Description
Case Study for BBC In-House Production and the Role of the Window of Creative Competition:- Competition in biology, ecology, and sociology, is a contest between organisms, animals, individuals, groups, etc., for territory, a niche, or a location of resources, for resources and goods, for prestige, recognition, awards, mates, or group or social status, for leadership; it is the opposite of cooperation.
Case Study for BBC In-House Production and the Role of the Window of Creative Competition
Abstract: Broadcasters in the UK are required by law to commission 25 percent of their content from the independent production sector, and in 2007 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) adopted a policy, the Window of Creative Competition (WoCC), whereby BBC commissioners can commission an additional 25 percent of their audiovisual content from the commercial sector. The logic behind the WoCC is that television production creativity can be stimulated by increasing competition between internal and external production. This paper critically assesses the WoCC and the potential consequences of a weak BBC production arm. Keywords: British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, Creativity, Competition, Window of Creative Competition, WOCC, Television Production, Public Service Broadcasting
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INTRODUCTION
A large number of internally-made BBC programmes, particularly from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s are considered benchmarks in television production. Many successful, recent programmes from across the globe apply similar creative production techniques that were pioneered at these studios, and countless, now-established programme-makers began their careers there, often through an apprenticeship approach (Born, 2004; Turner and Lourenço, 2011). Today, the studios continue to produce some of the finest television programmes from a wide range of genres, such as costume drama, current affairs, children, documentary and comedy. Despite these achievements, since the 1980s these studios have been eroding on account of micro, meso and macro-level regulatory changes. While one could argue that in the current digital, global and
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competitive audiovisual landscape there is less need for large public production units, one must also query whether a tipping point is drawing closer in which these units will eventually have a harder time justifying their existence (see Hutton, O'Keeffe, Turner, 2005; Turner and Lourenço, 2011). The gradual disempowerment of BBC production is mainly on account of the steady growth of the independent television production sector (indies). According to audiovisual policy-makers, the growth of this sector is required to stimulate broadcast creativity. The main policies behind its growth are: the creation of Channel Four in 1982 (that commissions all its content from the indies), a 25 percent independent quota introduced with the 1990 Broadcasting Act (whereby all broadcasters must commission at least 25% of their budgets from the indies), and a 2003 decision, by the Office of Communications (the UK communications regulator) through the 2003 Communications Act, to amend the terms of trade between indies and broadcasters that favour the former (giving indies more rights on programmes). These regulatory changes have had a seismic effect on the broadcasting industry, predominantly for the vertically-integrated BBC and ITV. The consequences of these changes have been felt not only in the subsector of production but on the industry as a whole. Following the 1990 Broadcasting Act, for example, ITV was broken down into smaller organisations and a new terrestrial fifth channel was created in order to compete with ITV, Channel Four and the BBC (see Iosifidis, 2010). In the UK all terrestrial broadcasters have public service responsibilities, yet the BBC stands out as a bastion of public service broadcasting (for example, it carries no advertising, it is not driven by profits, and it has a revenue model where the public pays a license fee directly to the BBC). Consequently, the shift in the balance of production power has affected the BBC (and ultimately UK citizens that see themselves as partial owners of the BBC) more than ITV, since ITV has similar commercial values and profit goals as the indies. As Turner and Lourenço note, 'private enterprises are not governed by the same public service remit or values' (2011: 5). The BBC's production model is based on a public service ethos instilled on the organisation in 1922 by its first Director General John Reith. To this day, the organisation is responsible for producing programmes with educational, informational and entertainment characteristics. Many such programmes would be ignored by both the indies and ITV since their ancillary profits and margins are low. Regulatory changes favouring the indies have forced the BBC to restructure itself and become more aligned with a commercial ethos. One muchdiscussed restructuring effort was an internal market scheme known as Producer Choice implemented in the 1990s. The scheme led to many full-time staff leaving the organisation making it smaller, leaner and more adaptable to the 25 percent quota. On account of its 'least cost production' philosophy, Producer Choice is remembered as
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one of the most draconian and injurious periods BBC in-house units have ever faced (Barnett and Curry, 1994; Born, 2004); but, on the other hand, it is also a scheme that gave the broadcaster some much-needed leverage during a period when it was facing severe attacks from right-wing supporters (see Schlesinger, 2010). Regardless of how one sees Producer Choice, it undoubtedly stands out as an example of how television production creativity deteriorated at the expense of efficiency and accountability (Barnett and Curry, 1994; Curran and Seaton, 1997; Born 2004). 'It grew up under Thatcher as the bosses recovered their self- confidence and new management was encouraged to crack the whip' noted programme-maker Tony Garnett (2009). ? more recent restructuring strategy in the BBC's television production setup involves a scheme launched in April 2007 known as the Window of Creative Competition (WoCC). Whereas Producer Choice was implemented to withstand the 25 percent quota, the WoCC is executed as a response to the 2003 terms of trade changes that have benefited the indies. Through the WoCC, the BBC can produce 50 percent of its programmes from its own in-house production units (this is called the In- House Guarantee, or IHG), 25 percent falls under the aforementioned statutory independent quota practiced since 1990, and the remaining 25 percent permits BBC commissioners and genre and channel controllers to choose the best ideas from either in-house producers or external suppliers. The logic behind the WoCC is that competition drives creativity; as independent producers and in-house producers compete on equal terms, television programmes become more creative. Whether or not the regulatory changes favouring the indies stimulates broadcast creativity is still unclear. There are a few that fear the BBC, and British television more generally, is not what it once was due to what they see as a steady decline in UK television creativity1. The deterioration, they argue, is manifested in changes that have occurred in television production over the past 20 years (the same changes identified above). According to Deakin, Lourenço and Pratten (2008), these changes are 'a significant step towards the complete marketisation of the sector' (p.2). The authors contend that it is only because of the long-standing values of public service broadcasting that marketization has not yet fully triumphed. Public service values, note Barnett and Curry (1994), were in the past founded on 'a social rather than a commercial view of the purpose of broadcasting (7). However, that it has progressed so far leads Deakin, Lourenço and Pratten (2008) to query, 'what precisely is the nature of the structure which has emerged', leaving them further wondering, 'can it be relied upon to deliver creativity and diversity of programme production which are core aims of current broadcasting policy'. Furthermore, a report by the Working Group (Hutton, O'Keeffe, Turner, 2005) has argued that, while there have been recent attempts to
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The decline appears more conspicuously at the BBC, possibly due to its long history of producing unforgettable and enduring television programmes.
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stimulate broadcast creativity (e.g. the WoCC), the measures taken might in fact stifle it. As the report states (21), British Television broadcasting has earned a significant reputation for creativity, although there are growing concerns that the ecology and organisational context in which that has taken place are becoming more unfriendly. The question is whether the dynamics now in train are together going to reduce, maintain or increase creativity - and what policy response, if any, there should be. This paper is an attempt to add to the debate by deconstructing the WoCC and shedding light on to whether it does indeed stimulate creativity. It wishes to do so by using knowledge from applied creativity theories and situating it within the wider socio-political, economical and technological context of public service broadcasting. The specific reasons for reviewing the WoCC with such scrutiny is to advocate a slight shift in the way audiovisual policy-makers strategize and balance the sector. The paper argues that the WoCC is a culmination of policies over the last three decades favouring independent producers. With the third review of the WoCC by the BBC Trust now complete, now might be a fitting time to tip the scales in favour of supporting the BBC's inhouse studios and the public interest more generally. Divided in four sections, the first part of the paper defines the WoCC and how it has hitherto faired. The second seeks to delineate creativity and draws on two widely-used creativity models from organisational studies; it then seeks to review the research conducted on competition and creativity. The third section analyses how the WoCC fairs when the characteristics of the two creativity models are applied upon it. Finally the fourth section analyses the cost of disempowering BBC in-house production and analyses the reasons why it is imperative to continue supporting BBC production. 1. Background to the WOCC and the Results Thus Far
Turner and Lourenço (2011) have identified two external policy changes they argue have 'culminated in the introduction of the WoCC' (2). Firstly, the 2003 terms of trade that favoured the indies; secondly, the UK government's policy line stating that more competition would increase 'efficiency' (DCMS, 2005a), 'creativity and innovation' (2005b), and 'deliver range and diversity' (DCMS, 2006). These policies are reflected in the BBC's internal strategies that led to the implementation of the WoCC and like Producer Choice, constitute a recent empirical example of new public management (see Hood 1991; and Ferlie et al., 2002). In 2004 the BBC's newly appointed management team began working on the Building Public Value manifesto, and at ways to make license fee money more efficient for audience/citizens. Following the publication of Building Public Value, a group of BBC executives began
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working on how to make the whole commissioning process within the BBC more efficient. Based on their work, a document was published known as the BBC Content Supply Review. Its purpose was 'to set out the BBC's future strategy for content supply' (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2008: 10). The review, which identified the advantages of increasing indy commissions but also of establishing an in-house guarantee, was approved by the then BBC Governors (BBC, 2006). Recommendations were consequently made to them in order to make various changes in the BBC's commissioning process that became known as the WoCC (BBC Trust, 2008: 21). Through the WoCC, the BBC could further support the smaller production companies that had hitherto little chance of winning commissions. This was highlighted in Ofcom's television production review stating, 'the BBC may become an increasingly important access point to the market for small producers' (Ofcom, 2006: 70). The WoCC was introduced in April 2007. To this day the BBC commissioning website posts that the WoCC is being implemented, 'to ensure that the best ideas are commissioned for BBC's audience irrespective of who makes them' (BBC, 2007). Ultimately, the logic of the WoCC is that it increases broadcast creativity by allowing numerous organisations to compete for television commissions and as a result make the license fee better value for money. The scheme is worth 25 percent of the BBC's production budget, or approximately 250 million pounds (average production budgets over the past five years). With 25 percent of production funds already guaranteed due to statutory obligations created during the Broadcasting Act of 1990, the WoCC has given the independent production sector an opportunity to increase the amount of funds it receives from the BBC to a total of 50 percent. The WoCC requires BBC controllers and genre commissioners (the two main divisions of labour responsible for choosing which original television programmes are produced), to choose from either in-house production or external suppliers. It should be noted here that these decision-makers have complete authority over what gets produced and what does not; their priority is to choose the best ideas regardless of from whom and how it gets to them. However, they are all aware of the budgetary issues, the rolling process of selection of genres and programmes, and the geographical conditions and requirements (a concern believed to be addressed with the new WoCC review). Table 1 illustrates how in-house production has hitherto faired against independent production. In 2010, the BBC worked with 305 independent producers that managed to reap the benefits of the WoCC (BBC, 2011). Recent successful award-winning, highly-rated and critically-acclaimed BBC audiovisual content, such as Land Girls, Luther, Sherlock, The Apprentice, The Street, and The Virtual Revolution, no doubt show the creative explosion currently witnessed at the broadcaster. These programmes are all examples of criticallyacclaimed productions that have also been successful with audiences.
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Table 1. Share of WoCC won by in-house/indies (source bbc.com) In-house 09/10 21% 36% 23% 50% 30% 30% Indie 09/10 79% 64% 77% 50% 70% 70%
Drama Entertainment Comedy Children's Knowledge Totals
10/11 14% 20% 21% 43% 34% 28%
10/11 86% 80% 79% 57% 66% 72%
2. Defining Creativity, Competition and Models of Organisational Creativity Creativity is a process that ends with a novel and useful idea. This is the definition endorsed by the majority of creativity theorists (see for example Henry, 2001; Bilton, 2007). Research on individual creativity and the creative process is relatively young with most studies deriving from the field of psychology. Even more current is the study of organisational creativity. Organisational creativity can be understood through Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's social-systems model (1997), whose main argument is that creativity can only be defined when it is seen within a wider context, outside merely that of the individual. By placing the theory within an organisational studies framework, it supports that working environments can be controlled, changed and manipulated by managers in order to stimulate creativity. This is how organisational initiatives such as the WoCC are justified. Following a similar approach, Turner and Lourenço (2011) draw on community, creativity and economics theories in order to evaluate the WoCC. They argue that 'cognitive variety' stimulates creativity since it leads to more fruitful discussions and less mutual understanding within 'communities of practice'. Conversely, 'cognitive proximity' exists when individuals share similar mental schemas leading to less innovative and creative solutions within communities. The WoCC is justified, therefore, because of its possibilities of 'cognitive variety' through many suppliers. However, the authors argue that 'cognitive proximity' is not avoided since the BBC prefers using the same producers that they know they can rely on (the paper returns to this in section four). 2.1 Competition and Creativity Whether or not creativity is stimulated on account of more competition is of paramount importance in the study of organisational creativity. It is particularly significant when analysing the WoCC since its very creation is based on the fact that competition does indeed drive creativity. Several years into the scheme and the BBC's continued endorsement in it is reflected in the 2009/10 annual report (BBC, 2010:
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2/70): The WOCC (Window of Creative Competition) was introduced three years ago, to drive creative competition between independent producers and the BBC's in-house production departments in television...This demonstrates true competition in action and raises the creative bar. There have been several studies vis-à-vis the connection between creativity and competition. Much of it has been structured on a behaviourist viewpoint, therefore restricting it to controlled environments. Some such examples include studies on young children or college students given artistic tasks in laboratory settings (e.g. Amabile, 1982; Shalley and Oldham, 1997). Lack of conclusive evidence regarding the connection between creativity and competition is accentuated in corporate settings and ironically, in corporate settings of creative industries. Yet it might seem that when it comes to attempting to produce 'intangible experiences' (creative goods such as songs, poems, literature, film, television etc.) in order to make a profit, competition might in fact stifle creativity because of the added pressure on 'creative employees' and the lack of intrinsic motivation at the expense of extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is when we are involved with something for our own personal reasons such as for recreation, autonomy, and self- satisfaction (engagement in the task or for the sake of the task itself) (Amabile, 1987; 1997), whereas extrinsic motivation is when we do something for external factors such as for financial rewards and recognition (Deci and Ryan, 1980). Significantly, intrinsic motivation enhances creativity, whereas extrinsic motivation constrains it (Shelly and Oldham, 1997). Creative performance of individuals producing 'intangible experiences' often occurs based on personal, and unknown to others, intrinsic motivation. Based on these facts, a good starting point in understanding the connection between creativity, motivation and competition is Deci and Ryan's cognitive evaluation theory (1980). The theory states that all human external behaviour is linked with either a controlling or an informational element. Informational relevance motivates individuals intrinsically, whereas controlling relevance motivates humans extrinsically. Competition can motivate humans both through informational or controlling relevance which is a possible reason why much research on the subject shows inconclusive results. Some studies that favour competition as having a detrimental affect on creativity showed competition as a salient controlling aspect. For example, Amabile's study (1982) on schoolgirls working on art projects around a common table were told they would later be judged by adults and awards would be given to them. This salient controlling aspect had a negative affect on creativity. Conversely, in studies that saw competition as having a positive affect on creativity, it was the informational aspects
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that seemed more salient (e.g. Raina, 1968; Torrance, 1965; Shelly and Oldham, 1997). Individuals in these studies were less concerned with winning prizes for controlling aspects such as rewards, but were informed they would be told how they compared against others in the same study. Here, the informational aspect is salient and it is for this reason that creativity was stimulated. Although studies, such as the ones mentioned, offer some insight regarding the connection between creativity and competition, they are - as aforementioned - restricted to laboratory research. According to Runco (2007), one study conducted in the creative industries field has attempted to analyze the creativity / competition link. The study specifically looked at how competition pushed The Beatles in becoming one of the most admired and creative pop bands in history (Clydesdale, 2006). It showed that the combination of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation can improve creativity in the real world. Clydesdale argued that on the one hand, The Beatles were competing with The Beach Boys to be named the most well-known band in the world (extrinsic due to controlling aspect), and on the other, Paul McCartney and John Lennon were competing with each other while also collaborating and enjoying the benefits of each others' creativity (intrinsic due to informational aspect). As Clydesdale noted, both these bands pushed their creativity to the limit in order to reach their own targets. Clydesdale's study (2006) argues that creativity can be stimulated by using competitive techniques that combine both informational and controlling aspects of behaviour. This might have been the case for the BBC during its so called golden era in the 1960s, when producers were competing with ITV but also with other departments internally (see Briggs, 1961-1995). The benefits of competing internally, however, were based on the fact that knowing another BBC producer won a pitch to create a programme would benefit the BBC as a whole. In the 1990s when competition grew further due to a multichannel environment and the independent quota, losing a pitch became more detrimental as many producers would lose their jobs. Controlling aspects were higher; the stakes too were much higher, and the extrinsic motivation was (and still is) considerably high. This might have had a detrimental effect on creativity. 2.2 Two Models of Creativity The following subsection looks at the characteristics of two well-know models used for studies on organisational creativity in order to then associate them with the WoCC. There is no doubt that the BBC has innovated with the implementation of the WoCC, yet the question of whether it stimulates or stifles creativity remains under-researched (one exception is Turner and Lourenço, 2011). By placing it within the theoretical framework of the two models, this paper aims to add more clarity to answering this difficult question. The models are Teresa Amabile's KEYS: Assessing the Climate for Creativity (1996), and Goran Ekvall's creative climate (1996). There are many overlapping aspects of
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the two models and both are in concurrence with Csikszentmihalyi's definition of creativity that it is a process that can be controlled, changed and engaged either in a positive or a negative way. 2.2.1 Model 1. KEYS: Assessing the Climate for Creativity KEYS was developed to 'assess perceptions of all the work environment dimensions that have been suggested as important in empirical research and theory on creativity in organisation' (Amabile, Contil, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996: 1155). The KEYS framework is a survey consisting of an 80-plus item psychometrically designed questionnaire that is given to organisations in order to assess their level of creativity. The Centre for Creative Leadership (CCL), founded over 40 years ago as a non-profit educational institute, is currently responsible for the KEYS programme. On what KEYS does specifically, the Centre notes, 'It [KEYS] measures the work environment; specifically the management practices, resources, motivations and interactions' (CCL, 2010). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the innerunderstandings of KEYS, it is useful to highlight the areas Amabile (1996: 231 232) identifies as stimulants and obstacles of creativity. These were the traits that were used to design the psychometric questionnaire: Stimulants to Creativity: 1. Freedom/Autonomy 2. Good project management 3. Sufficient resources 4. Encouragement 5. Organisational characteristics promoting cooperation and collaboration 6. Recognition 7. Sufficient time 8. Challenge 9. Pressure (a general desire to accomplish something important) Obstacles to Creativity: 1. Organisational characteristics with excessive red tape, lack of cooperation, inappropriate reward system 2. Lack of freedom and constraints 3. Insufficient resources 4. Poor project management 5. Inappropriate evaluation 6. Time pressure 7. Overemphasis on the status quo 8. Competition 9. Organisational disinterest
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2.2.1.1 Model 2. Ekvall's Organisational Climate for Creativity and Innovation Ekvall's model of creativity sees organisational climate as an attribute of the organisation that 'exists independently of the perceptions and understandings of the members of the organisation' (1996: 105). Climate, as defined by Ekvall, is a variable that impacts on the environment of the organisation. Specifically, climate 'influences organisational processes such as problem-solving, decision-making, communications, co- ordination, controlling and psychological processes of learning, creating, motivation, and commitment' (106). Similarly to the methodology used in KEYS, Ekvall lists ten factors that affect the level of the creative climate of an organisation and that provide the foundation for a 50-question survey asked to employees. These are: 1. Challenge 2. Freedom 3. Idea Support 4. T r u s t / O p e n n e s s 5. Dynamism/Liveliness 6. Playfulness/Humour 7. Debates 8. Conflicts 9. Risk-taking 10. Idea Time 2.2.2 The WoCC and Creativity This section draws on the two above models to conceptualise the WoCC's creative potential. The items listed from these two models that the WoCC is directly affected by are: Table 2. WoCC and Creativity Stimulants and Obstacles
Stimulants: Freedom Encouragement / Idea Support Sufficient resources Challenge
Obstacles: Insufficient resources Competition
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Pressure (a general desire to accomplish something important) 3.1 Freedom / Autonomy Henry (2001) notes that freedom 'refers to employees having the confidence to take initiatives' (35), whereas Andriopoulos and Dawson (2009) state that high levels of freedom and autonomy directly correlate with high levels of creativity. The WoCC leads to fewer opportunities for in-house production. It is possible therefore that at least during the first years of the WoCC, as in-house producers adapt to the changes, freedom and autonomy might decrease because they are simply winning less commissions. This might lead to producers pitching for less risky programme ideas, and trying less experimental techniques and ideas. It should be noted however that as BBC programme-makers get use to competing for more slots, they might not feel as distracted with the added pressure and start feeling more freedom to experiment and take risks. This could be the reason why BBC studios fared better in 2009/10 than in 2008/09 in winning pitches within the WoCC. 3.2 Encouragement From Amabile's KEYS design, encouragement is given the most emphasis. In fact, in Teressa Amabile's most recent work (Amabile and Kramer, 2011), encouragement is once again highlighted as one of the most important creativity stimulants. One significant reason why is because it is directly connected to motivation which is of such importance for creative stimulation. Since creative processes are driven more by intrinsic motivation than extrinsic motivation, programme-makers are more likely to produce new and useful ideas if they are encouraged for what they have already achieved (as this is linked to intrinsic motivation). Unfortunately, for in-house production, it is difficult to encourage employees and work in an environment that is rewarded by means of encouragement when so many employees are made redundant on account of the fewer commissions won as a result of the WoCC. Again, as things stabilize and fewer redundancies are made due to an averaging-out of the commissions won and lost in the WoCC , encouragement could increase. Turner and Lourenço (2011) note that, 'inthe public sector, professional communities [as opposed to epistemic communities] of practice learn through social interaction, apprenticeship, and mastery of professional knowledge' (4). Once an averaging-out occurs and a 'professional community' environment resurfaces, in-house production should become more stable and secure; this should relate to more opportunity to encourage creative excellence. 3.3 Resources It is important to bring to the forefront research that supports the perception of 'the adequacy of resources may affect people psychologically
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by leading them to beliefs about the intrinsic value of the projects that they have undertaken' (Amabile, Contil, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996: 1161). In television production management it is a good idea to make programmemakers feel they have the space and perception of resources in order to stimulate creativity and bring to life new and useful ideas. Since the implementation of the WoCC in 2007, in-house producers have had fewer funds available to develop original programmes. Pecuniary stability of the inhouse guarantee should allow programme-makers to act and think differently from independent producers. Yet producers at the BBC have no idea if they will be given a chance to make the programmes they wish to. Since resources are directly linked with creativity, it can therefore be argued that BBC producers are less creative. It could also result in producers pitching programmes they know will have a better chance of being commissioned rather than going for something completely out of the ordinary since they might be hesitant to try something different. If their pitch fails they are left with no resources and opportunities to retry (decreasing risk). 3.4 Pressure/Challenges In West and Sacramento's (2008) study on how creativity and innovation occur, they note, 'several studies suggest that, in general, creative cognition occurs when individuals feel free from pressure...moreover, psychological threats...are associated with rigid thinking' (27). Amabile's view on pressure is slightly different. According to her, pressure can release creativity. This happens when pressure is governed at a moderate level, and therefore becomes challenging. There is a point however that Amabile and colleagues call 'excessive workload pressure', which undermines creativity and which is more in line with West and Sacramento's thinking. How much pressure exactly the WoCC puts on in-house programme-makers is something that requires further investigation since television production is by nature a sector in which pressure, either in the form of time, budgets or other restraints, is common. Turner and Lourenço (2011) have touched on the issue in their study of UK audiovisual production and creativity noting, 'evidence was also found that the redundancies caused by the restructuring had affected morale and increased anxiety among producers' (16). 3.5 Competition The WoCC has a number of benefits. The most conspicuous concerns that regarding the increased diversity of suppliers given access to BBC television programming budgets. However, there is a disproportionate level of competition between in-house and external suppliers not only with the 25 percent quota but now also with the WoCC. The two 'sides' do not compete on a level playing field. BBC's in-house production, with BBC Vision as its only client, is asked to compete against an influx of ideas deriving from a burgeoning sector of roughly 400-600 active
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organisations. This alone is enough to increase the controlling aspects (see section on creativity and competition) and therefore make programme-making more of an extrinsically motivating activity rather than an intrinsically motivating one. Notably, if BBC commissioners and controllers reject an idea that has been pitched from an independent production company, the indy is free to take its idea elsewhere therefore alleviating the pressure when pitching to the BBC. Conversely, if an idea is pitched to BBC commissioners and controllers from inhouse producers and it is rejected, then it becomes of no use since they cannot pitch or produce programmes for other broadcasters. At best, it might be shelved until another commissioning editor arrives at the BBC. It should come as no surprise therefore that most of the WoCC programming opportunities are won by the independent production sector. Although in-house producers are guaranteed a 50 percent production quota (a large amount by any standard), when it comes to competing for slots within the WoCC, they are placed at a tremendous disadvantage. Not only do they have to compete against literally hundreds of companies, but they cannot send their ideas to other broadcasters if BBC commissioners do not want them. It is the kind of pressure that can seriously inhibit the creativity of individuals according to the work of West and Sacramento mentioned above. One individual working in in-house production mentioned, commissioners not only want ideas to address the briefings they give, but they also want the unknown, to be surprised...so within a production team we try to capture great ideas however they emerge' (interview notes, 2007)2. The quotes taken from the informant emphasises the new levels of competition and pressure that now exist in the WoCC era. Yet, with continued reductions in in-house staff, and working with such visible disadvantages, independent producers will inevitably continue to win the majority of commissions available in the WoCC. Arguably, the existence of in-house production is placed under greater threat even with a guaranteed 50 percent structure in place. This is particularly the case for genres in which talent (onscreen and off) is of greater importance. For example, comedy and drama are extremely susceptible to the threats of the WoCC, since talent across these genres will go to where the better deals are made for them, and if in-house production does not have enough negotiating power to attract the best talent, the 'tipping point' mentioned by Hutton, O'Keeffe and Turner (2005) will occur (see next section for further analysis of the WoCC and talent). Furthermore, if the BBC continues to be seen as an unstable environment to work in, a promising programme-maker working there would probably think twice about sharing his / her best ideas and rather wait for the inevitable to happen and share those ideas once he / she is working independently.
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BBC employee working in in-house production, spoken to this author attributably.
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4. The Case for a Strong BBC Production Unit There are definite benefits in creating a strong UK independent production sector. It generates jobs in the creative industries, attracts foreign investment, fuels strong exports, has auxiliary commercial value, and since English is one of the most spoken global languages, it allows the UK to continue its leading role in audiovisual production. From a technological perspective also, owning content has become imperative in the digital age since it is becoming just as significant as distributing content (if not more)3. It is possible policy-makers had one eye on these points when introducing the 2003 terms of trade changes that eventually allowed producers to own the content they produce. Yet for the exact same reasons, the BBC's in-house unit should also be encouraged to continue producing its own content. In fact, the BBC has already successfully expanded across global digital platforms (Chalaby, 2009: 108111) and produces content that has been extremely successful on a global level (e.g. Top Gear, Dr Who, Blue Planet, Planet Earth, The Office ). Apart from the BBC in-house production unit contributing to the sector in a direct manner, there are four further reasons why it should be supported. The first has to do with the BBC's responsibilities in serving the public interest. Indies strive to produce content that is attractive to both global and local audiences, but more importantly to produce content that has auxiliary value and is seen as profitable. Therefore, public funds generated by the license fee that are used to create national cultural goods need to be produced by programmemakers with the best interest of UK citizens in mind, especially in areas of market-failure. BBC in- house studios are the best equipped in doing so. They exist first to create content for the public interest, and then make a profit from it (it should be noted that even if a profit is made by in-house production, it is reinvested into further production, and this is not often the case with indies). Broadcasting trends are known to move in cycles (often correlated to economic cycles), therefore a strong in-house sector allows certain genres (known as market-failure genres e.g. religion, minority programmes, currentaffairs, local news) to continue being produced regardless of whether the market chooses not to. But the need for a strong BBC in-house unit goes beyond the production of 'market failure' content because in the digital age it is difficult to identify what 'market
3 Technological innovation in communications has led to seismic changes in how audiences watch television programmes (see Nicoli, 2011). Digital devices such as personal video recorders and media receivers will eventually allow content providers to bypass any intermediary organisations between themselves and the audience. In an ecology that no longer worries about spectrum scarcity and linear television schedules, whoever owns the content will be in the strongest position. In such a multi-platform environment it is imperative that the BBC owns its own content and therefore needs to hang on to the intellectual rights of the content it commissions. One only needs to see the return on investment of the BBC's documentaries Blue Planet or Planet Earth to fully appreciate this notion.
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failure' content is and how access to audiovisual content will be offered to audiences. A strong public interest production house that has the rights to its own audiovisual content across all genres is therefore a necessity. Jean Chalaby makes a strong case for European broadcasters to look beyond their '19th-century-style imperial rivalries' (2006: 49), and out of their nationalistic heritage in order to compete on a global scale; yet producing public service content that caters to local audiences, seen as citizens rather than consumers, remains imperative. The second reason deals with talent. As the independent production sector continues to grow and consolidate, it will be in a stronger position to attract talent (directors, actors, presenters, etc.) than smaller or weaker production units. For example, it will have the negotiating power to offer more money to talent to work on a specific concept. It will also be in a stronger negotiating position with commissioners since having the talent 'on board' makes the concept more attractive when pitching the idea. The logic of this works the other way too. For example a well-known writer with a new idea might take it to where it is believed it can get the highest return. For these reasons, it is imperative that the BBC remains strong enough, for the public interest, to be able to negotiate on equal terms with the 'super indies' (the term used for the very large and powerful indies) (as well as helping to control inflation by avoiding auctions to the highest bidder - had it been left merely to the market). The third reason is the need to allow the BBC to maintain its apprenticeship culture. This is a feat not easily achieved in profit- oriented production units. Georgina Born (2005) reminds us that the ultimate motive for independent producers is 'to proffer commissions and populist programming' and is thus difficult to concentrate on training and nurturing programmemakers, what she considers, 'the basis of quality and innovation in television production' (279). Doyle and Paterson (2008) note, 'a majority of programmemaking companies in the UK...lack opportunities to exchange ideas and nurturing environments for the development of new creative talent' (30). Consequently, the BBC needs to set benchmarks of excellence in creative audiovisual programme-making through higher standards and training initiatives as well as through the use of its 60-year experience. Achieving this requires an environment that is safe for producers to take risks in a 'professional communities' setting (a learning environment 'through social interaction, apprenticeship, and mastery of professional knowledge ?', Turner and Lourenço, 2011, p. 4). Therefore, a strong BBC production unit could assist in building stronger independent production companies. Finally, the fourth reason has to do with the BBC's role in establishing and supporting production bases across the UK and not just in the more obvious creative clusters (e.g. London's Soho district). By dispersing production across the UK it increases the chances of audiovisual talent to be found, and of forming new creative clusters.
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CONCLUSION
Since the 1980s policymakers have concentrated their efforts on establishing a strong independent production sector. Evidence of this is seen in the creation of Channels Four and Five, the 25 percent quota, the 2003 terms of trade and now the WoCC. Thus far the policies have yielded enormous benefits for many UK indy broadcasters. They have allowed them to compete and expand their businesses on a global level while simultaneously attracting shareholder interest from the UK and abroad. Furthermore, they have created hundreds of jobs in the creative industries, always an overarching initiative of recent governments. The WoCC now has a significant part to play in the UK's efforts to strengthen indies. Through it, they have new opportunities to pitch ideas and win more commissions. It also increases diversity of programme- making and allows BBC commissioners and controllers the luxury of choosing additional ideas for original programmes from a broad selection of organisations. Despite the BBC's preference in using a limited range of producers and of developing long-term relationships with them (see Deakin and Pratten, 2008; Turner and Lourenço, 2011), it is difficult to ignore these advantages and, because of the WoCC's strengths, it has been welcomed by many quarters. It ultimately exists to allow better programmes to be made, something all programme-makers want. It has also pushed the BBC's in-house production unit to improve as seen in the BBC's recent plans to simplify its production structure (Televisual, 2012). Consequently, for all these reasons the current environment might be the most appropriate course of action. Indeed, there are signs that both broadcasters and many indies are experiencing a creative surge in their audiovisual content output. However, the conducive environment that has been created for the indies over the past 30 years has come at the expense of the public interest. This is enunciated by Turner and Lourenço (2011) who note that policymakers face 'regulatory dilemmas' - they either support the indies, or the public interest (2). Despite its benefits, the WoCC undoubtedly weakens BBC production studios because producers working there have everything to lose, whereas independent production companies have everything to gain. As demonstrated in this paper, the disparity between in-house and independent producers when pitching ideas in the WoCC leads to detrimental effects on several of the most important stimulants of creativity. The WoCC is based on the notion that competition stimulates creativity, yet this may not be the case since research on creativity and competition show inconclusive results particularly in the creative industries. In fact, competition might even have a negative effect on creativity when it comes to intrinsic motivation. For many years now the independent production sector has been lobbying for the BBC to turn into a 100 percent publisher (like Channel Four and Channel Five that commission all of their content from the indies). With the BBC's inhouse guarantee at 50 percent, it is only natural that indies will continue their lobbying efforts. Only recently a
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chief executive of a large indy was publicly pushing for the 50 percent ING to be amended to 25 percent (Neilan, 2011) (when the 'guarantee' keeps changing, it defeats the purpose of keeping the word 'guarantee'). If the tipping point the 2005 Working Group warn us about is reached, it would be a shame to see the WoCC as the Trojan horse that led to the dismantling of the BBC's in-house production studios. Such an outcome would only be damaging for British media. For this reason, now might seem a good time for policymakers to turn their attention to serving and protecting the public interest as they seek to strike a balance between that and stimulating the growth and creativity of the independent production section.
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Amabile, Teresa (1982), Children's Artistic Creativity: Detrimental Effects of Competition in a Field-Setting, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , Vol. 8, pp. 573- 578. Amabile, Teresa (1987), 'The Motivation to be Creative' in Isasen, Scott (Ed.), Frontiers in Creativity: Beyond the Basics, pp. 223-254, Buffalo, New York: Bearly Ltd. Amabile, Teresa (1996), Creativity in Context, Boulder, CO: Westview. Amabile, Teresa (1997), Motivating Creativity in Organisations: On Doing What you love and Loving What you Do, California Management Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 39-58. Amabile Teresa, Coon Heather, Conti Regina, Herron Michael, Lazenby Jeffrey (1996), Assessing the Work Environment for Creativity' Academy of Management Journal , Vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 1154-1184. Amabile, Teresa and Kramer , Steven (2011), The Progress Principle: Using Small Wins to Ignite Joy, Engagement and Creativity at Work , Boston MA: Harvard Business Review Press Andriopoulos, Constantine and Dawson, Patrick (2009), Managing Change, Creativity & Innovation, London: Sage Publications. Barnett, Steve and Curry, Andrew (1994), The Battle for the BBC, London: Aurum Press. BBC, (2006), Minutes of Board of Governors in October 2006 , [Online], (Accessed February 24th 2008), Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/foi/docs/governance_of_the_bbc/board_of_govenors/full_minutes/BOG_Minutes_Day_1_Oct_20 06.pdf >. _______, (2007), BBC Commissioning, The WOCC, [online], (Accessed July 15th 2007), Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/commissioning/tv/ecomm/index.shtml>._______, (2010), BBC Annual Report and Accounts 2009110: The BBC Executive Review and Assessment, [online], (Accessed July 9 th 2010), Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/annualreport/2010/pdfs>._______, (2011), BBC publishes annual WOCC results and response to BBC Trust's second WOCC review, [online], (Accessed July 20th, 2011), Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.bbc.co.uk-/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2011/06_june/30/wocc.shtml> . BBC Trust, (2008), The Operation of the Window of Creative Competition (WOCC): First Biennial Review by the BBC Trust , July 2008, [online], (Accessed June 15 th,
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2009), Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/research/wocc/index.html>. Bilton, Chris (2007), Management of Creativity: From Creative Industries to Creative Management, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Born, Georgina (2004), Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the Reinvention of the BBC, London: Secker and Warburg. Born, Georgina (2005), The Review of the BBC Charter, Volume II, Evidence, House of Lords. Briggs, Asa (1961,1965,1970,1979, 1995), The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom 5 Volms., Oxford: Oxford University Press. CCL, Center for Creative Leadership, (2010), 'KEYS to Innovation and Creativity, [online], (Accessed July 19 th, 2010) Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ccl.org/leadership/forms/publications/publicationProductDetail.aspx?productId= 1882197-40- 2&pageId=1245>. Chalaby, Jean (2006), American Cultural Primacy in a New World Order: A European Perspective, International Communications Gazette, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 33-51. Chalaby, Jean (2009), Transactional Television in Europe: Reconfiguring Global Communications Networks, London: I.B Tauris. Clydesdale, Greg (2006), Creativity and Competition: The Beatles, Creativity Research Journal, Vol. 1, No.2, pp-129-140. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1997), Creativity: The Flow of Psychology of the Discovery and Invention, New York: Harper Collins. Curran, James and Seaton, James (1997), Power without Responsibility, Fifth Edition , London: Routledge. DCMS, (2005a). Review of the BBC's Royal Charter: A strong BBC, independent of government. Green Paper, DCMS: London. DCMS, (2005b). Government Response to the Lords Select Committee Report "Further Issues for BBC Charter Review". Cm. 6787. DCMS: London. DCMS, (2006). A public service for all: the BBC in the digital age. White Paper, DCMS: London. Deakin, Simon, Lourenço, Ana, and Pratten, Stephen (2008), 'No Third Way for Economic Organisation? Networks and Quasi-Markets in Broadcasting', Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 360, March 2008. Deci, Edward and Ryan, Richard (1980), The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational Processes, in Berkowitz, Leonard (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, pp. 39-80, New York: Academic Press. Doyle, Gillian and Paterson, Richard (2008), 'Public Policy and Independent Television Production in the UK', , Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 11-33. Ekvall Goran (1996), 'Organisational Climate for Creativity and Innovation' , European Journal of Work and Organisational Psychology , Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 105-123. Ferlie, Ewan (ed.) (2002), New Public Management, London: Sage Publications.
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Garnett, Tony (2009), 'Tony Garnett's Email on BBC Drama', T he Guardian, July 15th, 2009, [Online], (Accessed July 20th, 2009), Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/]uly/15/tony-garnett-email>. Henry, Jane (2001), Creativity and Perception in Management , London: Sage Publications. Hood, Christopher (1991), A Public Management for all seasons?, Public Administration, Vol.69, No.1, pp. 3-19. Hutton Will, O'Keeffe Aine, Turner Natali, (2005), The Work Foundation, The Tipping Point, How much is Broadcast Creativity at Risk? , (July 2005). Iosifidis, Petros (ed.) (2010) Reinventing Public Service Communication: European Broadcasters and Beyond, London: Palgrave Macmillan Neilan, Catherine (2011), 'All3 Boss: Reduce BBC in-house Production' Broadcast Now, September 2011 [Online], (Accessed February 11 th, 2012), Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.broadcastnow.co.uk/news/indies/all3-boss-reduce-bbc-in-houseproduction/5032216.article>. Nicoli, Nicholas (2011), Creative Management, Technology and the BBC, in Mesquida Anabela, Technology for Creativity and Innovation: Tools, Techniques and Applications, pp. 285-301, Hershey, New York: IGI Global Publishing OfCom (2006), Office of Communications, Review of Media Ownership, [online], (Accessed, June 20th, 2007), Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/media_owners/rulesreview/rules.pdf>. Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2008), Trust Biennial Review of the WOCC, [Online, July 28th, 2008], (Accessed January 11t h, 2009), Available form the World Wide Web: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/our_work/other/wocc.shtml>. Raina, M.K (1968), A Study Into the Effect of Competition on Creativity, Gifted Child Quarterly, Vol. 12, No.4, pp. 217-220. Runco, Mark (2007), Creativity: Theories and Themes: Research, Development and Practice, San Diego: Elsevier Academic Press. Schlesinger, Philip (2010), The Most Creative Organisation in the World? The BBC, 'Creativity' and Managerial Style, International Journal of Cultural Policy , Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 271-285. Shalley, Christina and Oldham, Greg (1997), Competition and Creative Performance: Effects of Competitor Presence and Visibility, Creative Research Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 337-345. Televisual (2012), 'BBC Announces Plans for New In-House Production Structure' Televisual, March 2012[Online], (Accessed April 10th, 2012), Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.televisual.com/news-detail/BBC-announces-plans-for-new-inhouse-production-structure_nid-1330.html>. Torrance, Ellis. Paul (1965). Developing Women's Natural Gifts , Women's Education, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-7. Turner Simon and Lourenço Ana (2011), Competition and Public Service Broadcasting: Stimulating Creativity or Servicing Capital? Socio-Economic Review (doi:10.1093/ser/mwr022b, published online 13 October 2011).
doc_822271467.docx
Case Study for BBC In-House Production and the Role of the Window of Creative Competition:- Competition in biology, ecology, and sociology, is a contest between organisms, animals, individuals, groups, etc., for territory, a niche, or a location of resources, for resources and goods, for prestige, recognition, awards, mates, or group or social status, for leadership; it is the opposite of cooperation.
Case Study for BBC In-House Production and the Role of the Window of Creative Competition
Abstract: Broadcasters in the UK are required by law to commission 25 percent of their content from the independent production sector, and in 2007 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) adopted a policy, the Window of Creative Competition (WoCC), whereby BBC commissioners can commission an additional 25 percent of their audiovisual content from the commercial sector. The logic behind the WoCC is that television production creativity can be stimulated by increasing competition between internal and external production. This paper critically assesses the WoCC and the potential consequences of a weak BBC production arm. Keywords: British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, Creativity, Competition, Window of Creative Competition, WOCC, Television Production, Public Service Broadcasting
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INTRODUCTION
A large number of internally-made BBC programmes, particularly from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s are considered benchmarks in television production. Many successful, recent programmes from across the globe apply similar creative production techniques that were pioneered at these studios, and countless, now-established programme-makers began their careers there, often through an apprenticeship approach (Born, 2004; Turner and Lourenço, 2011). Today, the studios continue to produce some of the finest television programmes from a wide range of genres, such as costume drama, current affairs, children, documentary and comedy. Despite these achievements, since the 1980s these studios have been eroding on account of micro, meso and macro-level regulatory changes. While one could argue that in the current digital, global and
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competitive audiovisual landscape there is less need for large public production units, one must also query whether a tipping point is drawing closer in which these units will eventually have a harder time justifying their existence (see Hutton, O'Keeffe, Turner, 2005; Turner and Lourenço, 2011). The gradual disempowerment of BBC production is mainly on account of the steady growth of the independent television production sector (indies). According to audiovisual policy-makers, the growth of this sector is required to stimulate broadcast creativity. The main policies behind its growth are: the creation of Channel Four in 1982 (that commissions all its content from the indies), a 25 percent independent quota introduced with the 1990 Broadcasting Act (whereby all broadcasters must commission at least 25% of their budgets from the indies), and a 2003 decision, by the Office of Communications (the UK communications regulator) through the 2003 Communications Act, to amend the terms of trade between indies and broadcasters that favour the former (giving indies more rights on programmes). These regulatory changes have had a seismic effect on the broadcasting industry, predominantly for the vertically-integrated BBC and ITV. The consequences of these changes have been felt not only in the subsector of production but on the industry as a whole. Following the 1990 Broadcasting Act, for example, ITV was broken down into smaller organisations and a new terrestrial fifth channel was created in order to compete with ITV, Channel Four and the BBC (see Iosifidis, 2010). In the UK all terrestrial broadcasters have public service responsibilities, yet the BBC stands out as a bastion of public service broadcasting (for example, it carries no advertising, it is not driven by profits, and it has a revenue model where the public pays a license fee directly to the BBC). Consequently, the shift in the balance of production power has affected the BBC (and ultimately UK citizens that see themselves as partial owners of the BBC) more than ITV, since ITV has similar commercial values and profit goals as the indies. As Turner and Lourenço note, 'private enterprises are not governed by the same public service remit or values' (2011: 5). The BBC's production model is based on a public service ethos instilled on the organisation in 1922 by its first Director General John Reith. To this day, the organisation is responsible for producing programmes with educational, informational and entertainment characteristics. Many such programmes would be ignored by both the indies and ITV since their ancillary profits and margins are low. Regulatory changes favouring the indies have forced the BBC to restructure itself and become more aligned with a commercial ethos. One muchdiscussed restructuring effort was an internal market scheme known as Producer Choice implemented in the 1990s. The scheme led to many full-time staff leaving the organisation making it smaller, leaner and more adaptable to the 25 percent quota. On account of its 'least cost production' philosophy, Producer Choice is remembered as
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one of the most draconian and injurious periods BBC in-house units have ever faced (Barnett and Curry, 1994; Born, 2004); but, on the other hand, it is also a scheme that gave the broadcaster some much-needed leverage during a period when it was facing severe attacks from right-wing supporters (see Schlesinger, 2010). Regardless of how one sees Producer Choice, it undoubtedly stands out as an example of how television production creativity deteriorated at the expense of efficiency and accountability (Barnett and Curry, 1994; Curran and Seaton, 1997; Born 2004). 'It grew up under Thatcher as the bosses recovered their self- confidence and new management was encouraged to crack the whip' noted programme-maker Tony Garnett (2009). ? more recent restructuring strategy in the BBC's television production setup involves a scheme launched in April 2007 known as the Window of Creative Competition (WoCC). Whereas Producer Choice was implemented to withstand the 25 percent quota, the WoCC is executed as a response to the 2003 terms of trade changes that have benefited the indies. Through the WoCC, the BBC can produce 50 percent of its programmes from its own in-house production units (this is called the In- House Guarantee, or IHG), 25 percent falls under the aforementioned statutory independent quota practiced since 1990, and the remaining 25 percent permits BBC commissioners and genre and channel controllers to choose the best ideas from either in-house producers or external suppliers. The logic behind the WoCC is that competition drives creativity; as independent producers and in-house producers compete on equal terms, television programmes become more creative. Whether or not the regulatory changes favouring the indies stimulates broadcast creativity is still unclear. There are a few that fear the BBC, and British television more generally, is not what it once was due to what they see as a steady decline in UK television creativity1. The deterioration, they argue, is manifested in changes that have occurred in television production over the past 20 years (the same changes identified above). According to Deakin, Lourenço and Pratten (2008), these changes are 'a significant step towards the complete marketisation of the sector' (p.2). The authors contend that it is only because of the long-standing values of public service broadcasting that marketization has not yet fully triumphed. Public service values, note Barnett and Curry (1994), were in the past founded on 'a social rather than a commercial view of the purpose of broadcasting (7). However, that it has progressed so far leads Deakin, Lourenço and Pratten (2008) to query, 'what precisely is the nature of the structure which has emerged', leaving them further wondering, 'can it be relied upon to deliver creativity and diversity of programme production which are core aims of current broadcasting policy'. Furthermore, a report by the Working Group (Hutton, O'Keeffe, Turner, 2005) has argued that, while there have been recent attempts to
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The decline appears more conspicuously at the BBC, possibly due to its long history of producing unforgettable and enduring television programmes.
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stimulate broadcast creativity (e.g. the WoCC), the measures taken might in fact stifle it. As the report states (21), British Television broadcasting has earned a significant reputation for creativity, although there are growing concerns that the ecology and organisational context in which that has taken place are becoming more unfriendly. The question is whether the dynamics now in train are together going to reduce, maintain or increase creativity - and what policy response, if any, there should be. This paper is an attempt to add to the debate by deconstructing the WoCC and shedding light on to whether it does indeed stimulate creativity. It wishes to do so by using knowledge from applied creativity theories and situating it within the wider socio-political, economical and technological context of public service broadcasting. The specific reasons for reviewing the WoCC with such scrutiny is to advocate a slight shift in the way audiovisual policy-makers strategize and balance the sector. The paper argues that the WoCC is a culmination of policies over the last three decades favouring independent producers. With the third review of the WoCC by the BBC Trust now complete, now might be a fitting time to tip the scales in favour of supporting the BBC's inhouse studios and the public interest more generally. Divided in four sections, the first part of the paper defines the WoCC and how it has hitherto faired. The second seeks to delineate creativity and draws on two widely-used creativity models from organisational studies; it then seeks to review the research conducted on competition and creativity. The third section analyses how the WoCC fairs when the characteristics of the two creativity models are applied upon it. Finally the fourth section analyses the cost of disempowering BBC in-house production and analyses the reasons why it is imperative to continue supporting BBC production. 1. Background to the WOCC and the Results Thus Far
Turner and Lourenço (2011) have identified two external policy changes they argue have 'culminated in the introduction of the WoCC' (2). Firstly, the 2003 terms of trade that favoured the indies; secondly, the UK government's policy line stating that more competition would increase 'efficiency' (DCMS, 2005a), 'creativity and innovation' (2005b), and 'deliver range and diversity' (DCMS, 2006). These policies are reflected in the BBC's internal strategies that led to the implementation of the WoCC and like Producer Choice, constitute a recent empirical example of new public management (see Hood 1991; and Ferlie et al., 2002). In 2004 the BBC's newly appointed management team began working on the Building Public Value manifesto, and at ways to make license fee money more efficient for audience/citizens. Following the publication of Building Public Value, a group of BBC executives began
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working on how to make the whole commissioning process within the BBC more efficient. Based on their work, a document was published known as the BBC Content Supply Review. Its purpose was 'to set out the BBC's future strategy for content supply' (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2008: 10). The review, which identified the advantages of increasing indy commissions but also of establishing an in-house guarantee, was approved by the then BBC Governors (BBC, 2006). Recommendations were consequently made to them in order to make various changes in the BBC's commissioning process that became known as the WoCC (BBC Trust, 2008: 21). Through the WoCC, the BBC could further support the smaller production companies that had hitherto little chance of winning commissions. This was highlighted in Ofcom's television production review stating, 'the BBC may become an increasingly important access point to the market for small producers' (Ofcom, 2006: 70). The WoCC was introduced in April 2007. To this day the BBC commissioning website posts that the WoCC is being implemented, 'to ensure that the best ideas are commissioned for BBC's audience irrespective of who makes them' (BBC, 2007). Ultimately, the logic of the WoCC is that it increases broadcast creativity by allowing numerous organisations to compete for television commissions and as a result make the license fee better value for money. The scheme is worth 25 percent of the BBC's production budget, or approximately 250 million pounds (average production budgets over the past five years). With 25 percent of production funds already guaranteed due to statutory obligations created during the Broadcasting Act of 1990, the WoCC has given the independent production sector an opportunity to increase the amount of funds it receives from the BBC to a total of 50 percent. The WoCC requires BBC controllers and genre commissioners (the two main divisions of labour responsible for choosing which original television programmes are produced), to choose from either in-house production or external suppliers. It should be noted here that these decision-makers have complete authority over what gets produced and what does not; their priority is to choose the best ideas regardless of from whom and how it gets to them. However, they are all aware of the budgetary issues, the rolling process of selection of genres and programmes, and the geographical conditions and requirements (a concern believed to be addressed with the new WoCC review). Table 1 illustrates how in-house production has hitherto faired against independent production. In 2010, the BBC worked with 305 independent producers that managed to reap the benefits of the WoCC (BBC, 2011). Recent successful award-winning, highly-rated and critically-acclaimed BBC audiovisual content, such as Land Girls, Luther, Sherlock, The Apprentice, The Street, and The Virtual Revolution, no doubt show the creative explosion currently witnessed at the broadcaster. These programmes are all examples of criticallyacclaimed productions that have also been successful with audiences.
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Table 1. Share of WoCC won by in-house/indies (source bbc.com) In-house 09/10 21% 36% 23% 50% 30% 30% Indie 09/10 79% 64% 77% 50% 70% 70%
Drama Entertainment Comedy Children's Knowledge Totals
10/11 14% 20% 21% 43% 34% 28%
10/11 86% 80% 79% 57% 66% 72%
2. Defining Creativity, Competition and Models of Organisational Creativity Creativity is a process that ends with a novel and useful idea. This is the definition endorsed by the majority of creativity theorists (see for example Henry, 2001; Bilton, 2007). Research on individual creativity and the creative process is relatively young with most studies deriving from the field of psychology. Even more current is the study of organisational creativity. Organisational creativity can be understood through Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's social-systems model (1997), whose main argument is that creativity can only be defined when it is seen within a wider context, outside merely that of the individual. By placing the theory within an organisational studies framework, it supports that working environments can be controlled, changed and manipulated by managers in order to stimulate creativity. This is how organisational initiatives such as the WoCC are justified. Following a similar approach, Turner and Lourenço (2011) draw on community, creativity and economics theories in order to evaluate the WoCC. They argue that 'cognitive variety' stimulates creativity since it leads to more fruitful discussions and less mutual understanding within 'communities of practice'. Conversely, 'cognitive proximity' exists when individuals share similar mental schemas leading to less innovative and creative solutions within communities. The WoCC is justified, therefore, because of its possibilities of 'cognitive variety' through many suppliers. However, the authors argue that 'cognitive proximity' is not avoided since the BBC prefers using the same producers that they know they can rely on (the paper returns to this in section four). 2.1 Competition and Creativity Whether or not creativity is stimulated on account of more competition is of paramount importance in the study of organisational creativity. It is particularly significant when analysing the WoCC since its very creation is based on the fact that competition does indeed drive creativity. Several years into the scheme and the BBC's continued endorsement in it is reflected in the 2009/10 annual report (BBC, 2010:
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2/70): The WOCC (Window of Creative Competition) was introduced three years ago, to drive creative competition between independent producers and the BBC's in-house production departments in television...This demonstrates true competition in action and raises the creative bar. There have been several studies vis-à-vis the connection between creativity and competition. Much of it has been structured on a behaviourist viewpoint, therefore restricting it to controlled environments. Some such examples include studies on young children or college students given artistic tasks in laboratory settings (e.g. Amabile, 1982; Shalley and Oldham, 1997). Lack of conclusive evidence regarding the connection between creativity and competition is accentuated in corporate settings and ironically, in corporate settings of creative industries. Yet it might seem that when it comes to attempting to produce 'intangible experiences' (creative goods such as songs, poems, literature, film, television etc.) in order to make a profit, competition might in fact stifle creativity because of the added pressure on 'creative employees' and the lack of intrinsic motivation at the expense of extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is when we are involved with something for our own personal reasons such as for recreation, autonomy, and self- satisfaction (engagement in the task or for the sake of the task itself) (Amabile, 1987; 1997), whereas extrinsic motivation is when we do something for external factors such as for financial rewards and recognition (Deci and Ryan, 1980). Significantly, intrinsic motivation enhances creativity, whereas extrinsic motivation constrains it (Shelly and Oldham, 1997). Creative performance of individuals producing 'intangible experiences' often occurs based on personal, and unknown to others, intrinsic motivation. Based on these facts, a good starting point in understanding the connection between creativity, motivation and competition is Deci and Ryan's cognitive evaluation theory (1980). The theory states that all human external behaviour is linked with either a controlling or an informational element. Informational relevance motivates individuals intrinsically, whereas controlling relevance motivates humans extrinsically. Competition can motivate humans both through informational or controlling relevance which is a possible reason why much research on the subject shows inconclusive results. Some studies that favour competition as having a detrimental affect on creativity showed competition as a salient controlling aspect. For example, Amabile's study (1982) on schoolgirls working on art projects around a common table were told they would later be judged by adults and awards would be given to them. This salient controlling aspect had a negative affect on creativity. Conversely, in studies that saw competition as having a positive affect on creativity, it was the informational aspects
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that seemed more salient (e.g. Raina, 1968; Torrance, 1965; Shelly and Oldham, 1997). Individuals in these studies were less concerned with winning prizes for controlling aspects such as rewards, but were informed they would be told how they compared against others in the same study. Here, the informational aspect is salient and it is for this reason that creativity was stimulated. Although studies, such as the ones mentioned, offer some insight regarding the connection between creativity and competition, they are - as aforementioned - restricted to laboratory research. According to Runco (2007), one study conducted in the creative industries field has attempted to analyze the creativity / competition link. The study specifically looked at how competition pushed The Beatles in becoming one of the most admired and creative pop bands in history (Clydesdale, 2006). It showed that the combination of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation can improve creativity in the real world. Clydesdale argued that on the one hand, The Beatles were competing with The Beach Boys to be named the most well-known band in the world (extrinsic due to controlling aspect), and on the other, Paul McCartney and John Lennon were competing with each other while also collaborating and enjoying the benefits of each others' creativity (intrinsic due to informational aspect). As Clydesdale noted, both these bands pushed their creativity to the limit in order to reach their own targets. Clydesdale's study (2006) argues that creativity can be stimulated by using competitive techniques that combine both informational and controlling aspects of behaviour. This might have been the case for the BBC during its so called golden era in the 1960s, when producers were competing with ITV but also with other departments internally (see Briggs, 1961-1995). The benefits of competing internally, however, were based on the fact that knowing another BBC producer won a pitch to create a programme would benefit the BBC as a whole. In the 1990s when competition grew further due to a multichannel environment and the independent quota, losing a pitch became more detrimental as many producers would lose their jobs. Controlling aspects were higher; the stakes too were much higher, and the extrinsic motivation was (and still is) considerably high. This might have had a detrimental effect on creativity. 2.2 Two Models of Creativity The following subsection looks at the characteristics of two well-know models used for studies on organisational creativity in order to then associate them with the WoCC. There is no doubt that the BBC has innovated with the implementation of the WoCC, yet the question of whether it stimulates or stifles creativity remains under-researched (one exception is Turner and Lourenço, 2011). By placing it within the theoretical framework of the two models, this paper aims to add more clarity to answering this difficult question. The models are Teresa Amabile's KEYS: Assessing the Climate for Creativity (1996), and Goran Ekvall's creative climate (1996). There are many overlapping aspects of
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the two models and both are in concurrence with Csikszentmihalyi's definition of creativity that it is a process that can be controlled, changed and engaged either in a positive or a negative way. 2.2.1 Model 1. KEYS: Assessing the Climate for Creativity KEYS was developed to 'assess perceptions of all the work environment dimensions that have been suggested as important in empirical research and theory on creativity in organisation' (Amabile, Contil, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996: 1155). The KEYS framework is a survey consisting of an 80-plus item psychometrically designed questionnaire that is given to organisations in order to assess their level of creativity. The Centre for Creative Leadership (CCL), founded over 40 years ago as a non-profit educational institute, is currently responsible for the KEYS programme. On what KEYS does specifically, the Centre notes, 'It [KEYS] measures the work environment; specifically the management practices, resources, motivations and interactions' (CCL, 2010). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the innerunderstandings of KEYS, it is useful to highlight the areas Amabile (1996: 231 232) identifies as stimulants and obstacles of creativity. These were the traits that were used to design the psychometric questionnaire: Stimulants to Creativity: 1. Freedom/Autonomy 2. Good project management 3. Sufficient resources 4. Encouragement 5. Organisational characteristics promoting cooperation and collaboration 6. Recognition 7. Sufficient time 8. Challenge 9. Pressure (a general desire to accomplish something important) Obstacles to Creativity: 1. Organisational characteristics with excessive red tape, lack of cooperation, inappropriate reward system 2. Lack of freedom and constraints 3. Insufficient resources 4. Poor project management 5. Inappropriate evaluation 6. Time pressure 7. Overemphasis on the status quo 8. Competition 9. Organisational disinterest
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2.2.1.1 Model 2. Ekvall's Organisational Climate for Creativity and Innovation Ekvall's model of creativity sees organisational climate as an attribute of the organisation that 'exists independently of the perceptions and understandings of the members of the organisation' (1996: 105). Climate, as defined by Ekvall, is a variable that impacts on the environment of the organisation. Specifically, climate 'influences organisational processes such as problem-solving, decision-making, communications, co- ordination, controlling and psychological processes of learning, creating, motivation, and commitment' (106). Similarly to the methodology used in KEYS, Ekvall lists ten factors that affect the level of the creative climate of an organisation and that provide the foundation for a 50-question survey asked to employees. These are: 1. Challenge 2. Freedom 3. Idea Support 4. T r u s t / O p e n n e s s 5. Dynamism/Liveliness 6. Playfulness/Humour 7. Debates 8. Conflicts 9. Risk-taking 10. Idea Time 2.2.2 The WoCC and Creativity This section draws on the two above models to conceptualise the WoCC's creative potential. The items listed from these two models that the WoCC is directly affected by are: Table 2. WoCC and Creativity Stimulants and Obstacles
Stimulants: Freedom Encouragement / Idea Support Sufficient resources Challenge
Obstacles: Insufficient resources Competition
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Pressure (a general desire to accomplish something important) 3.1 Freedom / Autonomy Henry (2001) notes that freedom 'refers to employees having the confidence to take initiatives' (35), whereas Andriopoulos and Dawson (2009) state that high levels of freedom and autonomy directly correlate with high levels of creativity. The WoCC leads to fewer opportunities for in-house production. It is possible therefore that at least during the first years of the WoCC, as in-house producers adapt to the changes, freedom and autonomy might decrease because they are simply winning less commissions. This might lead to producers pitching for less risky programme ideas, and trying less experimental techniques and ideas. It should be noted however that as BBC programme-makers get use to competing for more slots, they might not feel as distracted with the added pressure and start feeling more freedom to experiment and take risks. This could be the reason why BBC studios fared better in 2009/10 than in 2008/09 in winning pitches within the WoCC. 3.2 Encouragement From Amabile's KEYS design, encouragement is given the most emphasis. In fact, in Teressa Amabile's most recent work (Amabile and Kramer, 2011), encouragement is once again highlighted as one of the most important creativity stimulants. One significant reason why is because it is directly connected to motivation which is of such importance for creative stimulation. Since creative processes are driven more by intrinsic motivation than extrinsic motivation, programme-makers are more likely to produce new and useful ideas if they are encouraged for what they have already achieved (as this is linked to intrinsic motivation). Unfortunately, for in-house production, it is difficult to encourage employees and work in an environment that is rewarded by means of encouragement when so many employees are made redundant on account of the fewer commissions won as a result of the WoCC. Again, as things stabilize and fewer redundancies are made due to an averaging-out of the commissions won and lost in the WoCC , encouragement could increase. Turner and Lourenço (2011) note that, 'inthe public sector, professional communities [as opposed to epistemic communities] of practice learn through social interaction, apprenticeship, and mastery of professional knowledge' (4). Once an averaging-out occurs and a 'professional community' environment resurfaces, in-house production should become more stable and secure; this should relate to more opportunity to encourage creative excellence. 3.3 Resources It is important to bring to the forefront research that supports the perception of 'the adequacy of resources may affect people psychologically
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by leading them to beliefs about the intrinsic value of the projects that they have undertaken' (Amabile, Contil, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996: 1161). In television production management it is a good idea to make programmemakers feel they have the space and perception of resources in order to stimulate creativity and bring to life new and useful ideas. Since the implementation of the WoCC in 2007, in-house producers have had fewer funds available to develop original programmes. Pecuniary stability of the inhouse guarantee should allow programme-makers to act and think differently from independent producers. Yet producers at the BBC have no idea if they will be given a chance to make the programmes they wish to. Since resources are directly linked with creativity, it can therefore be argued that BBC producers are less creative. It could also result in producers pitching programmes they know will have a better chance of being commissioned rather than going for something completely out of the ordinary since they might be hesitant to try something different. If their pitch fails they are left with no resources and opportunities to retry (decreasing risk). 3.4 Pressure/Challenges In West and Sacramento's (2008) study on how creativity and innovation occur, they note, 'several studies suggest that, in general, creative cognition occurs when individuals feel free from pressure...moreover, psychological threats...are associated with rigid thinking' (27). Amabile's view on pressure is slightly different. According to her, pressure can release creativity. This happens when pressure is governed at a moderate level, and therefore becomes challenging. There is a point however that Amabile and colleagues call 'excessive workload pressure', which undermines creativity and which is more in line with West and Sacramento's thinking. How much pressure exactly the WoCC puts on in-house programme-makers is something that requires further investigation since television production is by nature a sector in which pressure, either in the form of time, budgets or other restraints, is common. Turner and Lourenço (2011) have touched on the issue in their study of UK audiovisual production and creativity noting, 'evidence was also found that the redundancies caused by the restructuring had affected morale and increased anxiety among producers' (16). 3.5 Competition The WoCC has a number of benefits. The most conspicuous concerns that regarding the increased diversity of suppliers given access to BBC television programming budgets. However, there is a disproportionate level of competition between in-house and external suppliers not only with the 25 percent quota but now also with the WoCC. The two 'sides' do not compete on a level playing field. BBC's in-house production, with BBC Vision as its only client, is asked to compete against an influx of ideas deriving from a burgeoning sector of roughly 400-600 active
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organisations. This alone is enough to increase the controlling aspects (see section on creativity and competition) and therefore make programme-making more of an extrinsically motivating activity rather than an intrinsically motivating one. Notably, if BBC commissioners and controllers reject an idea that has been pitched from an independent production company, the indy is free to take its idea elsewhere therefore alleviating the pressure when pitching to the BBC. Conversely, if an idea is pitched to BBC commissioners and controllers from inhouse producers and it is rejected, then it becomes of no use since they cannot pitch or produce programmes for other broadcasters. At best, it might be shelved until another commissioning editor arrives at the BBC. It should come as no surprise therefore that most of the WoCC programming opportunities are won by the independent production sector. Although in-house producers are guaranteed a 50 percent production quota (a large amount by any standard), when it comes to competing for slots within the WoCC, they are placed at a tremendous disadvantage. Not only do they have to compete against literally hundreds of companies, but they cannot send their ideas to other broadcasters if BBC commissioners do not want them. It is the kind of pressure that can seriously inhibit the creativity of individuals according to the work of West and Sacramento mentioned above. One individual working in in-house production mentioned, commissioners not only want ideas to address the briefings they give, but they also want the unknown, to be surprised...so within a production team we try to capture great ideas however they emerge' (interview notes, 2007)2. The quotes taken from the informant emphasises the new levels of competition and pressure that now exist in the WoCC era. Yet, with continued reductions in in-house staff, and working with such visible disadvantages, independent producers will inevitably continue to win the majority of commissions available in the WoCC. Arguably, the existence of in-house production is placed under greater threat even with a guaranteed 50 percent structure in place. This is particularly the case for genres in which talent (onscreen and off) is of greater importance. For example, comedy and drama are extremely susceptible to the threats of the WoCC, since talent across these genres will go to where the better deals are made for them, and if in-house production does not have enough negotiating power to attract the best talent, the 'tipping point' mentioned by Hutton, O'Keeffe and Turner (2005) will occur (see next section for further analysis of the WoCC and talent). Furthermore, if the BBC continues to be seen as an unstable environment to work in, a promising programme-maker working there would probably think twice about sharing his / her best ideas and rather wait for the inevitable to happen and share those ideas once he / she is working independently.
2
BBC employee working in in-house production, spoken to this author attributably.
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4. The Case for a Strong BBC Production Unit There are definite benefits in creating a strong UK independent production sector. It generates jobs in the creative industries, attracts foreign investment, fuels strong exports, has auxiliary commercial value, and since English is one of the most spoken global languages, it allows the UK to continue its leading role in audiovisual production. From a technological perspective also, owning content has become imperative in the digital age since it is becoming just as significant as distributing content (if not more)3. It is possible policy-makers had one eye on these points when introducing the 2003 terms of trade changes that eventually allowed producers to own the content they produce. Yet for the exact same reasons, the BBC's in-house unit should also be encouraged to continue producing its own content. In fact, the BBC has already successfully expanded across global digital platforms (Chalaby, 2009: 108111) and produces content that has been extremely successful on a global level (e.g. Top Gear, Dr Who, Blue Planet, Planet Earth, The Office ). Apart from the BBC in-house production unit contributing to the sector in a direct manner, there are four further reasons why it should be supported. The first has to do with the BBC's responsibilities in serving the public interest. Indies strive to produce content that is attractive to both global and local audiences, but more importantly to produce content that has auxiliary value and is seen as profitable. Therefore, public funds generated by the license fee that are used to create national cultural goods need to be produced by programmemakers with the best interest of UK citizens in mind, especially in areas of market-failure. BBC in- house studios are the best equipped in doing so. They exist first to create content for the public interest, and then make a profit from it (it should be noted that even if a profit is made by in-house production, it is reinvested into further production, and this is not often the case with indies). Broadcasting trends are known to move in cycles (often correlated to economic cycles), therefore a strong in-house sector allows certain genres (known as market-failure genres e.g. religion, minority programmes, currentaffairs, local news) to continue being produced regardless of whether the market chooses not to. But the need for a strong BBC in-house unit goes beyond the production of 'market failure' content because in the digital age it is difficult to identify what 'market
3 Technological innovation in communications has led to seismic changes in how audiences watch television programmes (see Nicoli, 2011). Digital devices such as personal video recorders and media receivers will eventually allow content providers to bypass any intermediary organisations between themselves and the audience. In an ecology that no longer worries about spectrum scarcity and linear television schedules, whoever owns the content will be in the strongest position. In such a multi-platform environment it is imperative that the BBC owns its own content and therefore needs to hang on to the intellectual rights of the content it commissions. One only needs to see the return on investment of the BBC's documentaries Blue Planet or Planet Earth to fully appreciate this notion.
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failure' content is and how access to audiovisual content will be offered to audiences. A strong public interest production house that has the rights to its own audiovisual content across all genres is therefore a necessity. Jean Chalaby makes a strong case for European broadcasters to look beyond their '19th-century-style imperial rivalries' (2006: 49), and out of their nationalistic heritage in order to compete on a global scale; yet producing public service content that caters to local audiences, seen as citizens rather than consumers, remains imperative. The second reason deals with talent. As the independent production sector continues to grow and consolidate, it will be in a stronger position to attract talent (directors, actors, presenters, etc.) than smaller or weaker production units. For example, it will have the negotiating power to offer more money to talent to work on a specific concept. It will also be in a stronger negotiating position with commissioners since having the talent 'on board' makes the concept more attractive when pitching the idea. The logic of this works the other way too. For example a well-known writer with a new idea might take it to where it is believed it can get the highest return. For these reasons, it is imperative that the BBC remains strong enough, for the public interest, to be able to negotiate on equal terms with the 'super indies' (the term used for the very large and powerful indies) (as well as helping to control inflation by avoiding auctions to the highest bidder - had it been left merely to the market). The third reason is the need to allow the BBC to maintain its apprenticeship culture. This is a feat not easily achieved in profit- oriented production units. Georgina Born (2005) reminds us that the ultimate motive for independent producers is 'to proffer commissions and populist programming' and is thus difficult to concentrate on training and nurturing programmemakers, what she considers, 'the basis of quality and innovation in television production' (279). Doyle and Paterson (2008) note, 'a majority of programmemaking companies in the UK...lack opportunities to exchange ideas and nurturing environments for the development of new creative talent' (30). Consequently, the BBC needs to set benchmarks of excellence in creative audiovisual programme-making through higher standards and training initiatives as well as through the use of its 60-year experience. Achieving this requires an environment that is safe for producers to take risks in a 'professional communities' setting (a learning environment 'through social interaction, apprenticeship, and mastery of professional knowledge ?', Turner and Lourenço, 2011, p. 4). Therefore, a strong BBC production unit could assist in building stronger independent production companies. Finally, the fourth reason has to do with the BBC's role in establishing and supporting production bases across the UK and not just in the more obvious creative clusters (e.g. London's Soho district). By dispersing production across the UK it increases the chances of audiovisual talent to be found, and of forming new creative clusters.
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CONCLUSION
Since the 1980s policymakers have concentrated their efforts on establishing a strong independent production sector. Evidence of this is seen in the creation of Channels Four and Five, the 25 percent quota, the 2003 terms of trade and now the WoCC. Thus far the policies have yielded enormous benefits for many UK indy broadcasters. They have allowed them to compete and expand their businesses on a global level while simultaneously attracting shareholder interest from the UK and abroad. Furthermore, they have created hundreds of jobs in the creative industries, always an overarching initiative of recent governments. The WoCC now has a significant part to play in the UK's efforts to strengthen indies. Through it, they have new opportunities to pitch ideas and win more commissions. It also increases diversity of programme- making and allows BBC commissioners and controllers the luxury of choosing additional ideas for original programmes from a broad selection of organisations. Despite the BBC's preference in using a limited range of producers and of developing long-term relationships with them (see Deakin and Pratten, 2008; Turner and Lourenço, 2011), it is difficult to ignore these advantages and, because of the WoCC's strengths, it has been welcomed by many quarters. It ultimately exists to allow better programmes to be made, something all programme-makers want. It has also pushed the BBC's in-house production unit to improve as seen in the BBC's recent plans to simplify its production structure (Televisual, 2012). Consequently, for all these reasons the current environment might be the most appropriate course of action. Indeed, there are signs that both broadcasters and many indies are experiencing a creative surge in their audiovisual content output. However, the conducive environment that has been created for the indies over the past 30 years has come at the expense of the public interest. This is enunciated by Turner and Lourenço (2011) who note that policymakers face 'regulatory dilemmas' - they either support the indies, or the public interest (2). Despite its benefits, the WoCC undoubtedly weakens BBC production studios because producers working there have everything to lose, whereas independent production companies have everything to gain. As demonstrated in this paper, the disparity between in-house and independent producers when pitching ideas in the WoCC leads to detrimental effects on several of the most important stimulants of creativity. The WoCC is based on the notion that competition stimulates creativity, yet this may not be the case since research on creativity and competition show inconclusive results particularly in the creative industries. In fact, competition might even have a negative effect on creativity when it comes to intrinsic motivation. For many years now the independent production sector has been lobbying for the BBC to turn into a 100 percent publisher (like Channel Four and Channel Five that commission all of their content from the indies). With the BBC's inhouse guarantee at 50 percent, it is only natural that indies will continue their lobbying efforts. Only recently a
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chief executive of a large indy was publicly pushing for the 50 percent ING to be amended to 25 percent (Neilan, 2011) (when the 'guarantee' keeps changing, it defeats the purpose of keeping the word 'guarantee'). If the tipping point the 2005 Working Group warn us about is reached, it would be a shame to see the WoCC as the Trojan horse that led to the dismantling of the BBC's in-house production studios. Such an outcome would only be damaging for British media. For this reason, now might seem a good time for policymakers to turn their attention to serving and protecting the public interest as they seek to strike a balance between that and stimulating the growth and creativity of the independent production section.
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