Escalating conflict in Balochistan could push President Pervez Musharraf to adopt an aggressive position against India.
WHEN THE Pakistan Army eliminated Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti last month, its bombs did more than eliminate the ageing, arthritic politician: the shockwaves from the explosions in his mountain hideout could have profound consequences for the future of India-Pakistan relations.
Since the killing of the 79-year-old politician who had become an icon of the Baloch nationalist cause, newspapers across South Asia have considered the consequences that the violence that followed his killing might have for Pakistan and the region. One real risk, however, has passed almost unnoticed. Escalating conflict in Balochistan, coupled with his domestic political vulnerability, could push President Pervez Musharraf to adopt an aggressive position against India and thus fuel a fresh military crisis in the region.
In recent weeks, Pakistan has repeatedly charged India with financing the Baloch rebellion. Pakistan claims that Research and Analysis Wing stations in Tehran and Kabul have funnelled funds to organisations such as the shadowy Balochistan Liberation Army, and that President Hamid Karzai's regime in Afghanistan is providing training camps for the rebels. Battered by the growing violence in Balochistan, and bereft of political allies, Gen. Musharraf is desperate for an issue with which to restore his fragile legitimacy. More than a few experts now believe that renewed hostilities with India are the sole card Pakistan's military ruler has left in his deck.
A general on the edge
Heading into elections scheduled for 2007, Gen. Musharraf is under assault from his core constituency: Pakistan's military establishment. In July, 18 prominent figures in Pakistan's public life — including the former Inter-Services Intelligence Chiefs, Lieutenant General Asad Durrani and Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, and the former Balochistan Governor, Lieutenant General Abdul Qadir — wrote to Gen. Musharraf demanding that he either resign as President of Pakistan or Chief of the Army Staff.
"Besides being a constitutional office," their letter argued, "the office of President of Pakistan is also a political office. Combining the presidency with the office of Chief of Army Staff politicises the latter post as well as the army." No democracy, the letter said, could function unless the institutions of state abided by their constitutional roles, and respected the principle of separation of powers. "The elections scheduled for 2007," it concluded, "will not be credible without neutral and impartial caretaker governments, both at the Centre and in the provinces."
Not surprisingly, India's military establishment has been watching Pakistan's military deployment patterns with some disquiet. On the face of it, Pakistan is in no position to risk an offensive military enterprise, whatever Gen. Musharraf's political concerns may be. Drained by counter-terrorist commitments along the Afghanistan border in the North West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Balochistan, Pakistan's Mangla-based I Corps, its northern army reserve, as well as a string of other formations that protect Punjab, have been denuded of troops.
In recent months, the Peshawar-based XI Corps' 7 Division, which is fighting the Taliban in the NWFP, is thought to have been reinforced by two brigades from the I Corps' 17 Division. Two more brigades of the Pannu Aquil-based XXXI corps' 37 Division are also thought to have been moved to support the 7 Division's operations. Similarly, the Kohat-based 9 Division, which is engaged in the NWFP, has received a brigade each from the Multan-based II Corps' 14 Division, the Quetta-based XII Corps' 16 Division, the I Corps' 35 Division, and the XXXI Corps' 41 Division.
But Pakistan still has offensive options if it believes India will not punish a localised offensive across the Line of Control by a full-scale offensive against Punjab and Sindh. In 1986-1987, India was deterred from retaliating against Pakistan's support for Khalistan terrorist groups through a conventional military offensive because of fears that the conflict might escalate to unmanageable levels.
Since then, Pakistani strategists have come to believe that their nuclear shield guarantees them the freedom to wage small, localised wars, or to support enterprises like the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. To Pakistan's military, India's decision not to cross the LoC during the 1999 Kargil war, or to risk a conflict in 2001-2002 after the terrorist attack on the Parliament House, demonstrated that this belief was robust.
Some in India's Military Intelligence establishment believe General Musharraf is again considering a Kargil-style enterprise. In recent weeks, the 19 Division, a reserve formation of the Muree-based X Corps, which has its peace-time headquarters at Jhelum, moved to concentration area at Chakoti, in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Troops of the Mangla-based 26 and 28 Brigades, along with the 7 Azad Kashmir Brigade from Jhari Khas are thought to have reinforced the Division, along with significant numbers of Special Forces personnel. In addition, the Jalalpur Jattan-based 333 Infantry Brigade, part of the 23 Division's reserves, has moved to forward positions facing the town of Naushera in Rajouri. Such movements typically precede a sharp, localised military thrust, which in this case would threaten Indian positions in Gulmarg and Poonch.
No one believes these troop movements are in themselves indicators of war. However, they suggest that the idea of a limited war in Jammu and Kashmir continues to engage the minds of Pakistani military strategists. An Indian strike against terror training camps in Pakistan, provoked for example by a massive terrorist attack of the kind seen in Mumbai in July, could be the pretext for such an attack. So, too, could large-scale artillery exchanges along the LoC. Most important of all, a massive escalation of violence in Balochistan, on election-eve, is certain to provoke charges that India is underwriting the secessionists — and push Gen. Musharraf to appropriate nationalist sentiment through military action.
The crisis ahead
Gen. Musharraf's decisions will, of course, depend on how desperate his situation becomes — but if the Baloch media are a good index of sentiment in the province, a full-blown secessionist war lies ahead.
For The Balochistan Express, these protests that broke out after Nawab Bugti's death were similar in character and intensity to the mass protests after General Yahya Khan decided to call off elections that would have brought East Pakistan's Awami League to power. Bengali nationalists responded to the military dictator's decision by launching a massive popular mobilisation, which in turn was met by a brutal military crackdown. The Baloch protests, the Express asserted, were "of the same level that was [seen] in Bangladesh on March 1, 1971, which was the beginning of the end of politics."
Azaadi, an Urdu language newspaper, argued that Islamabad had repeatedly "betrayed" the Baloch since the creation of Pakistan. "Nawab Norooz Khan Zehri, 90, a Baloch fighter, received promises from [Field Marshal] Ayub Khan's government that he would be granted an amnesty once he surrendered," it recorded. "But," the newspaper continued, "the government backtracked from its promise and killed the aged leader. This time, they have repeated the same deceitful act with Nawab Bugti." The widely-read Asaap chose to publish just five lines of commentary condemning Nawab Bugti's death, filling in the rest of the space normally reserved for the editorial with a black box.
Judging by events in recent days, it seems likely the anger demonstrated by Asaap's editors will drive political mobilisation in Balochistan. On September 3, the Balochistan National Party's Akhtar Mengal faction announced that it would resign its seats in the Provincial and National Assemblies, as well as Pakistan's Senate. Other Baloch parties who might have been valuable interlocutors for Pakistan's military, too, seem to have been alienated beyond the point of return. Tens of thousands of protesters were reported to have participated in a recent rally organised by the four-party Baloch Alliance and the Alliance for Restoration for Democracy against Nawab Bugti's killing.
While Baloch political resistance against the military regime in Pakistan clearly escalated, the military consequences of this development are still unclear. Several Pakistani commentators have suggested that Nawab Bugti's death could become the catalyst for thousands of new recruits to the ranks of Balochistan's secessionist militias. Baloch groups have already demonstrated both the capabilities and material resources to engage Pakistan's armed forces in a bitter war of attrition, and younger leaders like Nawabzada Balach Marri or Nawab Bugti's grandson, Brahmdagh Baloch, could well decide that an escalation of the conflict will serve their interests.
Egged on by hawks in Pakistan's military, Gen. Musharraf hopes Nawab Bugti's killing will signal to secessionist groups in Pakistan the costs of raising their heads. But Pakistan's President knows the risks this desperate manoeuvre contains within it.
President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed after a military coup by Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq because of his failure to contain the Baloch rebellion of 1973 and other internal threats. Bhutto committed 80,000 army and paramilitary personnel, along with helicopter gunships and armour provided by Iran's monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pehlavi, to crush the revolt — and paid for their failure with his life.
Could a General this time be sacrificed for the Pakistani military's errors of judgment? Perhaps. General Musharraf is, more likely than not, aware of the abyss that lies ahead.
In a desperate moment, a desperate man could well undertake desperate actions, driven by the desperate belief that a small war in South Asia is an acceptable price for survival. India's strategic establishments will have to watch the events in Pakistan with the greatest possible care — and respond with the greatest possible caution.
WHEN THE Pakistan Army eliminated Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti last month, its bombs did more than eliminate the ageing, arthritic politician: the shockwaves from the explosions in his mountain hideout could have profound consequences for the future of India-Pakistan relations.
Since the killing of the 79-year-old politician who had become an icon of the Baloch nationalist cause, newspapers across South Asia have considered the consequences that the violence that followed his killing might have for Pakistan and the region. One real risk, however, has passed almost unnoticed. Escalating conflict in Balochistan, coupled with his domestic political vulnerability, could push President Pervez Musharraf to adopt an aggressive position against India and thus fuel a fresh military crisis in the region.
In recent weeks, Pakistan has repeatedly charged India with financing the Baloch rebellion. Pakistan claims that Research and Analysis Wing stations in Tehran and Kabul have funnelled funds to organisations such as the shadowy Balochistan Liberation Army, and that President Hamid Karzai's regime in Afghanistan is providing training camps for the rebels. Battered by the growing violence in Balochistan, and bereft of political allies, Gen. Musharraf is desperate for an issue with which to restore his fragile legitimacy. More than a few experts now believe that renewed hostilities with India are the sole card Pakistan's military ruler has left in his deck.
A general on the edge
Heading into elections scheduled for 2007, Gen. Musharraf is under assault from his core constituency: Pakistan's military establishment. In July, 18 prominent figures in Pakistan's public life — including the former Inter-Services Intelligence Chiefs, Lieutenant General Asad Durrani and Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, and the former Balochistan Governor, Lieutenant General Abdul Qadir — wrote to Gen. Musharraf demanding that he either resign as President of Pakistan or Chief of the Army Staff.
"Besides being a constitutional office," their letter argued, "the office of President of Pakistan is also a political office. Combining the presidency with the office of Chief of Army Staff politicises the latter post as well as the army." No democracy, the letter said, could function unless the institutions of state abided by their constitutional roles, and respected the principle of separation of powers. "The elections scheduled for 2007," it concluded, "will not be credible without neutral and impartial caretaker governments, both at the Centre and in the provinces."
Not surprisingly, India's military establishment has been watching Pakistan's military deployment patterns with some disquiet. On the face of it, Pakistan is in no position to risk an offensive military enterprise, whatever Gen. Musharraf's political concerns may be. Drained by counter-terrorist commitments along the Afghanistan border in the North West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Balochistan, Pakistan's Mangla-based I Corps, its northern army reserve, as well as a string of other formations that protect Punjab, have been denuded of troops.
In recent months, the Peshawar-based XI Corps' 7 Division, which is fighting the Taliban in the NWFP, is thought to have been reinforced by two brigades from the I Corps' 17 Division. Two more brigades of the Pannu Aquil-based XXXI corps' 37 Division are also thought to have been moved to support the 7 Division's operations. Similarly, the Kohat-based 9 Division, which is engaged in the NWFP, has received a brigade each from the Multan-based II Corps' 14 Division, the Quetta-based XII Corps' 16 Division, the I Corps' 35 Division, and the XXXI Corps' 41 Division.
But Pakistan still has offensive options if it believes India will not punish a localised offensive across the Line of Control by a full-scale offensive against Punjab and Sindh. In 1986-1987, India was deterred from retaliating against Pakistan's support for Khalistan terrorist groups through a conventional military offensive because of fears that the conflict might escalate to unmanageable levels.
Since then, Pakistani strategists have come to believe that their nuclear shield guarantees them the freedom to wage small, localised wars, or to support enterprises like the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. To Pakistan's military, India's decision not to cross the LoC during the 1999 Kargil war, or to risk a conflict in 2001-2002 after the terrorist attack on the Parliament House, demonstrated that this belief was robust.
Some in India's Military Intelligence establishment believe General Musharraf is again considering a Kargil-style enterprise. In recent weeks, the 19 Division, a reserve formation of the Muree-based X Corps, which has its peace-time headquarters at Jhelum, moved to concentration area at Chakoti, in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Troops of the Mangla-based 26 and 28 Brigades, along with the 7 Azad Kashmir Brigade from Jhari Khas are thought to have reinforced the Division, along with significant numbers of Special Forces personnel. In addition, the Jalalpur Jattan-based 333 Infantry Brigade, part of the 23 Division's reserves, has moved to forward positions facing the town of Naushera in Rajouri. Such movements typically precede a sharp, localised military thrust, which in this case would threaten Indian positions in Gulmarg and Poonch.
No one believes these troop movements are in themselves indicators of war. However, they suggest that the idea of a limited war in Jammu and Kashmir continues to engage the minds of Pakistani military strategists. An Indian strike against terror training camps in Pakistan, provoked for example by a massive terrorist attack of the kind seen in Mumbai in July, could be the pretext for such an attack. So, too, could large-scale artillery exchanges along the LoC. Most important of all, a massive escalation of violence in Balochistan, on election-eve, is certain to provoke charges that India is underwriting the secessionists — and push Gen. Musharraf to appropriate nationalist sentiment through military action.
The crisis ahead
Gen. Musharraf's decisions will, of course, depend on how desperate his situation becomes — but if the Baloch media are a good index of sentiment in the province, a full-blown secessionist war lies ahead.
For The Balochistan Express, these protests that broke out after Nawab Bugti's death were similar in character and intensity to the mass protests after General Yahya Khan decided to call off elections that would have brought East Pakistan's Awami League to power. Bengali nationalists responded to the military dictator's decision by launching a massive popular mobilisation, which in turn was met by a brutal military crackdown. The Baloch protests, the Express asserted, were "of the same level that was [seen] in Bangladesh on March 1, 1971, which was the beginning of the end of politics."
Azaadi, an Urdu language newspaper, argued that Islamabad had repeatedly "betrayed" the Baloch since the creation of Pakistan. "Nawab Norooz Khan Zehri, 90, a Baloch fighter, received promises from [Field Marshal] Ayub Khan's government that he would be granted an amnesty once he surrendered," it recorded. "But," the newspaper continued, "the government backtracked from its promise and killed the aged leader. This time, they have repeated the same deceitful act with Nawab Bugti." The widely-read Asaap chose to publish just five lines of commentary condemning Nawab Bugti's death, filling in the rest of the space normally reserved for the editorial with a black box.
Judging by events in recent days, it seems likely the anger demonstrated by Asaap's editors will drive political mobilisation in Balochistan. On September 3, the Balochistan National Party's Akhtar Mengal faction announced that it would resign its seats in the Provincial and National Assemblies, as well as Pakistan's Senate. Other Baloch parties who might have been valuable interlocutors for Pakistan's military, too, seem to have been alienated beyond the point of return. Tens of thousands of protesters were reported to have participated in a recent rally organised by the four-party Baloch Alliance and the Alliance for Restoration for Democracy against Nawab Bugti's killing.
While Baloch political resistance against the military regime in Pakistan clearly escalated, the military consequences of this development are still unclear. Several Pakistani commentators have suggested that Nawab Bugti's death could become the catalyst for thousands of new recruits to the ranks of Balochistan's secessionist militias. Baloch groups have already demonstrated both the capabilities and material resources to engage Pakistan's armed forces in a bitter war of attrition, and younger leaders like Nawabzada Balach Marri or Nawab Bugti's grandson, Brahmdagh Baloch, could well decide that an escalation of the conflict will serve their interests.
Egged on by hawks in Pakistan's military, Gen. Musharraf hopes Nawab Bugti's killing will signal to secessionist groups in Pakistan the costs of raising their heads. But Pakistan's President knows the risks this desperate manoeuvre contains within it.
President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed after a military coup by Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq because of his failure to contain the Baloch rebellion of 1973 and other internal threats. Bhutto committed 80,000 army and paramilitary personnel, along with helicopter gunships and armour provided by Iran's monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pehlavi, to crush the revolt — and paid for their failure with his life.
Could a General this time be sacrificed for the Pakistani military's errors of judgment? Perhaps. General Musharraf is, more likely than not, aware of the abyss that lies ahead.
In a desperate moment, a desperate man could well undertake desperate actions, driven by the desperate belief that a small war in South Asia is an acceptable price for survival. India's strategic establishments will have to watch the events in Pakistan with the greatest possible care — and respond with the greatest possible caution.