Description
One of the fust environmental struggles in Finland was the campaign of a local citizens’ movement to close
down the KyHsaari incinerator in Helsinki. This campaign, taking place in the early 198Os, was a success.
The course of this struggle, in relation to the governmental rationality of the waste management administration,
is examined in this paper. Tbe paper argues that the patemalist and cameralist mentality of the waste
management authorities, who promoted the incineration ahemative, was counterproductive. Shortcomings
of the govcmmcntaf rationality were especially recognizable in the accounting practices
Pergamon Accounting Chganizations and Society, Vol. 20. No. 213, pp. 375-192. 1995
Copyrt@ 0 1995 Elxvicr Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0361~36~295 S9.50+0.00
0361-3682(94)EOOl6-N
ACCOUNTABILITY LOST?: AN ENVIRONMENTAL STRUGGLE OVER THE
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF INCINERATION*
National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health, Helsinki
Abstract
One of the fust environmental struggles in Finland was the campaign of a local citizens’ movement to close
down the KyHsaari incinerator in Helsinki. This campaign, taking place in the early 198Os, was a success.
The course of this struggle, in relation to the governmental rationality of the waste management administration,
is examined in this paper. Tbe paper argues that the patemalist and cameralist mentality of the waste
management authorities, who promoted the incineration ahemative, was counterproductive. Shortcomings
of the govcmmcntaf rationality were especially recognizable in the accounting practices. The paper claims
that a lack of accessibility, translatability and acceptability of accounts characterized the plans and calculations
of the city’s waste management administration. For this reason, the activists of the movement could challenge
the waste management authorities also in the technical-economic domain.
In 1982, architect Erkki Makio, an activist of the
citizens’ movement campaigning to close down
the environmentally hazardous incinerator in
Kykisaari, gave a talk on the radio (M&i@ 1982).
Encouraged by the campaign’s successes against
the traditional line of incineration-based waste
management, M&kio projected himself into the
year 1992 and looked back at the decade that
had just passed. He envisaged a future situation
where Helsinki had in place a system of solid
waste processing and disposal based on environ-
mentally safe selection and recycling - a system
so efficient that Helsinki would be seen as a
model example even by such major Swedish
cities as Stockholm and Gothenburg. The new
waste management system in Helsinki - as
envisaged by M&iii -was completed by 1988,
and key decisions to launch the project were
made in 1985-86, despite heavy resistance.
Approached as a dispute settlement, the
environmental struggle over the feasibility of
the Kylbaari incinerator in Helsinki can be
divided into four stages. The first stage is the
recognition of the dispute, which mobilized a
local citizens’ movement to challenge the plans
of the waste management administration in
Helsinki to renew and extend the Kylasaari
plant. The ultimate objective of the movement
was to have the incinerator closed down due to
pollution. In the second stage of the process,
the original dispute between the parties was
translated into discursive struggles in three
domains: ecological, to be resolved in terms of
impartial research; juridical, to be resolved by
adjudication or arbitration; and technical-
economic, to be resolved in terms of accounting
and accountability. It is this third aspect of the
discursive struggle - the accountability of
administrative practices -which is the specific
concern of this article. In the third stage of the
process the dispute was represented or articu-
lated by the parties according to their alternative
standpoints. The final stage of the process refers
to the resolution or settlement of the dispute,
* Thanks are due to the anonymous referees, and to Peter Miller, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
175
I 76 s. HANNINEN
which was crucially conditioned by the results
of the calculations of costs of the different
alternatives for solid waste processing and
disposal in Helsinki.
In his 1982 talk, M&iii sounded genuinely
amazed at the failure of the waste management
authorities to recognize the environmental and
economic counterproductivity of incineration.
He provided an ironic reconstruction of the
chain of reasoning that the authorities used to
convince both themselves and others that
incineration is worthwhile and profitable. In this
chain, he identified some crucial links: modern
citizens do not need to touch their waste
themselves even if they are willing and able to
do so; modern engineering technology must be
used even if other means are cheaper and more
effective; incineration is a useful domestic form
of energy production even though it is hard to
find markets for the products, the costs ofwhich
may exceed the possible revenues (M&iii,
1982).
To a certain extent, the changes seen in
Finland during the 1980s serve to corroborate
M&iii’s optimistic prognosis. The Kylasaari
. .
incinerator, as Makto had envisaged, was closed
down in 1983, never to re-open. As a symbol of
these changes, the main building of the Kylaisaari
plant has been converted into a recycling centre.
This is not an altogether isolated phenomenon.
It reflects a more general trend towards an
increase in the productive use of waste in the
short run, and the programmatic goal of
reducing the amount of waste produced in the
long run.
A number of important environmental advances
have been made during the 1980s. Environ-
mental issues have thoroughly permeated the
public sphere, and discussions and debates on
environmentally important topics and projects
can no longer ignore relevant research results
and crucial statistics; legislation on environ-
mental protection has been systematically up-
graded; the flexibility of waste management
decision-making has improved essentially; the
first decisive steps in environmental auditing
have been taken; and there is a much broader
awareness of the methodological complexity of
evaluating environmentally significant decisions
and projects.
BACKGROUND
The KylLaari social movement in which
M&iii took an active part operated for no more
than 4 years. It was a typical local intervener
group which set itself a specific task and which
was dissolved after its completion. Some of the
crucial events in the life of the movement are
as follows (Hanninen, 199 1, pp. 229-230).
In late 1979, the Helsinki city administration
responsible for refuse disposal publicized plans
for the extension and renewal of the Kyliisaari
incinerator. The announcement was made shortly
after the completion of the Partial City Master
Plan in which the Kykisaari shore (where the
incinerator was situated) was marked off as a
residential and recreational area. Immediately
after this contradictory news, some local citizens
and associations requested that the Kyliisaari
incinerator be closed down. In November 1980,
the Kyl&aari Citizens’ Committee was established
by seven subdistrict associations, and the
elected Board started a campaign to mobilize
people and to bring pressure to bear upon the
decision-makers.
The KylLaari movement was outstandingly
active in several respects. Firstly, while carefully
avoiding translating the issue into a party-
political one, it exploited in an innovative way
all the political means available for a grassroots
movement; expert and other meetings were
organized; popular festivals and speech tours
were arranged; a petition was signed (by 15,000
persons); letters and relevant information were
sent to administrators; co-operative links with
community associations were formed; negotia-
tions and press conferences were held; members
of elected bodies were informed and influenced.
Secondly, from the very outset, the Kylasaari
movement was adamant that the emissions of
the Kylbaari incinerator should be analysed by
impartial research. The publication of the main
research results in 1982 clearly demonstrated
the environmental risks of the plant.
ACC
One of the fust environmental struggles in Finland was the campaign of a local citizens’ movement to close
down the KyHsaari incinerator in Helsinki. This campaign, taking place in the early 198Os, was a success.
The course of this struggle, in relation to the governmental rationality of the waste management administration,
is examined in this paper. Tbe paper argues that the patemalist and cameralist mentality of the waste
management authorities, who promoted the incineration ahemative, was counterproductive. Shortcomings
of the govcmmcntaf rationality were especially recognizable in the accounting practices
Pergamon Accounting Chganizations and Society, Vol. 20. No. 213, pp. 375-192. 1995
Copyrt@ 0 1995 Elxvicr Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0361~36~295 S9.50+0.00
0361-3682(94)EOOl6-N
ACCOUNTABILITY LOST?: AN ENVIRONMENTAL STRUGGLE OVER THE
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF INCINERATION*
National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health, Helsinki
Abstract
One of the fust environmental struggles in Finland was the campaign of a local citizens’ movement to close
down the KyHsaari incinerator in Helsinki. This campaign, taking place in the early 198Os, was a success.
The course of this struggle, in relation to the governmental rationality of the waste management administration,
is examined in this paper. Tbe paper argues that the patemalist and cameralist mentality of the waste
management authorities, who promoted the incineration ahemative, was counterproductive. Shortcomings
of the govcmmcntaf rationality were especially recognizable in the accounting practices. The paper claims
that a lack of accessibility, translatability and acceptability of accounts characterized the plans and calculations
of the city’s waste management administration. For this reason, the activists of the movement could challenge
the waste management authorities also in the technical-economic domain.
In 1982, architect Erkki Makio, an activist of the
citizens’ movement campaigning to close down
the environmentally hazardous incinerator in
Kykisaari, gave a talk on the radio (M&i@ 1982).
Encouraged by the campaign’s successes against
the traditional line of incineration-based waste
management, M&kio projected himself into the
year 1992 and looked back at the decade that
had just passed. He envisaged a future situation
where Helsinki had in place a system of solid
waste processing and disposal based on environ-
mentally safe selection and recycling - a system
so efficient that Helsinki would be seen as a
model example even by such major Swedish
cities as Stockholm and Gothenburg. The new
waste management system in Helsinki - as
envisaged by M&iii -was completed by 1988,
and key decisions to launch the project were
made in 1985-86, despite heavy resistance.
Approached as a dispute settlement, the
environmental struggle over the feasibility of
the Kylbaari incinerator in Helsinki can be
divided into four stages. The first stage is the
recognition of the dispute, which mobilized a
local citizens’ movement to challenge the plans
of the waste management administration in
Helsinki to renew and extend the Kylasaari
plant. The ultimate objective of the movement
was to have the incinerator closed down due to
pollution. In the second stage of the process,
the original dispute between the parties was
translated into discursive struggles in three
domains: ecological, to be resolved in terms of
impartial research; juridical, to be resolved by
adjudication or arbitration; and technical-
economic, to be resolved in terms of accounting
and accountability. It is this third aspect of the
discursive struggle - the accountability of
administrative practices -which is the specific
concern of this article. In the third stage of the
process the dispute was represented or articu-
lated by the parties according to their alternative
standpoints. The final stage of the process refers
to the resolution or settlement of the dispute,
* Thanks are due to the anonymous referees, and to Peter Miller, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
175
I 76 s. HANNINEN
which was crucially conditioned by the results
of the calculations of costs of the different
alternatives for solid waste processing and
disposal in Helsinki.
In his 1982 talk, M&iii sounded genuinely
amazed at the failure of the waste management
authorities to recognize the environmental and
economic counterproductivity of incineration.
He provided an ironic reconstruction of the
chain of reasoning that the authorities used to
convince both themselves and others that
incineration is worthwhile and profitable. In this
chain, he identified some crucial links: modern
citizens do not need to touch their waste
themselves even if they are willing and able to
do so; modern engineering technology must be
used even if other means are cheaper and more
effective; incineration is a useful domestic form
of energy production even though it is hard to
find markets for the products, the costs ofwhich
may exceed the possible revenues (M&iii,
1982).
To a certain extent, the changes seen in
Finland during the 1980s serve to corroborate
M&iii’s optimistic prognosis. The Kylasaari
. .
incinerator, as Makto had envisaged, was closed
down in 1983, never to re-open. As a symbol of
these changes, the main building of the Kylaisaari
plant has been converted into a recycling centre.
This is not an altogether isolated phenomenon.
It reflects a more general trend towards an
increase in the productive use of waste in the
short run, and the programmatic goal of
reducing the amount of waste produced in the
long run.
A number of important environmental advances
have been made during the 1980s. Environ-
mental issues have thoroughly permeated the
public sphere, and discussions and debates on
environmentally important topics and projects
can no longer ignore relevant research results
and crucial statistics; legislation on environ-
mental protection has been systematically up-
graded; the flexibility of waste management
decision-making has improved essentially; the
first decisive steps in environmental auditing
have been taken; and there is a much broader
awareness of the methodological complexity of
evaluating environmentally significant decisions
and projects.
BACKGROUND
The KylLaari social movement in which
M&iii took an active part operated for no more
than 4 years. It was a typical local intervener
group which set itself a specific task and which
was dissolved after its completion. Some of the
crucial events in the life of the movement are
as follows (Hanninen, 199 1, pp. 229-230).
In late 1979, the Helsinki city administration
responsible for refuse disposal publicized plans
for the extension and renewal of the Kyliisaari
incinerator. The announcement was made shortly
after the completion of the Partial City Master
Plan in which the Kykisaari shore (where the
incinerator was situated) was marked off as a
residential and recreational area. Immediately
after this contradictory news, some local citizens
and associations requested that the Kyliisaari
incinerator be closed down. In November 1980,
the Kyl&aari Citizens’ Committee was established
by seven subdistrict associations, and the
elected Board started a campaign to mobilize
people and to bring pressure to bear upon the
decision-makers.
The KylLaari movement was outstandingly
active in several respects. Firstly, while carefully
avoiding translating the issue into a party-
political one, it exploited in an innovative way
all the political means available for a grassroots
movement; expert and other meetings were
organized; popular festivals and speech tours
were arranged; a petition was signed (by 15,000
persons); letters and relevant information were
sent to administrators; co-operative links with
community associations were formed; negotia-
tions and press conferences were held; members
of elected bodies were informed and influenced.
Secondly, from the very outset, the Kylasaari
movement was adamant that the emissions of
the Kylbaari incinerator should be analysed by
impartial research. The publication of the main
research results in 1982 clearly demonstrated
the environmental risks of the plant.
ACC