Description
The paper by Suddaby et al. (Suddaby, R., Gendron, Y., & Lam, H. (2009). The organizational
context of professionalism in accounting. Accounting Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 409–
427.) advances our understanding of the erosion, or otherwise, of traditional professional
values by locating the debates in organisational and work contexts. This commentary seeks
to extend the debate by posing questions about the theory and evidence of the paper. In
particular, it argues that changes in professional
Commentary on Roy Suddaby, Yves Gendron and Helen Lam ‘‘the
organizational context of professionalism in accounting”
Prem Sikka
Centre for Global Accountability, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
The paper by Suddaby et al. (Suddaby, R., Gendron, Y., & Lam, H. (2009). The organizational
context of professionalism in accounting. Accounting Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 409–
427.) advances our understanding of the erosion, or otherwise, of traditional professional
values by locating the debates in organisational and work contexts. This commentary seeks
to extend the debate by posing questions about the theory and evidence of the paper. In
particular, it argues that changes in professional attitudes and values cannot easily be
understood without a consideration of the broader social and political contexts.
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Accountants have long sought to distinguish their ex-
pert labour from competing occupational groups by
appealing to notions of professionalism, independence,
ethics, organisational commitment and claims of serving
the public interest. These claims disarm critics and obfus-
cate the close relationship with capital and the state, a nec-
essary condition for the rise and demand for accounting
labour. Nevertheless, such strategies have enabled accoun-
tants to enjoy high ?nancial rewards, status, markets,
niches and monopolies. The claims of professionalism are
routinely problematised by the recurring crisis of capital-
ism, frequently given visibility by unexpected corporate
collapses, frauds and economic crisis. Such events often
give visibility to ethical lapses and anti-social practices
crafted by accountants and pose renewed questions about
their claims of professionalism (Sikka, 2008a).
The usual regulatory response is to restore con?dence
in accountants by reasserting claims of professionalism
and by tweaking codes of ethics and an implicit promise
that next time accountants will live up the idealised claims
of professionalism. Inevitably, the next time arrives and
headline scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, continue
to highlight anti-social practices and ethical lapses of pro-
fessional accountants.
Since accountants spend a large part of their working
life in accounting ?rms and industrial, commercial and
public sector organisations, their professional attitudes to-
wards independence, ethical conduct, commitment to cli-
ents, employing organisation and the profession are
likely to be shaped by organisational culture and value sys-
tems. Therefore, the paper by Roy Suddaby, Yves Gendron
and Helen Lam (hereafter Suddaby, Gendron and Lam
(2009)) seeks to map the variations in professional atti-
tudes and values as the conditions of professional labour
change.
This commentary consists of three further sections. The
next section presents a brief overview of the Suddaby et al.
paper. This is followed by a commentary which poses some
questions about the evidence and theory of the paper. The
third section summarises and ?nalises this commentary.
The Suddaby et al. paper
The Suddaby et al. paper considers work and organisa-
tional contexts to be central sites for the transformation
of professional attitudes and norms. This is rightly so as
most accountants work in bureaucratic settings driven by
commercial rather than professional logics. In pursuit of
ef?ciency, standardisation, predictability and market
0361-3682/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.aos.2008.10.001
E-mail address: [email protected]
Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Accounting, Organizations and Society
j our nal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ aos
domination, the work of accountants is subjected to con-
trols and could be said to be proletarianised (Hanlon,
1994). Increasingly professional managers control re-
sources and concerns about integrity, autonomy, objectiv-
ity and independence are replaced by rules and techniques
and have to compete with institutional rather than profes-
sional logics. In industry, commerce and public sector,
accountants have long worked alongside other experts to
pursue organisational objectives, but with the intensi?ca-
tion of capitalism this trend has also deepened within ma-
jor accountancy ?rms. In pursuit of higher pro?ts, major
accountancy ?rms have diversi?ed into a variety of consul-
tancy and advisory ?elds and have become multi-disciplin-
ary practices. They employ not only accountants, but also
non-accounting professionals to deliver legal services, ad-
vice on taxation, mergers, transfer pricing, ?nance, infor-
mation technology and central and local government
policies. Their professional mangers and human resource
experts bring their own calculative logics. The changed
work context may herald changes in the professional val-
ues and norms traditionally associated with accountants.
In bureaucratic organisations accountants, as employ-
ees, are continuously socialised through a variety of
disciplinary processes which prioritise organisational
rather than personal and professional values. For example,
employees of an accounting ?rm may be incentivised for
expanding the ?rm’s income. Such incentives exert
pressure on staff to sell non-auditing services to audit cli-
ents and thus undermine the traditional claims of auditor
independence and objectivity. In this context, indepen-
dence and objectivity may not enhance organisational
ef?ciency and pro?ts, but remain important symbols
for securing social legitimacy. Such a line of inquiry sug-
gests that proletarianisation and the accompanying
bureaucratic structures play a key role in diluting the pro-
fessional norms and values traditionally associated with
accountants.
In common with other organisations, accountancy ?rms
can design a variety of organisational structures to create
space for professional values. For example, some ?rms have
sought to create professional enclaves within organisations
by enacting so-called Chinese Walls. These structures have
sought to preserve some semblance of professional norms
and values whilst simultaneously encouraging commit-
ment to employing organisations. However, professionals
are still constrained by organisational policies and values
and their rewards ultimately depend on advancing organi-
sational aims and objectives.
In the bureaucratic multi-disciplinary ?rm, accountants
have to team up with non-accounting professionals to
accomplish projects. Many of these have trained outside
the traditional professional arena and have not been socia-
lised into the idealised values associated with professional
accountants. They may not share accountant’s norms and
have little commitment to idealised professional values.
Indeed, through daily interaction and under the weight of
bureaucratic processes, accountants may adapt or dilute
their traditional values and become more susceptible to
institutional rather than professional logics, especially as
those advancing the institutional logics can expect to re-
ceive higher ?nancial rewards and status.
The Suddaby et al. paper fully recognises the con?ict be-
tween institutional and professional logics. Externally,
accountants legitimise their privileges by presenting them-
selves as independent, professional and ethical experts
who are committed to clients, their employing organisa-
tions and fellowprofessionals. At the same time, the organ-
isational logic requires them to adopt different value
systems. Consequently, accountants have to construct
and legitimise multiple identities.
The changing organisational and work environment pro-
vides the context for Suddaby et al. to explore shifts in pro-
fessional values espoused by accountants. Therefore, they
pose questions suchas ‘‘Howdovalue commitments change
when professionals work as salaried employees? Do the rel-
ative commitments change when they work in conditions
where professionals no longer control professionals? And
howdo value commitments change when professionals en-
gage in the delivery of non-professional services?” (p. 2).
The authors map the relative degree of commitment to core
and ideal professional values across a broad spectrum of
work contexts of professional accountants. Their data is col-
lected via a survey of 7000 randomly selected Canadian
chartered accountants (CAs), representing around 48% of
the total CAs located infour provinces. The sampled popula-
tion is employed in a variety of organisational settings, such
as public practice, private industry and public sector. Even-
tually, 1200 usable responses were received. The responses
were analysedby gender, organisational type and hierarchi-
cal positions occupied by the respondents. The survey was
conducted some time after the Enron scandal and collapse
of Arthur Andersen. This may have persuaded some accoun-
tants to re-examine the impact of institutional and profes-
sional logics and may have captured a very speci?c, or
perhaps a transitory, set of re?ections.
The paper’s ?ndings are somewhat mixed and indicate a
rich potential for future research. The results suggest that
the majority of accountants are highly committed to their
profession and are highly committed to professional ideals.
It is also argued that ‘‘professional norms are compromised
when professionals engage in, or are exposed to, non-pro-
fessional work” (p. 31). The data suggests that accountants
in public practice are more committed to their profession
than those who migrated to non-traditional work settings.
However, compared to their industrial and public sector
counterparts, members of public accounting ?rms are less
likely to support the rigour and enforcement of professional
independence (p. 29). More senior personnel in accounting
?rms think that they can be committed to clients and
simultaneously maintain a high level of commitment to
their employing organization and the profession (not much
mention of society though). As accountants rise in rank,
whether in public practice or otherwise, they are more
likely to identify with their professional designation in util-
itarian terms and are more likely to ‘‘adopt a ‘‘managerial
logic” of identi?cation with their clients” (p. 33). Suddaby
et al. report that accountants employed by the Big Four
accounting ?rms seem to ‘‘. . .operate under different value
assumptions and patterns of commitment than all other
accounting professionals. . . . [they] are remarkable by their
lower commitment to any of the variables studied. Their
attitudes are particularly contradictory regarding their
P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432 429
commitment to the client and to the core value of indepen-
dence. . . . while they are the least committed to their cli-
ents, Big Four accountants are the least engaged towards
the notion of independence enforcement (p. 38). This is
partly explained by the viewthat they may be working with
non-professional labour and in bureaucratic settings and
may be exposed to contradictory discourses which are then
translated into a set of paradoxical professional attitudes.
Some comments
The Suddaby et al. paper seems to accept idealised pro-
fessional traits of autonomy, independence, commitment,
discretion, objectivity, etc. Such claims often lack empirical
speci?city and may be akin to political strategies for distin-
guishing accountants from other (non-professional) labour
(Larson, 1977). Additionally, in Marxist sociology of the
professions (Johnson, 1972) accounting practices and
accountants are closely aligned with the interests of capi-
tal. Therefore, the self-af?rming claims of ethical conduct,
independence and serving the public interest are highly
problematical (Willmott, 1990).
The paper is crafted in the Canadian context and its con-
clusions for other environments may be problematic. The
paper seems to suggest that migration to ‘‘non-traditional
work setting”, which is taken to mean outside public prac-
tice, is something relatively recent. In the UK context, the
number of accountants working in public practice has been
declining (Matthews, Anderson, & Edwards, 1998) and a
large number of professional accountants have never
worked in that sector. Some accountancy bodies, notably
the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
(CIMA) emerged (in 1919) almost entirely outside public
practice sphere and owe their existence to the administra-
tive concerns of the state (Loft, 1988). The membership of
the Association of Chartered Certi?ed Accountants (ACCA),
the UK’s second largest professional body, since its incep-
tion (1904), is mainly employed in industry, commerce
and the public sector rather than in public practice. Stu-
dents of these bodies predominantly receive their training
in industry, commerce and public sector. Such patterns of
history and work problematise the universalising claims
of the paper. Are we to assume that just because accoun-
tants work with non-professional labour, or in industrial
settings, that their claims of professionalism are diluted?
Suddaby et al.’s view that the 1980s were an important
watershed in changes to the attitudes of accountants (p.
2) is plausible, but some contextualisation would have been
helpful in trying to understand the assumed uniqueness of
this period. This period is associated with the (re)emer-
gence of the New Right and its emphasis on individualism,
deregulation, competition and general liberalisation of
trade. Accounting ?rms were part of this resurgence and
closely aligned themselves with the state to promote the
new right’s ideologies. However, in sharp contrast to many
other enterprises they have resisted changes which could
arguably enhance their public accountability and might
even encourage re?ections on traditional professional
norms. The ?rms rarely publish any meaningful informa-
tionabout their affairs, or relationships withclients. Despite
being large commercial concerns they lack independent
observers and non-executive directors on their governing
structures. Their partners often dominate professional and
regulatory structures and can subvert any unwelcome
developments. Their liability position has also been steadily
diluted (Sikka, 2008b). Thus a weak regulatory environment
may have provided incentives for subordinationof idealised
professional norms to organisational logics.
Admittedly, any paper is limited by the available space,
but what signi?cance can we attach to its conclusions? The
paper makes no attempt to establish any connections, no
matter how tentative, between the expressed values and
overt behaviour. The changes in attitudes always incubate
in broader social contexts. Instead the paper states that
the objective is ‘‘not to map behaviour, but rather to cap-
ture changes in attitudes and logics . . . our study brings to
light the sites and locations of variations in ideal-type atti-
tudes of professionalism across a broad range of work
arrangements for accounting professionals. . . . there is
some expectation that, over time, shifts in values and opin-
ions will produce shifts in behaviour, there is no assump-
tion that this will occur in the short term” (p. 40). One
response is that behaviour provides a richer understanding
of attitudes and also offers re?ections not only on the per-
formance enacted by respondents to the questionnaire, but
also upon the broader structural elements which simulta-
neously enable and constrain attitudes towards society, cli-
ents, organisations and other professionals. An examination
of behaviours might showthat some shifts in attitudes have
already taken place and thus we need to think about possi-
bilities of fresher theories and regulation. For example, the
claims of the ‘‘adaptation” view can be problematised by
some evidence to show that the so called ‘‘Chinese Walls”
are designed to legitimise appearances and thwart effective
regulatory action. A US Senate Committee examining the
design and marketing of tax avoidance schemes by KPMG
stated that despite claims of separate structures the ?rm
targeted ‘‘its own audit clients for sales pitches . . . KPMG
tax professionals were directed to contact existing clients
about the product, including KPMG’s own audit clients. . .
By engaging in this marketing tactic, KPMG not only took
advantage of its auditor-client relationship, but also created
a con?ict of interest in those cases where it successfully
sold a tax product to an audit client.” (US Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, pp. 4, 9, 15 and 16).
Such examples, at the very least, pose serious questions
about the possibilities of creating professional enclaves
within pro?t-seeking organisations.
A great strength of the Suddaby et al. paper is that it
urges us to study the organisational work context of
accountants which is a key site for the production, con-
sumption, transformation, regulation, identity and subjec-
tivity of accountants. However, the paper does not locate
accounting ?rms in any recognisable social formation, such
as capitalism, and consider the structural dynamics of
change. In pursuit of capital accumulation accounting
?rms are concerned about strategy, ?nance and competi-
tion, and have been obliged to develop what the authors
call ‘‘ethical lapses”. There is evidence showing that major
?rms have participated in price ?xing, fraud, bribery, cor-
ruption, money laundering, falsi?cation of client ?nancial
430 P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432
statements, audit reports and, despite repeated warnings
and ?nes, have ignored rules on auditor independence
(Sikka, 2008a; US Securities Exchange Commission,
2004). In pursuit of pro?ts they have become leaders of
an industry specialising in tax avoidance and evasion (US
Senate Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003; US Senate Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003; US Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005). They
admit to ‘‘criminal wrongdoing” (US Department of Justice
press release, 29 August 2005
1
; US Department of Justice
press release, 30 May 2007
2
). Such episodes may connect
with the general thrust of the Suddaby et al. paper. However,
they are also found in small and medium-size accounting
?rms, where accountants work with fellow accounting pro-
fessionals and are supervised by fellow professionals. Such
an environment is also relatively less contaminated by the
intrusion of non-accounting professional labour and is per-
haps the closest to the idealised professional environment.
A couple of illustrations would help.
Versailles Group plc was listed on the London stock ex-
change. At its peak it had a market value of £630 million.
Amidst allegations of fraud the Group ceased trading in
December 1999 and in January 2000 it was placed into
administrative receivership. Subsequently, the Group’s
chairman and two directors were charged with fraud. The
?gures for turnover and for debtors were deliberately over-
stated and it was discovered ‘‘that phoney transactions
made up more than 80% of Versailles plc’s turnover in each
year from 1992 to the end of 1999” (The Guardian, 26 May
2004). The Group’s founder and chairman, Carl Cushnie,
was found guilty of fraud, and the company’s ?nance direc-
tor, Frederick Clough, admitted two counts of conspiracy to
defraud and one of fraudulent trading. Both were sentenced
to six-years in prison (The Times, 9 June 2004; The Guard-
ian, 28 June 2005; The Independent, 21 November 2006).
Since its inception (1990) Versailles Group had been au-
dited by Nunn Hayward, a small auditing ?rm headed by
chartered accountants. Versailles was Nunn Hayward’s
largest audit client and for a considerable time its only
listed client. Following public revelations of fraud, a disci-
plinary panel of the UK accountancy profession focused on
the conduct of audits by Nunn Hayward (Joint Disciplinary
Scheme, 2004a, 2004b) and reported that
‘‘There were several warnings that all was not well at
Versailles, which were ignored. . . In 1996, Mr Clough
[company’s ?nance director] arranged for publication
of the Versailles accounts, and their circulation to share-
holders, before [emphasised in the original] the audit
was completed. The published accounts contained a
false audit certi?cate. When this was discovered, Nunn
Hayward signed an audit certi?cate on unchanged
accounts after little further work, and these were re-cir-
culated to shareholders. In the face of this obvious dis-
honesty, Nunn Hayward acquiesced in a circular to
shareholders describing what had happened as ‘‘an over-
sight”. The reality was that Versailles was too important
a client for Nunn Hayward to risk losing: when resigna-
tion as auditors was mentioned by Nunn Hayward’s
solicitors, Mr Dales [partner in-charge of audit]
responded that this was ‘‘a big fee account” and his ?rm
did not want to resign. . .”.
The report goes on to add that one member of the audit
team, raised concerns which included
‘‘a lack of access to Versailles’s accounting records; Ver-
sailles’s reluctance to produce fundamental accounting
information; its complex accounting system and the
amount of control which Mr Cushnie [company chair-
man] was able to exert over it; and the lack of informa-
tion about Traders in the British Virgin Islands. She
wrote two memoranda, the ?rst to Mr Ian Nunn, the
senior partner, and Mr Dales, and the second to all the
Nunn Hayward partners, detailing her concerns. These
were ignored, and she was shortly moved off the audit.
. . .Nunn Hayward and Mr Dales . . . signed false ‘‘comfort
letters” required by the banks which had lent money to
Versailles. . . . There is evidence that several comfort let-
ters were simply faxed to Nunn Hayward by Versailles’s
accountant with the request: ‘‘. . .please type the enclosed
letters on your letter head. . . and fax them across to Fred
[Clough] a.s.a.p. and post hard copy to him direct.” (Joint
Disciplinary Scheme, 2004b).
The second example again relates to a small accoun-
tancy ?rm with a traditional work environment. In Novem-
ber 1998, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), UK’s main
?nancial markets regulator, brought proceedings against
Dobb White & Co., a ?rm of accountants and its two part-
ners, Shinder Singh Gangar, a chartered accountant, and
Alan White, a chartered certi?ed accountant (Financial Ser-
vices Authority, 1999, pp. 59–60; Financial Services
Authority press release, 5 December 2003). The FSA alleged
that Dobb White had, without being authorised to do so,
accepted deposits from clients who were promised sub-
stantial returns on their funds, often 40% per annum, and
even as high as 160%. From the 1990s onwards the ?rm
had been engaged in fraud and operated a series of what
the prosecution called ‘‘elaborate and apparently plausible
‘‘Ponzi” schemes” (UK Serious Fraud Of?ce press release,
22 February 2008
3
). There was no underlying trading in
investments and the fraud depended on the constant adding
of new victims’ funds to ?nance the payments of ‘‘interest”
to the existing victims. Client’s money was used by White
and Gangar to provide unsecured loans to acquaintances,
to purchase properties, and for speculative investments.
4
Interestingly, Gangar appealed to traditional notions of pro-
fessionalism to defend himself and claimed, ‘‘I am an
1http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html; accessed
24 September 2008.
2http://www. usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May07/eyindict-
mentpr.pdf, accessed 27 September 2008.
3http://www.sfo.gov.uk/news/prout/pr_536.asp?id=536; accessed 5
September 2008.
4
This had US links. See court judgement in Securities and Exchange
Commission V. Terry, L. Dowdell, et al. (Case No. 3:01CV00116), United
States District Court, Western District Of Virginia, Charlottesville Division, 9
April 2004. Also see the US Department of Justice press release, 28 February
2007 ( ht t p: / / www. usdoj . gov/ usao/ vaw/ press_rel eases/ dow-
dell_28feb2007.html) and 4 March 2008 (http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
vaw/press_releases/dowdell_04mar2008.html).
P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432 431
accountant. . . We don’t solicit for investments” (The Obser-
ver, 25 August 2002). In February 2008, both accountants
were found guilty of $200m investment fraud and conspir-
acy to corrupt a US of?cial and were sentenced to seven
and half year imprisonment (The Times, 22 February 2008;
Serious Fraud Of?ce press release, 11 April 2008).
The above cases may be dismissed as exceptional or
unusual, but theyarenot uniqueandshowthat evenaccoun-
tantsand?rmsassociatedwiththetraditional workenviron-
ment are not immune to the logic of higher pro?ts. With the
intensi?cation of capitalism, the tendency to pursue pro?ts
at almost any price is considered to be an entrepreneurial
skill and in a poorly regulated environment some ?rms and
their personnel are willing to take their chances.
Summary and discussion
The Suddaby et al. paper makes a signi?cant contribu-
tion to the professionalisation debate by examining the
signi?cance of organisational context and work content
and location on accountants’ attitudes towards traditional
professional values and norms. It collected and analysed
data from a large survey to map variations in professional
attitudes and values as the conditions of professional work
change. The results go some way towards explaining why
accountants from large accounting ?rms are associated
with ethical lapses. However, small and medium size ?rms,
closely identi?ed with traditional professional work orga-
nisation and relatively less contaminated with exposure
to non-professional labour, have also shown willingness
to engage in predatory practices.
The argument that bureaucratic pressures and interac-
tion with non-professional labour may change attitudes
has some plausibility, but it also, by default, condemns a
large number of accountants working and training in indus-
trytonegativespaces. Undoubtedly, workandorganisations
are key sites for the shaping of professional attitudes, but
their trajectories cannot easily be understood without
attention to the broader social contexts. Poor public
accountability does not encourage re?ections on ethical
lapses and professional education does not seem to make
accountants aware of the social consequences of their craft
(Sikka, Haslam, Kyriacou, &Agrizzi, 2007). Accountants have
been key actors in the intensi?cation of capitalismand have
absorbed some of its values and have been willing to engage
in predatory practices. Thus any shift in attitudes requires
attention to broader social as well as organisational forces.
It is easy enough to support Suddaby et al.’s recommen-
dation that ‘‘ethicists must also attend to the way in which
professional work is organized if they want to seriously ad-
dress ethical issues in professional services ?rms” (pp. 41–
42). However, the concern is that excessive emphasis on
idealised professional norms and values can obscure the
role of accountants and accounting ?rms as capitalist enter-
prises who must secure favourable conditions for making
pro?ts.
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432 P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432
doc_242711890.pdf
The paper by Suddaby et al. (Suddaby, R., Gendron, Y., & Lam, H. (2009). The organizational
context of professionalism in accounting. Accounting Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 409–
427.) advances our understanding of the erosion, or otherwise, of traditional professional
values by locating the debates in organisational and work contexts. This commentary seeks
to extend the debate by posing questions about the theory and evidence of the paper. In
particular, it argues that changes in professional
Commentary on Roy Suddaby, Yves Gendron and Helen Lam ‘‘the
organizational context of professionalism in accounting”
Prem Sikka
Centre for Global Accountability, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
The paper by Suddaby et al. (Suddaby, R., Gendron, Y., & Lam, H. (2009). The organizational
context of professionalism in accounting. Accounting Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 409–
427.) advances our understanding of the erosion, or otherwise, of traditional professional
values by locating the debates in organisational and work contexts. This commentary seeks
to extend the debate by posing questions about the theory and evidence of the paper. In
particular, it argues that changes in professional attitudes and values cannot easily be
understood without a consideration of the broader social and political contexts.
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Accountants have long sought to distinguish their ex-
pert labour from competing occupational groups by
appealing to notions of professionalism, independence,
ethics, organisational commitment and claims of serving
the public interest. These claims disarm critics and obfus-
cate the close relationship with capital and the state, a nec-
essary condition for the rise and demand for accounting
labour. Nevertheless, such strategies have enabled accoun-
tants to enjoy high ?nancial rewards, status, markets,
niches and monopolies. The claims of professionalism are
routinely problematised by the recurring crisis of capital-
ism, frequently given visibility by unexpected corporate
collapses, frauds and economic crisis. Such events often
give visibility to ethical lapses and anti-social practices
crafted by accountants and pose renewed questions about
their claims of professionalism (Sikka, 2008a).
The usual regulatory response is to restore con?dence
in accountants by reasserting claims of professionalism
and by tweaking codes of ethics and an implicit promise
that next time accountants will live up the idealised claims
of professionalism. Inevitably, the next time arrives and
headline scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, continue
to highlight anti-social practices and ethical lapses of pro-
fessional accountants.
Since accountants spend a large part of their working
life in accounting ?rms and industrial, commercial and
public sector organisations, their professional attitudes to-
wards independence, ethical conduct, commitment to cli-
ents, employing organisation and the profession are
likely to be shaped by organisational culture and value sys-
tems. Therefore, the paper by Roy Suddaby, Yves Gendron
and Helen Lam (hereafter Suddaby, Gendron and Lam
(2009)) seeks to map the variations in professional atti-
tudes and values as the conditions of professional labour
change.
This commentary consists of three further sections. The
next section presents a brief overview of the Suddaby et al.
paper. This is followed by a commentary which poses some
questions about the evidence and theory of the paper. The
third section summarises and ?nalises this commentary.
The Suddaby et al. paper
The Suddaby et al. paper considers work and organisa-
tional contexts to be central sites for the transformation
of professional attitudes and norms. This is rightly so as
most accountants work in bureaucratic settings driven by
commercial rather than professional logics. In pursuit of
ef?ciency, standardisation, predictability and market
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doi:10.1016/j.aos.2008.10.001
E-mail address: [email protected]
Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Accounting, Organizations and Society
j our nal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ aos
domination, the work of accountants is subjected to con-
trols and could be said to be proletarianised (Hanlon,
1994). Increasingly professional managers control re-
sources and concerns about integrity, autonomy, objectiv-
ity and independence are replaced by rules and techniques
and have to compete with institutional rather than profes-
sional logics. In industry, commerce and public sector,
accountants have long worked alongside other experts to
pursue organisational objectives, but with the intensi?ca-
tion of capitalism this trend has also deepened within ma-
jor accountancy ?rms. In pursuit of higher pro?ts, major
accountancy ?rms have diversi?ed into a variety of consul-
tancy and advisory ?elds and have become multi-disciplin-
ary practices. They employ not only accountants, but also
non-accounting professionals to deliver legal services, ad-
vice on taxation, mergers, transfer pricing, ?nance, infor-
mation technology and central and local government
policies. Their professional mangers and human resource
experts bring their own calculative logics. The changed
work context may herald changes in the professional val-
ues and norms traditionally associated with accountants.
In bureaucratic organisations accountants, as employ-
ees, are continuously socialised through a variety of
disciplinary processes which prioritise organisational
rather than personal and professional values. For example,
employees of an accounting ?rm may be incentivised for
expanding the ?rm’s income. Such incentives exert
pressure on staff to sell non-auditing services to audit cli-
ents and thus undermine the traditional claims of auditor
independence and objectivity. In this context, indepen-
dence and objectivity may not enhance organisational
ef?ciency and pro?ts, but remain important symbols
for securing social legitimacy. Such a line of inquiry sug-
gests that proletarianisation and the accompanying
bureaucratic structures play a key role in diluting the pro-
fessional norms and values traditionally associated with
accountants.
In common with other organisations, accountancy ?rms
can design a variety of organisational structures to create
space for professional values. For example, some ?rms have
sought to create professional enclaves within organisations
by enacting so-called Chinese Walls. These structures have
sought to preserve some semblance of professional norms
and values whilst simultaneously encouraging commit-
ment to employing organisations. However, professionals
are still constrained by organisational policies and values
and their rewards ultimately depend on advancing organi-
sational aims and objectives.
In the bureaucratic multi-disciplinary ?rm, accountants
have to team up with non-accounting professionals to
accomplish projects. Many of these have trained outside
the traditional professional arena and have not been socia-
lised into the idealised values associated with professional
accountants. They may not share accountant’s norms and
have little commitment to idealised professional values.
Indeed, through daily interaction and under the weight of
bureaucratic processes, accountants may adapt or dilute
their traditional values and become more susceptible to
institutional rather than professional logics, especially as
those advancing the institutional logics can expect to re-
ceive higher ?nancial rewards and status.
The Suddaby et al. paper fully recognises the con?ict be-
tween institutional and professional logics. Externally,
accountants legitimise their privileges by presenting them-
selves as independent, professional and ethical experts
who are committed to clients, their employing organisa-
tions and fellowprofessionals. At the same time, the organ-
isational logic requires them to adopt different value
systems. Consequently, accountants have to construct
and legitimise multiple identities.
The changing organisational and work environment pro-
vides the context for Suddaby et al. to explore shifts in pro-
fessional values espoused by accountants. Therefore, they
pose questions suchas ‘‘Howdovalue commitments change
when professionals work as salaried employees? Do the rel-
ative commitments change when they work in conditions
where professionals no longer control professionals? And
howdo value commitments change when professionals en-
gage in the delivery of non-professional services?” (p. 2).
The authors map the relative degree of commitment to core
and ideal professional values across a broad spectrum of
work contexts of professional accountants. Their data is col-
lected via a survey of 7000 randomly selected Canadian
chartered accountants (CAs), representing around 48% of
the total CAs located infour provinces. The sampled popula-
tion is employed in a variety of organisational settings, such
as public practice, private industry and public sector. Even-
tually, 1200 usable responses were received. The responses
were analysedby gender, organisational type and hierarchi-
cal positions occupied by the respondents. The survey was
conducted some time after the Enron scandal and collapse
of Arthur Andersen. This may have persuaded some accoun-
tants to re-examine the impact of institutional and profes-
sional logics and may have captured a very speci?c, or
perhaps a transitory, set of re?ections.
The paper’s ?ndings are somewhat mixed and indicate a
rich potential for future research. The results suggest that
the majority of accountants are highly committed to their
profession and are highly committed to professional ideals.
It is also argued that ‘‘professional norms are compromised
when professionals engage in, or are exposed to, non-pro-
fessional work” (p. 31). The data suggests that accountants
in public practice are more committed to their profession
than those who migrated to non-traditional work settings.
However, compared to their industrial and public sector
counterparts, members of public accounting ?rms are less
likely to support the rigour and enforcement of professional
independence (p. 29). More senior personnel in accounting
?rms think that they can be committed to clients and
simultaneously maintain a high level of commitment to
their employing organization and the profession (not much
mention of society though). As accountants rise in rank,
whether in public practice or otherwise, they are more
likely to identify with their professional designation in util-
itarian terms and are more likely to ‘‘adopt a ‘‘managerial
logic” of identi?cation with their clients” (p. 33). Suddaby
et al. report that accountants employed by the Big Four
accounting ?rms seem to ‘‘. . .operate under different value
assumptions and patterns of commitment than all other
accounting professionals. . . . [they] are remarkable by their
lower commitment to any of the variables studied. Their
attitudes are particularly contradictory regarding their
P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432 429
commitment to the client and to the core value of indepen-
dence. . . . while they are the least committed to their cli-
ents, Big Four accountants are the least engaged towards
the notion of independence enforcement (p. 38). This is
partly explained by the viewthat they may be working with
non-professional labour and in bureaucratic settings and
may be exposed to contradictory discourses which are then
translated into a set of paradoxical professional attitudes.
Some comments
The Suddaby et al. paper seems to accept idealised pro-
fessional traits of autonomy, independence, commitment,
discretion, objectivity, etc. Such claims often lack empirical
speci?city and may be akin to political strategies for distin-
guishing accountants from other (non-professional) labour
(Larson, 1977). Additionally, in Marxist sociology of the
professions (Johnson, 1972) accounting practices and
accountants are closely aligned with the interests of capi-
tal. Therefore, the self-af?rming claims of ethical conduct,
independence and serving the public interest are highly
problematical (Willmott, 1990).
The paper is crafted in the Canadian context and its con-
clusions for other environments may be problematic. The
paper seems to suggest that migration to ‘‘non-traditional
work setting”, which is taken to mean outside public prac-
tice, is something relatively recent. In the UK context, the
number of accountants working in public practice has been
declining (Matthews, Anderson, & Edwards, 1998) and a
large number of professional accountants have never
worked in that sector. Some accountancy bodies, notably
the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
(CIMA) emerged (in 1919) almost entirely outside public
practice sphere and owe their existence to the administra-
tive concerns of the state (Loft, 1988). The membership of
the Association of Chartered Certi?ed Accountants (ACCA),
the UK’s second largest professional body, since its incep-
tion (1904), is mainly employed in industry, commerce
and the public sector rather than in public practice. Stu-
dents of these bodies predominantly receive their training
in industry, commerce and public sector. Such patterns of
history and work problematise the universalising claims
of the paper. Are we to assume that just because accoun-
tants work with non-professional labour, or in industrial
settings, that their claims of professionalism are diluted?
Suddaby et al.’s view that the 1980s were an important
watershed in changes to the attitudes of accountants (p.
2) is plausible, but some contextualisation would have been
helpful in trying to understand the assumed uniqueness of
this period. This period is associated with the (re)emer-
gence of the New Right and its emphasis on individualism,
deregulation, competition and general liberalisation of
trade. Accounting ?rms were part of this resurgence and
closely aligned themselves with the state to promote the
new right’s ideologies. However, in sharp contrast to many
other enterprises they have resisted changes which could
arguably enhance their public accountability and might
even encourage re?ections on traditional professional
norms. The ?rms rarely publish any meaningful informa-
tionabout their affairs, or relationships withclients. Despite
being large commercial concerns they lack independent
observers and non-executive directors on their governing
structures. Their partners often dominate professional and
regulatory structures and can subvert any unwelcome
developments. Their liability position has also been steadily
diluted (Sikka, 2008b). Thus a weak regulatory environment
may have provided incentives for subordinationof idealised
professional norms to organisational logics.
Admittedly, any paper is limited by the available space,
but what signi?cance can we attach to its conclusions? The
paper makes no attempt to establish any connections, no
matter how tentative, between the expressed values and
overt behaviour. The changes in attitudes always incubate
in broader social contexts. Instead the paper states that
the objective is ‘‘not to map behaviour, but rather to cap-
ture changes in attitudes and logics . . . our study brings to
light the sites and locations of variations in ideal-type atti-
tudes of professionalism across a broad range of work
arrangements for accounting professionals. . . . there is
some expectation that, over time, shifts in values and opin-
ions will produce shifts in behaviour, there is no assump-
tion that this will occur in the short term” (p. 40). One
response is that behaviour provides a richer understanding
of attitudes and also offers re?ections not only on the per-
formance enacted by respondents to the questionnaire, but
also upon the broader structural elements which simulta-
neously enable and constrain attitudes towards society, cli-
ents, organisations and other professionals. An examination
of behaviours might showthat some shifts in attitudes have
already taken place and thus we need to think about possi-
bilities of fresher theories and regulation. For example, the
claims of the ‘‘adaptation” view can be problematised by
some evidence to show that the so called ‘‘Chinese Walls”
are designed to legitimise appearances and thwart effective
regulatory action. A US Senate Committee examining the
design and marketing of tax avoidance schemes by KPMG
stated that despite claims of separate structures the ?rm
targeted ‘‘its own audit clients for sales pitches . . . KPMG
tax professionals were directed to contact existing clients
about the product, including KPMG’s own audit clients. . .
By engaging in this marketing tactic, KPMG not only took
advantage of its auditor-client relationship, but also created
a con?ict of interest in those cases where it successfully
sold a tax product to an audit client.” (US Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, pp. 4, 9, 15 and 16).
Such examples, at the very least, pose serious questions
about the possibilities of creating professional enclaves
within pro?t-seeking organisations.
A great strength of the Suddaby et al. paper is that it
urges us to study the organisational work context of
accountants which is a key site for the production, con-
sumption, transformation, regulation, identity and subjec-
tivity of accountants. However, the paper does not locate
accounting ?rms in any recognisable social formation, such
as capitalism, and consider the structural dynamics of
change. In pursuit of capital accumulation accounting
?rms are concerned about strategy, ?nance and competi-
tion, and have been obliged to develop what the authors
call ‘‘ethical lapses”. There is evidence showing that major
?rms have participated in price ?xing, fraud, bribery, cor-
ruption, money laundering, falsi?cation of client ?nancial
430 P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432
statements, audit reports and, despite repeated warnings
and ?nes, have ignored rules on auditor independence
(Sikka, 2008a; US Securities Exchange Commission,
2004). In pursuit of pro?ts they have become leaders of
an industry specialising in tax avoidance and evasion (US
Senate Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003; US Senate Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003; US Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005). They
admit to ‘‘criminal wrongdoing” (US Department of Justice
press release, 29 August 2005
1
; US Department of Justice
press release, 30 May 2007
2
). Such episodes may connect
with the general thrust of the Suddaby et al. paper. However,
they are also found in small and medium-size accounting
?rms, where accountants work with fellow accounting pro-
fessionals and are supervised by fellow professionals. Such
an environment is also relatively less contaminated by the
intrusion of non-accounting professional labour and is per-
haps the closest to the idealised professional environment.
A couple of illustrations would help.
Versailles Group plc was listed on the London stock ex-
change. At its peak it had a market value of £630 million.
Amidst allegations of fraud the Group ceased trading in
December 1999 and in January 2000 it was placed into
administrative receivership. Subsequently, the Group’s
chairman and two directors were charged with fraud. The
?gures for turnover and for debtors were deliberately over-
stated and it was discovered ‘‘that phoney transactions
made up more than 80% of Versailles plc’s turnover in each
year from 1992 to the end of 1999” (The Guardian, 26 May
2004). The Group’s founder and chairman, Carl Cushnie,
was found guilty of fraud, and the company’s ?nance direc-
tor, Frederick Clough, admitted two counts of conspiracy to
defraud and one of fraudulent trading. Both were sentenced
to six-years in prison (The Times, 9 June 2004; The Guard-
ian, 28 June 2005; The Independent, 21 November 2006).
Since its inception (1990) Versailles Group had been au-
dited by Nunn Hayward, a small auditing ?rm headed by
chartered accountants. Versailles was Nunn Hayward’s
largest audit client and for a considerable time its only
listed client. Following public revelations of fraud, a disci-
plinary panel of the UK accountancy profession focused on
the conduct of audits by Nunn Hayward (Joint Disciplinary
Scheme, 2004a, 2004b) and reported that
‘‘There were several warnings that all was not well at
Versailles, which were ignored. . . In 1996, Mr Clough
[company’s ?nance director] arranged for publication
of the Versailles accounts, and their circulation to share-
holders, before [emphasised in the original] the audit
was completed. The published accounts contained a
false audit certi?cate. When this was discovered, Nunn
Hayward signed an audit certi?cate on unchanged
accounts after little further work, and these were re-cir-
culated to shareholders. In the face of this obvious dis-
honesty, Nunn Hayward acquiesced in a circular to
shareholders describing what had happened as ‘‘an over-
sight”. The reality was that Versailles was too important
a client for Nunn Hayward to risk losing: when resigna-
tion as auditors was mentioned by Nunn Hayward’s
solicitors, Mr Dales [partner in-charge of audit]
responded that this was ‘‘a big fee account” and his ?rm
did not want to resign. . .”.
The report goes on to add that one member of the audit
team, raised concerns which included
‘‘a lack of access to Versailles’s accounting records; Ver-
sailles’s reluctance to produce fundamental accounting
information; its complex accounting system and the
amount of control which Mr Cushnie [company chair-
man] was able to exert over it; and the lack of informa-
tion about Traders in the British Virgin Islands. She
wrote two memoranda, the ?rst to Mr Ian Nunn, the
senior partner, and Mr Dales, and the second to all the
Nunn Hayward partners, detailing her concerns. These
were ignored, and she was shortly moved off the audit.
. . .Nunn Hayward and Mr Dales . . . signed false ‘‘comfort
letters” required by the banks which had lent money to
Versailles. . . . There is evidence that several comfort let-
ters were simply faxed to Nunn Hayward by Versailles’s
accountant with the request: ‘‘. . .please type the enclosed
letters on your letter head. . . and fax them across to Fred
[Clough] a.s.a.p. and post hard copy to him direct.” (Joint
Disciplinary Scheme, 2004b).
The second example again relates to a small accoun-
tancy ?rm with a traditional work environment. In Novem-
ber 1998, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), UK’s main
?nancial markets regulator, brought proceedings against
Dobb White & Co., a ?rm of accountants and its two part-
ners, Shinder Singh Gangar, a chartered accountant, and
Alan White, a chartered certi?ed accountant (Financial Ser-
vices Authority, 1999, pp. 59–60; Financial Services
Authority press release, 5 December 2003). The FSA alleged
that Dobb White had, without being authorised to do so,
accepted deposits from clients who were promised sub-
stantial returns on their funds, often 40% per annum, and
even as high as 160%. From the 1990s onwards the ?rm
had been engaged in fraud and operated a series of what
the prosecution called ‘‘elaborate and apparently plausible
‘‘Ponzi” schemes” (UK Serious Fraud Of?ce press release,
22 February 2008
3
). There was no underlying trading in
investments and the fraud depended on the constant adding
of new victims’ funds to ?nance the payments of ‘‘interest”
to the existing victims. Client’s money was used by White
and Gangar to provide unsecured loans to acquaintances,
to purchase properties, and for speculative investments.
4
Interestingly, Gangar appealed to traditional notions of pro-
fessionalism to defend himself and claimed, ‘‘I am an
1http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html; accessed
24 September 2008.
2http://www. usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May07/eyindict-
mentpr.pdf, accessed 27 September 2008.
3http://www.sfo.gov.uk/news/prout/pr_536.asp?id=536; accessed 5
September 2008.
4
This had US links. See court judgement in Securities and Exchange
Commission V. Terry, L. Dowdell, et al. (Case No. 3:01CV00116), United
States District Court, Western District Of Virginia, Charlottesville Division, 9
April 2004. Also see the US Department of Justice press release, 28 February
2007 ( ht t p: / / www. usdoj . gov/ usao/ vaw/ press_rel eases/ dow-
dell_28feb2007.html) and 4 March 2008 (http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
vaw/press_releases/dowdell_04mar2008.html).
P. Sikka / Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009) 428–432 431
accountant. . . We don’t solicit for investments” (The Obser-
ver, 25 August 2002). In February 2008, both accountants
were found guilty of $200m investment fraud and conspir-
acy to corrupt a US of?cial and were sentenced to seven
and half year imprisonment (The Times, 22 February 2008;
Serious Fraud Of?ce press release, 11 April 2008).
The above cases may be dismissed as exceptional or
unusual, but theyarenot uniqueandshowthat evenaccoun-
tantsand?rmsassociatedwiththetraditional workenviron-
ment are not immune to the logic of higher pro?ts. With the
intensi?cation of capitalism, the tendency to pursue pro?ts
at almost any price is considered to be an entrepreneurial
skill and in a poorly regulated environment some ?rms and
their personnel are willing to take their chances.
Summary and discussion
The Suddaby et al. paper makes a signi?cant contribu-
tion to the professionalisation debate by examining the
signi?cance of organisational context and work content
and location on accountants’ attitudes towards traditional
professional values and norms. It collected and analysed
data from a large survey to map variations in professional
attitudes and values as the conditions of professional work
change. The results go some way towards explaining why
accountants from large accounting ?rms are associated
with ethical lapses. However, small and medium size ?rms,
closely identi?ed with traditional professional work orga-
nisation and relatively less contaminated with exposure
to non-professional labour, have also shown willingness
to engage in predatory practices.
The argument that bureaucratic pressures and interac-
tion with non-professional labour may change attitudes
has some plausibility, but it also, by default, condemns a
large number of accountants working and training in indus-
trytonegativespaces. Undoubtedly, workandorganisations
are key sites for the shaping of professional attitudes, but
their trajectories cannot easily be understood without
attention to the broader social contexts. Poor public
accountability does not encourage re?ections on ethical
lapses and professional education does not seem to make
accountants aware of the social consequences of their craft
(Sikka, Haslam, Kyriacou, &Agrizzi, 2007). Accountants have
been key actors in the intensi?cation of capitalismand have
absorbed some of its values and have been willing to engage
in predatory practices. Thus any shift in attitudes requires
attention to broader social as well as organisational forces.
It is easy enough to support Suddaby et al.’s recommen-
dation that ‘‘ethicists must also attend to the way in which
professional work is organized if they want to seriously ad-
dress ethical issues in professional services ?rms” (pp. 41–
42). However, the concern is that excessive emphasis on
idealised professional norms and values can obscure the
role of accountants and accounting ?rms as capitalist enter-
prises who must secure favourable conditions for making
pro?ts.
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