtable discussion “Peace and Security Threats in the Sahel-Sahara Region: Assessing the Response, Devising the Way Forward,”
held at the International Peace Institute in New York on September 7, 2012.
The Malian government, the MNLA, and Ansar
Dine recognized the need to establish an inter-
Malian dialogue framework, involving representa-
tives from the various communities in the north. In
preparation for this dialogue, the parties committed
to ending hostilities, avoiding all forms of abuses
and violence against civilians, facilitating the return
of refugees and internally displaced persons, and
establishing a secure environment devoid of
terrorism and transnational organized crime.
18
Far
from gaining the agreement of all Malian actors,
these initial talks broke down in early January 2013,
after Ansar Dine called off a ceasefire and launched
an attack on the central town of Konna on January
10th. The new split within Ansar Dine between
moderates seeking a political solution and radicals
with strong links to al-Qaida made prospects for a
political resolution look dim. This is especially true
in light of the ongoing military offensive.
Negotiators will now likely need to focus on the
newly formed Islamic Movement for Azawad, which
called for negotiations and asked for autonomy
rather than independence for northern Mali.
19
MILITARY INTERVENTION
In parallel to the ECOWAS negotiation track, a
military strategy was devised. This track, cautiously
agreed on by multiple actors, threatened the
possible deployment of an ECOWAS-led interna-
tional force to resolve the situation in the north if
the rebels did not cede power peacefully. The plan
was soon superseded, however, when the sudden
southward move by Islamists toward Bamako and
the strategic Sévaré military airport precipitated
France’s swift decision to respond to Interim
President Traoré’s call for military assistance.
With the understanding that a peaceful solution
was the ideal and that the use of force should
remain the last resort for dealing with terrorist
groups that are excluded from the political process,
the UN Security Council provided the legal
framework for the planned intervention. Since the
beginning of the Malian crisis in 2012, the Security
Council has adopted three resolutions on the
situation: Resolutions 2056 (July 2012), 2071
(October 2012), and 2085 (December 2012). In
Resolution 2071, the Security Council declared its
readiness to respond to the Malian transitional
authorities’ request for an international military
force to assist the national armed forces in
recovering the occupied territories in the north.
Following the UN Secretariat’s presentation of a
“strategic concept” for resolving the crisis and a
harmonized concept of operations (CONOPs) in
compliance with Security Council Resolution 2071,
the Security Council authorized the deployment of
the proposed African-led International Support
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of
one year in Resolution 2085. The council called on
member states to contribute troops to the interna-
tional force and on regional and international
organizations to provide training, equipment, and
other logistical support.
20
Upon the request of the UN Security Council, the
ECOWAS leaders adopted a harmonized CONOPs
for the deployment of AFISMA.
21
The CONOPs was
developed by the Malian military and ECOWAS
officers and planners, with the assistance of military
experts from the AU, the United Nations, and the
European Union, as well as Algeria, Canada, France,
Germany, Mauritania, Niger, and the United States.
The regional bloc announced the availability of a
3,300 inter-African force ready to intervene as soon
as it would be authorized, with troops coming
mostly from Nigeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso, as
well as other West African countries and some non-
African states.
Despite ECOWAS’s insistence on the urgency of
the planned intervention, some observers and
countries in the Sahel and Sahara considered the
regional bloc inadequate to intervene in northern
Mali. Many of those who would contribute to a
force face their own interrelated challenges
domestically. Niger, for instance, has a similarly
marginalized Tuareg population and a history of
northern rebellions that is intertwined with Mali’s.
Likewise, both Algeria and Mauritania face an
insurgency by AQIM and initially expressed
reservations about a military intervention. Algeria’s
8
18 “Press Communiqué of the ECOWAS Mediator for Mali on the Occasion of the First Meeting Between the Transitional Government, Ansar Dine and MNLA,”
December 4, 2012, available athttp://presidence.bf/pageArticle.php?id=4084&sid=2 .
19 Xan Rice, “Mali Rebel Faction Calls for Peace Talks,” Financial Times, January 24, 2013, available at
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/62d9bf86-661f-11e2-bb67-00144feab49a.html#axzz2JVRgH1Qp .
20 UN Security Council, Resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2085.
21 ECOWAS “Final Communiqué,” Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, November 11, 2012, available at
www.ecowas.int/publications/en/communique_final/session_extra/comfinal11112012.pdf .
fears materialized in January 2013, when al-Qaida-
linked militants seized dozens of hostages at an
internationally managed gas field for four days,
leading to the deaths of thirty-nine hostages and
twenty-nine kidnappers. Though the Algerian
government indicated the attack had been planned
for more than two months, likely for ransom
motives, the kidnappers claimed their action was in
retaliation for the French intervention against
Islamist militants in northern Mali launched five
days prior and in reaction to Algeria granting
France permission to use its airspace.
Due to its military capabilities, intelligence
services, and experience battling Islamist
extremism along its lengthy border, Algeria is one
of the most important actors for any military
operation aimed at neutralizing the Islamist and
criminal groups operating in northern Mali. Before
the French intervention, any military action by
ECOWAS without Algeria’s explicit support was
deemed to carry serious risks of failure and indeed
of escalation, with Algiers possibly playing a proxy
game with any of the myriad groups active in the
region. With the need to include a reluctant Algeria
in a regional strategy, an effective response to the
Malian crisis will probably need to be found with
the inclusion of the Sahel’s “core” countries or in
conjunction with the AU. ECOWAS would
continue to support the restoration of constitu-
tional order, while the AU would handle the
situation in the north.
The AU provides a broader forum than
ECOWAS, bringing together the core countries
from the Sahel that are not ECOWAS members.
The AU can also play a key coordinating role, as it
facilitates the involvement and support of powers
further afield, like South Africa and Egypt, in a
pan-African effort. In addition, the AU serves as a
bridge between the subregional ECOWAS and the
international community. For instance, the AU
endorsed the ECOWAS CONOPs prior to its
submission to the UN Security Council. The AU
Peace and Security Council also requested that the
UN Security Council authorize the planned deploy-
ment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year.
With CONOPS, the AU also submitted a
Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in
Mali to the UN Secretary-General, which backstops
the two-pronged efforts taking place under the
auspices of ECOWAS. The strategic concept was
presented as an important step toward greater
coordination between Mali and the international
community in efforts to restore stability in Mali and
the Sahel-Sahara region as a whole.
22
One critical issue is the funding of a proposed
operation, initially estimated to cost $300–500
million. To this end, the UN Security Council
invited member states to provide financial support
and in-kind contributions to facilitate the deploy-
ment and implementation of its mandate by
AFISMA. The council also planned to consider
options for the provision of voluntary and UN-
funded logistics support packages to the mission. It
further requested the establishment of a trust fund
through which member states could provide
earmarked and non-earmarked financial support to
AFISMA, and it called for the organization of a
donor conference to solicit contributions to the
trust fund.
Organized on the margins of the AU summit in
late January 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the
donor conference concluded with pledges
amounting to $455 million. The AU itself
earmarked $40 million for both AFISMA and the
Malian Defense and Security Forces, and pledges
were made by the European Union, China,
Germany, India, Japan, Sierra Leone, and the US,
among others. Additional contributions were
promised in the form of training, equipment, and
ammunition.
23
With the number of troops raised to
5,700 by ECOWAS leaders and additional troops
pledged by Chad, Burundi, and Tanzania, the initial
mission’s budget has more than doubled and now
stands at $950 million. The AU has asked the UN
Security Council to provide AFISMA with the
necessary support package funded through
assessed contributions, to ensure its reliability and
sustainability.
24
At the EU level, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain,
and France endorsed the ECOWAS CONOPs
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 9
22 African Union, “Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali,” Addis Ababa, October 2012.
23 African Union, “Conclusions of the Donors’ Conference for the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali and the Malian Defense and Security Forces,”
Addis Ababa, January 29, 2013, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-conclusions-donors-conference-29-01-2013.pdf .
24 Remarks by Ambassador António Téte, AU permanent observer to the United Nations, to the UN Security Council debate on the report of the Secretary-General
on the situation in Mali, December 5, 2012, available at www.peaceau.org/en/article/remarks-by-ambassador-antonio-tete-au-permanent-observer-to-the-united-
nations-to-the-security-council-debate-on-the-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in-mali .
10
following its adoption. In December 2012, the EU
approved a Crisis Management Concept for a
fifteen-month military operation, which will see up
to 500 troops sent to Mali for training and reorgan-
ization of the national security and defense forces to
allow for the restoration of the country’s territorial
integrity under civilian authority. Following the
French intervention, European countries—
including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—also
committed to contribute to military efforts by
France and West African countries present in
northern Mali by offering logistical and material
support, as well as financial assistance for the
African-led intervention force being set up.
Moreover, as part of its partnership with the AU,
the EU has replenished its funding allocations for
activities supported under the African Peace
Facility to about $250 million until 2014, of which
more than $150 million have been earmarked for
peace support operations, including the operation
in Mali.
25
For AFISMA, the African Peace Facility
will cover non-military expenditures including
daily allowances and transport costs of the troops
deployed on the ground.
As of late February, close to 5,800 African troops
and nearly 4,000 French troops have been deployed
to Mali.
26
Having retaken the main cities of Gao,
Timbuktu, and Kidal, France anticipates handing
over responsibility to African forces soon. However,
the relative ease with which France, the Malian
army, and African troops retook the north after
nearly a year of occupation has caused concern that
rebels are biding time to launch an insurgency-style
conflict. Additionally, worries about human rights
compliance by various national contingents, the
unpredictability of funding, and the ability to draw
in more diverse troop contributions have all lead
some UN Security Council members, including
France, to suggest the establishment of a UN
peacekeeping force.
27
Regardless of the final composition of the new
peacekeeping force, the critical challenge remains to
create the political conditions necessary for a consol-
idated and sustainable peace. The Malian crisis is
considered by many to be the tip of an iceberg that
carries serious long-term consequences for physical
and human security in other Sahelian countries.
Long-Term Challenges in
the Sahel
The acute crisis in Mali takes place against the
backdrop of a number of long-term challenges.
While Mali presents a situation in urgent need of
attention, these long-term regional challenges
provide an environment ripe for further crisis. In
addressing the situation in Mali, the international
community runs the risk of letting these long-term
challenges fall by the wayside, to the detriment of
long-term stability, peace, and human security.
While the difficulties facing the Sahel present a
complex and intertwined set of circumstances, it is
possible to identify three dominant categories of
challenges:
• chronic underdevelopment due to a combination
of demography, environment, and weak institu-
tions;
• periodic humanitarian crises, such as the one
related to current food insecurity; and
• underlying political and security concerns, such
as terrorism and organized crime.
UNDERDEVELOPMENT
One of the core challenges facing the countries in the
Sahel region is the problem of pervasive underdevel-
opment. The eleven countries that are touched by the
Sahel are faced with a wide variety of socioeconomic
contexts. There are, however, some shared character-
istics. For instance, all of the Sahelian countries
scored in the bottom quarter of the United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development
Index (HDI) and most have done so consistently.
28
Of the bottom ten countries in the HDI, fully one-
third overlap with the Sahel. Likewise, while the
Sahelian countries have made huge strides on some
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
most have a relatively low chance of achieving their
25 African Union and European Union, “Joint Communiqué,” Eighth Meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee of the African Peace Facility, Addis Ababa,
November 28, 2012, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/au.eu.jcc.apf.28.11.2012.pdf .
26 French Ministry of Defense, “Operation Serval: Situation Update on Monday, 25 February 2013,” www.defense.gouv.fr/english/content/view/full/194802 .
27 Louis Charbonneau, “UN Security Council to Discuss Peacekeepers for Mali,” Reuters, January 30, 2013, available at
www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/us-mali-rebels-un-idUSBRE90T1GU20130131 .
28 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index 2012, available athttp://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ .
targets. In fact, of the eleven, only Ethiopia seems
likely to achieve the MDGs, with some countries like
Niger and Chad off track on all but one or two goals.
This is due in large part to failures in areas like
education and maternal and infant health, and to a
lesser extent in food security.
Examining individual indicators adds depth to
this picture. There is only one country in the Sahel
with a life expectancy of more than 60 years—
Sudan. By comparison, the global average is just
below 70 years. In fact, most Sahelian countries
have life expectancies in the low 50s, with Chad
experiencing an astonishingly low 48.9 years.
Further, the countries of the Sahel experience
maternal mortality rates two, three, and even five
times the global average due to the combination of
a low number of skilled birth attendants and a high
proportion of mothers below 18 years of age. Infant
and under-five mortality rates are more than twice
the global average in countries like Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali, and Nigeria. Between 11 and 18 of
every 100 children in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali
don’t live to see their fifth birthdays.
29
While the causes of this are complex, it is possible
to identify some of the key problems. First, weak
institutions and public service provision play a role
in these socioeconomic outcomes. For example,
access to improved sanitation and potable water are
well below the global averages of 60 percent and 86
percent respectively. In Burkina Faso, 11 percent of
the population has access to adequate sanitation; in
Chad and Niger, only 9 percent has such access. In
Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, less than half the
population has access to clean drinking water.
30
This—coupled with lack of access to doctors,
medicine, and medical facilities in many areas—has
clear implications for public health. While HIV
infection rates remain relatively low in many of the
landlocked countries of the Sahel, other diseases
like malaria and tuberculosis are prevalent.
Furthermore, weak state capacity has implica-
tions for the absence of a well-functioning
economy. Basic infrastructure, like roads and
electrical grids, lags in most countries, to the
detriment of manufacturing and trade. Weak rule
of law and sometimes rampant corruption similarly
impede broad-based economic growth in the
region. These factors, coupled with volatile political
institutions, also hinder foreign investment. The
outcome is a high level of unemployment, low
economic growth, and extreme poverty.
Second, demography poses a major challenge for
the region. The Sahel is home to some of the highest
fertility rates in the world despite, or possibly
because of, high infant and child mortality rates.
Home to 115 million people, the Sahel population is
estimated to reach 150 million by 2040.
31
Burkina
Faso, Chad, Mali, and Nigeria all have fertility rates
more than twice the global average, and Niger is the
most fertile country in the world with more than
seven births per woman.
32
As a result, a number of
countries now find themselves in the throws of a
youth bulge.
33
Every single country in the Sahel falls
in this category, and Mali has the sixth largest youth
bulge in the world behind countries like Yemen,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
34
Finally, much of the Sahel is agriculturally
marginal land under intensive subsistence cultiva-
tion. This leaves the region highly susceptible to
unpredictable rainfall shocks. When it comes to
renewable freshwater sources, Burkina Faso and
Sudan each has less than one-tenth the global per
capita average, and Niger and Mauritania have less
than 5 percent. Often, agriculture in the Sahel also
represents an inefficient use of already marginally
productive land. Cultivation is highly labor
intensive and, for a variety of reasons, there doesn’t
seem to be a corollary of the Green Revolution of
the 1960s and 1970s emerging. Few of the Sahelian
countries have major exploitable natural resources
to offset poor agricultural productivity and water
shortages. While there has been some development
in the way of oil and gas exploration, the problem of
logistics remains.
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 11
29 Ibid.
30 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, available athttp://data.worldbank.org/ .
31 Mehdi Taje, “Vulnerabilities and Factors of Insecurity in the Sahel,” Sahel and West Africa Club, August 2010, available at
www.oecd.org/swac/publications/45830109.pdf .
32 World Bank, Indicators 2012.
33 This is a condition that occurs when a disproportionate segment of the population is aged between fifteen and twenty-nine years. Extreme stress cases, where 45
percent of the adult population is in this age range, can experience a number of security and economic threats.
34 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision, April 2012, available athttp://esa.un.org/wpp/ .
FOOD SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN
CRISES
On top of the longer-term development challenge,
there are sporadic and increasingly frequent acute
humanitarian crises, such as the 2011 food crisis. In
2012, the Sahel region was confronted with the third
large-scale humanitarian crisis since 2005, a
phenomenon that has become more frequent over
the last decade. These crises are one of the main
challenges facing the region today. According to the
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, more than
18 million people in the Sahel were directly at risk of
malnutrition in 2012 due to the 2011 drought.
35
In
this context, no country in the region can do without
international emergency aid, which requires the
assistance of the states to ensure its delivery.
Sporadic rainfall, periodic drought, and volatile
food prices have left food systems in the Sahel
vulnerable to crisis. It seems the “hungry season”
that occurs between harvests is becoming longer,
leading to increases in the frequency of these crises.
In addition to these sporadic or yearly crises, there
are also high levels of chronic undernourishment.
While in Niger and Sudan one in five people is
undernourished, in Chad more than a third of the
population is chronically undernourished. Indeed,
even in “good” years, 250,000 children die of severe
acute malnutrition in the region, and in a crisis year
like 2012, 1 million children were at risk.
Complicating crisis response are the thousands of
refugees and IDPs fleeing the security crisis in Mali.
Most of these refugees and IDPs resettle in drought-
affected areas, adding more strain to the local food
situation. Insecurity in northern Mali and northern
Nigeria makes delivery of humanitarian aid
difficult, as does the shortfall of international
assistance. With an estimated need of $1.6 billion in
2012, only 54 percent was met.
POLITICS AND SECURITY
The confluence of underdevelopment and sporadic
crises has led to increasing conflicts over smaller
shares of shrinking resources. Existing ethnic
tensions are being exacerbated in, for instance,
northern Nigeria, Western Sudan, and Mali.
Additionally, many of the countries of the Sahel
face the combination of weak states and vast
stretches of sparsely inhabited territory. This makes
vital basic state functions like the provision of
security in the outer regions and border areas
especially difficult. And though many states in the
region experienced sustained periods of democratic
rule, events over the course of the last few years
have called into question the durability of their
democratic institutions. Chad, Mali, and Niger have
all experienced sporadic separatist fighting. Coups
in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali represent challenges
to democratic continuity. Challenges such as
transnational organized crime and terrorism arise
from many factors, but one of the main factors is
simply the availability of ungoverned territory and
the ease of operation.
The lens of transnational terrorism is currently
focused on the gains made by AQIM and Islamist
affiliates in northern Mali and northern Nigeria.
However, a distinction must be made between acts
that are ideologically driven and those that are
linked to longer-running nationalist grievances.
These are not mutually exclusive and are often
found occupying the same space, but they also
compete for “hearts and minds,” as we are seeing in
northern Mali at the moment. There are a variety of
factors at play that influence local-level support for
these groups: the perceived lack of state legitimacy
from a nationalist standpoint, the inability of the
state to supply basic services, and grievances over
distribution of state resources. In fact, a perceived
lack of legitimacy seems to have bolstered claims by
rebels in some contexts and helped to bring about
coups in others. In cases like the Tuareg rebellions,
a national government’s lack of legitimacy helps the
rebels, but rebels’ interactions with local popula-
tions can also decrease the rebels’ legitimacy,
opening the way for other nonstate actors (such as
AQIM) to fill the gap.
Indeed, the focus on Islamist elements may be
somewhat misplaced in light of the grip that
transnational organized crime has on the region. As
noted in reference to Mali's flourishing criminal
ecosystem above, the permeability of many
Sahelian countries makes it extremely easy to traffic
contraband including drugs, commodities, and
people. Funds from trafficking are in turn used to
finance rebels and terrorists alike.
12
35 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Situation Update: The Sahel Crisis 2012,” October 5, 2012, available at
www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/sahel/docs/SITUATION%20UPDATE%20TCE%2005%20October.pdf .
Toward a Comprehensive
Approach to the Sahel
Crisis
In response to these long-term challenges, those
interested in the region have increasingly called for
a coordinated and comprehensive framework to
address the intertwining threats to the region. This
has manifested itself most prominently in the EU
and UN, at least in part because the donor role
played by these institutions lends itself to coordina-
tion in the development and security sectors.
EUROPEAN UNION
In response to the deteriorating political, security,
humanitarian, and human rights situation in the
region, the EU adopted a comprehensive develop-
ment and security strategy for the Sahel in July
2011.
36
The strategy was prepared in partnership
with the countries concerned. It covers four lines of
action: (1) development, good governance, and
internal conflict resolution; (2) political and
diplomatic activities; (3) security and the rule of
law; and (4) the fight against violent extremism and
radicalization. The strategy is currently being
implemented in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali.
Though the EU has suspended its development
cooperation to Mali, it plans to gradually resume
development assistance soon after the adoption of
the transition roadmap. Meanwhile, humanitarian
assistance and direct aid have been reinforced to
respond to the humanitarian crisis, and the strategy
gives particular consideration to the human rights
situation.
In July 2012, the EU launched a capacity-building
mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel-Niger). The
mission is a training program that assists Nigerien
security forces to improve control of their territory
and fight terrorism and organized crime. The EU
strategy is seen as a useful tool that has facilitated
the EU’s coherence in the Sahel, as well as the
union’s careful articulation of policies under the
framework of the international Support and
Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali.
UNITED NATIONS
Called upon to play a stronger role in the larger
crisis unfolding in the Sahel, the United Nations
responded with the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 2056 in July 2012, which asked the UN
Secretary-General to develop an integrated regional
strategy for the Sahel covering security, governance,
development, human rights, and humanitarian
issues, in consultation with regional organizations
and the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA). The
integrated strategy will seek to coordinate and build
on existing initiatives developed by the United
Nations and regional and subregional organizations.
Such initiatives include efforts to fight the
expansion of cross-border threats such as drug and
arms trafficking, and other transnational criminal
activities. After ECOWAS leaders adopted a declara-
tion on the prevention of drug abuse, illicit drug
trafficking, and organized crime in the region in
December 2008, UNODC developed a regional
program for West Africa, which brings together
UNOWA, the UN Departments of Political Affairs
and Peacekeeping Operations, and the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The
West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) provides
advice, equipment, technical assistance, and special-
ized training to law-enforcement officials at national
and regional levels in West Africa, with a view to
strengthening human and institutional capacity to
combat organized crime and drug trafficking more
effectively. Primarily focusing on postconflict
countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, WACI aims to cover all
fifteen ECOWAS countries, as well as Mauritania. A
useful tool that can address transborder issues of
drug trafficking and money laundering in the Sahel
region, the program needs more attention from
member states to ensure adequate funding.
37
Transborder terrorist activities have also prompted
countries in the region to join efforts in tackling this
security threat. At the policy level, ECOWAS has
prepared a draft counterterrorism strategy and
implementation plan, which aims to give effect to
various regional, continental, and international
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 13
36 European Union External Action Service, “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,” available at www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf .
In addition to the EU, the International Organisation of La Francophonie and the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have joined international efforts
to address the multiple crises in Mali and the Sahel.
37 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “West and Central Africa,” available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/west-and-central-africa.html .
counterterrorism instruments and to provide a
common operational framework for action.
38
The
draft strategy condemns terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations including acts of kidnapping,
hijacking, hostage taking, ransom demands,
bombings, sabotage, and the desecration of religious
and cultural sacred places. However, additional
efforts are required to ensure the adoption and
effective implementation of the proposed strategy.
Under Algerian leadership, Mali, Mauritania, and
Niger have developed joint efforts to combat
terrorism and criminal networks through a joint
operational command (CEMOC) and a “fusion and
liaison unit” (UFL) set up in April 2010. Based in
Algeria, the two bodies are charged with
monitoring, coordination, and analysis of security
in the region, as well as conducting operations to
search, localize, and dismantle terrorist groups. In
Mali, which shares a 5,000-kilometer border with
Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the
previous administration’s lack of military coopera-
tion contributed to weakening counterterrorism
efforts in the region. However, critics have also
blamed Algeria for its lack of action, hindering the
fight against AQIM in the region.
39
Transnational organized crime has spread across
the Sahel-Sahara region due to weak state
structures, particularly at the local level. Thus,
beyond the hard-security approach, a comprehen-
sive solution to tackle transnational criminality in
the Sahel will need to address the challenges to
governance and the rule of law. In Niger, decentral-
ization is considered to have facilitated integration,
specifically of the Tuareg population, which consti-
tuted an important peacebuilding factor. Such
national solutions could be shared as good practices
for fostering public participation and advancing
peace and security in Mali and other countries in
the region. These solutions could also inform the
UN integrated strategy, which is currently being
prepared, and help it to address the challenge of
weak local structures in northern parts of
Mauritania, Chad, the Central African Republic,
and Cameroon, for example. Regional platforms
could be established to share lessons and experi-
ences among countries in the Sahel. This could
reinforce the countries’ capacities to address
challenges relating to local governance, political
parties, civil society participation, strengthening of
the judiciary, and dialogue and reconciliation.
To respond to pressing humanitarian demands,
UN and partner humanitarian agencies have scaled
up their programs and teams on the ground to move
from a traditional development focus to a stronger
humanitarian approach. In addition, support is
being provided to governments in the region that
have developed ambitious plans to respond to food
security and nutrition challenges, such as Niger and
Chad.
40
In April 2012, OCHA appointed a regional
humanitarian coordinator for the Sahel, David
Gressly. The regional humanitarian coordinator
works closely with the UN resident coordinators
and humanitarian coordinators at the country level
to devise and implement a strategic response to the
Sahel crisis. The regional humanitarian coordinator
also has an advocacy role to mobilize funding.
Acknowledging the need to address the underlying
causes of the recurrent crises in the Sahel through
improved coherence between the emergency
humanitarian response and longer-term develop-
ment activities, the regional humanitarian coordi-
nator and development agencies in the region have
developed a UN action plan for building resilience in
the Sahel, under the leadership of the Secretary-
General’s special representative in West Africa and in
close consultation with governments. Aimed at
breaking the cycle of chronic food insecurity,
resilience constitutes an important component of the
UN integrated strategy for the Sahel. The concept
provides an opportunity to do things differently—by
supporting the households and communities most
vulnerable to humanitarian crises so that they can
better absorb shocks and rebuild after a crisis, and by
supporting a longer-term transformation through
broader coverage of basic social services, improved
agricultural productivity, livelihood diversification,
and stronger early-warning and risk-management
systems.
41
For the action plan to succeed, govern-
14
38 ECOWAS, “ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan for Review,” press release, May 6, 2011, available athttp://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=064&lang=en&annee=2011 .
39 Serge Daniel, “Unsupportive Algeria Is a Setback for Terror Hunt,” The Gulf Today, November 27, 2011, available athttp://gulftoday.ae/portal/7290a6aa-db61-4f50-9210-ca05a7bfa5af.aspx .
40 In Niger, the government has launched an ambitious program called the 3N Initiative, Les Nigeriens nourissent les Nigeriens, or Nigerians Feeding Nigerians. In
Chad, the government has committed to raising $400 million for agriculture. IPI roundtable, “Peace and Security Threats.”
41 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Special Humanitarian Bulletin: Sahel Crisis,” Issue 4, September 19, 2012.
ments in the region will need to be firmly engaged,
UN member states will need to provide political and
financial support, and the UN itself will need to work
coherently, avoiding the “silo” approach.
Indeed, one significant challenge facing the UN
in the development of its integrated strategy for the
Sahel is the multiplicity of actors within the UN
system and their difficulty working with each other.
To finalize its Sahel integrated strategy, the UN will
need to overcome the challenge of “making the
whole bigger than the parts.” Since October 9, 2012,
this task falls under the responsibilities of Mr.
Romano Prodi from Italy, whom the Secretary-
General appointed as his special envoy for the
Sahel. Mr. Prodi’s mandate includes, among other
things, the coordination of UN systemwide efforts
to finalize and implement the proposed UN
integrated strategy for the Sahel, which is due to be
presented to the Security Council in March 2013.
The UN alone cannot provide all the support
needed in the region. Neither can it maintain the
integrated strategy as a living document on its own,
nor ensure the region’s ownership. As such,
partnership with regional and subregional organi-
zations covering the Sahel is a fundamental
component of the integrated strategy. This calls for
exchange of information on what is already being
implemented at various levels, to identify and
address the persisting gaps. It also calls for the
involvement of all the countries in the Sahel.
Beyond bringing on board ECOWAS and other
subregional organizations, such as the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), a
larger platform needs to be created to facilitate
direct exchange between people in the region—one
that is not constrained by the institutional
groupings. And beside the programmatic and
bottom-up coordination, the UN special envoy will
need to help harmonize the various mandates and
strategies of special envoys appointed by individual
countries, including France and the United
Kingdom, as well as that of the recently appointed
AU high representative for Mali and the Sahel.
Conclusion
The fact that the Sahel-Sahara region—one that for
so long has undergone slow-motion crises with
little attention—is now finding a more prominent
place on the agenda of the international community
is, on the whole, a positive development. But, the
multiplicity of actors, positions, and strategies
seeking to resolve the crises in both Mali and the
Sahel-Sahara region add new challenges to the
multidimensional nature of the cross-border
threats to peace, stability, and development in the
region. While the French intervention in Mali has
shown some initial success, responsibility for a
long-term solution to the persistent insecurity in
the country and the broader Sahel-Sahara region
ultimately lies with the governments in the region.
The divergence of views among these countries
over the most appropriate approaches demands a
step forward from the interim authorities in Mali,
whose ownership and leadership in addressing the
crisis have been acknowledged, despite their
limited legitimacy, capacity, and resources. At the
same time, because the government is highly
unlikely to succeed if it acts alone, enhanced
support and further mobilization of the interna-
tional community remain essential.
Regional powers can also play an important role
in addressing this crisis. For the leading Sahelian
countries to remain in charge of their own agenda,
they must take up their responsibilities. At the
regional level, a consensus seems to have emerged,
which advocates for a combination of national
efforts to restore constitutional order and facilitate
reconciliation while also pursuing military action
in Mali’s north to enforce peace and tackle the
growing threat of terrorism. While the ongoing
intervention has temporarily weakened the joint
criminal and Islamist threat in Mali, the military
intervention will not address the structural causes
of the conflict in the West African country, nor the
recurring crises in the Sahel and Sahara. The
Malian crisis has helped to shed light on the region’s
multifaceted challenges. However, for countries in
the region and the international community, the
challenge remains to make the quantitative and
qualitative investments that will ensure sustainable
growth, strengthen state institutions, and facilitate
broad popular participation as preconditions for
long-term peace, stability, and development.
MALI AND THE SAHEL-SAHARA 15
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