Description
In this paper, we make the case that ICT projects in the developed and developing world often lead to partial or total failures due to the incomplete assessment of the problem being solved and the metrics used to evaluate solutions.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
Rahul Tongia, Member, IEEE, and Eswaran Subrahmanian
Information and Communications Technology
for Development (ICT4D) – A Design
Challenge?
Abstract— In this paper, we make the case that ICT projects in
the developed and developing world often lead to partial or total
failures due to the incomplete assessment of the problem being
solved and the metrics used to evaluate solutions. While in the
developed world the success of ICT solutions are often
determined by the market, with available infrastructure and
market mechanisms, in the developing world this ecosystem does
not exist thus requiring an understanding of the ecosystem in
which ICT solutions are to be applied. Using literature from the
design space, and experiences in ICT for development, we
elaborate the dimensions of design such as incorporation of
stakeholders, incentive structures, and design participation that
are critical to successful deployment. We examine some successes
and failures in product/solution development in the ICT area to
identify the dimensions of good design incorporated by these
products and services. With the perspective that ICT for
sustainable development issues are ill-structured and “wicked
problems” that have to incorporate all the defined dimensions of
design, we propose a model of product and service identification
and development that is based on insights from asynchronous
computational agent problem solving. We claim that new
methods such as the one proposed need to be identified,
developed and tested for their effectiveness in the development of
products and services that satisfy the needs of human
development.
Index Terms— Design, ICT and Development, Stakeholder
Participation , Wicked Problems
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) have
become a new tool in the path towards development, one that
has garnered increasing visibility (but also hype). The old
debate of bread vs. computers has moved from competition
towards complementarity.
1
However, many of the discussions
have focused on narrow interpretations of the “digital divide”
and the full scope of ICT, spanning new embedded devices or
sensors, databases, and algorithms, has not been developed to
meet human development needs.
R. Tongia is a faculty member at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,
in the School of Computer Science (ISRI) and the Dept. of Engineering &
Public Policy. He is also the Associate Director of the TechBridgeWorld
project at Carnegie Mellon (phone: 412-268-5619; fax: 412-268-2338; e-mail:
[email protected]).
E. Subrahmanian is a Research Professor at the Institute for Complex
Engineering Systems at Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, and is presently Visiting
Professor with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
1
“The issue is whether we accept that the poor should, in addition to the
existing deprivation of income, food and health service, etc., also be further
deprived of new opportunities to improve their livelihood.” [1]
Like the fable about the five blind men describing an
elephant, ICT and development has often been looked at in
parts. There are various technological and operational
components that go into design of these development
initiatives. There are multiple stakeholders, some of whom
may be indirect. There are different innovators and solution
providers, sometimes focusing on only one aspect of solution.
There are different contexts and frameworks for development,
including regulations and funding. The varying stakeholders
may also have different objectives, incentives, metrics for
success, and initial conditions. Until all of these are
considered in a holistic manner, as an ecosystem, the full
potential of ICT for development will remain elusive, and
many projects will fail.
We posit that if development is the desired goal,
stakeholders’ incentives and metrics must closely align. This
means that worrying about ICT price-performance is not
suitable as a standalone metric, nor complementary metrics
such as throughput or even scalability/replicability.
2
These are
all important components of any solution, but global metrics
must be focused on the intended beneficiaries or end-users, in
whom we should look for development benefits.
The ill-defined nature of ICT for development (ICT4D)
complicates the space significantly, and much of the literature
is ad-hoc or anecdotal. In this paper, we frame ICT4D as a
design problem, and use several cases to analyze failures and
successes. We analyze these cases in terms of asymmetries of
information in terms of inclusion of stakeholders, poor design
processes and misaligned incentives mechanisms. These
failures reflect the inability to solve the right problem of needs
of development and a technology driven tendency to solve the
wrong problem optimally, as is often the case in many design
problems [2].
Following sections of this paper go through the issues of
stakeholders, metrics, incentives, and design, followed by
select case studies. We subsequently present a new ICT4D
model, based on commonalities and shortcomings gleaned
from the case studies and literature.
2
We distinguish between growing solutions in scale and in volume as
“bigger” is not necessarily “better.” Economies of scale often have limits,
especially factoring in logistical and bureaucratic challenges, but there are
more fundamental issues of equity and (re)distribution.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
II. ICT4D DOMAIN SPACE
A. Defining Stakeholders – Divides in ICT4D
At a high level, the stakeholders can be thought of as:
• Development beneficiaries (general or targeted
population)
• Development / Services providers (government,
utilities, NGOs, commercial entities)
• ICT developers and providers (commercial, non-
profits, entrepreneurs)
• Funding entities, regulators, purveyors or enforcers
of social/legal norms
Inherently, many of the targeted beneficiaries are
“disconnected” from the mainstream. The underserved lack
not only physical connectivity but social or political avenues
for participation. This is has been a major challenge in not
only meeting their needs but also in bringing them to the table
in development projects.
There is mixed evidence regarding democracy and
development [3], but studies have shown that order and
accountability are strong determinants of development [4].
Democracy itself has limitations when it comes to
development, not necessarily in theory but certainly in
practice stemming from bureaucracy, segmented
disempowerment, factionalism, etc. India is considered a
vibrant democracy, and China has much more authoritarian
control, but there are significantly fewer people lacking basic
human needs in (a measure of “development”) than in India.
For example, over 98% of Chinese have in-home electricity
[5], but in India almost half of homes are not connected to the
electricity grid [6]; the authors indicate governmental policies
are a prime factor for such variance. This disconnect extends
to the limits of using markets and market signals to spur new
solutions—many people are outside markets, let alone
efficient markets. DeSoto [7] argues that the informal
economy and lack of liquidity towards formal economic
systems limits participation and empowerment of the
underprivileged. Cobb and Daly [8] refer to economics
especially suffering from a “Fallacy of misplaced
concreteness” because of issues with markets, measurements,
human rationality, and resources. In ICTD, there is a parallel
tendency to assume that the main challenges are developing
the “optimal solutions” at the “right cost.”
The term “digital divide” is popular to describe divides
between groups of people, but this is recognized by many as
being a symptom of underlying divides and of capabilities, not
merely differences between “haves vs. have nots.” [9]
Unfortunately, a (narrow) focus on the digital divide has
distracted if not hijacked many ICT4D efforts. Bringing a
computer into poor, rural areas is unlikely to help education
significantly, at least not on its own. But such projects garner
significant media attention and funding. The real space of
development is vast, spanning infrastructure, food, healthcare,
education, economic growth/jobs, governance, and
empowerment.
Another divide in the ICT4D space is that between ICT
professionals and development professionals.
3
Heeks [10]
argues that ICTs may or may not be relevant to the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the MDGs
themselves must be examined critically. On the other hand,
Tongia, et. al [9] conjecture that ICT can help with the MDGs
or at least development broadly if we think of alternatively
designed technologies and solutions than today, in short
advocating innovation and new R&D and not trickle-down.
Today, development professionals rarely interact with ICT
R&D professionals; at best they know of select technologies
that are available today. However, given the dramatic speed of
technological innovation in ICT, there is especially greater
need for interactions by development professionals and end-
users to help guide ICT R&D. This divide often parallels a
geographic divide, termed East/West or North/South.
A third divide exists in ICT4D between different groupings
of stakeholders: academics, industry, government, funding
groups (which may not be the government), field
professionals (including NGOs), and targeted beneficiaries.
For starters, the users of the ICT-based solutions may not be
the desired end-beneficiaries; NGOs often play the role of
intermediary, required given literacy and logistical constraints
amongst much of the population. Funding groups often have
statutory or charter constraints, and they often seek “visible
solutions” that limit longer-term ICT4D solutions that are not
readily deployable. Industry is often pushing solutions driven
by “market” expectations, which may be understandable given
their shareholder obligations. Work recognizing the bottom
(or, the more politically correctly, “base”) of the pyramid as
an untapped market [11] has not yet resulted in major,
fundamental innovations by the ICT industry, though they are
working on improving the size, scale, costs, and robustness of
their offerings. Academia is often accused of acting in a
vacuum (the “ivory tower”), and limited scholarly analysis of
ICT4D works self-limit the short-term value of academic
research. Academia also suffers from time lag issues, in that
many rigorous studies require data over time series, and the
publication and dissemination process itself can take 1-2
years.
4
In the middle, you have the governments, who
ostensibly have a development focus. While there are a variety
of responses and roles governments have taken in this space,
from being a consumer of ICT, spurring R&D, setting
legislation and regulations, deploying e-Governance
programs, etc., given limited government budgets and ICT
skills, it is unlikely they can be more than an enabler for other
stakeholders.
These divides are important when we remember that ICT4D
3
It has been commented that, in parallel, scientists and social scientists
observe and explain, while engineers solve practical problems or intervene.
4
There was relatively little academic representation at WSIS, and scholars
would counter much of the efforts were not academically rigorous, focusing
on select cases, pilot projects, etc. One participant also raised the interesting
point of self-reinforcing feedback and social networks at events like WSIS
[12], essentially questioning the value of consultants spending other people’s
money on such efforts; true “grassroots” people were not in attendance. With
30,000 attendees, WSIS Phase II would easily have cost on the order of
$100m, and probably much more including preparatory work and conferences.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
is a work in progress, with substantial innovation and effort
required to achieve development goals. Many experts believe
the true needs of development require not all-purpose
computers per se, which are powerful but expensive, but
specialized ICT devices to meet specific needs, e.g., soil
condition monitoring or a biomedical “lab on a chip.” There
are limited “off the shelf” solutions, and the need for
customizing the ICT solutions for specific classes of needs is
central. The need to balance cost, usability, scalability,
maintainability, recyclability and relatively long life cycle of
the solution becomes critical in the context of development.
Without the understanding of the overall ecosystems of the
product operation, the products will often fail, and such an
understanding is not achieved through isolation of the
technologists from the people for whom solutions are targeted.
B. Incentive structures
ICT usage in development is a means, and not an end. ICT
may or may not be cost-effective on its own (e.g., saving
transaction or transportation costs) but it may improve
development outcomes in non-monetized forms. It may be
more straightforward to account for ICT costs benefits only in
direct monetized terms, but on such grounds, it may fail in
terms of opportunity costs. For example, a dollar spent on
distributing condoms may have hundreds of dollars of return
(disease and unwanted pregnancy prevention); ICT for
healthcare is unlikely to produce such returns. However, ICT
infrastructure would have multiple benefits, usable across
many development themes. One challenge is of determining
appropriate boundaries and transactions between stakeholders
and beneficiaries, especially as we straddle the public and
private domains. For this reason, the government is often cited
as an appropriate shepherd for, say, ICT infrastructure.
However, many professionals feel it is best for the
government to step in only in specific cases where there are
issues of size, scale, or market failures, as was the case in rural
electrification in the developed world. Governments,
especially developing country ones, are also not going to
innovate at the cutting edge of ICT; their role is more one of
diffusion and deployment.
Easterly [13] posits that (lack of) incentives are a key
reason for failure of development projects, and externally
imposed solutions are predisposed to failure. If we consider
ICT4D, some consumer products have been successful
specifically because consumers are able to “vote with their
wallets.” However, the incentive (or barriers) to innovate in
fundamental technology creation is not the same as that for
service provisioning or deployment. In addition, if we
consider the 4Cs of ICT (computers, content, connectivity and
(human) capacity), different components have different
barriers to entry and profitability. Mobile phone providers in
the US routinely give away free handsets in return for annual
contracts. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, etc., make an enormous
number of services available online for free. Of course, they
make their money from advertisements, product tie-ins, and
paid versions with enhanced services. However, if we
consider ICT usage for development, e.g., e-Governance
programs, similar models would likely face troubling privacy
implications, equity concerns, and potential conflicts of
interest.
C. Metrics
Stakeholder goals can be in explicit or implicit conflict; a
cheaper product may mean lower profits for a supplier.
Classical economics labels equilibrium points where no
stakeholder would change their position (price, quantity, etc.)
as being Pareto optimal (any one’s improvement results in a
deterioration of utility for the other(s)). As is known Pareto-
optimality does not necessarily produce a just solution as it
depends on initial endowments of the stakeholders.
Even if we have a common goal, with aligned incentives,
we must determine what is or isn’t failure outside of the
Pareto nature of the solution. Heeks [14] segments projects as
total failures, partial failures (goals partially met, unintended
consequences, or sustainability challenges) or successes.
ICT4D projects often lack rigorous analysis or metrics, not to
mention baselines, and without analyses that move beyond the
level of case studies, it is difficult to obtain a clearer picture.
This is further complicated by ICT4D being a dynamic
process, with goals that can not only shift over time, but also
are inherently dependent on the goals of stakeholders and their
ability to participate in defining the right development
problem to be solved. In the rural US, the digital divide has
moved from merely accessing the Internet (widely available
through dial-up) to having broadband. Consumer groups and
municipalities interested in providing broadband have often
been restricted due to regulatory statutes that confer a
monopoly or rights of first provision to the incumbent service
provider. An additional challenge in metrics is one of
granularity; most data (and even analysis) are based on
national numbers – this says nothing about, say, rural or
region-specific deployment. Indian Government data indicate
teledensity approaching 10%, but this is based on urban
penetrations approaching 30%, and rural penetrations under
2%.
ICTs find greater use in developed regions, often for use
outside the traditional “ICT4D” moniker. Heeks [14] states
that there is no evidence or theory why failures would be
higher in developing countries, but we conjecture there may
greater failures in developing regions be because: (1) ICT is
not just an incremental improvement in efficiency, but can
represent or catalyze enormous social shifts; (2) Infrastructure
is worse developed; (3) Complementary institutions are less
developed (courts/rule of law, regulators, etc.); (4)
stakeholders have lower familiarity with the solutions; (5) the
initial conditions (baselines) are often worse.
In spite of these, there are still many failures in ICT projects
in developed regions, largely because of design issues.
Examples include the iridium satellite constellation, which
failed as a business venture, or the deployment of customer
relations management (CRM) solutions by enterprises. In the
latter, roughly 80% of projects fail or are over budget and/or
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
over time [15], largely because of hidden or unbudgeted
(secondary) costs.
III. ICT4D INNOVATION CHALLENGES
The traditional model of R&D as a sequence of steps is one
of generating a number of ideas from large scale and
expensive fundamental research that is detached from end
uses, and then adaptation of the research to needs by isolated
inventors leading to marketing and adoption of products
through the early adopters and subsequent diffusion. von
Hippel [16] in his studies of product innovation makes the
case that the users are often the leading innovators as they are
the ones who understand their particular needs and their
inclusion removes the information asymmetry that inherently
exists between the technologist and the user. This asymmetry
extends beyond the user-technologists divide but also the
social and political context in which the product is expected to
operate.
There is a widespread belief that fundamental research is
expensive and risky, with many steps of potential failure,
because of the serialized model of innovation that is assumed
in the current models of R&D. Thus, “big R&D” is best left to
national labs or well-funded groups, who may
(pharmaceuticals) or may not (bell labs, CERN) be aiming to
appropriate their innovation. On the other hand, innovation in
the ICT4D space has several components beyond just devices;
the 4C framework spans Computers (devices); Connectivity;
Content, and (human) Capacity. While the capabilities in
building a mobile phone may be with only a handful of
entities, creating content or human capacity is certainly within
the scope of many stakeholders. Even device and network
innovations are possible at the edge, e.g., through community
wireless mesh networks using ~$50 commodity wireless
routers for city-wide networks (1-4 per sq. km) [17].
5
However, when we consider ICT for specific development
needs, e.g., the so-termed medical “lab on a chip,” such new
solutions will require fundamental advances in technology,
which translates to extensive R&D. Given the long lead times
and risks inherent in such innovation, how do we classify
what are important problems in the ICT4D space? Several
scholars have advocated determining the “Grand Challenges”
of the space, but this will not be as easy as, say, in Computer
Science. Not only is the field nascent, there is the need to
integrate various stakeholders operating under different
assumptions, thresholds, and initial conditions.
A. ICT4D Innovation - Trickle Down, Watered Down, or
Upside Down?
Generalizing ICT innovation is difficult if not impossible,
given the range of the ICT space (the 4Cs). However, there
are several commonalities seen in ICT usage in development
scenarios. One mode is trickle down, where solutions from
developed countries make their way to developing regions
over some period of time. PCs, mobile phones, or digital
cameras are common examples, where everyone benefits from
continuous innovation, and the volumes initially came from
developed countries. Trickle down solutions may or may not
also have reduced feature sets or functionality. Part of this
may be driven by cost differentials, but part of this is driven
by market segmentation and a desire not to cannibalize more
profitable markets. Microsoft’s Windows Starter Edition is a
useful portfolio expansion at a more affordable price, about an
order of magnitude lower than full versions, but it is ironic
that it cost extra money to “innovate” to reduce its features
and functionality versus the normal Windows XP.
5
Even after adding in antennae, weatherproofing, etc., such systems can be
as low as ~$100/node.
Computers can find good use in many developing regions,
often in educational institutions or some businesses. However,
visit any government office in developing countries, and one
may also find a PC in the office, especially if the official is
senior. However, what applications are running? Is it more
than a glorified typewriter? Is the machine networked, (and if
so, used for more than reading the sports score)? Backed up?
Until the end-user and related stakeholders are involved in the
ICT decision making process, ICT’s use or integration will be
limited.
Can we turn the innovation framework upside down, with
user needs driving innovation and design? For this, we must
start with a clearer understanding of the needs space, as well
as understanding the ICT space overall, itself a complex
ecosystem with hardware, software, content, connectivity,
access/usability, maintenance, security and other components.
B. Design, Participatory Design and Open Standards
In engineering of products, we have seen over the last
century and a half a complete cycle in the understanding of
how products should be designed. We have moved from
products often designed by the user for the user, and often
manufactured by the user in the world of artisans, to the world
of mass manufacturing where designer, manufacturer and
users were divided as sequential actors in the process of
product creation and use. The failures during use by early
users were the impetus for product refinement, and mass
usage goals drove mass production. The sequential model of
product design was challenged in the 80s and 90s by
movements such as concurrent engineering and simultaneous
engineering [18]. In ICT field the incorporation of user in
design was defined as user centered engineering [19].
However, many of the goals of incorporating user
requirements and preferences were within the framework of
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) design, which relates to
human usage factors instead of human needs driving ICT
design. The supplier still has a mental model of what the need
is, and works to optimize the delivery of such needs.
These trends were due to the recognition of existence of
information asymmetries in the product design process as a
purely top-down process. The limitations of the top-down
processes have become apparent in the globalized world
where accommodation of variation in customer needs and
social context is important to success. This can be seen in
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
every aspect of product design both in physical and
information products [20] and hence the move by even
technology companies like Intel to employ anthropologists
and sociologists to understand cultural contexts of use for
generic technologies [21]. While these are a clear indication of
the acknowledgement of information asymmetries in the
product development arena the question remains are there
general methods for addressing these information asymmetries
for design of products and solutions, especially those that are
directed at development?
The banner of participatory design and the involvement of
the user in design has emerged as a mantra in the product
6
design area. In many cases, while this participation may be
limited, it has provided a means to limit uncertainty in the
adoption of the product. von Hippel [16] has advocated for
larger participation of the user either directly or indirectly
through user representatives who become translators and
bridges to overcome information asymmetry. Such models for
product design have found use in select contexts, often in
high-cost products such as commercial aircraft design; user-
driven specialized design in fields such as pharmaceutical or
high tech industries are less common. In his work on
democratizing innovation, von Hippel makes the case that
participation should be extended as innovation is often local
and user driven, e.g., in the case of surfboards and irrigation
systems. In many cases the users create these innovations due
to the lack of commercial products to satisfy their needs. This
is not surprising because as Petroski [22] points out
innovations take place by design and as recognition of failures
by the products that are in the market or non-existence of the
same. Importantly, innovators are not often these large
conglomerates but the users themselves. It is in this context
that Reich et.al [23] argue for exploring varieties of
participation in design and the use of ICT in the participation
process itself.
The participatory model of product design attempts to
addresses the information asymmetries identified by von
Hippel as the basis for his case for democratizing innovation.
The overall social cost of not addressing these asymmetries at
early stages of design reveal themselves in costly adaptation
and adoption processes by the users. Engineering design
studies indicate that 70% costs of product development are
committed in the design stage of the product whereas the cost
of the design stage accounts for 5% of the overall costs of
product development. It has also been observed that changes
later in the product design are an order of magnitude more
expensive than changes during the early part of design [24].
Early and continuous feedback from all the stakeholders is
critical to the success of the design of a product. The goal of
participatory design is to recognize that communication
among the stakeholders early and frequently is the key to
successful products.
Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS, aka FOSS—
sans Libre) is one popular example of participatory design,
and is considered a useful ICT model for developing
countries. There are pros and cons to FLOSS solutions, with
the latter especially based on steep learning curves for
adopters (total costs of ownership, instead of just upfront),
limited local availability of specialized talent, and also limits
to how such software can be used in proprietary solutions. We
must also recognize that true end-users (e.g., in the
development space) are very unlikely to guide the design of
FLOSS, except in niche solutions where the end-users are IT
savvy. In reality, FLOSS solutions have a relatively small core
group of designers and system architects. A parallel and
perhaps more useful development has been the emergence of
open standards, which may not be user driven but are driven
by select stakeholders, often competing. The WiFi
specification (based on IEEE’s 802.11 standard) is a good
example of open standards driving innovation (often as a
means of differentiation) and cost reduction. In under 10
years, the solutions have fallen in cost two orders of
magnitude, and the speeds have increased 52 times.
6
We mean product design in the general sense of solutions, both physical
and information-based.
In the ICT and development space, we can already see the
split in innovation, where end-users often innovate around
deployment, applications, and business models (e.g., Grameen
Phone), while designers innovate to expand their market (e.g.,
rugged PCs). Our initial analysis indicates that the link
between users and fundamental design will not be bridged all
the way in the short term, rather across some layers only.
Hardware will still be expensive to design, but once designed,
many products will become closer to a commodity. They will
also be more modular and expandable, often via software or
firmware. An example of this is the use of commodity WiFi
chipsets in inexpensive wireless routers that are sometimes
“hacked” by end-users with new embedded software
(firmware) to enable community mesh networks [17].
IV. DIMENSIONS OF ICT4D DESIGN
Based on the notion of ICT4D being primarily a design
challenge, distilling from our experiences and those found in
literature, below are characteristics or markers we need to
consider for “good” designs.
Improved ICT4D Design Outline
1. Who are the stakeholders, and what are their needs?
a. Are all stakeholders considered?
b. Are metrics for prior state (baseline)
available?
2. Does the technology perform well for the needs?
a. Is the Cost – Benefit (or other appropriate)
Analysis favorable (incorporating lifecycle,
non-monetized factors, etc.)?
b. Are there unintended consequences, positive
or negative?
c. How is the price-performance or cost
effectiveness?
d. Is the solution optimized (often an iterative
process or evolving)?
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
3. Do stakeholder incentives align?
a. Management of varying and often
conflicting stakeholders and/or goals
b. Development of the required ecosystem
c. Who “owns” the project or process
(responsibility)?
d. Is there a “champion” driving the process
(optional)?
4. Are there mechanisms for feedback or participation
by all stakeholders?
a. Design stage
b. Deployment stage
c. Diffusion state
5. Are metrics available for measuring success across
stakeholders?
a. Who measures – self, designated
stakeholder, or third party?
b. Are assumptions and methodologies
transparent?
c. What else has or can be done (alternatives
and opportunity costs)? Have lessons been
learned from prior experiences?
Clearly, stakeholders are central to the process, as
performance can only be in the context of their needs. In
addition, they are dynamic actors, displaying explicit or
implicit incentives, and different baselines. Metrics and
Performance can be considered duals, but separating the two
is useful for creating a starting point. Both of these have
additional characteristics, elaborated below.
6. Is the solution sustainable?
a. Supplier side – profitable
b. Consumer side – affordable
c. Concerns:
i. If subsidies are required, will they
be available continually?
ii. Is this viable only in some select
cases (cherry-picking)?
7. Is the solution scalable?
a. Can it grow beyond a pilot?
b. Will it work in other regions or cultures?
c. Will economic sustainability remain with
scaling?
8. Is the solution acceptable?
a. Displacement of vested interests – issues of
political economy
b. Culturally acceptable?
c. Trustworthy?
d. Empowering?
e. Will people use it of their free will?
Naturally, there are tradeoffs involved. In the IT world, a
common adage is “Cheaper, faster, better – pick any two”
(derived from NASA usage). Solutions that can “revolutionize
the world” or lead to dramatic improvements are more prone
to failure, but smaller projects, which may indeed significantly
improve local conditions or provide incremental benefits, may
not be applicable across wider or different areas. Some of the
best examples of ICT based solutions are those with very low
barriers to entry or usage—the solution can spread by word of
mouth, almost “virally.” Skype, the VoIP solution, was such
an example. It typically has 4-5+ million concurrent users
online and the software has been downloaded over 220
million times.
7
Metrics do not necessarily mean a cost-benefit calculus, let
alone a positive one. Some projects are true experiments, e.g.,
studying the user adoption rates for new technologies, where
there is no expectation of cost-effectiveness. However, even in
such cases, chosen metrics must be stated up front to
determine “success” or effectiveness.
V. CASE EXAMPLES OF ICT, DEVELOPMENT, AND
INNOVATION
Given the ICT4D design outline, we present case examples
of some ICT projects especially as applied to development.
These are shown not as full case studies but to convey select
design aspects; some of these are ongoing or even proposed
solutions. Table I summarizes these cases in the ICT4D
Design Outline.
A. Mobiles and the Digital Divide
Mobile phones are a runaway success, especially in
developing countries. Landline growths are only a few percent
per annum, but mobiles have grown by an order of magnitude
more, and, e.g., African mobiles teledensity is now ~10% [25]
from nearly zero a few years ago.
Mobiles clearly filled a need, for people to communicate
and share information, and they responded by spending a fair
amount of their income on this solution. Mobiles’ average
2003-04 revenues per user (ARPU) in Africa were
~$25/month, approaching the average income [26]. This was
more than double the ARPU in India. Of course, average
numbers are misleading, a major shortcoming of most studies
of the digital divide. E.g., both income and infrastructure
availability are concentrated in urban or richer areas.
Mobiles grew in part due to technology improvements, but
also because they were offered by efficient and (often)
competitive operators. Most initial African deployments (per
country) were by private operators, who had almost no
waiting list. In addition, the innovation to use a pre-paid card
overcame financial credit limitations. The mobile phone
replaced desire for a landline as it could be used at home,
work, and on the road – a single device sufficed. Mobiles
were easy to use, with the design overcoming end-user
limitations of literacy, education or infrastructure. We posit
mobiles also succeeded in that they were not an interim
solution, or watered down from developed country solutions
(often, they leapfrogged ahead). Under the 4C framework,
ease of use by end-users can be framed in terms of content—
anyone can produce as well as consume content, unlike the
Internet where even skilled, literate users are more likely to be
consumers than producers.
7
This metric is misleading, as users likely download several versions over
time, especially to upgrade. Nonetheless, Skype is estimated to have multiple
times more users than any other competitive VoIP solution, with zero
advertising outlay.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
Mobile phones provide value to users. Studies show an
increased 0.6% GDP growth rate for every 10% higher mobile
penetration [27]. But this is correlation, not causality—
perhaps operators picked the more economically favorable
regions for deployment?
Moving beyond voice, there are mixed results for extending
mobiles to other uses. If we consider use of mobiles for data
connectivity, the bandwidth is limited, claims of 3G wireless
systems notwithstanding, and the costs are very high.
8
Alternative wireless and community networking solutions
may be superior, but need regulatory approval. The problem is
one where the mobile operators in developing countries have
become the equivalent of the landline incumbents in
developed countries, entities who want to restrict competition
and aim to expand into new services, often relying on weak
regulations. Such limits on new entrants are reinforced by the
incumbent carrier also typically having control over key
aspects of connectivity, such as the international gateway.
Other needs for which mobiles are considered a possible
solution or facilitator include inexpensive financial
transactions. But the countries that lead in “mobile wallet”
deployments are Japan, Korea, and W. European countries,
where the back-end (banking) system is well developed. In
contrast, in many developing countries, informal banking
systems are the norm, and the postal system handles more
savings than any other traditional bank; e.g., in India it has
~$85 billion in deposits [28].
9
While mobiles can and do work
for economic transactions, they are a closed system,
10
requiring the active participation of the mobile provider to
enable the system and the transactions (indeed, the mobile
provider may be taking a cut from all the transactions). A
more open but still trusted solution, even using mobiles, might
grow faster.
B. ICT for Education
Knowledge relates to education in fundamental ways, and
information can be considered a stepping stone towards
knowledge. ICT for education is fundamentally about content,
and one of the unspoken goals is to mitigate the unavailability
of teachers in developing regions. Due to limited
interconnectivity, most ICT for education has not been real-
time interactive, relying either on unidirectional broadcasts
(including TV) or content on a CD or disk (nicknamed
“broadband by station wagon”).
EduSat is the Indian governmental initiative to use satellite
connectivity for interactive ICT education.
11
It is driven the by
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), and enjoys
significant central government support. However, it is unclear
to what extent teachers have been integrated into the schema.
In addition, on a price-performance basis, the scheme appears
wanting. Satellite connectivity is inherently expensive,
especially if we want high bandwidth bi-directionally. ISRO
states the capital cost per school to connect will be
~$3,800/interactive node,
8
In S. Africa, Vodacom’s website (Dec 2005) indicates 3G costs are
roughly 2 Rand/MB. For 1 GB/month, this means about $300/month.
9
The postal system has enormous deposits even in Japan, a driver for
Prime Minister Koizumi’s attempts at reforming the postal system.
10
In contrast, in the Internet innovation can occur freely at the edge, by
design; the links are just a “dumb cloud.”
11
http://www.edusatindia.org/center.htm
excluding computers or A/V
equipment that can cost more, a very high barrier to scaling.
One Laptop Per Child (OLPC, formerly the $100 Laptop)
is MIT’s Prof. Negroponte’s vision for a cheap computer for
education.
12
It is geared towards developing countries, with a
hand crank for power and mesh-based connectivity options.
However, like EduSat, it appears to be a top-down solution, to
be sold (on a non-profit basis) to Ministries of Education in a
minimum order size of 1,000,000 units.
13
While
standardization has its advantages, it also limits the ability to
iterate. This also represents a major barrier to adoption in
poorer regions, where per-primary student (not capita)
education expenditures can be ~$20/year or lower. How much
of the cost reduction is due to innovations, and how much due
to the non-profit status (and attendant “free” innovation from
co-developers), and how much from the economies of
volume? There have been other critiques of this model as
well, including the physics of battery charging based on a
crank aimed for a 1:6 charging:usage ratio[29].
14
In addition,
the mesh-networking itself is a new design that may not work
as well without line of sight, and certainly requires
neighboring nodes to be on simultaneously (affecting power
requirements). Of course, at some point nearby, there needs to
be a viable uplink to the Internet.
Will the hardware last in hot, humid, dusty, and generally
unprotected environments? Ruggedness is part of the design,
and calculators certainly are robust, but they are built for less
continuous usage. More importantly, they are built as closed
systems. OLPC systems are designed to be interactive, with
new content and interconnectedness. What happens when
there is a virus loaded onto the OLPC? Who creates (and
controls) content? The OLPC is visionary (with real
innovation in the display proposed), and if it performs as
advertised, at $100, many people in richer communities will
want one.
15
But what problem is it solving, where, and for
whom?
The problems of ICT and education are deeper than content
(un)availability, extending to teachers, funding, and value of
education in society (parents find competing “uses” for their
children). One common failure is ignorance of lifecycle costs,
or total costs of ownership (TCO). Studies in developed
countries indicate that the initial hardware is only about a
quarter of TCO or less. Developing countries may have
cheaper labor, but other infrastructure is often unavailable.
Also, skilled ICT personnel for e-education are difficult not
12
http://laptop.media.mit.edu/
13
Such a move can overcome some of the reasons for the Simputer’s
failure, where consumers chose to stay away from the product en masse,
which offered perhaps too little, too late, and didn’t consider integration of the
technology into the development ecosystem.
14
Battery lifespans are fickle, especially for less expensive (e.g., NiCad or
even NiMH) batteries.
15
There are extensive fears about a secondary market being set up for
these.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
only to train but also to retain; e-governance projects can
bring with them government perks, while e-commerce
solutions imply potential upside earnings.
C. e-Governance and Land-records: Bhoomi Project
India has several state level e-Governance projects, some
focused on land-record digitization. Metrics for success are a
key issue in such programs. Heeks [10] finds usage of
Gyandoot (in Madhya Pradesh) limited after the initial
program. Financial sustainability of many programs is in
doubt, e.g., Akshaya in Kerala.
16
The Bhoomi project of
Karnataka is celebrated as a success, often cited by the World
Bank (a funding agency). While the transactions may have
been quicker and with less direct corruption, such metrics
were based on surveys of users of such programs (people in
the line). This failed to measure those outside the system, or
unintended consequences: increasing dispossession of land
from marginal farmers [30]. The systems not only lacked
security mechanisms to prevent such abuses, they also lacked
feedback to modify the solutions quickly enough.
D. e-Choupal
Indian multinational ITC Ltd.’s e-Choupal initiative is
regarded a success in ICT for development, winning the 2005
Development Foundation’s ICT and Development Prize. The
high-level business model is one of removing the middleman
between the farmer and the grain procurer (such as ITC) using
ICT infrastructure for price-discovery and trading, with both
ends benefiting from the improved efficiency and lower
transaction costs. Kumar [31] calculates an estimated 3.9 year
payback for ITC for their investment.
ITC’s design was important in its success. Central to the
model was the selection of a local farmer (Sanchalak) to
operate the system, as an entrepreneur. He would help
overcome literacy issues amongst farmers, and also help build
up trust in the system. Related to trust is the design geared
around empowerment—the farmers could gain free
information using the system, and ITC (and the Sanchalak)
would only get paid if a transaction was fulfilled. ITC,
learning from earlier trials, also integrated the ICT into their
physical supply chain, with receiving warehouses within
tractorable distance—ICT was not enough in and of itself.
The e-Choupal model is not revolutionary from a
technology perspective, but it is highly replicable and
sustainable. It already covers roughly 5,000,000 farmers in
India, and they are leveraging the infrastructure for additional
services including e-commerce (with higher quality goods
than previously available), e-health, and women’s
empowerment. However, this solution will not easily work in
many other regions. Many other countries don’t have the
supply chain set up for such systems, and officials at the Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN believe the
entrepreneurial model will not work in much of Africa (as per
personal discussions).
16
If programs provide social value, external or cross-subsidies can be
appropriate policies.
E. Google
In just a few years, “Googling” has joined the dictionary as
a verb, speaking volumes of the integration of the search
engine into society. While many studies have been written
about Google’s technology and the rise of the company, there
is less written about the design perspective. Of course, Google
is not an ICT4D solution per se, but, being free and virtually
synonymous with searching, it has trickled down even into
development uses and is illustrative for several reasons. It
began its earlier life with a focus on just doing search, and
doing it well with a clean user interface. It has since
expanded, but consumers liked the speed and accuracy of their
algorithms. Consumers would often give feedback, but the
greater inclusivity was towards application and software
developers, who could avail of tools and application
programming interfaces (APIs) to build upon Google’s
technology. Thus, there became an ecosystem of users and
developers. Google also pioneered micropayments to content
developers, big and small, for advertisements through their
targeted advertising AdSense technology. Thus, everyone
benefited as Google grew in popularity. There was another
element to Google’s success – trust. Google refused to
intermix paid advertisements with search results, not only
maintaining a clean interface, but avoiding conflicts of
interest.
F. IT for Smart Electricity Metering
Electricity is considered a primary development need.
Indeed, ICT cannot function without energy. Developing
countries face significant shortfalls in power, often related to
the poor financial and technical state of their utilities.
Electricity theft is a major challenge in developing countries,
with losses (both theft and technical) as high is 25+% in India
and Nigeria [32]. In contrast, China and the US have only
~8% total losses in transmission and distribution, mainly
technical losses.
Earlier, electromechanical meters are now being replaced
by more accurate, digital meters, and there are proposals to
incorporate communications and control into meters to reduce
theft and allow better operations (such as load reduction
during periods of shortfall) and improved power quality [33].
Unfortunately, there are no standards for such ICT, and most
solutions are proprietary and expensive.
The ecosystem is also disparate with a variety of
stakeholders. Appliance vendors also envision a “smart home”
but are developing proprietary or independent solutions.
Utility personnel may be resentful of such technologies as it
reduces labor requirements (and also cuts off a source of illicit
income).
Breaking this chicken and egg cycle may require regulatory
intervention, but electricity regulators are often risk averse
and are typically unaware of ICT’s potential for fundamental
transformations in the power market. It is unclear who should
drive the process—utilities, vendors, regulators, or consumer
groups, etc.—but it is clear that without open standards,
solutions will be geared towards niche markets (high margins
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
but low volumes).
17
The few scenarios where such solutions have been
deployed or are under development, such as the Italian utility
Enel with blanket deployment, there is a single strong
stakeholder driving the process [33]. This is similar to many
ICT4D or even development projects overall, where there is a
champion required to shepherd the process through political
and bureaucratic barriers, e.g., a village elder or an NGO.
Champions often display one or more of the following
characteristics: respect, goodwill, authority, or a large
following.
17
Even modest improvements such as pre-paid metering (pioneered in S.
Africa to improve electrification in commercially risky Black Townships)
aren’t widespread.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
TABLE I
ICT4D DESIGN OUTLINE CASE EXAMPLES
Mobiles Edusat $100 Laptop Bhoomi Project e-Choupal Google
ICT for Smart
Electricity
Metering
Design Outline
1. Stakeholders
and their
needs
?: For voice X or ?? X or ??
/: Some
stakeholders
were left out
?: Trusted
operator
(Sanchalak) is
key to success
?
/: Consumers not
integrated;
vendors resisting
change
2. Performance
?; Still
expensive for
some users
X: Expensive,
uplink
capabilities esp.
limited
??: Advertised
specs appear
promising
/: Many users
were helped but
marginal farmers
were
disempowered
? ?
/: Incomplete
progress in
price-
performance
(innovation)
3. Incentives ? /
X: Only supply
side incentives
seem to be
worked out
?
?: ITC only gets
paid when the
farmer
voluntarily
transacts
? ?
4. Feedback and
participation
/: Supplier
driven, market
feedback;
Use of pre-paid
increased
participation
X
X: 1 million unit
order size limits
experimentation
X: couldn’t fix
design problems
easily
? ?
X: Lumpy model
of technology
diffusion adds
risks for early
adopters (need
large volumes)
5. Metrics
?: For voice
??: unknown
when
considering
widespread
ICT4D
?? or X ?? or X
/: Helped some
(efficiency) but
failed many
marginal
landowners
?
? / ?? (for
ICTD): Data
limitations
?
6. Sustainable ?
/: Only through
govt. support
?? ? ?
?: But, can be
displaced by
competition over
time (supplier
risk)
?: With the right
design, can lead
to savings and
new services
7. Scalable
/: Rural growth
is difficult
/: Easy to add a
single school;
Ultimate
capacity limited
? or ??: IF
buyers continue
to pay
~$100/device
?
/: Deployment
process is effort-
intensive; not all
regions are
suitable
candidates
? ?
8. Acceptable ? ?? ?? / ? ?
/: Potential
savings
welcomed;
Resistance to
change by
regulators and
even consumers
Why it
worked/failed
Leapfrogged
landlines; was
empowering
Some users were
helped, others,
esp. outside the
system, were
hurt
Benefits were
shared by farmer
and ITC
(promoter);
became trusted
Created an
ecosystem of
users
Verdict
Success for
voice; less
evidence for
broader
development
Work in
progress
Work in
progress
Mixed success
(depends on
metric!)
Success
Success in
original mission;
Limited in
development
Work in
progress
? = Positive
X = Negative
/ = Neutral
?? = Unknown
VI. A NEW MODEL: ENCOMPASSING STAKEHOLDERS,
INCENTIVES, FEEDBACK, AND DEPLOYMENT
Tongia et. al, [9] present a process flow diagram for ICT for
development which incorporates feedback from users and
posits availability, affordability, and acceptability as key
attributes of ICT solutions as used for development. This also
includes deployment as a component of the R&D space. We
present an enhancement to that model to explicitly allow for
stakeholder participation in the problem formulation and
design phase.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
As Table I shows, every failure had difficulties with one or
more step in the design outline, and this holds true for other
failures not in the list. E.g., the much-touted Simputer, which
was eventually commercialized but has seen abysmal sales,
simply didn’t provide value to potential users (let alone the
poor, the original target users). It wasn’t integrated into
development needs, and there was no practical ecosystem
producing content, applications, etc. Of course, one cannot
claim the converse, that adhering to the outline will lead to
success.
To overcome the limitations of a technology-centric push,
and to improve the design as per the outline presented before,
we present a framework and process we have been
experimenting with to both aid designing of new products and
for the analysis of existing products (services and physical
products). In this model of design [34], the basic elements are:
1) Stakeholders
2) Goals
3) Design variables and design space
4) Tests and attendant metrics for goals
5) Starting points (historical solutions) (Fig. 1)
All of these are situated in the context of the ecosystem
within which the needs are addressed by the problem. In this
model, we stress the importance of formulating the right
problem and to create alternative problem formulations in
contrast to the classic product design approaches where
alternatives to the product solutions and their evaluations are
the focus. This process supplants the classic model of the lone
designers or technology driven approaches to product and
needs addressing. In this model of participation, we use the
results from computational experiments with asynchronous
distributed agent (stakeholder) problem solving [35] and use it
in the context of problem formulation.
The fundamental reason for adopting this framework is that
all ICT design problems for development are “wicked
problems” and the definition of the problem emerges in the
context of identifying the problem and its solution [36]. It is
the ill-structured nature of the problem being solved that does
not lend it self to assuming that the problem has been defined
in terms of perceived needs for which there might exist a
straight forward method of problem solving. Other
characteristics of wicked problems include [36]:
18
• Wicked problems cannot be formulated definitively
• Wicked problems have no stopping rules
• Solutions are not true-or-false but good-or-bad
19
• Wicked problems cannot be tested definitively or
immediately
• Every implemented solution to a wicked problem has
consequences
• Wicked problems do not have a well-described set of
potential solutions
• Every wicked problem is unique
18
Taken from: Lesley Seebeck
(http://www.itee.uq.edu.au/~lesley/Complex%20Adaptive%20Systems.htm
)
19
We add that there are also shades of grey, with trade-offs.
• Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom
of another problem
• Wicked problems interlock and overlap and change
over time
• The causes of a wicked problem can be explained in
numerous ways
• The planner, or designer, has no right to be wrong
In short, ICT4D is a wicked problem!
Insights from prior work on asynchronous distributed agent
algorithms have directed us to a problem elicitation process
that identifies multiple groups of people with each group
made up of people with diverse backgrounds (functional,
expertise and social) that share their mental models of the
problems throughout the process of problem formulation.
Each group uses the framework elicited above by first
identifying the set of stakeholders for a given problem
statement and their goals and they exchange this information
across these groups, ideally through formal mechanisms. Once
the step is taken the group identifies the ecosystem in which
the problem is to be solved and possibly revises their
stakeholder spaces and goals to understand who should be
included and what should be outside the boundary defined by
the ecosystem. Having resolved these, each group identifies
the design and decision variables and goes through the sharing
process. In the course of sharing the group of groups identifies
a prototypical solution to the problem. The prototypical
solution arises out of previous efforts in solving the problem
and their failures and successes. This prototypical solution and
the formulations by the groups up to that point are used by the
groups to develop the metrics and tests to detail the
formulations of the problem.
Construct Construct
Full Design Full Design
Space Space
Prioritize Prioritize
Design Design
Space Space
Select Goals, Select Goals,
Ecosystem, Ecosystem,
and Metrics and Metrics
Formulate Formulate
Problem Problem
Prune Prune
Design Design
Space Space
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
…
…
E
n
d
S
t
a
t
e
Construct Construct
Full Design Full Design
Space Space
Prioritize Prioritize
Design Design
Space Space
Select Goals, Select Goals,
Ecosystem, Ecosystem,
and Metrics and Metrics
Formulate Formulate
Problem Problem
Prune Prune
Design Design
Space Space
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
…
…
E
n
d
S
t
a
t
e
Fig. 1. ICT for Development Design Process. Based on design for Wicked
Problems, this framework shows how different stakeholders fit together like
pieces of a puzzle, and must iterate to define the problem. The solution per se
derives from the problem formulation.
Eventually each group presents its view of the problem as
formulated and this often leads to multiple formulations of the
problem, with different collection of goals, priorities, problem
details, metrics, and tests for satisfactory acceptance. Such a
scenario of multiple formulations of the problem must lead to
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
not merely a debate on which is the most appropriate
formulation for a given context but also the explicit
identification of the trade-offs being made in the problem
being formulated. Ultimately, the set of decision-makers must
converge on a chosen solution to be developed and deployed.
Importantly, this model allows for experimentation and
continual updating to the processes. Of course, in the real
world, some of these steps in our proposed design model are
undertaken in implicit or embedded means.
Personal discussions with ITC regarding their e-Choupal
initiative indicates they followed a somewhat similar
approach, giving extreme importance to identification of
stakeholders and aligning incentives. E.g., for choosing a
Sanchalak (operator), they make multiple visits to a village to
find an appropriate person based on multiple critera including
standing in the village, trust in the community, farming
experience, entrepreneurship, and risk tolerance [37]. An early
prototype system showed difficulties in closing transactions,
so ITC redesigned the system to better link the information to
the physical supply chain infrastructure by moving storage
and transaction locations closer to consumers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on ICT and development experiences, we find a
majority of current solutions wanting. Yes, there may be a
flurry or activity and even innovation in this space, and there
are real-world results being achieved. However, these are
often narrow verticals of deployment, driven by the project at
hand (and associated funding), and metrics are limited at best.
Worse, development needs are often not integrated Into the
ICT design space: ICT for development as a wicked problem
is not yet recognized. The case examples show that
stakeholder roles are key to success or failure, and the overall
system design depends on this.
Solving the right problem is much harder than solving a
“given” problem. In teaching ICT and design, experience
shows students are good at solving problems once structured
for them, but teaching them to formulate the right problems is
hard, but important. Cultural issues and context are critical for
success, but there is evidence that in the education space there
is a reduced tendency to learning history and context, perhaps
in part due to changing priorities and the very nature of ICT –
the Internet offers instant gratification and information is
typically presented in small bites, often without rigor,
references, or assumptions. Using design methods and
practice as well as case examples from the ICT and
development space, we have proposed a new model for ICT
and Development design and R&D that fundamentally treats
the domain as that of appropriate problem definition, and
recognizes the central role of stakeholders and feedback. We
are currently experimenting in using the proposed framework
for ongoing ICT4D projects, but it is premature to expect any
results. We firmly believe that greater inclusion of
stakeholders in the design phase of solutions itself with formal
mechanisms for feedback and trade-off elicitations will lead to
far greater success in ICT for development than seen today.
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[23] Y. Reich, E. Subrahmanian, I. Monarch, S. Levy, and
S. L. Konda, "Varieties of Participation in Design,"
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[24] J. Hooker, "Concurrent Engineering at Caterpillar,"
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Germany, 1994.
[25] C. Kenney, "Financing Information and
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(Draft)," World Bank, Washington, DC 2005.
[26] ITU, "African Telecommunication Indicators 2004,"
ITU, Geneva May 2004 2004.
[27] M. Bishop, "Loose talk saves lives," in
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[28] UNI, "Postal department gearing for foray into
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[29] L. Felsenstein, "Problems with the $100 laptop," vol.
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doc_174467586.pdf
In this paper, we make the case that ICT projects in the developed and developing world often lead to partial or total failures due to the incomplete assessment of the problem being solved and the metrics used to evaluate solutions.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
Rahul Tongia, Member, IEEE, and Eswaran Subrahmanian
Information and Communications Technology
for Development (ICT4D) – A Design
Challenge?
Abstract— In this paper, we make the case that ICT projects in
the developed and developing world often lead to partial or total
failures due to the incomplete assessment of the problem being
solved and the metrics used to evaluate solutions. While in the
developed world the success of ICT solutions are often
determined by the market, with available infrastructure and
market mechanisms, in the developing world this ecosystem does
not exist thus requiring an understanding of the ecosystem in
which ICT solutions are to be applied. Using literature from the
design space, and experiences in ICT for development, we
elaborate the dimensions of design such as incorporation of
stakeholders, incentive structures, and design participation that
are critical to successful deployment. We examine some successes
and failures in product/solution development in the ICT area to
identify the dimensions of good design incorporated by these
products and services. With the perspective that ICT for
sustainable development issues are ill-structured and “wicked
problems” that have to incorporate all the defined dimensions of
design, we propose a model of product and service identification
and development that is based on insights from asynchronous
computational agent problem solving. We claim that new
methods such as the one proposed need to be identified,
developed and tested for their effectiveness in the development of
products and services that satisfy the needs of human
development.
Index Terms— Design, ICT and Development, Stakeholder
Participation , Wicked Problems
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) have
become a new tool in the path towards development, one that
has garnered increasing visibility (but also hype). The old
debate of bread vs. computers has moved from competition
towards complementarity.
1
However, many of the discussions
have focused on narrow interpretations of the “digital divide”
and the full scope of ICT, spanning new embedded devices or
sensors, databases, and algorithms, has not been developed to
meet human development needs.
R. Tongia is a faculty member at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,
in the School of Computer Science (ISRI) and the Dept. of Engineering &
Public Policy. He is also the Associate Director of the TechBridgeWorld
project at Carnegie Mellon (phone: 412-268-5619; fax: 412-268-2338; e-mail:
[email protected]).
E. Subrahmanian is a Research Professor at the Institute for Complex
Engineering Systems at Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, and is presently Visiting
Professor with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
1
“The issue is whether we accept that the poor should, in addition to the
existing deprivation of income, food and health service, etc., also be further
deprived of new opportunities to improve their livelihood.” [1]
Like the fable about the five blind men describing an
elephant, ICT and development has often been looked at in
parts. There are various technological and operational
components that go into design of these development
initiatives. There are multiple stakeholders, some of whom
may be indirect. There are different innovators and solution
providers, sometimes focusing on only one aspect of solution.
There are different contexts and frameworks for development,
including regulations and funding. The varying stakeholders
may also have different objectives, incentives, metrics for
success, and initial conditions. Until all of these are
considered in a holistic manner, as an ecosystem, the full
potential of ICT for development will remain elusive, and
many projects will fail.
We posit that if development is the desired goal,
stakeholders’ incentives and metrics must closely align. This
means that worrying about ICT price-performance is not
suitable as a standalone metric, nor complementary metrics
such as throughput or even scalability/replicability.
2
These are
all important components of any solution, but global metrics
must be focused on the intended beneficiaries or end-users, in
whom we should look for development benefits.
The ill-defined nature of ICT for development (ICT4D)
complicates the space significantly, and much of the literature
is ad-hoc or anecdotal. In this paper, we frame ICT4D as a
design problem, and use several cases to analyze failures and
successes. We analyze these cases in terms of asymmetries of
information in terms of inclusion of stakeholders, poor design
processes and misaligned incentives mechanisms. These
failures reflect the inability to solve the right problem of needs
of development and a technology driven tendency to solve the
wrong problem optimally, as is often the case in many design
problems [2].
Following sections of this paper go through the issues of
stakeholders, metrics, incentives, and design, followed by
select case studies. We subsequently present a new ICT4D
model, based on commonalities and shortcomings gleaned
from the case studies and literature.
2
We distinguish between growing solutions in scale and in volume as
“bigger” is not necessarily “better.” Economies of scale often have limits,
especially factoring in logistical and bureaucratic challenges, but there are
more fundamental issues of equity and (re)distribution.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
II. ICT4D DOMAIN SPACE
A. Defining Stakeholders – Divides in ICT4D
At a high level, the stakeholders can be thought of as:
• Development beneficiaries (general or targeted
population)
• Development / Services providers (government,
utilities, NGOs, commercial entities)
• ICT developers and providers (commercial, non-
profits, entrepreneurs)
• Funding entities, regulators, purveyors or enforcers
of social/legal norms
Inherently, many of the targeted beneficiaries are
“disconnected” from the mainstream. The underserved lack
not only physical connectivity but social or political avenues
for participation. This is has been a major challenge in not
only meeting their needs but also in bringing them to the table
in development projects.
There is mixed evidence regarding democracy and
development [3], but studies have shown that order and
accountability are strong determinants of development [4].
Democracy itself has limitations when it comes to
development, not necessarily in theory but certainly in
practice stemming from bureaucracy, segmented
disempowerment, factionalism, etc. India is considered a
vibrant democracy, and China has much more authoritarian
control, but there are significantly fewer people lacking basic
human needs in (a measure of “development”) than in India.
For example, over 98% of Chinese have in-home electricity
[5], but in India almost half of homes are not connected to the
electricity grid [6]; the authors indicate governmental policies
are a prime factor for such variance. This disconnect extends
to the limits of using markets and market signals to spur new
solutions—many people are outside markets, let alone
efficient markets. DeSoto [7] argues that the informal
economy and lack of liquidity towards formal economic
systems limits participation and empowerment of the
underprivileged. Cobb and Daly [8] refer to economics
especially suffering from a “Fallacy of misplaced
concreteness” because of issues with markets, measurements,
human rationality, and resources. In ICTD, there is a parallel
tendency to assume that the main challenges are developing
the “optimal solutions” at the “right cost.”
The term “digital divide” is popular to describe divides
between groups of people, but this is recognized by many as
being a symptom of underlying divides and of capabilities, not
merely differences between “haves vs. have nots.” [9]
Unfortunately, a (narrow) focus on the digital divide has
distracted if not hijacked many ICT4D efforts. Bringing a
computer into poor, rural areas is unlikely to help education
significantly, at least not on its own. But such projects garner
significant media attention and funding. The real space of
development is vast, spanning infrastructure, food, healthcare,
education, economic growth/jobs, governance, and
empowerment.
Another divide in the ICT4D space is that between ICT
professionals and development professionals.
3
Heeks [10]
argues that ICTs may or may not be relevant to the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the MDGs
themselves must be examined critically. On the other hand,
Tongia, et. al [9] conjecture that ICT can help with the MDGs
or at least development broadly if we think of alternatively
designed technologies and solutions than today, in short
advocating innovation and new R&D and not trickle-down.
Today, development professionals rarely interact with ICT
R&D professionals; at best they know of select technologies
that are available today. However, given the dramatic speed of
technological innovation in ICT, there is especially greater
need for interactions by development professionals and end-
users to help guide ICT R&D. This divide often parallels a
geographic divide, termed East/West or North/South.
A third divide exists in ICT4D between different groupings
of stakeholders: academics, industry, government, funding
groups (which may not be the government), field
professionals (including NGOs), and targeted beneficiaries.
For starters, the users of the ICT-based solutions may not be
the desired end-beneficiaries; NGOs often play the role of
intermediary, required given literacy and logistical constraints
amongst much of the population. Funding groups often have
statutory or charter constraints, and they often seek “visible
solutions” that limit longer-term ICT4D solutions that are not
readily deployable. Industry is often pushing solutions driven
by “market” expectations, which may be understandable given
their shareholder obligations. Work recognizing the bottom
(or, the more politically correctly, “base”) of the pyramid as
an untapped market [11] has not yet resulted in major,
fundamental innovations by the ICT industry, though they are
working on improving the size, scale, costs, and robustness of
their offerings. Academia is often accused of acting in a
vacuum (the “ivory tower”), and limited scholarly analysis of
ICT4D works self-limit the short-term value of academic
research. Academia also suffers from time lag issues, in that
many rigorous studies require data over time series, and the
publication and dissemination process itself can take 1-2
years.
4
In the middle, you have the governments, who
ostensibly have a development focus. While there are a variety
of responses and roles governments have taken in this space,
from being a consumer of ICT, spurring R&D, setting
legislation and regulations, deploying e-Governance
programs, etc., given limited government budgets and ICT
skills, it is unlikely they can be more than an enabler for other
stakeholders.
These divides are important when we remember that ICT4D
3
It has been commented that, in parallel, scientists and social scientists
observe and explain, while engineers solve practical problems or intervene.
4
There was relatively little academic representation at WSIS, and scholars
would counter much of the efforts were not academically rigorous, focusing
on select cases, pilot projects, etc. One participant also raised the interesting
point of self-reinforcing feedback and social networks at events like WSIS
[12], essentially questioning the value of consultants spending other people’s
money on such efforts; true “grassroots” people were not in attendance. With
30,000 attendees, WSIS Phase II would easily have cost on the order of
$100m, and probably much more including preparatory work and conferences.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
is a work in progress, with substantial innovation and effort
required to achieve development goals. Many experts believe
the true needs of development require not all-purpose
computers per se, which are powerful but expensive, but
specialized ICT devices to meet specific needs, e.g., soil
condition monitoring or a biomedical “lab on a chip.” There
are limited “off the shelf” solutions, and the need for
customizing the ICT solutions for specific classes of needs is
central. The need to balance cost, usability, scalability,
maintainability, recyclability and relatively long life cycle of
the solution becomes critical in the context of development.
Without the understanding of the overall ecosystems of the
product operation, the products will often fail, and such an
understanding is not achieved through isolation of the
technologists from the people for whom solutions are targeted.
B. Incentive structures
ICT usage in development is a means, and not an end. ICT
may or may not be cost-effective on its own (e.g., saving
transaction or transportation costs) but it may improve
development outcomes in non-monetized forms. It may be
more straightforward to account for ICT costs benefits only in
direct monetized terms, but on such grounds, it may fail in
terms of opportunity costs. For example, a dollar spent on
distributing condoms may have hundreds of dollars of return
(disease and unwanted pregnancy prevention); ICT for
healthcare is unlikely to produce such returns. However, ICT
infrastructure would have multiple benefits, usable across
many development themes. One challenge is of determining
appropriate boundaries and transactions between stakeholders
and beneficiaries, especially as we straddle the public and
private domains. For this reason, the government is often cited
as an appropriate shepherd for, say, ICT infrastructure.
However, many professionals feel it is best for the
government to step in only in specific cases where there are
issues of size, scale, or market failures, as was the case in rural
electrification in the developed world. Governments,
especially developing country ones, are also not going to
innovate at the cutting edge of ICT; their role is more one of
diffusion and deployment.
Easterly [13] posits that (lack of) incentives are a key
reason for failure of development projects, and externally
imposed solutions are predisposed to failure. If we consider
ICT4D, some consumer products have been successful
specifically because consumers are able to “vote with their
wallets.” However, the incentive (or barriers) to innovate in
fundamental technology creation is not the same as that for
service provisioning or deployment. In addition, if we
consider the 4Cs of ICT (computers, content, connectivity and
(human) capacity), different components have different
barriers to entry and profitability. Mobile phone providers in
the US routinely give away free handsets in return for annual
contracts. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, etc., make an enormous
number of services available online for free. Of course, they
make their money from advertisements, product tie-ins, and
paid versions with enhanced services. However, if we
consider ICT usage for development, e.g., e-Governance
programs, similar models would likely face troubling privacy
implications, equity concerns, and potential conflicts of
interest.
C. Metrics
Stakeholder goals can be in explicit or implicit conflict; a
cheaper product may mean lower profits for a supplier.
Classical economics labels equilibrium points where no
stakeholder would change their position (price, quantity, etc.)
as being Pareto optimal (any one’s improvement results in a
deterioration of utility for the other(s)). As is known Pareto-
optimality does not necessarily produce a just solution as it
depends on initial endowments of the stakeholders.
Even if we have a common goal, with aligned incentives,
we must determine what is or isn’t failure outside of the
Pareto nature of the solution. Heeks [14] segments projects as
total failures, partial failures (goals partially met, unintended
consequences, or sustainability challenges) or successes.
ICT4D projects often lack rigorous analysis or metrics, not to
mention baselines, and without analyses that move beyond the
level of case studies, it is difficult to obtain a clearer picture.
This is further complicated by ICT4D being a dynamic
process, with goals that can not only shift over time, but also
are inherently dependent on the goals of stakeholders and their
ability to participate in defining the right development
problem to be solved. In the rural US, the digital divide has
moved from merely accessing the Internet (widely available
through dial-up) to having broadband. Consumer groups and
municipalities interested in providing broadband have often
been restricted due to regulatory statutes that confer a
monopoly or rights of first provision to the incumbent service
provider. An additional challenge in metrics is one of
granularity; most data (and even analysis) are based on
national numbers – this says nothing about, say, rural or
region-specific deployment. Indian Government data indicate
teledensity approaching 10%, but this is based on urban
penetrations approaching 30%, and rural penetrations under
2%.
ICTs find greater use in developed regions, often for use
outside the traditional “ICT4D” moniker. Heeks [14] states
that there is no evidence or theory why failures would be
higher in developing countries, but we conjecture there may
greater failures in developing regions be because: (1) ICT is
not just an incremental improvement in efficiency, but can
represent or catalyze enormous social shifts; (2) Infrastructure
is worse developed; (3) Complementary institutions are less
developed (courts/rule of law, regulators, etc.); (4)
stakeholders have lower familiarity with the solutions; (5) the
initial conditions (baselines) are often worse.
In spite of these, there are still many failures in ICT projects
in developed regions, largely because of design issues.
Examples include the iridium satellite constellation, which
failed as a business venture, or the deployment of customer
relations management (CRM) solutions by enterprises. In the
latter, roughly 80% of projects fail or are over budget and/or
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
over time [15], largely because of hidden or unbudgeted
(secondary) costs.
III. ICT4D INNOVATION CHALLENGES
The traditional model of R&D as a sequence of steps is one
of generating a number of ideas from large scale and
expensive fundamental research that is detached from end
uses, and then adaptation of the research to needs by isolated
inventors leading to marketing and adoption of products
through the early adopters and subsequent diffusion. von
Hippel [16] in his studies of product innovation makes the
case that the users are often the leading innovators as they are
the ones who understand their particular needs and their
inclusion removes the information asymmetry that inherently
exists between the technologist and the user. This asymmetry
extends beyond the user-technologists divide but also the
social and political context in which the product is expected to
operate.
There is a widespread belief that fundamental research is
expensive and risky, with many steps of potential failure,
because of the serialized model of innovation that is assumed
in the current models of R&D. Thus, “big R&D” is best left to
national labs or well-funded groups, who may
(pharmaceuticals) or may not (bell labs, CERN) be aiming to
appropriate their innovation. On the other hand, innovation in
the ICT4D space has several components beyond just devices;
the 4C framework spans Computers (devices); Connectivity;
Content, and (human) Capacity. While the capabilities in
building a mobile phone may be with only a handful of
entities, creating content or human capacity is certainly within
the scope of many stakeholders. Even device and network
innovations are possible at the edge, e.g., through community
wireless mesh networks using ~$50 commodity wireless
routers for city-wide networks (1-4 per sq. km) [17].
5
However, when we consider ICT for specific development
needs, e.g., the so-termed medical “lab on a chip,” such new
solutions will require fundamental advances in technology,
which translates to extensive R&D. Given the long lead times
and risks inherent in such innovation, how do we classify
what are important problems in the ICT4D space? Several
scholars have advocated determining the “Grand Challenges”
of the space, but this will not be as easy as, say, in Computer
Science. Not only is the field nascent, there is the need to
integrate various stakeholders operating under different
assumptions, thresholds, and initial conditions.
A. ICT4D Innovation - Trickle Down, Watered Down, or
Upside Down?
Generalizing ICT innovation is difficult if not impossible,
given the range of the ICT space (the 4Cs). However, there
are several commonalities seen in ICT usage in development
scenarios. One mode is trickle down, where solutions from
developed countries make their way to developing regions
over some period of time. PCs, mobile phones, or digital
cameras are common examples, where everyone benefits from
continuous innovation, and the volumes initially came from
developed countries. Trickle down solutions may or may not
also have reduced feature sets or functionality. Part of this
may be driven by cost differentials, but part of this is driven
by market segmentation and a desire not to cannibalize more
profitable markets. Microsoft’s Windows Starter Edition is a
useful portfolio expansion at a more affordable price, about an
order of magnitude lower than full versions, but it is ironic
that it cost extra money to “innovate” to reduce its features
and functionality versus the normal Windows XP.
5
Even after adding in antennae, weatherproofing, etc., such systems can be
as low as ~$100/node.
Computers can find good use in many developing regions,
often in educational institutions or some businesses. However,
visit any government office in developing countries, and one
may also find a PC in the office, especially if the official is
senior. However, what applications are running? Is it more
than a glorified typewriter? Is the machine networked, (and if
so, used for more than reading the sports score)? Backed up?
Until the end-user and related stakeholders are involved in the
ICT decision making process, ICT’s use or integration will be
limited.
Can we turn the innovation framework upside down, with
user needs driving innovation and design? For this, we must
start with a clearer understanding of the needs space, as well
as understanding the ICT space overall, itself a complex
ecosystem with hardware, software, content, connectivity,
access/usability, maintenance, security and other components.
B. Design, Participatory Design and Open Standards
In engineering of products, we have seen over the last
century and a half a complete cycle in the understanding of
how products should be designed. We have moved from
products often designed by the user for the user, and often
manufactured by the user in the world of artisans, to the world
of mass manufacturing where designer, manufacturer and
users were divided as sequential actors in the process of
product creation and use. The failures during use by early
users were the impetus for product refinement, and mass
usage goals drove mass production. The sequential model of
product design was challenged in the 80s and 90s by
movements such as concurrent engineering and simultaneous
engineering [18]. In ICT field the incorporation of user in
design was defined as user centered engineering [19].
However, many of the goals of incorporating user
requirements and preferences were within the framework of
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) design, which relates to
human usage factors instead of human needs driving ICT
design. The supplier still has a mental model of what the need
is, and works to optimize the delivery of such needs.
These trends were due to the recognition of existence of
information asymmetries in the product design process as a
purely top-down process. The limitations of the top-down
processes have become apparent in the globalized world
where accommodation of variation in customer needs and
social context is important to success. This can be seen in
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
every aspect of product design both in physical and
information products [20] and hence the move by even
technology companies like Intel to employ anthropologists
and sociologists to understand cultural contexts of use for
generic technologies [21]. While these are a clear indication of
the acknowledgement of information asymmetries in the
product development arena the question remains are there
general methods for addressing these information asymmetries
for design of products and solutions, especially those that are
directed at development?
The banner of participatory design and the involvement of
the user in design has emerged as a mantra in the product
6
design area. In many cases, while this participation may be
limited, it has provided a means to limit uncertainty in the
adoption of the product. von Hippel [16] has advocated for
larger participation of the user either directly or indirectly
through user representatives who become translators and
bridges to overcome information asymmetry. Such models for
product design have found use in select contexts, often in
high-cost products such as commercial aircraft design; user-
driven specialized design in fields such as pharmaceutical or
high tech industries are less common. In his work on
democratizing innovation, von Hippel makes the case that
participation should be extended as innovation is often local
and user driven, e.g., in the case of surfboards and irrigation
systems. In many cases the users create these innovations due
to the lack of commercial products to satisfy their needs. This
is not surprising because as Petroski [22] points out
innovations take place by design and as recognition of failures
by the products that are in the market or non-existence of the
same. Importantly, innovators are not often these large
conglomerates but the users themselves. It is in this context
that Reich et.al [23] argue for exploring varieties of
participation in design and the use of ICT in the participation
process itself.
The participatory model of product design attempts to
addresses the information asymmetries identified by von
Hippel as the basis for his case for democratizing innovation.
The overall social cost of not addressing these asymmetries at
early stages of design reveal themselves in costly adaptation
and adoption processes by the users. Engineering design
studies indicate that 70% costs of product development are
committed in the design stage of the product whereas the cost
of the design stage accounts for 5% of the overall costs of
product development. It has also been observed that changes
later in the product design are an order of magnitude more
expensive than changes during the early part of design [24].
Early and continuous feedback from all the stakeholders is
critical to the success of the design of a product. The goal of
participatory design is to recognize that communication
among the stakeholders early and frequently is the key to
successful products.
Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS, aka FOSS—
sans Libre) is one popular example of participatory design,
and is considered a useful ICT model for developing
countries. There are pros and cons to FLOSS solutions, with
the latter especially based on steep learning curves for
adopters (total costs of ownership, instead of just upfront),
limited local availability of specialized talent, and also limits
to how such software can be used in proprietary solutions. We
must also recognize that true end-users (e.g., in the
development space) are very unlikely to guide the design of
FLOSS, except in niche solutions where the end-users are IT
savvy. In reality, FLOSS solutions have a relatively small core
group of designers and system architects. A parallel and
perhaps more useful development has been the emergence of
open standards, which may not be user driven but are driven
by select stakeholders, often competing. The WiFi
specification (based on IEEE’s 802.11 standard) is a good
example of open standards driving innovation (often as a
means of differentiation) and cost reduction. In under 10
years, the solutions have fallen in cost two orders of
magnitude, and the speeds have increased 52 times.
6
We mean product design in the general sense of solutions, both physical
and information-based.
In the ICT and development space, we can already see the
split in innovation, where end-users often innovate around
deployment, applications, and business models (e.g., Grameen
Phone), while designers innovate to expand their market (e.g.,
rugged PCs). Our initial analysis indicates that the link
between users and fundamental design will not be bridged all
the way in the short term, rather across some layers only.
Hardware will still be expensive to design, but once designed,
many products will become closer to a commodity. They will
also be more modular and expandable, often via software or
firmware. An example of this is the use of commodity WiFi
chipsets in inexpensive wireless routers that are sometimes
“hacked” by end-users with new embedded software
(firmware) to enable community mesh networks [17].
IV. DIMENSIONS OF ICT4D DESIGN
Based on the notion of ICT4D being primarily a design
challenge, distilling from our experiences and those found in
literature, below are characteristics or markers we need to
consider for “good” designs.
Improved ICT4D Design Outline
1. Who are the stakeholders, and what are their needs?
a. Are all stakeholders considered?
b. Are metrics for prior state (baseline)
available?
2. Does the technology perform well for the needs?
a. Is the Cost – Benefit (or other appropriate)
Analysis favorable (incorporating lifecycle,
non-monetized factors, etc.)?
b. Are there unintended consequences, positive
or negative?
c. How is the price-performance or cost
effectiveness?
d. Is the solution optimized (often an iterative
process or evolving)?
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
3. Do stakeholder incentives align?
a. Management of varying and often
conflicting stakeholders and/or goals
b. Development of the required ecosystem
c. Who “owns” the project or process
(responsibility)?
d. Is there a “champion” driving the process
(optional)?
4. Are there mechanisms for feedback or participation
by all stakeholders?
a. Design stage
b. Deployment stage
c. Diffusion state
5. Are metrics available for measuring success across
stakeholders?
a. Who measures – self, designated
stakeholder, or third party?
b. Are assumptions and methodologies
transparent?
c. What else has or can be done (alternatives
and opportunity costs)? Have lessons been
learned from prior experiences?
Clearly, stakeholders are central to the process, as
performance can only be in the context of their needs. In
addition, they are dynamic actors, displaying explicit or
implicit incentives, and different baselines. Metrics and
Performance can be considered duals, but separating the two
is useful for creating a starting point. Both of these have
additional characteristics, elaborated below.
6. Is the solution sustainable?
a. Supplier side – profitable
b. Consumer side – affordable
c. Concerns:
i. If subsidies are required, will they
be available continually?
ii. Is this viable only in some select
cases (cherry-picking)?
7. Is the solution scalable?
a. Can it grow beyond a pilot?
b. Will it work in other regions or cultures?
c. Will economic sustainability remain with
scaling?
8. Is the solution acceptable?
a. Displacement of vested interests – issues of
political economy
b. Culturally acceptable?
c. Trustworthy?
d. Empowering?
e. Will people use it of their free will?
Naturally, there are tradeoffs involved. In the IT world, a
common adage is “Cheaper, faster, better – pick any two”
(derived from NASA usage). Solutions that can “revolutionize
the world” or lead to dramatic improvements are more prone
to failure, but smaller projects, which may indeed significantly
improve local conditions or provide incremental benefits, may
not be applicable across wider or different areas. Some of the
best examples of ICT based solutions are those with very low
barriers to entry or usage—the solution can spread by word of
mouth, almost “virally.” Skype, the VoIP solution, was such
an example. It typically has 4-5+ million concurrent users
online and the software has been downloaded over 220
million times.
7
Metrics do not necessarily mean a cost-benefit calculus, let
alone a positive one. Some projects are true experiments, e.g.,
studying the user adoption rates for new technologies, where
there is no expectation of cost-effectiveness. However, even in
such cases, chosen metrics must be stated up front to
determine “success” or effectiveness.
V. CASE EXAMPLES OF ICT, DEVELOPMENT, AND
INNOVATION
Given the ICT4D design outline, we present case examples
of some ICT projects especially as applied to development.
These are shown not as full case studies but to convey select
design aspects; some of these are ongoing or even proposed
solutions. Table I summarizes these cases in the ICT4D
Design Outline.
A. Mobiles and the Digital Divide
Mobile phones are a runaway success, especially in
developing countries. Landline growths are only a few percent
per annum, but mobiles have grown by an order of magnitude
more, and, e.g., African mobiles teledensity is now ~10% [25]
from nearly zero a few years ago.
Mobiles clearly filled a need, for people to communicate
and share information, and they responded by spending a fair
amount of their income on this solution. Mobiles’ average
2003-04 revenues per user (ARPU) in Africa were
~$25/month, approaching the average income [26]. This was
more than double the ARPU in India. Of course, average
numbers are misleading, a major shortcoming of most studies
of the digital divide. E.g., both income and infrastructure
availability are concentrated in urban or richer areas.
Mobiles grew in part due to technology improvements, but
also because they were offered by efficient and (often)
competitive operators. Most initial African deployments (per
country) were by private operators, who had almost no
waiting list. In addition, the innovation to use a pre-paid card
overcame financial credit limitations. The mobile phone
replaced desire for a landline as it could be used at home,
work, and on the road – a single device sufficed. Mobiles
were easy to use, with the design overcoming end-user
limitations of literacy, education or infrastructure. We posit
mobiles also succeeded in that they were not an interim
solution, or watered down from developed country solutions
(often, they leapfrogged ahead). Under the 4C framework,
ease of use by end-users can be framed in terms of content—
anyone can produce as well as consume content, unlike the
Internet where even skilled, literate users are more likely to be
consumers than producers.
7
This metric is misleading, as users likely download several versions over
time, especially to upgrade. Nonetheless, Skype is estimated to have multiple
times more users than any other competitive VoIP solution, with zero
advertising outlay.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
Mobile phones provide value to users. Studies show an
increased 0.6% GDP growth rate for every 10% higher mobile
penetration [27]. But this is correlation, not causality—
perhaps operators picked the more economically favorable
regions for deployment?
Moving beyond voice, there are mixed results for extending
mobiles to other uses. If we consider use of mobiles for data
connectivity, the bandwidth is limited, claims of 3G wireless
systems notwithstanding, and the costs are very high.
8
Alternative wireless and community networking solutions
may be superior, but need regulatory approval. The problem is
one where the mobile operators in developing countries have
become the equivalent of the landline incumbents in
developed countries, entities who want to restrict competition
and aim to expand into new services, often relying on weak
regulations. Such limits on new entrants are reinforced by the
incumbent carrier also typically having control over key
aspects of connectivity, such as the international gateway.
Other needs for which mobiles are considered a possible
solution or facilitator include inexpensive financial
transactions. But the countries that lead in “mobile wallet”
deployments are Japan, Korea, and W. European countries,
where the back-end (banking) system is well developed. In
contrast, in many developing countries, informal banking
systems are the norm, and the postal system handles more
savings than any other traditional bank; e.g., in India it has
~$85 billion in deposits [28].
9
While mobiles can and do work
for economic transactions, they are a closed system,
10
requiring the active participation of the mobile provider to
enable the system and the transactions (indeed, the mobile
provider may be taking a cut from all the transactions). A
more open but still trusted solution, even using mobiles, might
grow faster.
B. ICT for Education
Knowledge relates to education in fundamental ways, and
information can be considered a stepping stone towards
knowledge. ICT for education is fundamentally about content,
and one of the unspoken goals is to mitigate the unavailability
of teachers in developing regions. Due to limited
interconnectivity, most ICT for education has not been real-
time interactive, relying either on unidirectional broadcasts
(including TV) or content on a CD or disk (nicknamed
“broadband by station wagon”).
EduSat is the Indian governmental initiative to use satellite
connectivity for interactive ICT education.
11
It is driven the by
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), and enjoys
significant central government support. However, it is unclear
to what extent teachers have been integrated into the schema.
In addition, on a price-performance basis, the scheme appears
wanting. Satellite connectivity is inherently expensive,
especially if we want high bandwidth bi-directionally. ISRO
states the capital cost per school to connect will be
~$3,800/interactive node,
8
In S. Africa, Vodacom’s website (Dec 2005) indicates 3G costs are
roughly 2 Rand/MB. For 1 GB/month, this means about $300/month.
9
The postal system has enormous deposits even in Japan, a driver for
Prime Minister Koizumi’s attempts at reforming the postal system.
10
In contrast, in the Internet innovation can occur freely at the edge, by
design; the links are just a “dumb cloud.”
11
http://www.edusatindia.org/center.htm
excluding computers or A/V
equipment that can cost more, a very high barrier to scaling.
One Laptop Per Child (OLPC, formerly the $100 Laptop)
is MIT’s Prof. Negroponte’s vision for a cheap computer for
education.
12
It is geared towards developing countries, with a
hand crank for power and mesh-based connectivity options.
However, like EduSat, it appears to be a top-down solution, to
be sold (on a non-profit basis) to Ministries of Education in a
minimum order size of 1,000,000 units.
13
While
standardization has its advantages, it also limits the ability to
iterate. This also represents a major barrier to adoption in
poorer regions, where per-primary student (not capita)
education expenditures can be ~$20/year or lower. How much
of the cost reduction is due to innovations, and how much due
to the non-profit status (and attendant “free” innovation from
co-developers), and how much from the economies of
volume? There have been other critiques of this model as
well, including the physics of battery charging based on a
crank aimed for a 1:6 charging:usage ratio[29].
14
In addition,
the mesh-networking itself is a new design that may not work
as well without line of sight, and certainly requires
neighboring nodes to be on simultaneously (affecting power
requirements). Of course, at some point nearby, there needs to
be a viable uplink to the Internet.
Will the hardware last in hot, humid, dusty, and generally
unprotected environments? Ruggedness is part of the design,
and calculators certainly are robust, but they are built for less
continuous usage. More importantly, they are built as closed
systems. OLPC systems are designed to be interactive, with
new content and interconnectedness. What happens when
there is a virus loaded onto the OLPC? Who creates (and
controls) content? The OLPC is visionary (with real
innovation in the display proposed), and if it performs as
advertised, at $100, many people in richer communities will
want one.
15
But what problem is it solving, where, and for
whom?
The problems of ICT and education are deeper than content
(un)availability, extending to teachers, funding, and value of
education in society (parents find competing “uses” for their
children). One common failure is ignorance of lifecycle costs,
or total costs of ownership (TCO). Studies in developed
countries indicate that the initial hardware is only about a
quarter of TCO or less. Developing countries may have
cheaper labor, but other infrastructure is often unavailable.
Also, skilled ICT personnel for e-education are difficult not
12
http://laptop.media.mit.edu/
13
Such a move can overcome some of the reasons for the Simputer’s
failure, where consumers chose to stay away from the product en masse,
which offered perhaps too little, too late, and didn’t consider integration of the
technology into the development ecosystem.
14
Battery lifespans are fickle, especially for less expensive (e.g., NiCad or
even NiMH) batteries.
15
There are extensive fears about a secondary market being set up for
these.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
only to train but also to retain; e-governance projects can
bring with them government perks, while e-commerce
solutions imply potential upside earnings.
C. e-Governance and Land-records: Bhoomi Project
India has several state level e-Governance projects, some
focused on land-record digitization. Metrics for success are a
key issue in such programs. Heeks [10] finds usage of
Gyandoot (in Madhya Pradesh) limited after the initial
program. Financial sustainability of many programs is in
doubt, e.g., Akshaya in Kerala.
16
The Bhoomi project of
Karnataka is celebrated as a success, often cited by the World
Bank (a funding agency). While the transactions may have
been quicker and with less direct corruption, such metrics
were based on surveys of users of such programs (people in
the line). This failed to measure those outside the system, or
unintended consequences: increasing dispossession of land
from marginal farmers [30]. The systems not only lacked
security mechanisms to prevent such abuses, they also lacked
feedback to modify the solutions quickly enough.
D. e-Choupal
Indian multinational ITC Ltd.’s e-Choupal initiative is
regarded a success in ICT for development, winning the 2005
Development Foundation’s ICT and Development Prize. The
high-level business model is one of removing the middleman
between the farmer and the grain procurer (such as ITC) using
ICT infrastructure for price-discovery and trading, with both
ends benefiting from the improved efficiency and lower
transaction costs. Kumar [31] calculates an estimated 3.9 year
payback for ITC for their investment.
ITC’s design was important in its success. Central to the
model was the selection of a local farmer (Sanchalak) to
operate the system, as an entrepreneur. He would help
overcome literacy issues amongst farmers, and also help build
up trust in the system. Related to trust is the design geared
around empowerment—the farmers could gain free
information using the system, and ITC (and the Sanchalak)
would only get paid if a transaction was fulfilled. ITC,
learning from earlier trials, also integrated the ICT into their
physical supply chain, with receiving warehouses within
tractorable distance—ICT was not enough in and of itself.
The e-Choupal model is not revolutionary from a
technology perspective, but it is highly replicable and
sustainable. It already covers roughly 5,000,000 farmers in
India, and they are leveraging the infrastructure for additional
services including e-commerce (with higher quality goods
than previously available), e-health, and women’s
empowerment. However, this solution will not easily work in
many other regions. Many other countries don’t have the
supply chain set up for such systems, and officials at the Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN believe the
entrepreneurial model will not work in much of Africa (as per
personal discussions).
16
If programs provide social value, external or cross-subsidies can be
appropriate policies.
E. Google
In just a few years, “Googling” has joined the dictionary as
a verb, speaking volumes of the integration of the search
engine into society. While many studies have been written
about Google’s technology and the rise of the company, there
is less written about the design perspective. Of course, Google
is not an ICT4D solution per se, but, being free and virtually
synonymous with searching, it has trickled down even into
development uses and is illustrative for several reasons. It
began its earlier life with a focus on just doing search, and
doing it well with a clean user interface. It has since
expanded, but consumers liked the speed and accuracy of their
algorithms. Consumers would often give feedback, but the
greater inclusivity was towards application and software
developers, who could avail of tools and application
programming interfaces (APIs) to build upon Google’s
technology. Thus, there became an ecosystem of users and
developers. Google also pioneered micropayments to content
developers, big and small, for advertisements through their
targeted advertising AdSense technology. Thus, everyone
benefited as Google grew in popularity. There was another
element to Google’s success – trust. Google refused to
intermix paid advertisements with search results, not only
maintaining a clean interface, but avoiding conflicts of
interest.
F. IT for Smart Electricity Metering
Electricity is considered a primary development need.
Indeed, ICT cannot function without energy. Developing
countries face significant shortfalls in power, often related to
the poor financial and technical state of their utilities.
Electricity theft is a major challenge in developing countries,
with losses (both theft and technical) as high is 25+% in India
and Nigeria [32]. In contrast, China and the US have only
~8% total losses in transmission and distribution, mainly
technical losses.
Earlier, electromechanical meters are now being replaced
by more accurate, digital meters, and there are proposals to
incorporate communications and control into meters to reduce
theft and allow better operations (such as load reduction
during periods of shortfall) and improved power quality [33].
Unfortunately, there are no standards for such ICT, and most
solutions are proprietary and expensive.
The ecosystem is also disparate with a variety of
stakeholders. Appliance vendors also envision a “smart home”
but are developing proprietary or independent solutions.
Utility personnel may be resentful of such technologies as it
reduces labor requirements (and also cuts off a source of illicit
income).
Breaking this chicken and egg cycle may require regulatory
intervention, but electricity regulators are often risk averse
and are typically unaware of ICT’s potential for fundamental
transformations in the power market. It is unclear who should
drive the process—utilities, vendors, regulators, or consumer
groups, etc.—but it is clear that without open standards,
solutions will be geared towards niche markets (high margins
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
but low volumes).
17
The few scenarios where such solutions have been
deployed or are under development, such as the Italian utility
Enel with blanket deployment, there is a single strong
stakeholder driving the process [33]. This is similar to many
ICT4D or even development projects overall, where there is a
champion required to shepherd the process through political
and bureaucratic barriers, e.g., a village elder or an NGO.
Champions often display one or more of the following
characteristics: respect, goodwill, authority, or a large
following.
17
Even modest improvements such as pre-paid metering (pioneered in S.
Africa to improve electrification in commercially risky Black Townships)
aren’t widespread.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
TABLE I
ICT4D DESIGN OUTLINE CASE EXAMPLES
Mobiles Edusat $100 Laptop Bhoomi Project e-Choupal Google
ICT for Smart
Electricity
Metering
Design Outline
1. Stakeholders
and their
needs
?: For voice X or ?? X or ??
/: Some
stakeholders
were left out
?: Trusted
operator
(Sanchalak) is
key to success
?
/: Consumers not
integrated;
vendors resisting
change
2. Performance
?; Still
expensive for
some users
X: Expensive,
uplink
capabilities esp.
limited
??: Advertised
specs appear
promising
/: Many users
were helped but
marginal farmers
were
disempowered
? ?
/: Incomplete
progress in
price-
performance
(innovation)
3. Incentives ? /
X: Only supply
side incentives
seem to be
worked out
?
?: ITC only gets
paid when the
farmer
voluntarily
transacts
? ?
4. Feedback and
participation
/: Supplier
driven, market
feedback;
Use of pre-paid
increased
participation
X
X: 1 million unit
order size limits
experimentation
X: couldn’t fix
design problems
easily
? ?
X: Lumpy model
of technology
diffusion adds
risks for early
adopters (need
large volumes)
5. Metrics
?: For voice
??: unknown
when
considering
widespread
ICT4D
?? or X ?? or X
/: Helped some
(efficiency) but
failed many
marginal
landowners
?
? / ?? (for
ICTD): Data
limitations
?
6. Sustainable ?
/: Only through
govt. support
?? ? ?
?: But, can be
displaced by
competition over
time (supplier
risk)
?: With the right
design, can lead
to savings and
new services
7. Scalable
/: Rural growth
is difficult
/: Easy to add a
single school;
Ultimate
capacity limited
? or ??: IF
buyers continue
to pay
~$100/device
?
/: Deployment
process is effort-
intensive; not all
regions are
suitable
candidates
? ?
8. Acceptable ? ?? ?? / ? ?
/: Potential
savings
welcomed;
Resistance to
change by
regulators and
even consumers
Why it
worked/failed
Leapfrogged
landlines; was
empowering
Some users were
helped, others,
esp. outside the
system, were
hurt
Benefits were
shared by farmer
and ITC
(promoter);
became trusted
Created an
ecosystem of
users
Verdict
Success for
voice; less
evidence for
broader
development
Work in
progress
Work in
progress
Mixed success
(depends on
metric!)
Success
Success in
original mission;
Limited in
development
Work in
progress
? = Positive
X = Negative
/ = Neutral
?? = Unknown
VI. A NEW MODEL: ENCOMPASSING STAKEHOLDERS,
INCENTIVES, FEEDBACK, AND DEPLOYMENT
Tongia et. al, [9] present a process flow diagram for ICT for
development which incorporates feedback from users and
posits availability, affordability, and acceptability as key
attributes of ICT solutions as used for development. This also
includes deployment as a component of the R&D space. We
present an enhancement to that model to explicitly allow for
stakeholder participation in the problem formulation and
design phase.
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
As Table I shows, every failure had difficulties with one or
more step in the design outline, and this holds true for other
failures not in the list. E.g., the much-touted Simputer, which
was eventually commercialized but has seen abysmal sales,
simply didn’t provide value to potential users (let alone the
poor, the original target users). It wasn’t integrated into
development needs, and there was no practical ecosystem
producing content, applications, etc. Of course, one cannot
claim the converse, that adhering to the outline will lead to
success.
To overcome the limitations of a technology-centric push,
and to improve the design as per the outline presented before,
we present a framework and process we have been
experimenting with to both aid designing of new products and
for the analysis of existing products (services and physical
products). In this model of design [34], the basic elements are:
1) Stakeholders
2) Goals
3) Design variables and design space
4) Tests and attendant metrics for goals
5) Starting points (historical solutions) (Fig. 1)
All of these are situated in the context of the ecosystem
within which the needs are addressed by the problem. In this
model, we stress the importance of formulating the right
problem and to create alternative problem formulations in
contrast to the classic product design approaches where
alternatives to the product solutions and their evaluations are
the focus. This process supplants the classic model of the lone
designers or technology driven approaches to product and
needs addressing. In this model of participation, we use the
results from computational experiments with asynchronous
distributed agent (stakeholder) problem solving [35] and use it
in the context of problem formulation.
The fundamental reason for adopting this framework is that
all ICT design problems for development are “wicked
problems” and the definition of the problem emerges in the
context of identifying the problem and its solution [36]. It is
the ill-structured nature of the problem being solved that does
not lend it self to assuming that the problem has been defined
in terms of perceived needs for which there might exist a
straight forward method of problem solving. Other
characteristics of wicked problems include [36]:
18
• Wicked problems cannot be formulated definitively
• Wicked problems have no stopping rules
• Solutions are not true-or-false but good-or-bad
19
• Wicked problems cannot be tested definitively or
immediately
• Every implemented solution to a wicked problem has
consequences
• Wicked problems do not have a well-described set of
potential solutions
• Every wicked problem is unique
18
Taken from: Lesley Seebeck
(http://www.itee.uq.edu.au/~lesley/Complex%20Adaptive%20Systems.htm
)
19
We add that there are also shades of grey, with trade-offs.
• Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom
of another problem
• Wicked problems interlock and overlap and change
over time
• The causes of a wicked problem can be explained in
numerous ways
• The planner, or designer, has no right to be wrong
In short, ICT4D is a wicked problem!
Insights from prior work on asynchronous distributed agent
algorithms have directed us to a problem elicitation process
that identifies multiple groups of people with each group
made up of people with diverse backgrounds (functional,
expertise and social) that share their mental models of the
problems throughout the process of problem formulation.
Each group uses the framework elicited above by first
identifying the set of stakeholders for a given problem
statement and their goals and they exchange this information
across these groups, ideally through formal mechanisms. Once
the step is taken the group identifies the ecosystem in which
the problem is to be solved and possibly revises their
stakeholder spaces and goals to understand who should be
included and what should be outside the boundary defined by
the ecosystem. Having resolved these, each group identifies
the design and decision variables and goes through the sharing
process. In the course of sharing the group of groups identifies
a prototypical solution to the problem. The prototypical
solution arises out of previous efforts in solving the problem
and their failures and successes. This prototypical solution and
the formulations by the groups up to that point are used by the
groups to develop the metrics and tests to detail the
formulations of the problem.
Construct Construct
Full Design Full Design
Space Space
Prioritize Prioritize
Design Design
Space Space
Select Goals, Select Goals,
Ecosystem, Ecosystem,
and Metrics and Metrics
Formulate Formulate
Problem Problem
Prune Prune
Design Design
Space Space
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
…
…
E
n
d
S
t
a
t
e
Construct Construct
Full Design Full Design
Space Space
Prioritize Prioritize
Design Design
Space Space
Select Goals, Select Goals,
Ecosystem, Ecosystem,
and Metrics and Metrics
Formulate Formulate
Problem Problem
Prune Prune
Design Design
Space Space
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
…
…
E
n
d
S
t
a
t
e
Fig. 1. ICT for Development Design Process. Based on design for Wicked
Problems, this framework shows how different stakeholders fit together like
pieces of a puzzle, and must iterate to define the problem. The solution per se
derives from the problem formulation.
Eventually each group presents its view of the problem as
formulated and this often leads to multiple formulations of the
problem, with different collection of goals, priorities, problem
details, metrics, and tests for satisfactory acceptance. Such a
scenario of multiple formulations of the problem must lead to
202 (paper submission number) – ICTD2006
not merely a debate on which is the most appropriate
formulation for a given context but also the explicit
identification of the trade-offs being made in the problem
being formulated. Ultimately, the set of decision-makers must
converge on a chosen solution to be developed and deployed.
Importantly, this model allows for experimentation and
continual updating to the processes. Of course, in the real
world, some of these steps in our proposed design model are
undertaken in implicit or embedded means.
Personal discussions with ITC regarding their e-Choupal
initiative indicates they followed a somewhat similar
approach, giving extreme importance to identification of
stakeholders and aligning incentives. E.g., for choosing a
Sanchalak (operator), they make multiple visits to a village to
find an appropriate person based on multiple critera including
standing in the village, trust in the community, farming
experience, entrepreneurship, and risk tolerance [37]. An early
prototype system showed difficulties in closing transactions,
so ITC redesigned the system to better link the information to
the physical supply chain infrastructure by moving storage
and transaction locations closer to consumers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on ICT and development experiences, we find a
majority of current solutions wanting. Yes, there may be a
flurry or activity and even innovation in this space, and there
are real-world results being achieved. However, these are
often narrow verticals of deployment, driven by the project at
hand (and associated funding), and metrics are limited at best.
Worse, development needs are often not integrated Into the
ICT design space: ICT for development as a wicked problem
is not yet recognized. The case examples show that
stakeholder roles are key to success or failure, and the overall
system design depends on this.
Solving the right problem is much harder than solving a
“given” problem. In teaching ICT and design, experience
shows students are good at solving problems once structured
for them, but teaching them to formulate the right problems is
hard, but important. Cultural issues and context are critical for
success, but there is evidence that in the education space there
is a reduced tendency to learning history and context, perhaps
in part due to changing priorities and the very nature of ICT –
the Internet offers instant gratification and information is
typically presented in small bites, often without rigor,
references, or assumptions. Using design methods and
practice as well as case examples from the ICT and
development space, we have proposed a new model for ICT
and Development design and R&D that fundamentally treats
the domain as that of appropriate problem definition, and
recognizes the central role of stakeholders and feedback. We
are currently experimenting in using the proposed framework
for ongoing ICT4D projects, but it is premature to expect any
results. We firmly believe that greater inclusion of
stakeholders in the design phase of solutions itself with formal
mechanisms for feedback and trade-off elicitations will lead to
far greater success in ICT for development than seen today.
VIII. REFERENCES
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People for a Better World. Lessons, Innovations and
Perspectives of Information and Communication
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Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
and Global Knowledge Partnership (GKP), 2004.
[2] M. Franssen and L. L. Buccirelli, "On Rationality in
Engineering Design," Journal of Mechanical Design,
vol. 126, (6), pp. 945-949, 2004.
[3] P. Bardhan, "Democracy and Development: A
Complex Relationship," in Democracy's Values, I.
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