As if the first U-turn that President Pervez Musharraf did on October 12, 1999 by staging a coup was not bad enough, he has done it again, eight years later, taking the nation back to square one. Strangely enough this time around it is not a coup against a ‘corrupt' civilian government but one against his own army-led regime of which he has been the supreme commander and leader all these years.
The sense of deja vu apart, it is difficult to fathom the motivation behind imposing emergency that is, at its best, an admission of the failure of his own style of governance, a breakdown of the system that he himself created and collapse of the empire that he built with his own hands.
The first time he staged a coup, Musharraf had his share of critics, but the move was largely hailed in Pakistan. People took to the streets in celebration and distributed sweets because they were tired of corrupt politicians. Musharraf vowed to crack down on corruption, improve the law and order situation and bring real democracy to Pakistan. But not much later, the promises were forgotten and politicians who were booked under the National Accountability Bureau were seen enjoying fruits of power.
Today, the lawless elements have grown in number and strength so much so that the president himself has had to resort to the extreme measure of an emergency to safeguard their interests. If this was the state of affairs under a civilian government, things may have been looked at differently. But since Musharraf is the one who has been calling the shots all these years, who else but he should take the blame for deteriorating law and order?
The fight against extremism and rogue elements has been Musharraf's objective in recent years and that is also ironically the reason behind the announcement of emergency. But is he willing to concede that there were both fundamental and logistical flaws in the way he handled issues? If an army general, continuously supported by a disparaging but willing bunch of politicians, cannot improve the law and order situation, who else can?
Even if we look at it from the perspective of collective responsibility, the obvious way out should have been to identify the real culprits and punish them. If the writ of the government was not working in the tribal areas, then why was the interior ministry or interior secretary not held accountable? Why didn't Musharraf reshuffle the cabinet and bring a more capable hand to bring things in tribal areas under control?
The showdown with the judiciary has kept Musharraf occupied in the last few months and it has been a case of one mistake after another. Even if we leave out former chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry - with whom Musharraf chose to enter into direct confrontation - other judges were targeted just because they had had disagreements with the president. In recent cases, the judiciary was cracking down on those who were taking law into their own hands but for Musharraf this amounted to ‘demoralising' the law enforcement agencies. For him this was provocation enough to resort to taking an extreme step despite issuing denials for months about the possibility of emergency.
The role of politicians, especially those who backed Musharraf during the most crucial phase, is probably the most dubious. Instead of uniting against him for the sake of restoration of democracy, they remained a divided opposition, some even going to the extent of entering into deals as a means to usurp power. It was this myopic and self-centred approach that strengthened Musharraf's hands and caused things to deteriorate even further. Even now when the ultimate price has been paid, politicians are a divided lot, unable to cobble together any viable alternative. The political parties will have to bear the consequence of their studied silence, and even connivance, in the long run.
Along with lawyers, it is the media that has been singled out for punitive treatment, laying bare the paranoia that surrounds Musharraf's governance. The press, particularly the electronic media, which has been struggling for freedom for years, is now facing a harsh crackdown. Now that the private television channels have been blanked out in Pakistan, Musharraf can go back to his trusted state-media lieutenants to brief him on the state of affairs. However, he must remember that the media was not a powerful tool in 1958 when martial law was first imposed in Pakistan, in 1969 when the movement against Ayub Khan took shape and in 1977 against Z A Bhutto. On all these occasions, the media just danced to the tune of the government. The situation is not the same now.
The judiciary is also being targeted.
Honest and credible judges are being removed and only those who are loyal to the president are being sworn in. Mass arrests of lawyers, human rights activists and politicians are being made across the country.
Pakistan is now at a crossroads from where there is little hope in sight. At least not in the near future.
The sense of deja vu apart, it is difficult to fathom the motivation behind imposing emergency that is, at its best, an admission of the failure of his own style of governance, a breakdown of the system that he himself created and collapse of the empire that he built with his own hands.
The first time he staged a coup, Musharraf had his share of critics, but the move was largely hailed in Pakistan. People took to the streets in celebration and distributed sweets because they were tired of corrupt politicians. Musharraf vowed to crack down on corruption, improve the law and order situation and bring real democracy to Pakistan. But not much later, the promises were forgotten and politicians who were booked under the National Accountability Bureau were seen enjoying fruits of power.
Today, the lawless elements have grown in number and strength so much so that the president himself has had to resort to the extreme measure of an emergency to safeguard their interests. If this was the state of affairs under a civilian government, things may have been looked at differently. But since Musharraf is the one who has been calling the shots all these years, who else but he should take the blame for deteriorating law and order?
The fight against extremism and rogue elements has been Musharraf's objective in recent years and that is also ironically the reason behind the announcement of emergency. But is he willing to concede that there were both fundamental and logistical flaws in the way he handled issues? If an army general, continuously supported by a disparaging but willing bunch of politicians, cannot improve the law and order situation, who else can?
Even if we look at it from the perspective of collective responsibility, the obvious way out should have been to identify the real culprits and punish them. If the writ of the government was not working in the tribal areas, then why was the interior ministry or interior secretary not held accountable? Why didn't Musharraf reshuffle the cabinet and bring a more capable hand to bring things in tribal areas under control?
The showdown with the judiciary has kept Musharraf occupied in the last few months and it has been a case of one mistake after another. Even if we leave out former chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry - with whom Musharraf chose to enter into direct confrontation - other judges were targeted just because they had had disagreements with the president. In recent cases, the judiciary was cracking down on those who were taking law into their own hands but for Musharraf this amounted to ‘demoralising' the law enforcement agencies. For him this was provocation enough to resort to taking an extreme step despite issuing denials for months about the possibility of emergency.
The role of politicians, especially those who backed Musharraf during the most crucial phase, is probably the most dubious. Instead of uniting against him for the sake of restoration of democracy, they remained a divided opposition, some even going to the extent of entering into deals as a means to usurp power. It was this myopic and self-centred approach that strengthened Musharraf's hands and caused things to deteriorate even further. Even now when the ultimate price has been paid, politicians are a divided lot, unable to cobble together any viable alternative. The political parties will have to bear the consequence of their studied silence, and even connivance, in the long run.
Along with lawyers, it is the media that has been singled out for punitive treatment, laying bare the paranoia that surrounds Musharraf's governance. The press, particularly the electronic media, which has been struggling for freedom for years, is now facing a harsh crackdown. Now that the private television channels have been blanked out in Pakistan, Musharraf can go back to his trusted state-media lieutenants to brief him on the state of affairs. However, he must remember that the media was not a powerful tool in 1958 when martial law was first imposed in Pakistan, in 1969 when the movement against Ayub Khan took shape and in 1977 against Z A Bhutto. On all these occasions, the media just danced to the tune of the government. The situation is not the same now.
The judiciary is also being targeted.
Honest and credible judges are being removed and only those who are loyal to the president are being sworn in. Mass arrests of lawyers, human rights activists and politicians are being made across the country.
Pakistan is now at a crossroads from where there is little hope in sight. At least not in the near future.